Highways Agency/Association
of Chief Police Officers
Roles and responsibilities report
20 June 2003
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief
Police Officers
Roles and responsibilities report
20 June 2003
© PA Knowledge Limited 2003
Prepared for:
Prepared by:
Nick Carter, Highways Agency
Stephen Green, ACPO
Rodney Brown, ACPO
Bob Castleman, Highways Agency
Adrian Gains, PA Consulting Group
Charlie Henderson, PA Consulting Group
Jim Knox, PA Consulting Group
PA Consulting Group
123 Buckingham Palace Road
London SW1W 9SR
Tel: +44 20 7730 9000
Fax: +44 20 7333 5050
www.paconsulting.com
Version: 1.0
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers 19/6/03
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The policy context suggests police and Highways Agency (HA) roles could be better aligned
Congestion on the HA core network (English motorway and trunk roads) is estimated to cost £2.9bn each year. Incidents, a significant cause of congestion,
are generally managed and resolved by the police. However, whilst both traffic volumes and incidents have increased steadily in the past four years, the
number of police officers assigned to roads duties has fallen by 12%. This is believed to have contributed to an increase in clear-up times and consequent
congestion. However, it is unlikely that the police will devote more resource to roads duties given the emphasis of the current police reform agenda on core
police priorities. Meanwhile, the Highways Agency is working to define the best way to evolve its role as network operator, as set out in the New Deal for
Transport and amplified by the New Deal for Trunk Roads. The time is, therefore, right to examine the respective roles and responsibilities of the Highways
Agency and the police in relation to the core network (Section 2).
Whilst currently the police undertake most functions, there are precedents for an alternative approach
Extensive consultation with the police, HA practitioners and contractors has identified a good deal of consensus on the services required to operate the core
network. These activities are detailed in the report and grouped into control office functions (e.g. logging reports of problems on the highway and deploying a
response), on-road activity (resolving incidents such as breakdowns, collisions and spillage) and central functions (e.g. planning for roadworks). The bulk of
these activities are currently carried out by the police although there have been interesting developments:
•
the Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG) in the Midlands has demonstrated the benefits of joint management of the motorways across
police force boundaries, whilst the Integrated Police Group (IPG) covering the M25 area extends the benefits of coordination further by involving
the Highways Agency as a full partner in joint operation
•
in terms of on-road duties the HA has introduced Incident Support Units within the context of the term maintenance contractor role and achieved
dramatic improvements in response times. The Minuteman initiative – involving continually patrolling recovery vehicles – has helped deal more
rapidly with breakdowns which threaten traffic flows on certain routes.
These developments mark a trend towards the HA taking a more active role in operating the network, but they are not taking place within a joint operational
strategy. In the US, we found a number of precedents for an expanded role for non-police bodies in running the network. Indeed there are relevant examples
within the UK, including the Dartford Crossing, where civilian staff – financed by tolls and under special powers – undertake ‘traditional’ road policing functions
on this strategically sensitive stretch of road (Section 3).
Current costs of police involvement are significant, but relatively little time is spent dealing with crime
We combined police activity analysis data from 19 forces with information provided by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary to estimate the level of
policing devoted to the core network. In terms of on-road activity there are approximately 6,540 road police in England, and a proportion of this resource is
devoted to the HA network – potentially as much as £86m. Interestingly, only around 15% of road police officers time is spent on crime related activity, whilst
about 30% of their time is on non-crime incidents and 20% on patrol. On the other hand, the HA spends very little in terms of network operation (Section 4).
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers 19/6/03
There is scope to transfer some functions from the police to the Highways Agency
Working with practitioners and senior managers we scrutinised each activity involved in running the network, together with the issues and obstacles – legal,
operational and presentational – inherent in any transfer. There was considerable consensus that the police role might be pared back to focus more on
managing criminal activity and dealing with serious and fatal collisions. The two diagrams below depict how the balance of current and future roles could
change over time.
Diagram 1: Current lead roles and responsibilities
1. Control office functions
Diagram 2: Future lead roles and responsibilities after transfer
3. Central
functions
2. OnOn-road activity
1. Control office functions
3. Central
functions
2. OnOn-road activity
Incident
management
Monitoring
road
network
Support to
drivers
General on
road duties
Controlling
traffic flow
Other
services
Planning
and control
functions
Incident
management
Monitoring
road
network
Support to
drivers
General on
road duties
Controlling
traffic flow
Other
services
Planning
and control
functions
Major incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
for incident
management
& criminality
Providing
network
information
to media
Managing
criminal activity
Dealing with
abandoned
vehicles
Escorting
high risk
vehicles
Developing
protocols
and
standards
Major incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
for incident
management
& criminality
Providing
network
information
to media
Managing
criminal activity
Dealing with
abandoned
vehicles
Escorting
high risk
vehicles
Developing
protocols
and
standards
Minor incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
to monitor
traffic flow
Tactical
diversion
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
fatal & serious
collisions
Removal of
damaged/
broken down
vehicles
Escorting
abnormal
loads
Contingency
planning
Minor incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
to monitor
traffic flow
Tactical
diversion
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
fatal & serious
collisions
Removal of
damaged/
broken down
vehicles
Escorting
abnormal
loads
Contingency
planning
(ERT)
Telephone call
handling
Real-time
traffic
management
Strategic
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
minor
collisions
Providing
mobile/
temporary
road closures
Monitoring
roadworks
Routing of
abnormal
loads
(ERT)
Telephone call
handling
Real-time
traffic
management
Strategic
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
minor
collisions
Providing
mobile/
temporary
road closures
Monitoring
roadworks
Routing of
abnormal
loads
Enforcement of
road traffic
offences
Clearing
debris and
animals
Special
events
Planning
fixed traffic
management
Incident sign
setting
Enforcement of
road traffic
offences
Clearing
debris and
animals
Special
events
Planning
fixed traffic
management
High visibility
patrols e.g.
vulnerable
motorists
Repairing and
improving the
infrastructure
(road safety)
Planning for
roadworks
Liaison with
TMC/roadside
service
providers
High visibility
patrols e.g.
vulnerable
motorists
Repairing &
improving the
infrastructure
(road safety)
Road user
education
Planning for
roadworks
Incident sign
setting
KEY
Police
Liaison with
TMC/roadside
service
providers
Highways Agency
Shared
Road user
education
KEY
Police
Highways Agency
Shared
There are clear benefits to both organisations
Key benefits for the HA include a much greater control over the network operation, improvement in overall incident management and a real opportunity to
make a direct contribution to the management of congestion. In terms of the police, a key benefit of the transfer is the freeing up of the equivalent of around
540 full-time officers. This resource might be redeployed to concentrate on crime fighting and collision investigation. Our assessment highlighted a number of
issues involved in any transfer, but identified also how issues might be mitigated with careful planning and good project management. Key challenges include
the development within the HA and its contractors of the skills, culture and operating protocols essential for effective service delivery (Section 5).
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers 19/6/03
Conclusion and recommendations
The overall conclusion is that there is a strong case for transferring many of the ancillary tasks currently undertaken by the police that do not need specialist
training and skills. This transfer is achievable, but needs to be carried out in the context of an agreed overall network operations strategy, with a clear and
well-managed implementation. Some changes in legislation are required to facilitate the full transfer (Section 6).
To make the transfer effective the main recommendations are as follows:
1. The development of protocols agreed with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the HA on all aspects of incident management and
control on the network
2. An introduction of integrated control offices and a ‘Traffic Operations Service’
3. A communications strategy to manage public expectations and improve HA branding in its new role
4. Sufficient resources allocated to the network operator role – based on a fully costed business case
5. The introduction of effective performance management systems and a network model to inform optimal deployment
6. A phased introduction of change.
We highlight also a number of issues that, though not within our brief, would need to be considered further in the context of any transfer of responsibility.
These include use of CCTV, call answering processes, road signage, improved traffic flow information and communications between the HA, police and
contractors.
We identified and tested options for phased implementation, the key difference being the speed at which the Integrated Control Office (ICO) and Traffic
Operations Service is introduced in different regions. The recommended option, and that which is being implemented, is to begin the introduction in the
Central Motorways Policing Group (in the Midlands) in 2004 and then in the Integrated Police Group (around the M25) and Northwest in 2005. Capital costs
would be in the region of £30m, spread over a three-year period. Revenue costs would rise over the implementation from £20m to around £38m per annum.
The bulk of the capital costs are to set up the ICOs whereas the bulk of the revenue costs are to provide the on-road resource (Section 7).
Implementation
The HA, ACPO and ministers support the implementation of the review findings, and a budget has been secured. The review has identified the principal work
streams needed to deliver the programme, there is an overarching national partnership board, and there is close coordination with senior officers and
managers from the police, the HA, Home Office and Department for Transport. A small, dedicated team within the HA (with police experience and ACPO
representation) exists to manage the work (Section 8).
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers 19/6/03
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive summary
1.
Introduction
1.1
Rationale for review
1.2
Terms of reference
1.3
Methodology
1.4
Scope
1.5
Report structure
2.
Context to the review
2.1
Policy context
2.2
Demand for operational response
3.
Current roles and responsibilities
3.1
Current roles
3.2
Relevant initiatives
4.
Costs of current service provision
4.1
Roads policing
4.2
Highways Agency network operation
5.
Transfer of roles, impact & risks
5.1
Methodology
5.2
Impact of transfer on police
5.3
6.
Risk areas
Conclusions
7.
Recommendations
7.1
Key recommendations
7.2
Further issues needing to be addressed
7.3
Organisational options
7.4
Implementation benefits
8.
Implementation
8.1
Work-streams
8.2
Implementation plan
8.3
Project management
8.4
Strategy development
Appendices
APPENDIX A: Contribution to department PSA
targets
APPENDIX B: Estimating the cost of congestion on
the trunk road network
APPENDIX C: Bibliography
APPENDIX D: Glossary
APPENDIX E: Acknowledgements
i
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers 19/6/03
1.
INTRODUCTION
The Highways Agency core network, comprising motorways and trunk roads in England, is a key element of UK infrastructure. In 2000, it accounted for over
36% of all vehicle kilometres travelled despite representing only 4% of the overall length of all roads. With such high volumes of traffic, the network is prone
to congestion, in particular, delays associated with unexpected events (including vehicle collisions, breakdowns and debris on the carriageway). It is
estimated that congestion on the HA core network costs the UK around £2.9bn per annum.
1.1
RATIONALE FOR REVIEW
Currently the police manage and resolve the majority of incidents on the core network. However, in spite of a 12% rise in the volume of traffic between 1997
and 2001, the number of police officers nominally assigned to roads policing duties fell by 12% during this period. Evidence from practitioners indicates that
the increase in the number of incidents, coupled with the decrease in police resource available to resolve them, is a contributory factor to an increase in
congestion. The Highways Agency currently has a limited involvement in resolving such incidents.
From a policy perspective, the current police reform agenda is driving the police to focus more on tackling criminality and less on non-core activities.
Similarly, the Highways Agency is tasked with becoming more proactive around its core objectives of improving safety and tackling congestion, including
becoming a network operator. Appendix A sets out how this review will contribute to particular departmental PSA targets.
The key question that this review seeks to address is whether the current apportionment of roles and responsibilities in managing the core network is aligned
with organisational objectives of both the police and Highways Agency.
1.2
TERMS OF REFERENCE
There are three ultimate objectives of this review, namely:
1. To gain consensus about the range of services which should be provided to users of the HA core network
2. To identify which of these services is best provided by the police, the Highways Agency, or by an alternative supplier
3. To establish the implications of any transfer of responsibilities between the police and the Highways Agency, and the consequences in terms of
broad costs and organisational development.
Working assumptions agreed with the review steering group were as follows:
•
any transfer of roles and responsibilities would be dependent on adequate, reprioritised or additional resources being made available
•
there would be no overall reduction in police resources, rather a re-focussing of existing resources on core priorities
•
the focus of the review was the HA core network (as shown in Figure 1 overleaf), recognising that in the medium term some roads will be
added to the network and some roads will be ‘detrunked’.
The review was conducted between June 2002 and November 2002. The Highways Agency Board and ACPO Council have endorsed the conclusions and
recommendations set out in this report.
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1. Introduction. . .
1.3
METHODOLOGY
The review findings, conclusions and recommendations have been derived from a
combination of workshops (at both practitioner and senior manager/officer level from the
Highways Agency and police), stakeholder consultations and desk research.
1.4
Figure 1: HA core network (as of 7/2/02)
SCOPE
The scope of this report is restricted to the Highways Agency core road network and,
specifically to the roles and responsibilities of the Highways Agency and the police.
Whilst there will be implications on other highways authorities (particularly for diversion
route planning and abnormal load routing) these are not considered in detail as part of
this review. Local government representative groups will receive copies of the final
report and will be fully consulted at the detailed planning stage of the implementation.
Similarly, there are also implications for the police and other emergency services. The
latter have not been considered in detail here, but it will be necessary for the fire brigade
and ambulance service to be fully consulted in the implementation to ensure there are
no overlaps and/or gaps in service provision.
The Highways Agency only has a responsibility for roads in England, therefore, this
report does not make any references to Wales or Scotland. These will have to be
considered separately by both the Welsh Assembly and Scottish Executive.
1.5
REPORT STRUCTURE
The report is structured as follows:
•
Section 2 ~ Context to the review
•
Section 3 ~ Current roles and responsibilities
•
Section 4 ~ Cost of current service provision
•
Section 5 ~ Transfer of roles, impacts and risk
•
Section 6 ~ Conclusions
•
Section 7 ~ Recommendations
•
Section 8 ~ Implementation
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
2. Context to the review. . .
2.
CONTEXT TO THE REVIEW
This review considers the roles and responsibilities of the Highways Agency and the police in supporting the HA core network. The policy drivers behind the
review were:
•
in 1998, the Government published its integrated transport policy white paper ‘A New Deal for Transport’. This set out the future role of the Highways
Agency as a network operator in addition to building and maintaining the network. This was reinforced in the 10-year plan published in 2000
•
in 2001, the Government published its White Paper on reforming the police ‘Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform’. It set out a number of
areas for change including making better use of police and support staff.
2.1
POLICY CONTEXT
Taken together, the above policies have caused the Highways Agency and ACPO to reconsider their activities on the HA core network and assess whether or
not the roles and responsibilities could or should change. The purpose of this review was to identify what network functions were undertaken by each
organisation, to examine which of these functions was aligned with their organisational objectives and to examine the feasibility of transferring functions
between organisations. These strategies provide both a driver for this review and the context within which future services should be delivered. Each of these
policies is therefore discussed in turn.
2.1.1
Highways Agency ~ A New Deal for Transport
In 1998, the Government published their integrated transport policy ‘A New Deal for Transport: Better for Everyone – The Government's White Paper on the
Future of Transport’. This identified a number of areas where the police and highways authorities (including the Highways Agency) could forge stronger
relationships. Areas relevant for this review included:
•
recovering vehicles from the HA core network, following breakdowns or accidents. This is currently mobilised by the police although the strategy
commits the Highways Agency to reviewing the service, including the possibility of giving higher priority to vehicle recovery in congestion
•
working with the police to improve road safety. This included associated areas such as improving road user behaviour, improving engineering, and
better enforcement. It was envisaged that to deliver this would require inter-agency working at both a national and local level
•
reviewing the balance of work between civilian staff and trained police officers to ensure that scarce police resource is not diverted from detecting
and enforcing serious crime
•
using technology in order to make the best use of police resources
•
consulting with the police and the Vehicle Inspectorate on a vehicle testing strategy to check both the safety of vehicles (and environmental
emissions) at the roadside and issuing fixed penalties to owners of vehicles that fail
•
reviewing the use of police for enforcing camera offences
•
introducing streamlined procedures for relatively minor offences to save police and court time whilst ensuring that enforcement is targeted on bad
driving and anti-social behaviour.
In summary, the white paper envisaged an expanded network management role for the HA, relieving some of the burden on the police.
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2. Context to the review. . .
2.1.2
Highways Agency ~ A New Deal for Trunk Roads in England
A New Deal for Trunk Roads in England is one of a number of publications which spelt out more fully the policies in the transport White Paper “A New Deal
for Transport: Better for Everyone”. The document recognised that better use must be made of the transport infrastructure that is already in place, including
providing clear and up to date information to help people choose the best route and by managing traffic on roads more effectively. The document stressed
the importance of good transport for the efficiency and vitality of the economy. In terms of economic performance, four priorities were identified, namely:
•
to tackle congestion on the trunk road network with a package of measures designed to maximise benefits to the economy and the environment
•
to improve the planning of trunk road maintenance so as to reduce the disruption to traffic flow
•
to improve journey time reliability and develop performance indicators to measure progress
•
to give priority, where appropriate on the network, to public transport and heavy goods vehicle traffic
As part of this, the white paper sets out proposals for Traffic Control Centres (TCCs) in England.
As will be discussed below (Section 3) some of these are functions currently delivered by the police. The White Paper anticipated that there would be
substantial and real benefits for the economy from these policies. In particular it noted that:
“investing in network control, introducing traffic management measures and providing minor improvements will improve the performance of the network
as a whole. Our aim is to increase reliability by reducing congestion and helping to create the conditions for more predictable journey times”.
2.1.3
The Police ~ Policing a New Century: A Blueprint for Reform
The Government published the White Paper “Policing a New Century: Blueprint for Reform” in December 2001. It addressed six key areas for change. The
three most relevant to this review were:
•
better use of the time and skills of police officers and support staff – it was envisaged that this would involve further civilianisation of support
functions, reducing police bureaucracy and increased police visibility. This could include functions transferring to organisations such as the
Highways Agency and is, therefore, relevant for this review. This is simply an extension of Home Office policy in developing the ‘Community
Support Officer’ role
•
making best use of science, technology and information technology – it was envisaged that this would include improving local and central criminal
intelligence systems and making more use of technologies such as CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). If functions were to
be transferred from the police to the Highways Agency, it was recognised that the potential to detect criminal activity must not be lost on the core
network
•
improving linkages between the police and other bodies – whilst the police liaise with a range of organisations, it was recognised that there could
be closer working with other parts of the criminal justice system and other local organisations. The practical, as well as the political difficulties,
also needs to be considered in this review.
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2. Context to the review. . .
2.1.4
National Policing Plan
The National Policing Plan for England and Wales, published on 20 November 2002, sets out for the first time the Government's strategic priorities for the
police service for the next three years. This reinforced the 2001 White Paper and, for this review, it emphasised the importance of the police working in
partnership with national bodies, making better use of police officers, the introduction of the Community Support Officer with limited powers to deal with low
level crime and disorder.
2.1.5
Modern roads policing ~ a manifesto for the future
More relevant to this review is the ACPO roads policing strategy published on 24 November 2002. In this, ACPO confirmed that the police were looking to
focus on core priorities.
The following are extracts from this strategy:
•
the police will need not just to concentrate on core functions but also to shed unnecessary or inappropriate tasks. In particular we seek to withdraw
from network management issues and to transfer these to the road operator and/or the private sector
•
in terms of patrolling the network, ACPO recognises that there is a clear and justified public demand for a visible reassuring police presence on the
roads. This is an end in itself, and will be pursued as such, but we will also seek to impact heavily on poor driver behaviour in general. This will
also involve measures to increase visibility and the further development of collaborative working arrangements (such as the existing Central
Motorway Police Group, CMPG), and we will seek partnership agreements with the road network operators in order to maximise our patrol
effectiveness.
DEMAND FOR OPERATIONAL RESPONSE
In
3,000,000
the operational context, it is worth
noting that the number of traffic
related incidents that require police
attendance has risen by 5% in the
last four years. (Figure 2). Further
detail about what these are is given
4.1.2.
35,000
30,000
2,500,000
in
15,000
10,000
Accidents
5,000
Figure 2: Number of traffic incidents requiring
police attendance per annum all roads (HMIC)
2000
1999
1999
1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02
0
1998
have
0
1997
500,000
1996
Offences
1995
1,000,000
20,000
1994
Obstructions
1993
1,500,000
25,000
1992
Other
1991
2,000,000
1990
2.2
This is in line with the general
increase in traffic volumes, which
risen by 35% in the last 10 years
(Figure 3).
Figure 3: Volume of traffic (million vehicle km
per annum) on HA core network (DfT)
2-5
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
7,600
7,400
7,200
7,000
6,800
6,600
6,400
6,200
6,000
1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02
Figure 4: Number of designated traffic police (HMIC)
Proportion of incidents responde
to within 10 minutes
2. Context to the review. . .
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0
5
10
15
20
Number of patrol vehicles on the road
Figure 5: Impact of number of patrol vehicles on
response times (example for CMPG)
The most recent Government forecasts estimate that the volume of traffic on Britain's roads will increase 28% by 2011 and 60% by 2031 from the 1996 base.1
Significantly, the volume of traffic is expected to grow the fastest on the motorway network – an increase of 52% by 2011 and 117% by 2031. These
forecasts assume that there will be little further expansion of road capacity and on this basis the level of congestion is expected to increase sharply.
Despite the increase in demand for policing type services at traffic related incidents and an increase in their activity base (for example, many forces now
include their Armed Response Vehicle capability within roads policing), the number of designated roads police has fallen by 12% over the last five years
(Figure 4). There is also a clear link of how significant the number of vehicles on patrol is in determining response times to incidents (Figure 5). Feedback
from practitioners is that road policing resources have been cut back to such a level that the ability to respond promptly to incidents on the HA core network is
at a minimum acceptable level. While this review was unable to identify any data to support or refute this statement, there is broad consensus that the current
trends in road policing resources and road traffic incidents is untenable in the medium term. This review is, therefore, extremely timely.
In summary, the police have been increasingly concerned with focussing on core priorities, and have reduced the total and proportion of their resource
dedicated to roads policing. This is at a time when demands – in terms of incidents and traffic volumes – have risen. Meanwhile the Highways Agency has
been charged with developing its network operator role. A review of the respective roles and responsibilities is therefore both timely and appropriate.
1
Department for Transport, National Road Traffic Forecasts (Great Britain) 1997
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
3.
CURRENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The majority of operational roles undertaken on the HA core network are undertaken by the police either alone or in conjunction with other service providers,
including the Highways Agency and contractors. In this section we set out at a high level what these activities are and summarise the current relevant
initiatives. These are split between on-road activities, control office and central functions.
3.1
CURRENT ROLES
As part of the methodology a number of practitioner and senior manager workshops were conducted. The purpose of these workshops was to identify
activities that the police and Highways Agency currently undertake as part of the overall management of the HA core network. These can be split three ways:
1. Control office functions – these activities are currently
undertaken in police control offices, although some areas
are developing the concept of an Integrated Control Office
(ICO) (for example the M25 and in the Midlands)
2. On-road activity – these activities are currently
undertaken by the police, although a number of Highways
Agency areas (for example M25 and M6) have introduced
a number of incident support units (ISUs) to assist the
police with clearing up incidents
3. Central functions – these activities are predominately
planning functions undertaken jointly by the police/
Highways Agency at a local level.
Whilst each area represents a set of complex interactions
and dependencies, the broad range of activities is
summarised in Figure 6 and discussed in turn below. It is
worth noting that not all areas have the same alignment of
roles – this reflects local operating circumstances,
developments or pilot initiatives. Where appropriate,
different delivery structures/mechanisms have been
identified. The three broad areas are summarised overleaf.
Figure 6: Current lead roles and responsibilities
1. Control office functions
3. Central
functions
2. OnOn-road activity
Incident
management
Monitoring
road
network
Support to
drivers
General on
road duties
Controlling
traffic flow
Other
services
Planning
and control
functions
Major incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
for incident
management
& criminality
Providing
network
information
to media
Managing
criminal activity
Dealing with
abandoned
vehicles
Escorting
high risk
vehicles
Developing
protocols
and
standards
Minor incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
to monitor
traffic flow
Tactical
diversion
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
fatal & serious
collisions
Removal of
damaged/
broken down
vehicles
Escorting
abnormal
loads
Contingency
planning
(ERT)
Telephone call
handling
Real-time
traffic
management
Strategic
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
minor
collisions
Providing
mobile/
temporary
road closures
Monitoring
roadworks
Routing of
abnormal
loads
Enforcement of
road traffic
offences
Clearing
debris and
animals
Special
events
Planning
fixed traffic
management
High visibility
patrols e.g.
vulnerable
motorists
Repairing and
improving the
infrastructure
(road safety)
Road user
education
Planning for
roadworks
Incident sign
setting
KEY
Police
Liaison with
TMC/roadside
service
providers
Highways Agency
Shared
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
Central functions
On-road activity
Control office
3. Current roles and responsibilities. . .
Table 1 Current roles and responsibilities
The Highways Agency currently provides, maintains and upgrades a motorway communications
infrastructure that is co-ordinated from around 29 individual local (police) control rooms. The operation
of this infrastructure is currently provided by the individual police forces. In most cases the motorway
element is included in the overall control room operation. The exceptions to this are three police
motorway control offices at Godstone, Perry Bar and Chigwell which provide a dedicated control facility.
There are a number of related initiatives that are being undertaken to bring together control office
functions in a single, regional control office structure, for example in the greater West Midlands area
(through the Central Motorway Policing Group covering four separate forces) and around the M25 (six
forces as part of the Integrated Police Group). The IPG business case for a new control office at
Godstone in Surrey indicates a positive cost benefit analysis.
Implementing an Integrated Control Office (ICO), whereby the network is jointly managed by both police
and HA controllers would allow for a more strategic, co-ordinated approach to network management. In
this context, decisions need to be made within the HA and in partnership with key stakeholders about
how proposed ICOs are resourced, structured and organised, in particular the linkages to the Traffic
Control Centre (TCC), other emergency services and roadside service providers.
The police and other emergency services currently attend all reported incidents, where it exercises
primacy as well as undertaking enforcement and other specialist functions. The Highways Agency,
through contractors, provides engineering and road clearance facilities. Recovery agents, hazardous
chemical specialists etc provide other services. Other emergency services also attend incidents and
should be involved in the development of this review.
A number of areas have introduced enhanced Incident Support Units (ISUs) with improved response
times. They are currently restricted in the activities that they undertake - minor repairs and debris
removal for example.
Legislation restricts ISUs from taking on greater responsibility, for example to direct traffic.
Both the HA and police currently undertake a number of off-line functions in support of the HA core
network. These functions include, amongst others, contingency planning, standard and protocol setting,
and development of protocols and codes of practice. A recurring theme from the workshops was that the
Highways Agency should take a greater role centrally in developing, agreeing with stakeholders and then
specifying protocols and standards – initially for on-road resource. This would extend to ICO
specification, contingency planning, including diversion routes, and may include the planning and
coordination of abnormal loads. There was genuine frustration at the lack of performance measurement
tools to monitor how well the network was operating.
How well is it operating?
•
where there is a dedicated resource it
works well
•
emergency Roadside Telephone handling
in non-dedicated centres was perceived
to be low priority
•
the perception from practitioners was that
there was little apparent coordination
between Highways Agency driven
initiatives
•
police have good procedures and
protocols but there are no national
standards for ISUs
•
ISUs are popular with police and public
•
ISU response rates on the M6 have
reduced from 57 mins to 12 mins
•
ISUs can improve clear-up times and
reduce congestion
•
there are some concerns over safety
•
performance not routinely measured.
•
the current plethora of localised HA
initiatives can lead to different levels of
performance and standards, and results
in inconsistent service delivery and
management as well as frustration within
key partner organisations.
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
3. Current roles and responsibilities. . .
3.2
RELEVANT INITIATIVES
There are a number of developments and initiatives that are relevant to the discussions of proposed roles and responsibilities and the practicalities of
transferring functions. These initiatives are interesting because they highlight not only the evolution of new approaches, but also some instances of an
expanded role for the HA and contractors:
•
Central Motorway Policing Group (CMPG) – CMPG covers motorways within Warwickshire, Staffordshire, West Mercia and West Midlands police
force areas. These forces have separated out the control and management of motorway related operations from the remainder of the force areas.
CMPG is controlled from a dedicated and operationally autonomous control room currently based at Perry Barr in Birmingham.
•
Integrated Police Group (IPG) – The M25 IPG was set up following the creation of the Greater London Authority and the changes in the Metropolitan
Police Service (MPS) boundaries. The M25 IPG is the first partnership of its kind between the police and the Highways Agency. It is a co-operative
venture involving Kent, Surrey, Thames Valley, Hertfordshire and Essex Forces, the Metropolitan Police Service and the HA. The partnership aims to
develop an integrated approach to the policing and operation of the M25 network and synergy between common objectives whilst retaining separate
operational command structures for the individual police forces.
•
North West – Police forces in the North West are about to embark on a strategic review of motorway policing in this region.
•
Incident Support Units (ISUs) – ISUs are a relatively new concept within the HA. They are a development of the traditional Term Maintenance
Contractor (TMC) role. The key difference is their significantly improved response time targets – 20 minutes as opposed to 1.5hrs. The vehicles carry
first aid equipment, fire extinguishers, traffic cones, road repair materials, temporary traffic signs etc. They attend incidents on the network in support of
the police and also deal with debris and minor carriageway and barrier repairs. They have been operational on the M25 and on the M6 in Cheshire since
2001. For ISUs to operate effectively and in a consistent manner across the network, agreed procedures and protocols must be developed. The ISU
concept is generally welcomed by the police (although there are real concerns about national standards, training and operational protocols).
•
Minuteman – On a number of two lane, all purpose trunk roads without hard shoulders, the HA has piloted the concept of a standby recovery vehicle that
will remove at no cost (to the driver) broken down vehicles that are obstructing running lanes during periods of dense traffic. Such quick response
capability both improves safety and significantly reduces arising congestion. Typically one patrolling vehicle continuously circulates a 30km route (15km
per direction) for the duration of the weekday morning and evening peak periods. The role of a Minuteman is to identify and remove broken down
vehicles that affect traffic flows on the carriageway as quickly as possible and deposit at the nearest safe refuge. Having been deposited at a safe
refuge, the drivers of the broken down vehicle can then arrange for assistance from their own recovery organisation. Three case studies have been
undertaken of the operation of minuteman, namely on the A63, Hull, A1(T) Gateshead Western Bypass and the A55/A494/A550, North Wales.
Interestingly over half of stranded motorists contacted refused recovery for a variety of reasons [They were unaware that there was a recovery scheme in
operation and had already contacted a recovery service; they were not aware that the recovery service was free of charge; and drop off points were
inappropriate for the direction of travel.] Operational costs ranged between £13.60 and £27.80 per hour, however an external evaluation showed that
benefits (in particular the reduction in congestion) exceeded operational costs. 2
2
Highways Agency – Outward Facing Research: SP5.1 “Assessing the Effectiveness of a ‘Minutemen’ Standby Vehicle Recovery Service, Economic Assessment using INCA”, May 2002
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
3. Current roles and responsibilities. . .
• Dartford Crossing – The A280 Dartford crossing covers approximately 3.5km of the national trunk road network, otherwise known as the concession
length. The operational area that is patrolled by civilian Dartford River Crossing Traffic Officers runs from Junction 2 to Junction 30 on the M25. In terms of
staffing the control room, there is one senior traffic controller and four shift controllers. On-road resources are provided by a four-shift system of three
senior traffic officers and 20 traffic officers – around 100 officers in total. On road duties are split into mobile patrols, escort of dangerous and wide loads
and incident management. Officers also patrol the control points and toll plazas. The Dartford River Crossing is relevant for this review for a number of
reasons:
!
it is a good example in the UK where civilians under special powers undertake some ‘traditional’ road policing functions
!
it has produced a set of procedures and guidelines for on-road resource and control room functions that could be used as a basis for national
guidance
!
the operation of the network is self-financing from the tolls.
• Scottish National Driver Information and Control System (NADICS) – While outside the geographical boundaries of the Highways Agency, NADICS
provides an interesting example of how incidents and congestion on the roads are dealt with where similar relationships exist between the police and
network operators. NADICS is operated by the National Network Control Centre (NNCC), which has a 24-hour role of implementing traffic control and
network management across the Scottish trunk road network. From the NNCC, staff monitor and communicate with a number of organisations (primarily
through its Web site www.nadics.org.uk) to collect and distribute relevant traffic information to:
− trunk road maintenance operators
− the media
− local roads authorities
− motoring organisations
− the police
− other interested parties.
The police use its own control rooms for setting localised variable message signs and lane control signals during the initial stages of a traffic incident,
though for special events (for example closing the M8) the police can (and has) co-locate in the NADICS office. The setting of more strategic signing
across the network is the role of the NNCC.
The police currently provides the majority of tasks in the control office, on-road and centrally. The previous section highlighted the fact that in many areas
resource was being withdrawn from roads policing. A number of initiatives have been introduced as an attempt to fill the ‘gaps’. The most relevant to this
review is CMPG and IPG, where forces are taking a more regional approach to motorway policing, including joint control offices. The introduction of the
Incident Support Unit is also important and the first step towards a ‘Traffic Operations Service’ concept. A good example of this is in operation is on the
Dartford Crossing.
There are a lot of related initiatives within the UK where aspects of network operation are being introduced. These are happening on an ad-hoc basis with
little apparent coordination. This is widely recognised by the Highways Agency, the police and contractors, and a national approach embodied in a joint
network operations strategy would be timely and welcome.
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
4.
COSTS OF CURRENT SERVICE PROVISION
The stakeholder interviews and workshops identified a range of activities undertaken by the police and Highways Agency on the HA core network. In order to
assess the impact of, and risks associated with, a possible transfer of services it was necessary to understand the current level of activity in each area. Her
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and the Department for Transport were able to provide headline information and projections for policing and the HA
core network respectively.
4.1
ROADS POLICING
For roads policing activities, all force Finance Directors were contacted and asked to identify:
• Total force establishment and number of support staff
• Roads policing establishment, number of support staff, staff structures and whether roads policing was a separate division or whether it was
integrated in local divisions
• An estimate of the percentage of roads police time spent on activities related to the HA core network
• Activity Based Costing (ABC) information for roads policing. Where provided, this was broken down as per standard Home Office Codes3 for ABC
classification.
While some forces indicated that no ABC data was currently available for roads policing, 19 forces were able to provide full breakdowns of roads policing
activities – this data included returns from metropolitan, rural and ‘mixed’ force areas. Some forces noted that while Home Office guidelines had been
followed in the collection of activity data, ABC was ‘in its infancy’ and therefore results should be treated with caution. A comparison across the 19 force
returns, however, showed a broad level of consistency in activity levels – for example, the time spent escorting abnormal loads ranged from 0.1% to 2.1%
with a force average of 0.9%, while the time spent dealing with stranded motorists ranged from 0.1% to 1.7% with a force average of 0.8%.
In terms of the time spent on HA core network relative to the time spent on the regional road network, 10 forces were able to supply information. Because
trunk/non-trunk road is not a distinction used by most police forces to organise activities, most had to estimate this – there is therefore less confidence
associated with this data.
In addition to individual force information, CMPG and IPG were also contacted and asked to provide activity and costing information. CMPG is currently
undergoing a review and was able to provide control room and on road staffing costs. However, because the IPG concept is still being developed there was
little hard costing information available, rather there were indications as to the future likely costs. CMPG was also able to provide additional activity
information.
In terms of Highway Agency costs, Highway Agency contractors were contacted and asked to provide resource allocation information in relation to the HA
core network.
3
“Police Activity Sampling. Manual of Guidance on Conducting Activity Sampling Within Police Forces” Home Office/Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (not dated)
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4. Costs of current service provision. . .
4.1.1
Control office functions
The majority of police forces operate a unitary control office, that is a single control room function that deals with all traffic and non-traffic related incidents for
their force area (including non-HA roads). Based on the information collated from across the forces, we estimate there are approximately 2,300 control office
staff, i.e. approximately 60 control room staff per force. While incident types are recorded, little information is routinely collected on the level of activity and
the resource requirement in control rooms exclusively relating to the HA core network. Estimates from forces suggest that only 5% of control office time is
spent in relation to HA core network issues, i.e. 115 full time equivalents for all forces or three staff per force.
As identified above, the CMPG forces have separated out the control and management of motorway related incidents from other incidents and were able to
provide high-level activity analysis. Specifically, the control room function is staffed by two Sergeants, 18 Constables and 11 support staff – this equates to
annual staffing costs of approximately £900,000. These 31 office staff provide control and coordination for approximately 170 dedicated roads policing staff.
This covers 12% of the motorway network.
IPG has not as yet developed its ICO capability, however, a business case identified that the two offices would cost approximately £3,250,000 to build and fit
out and £1,860,000 to upgrade/link existing IT systems. In terms of revenue costs, the business case estimated that the staffing costs would be £2,400,000
per annum – this would provide for 18 operator seats during the day and 24 hour/365 days a year operation.
4.1.2
On-road activity and central functions
Figures from HMIC identified that in 2001/02 there were a total of 6,540 designated roads police, although this has dropped by 12% since 1997/98. Indeed
the proportion of roads police with respect to all police officers has dropped from 6.32% in 1997/98 to 5.45% in 2001/02. 6,540 roads officers equates to an
average of 167.7 roads officers per force in England. On the basis of information collated from forces, the average number of road policing officers by grade
is as follows:
Grades
Officers
Superintendent
0.5
Chief Inspectors
0.9
Inspectors
3.7
Sergeant
15.6
Constable
147.0
Total uniformed staff
167.7
Using the HMIC Force Ready Reckoner, the average uniformed cost for road
policing in England was estimated to be £5,240,000 per annum per force. Note that
this excludes vehicles costs and civilian support staff. Nationally, this equates to a
total road police staffing cost of £205million per annum. From the data supplied by
forces, we estimate that there are approximately 530 civilian staff supporting road
policing at a cost of approximately £10million per annum - this equates to
approximately 14 full time equivalents per force at a cost of £285,000 per annum.
The total staff costs for on-road policing and associated central activities is therefore
approximately £215 million per annum.
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
4. Costs of current service provision. . .
The on-road activities undertaken by these officers consisted of five broad areas as follows (Figure 7):
Non Incident
Linked
Activities
45.6%
1. Crime incidents, which accounted for, on average, 5.3% of police time. This included
all criminal related activity, for example dealing with stolen vehicles and attendance at
crime related incidents at motorway service stations
2. Non-crime incidents, which accounted for, on average, 31% of police time. This
included attendance at collisions (12.1%), enforcement and dealing with motoring
offences (8.6%) escorting abnormal loads (0.8%), assisting stranded motorists (0.7%)
and other traffic incidents (8.8%)
3. Non-incident linked activities, which accounted for, on average, 45.6% of police time.
This included visible patrols (21.6%), attendance at meetings (6.1%), non-incident
paperwork (5%), special operations (2.6%), accident prevention (1.9%), training (2.4%)
and other duties (8.4%)
Non Crime
Incidents
31.0%
Crime
Incidents
5.3%
Other
13.3%
4. Management/supervisory activities, which accounted for, on average, 4.8% of police
time. This included general management (1.8%), checking paperwork in a supervisor’s
capacity (1.1%), shift handovers (0.7%), planning for known events (0.7%) and
staff appraisals (0.5%). This incorporates many of the activities associated with
Figure 7: Split of current road policing activities
central functions
Management
/Supervisory
Duties
4.8%
5. Other, which accounted for, on average, 13.3% of police time. This included time
spent taking breaks (5.8%) and other non-incident and non-management duties (7.4%).
In headline terms, only 36.3% of roads police officers time is currently spent dealing with incidents and 5.3% of time is spent dealing directly with crime
related matters – a core police area. During the workshops, senior officers indicated that while these figures reflected the balance of work undertaken, the
inclusion of traffic enforcement duties (static vehicle checks, breathalyser, speed, and other traffic offences) in non-crime incidents (a vagary of the Home
Office recording system) did not reflect their criminal nature or that they often lead to other crimes being identified. These enforcement activities accounted
for nearly 10% of roads police time. Around 15% of officers time is spent dealing with crime-related work.
The largest single component of non-crime incidents related to road traffic collisions. While there are fewer fatal and serious (as opposed to minor) road
traffic collisions on the network, they are more resource intensive and hence roads police spend more time dealing with fatal and serious road traffic collisions
(7.8%) than slights/damage only accidents (4.3%). Interestingly, the practitioner workshops identified escorting abnormal loads as a function that caused
significant inconvenience, however, in practice, it occupies less than 1% of on-road staff time. In terms of non-incident linked activities, visible patrol was the
most significant element (nearly 22% of all time). Attendance at traffic related briefings/meetings (6.1%) and non-incident linked paper work (5.0%) were also
significant activities.
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4. Costs of current service provision. . .
4.2
HIGHWAYS AGENCY NETWORK OPERATION
The control centre and on-road costs (Incident Support Units) are often wrapped up into larger contracts and, therefore, it can be difficult to disaggregate out.
However, based on information from Carillion and Amey Mouchel in Area 10, Area 9 and the M25 sphere, the Highways Agency’s current expenditure on
network operation activities is as illustrated below:
Highways Agency
Area
Birmingham, M25
and Manchester
areas.
Incident Support Units
33 vehicles
Km
covered
Av km per
vehicle
1064
20 - 50
Network control centre costs
Incident support units
Set up costs
Ongoing
Set up costs
Ongoing
£268,600
£548,500
£664,300
£5,441,100
Given the above represents approximately one-third of the motorway network in England, we would estimate the current Highways Agency control centre
revenue costs to be no more than £1.5 million and on-road costs to be no more than £15 million. This is a fraction of the amount spent by the Agency on
asset management.
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5.
TRANSFER OF ROLES, IMPACT & RISKS
During the practitioner and senior manager workshops the potential for transfer of roles was fully explored and discussed. It was assumed that any transfer
would take place in controlled circumstances and would not be conditional on transfers of existing Departmental funds, rather, additional funding would be
provided. Although there was general consensus with regard to what roles should transfer, it was also recognised that any transfer was not without risk. In
this section we set out the methodology for identifying whether or not key functions should be considered as candidates to be transferred.
5.1
METHODOLOGY
In deciding what activities were better aligned to another organisations’ core objectives, the workshops were asked to consider each of the activities currently
undertaken in support of the core network. Each activity was then reviewed (or groups of activity where more appropriate) in terms of six key questions:
Q1
Does the task constitute a core business area for the current task owner(s)?
Q2
Is there a legislative basis to or requirement for the current task provision arrangements?
Q3
Is the current task owner the most efficient and appropriate delivery organisation?
Q4
Could the task be “unbundled” from other services provided by the current task owner(s)?
Q5
Is the task more closely aligned with another organisation’s core business area?
Q6
Could delivery of the task be shared with another organisation?
Given the answers to these questions, the workshop/consultation exercise was then able to reach a conclusion as to whether a task should be:
•
Retained by the current owner
•
Transferred (in full) to a different organisation or
•
Shared with another organisation.
The table overleaf summarises the review findings.
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Shared?
Aligned other?
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police & HA
Police
Police
Police & HA
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police & HA
HA
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police & HA
Police
Police & HA
Police & HA
Unbundled?
Major incident management/deployment
Minor incident management/deployment
Emergency Roadside Telephone call handling
Incident sign setting
Liaison with TMC/roadside service providers
Use of CCTV for incident management & criminality
Use of CCTV to monitor traffic flow
Real-time traffic management
Providing network information to the media
Tactical diversion sign setting
Strategic sign setting
Managing criminal activity
Management of fatal/serious collisions
Management of slight/non-injury collisions
Enforcement of road traffic offences
High visibility patrols
Dealing with abandoned vehicles
Removal of damaged/broken down vehicles
Providing mobile/temporary road closures
Clearing debris & animals
Repairing & improving the infrastructure
Escorting high risk vehicles
Escorting abnormal loads
Monitoring roadworks
Special events
Road user education
Developing protocols & standards
Contingency planning
Routing of abnormal loads
Planning fixed traffic management
Planning for roadworks
Legislation?
Owner now
Core activity?
Table 2 Rationale for transfer of roles
Appropriate?
Central
On-road
Control Office
5. Transfer of roles, impact & risks. . .
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Review recommendation:
Retain, transfer or share?
Shared by Police & HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Retained by the Police
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Retained by the Police
Shared by Police & HA
Shared by Police & HA
Retained by the Police
Shared by Police & HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Retained by HA
Shared by Police & HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Shared by Police & HA
Shared by Police & HA
Shared by Police & HA
Shared by Police & HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
Transferred to the HA
5-2
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
5. Transfer of roles, impact & risks. . .
On this basis, the review concluded that with the exception of a few core-policing activities (including the use of CCTV for incident management and to
detect criminal activity, on-road response to criminal activity and the investigation of fatal and serious collisions), the majority of activities could either be
shared or led by the Highways Agency. Figure 9 depicts how practitioners envisaged the roles and responsibilities following transfer (Figure 8 shows the
current situation).
Diagram 8: Current lead roles and responsibilities
1. Control office functions
Diagram 9: Future lead roles and responsibilities after transfer
3. Central
functions
2. OnOn-road activity
1. Control office functions
3. Central
functions
2. OnOn-road activity
Incident
management
Monitoring
road
network
Support to
drivers
General on
road duties
Controlling
traffic flow
Other
services
Planning
and control
functions
Incident
management
Monitoring
road
network
Support to
drivers
General on
road duties
Controlling
traffic flow
Other
services
Planning
and control
functions
Major incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
for incident
management
& criminality
Providing
network
information
to media
Managing
criminal activity
Dealing with
abandoned
vehicles
Escorting
high risk
vehicles
Developing
protocols
and
standards
Major incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
for incident
management
& criminality
Providing
network
information
to media
Managing
criminal activity
Dealing with
abandoned
vehicles
Escorting
high risk
vehicles
Developing
protocols
and
standards
Minor incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
to monitor
traffic flow
Tactical
diversion
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
fatal & serious
collisions
Removal of
damaged/
broken down
vehicles
Escorting
abnormal
loads
Contingency
planning
Minor incident
management/
deployment
Use of CCTV
to monitor
traffic flow
Tactical
diversion
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
fatal & serious
collisions
Removal of
damaged/
broken down
vehicles
Escorting
abnormal
loads
Contingency
planning
(ERT)
Telephone call
handling
Real-time
traffic
management
Strategic
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
minor
collisions
Providing
mobile/
temporary
road closures
Monitoring
roadworks
Routing of
abnormal
loads
(ERT)
Telephone call
handling
Real-time
traffic
management
Strategic
sign setting
Management &
investigation of
minor
collisions
Providing
mobile/
temporary
road closures
Monitoring
roadworks
Routing of
abnormal
loads
Enforcement of
road traffic
offences
Clearing
debris and
animals
Special
events
Planning
fixed traffic
management
Incident sign
setting
Enforcement of
road traffic
offences
Clearing
debris and
animals
Special
events
Planning
fixed traffic
management
High visibility
patrols e.g.
vulnerable
motorists
Repairing and
improving the
infrastructure
(road safety)
Planning for
roadworks
Liaison with
TMC/roadside
service
providers
High visibility
patrols e.g.
vulnerable
motorists
Repairing &
improving the
infrastructure
(road safety)
Road user
education
Planning for
roadworks
Incident sign
setting
KEY
Police
Liaison with
TMC/roadside
service
providers
Highways Agency
Shared
Road user
education
KEY
Police
Highways Agency
Shared
Clearly, such a transfer of roles has significant organisational implications for both ACPO and the Highways Agency. Two main changes are envisaged –
the introduction of a small number of integrated control offices and the introduction of a Traffic Operations Service. The Traffic Operations Service will be
used in this report to distinguish from the existing Incident Support Units that are an extension of existing Term Maintenance Contractor vehicles. An example
of how the Traffic Operations Service may look and operate can be found on the Dartford River crossing, although it is not the only example on the network.
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5. Transfer of roles, impact & risks. . .
5.2
IMPACT OF TRANSFER ON POLICE
Using the ABC information collated from forces, the impact of the above transfers on the police were estimated as follows:
Current
Proposed
Savings
Police time (FTE)
Police time (FTE)
Police Time (FTE)
115
115
-
6,226
5,756
470
314
244
70
6,655
6,115
540
Control office functions
On-road activity
Central functions
Total
Although, on paper, there are potential savings to
be made, in practice these will be difficult to realise
since there will be a requirement to retain a
minimum response capability on the network. As
part of the implementation, both ACPO and the HA
would need to agree to a minimum response
capability both in terms of on-road police and
collision investigation. In some cases, this could
mean more police on the HA core network.
In total, the transfer would free up the equivalent of nearly £20million per annum or 540 police officers. If this resource were re-deployed in tackling criminal
activity, for example through greater use of Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), this would radically change the profile of roads police activities, as
shown below:
Current situation
Following transfer/sharing of selected roles & responsibilities
Non Incident
Linked
Activities
45.6%
Non Crime
Incidents
31.0%
Crime
Incidents
5.3%
Other
13.3%
Management/
Supervisory
Duties
4.8%
Non Incident
Linked
Activities
32%
Non Crime
Incidents
24.6%
Management/
Supervisory
Duties
3.5%
Other
11.4%
Crime
Incidents
27.8%
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
5. Transfer of roles, impact & risks. . .
5.3
RISK AREAS
There are a number of risks associated with the transfer/sharing of activities, and these can arise from both the implementation process itself and the future
operation. These relate to:
•
organisational objectives – the organisational cultures of the police, Highways Agency and their contractors are different and reflect different
institutional objectives and drivers. For example, police approach many incidents on HA core network from the perspective that a crime may have taken
place and evidence needs to be collated, whereas Highways Agency staff and contractors are more concerned about traffic management. The risk of
closer working between the police and Highways Agency is that these different cultures conflict and this is particularly likely given that there is no clearly
articulated and agreed national strategy for the HA core network. This gives rise to a number of related initiatives on the HA core network that are being
pursued by organisations in an uncoordinated fashion. In order to facilitate the effective and smooth transfer of roles and responsibilities and to ensure
that future activities on and around the HA core network are aligned, a single network operations strategy would need to be developed.
•
control & handover – with both the police and Highways Agency involved in incidents that were previously dealt with solely by the police, a potential risk
is that each organisation has different understandings and expectations of roles and responsibilities. Rather than clear handovers between the
organisations in dealing with incidents, there could be gaps in provision (where both the police and Highways Agency believe the other is responsible) or
wasteful duplication (where both organisations believe they have responsibility). These gaps/duplications could be further complicated by differing
geographic boundaries and at the interface between the HA core network and local authority roads.
•
liability & contractual responsibility – in the transfer of responsibilities to the Highways Agency, there is an associated transfer of liability. Where a
single organisation is dealing with an incident, liabilities are much clearer. However where the police, Highways Agency and their contractors are
involved in a service, overall responsibility and liability becomes less clear-cut. Well-defined protocols with regards to handover, liabilities and contractual
responsibility are required.
•
systems & communications – with shared responsibility for addressing certain incidents it is possible that police and Highways Agency have different
information relating to the same incident and that this information is not effectively shared. While this is the situation for most of the HA core network (with
separate network control offices and information systems), this has not been a major issue to date because police dealt with the majority of incidents.
With sharing of service delivery, this risk is very much greater. With the introduction of Airwave (the new police radio network), communications to and
from patrol vehicles will be easier in the future.
•
public awareness – while different police force vehicles may have different livery, the police “brand” is almost universally recognised. It is questionable
whether the public has the same level of brand awareness of the Highways Agency (and contractors); indeed this was flagged up in both the workshops
and stakeholder meetings. A key risk is therefore that the public do not know who the Highways Agency (or contractors) is and do not understand the
role it has. A further risk is that the public do not understand the delineation between Highways Agency core network and local authority roads, and
contact the Highways Agency rather than the relevant local authority and vice versa.
•
resourcing – expanded Highway Agency responsibilities will require additional resources or reallocation of existing resources. The review identified that
current information relating to the number of network incidents tends to be incomplete or insufficient for resourcing purposes. A very real risk is that the
transfer of services to the Highways Agency could result in either the over-resourcing or under-resourcing of road assistance provision.
•
skills & experience – given that roads police have been dealing with the majority of incidents on the road network, the majority of skills and experience
rest within the police. The transfer of activities from the police to the Highways Agency and its contractors could result in the loss of these skills and
experience, and (initially) incidents being dealt with by inexperienced staff e.g. uncoordinated and non-standardised introduction of ISUs.
In terms of transferring specific roles and responsibilities, the risk likelihood and impacts are summarised overleaf.
5-5
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
Central
Functions
On-road
Activity
Control office
Functions
5. Transfer of roles, impact & risks. . .
Table 3 Risk analysis for transfer of functions
Major incident management/deployment
Minor incident management/deployment
Incident
management Telephone call handling (ERT)
Incident sign setting
Liaison with TMC/roadside service providers
Use of CCTV for incident management & criminality
Monitoring
Use of CCTV to monitor traffic flow
road network
Real-time traffic management
Providing network information to media
Support to
Tactical diversion sign setting
drivers
Strategic sign setting
Managing criminal activity
Management & investigation of fatal/serious collisions
General
on-road
Management & investigation of minor collisions
duties
Enforcement of road traffic offences
High visibility patrols e.g. vulnerable motorists
Dealing with abandoned vehicles
Removal of damaged/broken down vehicles
Controlling
Providing mobile/permanent road closures
traffic flow
Clearing debris & animals
Repairing & improving the infrastructure (road safety)
Escort high risk vehicles
Escorting abnormal loads
Other
Monitoring roadworks
services
Special events
Road safety education
Planning &
control
Current
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Shared
Police
Police
Shared
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Shared
HA
Police
Police
Police
Police
Police
Proposed
Shared
HA
HA
HA
HA
Police
HA
HA
HA
HA
HA
Police
Shared
Shared
Police
Shared
HA
HA
HA
HA
HA
Shared
HA
HA
Shared
Shared
Risk
High
High
High
High
High
Impact
Medium
High
Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Medium
Medium
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
Medium
Low
High
High
High
High
Medium
High
High
High
High
Low
Low
Low
High
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Low
Low
Medium
Low
Medium
High
Low
Developing protocols and standards
Contingency planning
Routing of abnormal loads
Police
Shared
Police
Shared
Shared
HA
Low
High
Planning fixed and active traffic management
Planning for roadworks
Shared
Shared
Low
Medium
HA
HA
Medium
Low
Medium
Medium
Mitigation
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Clear vision
Clear standards and protocols
Ongoing performance
measurement and analysis
Contingency planning
Clear delineation or roles and
responsibilities
Sufficient resource allocation
Specification, recruitment and
training of staff
Systems integration plan
Telecommunications plan
Detailed specification of roles
and responsibilities
Internal communications plan
Legislation to allow approved
staff to have appropriate
powers
Contract specification
Agreed liabilities
Public awareness campaign
Sufficient resource allocation
Specification, recruitment and
training of staff
In car technology
Standardisation of vehicle livery
and branding
Standardising the operational
protocols
Development of network model
Supplier liaison
Performance measurement
systems
National partnership agreement
The key to risk mitigation is strong partnership working at a national level as opposed to area-by-area activity
5-6
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
6.
CONCLUSIONS
This section sets out the main conclusions from the roles and responsibilities review.
On the basis of the review findings, the following conclusions have been made.
1. The HA core network is an important national infrastructure. While it accounts for only 4% of the overall length of all roads, over 36% of all
vehicle kilometres are travelled on it. The volume of traffic on motorways is expected to increase by over 50% from the 1996 levels in the next ten
years. Currently congestion on the HA core network costs the UK approximately £2.9 billion per annum and this figure is likely to increase
substantially as a result of increased traffic volumes. Given the strategic importance of the network and predicted traffic growth, reviewing roles and
responsibilities on the core network is timely.
2. Despite the increase in demand on police at traffic related incidents and an increase in their activity base, the number of designated roads police
has fallen by 12% over the last five years. Feedback from practitioners is that resources have been cut back to such a level that the police ability
to promptly respond to incidents on the HA core network is at a minimum acceptable level. While this review was unable to identify any metrics to
support or refute this statement, there is broad consensus that that the current trends in road policing resources and road traffic incidents is untenable
in the medium term. We have therefore concluded that action needs to be taken with regards to the resources available to road policing and/or the
activities undertaken by roads police.
3. In spite of the volume of activities and resources assigned to the management and control of the HA core network, management information is
limited and under-developed. The lack of adequate management information does not provide a sound basis for monitoring performance delivery
or allocating resources, and needs to be addressed.
4. Current policy envisages the Highways Agency becoming a network operator not just a network builder, while the police will concentrate more
on their core objectives. There is a strong desire within the Highways Agency to take on additional responsibilities where it is appropriately
resourced. This is matched by an equal commitment from the police to focus on core activities and a desire to relinquish non-core functions, providing
there are sufficient quality control procedures in place. On this basis we have concluded that there is strong policy logic for transfer of network
operator responsibilities (such as traffic management and control) on the core network from police to the Highways Agency. In addition both ACPO
and Highways Agency support this realignment.
5. There are examples where similar functions have transferred with some success. In general, the benefits outweigh the costs – particularly in
terms of improved response times and clearance times. Clearly there are risks in the transfer process, however we have concluded that there
appears to be real benefits for the police, the Highways Agency and the road user from a transfer of some network responsibilities to the Highways
Agency and the sharing of some responsibilities by the police and the Highways Agency.
• Any transfer of functions from the police to the Highways Agency could free up additional police resource to focus on tackling criminality. The
police could use these resources for dedicated crime-fighting initiatives, for example using intercept teams to apprehend vehicles detected from
Automatic Number Plate Recognition systems
• A greater operational involvement and control of the HA core network would allow the Highways Agency to take on more of the role of a network
operator. It would also contribute to meeting other high level objectives such as reducing congestion and improving incident clearance times
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Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
6. Conclusions. . .
• The road user would benefit from having the police and Highways Agency focusing on their core objectives – the most appropriate resources
delivering key services and activities.
6. The current alignment of roles and responsibilities reflects historical development, rather than the most appropriate organisation for delivering
services or alignment with organisational objectives. The result is that police, who are under increasing pressure to focus on core activities, are
currently expected to address a wide variety of non-core activities on the HA core network. Clearly there is a desire to reflect local conditions, policing
priorities and work practices. However, we have concluded that the current lack of a single, national set of standards and protocols for incident
management, control and resolution (and monitoring against these standards) has contributed to the variable quality of service provision and delivery
for these ancillary services.
7. Supporting strategic national routes on the basis of relatively small-scale police administrative boundaries appears to be both inefficient
and ignores the wider interactions of the network, in particular in the control office functions. This is something that has been recognised through
projects such as CMPG and IPG. In addition, there are some forces that deal with a number of Highways Agency TMCs, and all TMCs deal with a
number of police forces. We have therefore concluded that the current combined used of police and Highways Agency administrative boundaries
(which are different for strategic and operational purposes) do not provide an efficient basis for managing the network.
There was a high degree of agreement amongst police and Highways Agency senior managers and practitioners as to which activities should be retained by
the police, which activities should be transferred to the Highways Agency and which activities should be shared by the police and the Highways Agency. On
the basis of these considerations, discussions with other key parties, a review of organisational objectives and capabilities and international case studies, we
have concluded:
The following activities should
be retained by the police
(supported by the HA):
• Use of CCTV for incident
management and criminality
• Managing criminal activity
• Detection and enforcement of
road traffic offences.
The police and Highways Agency
should jointly deliver the following
activities:
• Management and investigation of
fatal and serious injury collisions
• Management and investigation of
non injury collisions
• Major incident management and
deployment
• High visibility patrols
• Escorting high risk vehicles
• Special events
• Road user education
• Developing protocols and
standards
• Contingency planning.
The leadership for the following activities should be transferred to the
Highways Agency:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Minor incident management and
deployment
Telephone call handling (ERT)
Incident sign setting
Liaison with TMC/roadside service
providers
Use of CCTV to monitor traffic
flows
Real time traffic management
Providing network information to
the media
Tactical diversion sign setting
Strategic sign setting
Dealing with abandoned vehicles.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Removal of damaged/broken
down vehicles
Providing mobile/temporary
road closures
Clearing debris and animals
Repairing and improving the
infrastructure (road safety)
Escorting abnormal loads
Monitoring roadworks
Routing of abnormal loads
Planning fixed traffic
management
Planning for roadworks.
6-2
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
6. Conclusions. . .
In summary:
•
There are valid and real concerns as to how any roles and responsibilities could be transferred. There are some concerns from police
practitioners that the Highways Agency and their contractors do not have the core skills and supporting culture to take on some of the tasks that
are currently undertaken by the police. The police would be reluctant to relinquish responsibilities unless it was confident that the subsequent
service would be at least as good as the existing arrangements. We have therefore concluded that the transfer of responsibilities from police to
Highways Agency must take place in a controlled and planned manner, with a realistic timescale and appropriate funds to support the transition.
•
The review has identified a number of risks that could potentially affect transfer of roles and responsibilities. The majority of these risks
could be addressed as part of standard project management, however issues relating to legislation and organisational liability/contractual
responsibility are potentially key to a successful transfer. We have therefore, concluded that in order for the transfer of responsibilities to take
place, a clear understanding must be developed as to the likely legislative and liability/contractual responsibilities.
•
Currently there is no agreed vision amongst stakeholders as to service provision on the HA core network. Whilst this lack of network
operations strategy has not been a limiting factor to date, with closer working between police and Highways Agency (in particular, during any
transition period) this will no longer be the case. We have, therefore, concluded that for the transfer/sharing of responsibilities to be implemented
and operated successfully, the police and Highways Agency will need to jointly develop and agree a network operations strategy.
•
The use of trained and expensive police staff on relatively mundane road traffic management tasks is both inappropriate and inefficient
and does not produce best value for money for the population as a whole or the road user in particular.
Whilst there are risks in the transfer of roles and responsibilities, these can be dealt with through careful programme management and the development of
appropriate operating protocols.
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7.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This section sets out the main recommendations from the roles and responsibilities review.
7.1
KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the conclusions listed in Section 6, the following recommendations have been made.
1. Network operations strategy – as a pre-cursor for transferring roles and responsibilities, ACPO and the Highways Agency must come together to
develop a single agreed vision for the HA core network. It would be useful to develop greater communication and mutual understanding of activities
undertaken at the practitioner level. The strategy should include the following:
Control office functions
On-road activity
Central functions
•
Simplified regional management
structure for motorways and HA core
network roads
•
Extended functionality and more
consistent use of ISU/ Traffic
Operations Service
•
National set of standards, equipment
and systems for all aspects of
motorway operations
•
Single national control office structure
with co-terminus boundaries, possibly
regionally based, manned by Highways
Agency, police and perhaps contractors
(size and location to be decided)
•
Standard livery and image of vehicles
with primacy of branding to be Agency
and not the contractor
•
•
Improved staff training and
accreditation
A network operator model to simulate
the effect of alternative strategies (such
as the number and location of response
vehicles)
•
Intelligent control office capability with
GPS tracking of all incident response
capability, including all emergency and
roadside response vehicles
•
Greater emphasis on motorway driver
training through working with agencies
such as the Driving Standards Agency
A simple performance measurement
system against which to measure
actual improvements
•
Greater role in educating motorway
drivers (including but not exclusively the
dangers of driving in temporary
roadworks).
•
•
Better, more accurate, timely traffic and
incident management information to be
made accessible to the media and
public (via TCC/ICO)
•
Universal CCTV coverage with
response units linked to ANPR units
located at strategic points on the road
network (such as motorway service
stations).
•
Commitment to developing common
operational practices and protocols.
7-1
Highways Agency/ Association of Chief Police Officers.19/6/03
7. Recommendations. . .
2. Transfer of roles and responsibilities – it is recommended that police and Highways Agency activities should be realigned as outlined in Section 6
of this report.
3. Agreed protocols & processes – having agreed the transfer of responsibilities, the Highways Agency and ACPO need to develop detailed protocols
and standards for all aspects of incident management and control on and around the HA core network. These must also specify who is responsible
for each stage, contingency steps, liability, interface and handover protocols. Legislation may be required to give certain HA staff some specific
operational powers. This could include:
$
Powers to stop, regulate or direct moving traffic
$
Close roads either wholly or partly
$
Exercise discretionary powers under the motorway regulations
$
Exercise removal and disposal of vehicle powers
$
Display on-vehicle high conspicuity livery and some form of emergency lighting (response and escorts).
4. Management information – it is recommended that as part of the protocols and procedures exercise, appropriate key performance targets and
indicators are developed and that appropriate management information is collected and reported on. In addition, a national network performance
measurement system needs to be introduced to assess how well the network is performing and to measure performance before and after any roles
are transferred. A network model should be developed to test various scenarios (eg, the number and location of Traffic Operations Service vehicles
against response times)
5. Integrated Control Offices – regardless of which functions are actually transferred or shared, it is recommended that the Highways Agency and
ACPO develop the Integrated Control Office concept. This concept will need to be extended to incorporate new work elements as well integrated
command, control and information systems.
6. Communications strategy – the Highways Agency must develop a robust communications strategy and implementation plan to redress the lack of
public awareness. This could incorporate branding, education, a publicity campaign, controlled use of VMS and more consistent use of vehicle livery.
7. Resourcing – a working assumption for the review was that additional resources must be allocated both to support the transition process and the ongoing provision of activities. It will therefore be necessary for Highways Agency to develop a fully costed case.
8. Phased introduction – given the lack of data on activities on the HA core network, it seems appropriate that the HA introduces the revised
processes in one and measures activities, performance and impact. The most appropriate area to begin this would appear to be the CMPG followed
shortly by IPG and then in the north. A key element of this task will be to develop performance measures and a data collection framework. This will
allow a more accurate assessment of resource requirements for a national rollout, provide assurance that budgeting is appropriate and that savings
are identified and realised. A key part of the phased introduction will be to set out a partnership agreement between the HA and ACPO to ensure that
adequate resources are available to support the network in the interim.
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7. Recommendations. . .
7.2
FURTHER ISSUES NEEDING TO BE ADDRESSED
The review identified a number of related issues that impinge upon the operation of the HA core network. It was not the purpose of this review to focus on
these nor did the review have sufficient data to confirm their validity or extent, however we feel that they are worthy of reporting and where appropriate
investigating further. Specifically, the workshops/consultations raised issues relating to:
• the coverage of the CCTV network – while some parts of the HA core network had extensive coverage, other areas had limited or no CCTV coverage.
To facilitate the move to and assist with the operation of Integrated Control Offices, it would seem appropriate if:
−
There was an audit of current CCTV coverage
−
A review of coverage against incident locations (for example using the STATS19 accident records)
−
A plan to implement CCTV in those areas where there are a high number of incidents but currently no CCTV coverage.
• recording of network incidents and response – measurement systems need to be put in place to ensure that response and clearance times are
consistent across the network. Some work is required in order to develop protocols for defining incident types and recording information about these
incidents in a consistent fashion.
• ERT call answering – currently there is no single standard system for recording calls and incidents – this varies from force to force and will be an issue if
there is a move towards centralised control offices. The training of operators was also seen as crucial, for example the call may indicate that the caller is
impaired through drink or drugs – the police would not want to lose this intelligence. In developing a centralised service, it may be appropriate to introduce
call recording both for legal reasons and to help with training.
• road signage – there was feedback that signage and cones are often left out by contractors for long periods after roadworks have finished, as well as the
imposition of inappropriate temporary speed limits and inappropriate or inaccurate VMS and matrix sign setting whcih can cause major safety and
credibility problems. In this context, it is worth noting that little performance measurement data exists on the accuracy and appropriateness of sign
settings. Given the potential legal implications, it may be worth exploring the adoption of full audit trails and closer monitoring of signage.
• liaison between HA, its TMCs and police – while most areas reported that they have formal feedback meetings following major incidents to decide what
went well and identify improvement opportunities, there appeared to be no mechanism to support continued dialogue, either at operational or strategic
level. One police force reported that to assist with this process, officers would occasionally work shadow TMC staff – this provided valuable insight and
was seen as extremely useful in developing linkages. The lack of co-terminus boundaries does not assist with partnership working.
• diversion routes – pre-agreed routes need to be put in place, with symbol signing (such as a diamond) on all motorway exits.
• use of traffic flow information – traffic flow is normally monitored using induction loops – these are spaced every 500m on the motorway. These could
provide useful monitoring information but, apart from in certain circumstances, these are not routinely monitored. The NADICS system in Scotland uses
this data more proactively and there may be benefit from sharing its experiences
• definition of abnormal loads – whilst there are ACPO guidelines on dimension and criteria, there is little consistency in the application of different width
and weight restrictions that designate abnormal loads, some forces require payment for escort (as a special service), while some forces have civilianised
at least part of the service. This should be addressed.
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7. Recommendations. . .
7.3
ORGANISATIONAL OPTIONS
It is beyond the scope of this part of the roles and responsibilities review to make recommendations as to the absolute number and size of both the ICO and
the Traffic Operations Service infrastructure required to support the network. These need to be carefully modelled, but the advantage of a phased approach
is that efficient working practices can be introduced and monitored. This will, in due course, inform future decisions on sizing and funding requirements.
Central planning and standard setting
HA Traffic
Officers
Integrated control
office
Organisational implications
HA operations area boundaries and police force
areas are not co-terminus
HA strategic, Government Office and ACPO
regional area boundaries are co-terminus
A small number (say four to seven) of
jointly staffed ICO’s that are dedicated
to managing and controlling the
motorway (and ultimately wider road)
network. The exact number will depend
on a balance of cost (in general, the
smaller the number the lower the cost)
and practicality.
A centrally managed network of HA
Traffic Officers operating in liveried
vehicles, co-terminus with the ICO
boundaries.
There is an urgent need for the HA and
the police to develop a clear set of joint
standards and protocols for both the onroad resource and the control office
functions.
In addition, a performance
measurement system needs to be put
in place to establish baseline measures
of performance and to monitor progress
against this benchmark.
A small central team needs to be
established to implement the
recommendations from this review.
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7. Recommendations. . .
7.4
IMPLEMENTATION BENEFITS
There are a number of small financial benefits by reducing the workload on the police, although these will be difficult to realise.
The real benefits would be to reduce incident related congestion by improved incident management. Attempts have been made to estimate the ‘costs of
congestion’ by taking the legal speed limit on roads or the standards to which they were designed as baselines from which to calculate and cost delays. A
study by the British Road Federation estimated that the cost of congestion in Britain's main conurbations in 1985/86 amounted to £3.2 billion. In 1989, the
CBI estimated that the nationwide costs of congestion were around £15 billion per annum, of which some £10 billion could be attributed to the problems of
London and the South East. More recently, Newbery and Maddison (with Pearce and others) have both valued congestion costs at £19.1 billion a year. The
Government's consultation paper estimates that drivers and passengers lost 1.6 billion hours in 1996 as a result of congestion.
We estimate the cost of congestion to be around £2.9 billion on the motorway and trunk road network, as described in Appendix B. A small
reduction in congestion would return a significant positive financial benefit. There are also significant potential road safety benefits.
We have found a number of comparable schemes involving the deployment of highways patrol vehicles in the United States; each claims to achieve
significant benefits.
In the USA, traffic incidents are seen as a major cause of congestion on the nation’s highway network. More than half of all freeway traffic congestion in the
United States is caused by incidents. This incident-related congestion problem is expected to worsen in the near future – it is estimated that this congestion
will cost the U.S. public $75 billion in lost productivity and 8.4 billion gallons of wasted fuel in the year 2005 (Lindley, 1989). In the USA, incident management
is the process of managing multi-agency, multi-jurisdictional responses to highway traffic disruptions. Efficient and coordinated management of incidents
reduces their adverse impacts on public safety, traffic conditions and the local economy.
In the USA, freeway service patrols have proven to be one of the most successful aspects of an incident management programme for reducing incident
detection time and duration. With a high benefit-cost ratio (ranging from 2:1 to 36.2:1), programmes such as these are becoming more popular with the
motoring public, politicians, and the agencies that support/operate them.
Whilst it is possible to question the validity of some of the benefits claimed, it is clear that there are benefits to be achieved from the introduction of a ‘Highway
Patrol’-style service. These include:
Business objective
Improved journey time reliability
Contributes towards making the road network
safer
Nature of benefit
•
reduced incident related congestion through improved incident response time and reduced
overall duration of incidents
•
reduced journey time through improved detection and clearance times of debris
•
fewer accidents through reduction in secondary incidents
•
reduced accidents through improved detection and clearance of debris
•
improved safety in temporary roadworks
•
enhanced public reassurance through increased visibility on the HA network
•
operational improvements in ‘service provision’
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7. Recommendations. . .
Increased police focus on incident management
and crime
•
freeing of police time and resources from non-core activities
•
enabling more police resource to tackle criminality
Other
•
improved TCC efficiency
•
increased partnership between HA and police (eg sharing of information)
•
cross-government working (eg Home Office and Highways Agency)
Subject to sufficient funds being made available, the review recommends that the HA and ACPO set up a jointly managed programme to implement the
findings of the review. There is sufficient evidence from both the UK and elsewhere that implementation will yield positive cost benefits to society and free
up scarce police resource to focus on core priorities. This recommendation is now being taken forward.
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8.
IMPLEMENTATION
The conclusion of the review is that the roles and responsibilities of the Highways Agency in support of the core network are not aligned with core objectives.
There are international examples where the roles have been transferred with some success. Transfer of roles is not, however, without risk. Implementation
of the roles and responsibilities review requires a national change management programme to deliver the full benefits. There are a lot of institutional issues to
overcome both within the Highways Agency and the police. The critical question is, what needs to be done and in what order to make it happen? The review
recommendations have now been approved, and the HA and ACPO are working together to deliver them. In this section, we outline the broad elements of the
implementation plan.
8.1
WORK-STREAMS
Implementation of this review will provide a large number of challenges to the organisation and culture of the Highways Agency and its business change
programme delivery capability. This requires a coherent approach to the management of the overall programme to mitigate the significant risks involved.
Eleven work-streams have been identified, as follows:
•
network operations strategy ~ developing a jointly agreed ACPO/HA strategy for operation of the core motorway network, and from this to derive
both national and regional operating arrangements between the HA and roads policing
•
procurement ~ addressing how the different aspects of services necessary to operate the core network will be procured
•
performance management ~ identifying quantitative network performance metrics against which the Agency and the project can be assessed, and
the production and management of the business case for change
•
legislation ~ affording the Highways Agency and its contractors necessary statutory powers to control traffic and close roads
•
integrated control offices ~ delivering a network of integrated Highways Agency and police control offices to monitor and manage traffic flow and
despatch mobile resources
•
technology ~ enabling IT systems and telecommunications infrastructure for both fixed (control office) and mobile (on-road) resources
•
people ~ specifying, recruiting, training and developing Highways Agency personnel to support the provision of new services, including how the
service will be managed and controlled within the Agency
•
on-road resources ~ enhancement to existing on-road support to traffic incidents and provision of a new patrol capability to provide traffic
management services
•
communications ~ a robust internal and external communications and stakeholder engagement plan
•
education and marketing ~ how the services will be promoted to the road-using public and steps towards improving the standards of motorway
driving by making best use of the new capabilities
•
project management ~ underpinning all activity is a need for strong project management to integrate the concurrent activities in all workstreams and
to ensure that risks and issues are addressed as they arise in a prompt and effective manner.
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8. Implementation. . .
8.2
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Many phasing options have been explored ranging from introducing one region at a time over a period of three years, to introducing everything at once. The
preferred option, both in terms of cost and low risk, is to begin the introduction in key motorways and trunk toads in the Central Motorways Policing Group (in
the Midlands) in 2004 and then in the Integrated Police Group (around the M25) and Northwest in 2005. Capital costs would be in the region of £30m, spread
over a three-year period. Revenue costs would rise over the implementation from £20m to around £38m per annum. The bulk of the capital costs are to set
up the ICOs whereas the bulk of the revenue costs are to provide the on-road resource.
Early 2005
Initial service in Midlands
!
First control office operational from April 2004
!
Largely current technology and existing / refurbished accommodation
!
Trial new ways of working and technologies
Second tier control offices early 2005
!
!
Northwest region and South and East control offices operational by
early 2005
Building on experience from Midlands
Expand coverage to include all motorways & key trunk roads
!
!
Expansion during 2005
Balance between early introduction of service in core areas with
opportunity for learning from initial trial
South
Midlands
Other regions
East
New staff
1,000
Northwest
100
0 Vehicle numbers
500
0
Apr 2003
Apr 2004
Apr 2005
Apr 2006
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8. Implementation. . .
8.3
PROJECT MANAGEMENT
In terms of governance, the project has a small number of nominated individuals, each taking on
responsibility for elements of implementing the roles and responsibilities review.
Each of the stream leaders reports into a small management group who are overseen by a
National Partnership Board that meets on a quarterly basis. Chaired by the Highways Agency,
this is made up of senior officers and managers from ACPO, the Home Office and Department for
Transport. The role of the project board is to advise on any major issues that cut across
organisational boundaries.
8.4
STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT
Work is required on three levels to develop a joint network operations strategy and subsequent
outputs. At ACPO/ HA board level, the overall operations strategy is being developed and
agreed. The framework will feed into a National Guidance framework that governs the
relationship between ACPO and the Highways Agency. This will set out the working
relationship and the standards that each partner is expected to adhere to, and include desired
levels of network policing and incident investigation response. At a local level, these standards
will be tailored to reflect local operating conditions and priorities, encapsulated in detailed local
operating agreements. This would be done on a region-by-region basis.
Draft livery for the Traffic Operations Service and Incident Support Units
Implementation of the recommendations of this review requires a major change management programme to support it. As well as financial resources, it also
requires a small, dedicated team at the centre to manage the implementation. This work is underway and on course to deliver within the timescales outlined
above.
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8. Implementation. . .
APPENDIX A: CONTRIBUTION TO DEPARTMENT PSA TARGETS
A.1
TRANSPORT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
On 15 July 2002 the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the conclusion of the 2002 Spending Review. The accompanying Public Service Agreements
White Paper sets out the performance targets that departments committed themselves to meeting in exchange for the investment being made. The relevant
Department for Transport PSA targets are as follows:
PSA TARGETS
HOW THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES REVIEW WILL
CONTRIBUTE
•
Improve incident response and clear-up times
•
Improve appropriate response capability
•
Introduce measurement systems to measure performance
•
Promulgate best practice for sign-setting and incident management
2. Reduce the number of people killed or seriously injured in
Great Britain in road accidents by 40%, and the number of
children killed or seriously injured by 50%, by 2010
compared with the average for 1994-98, tackling the
significantly higher incidence in disadvantaged
communities
•
Improve consistency of speed enforcement on the motorway and
trunk road network
•
Reduce the potential for secondary incidents
•
Improve safety in temporary roadworks
3. Improve air quality by meeting our National Air Quality
strategy objectives for carbon monoxide, lead, nitrogen
dioxide, particles, sulphur dioxide, benzene and 1-3
butadiene.
•
Reduce pollution caused by congestion
1. Reduce congestion on the inter-urban trunk road network
and in large urban areas in England below 2000 levels by
2010
POTENTIAL
IMPACT
HIGH
MEDIUM
LOW
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8. Implementation. . .
A.2
POLICE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
This review will make a direct contribution to the ACPO roads policing strategy (‘Modern roads policing ~ a manifesto for the future’ published 24 November
2002). In this ACPO confirmed that the police were looking to focus on core priorities. Less directly, it will free up police resource to tackle criminality and
therefore contribute towards the Home Office PSA targets.
ACPO ROADS POLICING STRATEGY
HOW THE ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES REVIEW WILL
CONTRIBUTE
POTENTIAL
IMPACT
1.
The police will need not just to concentrate on core functions but also to shed
unnecessary or inappropriate tasks. In particular we seek to withdraw from network
management issues and to transfer these to the road operator and/or the private sector.
• Highways Agency to take on noncore network support activities
HIGH
In terms of patrolling the network, ACPO recognise that there is a clear and justified
public demand for a visible reassuring police presence on the roads. This is an end in
itself, and will be pursued as such, but we will also seek to impact heavily on poor driver
behaviour in general. This will also involve measures to increase visibility and the further
development of collaborative working arrangements (such as the existing Central
Motorway Patrol Group, CMPG), and ACPO will seek partnership agreements with the
road network operators in order to maximise patrol effectiveness.
• High visibility police patrol
complimented by the Traffic
Operations Service
2.
• Police focus on core business
HIGH
• Joint HA/ ACPO network operations
strategy
• Collaborative regional police working
HOME OFFICE PSA TARGETS
HOW THE ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES REVIEW WILL
CONTRIBUTE
POTENTIAL
IMPACT
Objective I: reduce crime and the fear of crime, including organised and international crime.
• Free up traffic police to focus on
tackling criminality
MEDIUM
Reduce:
•
vehicle crime by 30 % from 1998-99 to 2004;
•
domestic burglary by 25 % from 1998-99 to 2005;
•
robbery in the ten Street Crime Initiative areas by 14% from 1999-2000 to 2005;
Improve the performance of all police forces, and significantly reduce the performance gap
• Improve intelligence (CCTV/ANPR)
• Free up time to spend on front-line
policing
• Reassurance aspects of Traffic
Operations Service functions
between the best and worst performing forces; and significantly increase the proportion of
time spent on frontline duties.
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APPENDIX B: ESTIMATING THE COST OF CONGESTION ON THE TRUNK ROAD NETWORK
The table below estimates the cost of congestion on the HA network:
Billion vehicle kilometres driven per year on trunk
roads
Source: Transport Statistics Bulletin 2001
Motorways
Non built-up major trunk roads
Built-up major trunk roads
Total motorway and trunk road traffic
Total motorway and trunk road network traffic
Light vans Goods vehicles
10.2
12.3
7.6
6.9
1.0
0.5
18.8
19.7
16.0
16.7
Total
95.4
68.2
9.3
172.9
147.0
Cars & taxis
71.9
52.7
7.6
132.2
112.4
Motorcycles
0.4
0.6
0.1
1.1
0.9
Larger buses
0.6
0.4
0.1
1.1
0.9
156,069,444
1,298,611
1,298,611
22,194,444
23,256,944
£9.23
£9.23
£7.78
£8.58
£7.31
£1,440,520,972
£11,986,181
£10,103,194
£190,428,333
£170,008,264 £1,823,046,944
£864,312,583
£7,191,708
£6,061,917
£114,257,000
£102,004,958 £1,093,828,167
where roads in England account for 85 percent of traffic on
all roads
Time lost to congestion per year (hours)
204,118,056
Source: Figure from DfT of 5 seconds per vehicle km
Value of Time per vehicle per hour
Source: Transport Economics Note (DfT)
Value of journey time lost on road network
Possible reliability benefits 60% of value of time
Source: Figure from ITEA of the DfT
Total cost of congestion on HA core network: £2,916,875,111
The total cost of congestion is estimated at £2.9bn per annum.
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APPENDIX C: BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following documents were provided to the roles and responsibilities project team:
HIGHWAYS AGENCY
POLICE
Interim report on the Emergency Support Unit Pilot in Area 10, Highways
Agency, March 2001
Central Motorway Police Group Policing Plan - 2002/3
Final report on the Emergency Support Unit pilot, Highways Agency, June
2002
Integrated Control Office (South) Operational functions, roles and
responsibilities, Integrated Police Group, May 2002,
JOINT ACPO/ HA
A partnership for safer roads – Highways Agency/ ACPO
Highways Agency Incident Management Study (draft report) – May 2002
The Highways Agency Traffic Control Centre Project – National Guidance
Framework and scoping document
Use of motorway compounds – January 2002
Emergency sign bins – January 2002
The movement of abnormal indivisible loads through roadworks
Police involvement in traffic management activities at roadworks, October
2001
Media handling guidance, January 2002
The joint ACPO and HA policy and procedures for the police use of Matrix
signals, April 2002.
Variable message signs, October 1999
The cost of police services – North Wales Police, 2001
Best Value review of road traffic, Derbyshire, 2001
Review of roads policing – Devon and Cornwall, 2001
Road Policing – The best value review of the Durham Constabulary Road
Policing Strategy, Durham Police, March 2002
Abnormal loads – the way forward, ACPO, September 2000
Indivisible abnormal loads, ACPO, March 2002
ACPO Roads Policing Strategy, ACPO, April 2002
UNITED STATES
Incident management - successful practices, a crosscutting study – Federal
Highway Administration, June 2000
Traffic incident management handbook - Federal Highway Administration,
Office of Travel Management, November 2000
OTHERS
Assessing the effectiveness of the ‘Minutemen’ standby service, Faber
Maunsell
•
Economic assessment using INCA, May 2002
•
Final technical report on A63 ‘minutemen’ service, May 2002
•
Final technical report on A55 in North Wales, May 2002
•
Final technical report on A1 experimental standby service, August
2002
The SURVIVE report on hard shoulder and roadside safety, Institute of Civil
Engineers, April 2000
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APPENDIX D: GLOSSARY
ABC
Activity Based Costing
ICO
Integrated Control Offices
ACPO
Association of Chief Police Officers
IPG
Integrated Police Group
ANPR
Automatic Number Plate Recognition
ISU
Incident Support Units
BCU
Basic Command Unit
KPI
Key Performance Indicators
CBI
Confederation of British Industry
LGA
Local Government Association
CCTV
Close Circuit Television
LHA
Local Highway Authority
CMPG
Central Motorway Policing Group
MPS
Metropolitan Police Service
CSS
County Surveyors Society
NADICS
DfT
The Department for Transport
National Driver Information and Control System
(Scotland)
DOT
The Department of Transport (USA)
NNCC
National Network Control Centre (Scotland)
DSA
Driving Standards Agency
NSPIS
National Strategy for Police Information Systems
DTLR
Department for Transport, Local Government & the
Regions
OMG
Operations Management Group (HA)
PA
PA Consulting Group
ERT
Emergency Roadside Telephone
PSA
Public Service Agreement
FTA
Freight Transport Association
ROSPA
Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents
FTE
Full Time Equivalent
RTTC
Regional Traffic Control Centres
GPS
Global Position Satellite
TCC
Traffic Control Centre
HA
Highways Agency
TMC
Term Maintenance Contractor
HMIC
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
TRO
Traffic Regulation Order
HSE
Health and Safety Executive
VMS
Variable Message Signing
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APPENDIX E: ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
In addition to extensive input from the Highways Agency, the project team would like to thank the representatives from the following organisations that have
made valuable contributions to the report:
Organisations at practitioner and senior
manager workshops
•
Amey Mouchel
•
Carrillion
•
Central Motorway Policing Group
•
Cheshire Police
•
Cumbria Police
•
Derbyshire Police
•
Greater Manchester Police
•
Lancashire Police
•
Leicestershire Police
•
Mouchel Consulting
•
Nottinghamshire Police
•
Police Service Northern Ireland
•
South Yorkshire Police
•
Staffordshire Police
•
Strathclyde Police
•
Sussex Police
•
TRL
•
West Midlands Police
Providers of activity based costing data
•
Avon & Somerset Constabulary
•
Lincolnshire Police
•
Bedfordshire Police
•
Metropolitan Police Service
•
Cambridgeshire Constabulary
•
Norfolk Constabulary
•
Cheshire Constabulary
•
North Wales Police
•
Cumbria Constabulary
•
North Yorkshire Police
•
Derbyshire Constabulary
•
Northamptonshire Police
•
Devon & Cornwall Constabulary
•
Northumbria Police
•
Dorset Police
•
Nottinghamshire Constabulary
•
Durham Constabulary
•
South Wales Police
•
Gloucestershire Constabulary
•
South Yorkshire Police
•
Greater Manchester Police
•
Suffolk Constabulary
•
Gwent Police
•
Surrey Police
•
Hampshire Constabulary
•
Sussex Police
•
Hertfordshire Constabulary
•
Warwickshire Police
•
Humberside Police
•
West Mercia Constabulary
•
Kent County Constabulary
•
West Midlands Police
•
Lancashire Constabulary
•
West Yorkshire Police
•
Leicestershire Constabulary
•
Wiltshire Constabulary
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