Election fraud,
protests and dashed hopes:
Russia’s non-happening
colour revolution
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Jean-Marie Koslowski
Main Supervisor: Dr Christian Noack
Second Supervisor: Prof. Michael Kemper
July 2013
1 Contents:
Introduction
1. Election fraud
1.1. Background – The Yeltsin years
1.2. OSCE Election Observation Missions (EOM)
1.2.1. Set-up
1.2.2. Election observation
1.3. Russian elections
1.3.1. Putin’s first term 2000-2004
1.3.2. Between the elections
1.3.3. State Duma elections 2003
1.3.4. Presidential elections 2004
1.3.5. Putin’s second term 2004-2008
1.3.6. State Duma elections 2007
1.3.7. Presidential elections 2008
1.3.8. Tandemocracy
1.3.9. State Duma elections 2011
1.3.10. Presidential elections 2012
1.4. Development of level of fraud
1.5. Conclusion
2. Colour Revolutions
2.1. Colour revolutions in theory
2.2. Colour revolutions in practice
2.2.1. Georgia
2.2.2. Ukraine
2.2.3. Belarus
2.3. Conclusion
3. Russia’s non-happening colour revolution
3.1. Moscow and the colour revolutions abroad
3.2. Connection between fraud and protests
3.2.1. Urban middle class
3.2.2. Civil society
3.3. Protest movement 2011/2012
3.4. Conclusion
Conclusion
2 “Something is wrong with our elections”,
Mikhail S. Gorbachev, NY Times, January 2008.
Introduction
On 4 December 2011 Russia elected a new State Duma. Three months later, on 4 March
2012, Vladimir Putin was re-elected president of Russia for the third time. Between these two
dates the country saw the biggest street protests since the 1990s. Especially the State Duma
elections in December have been highly fraudulent. Election observers of the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) speak of group voting, instances of apparent
manipulation during counting processes or denial of access for independent observers.1 The
obvious fraud was underlined both by eyewitness reports and poll ratings, provided by wellknown opinion research institutes like the Levada-Centre, which differed extremely from the
official results. A representative survey among voters in Moscow showed that the ruling party
United Russia only scored 32 per cent instead of the official 47 per cent. In several regions the
official turnout reached almost unlikely 100 per cent. These obvious manipulations were accompanied by a massive pre-election popularity decline of Putin, United Russia and its top
candidate Dmitry Medvedev.2
Already on and following election day many people attended protest rallies in Moscow. In the
course of the demonstrations several people have been arrested, among them one of the leading figures of the non-parliamentary opposition, Alexei Navalny.3 Finally, on 10 December
2011 the biggest street protests since the 1990s took place in Russia’s capital. Between 75.000
and 100.000 people gathered to show their discontent with the obvious fraud and especially
with Putin and his authoritarian rule.4 People in up to 96 other cities all over the country followed their lead, a dimension neither the political actors nor observers had expected.5 On 24
1
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation
State Duma Elections 4 December 2011’, OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings
and Conclusions, 2011, p.11.
2
Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Kontrollverlust, Manipulation, Protest – Die Dumawahlen 2011 in Russland’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp. 25-40, p. 29.
3
No author, ’Opposition blogger Navalny arrested for 15 days’, Gazeta.ru,
http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/12/06/a_3861462.shtml, accessed on 17 April 2013.
4
Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Kontrollverlust, Manipulation, Protest’, p. 30.
5
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, p.63
3 December another even bigger mass protest took place in the centre of Moscow, this time
with Navalny as spearhead. He had been released after spending 15 days in prison. 6
Three months later in March 2012, after unfair presidential elections, the protests recurred in
Moscow but the number of participants had sharply declined. Only about 25.000 people came
out to demonstrate.7 However a protest rally in June 2012 showed that the resistance against
Putin has not faded. 50.000 people from very different social classes, ranging from radical
anti-capitalist leftists up to extreme right nationalists, gathered in Moscow. Next to static rallies people invented different forms of protests, including motorcades, walks or tent camps,
known from the Occupy-movement.8
With regard to the rallies political observers spoke about the awakening of the Russian civil
society. It seemed as if Russian citizens stepped out of their inactivity and apathy wherein
they had been trapped for more than a decade. In any case the peak of 100.000 people in December is for Russian proportions quite considerable, given the fact that Russia so far was not
at all famous for its political protest culture.
In view of this fact the question raises, what has been the reason that provoked this sudden
reaction of parts of the Russian population? Until 2011 the voters’ attitude towards election
manipulation was characterised by indifference and passivity. Thus during the latest State
Duma elections something exceptional must have happened that made Russian citizens protest massively on the streets. With regard to the demand of the protesters for free and fair
elections one could assume that a new dimension of election fraud has been the trigger.
In this work I want to examine whether the latest parliamentary and presidential elections
have been the climax of a continuous increase in election fraud since 2000.
In order to find an answer to this question I will analyse OSCE Election Observation Mission
(EOM) reports of all parliamentary and presidential elections from 2000 until 2012. To limit
the research, only the development of the level of fraud will be central and not the general
question whether Russian elections have been fraudulent or not because this has already been
proven (e.g. for details see OSCE or GOLOS reports from that period).
6
Benjamin Bidder &Vladimir Pyljov, ’Massenprotest in Moskau: “Wir könnten den Kreml
stürmen“’, Spiegel Online, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/massenprotest-in-moskauwir-koennten-den-kreml-stuermen-a-805728.html, accessed on 17 April 2013.
7
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege – Can There Be a Color Revolution?’, Journal of
Democracy, Vol. 23, nr. 3 (2012), pp. 63-70, p.63.
8
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung – Russland gespaltene Gesellschaft’, Osteuropa,
Vol. 62, 6-8/2012, pp. 9-22, p. 9.
4 Before going into detail I first want to discuss what we understand by election fraud. In general free and fair elections are a central element of the political participation in a democracy.
Through polls the will of the people is expressed. At the same time elections serve as means
of control and legitimation for political power. Most states have written down in their constitution the commitment to hold free and fair elections. Therefore competitive and largely nonfraudulent polls are generally a good index of a democratic state. Nonetheless, in some states
elections are accompanied by fraud, whatever the precise reason may be.
Conspicuously often this is the case in former states of the Soviet Union like Russia, Belarus
or the Central Asian republics.9 Most observers consider these countries not as democracies
but as (semi-) authoritarian states. In the Russian case terms like managed (Krastev), imitation
(Shevtsova) or sovereign (Ambrosio) democracy are regularly used to describe the country.
Even if the constitution says that Russia is a ‘democratic federative law-governed state’ and
that ‘the direct expression of the power of the people shall be referendum and free elections’,
there are clearly doubts about the democratic character of Russian elections.10 Ivan Krastev
notes that ‘in Russian elections it is the outcome that is certain’ which should indicate the
disputable democratic character of the electoral process in the country.11 Unsurprisingly, in
the last decade international and domestic observers repeatedly found evidence for election
fraud in Russia.
This brings up the question of how election fraud is defined, detected and measured. First, it
is quite complicated to find a universal definition for it because there are many ways to manipulate elections. It is clear that violations of the electoral protocol, like printing extra ballots, proxy-voting or direct result manipulations during counting and tabulation can be considered as fraud. Nevertheless, like Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin state, it is more difficult
to define the point from which on elections should be labelled as fraudulent. How many votes
need to be falsified before one can speak of fraud? Is it possible to identify the difference between deliberate fraud, administrative incompetence or simply misinterpretation of the law?
Where is the line between intimidating opponents and controlling public assemblies in order
to maintain the public safety?12
9
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election Fraud
– Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, p. 13.
10
Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Constitution of the Russian Federation’,
http://www.government.ru/eng/gov/base/54.html, accessed on 23rd January 2013.
11
Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, ‘Putinism Under Siege – An Autopsy of Managed Democracy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, nr. 3 (2012), pp. 33-45, p. 33.
12
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, p. 13-14.
5 It is likely that people from different (national) backgrounds would give diverging interpretations. In order to answer these questions and due to the fact that I will use mainly OSCE reports for this research, I want to refer to the ‘Existing commitments for democratic elections
in OSCE participating states’.13 In this document all preconditions for free and fair election
can be found, including free voting procedures, universal and equal suffrage, secrecy of ballots, the freedom of establishing own political parties, access to media on a nondiscriminatory basis or the right to assemble and demonstrate in a peaceful way.14 Thus I argue that everything that contradicts these commitments can be labelled as election fraud. The
commitments written down in this document are not exclusively valid for OSCE participating
states. Instead they are universally accepted conditions for democratic elections throughout
the whole world. The United Nations Human Rights Committee and other UN institutions
adopted these commitments already in 1948 that emphasizes their global recognition. Consequently OSCE values are based on those of the global community.15
Next to the examination of the development of fraud I want to focus on the meaning of the
post-election protests for Russia. Referring to the scope and time of outbreak scholars like
Sharon Wolchik raised the question whether Putin’s regime could have fallen to a colour revolution because the demonstrations resembled those election-related protests known from
other former Soviet states.16
According to Donnacha Ó Beacháin and Abel Polese the term ‘colour revolution’ describes ‘a
number of non-violent protests that succeeded in overthrowing authoritarian regimes during
the first decade of the twenty-first century’. Excluding similar regime changes in other regions (Middle East; Asia), the term focuses only on events in former communist countries in
Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 17 There, in the period between 1998 and 2005 several
(semi-) authoritarian rulers have been ousted from office after manipulating elections. Sharon
Wolchik who coined the more neutral term ‘electoral revolution’ underlines the common fea 13
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States’, OSCE/ODIHR, 2003.
14
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE’,
OSCE/ODIHR, 1990, pp. 3-8.
15
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States’, pp. 7-8.
16
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, pp. 63 & 67.
17
Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Abel Polese, ‘Introduction – What’s in a colour?’, in: Donnacha Ó
Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010, p. 1.
6 ture of these events. Civil society activists, political opposition groups, ordinary citizens and
external democracy supporters used elections in order to struggle collectively and peacefully
against an illiberal incumbent or his appointed successor. Starting in Slovakia in 1998 with
the fall of Vladimir Mečiar the wave of revolution spread to Croatia (2000) and Serbia
(2000).18
However it was the last decade when the term colour revolution has been coined. The golden
age of these movements has been the period between 2003 and 2005 when in several former
Commonwealth of Independent States republics (CIS) a colour revolution was attempted. The
most successful and prominent cases have been the Rose (Georgia, 2003), the Orange
(Ukraine, 2004) and the Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan, 2005). Attempts to overthrow the regime have also been made in Azerbaijan in 2005 or in Belarus in 2006.19 These however
failed and the respective leaders managed to regain control over their countries.
As one can see from this overview these protests occurred with such regularity that scholars
started to consider them as connected events that influence each other.20 That would explain
their temporal and spatial limitation. It seemed as if again a revolutionary virus, similar to the
events of 1989, was spreading through the former Communist world.21 Especially striking is
the fact that these events always occurred in the course of national elections.22
However, despite the proximity none of these protests spread to Russia, still the biggest of the
post-Soviet states and according to Freedom House a non-free authoritarian regime that manipulates elections.23 All the more astonishing is what we could witness in 2011 and 2012
when the latest Russian national elections have been accompanied by massive protests.
Given the fact that Putin survived the protests for the time being seems to confirm what
Thomas Ambrosio observed. Russia not only monitored closely the colour revolutions in its
near abroad but, in order to preserve authoritarianism on own soil, it initiated also a compre 18
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, pp. 63-64.
19
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution”: Reflections on Georgia and Ukraine’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 19, nr.1-2 (2011), p. 422.
20
Abel Polese, Donnacha Ó Beacháin, ‘The Colour Revolution Virus and Authoritarian Antidotes – Political Protest and Regime Counterattacks in Post-Communist Spaces’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 19, nr. 2 (2011), pp. 111-132, p. 112.
21
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution”, p. 421.
22
Abel Polese, Donnacha Ó Beacháin, ‘The Colour Revolution Virus and Authoritarian Antidotes’, p. 112.
23
Freedom House, ‘Russia’, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/russia, accessed on 17
April 2013.
7 hensive strategy to counter any pro-democracy movement.24 This included the intensified
struggle against (foreign funded) non-governmental organisations, the growing criticism towards primarily western election observers or the creation of a pro-Kremlin youth movement
called Nashi (Ours) that should counterbalance anti-governmental youth groups.25
On the other hand if the Kremlin watched so closely the colour revolutions, Moscow should
have realised that manipulating elections can be dangerous. Even the best anti-democracy
strategies will not help if the people are determined to bring about a regime change.
Thus with regard to similar events in other post-Soviet countries one could ask whether the
Russian post-election protest movement, because of its emergence, characteristics but also
preliminary failure, afterwards could be labelled as Russia’s non-happening colour revolution.
Structure, methods and sources
During the period from 2000 to 2012 the OSCE has published a report for every election that
describes and analyses the respective polls, presents the general outcome and shows potential
findings of election fraud in a clear and detailed way. Identical working methods of EOMs
and similar setup of the reports make them easy to compare. By this it should be possible to
detect potential changes in the scale of election fraud. An empirical-analytical approach is
needed in order to obtain accurate results about the degree of election fraud. The OSCE reports will be submitted to a quantitative research method. That means that I will gather the
data from these reports in order to show the development of the level of fraud. First I will
analyse the reports in search of the general assessment of the OSCE (positive or negative rating). Subsequently a more detailed look at the way of fraud will follow. At which stage of the
electoral process and to what extent occurred the fraud and did this had influence on the outcome will be important questions. These data include the amount of visited polling stations
where irregularities have been detected and numbers of group voting, ballot box stuffing or
lacking transparency in the counting process. After analysing all reports I will compare the
results in order to detect the development of fraud.
The OSCE reports give an international, independent and largely impartial assessment of the
particular elections. It makes them legitimate and credible although a Western world influ 24
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour
Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge
2010, pp. 136-155, pp. 136-138.
25
Ibid., pp. 138-141.
8 enced subjectivity concerning especially Russian elections cannot be ruled out. The often very
diverging evaluations of various regional security organisations confirm that Russian elections can be rated completely contrastive. Whereas western world influenced organisations
like OSCE are not reluctant to criticize undemocratic electoral procedures other rather eastern-oriented groups like the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) often avoid too much criticism on Russia, even regularly prevaricating the facts.26 The last two organisations have a somewhat different understanding of
democracy probably due to the fact that the members of both organisations are countries (e.g.
Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Uzbekistan to name but a few) with authoritarian leaderships. Therefore they support presidential power and try to marginalize the influence of civil
society at the same time.27 Thus the ruling elites in these states are anxious for preserving the
status quo in terms of presidency and leadership. Political change through elections is not at
all at the top of their agenda. Therefore one should not expect too much criticism on Russian
elections from observers commissioned by the CIS or SCO.
In contrast it would be useful to analyse the reports by Russian domestic observers as well.
Here, GOLOS (meaning ‘vote’ or ‘voice’), a Russian non-governmental organisation which
monitors the country’s elections, is the eminent organisation. However, there is a language
problem for a non-Russian reader because GOLOS publishes most of its reports in Russian
and only a small amount in English. That means for the research that only sources written in
English can be taken into account, a fact that limits the project. On the other hand many of the
GOLOS findings have been either translated or already been used in other academic works.
Therefore it is possible to come to a reasonable conclusion.
With regard to the second research question, whether the Russian post-election protest
movement afterwards could be labelled as Russia’s non-happening colour revolution, qualitative research is needed because numerical data can’t provide accurate results in this case.
To be able to compare the Russian protests with those known from the colour revolutions I
will use a range of secondary sources that include academic books and articles dealing with
the issue. Finally the results of both the quantitative and qualitative research will be brought
together to formulate the final result.
26
Evgeniya Lukinova, Mikhail Myagkov & Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Metastasised Fraud in Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, Nr. 4 (2011), pp. 603 – 621,
p. 603.
27
Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia – From Red Army to independence,
London: Routledge 2010, p. 81.
9 Chapter overview
The first chapter, mainly based on OSCE reports, will concentrate on the evaluation of the
level of fraud in Russian elections. However, initially I will shortly focus on the Yeltsin years
because this period laid the foundations for Putin’s Russia. Subsequently I will outline the
working methods of the EOMs because it should be clear how the results of the reports have
been achieved. Subsequently, in order to reveal the development of fraud since Putin is in
power, I will present my findings of all parliamentary and presidential elections from 2000
until 2012. The 2007 parliamentary and the 2008 presidential elections form an exception.
Due to the fact that the Russian authorities imposed too many restrictions (e.g. limiting the
observer’s mobility within the country) the OSCE refused to send a mission to Russia.28 Academic expert analysis on these elections will be used instead.29 Subsequently, based on these
findings I will try to connect them with the recent protests. Was ballot rigging the main trigger or did other developments in Russia also play a role for unleashing the wave of demonstrations. An important point is this to establish why people protested precisely at this stage
and not after other preceding elections.
With regard to the demonstrations and the question whether these could have led to a political
overthrow the second chapter will deal with the phenomenon of those election-related protests
that became known as colour revolutions. Eventually at the height of the Russian protests
scholars noted the spirit of a possible colour revolution. 30 This brings up the question of the
characteristics of such an event. I will figure out the common features by comparing events in
Georgia, Ukraine and Belarus in order to determine whether some of them have been present
in Russia in 2011 and 2012. Central questions will be what or who are the driving forces behind the events, what makes them a success and what is lacking in case of failure.
Consequently, the last chapter deals with the reaction of the Kremlin towards these revolutions in its near abroad. What has Moscow learned and which steps did the Kremlin take to
28
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘OSCE/ODIHR
regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federation’, OSCE Press release, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/49438, accessed on 21st January 2013.
29
See: Evgeniya Lukinova, Mikhail Myagkov, , & Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Metastasised Fraud
in Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, Nr. 4 (2011), pp. 603 –
621.
30
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, p.63.
10 prevent a similar revolution at home? This could provide an answer to the question why the
protests did fizzle out quickly. Finally, because of the preliminary disruption of the protests I
will sort out the question in how far we could label the events as ‘Russia’s non-happening
colour revolution’.
11 1. Election fraud
1.1 Background - The Yeltsin years
In order to understand the special character of Russian elections it is necessary to have a look
at the time before Putin came to power. Back then, during Yeltsin’s reign (1991-1999) the
basis for the contemporary electoral system has been created.
The collapse of the Soviet Union put an end to communist rule and to managed elections
without choice. The first free polls in 1991 marked the beginning of Russia’s attempt to political change. Boris Yeltsin, who won the elections and became the first democratic chosen
president, faced the difficult task to transform the country into a modern democratic state.
According to Richard Rose and Neil Munro such a state must meet two conditions, rule of
law and free elections. If one of these conditions is not met the state is not fully democratic.31
How difficult the process of transformation for Russia would have been, was underlined by
political scientists like Dankwart Rustow, Robert Dahl, Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan who
noted that the precondition for successful democratization is a stable state (“No state – no
democracy”). However, Russia in the early 1990s was all but stable that made Yeltsin’s task
even more difficult.32 In the strict sense he had to manage four transformations at once: creating a free market, democratizing the political regime, resolving an empire and finding a new
geopolitical role for a former nuclear superpower. Furthermore and in contrast to the West,
Russia could not pass first through phases of nation building, development of capitalism and
political democratization. Instead, the country had to achieve all at once.
Lilia Shevtsova notes that next to these unfavourable circumstances the political class, including the liberals, was not willing to introduce a real liberal political system. According to her,
in this period ‘Russian liberals envisioned democracy as consisting mainly of elections, but
only for the purpose of guaranteeing their power. They never conceded the possibility that
their rivals might win, which from the beginning created the danger of election manipulation’.33
31
Richard Rose & Neil Munro, Elections without Order – Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir
Putin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 42.
32
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition – The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, Washington:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007, p. 9.
33
Ibid., pp. 9-10.
12 Another point that prevented the transformation towards a completely democratic state was
the fact that Russian society had no experience with independent (non-) political civic participation. A functioning civil society was simply not existent.34 It was the legacy of the communist state that ‘treated the idea of civil society as a bourgeois device, encouraging false
consciousness’. In other words the Soviet state tried to direct the thoughts of artists, scientists
or other independent thinking citizens.35 Against this background the development of an active Russian civil society was difficult if not impossible. The consequences for a state in transition without a working civil society are fatal. Under these circumstances authoritarianism
can develop much easier.
Unsurprisingly Shevtsova notes that Yeltsin missed the decisive moment in autumn 1991 to
set Russia on the road to liberal democracy. This step would have enabled the development of
both rule of law and free elections. She remarks that ‘he could have introduced a constitution
with checks and balances to constrain the power of the state and its leader’s omnipotence.
There could have been new elections for both presidency and parliament on the basis of a new
constitution’. Instead, directly after the collapse of the Soviet Union Yeltsin embarked on a
different strategy. He consolidated his personal power and retained Soviet era elements like
the parliament as main focus of power. Certainly, he initiated economic reforms but political
transformations were postponed until 1993. In that year Yeltsin adopted a new constitution
that theoretically ensured the power and freedom of the people. However, in fact it provided
the president with unlimited authority.36
Nonetheless, in spite of these initial turbulent times and in comparison to the Soviet period,
from 1993 until Yeltsin’s hasty departure from the Kremlin in 1999, Russia has known indeed
relatively free elections, independent media and a certain political pluralism. OSCE even
praised Yeltsin’s efforts to transform the country into a representative democracy. Concerning
the 1999 State Duma elections OSCE even spoke of the conclusion of a transitional period
forged by the president since 1991.37
34
Ibid., p. 11.
35
Richard Rose & Neil Munro, Elections without Order, pp. 45-46.
36
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition, pp. 13-18.
37
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation
– Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999’, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2000, p. 1.
13 This however did not mean that Russia was on the same level like other (western) democratic
states. Stephen White confirms Shevtsova’s negative view of the period. He notes that parties
remained weak and that authorities quickly returned to methods of controlling elections.38
Shevtsova again, therefore speaks about an illusion of freedom and competition because the
president indeed implemented elections and free media but rejected other democratic principles like the rule of law. The main political decisions have been made behind closed doors
inside the Kremlin. Yeltsin, his entourage and a few oligarchs actually ruled the country without consulting the parliament or the people. In Shevtsova’s eyes Yeltsin only used liberal and
democratic rhetoric in order to counter nationalist and populist left-wing opposition groups
who represented his biggest enemies at this time.39
The presidential elections of 1996 reflected Yeltsin’s questionable interpretation of democracy. Stephen White remarks that the polls have been massively influenced by the Kremlin in
order to ensure the incumbent’s victory. Especially due to the disastrous First Chechen War
that Yeltsin had begun in 1994, his popularity ratings were extremely bad. Without the use of
administrative resources that enabled a big campaign, he would have lost the elections clearly.40 Despite the positive general view of the decade mentioned above, logically OSCE observers spoke of an imbalance of media coverage in favour of Yeltsin or the use of state funds
in order to raise support for him.41. Thus even in Russia’s most democratic period elections
have been manipulated.
During the chaotic 1990s voters were not too apprehensive about this. Instead they were more
concerned about their personal future and to a lesser extent about the question whether Russia
will be transformed into a modern democratic state.42 Probably because of the focus on private issues Russians were also little concerned about Yeltsin’s handing over of power in
1999. According to Shevtsova, by appointing Putin as his successor and his subsequent endorsement through Kremlin-managed elections, Yeltsin created a new Russian tradition that
emphasised the authoritarian character of the regime.43 Similar procedures could be witnessed
38
Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2011, p. 27.
39
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition, pp. 25-27.
40
Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics, p. 92.
41
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Observer Mission – Election of President of the Russian Federation 16th June 1996 and 3rd July
1996 – Report on the Election’, OSCE/ODIHR, 12th July 1996, p. 4.
42
Richard Rose & Neil Munro, Elections without Order, pp. 1-4.
43
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition, p. 27.
14 in 2007/08 when Putin was superseded by his beforehand selected favourite, Dmitry
Medvedev. Four years later the power was handed back to Putin according to a similar practice. In contrast to previous years this transition of power evoked fierce opposition of the voters.
When speaking about Russia’s political system at the beginning of the 21st century experts
speak of ‘electoral authoritarianism’. In such a system different candidates or parties only
exist in order to imitate political pluralism. Official or unofficial rules, unfair access to funds
and media and the use of administrative resources in favour of the incumbent make it impossible for other parties or candidates to win elections. This set up only serves the purpose of
ensuring the victory of the incumbent or of an pre-selected candidate. The will of the electorate is completely ignored. However, in contrast to the ‘classic’ authoritarianism, characterised by election without choice, in electoral authoritarianism polls are still relevant. The rulers
need them for domestic and international legitimization. To prevent criticism from both sides
regimes are forced to make efforts to hide the unfairness of their elections.44 If Russia indeed
fits into the framework of electoral authoritarianism, it is surprising that the Kremlin did nothing to hide the manipulations during the recent elections in 2011/12. This could be a sign for a
growing self-confidence of the ruling elite and thus indifference towards domestic and international criticism.
1.2 OSCE Election Observation Missions (EOM)
I will proceed now to the analysis of the level of election fraud since Putin is in power. Before
discussing the results of my findings, I will first outline the working methods of the OSCE
Election Observation Missions to prove that their observations are valuable indicators for the
level of fraud.
Monitoring elections and detecting potential fraud is usually the task of international (e.g.
OSCE) and domestic election observers (e.g. GOLOS). In the majority of cases they are present in the respective country during the whole election period. However, concerning the detection of fraud, authors like Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin argue that on-the-ground election monitoring is not sufficient to obtain a persuasive indication about the level of fraud and
its impact on the final results. They are dubious about the objectivity of OSCE election observers who could come from states that are for example dependent on Russian energy sup 44
Vladimir Gelman, ‘Risse im System – Russlands Autoritarismus 2012’, Osteuropa, Vol.62,
6-8/2012, pp. 23-44, pp. 24-25.
15 plies. Additionally they claim that observers cannot visit every polling station. This makes it
impossible to pass a comprehensive judgement about the dimension of fraud, simply because
massive irregularities could occur in one region whereas in others everything is in line with
the law.45 Therefore according to the authors on-the-ground monitoring should be combined
with additional tools.46 Indicators like the relationship between turnout and a candidate’s
share of the votes, the distribution of turnout across districts or regions or the flow of the
votes from one election to the next should be taken into consideration as well.47 In case the
OSCE reports do not contain sufficient data, as the three authors argue, I will, as far as available, consult other sources dealing with these indicators in order to estimate a shift in the level
of fraud. How on-the-ground OSCE monitoring works and what the OSCE does to counter
the above-mentioned critique will be discussed now.
The OSCE with its headquarters in Vienna is the world’s largest regional security organisation with 57 participating states in Europe, Asia and North America.48 Among others, election
observation is one of the main instruments to promote human rights, democracy and the rule
of law. The participating states, including the Russian Federation, have expressed their commitment to the ideals of democracy, political pluralism and the building of democratic societies based on free elections and the rule of law. More precisely, they guarantee free elections
by secret ballot, free expression of opinion, unimpeded access to media and the right to establish political parties in full freedom.49 Within OSCE, the Office for Democratic Institutions
and Human Rights (ODIHR) is responsible for all issues about elections. It has the task of
assisting the participating states in holding democratic elections. On invitation only, ODIHR
deploys Election Observation Missions (EOMs) to participating states in order to monitor
polls before, during and after election day.50 Moreover, at least theoretically, the OSCE member states have guaranteed to follow up immediately the evaluations and recommendations
suggested by the EOMs.51
45
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, pp. 12-25.
46
Ibid., p. 17.
47
Ibid., pp. 31-32.
48
OSCE Press and Public Information Section, ‘What is the OSCE?’, OSCE Secretariat, p. 1.
49
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Document of the
Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE’,
OSCE/ODIHR, 1990, pp. 2-3; 6.
50
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Election Observation Handbook, Sixth Edition’, OSCE/ODIHR, 2010, p. 7.
51
Ibid., p. 13.
16 1.2.1 Set-up
According to the Election Observation Handbook of OSCE/ODIHR the missions consist in
general of a core team, long-term (LTOs) and short-term observers (STOs). Six to eight
weeks before election day the EOM sets up its office in the capital of the respective country.
10-15 international analysts are based there and form the core team of the mission. This includes the head of the mission and an election, a political, a legal, a media and a statistical
analyst as well as a LTO co-ordinator and a parliamentary liaison officer. Other analysts can
be brought in if this is required. This would be the case for issues like women’s and minority
participation in political life or with regard to new voting technologies. Furthermore an operations expert, a procurement and contracting co-ordinator, a security expert and a finance officer are members of the core team.52
Besides the people based in the capital’s office, long-term observers (LTOs) are sent to the
different regions to provide the mission with a wide-ranging evaluation of the electoral process throughout the country. LTOs arrive about one week after the EOM has been established
and stay until one week after election day. Through their presence they enable the OSCE to
observe the electoral process in different periods, ranging from pre- to post-election days.
LTOs are deployed according to a plan that ensures a balanced geographical coverage. The
observers are expected to stay in the regions for the whole electoral process and should work
there on local, district and provincial level. They are also responsible for the instruction and
debriefing of the short-term observers.53
One week before election day the core team and LTOs are joined by these short-term observers (STOs). Like all other observers they are drawn from OSCE participating states. All together they form the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). In most cases representatives of national parliaments from OSCE member states, the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe (PACE) and/or the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) are
among the STOs.54 Their task is the observation of the election day processes in the polling
stations of their assigned zone and the reporting of their findings to the EOM headquarters.
52
Ibid., pp. 37-38; For detailed information on the specific tasks of each analyst see chapter
6.1.1 and 6.1.2 of the handbook, pp. 38-44.
53
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Election Observation Handbook’, pp. 44-46.
54
See e.g.: OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March
2000’, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2000, p. 1.
17 Enough STOs are deployed throughout the country to obtain representative statistical samples.55
A central element of any EOM is the national staff. They serve as assistants, interpreters,
drivers or administrative support staff. In contrast to OSCE personal they are not accredited as
observers in order to prevent conflicts about subjectivity and impartiality.56 Concerning the
official observers it is also important to mention that they do not represent their own countries, but a OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission only.57 Again, this is relevant for preventing the mission, its results and the OSCE from discussions about impartiality, for example in the case of a negative evaluation of the polls.
1.2.2. Election observation
Observation in the pre-election period focuses on the respective country’s correct implementation of election legislation as well as on the work of its election administration. Furthermore
the role of the media in the election season is monitored. The results of the pre-election observation are published in interim reports that underline the positive but also the negative aspects in order to give the authorities the possibility to solve critical issues before election
day.58
On election day itself the short-term observers are of special relevance because they are the
primary source for the observation of the electoral process. STOs are deployed throughout the
country covering urban and rural areas. In order to maintain the surprise effect during unexpected visits the location of their deployment is not published beforehand. STOs usually work
in multi-national teams of two because this ensures diversity of experience and a more balanced view on the observations in the polling stations. ODIHR has developed forms that the
teams should fill out in every polling station they visit. The qualitative as well as the quantitative data gathered with these forms are taken as a basis for the final assessment of the polls.59
The STO teams start their day by observing the opening of the polling stations. Throughout
the day they watch the voting and counting process as well as the transfer of the results to the
55
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Election Observation Handbook’, pp. 46-47.
56
Ibid., pp. 47-48.
57
Ibid., pp. 44; 46.
58
Ibid., p. 49; for detailed information on the tasks in pre-election period see chapter 7.1 - 7.9,
pp. 49 – 68.
59
Ibid., pp. 69-70.
18 mid-level election commission where tabulation is monitored. According to their specific task
it could be that observers stay the whole day at only one, whereas others move around, visiting up to ten polling stations. Additionally, some observers are monitoring polls in military
facilities, prisons and hospitals or are following a mobile ballot box.60 STOs are not allowed
to interfere in the electoral process but, in case of irregularities, could draw the attention of
the officials to a problem.61
Monitoring of vote count and tabulation is of special importance because, as OSCE experience has shown, this is the stage where most cases of fraud take place.62 When counting and
tabulation has been accomplished STOs send their forms back to EOMs headquarters. Significant irregularities should be reported to the superior LTOs immediately. On the day after the
polls, the EOM publishes a preliminary statement that contains key findings and first conclusions on the electoral process. After election day EOMs continue to monitor the post-electoral
process for approximately two weeks. In this period the respective national election commission publishes the official results. Furthermore possible (oppositional) complaints about the
electoral process would have been published.63 This will be taken into account for the final
evaluation as well. Out of all results of the entire electoral process OSCE/ODIHR drafts the
final report. It contains next to the assessment also concrete recommendations to help the
states to further improve electoral processes.64
Thus, the OSCE election observation missions provide an accountable and legitimate as well
as detailed assessment of elections. The structure and the working methods like presence of
analysts from different fields, observers with different tasks on different locations throughout
the whole country or the general duration of the mission make the presented evaluations reliable. Therefore the argument of Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin that OSCE on-the-ground
missions are insufficient must be qualified. However it should be admitted that in some cases
concrete statistical data could be of additional value. After we have seen how the missions
work, it is now time to focus on the development of fraud in Russia since the coming to power of Vladimir Putin.
60
Ibid., p. 47.
61
Ibid., p. 70.
62
Ibid., p. 79.
63
Ibid., pp. 83-85.
64
Ibid., p. 95.
19 1.3 Russian elections
From the year 2000 on the general view on the development of democratic institutions in
Russia is dramatically negative. Observers often argue that the accession of Putin to the presidential office forms the beginning of the undermining of democratic institutions in Russia.65
However Russia’s transition towards democracy had already come to a standstill at the moment when Yeltsin abolished free and fair elections in 1996.66 It signified Russia’s first step
towards a ‘fake’ or ‘imitation’ democracy.67 Nonetheless the biggest decline of democratic
values and procedures falls within the Putin years.68 In any case it is clear that this development affected the electoral system to a substantial degree.
OSCE reports from the period 2000-2012 underline this negative trend. The comparison of
these reports supports the assumption that together with the widening of bureaucraticauthoritarian structures election fraud has indeed increased. Apparently this is closely connected to the changes in electoral law during Putin’s presidencies. These systematic changes
facilitate fraud or make it possible in the first place. One can think about the abolishment of
the direct election of regional governors and the introduction of the presidential right to remove them at any time when ‘he loses confidence in them’ (2004).69
In general elections serve the Kremlin primarily to check the loyalty of the local and regional
political elites. Putin created a system where allegiance to the Kremlin is the precondition for
political advancement and survival. As a consequence local governors are in constant competition among each other in order to win or maintain the Kremlin’s favour. To reach this goal
they manipulate elections voluntarily, even without any instructions by the Kremlin. Turnouts
and results of nearly 100 per cent are the consequences.70 Especially in Russia’s ethnic republics, in some cases controlled by local bosses with dubious interpretations of democracy, such
lunatic voting results are not uncommon.71
65
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht – De macht van Vladimir Poetin, Amsterdam: Ambo|Anthos uitgevers 2012, pp. 184-185.
66
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition’, p. 35.
67
Ibid., pp. 18-19.
68
Ibid., p. 47.
69
Stephen White, ‘Elections Russian-Style’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, Nr. 4 (2011), pp.
531-556, p. 533.
70
Evgeniya Lukinova, Mikhail Myagkov & Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Metastasised Fraud in Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, p. 621.
71
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, p. 25.
20 Other important changes in electoral law were the abolishment of the single-member constituency that returned 50 per cent of the State Duma members. Apparently it has been abolished
because it was too difficult to manipulate. In addition the raising of threshold for the parliament from 5 to 7 per cent (2007), a constant tightening of the rules for candidate or party registration and the abolishment of the ‘against all’ vote as well as the minimum turnout requirement had a negative impact on the electoral system.72 Through these ‘adjustments’ Putin
ensured that new political forces had little chance to develop and therefore could not threaten
his power.
Which influence these changes had on the development of the level of election fraud will be
discussed now. Changes in the dimension of manipulation can be detected easier when we
look from term to term. That is why I divided the period 2000-2012 into three stages, the first
two covering Putin’s terms as president (2000-2004; 2004-2008) and the last covering the
years 2008 until 2012 when Dmitri Medvedev held the office. The three State Duma elections
within these periods will of course be taken into consideration as well.
1.3.1. Putin’s first term 2000-2004
The OSCE assessment of the 2000 presidential elections was largely positive, even if minor
irregularities have been noted. The overall turnout reached 68.7 per cent that is according to
OSCE a healthy figure.73 International observers visited nearly 1724 polling stations throughout the country. They noticed irregularities such as family and proxy voting (in 82 resp. 34
per cent of visited stations) or a poor layout of the stations (9 per cent). This limited the view
on certain aspects of the electoral process. During vote count observers reported instances of
not cancelling unused ballots before opening ballot boxes (19 per cent) or not certifying the
register of voters before opening the first box (27 per cent).
However, OSCE agreed that these and other minor violations occurred in order to speed up
the counting process and rather not with the aim of manipulating the results. Furthermore
family or group occurred because the voters simply did not seem to be concerned about the
secrecy of vote.74 Therefore the irregularities occurred unplanned and thus did not have any
72
Stephen White, ‘Elections Russian-Style’, p. 533.
73
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March 2000’,
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2000, p. 32.
74
Ibid., pp. 27-28.
21 influence on the final results so that Vladimir Putin’s election as president was widely accepted.
The comparison of poll numbers of the All-Russian Centre for the Study of Public Opinion
(VTsIOM) that estimated 57,6 per cent of likely voters for Putin and the official result of 52,9
per cent proves that he did not benefited from irregularities. Otherwise the official result
would not be lesser than the forecast. These numbers make it unlikely that Putin profited from
fraud.75 Normally in the case of manipulation independent polls and official results differ considerably the other way around.
OSCE praised Russia’s continuing efforts in developing its democratic institutions and noticed that the constitutional and legislative framework was consistent with international standards for democratic elections. Especially the work of the Central Election and the Polling Station Commission(s) was highly rated by OSCE observers. Furthermore domestic and international observers have not been hindered in their work.
Nonetheless there were also several points of criticism, concerning the demise of political
pluralism, the endangered position of independent media or the use of administrative resources in order to create an advantage for Vladimir Putin.76 Especially the latter was regarded as a problem because it provided the acting president with a big pool of state officials that
campaigned in his favour. This included a high number of senior officials of federal and regional administrative offices, including for example members of the presidential Administration, various ministries, tax police, the FSB, the military or major commercial enterprises.
However the law interdicts campaigning for members of most of the mentioned institutions.77
Furthermore OSCE criticised the expansion of state-controlled media and the pressure on independent journalists. The organisation saw the journalistic freedom endangered because of
administrative pressure on critical journalists, television channels or newspapers. In addition
observers remarked that the state-controlled media failed to provide a serious and balanced
coverage. Instead they have actively been promoting a specific outcome.78 An analysis of
media coverage showed that Putin appeared on television as often as the total time of his three
opponents, Zyuganov, Yavlinsky and Zhirinovsky. Particularly the major state television
75
Richard Rose & Neil Munro, Elections without Order, pp. 176-178.
76
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March 2000’, pp. 3 5.
77
Ibid., pp. 21-23.
78
Ibid., pp. 24-27.
22 channel ORT, controlled by Boris Berezovky at this time, supported Putin.79 The phenomenon of one-sided media coverage, often supporting the incumbent or a designated candidate,
occurred already in the Yeltsin years. However, it was under Putin when it became a central
instrument for promoting and securing a certain outcome in the elections.
1.3.2. Between the elections
The period between the preceding presidential and the State Duma elections in 2003 had been
characterized by the consolidation of Putin’s power. Subsequently the hope for democratic
transition started to shrink among Russian and international observers.80 One of Putin’s first
acts after becoming president for example was cutting the political power of the oligarchs and
at the same time bringing large parts of the media under the control of the Kremlin. Concerning the oligarchs Putin set up one rule: who stayed out of politics could keep his fortune. It
should be noted that in the course of the decade the same would become true for the independent thinking minority of ‘ordinary’ people. The credo was: ‘you can do whatever you
want, we won’t interfere in your business, you don’t need to like us, you may even criticise
us, as long as you stay out of politics’.81 The oligarchs with independent political ambitions or
too much political and economic influence were forced into exile (Vladimir Gusinsky and
Boris Berezovsky). Later in 2003 followed juridical persecution and imprisonment as the case
of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former head of Russian oil company Yukos showed.82
Thus, only three month after Putin’s accession to the presidential office two of richest men of
Russia had lost their influence and were forced to leave the country. Moreover already in
2001 all federal television channels have been put under the control of the Kremlin.83 In this
process especially the state monopolist Gazprom with its tight connections to the Kremlin
played a major role. Not only in absorbing the companies of these oligarchs but likewise in
gaining control over the media. By 2002 once Kremlin-critical TV and radio stations as well
as newspapers have been bought up by Gazprom-media and were transformed into loyal ad-
79
Rose, Richard &, Neil, Elections without Order, p. 175.
80
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March 2000’,
OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2000, pp. 1-2.
81
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, p. 13.
82
White, Stephen, ‘Elections Russian-Style’, p. 533.
83
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht, p. 179.
23 vocates of Putin’s ideology. Gazprom did not only interfere in the media landscape but would
from that time on also fund the electoral campaigns of Putin, Medvedev or United Russia.84
With regard to the change of the media landscape it is not surprising that Russian journalists
like Masha Gessen speak of ‘the day that the media died’. A statement that is the equivalent
of the death of democracy.85 Independent media are essential in democratic states and especially for holding free and fair elections. Their absence or marginalisation clearly facilitates
election fraud because independent and critical opinion making is not anymore or only to a
very limited extent possible. Furthermore without free media election results cannot be tested
sufficiently for fraud due to one-sided pro-regime coverage.
However, not only the media but also the political landscape changed prior to the State Duma
elections in 2003. The event with the biggest impact for Russia was the creation of the propresidential party United Russia in 2001, out of a merger of the Unity and Fatherland-All
Russia parties. In the next years United Russia would grow out to the party of power, with the
absolute majority in the State Duma or in other words with a carte blanche to legislate. From
2003 on Russian legislation was dominated by United Russia and the Kremlin. The parliament did not play any noteworthy role during the legislation process because government and
party usually came to an agreement even before bills have been introduced in the State Duma.
It should be noted that United Russia’s party programme is confined only to the support of
Putin and his politics. This party only exists to mobilize as many people as possible to vote
for him and his system. While keeping up the pretence of democracy United Russia is an important instrument for the preservation of power of the ruling elite.
Another unusual thing is the fact the Putin until 2008 has never been member of United Russia. However, for people working in the huge administrative apparatus membership in the
party can bring in physical benefits as well as better career opportunities.86 A phenomenon
that is known from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and can be seen among
other facts (e.g. all imitation of rule of law, freedom and pluralism; top-down governance) as
84
Gemma Pörzgen, Gasprom – Die Macht aus der Pipeline, Hamburg: Europäische Verlagsanstalt 2008, pp. 50-54.
85
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht, pp. 150-180.
86
Dr. Thomas Kunze, ‘Partei “Einiges Russland”’, Länderberichte, Publikationen, Auslandsbüro Russland (Moskau), Sankt-Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2005, pp.1-2.
24 an indication for the partly revival of a Soviet style bureaucratic state. This time only without
the communist ideology and massive repressive apparatus.87
1.3.3. State Duma elections 2003
As a result the State Duma elections in December 2003 failed to meet many OSCE commitments for democratic elections. Open and group voting, irregularities during counting processes or intimidation of voters have been noted. OSCE speaks about a ‘worrisome development’, ‘serious shortcomings’ and ‘blatant fraud’ to name but a few.88
This time IEOMs observers visited nearly 2500 polling stations throughout the country. In 95
per cent of the visited stations the general voting process (opening of station, voter identification or ballot issuing) was assessed positively. Nonetheless OSCE observers noted instances
of open and group voting in a quarter of the stations visited.89 A significant difference to the
same violations in 2000 was the fact that this time the Central Election Commission (CEC)
failed to provide enough booths in the polling stations. Stations in a district in Bashkortostan
even had no booths at all. In addition, international observers reported many cases, especially
in St. Petersburg and Moscow, wherein members of the Precinct Election Commissions (PEC)
actively encouraged voters not to use booths. OSCE expressed its concern that this practice
could expand further into the Russian Federation. Moreover observers noticed overcrowded
polling stations, problems with mobile ballot boxes (open voting), unauthorized persons in the
stations (in 14 per cent of the visited stations), intimidation of PEC members or voters (3 per
cent) or presence of police inside the stations (67 per cent). In some cases the police hindered
actively the work of international observers. During counting processes OSCE observers noted significant procedural errors in 31 per cent of the observed counts. Especially the fact that
results were not read out aloud during counting (48 per cent) and that result protocols were
not published (12 per cent) worried the observers. These practices facilitate manipulation due
to the lack of transparency. Therefore most of the complaints in the post-election period,
87
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition, p. 289.
88
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation, Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003’, Statement of Preliminary Findings and
Conclusions, 2003, p. 1.
89
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation, Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003’, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, 2004, pp.1-3.
25 mainly expressed by domestic non-partisan observers or political parties, were related to this
issue.90
Whereas the OSCE observer mission in 2000 issued relatively few recommendations for the
next polls, this time the list had been longer, which is already an indication for the questionable character of the polls. The few direct manipulations during counting and tabulation probably did not have any significant influence on the final result. Indisputable however is the impact of the use of administrative resources and the massive one-sided coverage of the statecontrolled media. In this way equal opportunities were not guaranteed and one could speak of
intended fraud.91
In this image the rise in election fraud fits perfectly. As we see how Putin and his entourage
did everything to extend their power it should be logic that they would use administrative
resources to maintain this power. They could do this without limitation because there was
nobody anymore who was in state or had the will to offer something in reply. Oligarchs have
been neutralised and the political opposition was disunited, thus irrelevant. The rest of the
population was either occupied with enjoying its new wealth or continued longing for the
‘good old times’. In fact hardly anybody was interested in politics. One could assume that
economic prosperity was more important than democratic principles like political pluralism
and multiparty elections. A survey among voters in 2003 underlined the ambivalent attitude of
Russians towards democracy. Only 29 per cent of the respondents considered multiparty elections as useful. In such a climate of indifference it will be easy for every political leader to
undercut political pluralism.92
1.3.4. Presidential elections 2004
Only a few months later in March 2004 presidential elections have been hold with Vladimir
Putin as the incumbent. OSCE observers visited 1350 polling stations and again remarked that
the electoral process failed to meet important democratic principles. Secrecy of ballots and
equal opportunities for candidates were missing as well as political pluralism and a vibrant
discourse during pre-election period. Again state-controlled media supported the incumbent
directly and left little space for coverage of other candidates. Still worse, none of the little
known rival candidates expected to win, while one, Sergey Mironov (A Just Russia), openly
90
Ibid., pp. 20-23.
91
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
92
Yuri A. Levada, Alex Campbell, ‘What the Polls tell us’, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15,
Nr. 3 (2004), pp. 43 – 51, p. 45.
26 supported Putin.93 This suggests that they may have been selected by the Kremlin in order to
imitate political pluralism.
Similar to previous elections local administrators have been involved in illegal activities to
ensure high voter turnout, promising for example money for those who vote for Putin. Suspect
proportions between the turnout and the share of votes for Putin have been noted in the six
republics of Dagestan, Mordovia, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, Tatarstan and Chechnya. According to the OSCE turnout and result figures have been nearly the same, that is almost impossible to achieve without manipulation.94
With regard to voting procedures observers made a positive assessment of 95 per cent of the
observed polling stations. However several breaches of electoral law like open voting have
been reported in 22 per cent of the polling stations. This high number was especially regrettable because OSCE recommended the provision of a sufficient number voting booths already
in 2003. Problems occurred also with regard to mobile ballot boxes and new automated vote
scanning machines. In all reported cases the secrecy of the voter’s choice was not guaranteed.
Serious cases of intimidation have been noted in 10 polling stations where domestic candidate-nominated observers, representing Vladimir Putin, forced voters to show their ballot paper before putting it into the box. Those who voted against the incumbent were exposed to
verbal assaults. Another case of influence on the voter’s choice was reported in Khabarovsk
where students who voted had a stamp in their student IDs. This raises the question whether
the ‘wrong’ choice had adverse effects for them in university. A questionable part played the
police in two third of the observed polling stations. Officers were present in the room where
voting took place. In St. Petersburg a police officer even noted the voter’s names and passed
them to unidentified persons. In Moscow region officers reported turnout figures to their
headquarters every two hours. The fact that presence of police inside the polling stations
evoked almost no reaction among the voters surprised OSCE observers to a great extent. 95 It
confirmed the indifferent attitude of Russians towards the integrity of the electoral process.
Vote count and tabulation was assessed negative in 24 per cent of the stations because lack of
transparency during both processes endangered the integrity of the final result. In some cases
93
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 14 March 2004,
OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2004, pp. 1-4.
94
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 14 March 2004,
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2004, p. 2; pp. 31-35.
95
Ibid., pp. 21-23.
27 OSCE observers noted clear intentions to commit fraud like bringing in additional ballot papers, manipulating electoral lists or election commission members filling out supplementary
ballot papers. Some result protocols have been completed only after commission members
spoke with their superiors on the phone. Furthermore, during tabulation observers reported
that data have been tested on a separate computer before entering them in the GAS Vybory
automated tabulation system.96 The national turnout of 63 per cent was little lower than in
2000 (68 per cent) and, except for the mentioned (North Caucasian) areas, in general not conspicuous. Putin’s popularity was reflected by the high figure of 71 per cent of votes for him in
the final result. OSCE remarks that his support was evenly spread throughout the country except for the mentioned areas above.97
Nonetheless Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin note that the turnout figures in some districts
underwent major shifts compared to elections in the Yeltsin years and to those in 2000. The
number of districts that reported turnout figures above 90 per cent has increased since 1999
from 56 to 251. Such high turnout figures are not explicable without manipulation.98 However
the authors remark that falsification of turnout and results figures, at least until 2004, is not
necessarily a product of a Kremlin directive. As already mentioned, since Putin’s first term
the power structure has changed to the effect that local and regional elites engage in a competition among each other. High pro-Kremlin results should surpass other regional leaders in
order to win Moscow’s favour. Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin therefore note that in 2004
the Kremlin saw widespread self-initiated election fraud as unnecessary probably because of
the great popularity of Putin and the absence of any serious contender.99
However taking into account the development of the electoral process since 2000, the growing influence of the state and the increasing number of violations of electoral law reported by
OSCE observers, it is legitimate to say that the 2004 elections marked a preliminary high water mark of electoral corruption and fraud. In this light and with regard to Russia’s ‘managed’
democracy fits the statement of Yuri Levada who says, that ‘the people may vote, but those in
power will, if need be, ‘correct’ the people’s choice’.100 In other words because of its dominance on society it is the state and not the people who determines the outcome of the polls.101
96
Ibid., pp. 23-25.
97
Ibid., pp. 25-26.
98
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, pp. 71-74.
99
Ibid., pp. 82-90.
100
Yuri A. Levada, Alex Campbell, ‘What the Polls tell us’, p. 46.
101
Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov, ‘What the Elections tell us’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.
15, Nr. 3 (2004), pp. 20-31, p. 29.
28 This summarizes the development of fraud up to that point very well. Striking is that so far
hardly anyone among the population was concerned about the increase in election fraud.
1.3.5. Putin’s second term 2004-2008
In his second term Putin consolidated his bureaucratic-authoritarian system by pursuing his
course of widespread political and economic control. After bringing mass media under state
control and limiting political competition already in his first term, from now on ‘parliament
and the courts were totally subordinated to the executive administration; and the creation of
political movements was manipulated by the Kremlin’.102 Furthermore Putin managed to fill
the administrative apparatus with staff that was willing to support every decision made by the
Kremlin. Long before the ending of Putin’s second term the presidential administration began
to change the electoral law in order to ensure the maintenance of power for the period after
his constitutional retreat from the office. Among others, this included a law that made it impossible to establish a political party without the approval of the Kremlin. In addition the barrier to enter the parliament was raised to 7 per cent. A law that forbids the formation of political blocs and one that classifies criticism of the regime as extremism have been passed as
well.103 Moreover with regard to the Ukrainian colour revolution of 2004 it is not unlikely that
such steps also served to build up defences against an ‘orange threat’.104
Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin note that a victory of United Russia in the 2007 elections
was crucial if the ruling elite wanted the system to survive beyond the end of Putin’s term.
Striking is that the administration was eager to break the constitution to achieve this goal. The
exclusion of international observers through a system of new restrictions and visa requirements also fits the picture. One could assume that by this point the Kremlin became indifferent to the question how observers would assess Russian elections.105 Consequently, for the
next two polls there are no OSCE reports available because the organisation refused to accept
the limitations implemented by the Russian Federation on an EOM.106
102
Lilia Shevtsova, Russia – Lost in Transition, p. 47.
103
Ibid., pp. 47-48.
104
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy – The Dual State, Factionalism and the
Medvedev Succession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, p. 160.
105
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, pp. 116-118.
106
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘OSCE/ODIHR
regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federa29 1.3.6. State Duma elections 2007
Nonetheless there are several other assessments of the 2007 State Duma elections. Among
them, Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin concentrate on statistical evidences. They state that
already known violations like limitations for party or candidate registration, voter intimidation
and unequal media access occurred again.107 Studies revealed that ‘United Russia had 10
times as much coverage over the pre-election period as its main challenger, the Communist
Party’.108 Furthermore Richard Sakwa notes that there are evidences that state agencies were
instructed to provide high turnout figures. This is also underlined by GOLOS observers who
‘have seen (…) mass forced voting and a raft of other violations’.109
With regard to the Soviet-era outcome of the ruling party one could assume that criminal acts
of fraud like ballot box stuffing or manipulation of result and turnout numbers indeed took
place. Especially the shift from 37 per cent in 2003 to 64 per cent in 2007 makes the outcome
for United Russia suspicious.110 In addition, compared to 2003 and 2004, the authors see a
dramatic change in the distribution of turnout numbers. They note a significant increase of
districts with turnout higher than 90 per cent and similar pro-United Russia votes. It is likely
that such results are only possible if the numbers have been artificially generated. Furthermore the authors note that those manipulations were not anymore limited to ethnic republics
but also affected urban regions.111 To put it differently, ‘fraud has now infected and metastasized within the Russian polity’.112 The independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta published
reports that underline the obvious manipulation: ‘Representatives of the oppositional party
Yabloko found people who came from outside Moscow to vote there for United Russia. In
compensation they were awarded a free tour around Moscow. Other reports state that according to lists even blind or dead people came out to vote. In Dagestan armed men escorted a
group of people to the polling stations.113
tion’, OSCE Press release, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/49438, accessed on 21st January 2013.
107
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, p. 118.
108
Stephen White, ‘Elections Russian-Style’, p. 535.
109
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, pp. 244-245.
110
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, & Dimitri Shakin, The Forensics of Election
Fraud, p. 126.
111
Ibid., pp. 126-134.
112
Ibid., p. 118.
113
Ibid., p. 117.
30 The general difference to the 2003 parliamentary elections is the fact that in 2007 the Kremlin
itself encouraged election fraud out of fear of losing control. Until then the impulse rather
came from regional and local bosses. This time it was the Kremlin self who used manipulations for providing the absolute majority for United Russia. Like preceding elections these
polls again served at the same time to control the loyalty of the regional elites.114
1.3.7. Presidential elections 2008
A few months later the presidential elections formed the framework for the Kremlinorchestrated succession of Vladimir Putin. Similar to the handing over of power in 1999/2000
the incumbent announced his preference for a candidate beforehand and the administration
subsequently managed to get Dmitry Medvedev elected. According to Richard Sakwa it was
not the name of the victor but the margin of victory, the turnout and the results of the other
candidates that would be decided on election day.115
Election observers from the CIS and SCO assessed the polls as ‘free, open and transparent’
and ‘in line with international standards’. It is a typical example for the diverging ratings of
western and more eastern-oriented observers. Due to the fact that OSCE refused to send a
mission no detailed report is available from the organisation. According to Gennady
Zyuganov from Russia’s Communist Party the manipulations however reached a new level.
Several other opponents underlined this assumption. Despite this criticism most people confirm that Medvedev would have won the polls anyway.116
Richard Sakwa thus speaks of free but unfair elections. He observed the usage of the common
instruments of influence that should prevent the access of independent candidates to the polls
(e.g. the use of administrative resources, unfair access to media, limitations on candidate registration etc.).117 The turnout of 69 per cent is a plausible figure. However, striking is
Medvedev’s 70 per cent result, that almost reached Putin’s 71 per cent of 2004.118 It implies
that Medvedev profited considerably from Putin’s enormous popularity (in 2008 more than 80
per cent approval ratings) but also from the use of administrative resources. Otherwise it is
not explicable how a relatively unknown candidate like Medvedev could score such figures.
114
Ibid., pp. 135-137.
115
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, p. 292.
116
Evgeniya Lukinova, Mikhail Myagkov & Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Metastasised Fraud in
Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, pp. 603-604.
117
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, pp. 296-297.
118
Ibid., pp. 292-293.
31 On the other side one should not forget Putin’s (economic) achievements of the previous
years. Those factors have a certain influence on a voter’s choice. People who profited from
the economic success, based on the selling of Russia’s huge natural resources, would certainly
choose the proposed successor trusting that he will continue the political and economic
course. In addition, many simply appreciated Putin’s leadership qualities, his competence and
his charisma.119 By choosing Medvedev as new president the people also chose automatically
for the continuation of Putin’s career. Medvedev’s first announcement after becoming candidate was the proposal of Putin as his Prime Minister.120 Not only because of that, the handing
over of power closely resembled the transition from Yeltsin to Putin. It can be seen as evidence for Shevtsova’s claim that Yeltsin back then created a new tradition of transfer of power, one that ignores the people’s will completely.
Myagkov and Ordeshook who already analysed previous elections came to the conclusion that
the fraud further spread into regions that so far have been unaffected by it. Again they looked
at turnout figures compared to previous polls and noticed significant shifts especially in urban
areas. However because of the uneven distribution of abnormal data throughout the country,
they suppose that the Kremlin did not direct manipulations. Instead those are again rather the
result of the electoral system that has been created under Putin wherein the survival of local
governors depends to a great extent on their loyalty towards the Kremlin. Consequently this
fidelity is expressed through high pro-government election results. 121
Up to this point OSCE reports did not mention any resistance or protests of oppositional forces or citizens. Quite the contrary, they noted the indifference of voters and election commission members towards apparent manipulations.122 Most of the Russians just wanted to hold on
to the status quo because political change reminded them of the chaotic 1990s. Many people
were simply anxious to avoid a return to such unstable days. As a consequence they repeatedly chose for a continuation of the Putin system. However despite stunning election results the
rejection of the regime started to grow from 2008 on. Especially the arbitrariness of government employees was one of the reasons of growing discontent. Many citizens felt to be at the
mercy of police, tax investigation, justice or other government institutions.123 Already from
119
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, pp. 299-300.
120
Ibid., p. 270.
121
Evgeniya Lukinova, Mikhail Myagkov & Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘Metastasised Fraud in
Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, pp. 620-621.
122
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 14 March 2004, pp.
21-23.
123
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, p. 11.
32 2006 on there have been some minor protests against the regime, organized by a coalition of
several oppositional forces. The movement, called The Other Russia, united people from diverging political camps as well as human rights activists. The most known are former chess
champion Garry Kasparov, former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov and former economic
advisor to President Putin, Andrei Illarionov.124 In 2007 The Other Russia organized several
dissenters’ marches in Moscow and St. Petersburg, bringing together up to 2000 regime critical activists.125 After the 2008 elections Kasparov called again for dissenters’ marches but for
the time being those rallies never reached the extent of the 2011 and 2012 demonstrations.126
1.3.8. Tandemocracy
Before proceeding to the most recent elections of 2011 and 2012 it is useful to have a short
look at Medvedev’s presidency. Initially he was seen as liberal economist and democratic
moderniser. However, due to the fact that he could not fall back on his own independent power base inside the Kremlin, it was doubtful whether the former lawyer could really emancipate
himself from his mentor Putin.127 In the course of his term it became clear that he was merely
a placeholder for Putin who continued to rule the country from the background as Prime Minister. Actually both acted in such a close correlation with each other that observers coined the
term tandemocracy. Despite initial hopes for reforms, in the end Medvedev was unable to
achieve any noteworthy political or legal renewal.128 Therefore public support for him and the
regime declined significantly during his term.
Political and economic stagnation, high corruption, security problems, arbitrariness by state
institutions and many unredeemed promises of the ruling tandem led to growing discontent
among parts of the population. Throughout the whole country people started to protest against
illegitimate practices and began to demand accountability and the right to freely determine
their political leaders, on local as well as on national level. The reaction of the regime was
ambivalent, making concessions on the one hand but cracking down protests on the other.
Especially the regular nationwide peaceful pro-democracy demonstrations on the last day of
124
No author, ‘’Other Russia’ Conference Opens In Moscow’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069756.html, accessed on 10 June 2013.
125
No author, ‘Russia: Opposition Rallies Met With Massive Police Force’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075897.html, accessed on 10 June
2013.
126
Richard Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, p. 298.
127
Ibid., pp. 273-274.
128
Ibid., pp. 303; 352.
33 every month that has thirty-one days have been brutally dispersed. This behaviour is particularly striking because the date of those rallies should symbolize Article 31 of the Constitution
that guarantees the freedom of assembly.129
However during Medvedev’s term observers also remarked a slight relaxation of control of
the few remaining independent media. In this period new communication technologies like
the Internet started to play a prominent role for oppositional forces. New digital news media
have been created online, giving regime-critical journalists or other disgraced persons a voice.
The spread of the uncensored Internet was of special importance for Russian civil society
groups because it served them as platform for organisation and mobilisation of all kinds of
protests. Furthermore citizens started to use online platforms like blogs or social networks to
report about illegal practices of the regime.130 In contrast to the traditional media the state
abstained for a long time from controlling the Internet. The ruling elite probably underestimated the relevance of this new technology. As direct consequence the still little controlled
Internet would become of special importance for the protesters in 2011 and 2012. Nonetheless, as Kara-Murza notes, even with decreasing public support and a growing opposition, the
regime was still able to manage an election and if necessary ‘correct’ the voter’s choice because of its many administrative tricks.
1.3.9. State Duma elections 2011
In contrast to both previous elections this time OSCE observers have been invited and, despite
repeated limitations for international long-term observers, agreed to send a mission. Domestic
civil society groups were officially not allowed to monitor the polls. Nevertheless GOLOS,
the domestic election observation NGO, established a homepage where voters could report
election manipulations. However, the activists faced pressure by state institutions already before election day.131 Other well-known ways of influence like limitations on candidate registration for certain parties, one-sided media coverage or the lack of independence of the election administration led to a negative assessment by OSCE. Especially the counting process
129
Vladimir Kara-Murza, ‘Stealing the Vote – The Kremlin Fixes Another Election, World
Affairs, 2011, pp. 47-55, pp. 52-54.
130
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, pp. 13-18.
131
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 4 December 2011’, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission
Final Report, 2012, pp. 16-17.
34 was characterised by serious and frequent violations, including instances of ballot box stuffing.132
International observers visited 1500 polling stations where opening and voting procedures
have been assessed positively in 90 resp. 93 per cent of the cases. Nonetheless observers remarked also serious shortcomings like group voting (14 per cent) overcrowded polling stations (9 per cent) and cases of tensions inside them or indications for vote buying. Furthermore cases of attempts at multiple voting and indications of fraud (similar signatures) have
been noted.
With regard to vote count OSCE speaks of bad and very bad assessments in every third polling station visited. Among the shortcomings were poor organisation, lack of transparency and
violation of counting procedures. More concretely, this included ballot box stuffing, extended
breaks in the counting process, restrictions or denial of access for observers to polling stations. Tabulation has equally been assessed as bad or very bad. Furthermore, several independent news websites like Echo Moskvy, Kommersant or The New Times as well as the
GOLOS and Levada Center homepages have been blocked on election day. Except for the
latter all methods of manipulation have already been used in preceding polls. Therefore one
could not speak of a worsening of fraud. Instead a new civic engagement in monitoring the
polls led to a changed perception of the level of fraud. Therefore it only seemed as if these
elections have been more fraudulent than preceding.
The turnout was 60 per cent and the winner United Russia officially received 49 per cent of
the votes.133 This is compared to the last State Duma elections of 2007 a decline of 15 per
cent but still enough to win the polls. Independent observers and statistical analysts, however,
called even these official 49 per cent into question. According to model calculations and representative surveys in Moscow, the results of United Russia actually should not be higher than
35 (nationwide) resp. 32 per cent (Moscow). In addition to those investigations and the OSCE
report, many eyewitnesses observed obvious manipulations and taped those on audio or video.134 In Moscow NGO activists found packs of already filled in ballots. Moreover members
of GOLOS uploaded result protocols on the Internet that showed anomalies and created a map
of violations (kartanarusheniy.ru) where users should report manipulations.135
132
Ibid., p. 1.
133
Ibid., pp. 18-20.
134
Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Kontrollverlust, Manipulation, Protest’, pp. 28-29.
135
Benno Ennker, ‘Russland in Bewegung – Die alte Ordnung und die neuen Dekabristen’,
Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp.41-55, p. 53.
35 Immediately after the polls street protests against the regime occurred in Moscow. In the following days those demonstrations have been repeated in the capital and spread to other cities
and regions as well. As a consequence during December 2011 Russia saw the biggest mass
protests since the demise of the Soviet Union.136 A sample among protesters in Moscow
showed that most participants have been oppositional voters who belonged to the growing
Russian middle class. 62 per cent of the demonstrators were higher educated people, including experts, executives, business owners and students. The majority was under the age of 40,
including 25 per cent aged between 18 and 24.137 Striking is that they were mainly mobilized
via the free Internet.138 It shows that this new technology can be used as a tool for oppositional movements to circumvent state censorship. Mobilization via Internet is a clear parallel to
the Ukrainian protests of 2004 that have been largely organized online.139
1.3.10. Presidential elections 2012
With regard to the on-going protests since the last polls the presidential elections in March
2012 were under special observation. Apparently the unexpected reaction of the population
did have had an impact on the regime. At least OSCE observers remarked that the authorities
tried to increase transparency by installing web cameras in the polling stations. In addition in
one-third of the stations transparent ballot boxes have been used. However these concessions
could not hide the fact that the polls have been unfair as well. Especially the media coverage
about Putin exceeded those of all other candidates. In addition again administrative resources
have been used to promote his re-election.140
With regard to election day OSCE observers assessed the voting procedure in 95 per cent of
the 1000 visited stations as good or very good. However this could not be said about counting
and tabulation processes. Out of the 106 observed counts 31 have been rated bad and very
bad. Observers noted chaotic arrangement of the vote count, cases of deviation from the pro-
136
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 4 December 2011’, p. 19.
137
Benno Ennker, ‘Russland in Bewegung’,p. 54.
138
Ibid., p. 48.
139
Joshua Goldstein, ’The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution’, Berkman Center Research Publication, 2007, p.4.
140
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 4 March 2012,
OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2012, pp. 1-2.
36 tocol during counting and indications of ballot box stuffing. Footages of the installed web
cameras gave evidence for ballot box stuffing as well.141
The turnout was 64 per cent and the winner, Vladimir Putin, received 63 per cent of the
votes.142 Compared to the preceding presidential elections this figure is smaller than those of
2004 and 2008. This decline is probably related to the bad popularity ratings of Putin and the
high number of protest voters. Nevertheless a defeat of Putin never came within reach, simply
because of the absence of any noteworthy rival candidate. Again the Kremlin limited access
to the polls for those who could have posed a threat to the regime’s integrity.
Finally the fraudulent re-election of the former president prompted citizens to protests again
on the streets. Similar to the events in December authorized and unauthorized rallies took
place in big cities like Moscow or St. Petersburg. This time even larger police units have been
deployed in order to counter attempts to riot.143 Since Putin officially returned to the presidential office, the state increased its activities to ban any regime-critical opinions and protests.
This can be seen as a direct result of those post-elections demonstrations. Especially foreign
funded NGOs became the target of the Kremlin. A law of 2012 obliges those organisations to
register as ‘foreign agents’.144
1.4. Development of level of fraud
Analysing all elections between 2000 and 2012, it can be stated that election fraud has increased indeed, but not evenly over the whole period. Starting in 2000 minor irregularities
have been reported but did not affect the overall result. The most considerable worsening can
be situated in the period between 2000 and 2004. From 2003 on a significant decline of the
democratic character of the elections is noticeable. Between only two elections OSCE’s assessment has changed from largely positive in 2000 into negative in 2003, stressing a worrisome development, serious shortcomings and blatant fraud. A preliminary climax of manipulations has been reached during the 2004 presidential elections. OSCE observers noted that
the polls failed to meet important democratic principles. Especially the growing state influence on the electoral process and the increasing number of violations of electoral law contrib 141
Ibid., pp. 18 – 20.
142
Ibid., p. 25.
143
Ibid., p. 20.
144
No author, ‘Rapport Amnesty: ‘Poetin is op heksenjacht’’, Volkskrant.nl,
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/article/detail/3431001/2013/04/24/RapportAmnesty-Poetin-is-op-heksenjacht.dhtml, accessed on 21 June 2013.
37 uted to a negative rating. Striking was the indifference of the population towards the growing
influence of the authorities on the election outcome.
Even if the shift was not that significant anymore, the next level of manipulation has been
reached during the 2007 State Duma elections. Whereas before violations were limited to rural areas and ethnic republics, this time also urban regions have been affected by fraud. These
elections were of special importance for the ruling elite. A victory of the party of power,
United Russia, was crucial for the survival of the regime beyond the end of Putin’s term as
president in 2008. Thus in contrast to the preceding polls where mainly local and regional
bosses were responsible, this time it was the Kremlin self who used manipulations to obtain a
particular result.
With regard to the 2008 presidential elections observers assessed the polls as free but unfair.
Except for the questionable transition of power from Putin to Medvedev, there are no indications for further increase in election fraud. The manipulations rather stayed on the same level.
Experts remarked that the outcome was fixed in advance. The voters were only expected to
confirm Putin’s choice of his beforehand selected candidate, Dmitry Medvedev. Furthermore
the polls have been influenced again through already tried and tested methods like the use of
administrative resources, unfair access to media and limitations on registration for independent candidates. However observers agree that these manipulations had no influence on the
final result. Especially due to the popularity of his mentor Putin, Medvedev would have won
anyway. Though Putin’s poll ratings were at the peak observers noted for the first time minor
electoral-related protests of oppositional groups. From 2008 on a growing discontent with the
regime among parts of the population was noticeable.
Compared to both preceding Putin terms, for Medvedev’s presidency the data provide no evidence for further increase in election manipulation. Instead it was the perception of fraud that
changed during the State Duma elections in December 2011. In contrast to the preceding parliamentary polls this time many voters actively observed the electoral process in order to reveal potential violations. This led to the publication of many unofficial reports about manipulations, mainly via the uncensored Internet.
OSCE observers rated the voting procedures mainly positive but reported also serious violations during counting and tabulation processes. Group voting, vote buying, lack of transparency, previously filled in ballots, obvious ballot box stuffing, denial of access to polling stations for observers or the blocking of independent news and other regime-critical websites
38 have been noted. However this list contains no new practices of fraud. Thus counterintuitively, the 2011 State Duma elections did not mark the preliminary climax of election
fraud. Instead violations simply have been reported to a greater extent than before.
Concerning the 2012 presidential elections OSCE remarked a slight decline of fraud. However the polls again have been state-influenced to such an extent that Putin’s victory was never
in danger. The analysis shows that authorities used again the same methods in order to influence the outcome. With regard to the pre-election period these included the use of administrative resources, one-sided media coverage, limitations on independent candidate registration
and acts that should prevent the creation of political pluralism. On election day and especially
during counting and tabulation processes many cases of lacking transparency have been noted. Furthermore in order to influence the outcome additional ballots were thrown in the boxes
or results have been ‘adjusted’ during counting or tabulation. Inside the polling stations voters
have been intimated and were forced to make the ‘right’ choice. Rewards for the correct
choice were offered in some cases as well.
All in all, one could classify the development of the level of fraud in three categories. The
first one would be the period between 2000 and 2004 when the biggest increase of fraud can
be noticed. Back then Russia regressed from a state in transition towards democracy to an
authoritarian ruled country. The next category would be Putin’s second term as president
when a further decline of democratic election procedures is noticeable. However, the shift
was no that significant anymore as during his first term. Remarkable though is the fact that
the rise in election fraud can be closely associated with the consolidation of power by Putin.
Finally the last category represents the period between 2008 and 2012. However Medvedev’s
presidency is not characterized by further increase in election fraud. Instead the authorities
persisted with the usual methods of manipulation. The only significant novelty is the change
of perception of fraud. The attitude of many voters towards the electoral process changed. As
a result citizens actively monitored the polls to detect violations.
1.5. Conclusion
The analysis of OSCE reports provides evidence for election fraud during the relevant period.
However a constant increase in manipulation until 2012 cannot be confirmed. Indeed within
the first years of Putin rule the fraud increased dramatically but subsequently remained con 39 stant. Similar methods of manipulation have been used repeatedly during all elections. The
level of fraud thus could not provide a clear reason for the outbreak of the protests.
40 2. Colour Revolutions
In the recent past other former Soviet states have seen protests on the occasion of elections as
well. In some of these cases such rallies caused the downfall of an unpopular and undemocratic regime. In particular this was the case during the events in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan that became known as colour revolutions. In all three countries, regime changes took
place according to a similar pattern. Due to the concentration on a certain region scholars
even claim that the events influenced each other. It seems probable that an uprising in a
neighbouring country can have an impact on the population of a second one.145 How quick the
idea of political change could spread from one country to another showed the case of the Tulip Revolution. Shirin Akiner considers the 2005 Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan, as a direct
result of the Tulip Revolution in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan that same year.146 Akiner could not
find any religious or socio-economic factors that could have evoked the protests. In the end
the rallies have been crushed violently by Uzbek authorities, causing approximately 100
deaths. According to Akiner the most prevalent motive for the uprising was political, intended
as the first step of a regime change.147 That confirms that major political events can spread
and affect a broader region as well. Next to regional limitation, mutual support of civic groups
in the struggle against questionable regimes could also be a reason for the spreading idea of
staging an electoral-related revolution.
At first glance it is indeed tempting to associate these colour revolutions with the recent Russian protests. Especially the time of outbreak immediately after the proclamation of the alleged ‘outcomes’ of fraudulent elections, as it happened in Russia, has been a central feature
of the colour revolutions. Only now, from hindsight, we know that the Russian protests have
been shattered and no revolution took place. On the contrary, the Kremlin reinforced legal and
juridical measures to counter any attempts at a regime change.
With a view of the time of outbreak, however, we may still review the Russian post-election
protest movement and its later suppression as Russia’s colour revolution ‘that did not happen’. An examination of the common features of both the Russia’s protest movement and the
145
Abel Polese, Donnacha Ó Beacháin, ‘The Colour Revolution Virus and Authoritarian Anti-dotes‘, p. 112.
146
Sally N. Cummings, Understanding Central Asia – Politics and contested transformations,
London: Routledge 2012, p.81.
147
Shirin Akiner, ‘Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment’, Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2005, p. 10.
41 colour revolutions in general, clarifies whether we need to add the Russian events to the table
of attempted colour revolutions.
Therefore this chapter will concentrate on the general characteristics of the colour revolutions.
Among others, I want to focus on the driving forces behind these events and on the preconditions for success. After discussing the theoretical perspective, I will analyse successful events
in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as the failed Belarusian attempt of 2006.
2.1. Colour revolutions in theory
Before going into details about the characteristics it should be clear how the term colour revolution is defined. Since the 2003 Georgian regime change such an electoral-related transition
is labelled ‘colour revolution’. It owes its name to the symbolic use of colours in order to create a common identity, to promote solidarity among protesters, to convey a message or simply
to be visible. Events in Georgia thus became known as the Rose Revolution because of the
flower-wielding protesters whereas the Orange Revolution in Ukraine owes its name to the
colour adopted by the oppositional faction.148
In general, according to Abel Polese and his colleague Donnacha Ó Beacháin, experts on the
field of colour revolutions, the term stands for ‘non-violent protests arising from rigged elections, especially in the former socialist world’.149 However, it is not as simply as this definition appears to be. Above all the word revolution poses a problem. Ó Beacháin and Polese
argue that in our case ‘revolution’ has lost its original meaning. Traditionally, according to
Encyclopaedia Britannica, a revolution is ‘a major, sudden, and hence typically violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures.’150 However, one of the main
features of a colour revolution is its peaceful nature.
Furthermore Polese notes that no colour revolution did bring about a complete change of a
country’s political or social system. A striking example for this is Georgian president Mikheil
Saakhashvili who came to power through the Rose Revolution in 2003 but finally continued
to rule the country in some respects in a comparable questionable way as his predecessor Eduard Shevardnadze did.
148
Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Abel Polese, ‘Introduction – What’s in a colour?’, p. 7.
149
Ibid., p. 7.
150
Encyclopædia Britannica, ‘revolution’, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia
Britannica Inc., 2013, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/500584/revolution, accessed on 25 March 2013.
42 Therefore Polese rather defines colour revolutions as ‘a moment in the history of a country
where people, civil society and the opposition unite and challenge the legitimacy of a regime’.151 This interpretation implies also that ‘street protests and all the events that lead to
such rallies are the main dimension of a colour revolution’.152 I will apply this definition during my analysis of the Russian protests.
Polese adds that the difference between a coup and a colour revolution is the fact that only the
latter represents popular will and produces also evidence of this. Such evidence could be election results (many anti-incumbent votes, promoted through a preceding campaign against the
regime) or non-violent street protests of a large number of people. These, at least theoretically, can be seen as a strong indication for widespread popular discontent and for the fact that
people are no longer willing to accept electoral fraud. Polese emphasizes that especially the
non-violent character is the decisive feature. As a matter or fact, peaceful rallies stress the
difference between the democratic protesters and the authoritarian ruler. In addition, Polese
notes that ‘non-violence is more likely to attract sympathy and support from the international
community than an armed struggle’. This is of special importance because foreign support is
one of the more important elements of a colour revolution. ‘External forces (…) could offer
support to protesters, share knowledge, grant funds and put pressure on a regime to limit, or
avoid, repression of street protests’.153
That said, neither a high number of votes against the ruling party or the incumbent nor any
street protest could be achieved without the mobilisation of the population. Sharon Wolchik’s
analysis of colour revolutions emphasises popular activity. She studied colour revolutions in
order to establish the basic preconditions for their occurrence and suggested the following
model. It amounts to a kind of guideline for a peaceful regime change:
‘The basic elements included 1) a more united political opposition, committed to supporting a
common candidate; 2) energetic campaigns by civil society groups to register voters, get out
the vote, and inform citizens about issues and their rights; 3) the development of some form
of independent media or plans to counteract the state’s monopoly on communication; 4) pressure on incumbents to make the electoral playing field more level by increasing opposition
representation on electoral commissions and allowing the deployment of domestic and inter 151
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution’’, p. 426.
152
Ibid., p. 426.
153
Ibid., p. 427.
43 national election observers; 5) the use of exit polls and parallel vote counts; and 6) when incumbents refused to vacate office, mass protests and demonstrations’.154
This model shows clearly the relevance of the political opposition and civil society groups as
spearheads for such a regime change. Certainly not only these groups but also domestic and
external NGOs can play a role during an electoral revolution. In addition to that, particularly
Wolchik’s third point should not be underrated. Especially new technologies like the Internet,
social media or mobile phones as well as innovative campaigns, including rock concerts, bicycle tours or door-to-door canvassing were/are used (today) as additional tools to mobilise
the electorate.
Since the Serbian Revolution youth movements play an essential part during those regime
changes. These groups invented and headed those creative forms of campaigning. Otpor, the
Serbian movement is regarded as prototype for similar youth groups in Georgia (Kmara),
Ukraine (Pora) or Russia (Oborona).155 After the successful demise of Slobodan Milosevic the
leaders of Otpor began to share their experiences of non-violent struggle worldwide. Their
Centre for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies (CANVAS) focuses on ‘the transfer of
knowledge on strategies and tactics of non-violent struggle’.156 Similar to Gene Sharp, one of
the most influential scholars on the field of non-violent protests, CANVAS published a guide
for effective non-violent struggle.157 Understandably, authoritarian regimes fear that the population of their countries get access to these sources and may use them subsequently as inspiration in their struggle against the government.
However, the success of a colour revolution as a whole is not only based on the existence of a
comprehensive strategy of the protesters. Instead, it depends on the attitude of five main forces: the regime, the opposition, external actors, civil society and common people. In other
words, much depends on the attitude of the elite towards democratic values. In a regime with
only minor commitment to democracy and a policy of massive repression it could be difficult
to provoke and maintain a non-violent revolution. In addition, the degree of cohesion within
the elites is crucial because they have control over the security forces. Thus the elites deter-
154
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, p.64.
155
Ibid., p. 64.
156
CANVAS, ‘Who we are‘, http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/who-we-are, accessed
on 24 June 2013.
157
See: Srdja Popovic, Slobodan Djinovic, Andrej Milivojevic, Hardy Merriman and
Ivan Marovic, CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle, Serbia:
CANVAS, 2007.; Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy – A Conceptual Framework
for Liberation, East Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2010.
44 mine whether protests will be allowed or defeated.158 Second, the role of a functioning opposition as counterbalance to the existent regime seems evident. I mentioned the relevance of
external actors already above. It should be noted, though, that these external forces are actually of secondary importance because the initial spark for resistance needs to come from inside
a country. That is why the existence or non-existence of a civil society in a given country is of
central relevance. In case of popular discontent civil society groups may take the lead in a
movement. The last variable is obviously the population. If the majority of the population is
determined to struggle against a regime, a successful transition is possible.159
2.2. Colour revolutions in practice
After discussing the concept of the colour revolution from a theoretical perspective, it is now
time to concentrate shortly on genuine events. This will facilitate the examination of the Russian protests in the framework of colour revolutions. I will focus on Georgia and Ukraine for
the successful attempts and on Belarus as an example for a failed revolution.
2.2.1. Georgia
Even if other electoral-related protests preceded the Georgian revolution, the latter is regarded
as the first colour revolution. In November 2003, following fraudulent parliamentary elections, thousands of people protested peacefully in the capital Tbilisi against manipulations.
Independent exit polls differed significantly from official results. Civil society activists had
collected evidence for fraud which they spread via non-governmental media. International
observers from OSCE confirmed that the elections were not in line with international standards. Shortly after the polls the leaders of the oppositional parties united in order to organize
joint measures against the illegitimate winner Eduard Shevardnadze. As a result nationwide
street protests were organized, with hundred thousands of people demanding the resignation
of Shevardnadze and new elections. When prominent representatives of the opposition, to-
158
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution”, p. 429.
159
Donnacha Ó Beacháin, Abel Polese, ‘Introduction – What’s in a colour?’, pp. 7-9.
45 gether with thousands of protesters, occupied the parliament building, Shevardnadze officially
resigned on 23 November.160
During the period preceding the revolution, Georgia could be characterized as weak state.
Corruption has infected all layers of society. Security forces were badly equipped and trained.
Abuses of human rights in prisons and the absence of rule of law completed the picture. Large
parts of the population were extremely poor and the infrastructure was badly maintained. The
(ruling) Shevardnadze clan was mainly occupied with its business interests. As a consequence
the government had little authority outside the ministries.161 Still worse the elite was highly
fragmented and volatile in its support for the president.162 Similar to Putin’s Russia, the system was characterized by a ‘contract’ of mutual of non-interference: People who do not interfere in politics and business of the elite had nothing to fear.163
Even if there is no evidence for direct foreign involvement during the revolutionary weeks in
November, a long-term financial and educational support to local NGOs from organisations
like the UN, Council of Europe, USAID or the George Soros Open Society Foundation can be
confirmed.164 Georgian access to international organisations in the past paved the way for
western democracy promotion programmes. Based on this help, a new young (and well educated) Georgian elite has been created, which stood at the centre of the emerging civil society.
In addition, long before the 2003 elections several Georgian NGOs met with visitors from the
Serbian youth movement Otpor to discuss a ‘Serbian scenario’ in order to get rid of Shevardnadze. Out of these meetings an election campaign, similar to the Otpor 2000 strategy was
developed. One of the results was the creation of a Georgian youth movement called Kmara
(Enough!) that should play a supporting role during the revolution.165 Finally many NGOs,
together with the reformist political opposition and non-governmental media were able to
mobilize large parts of the population for the elections and the following protests. In January
2004 after new polls opposition leader Mikheil Saakashvili was elected new Georgian president.166
160
Francoise J. Companjen, ‘Georgia’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The
Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010, pp. 13-29, pp. 14-16.
161
Ibid., pp. 18-19.
162
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution”, p. 435.
163
Ibid., p. 26.
164
Ibid., pp. 19-22.
165
Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in the Former Soviet Union, Aldershot: Ashgate 2005, pp. 179; 186.
166
Francoise J. Companjen, ‘Georgia’, pp. 27; 24.
46 As a last point, according Jonathan Wheatley, the revolution was only possible because the
regime was ‘either incapable of using or unwilling to use repression to resist the wave of
demonstrations (…); at the crucial moment the police abstained from using force against the
protesters’.167 Indeed, immediately after the polls, Shevardnadze took last-minute decisions to
still prevent the outbreak of a revolution: Minister of State, Avtandil Jorbenadze, forced the
head of independent television station, Rustavi-2 not to publish any exit polls. The latter
though withstood the pressure and provided crucial information for the opposition.168
In response to the first protests, Shevardnadze send one of his allies to Armenia, Azerbaijan
and Russia to request support for the regime.169 However, especially Moscow’s patience with
Shevardnadze had already run out before the 2003 elections. Since the Pankisi Crisis in summer 2002 the relations between both countries had plummeted. As Wheatley notes, ‘Russia
accused Georgia of allowing Chechen terrorists to cross from Georgia into Russia and complained that Georgia was either unable or unwilling to deal with them’.170 Therefore it is not
surprising that the Kremlin in 2003 was not willing to help Shevardnadze. When Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov flew in to Tbilisi one morning to actually promote dialogue between the conflicting parties, he himself was surprised about the progress of the revolution
because that same day in the evening Shevardnadze would have resigned. Russia though did
not play any noteworthy role during the whole process.171
Before his resignation Shevardnadze’s last attempt to counter the oppositional rallies included
the organisation of pro-governmental counterdemonstrations. State-employees have been
forced to partake but many unwilling participants slipped away on the first occasion that emphasized the president’s unpopularity within the apparatus of state.172 These demonstrations
thus could in no sense oppose those of the anti-governmental camp. Furthermore Shevardnadze not only lost support among the population or parts of the security apparatus but also
among his political allies. Formerly loyal parties decided to stay neutral and thereby boosted
the president’s isolation. Still worse, people from his inner circle cut him off from all communication. In the last days before his removal, Shevardnadze thus received none or only
167
Jonathan Wheatley, ‘Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution’, p. 191.
168
Ibid., p. 182.
169
Ibid., p. 183.
170
Ibid., p. 177.
171
Ibid., p. 190.
172
Ibid., p. 184.
47 wrong information about the events. This surely contributed to his inaction because he was
told that everything was under control.173
Summing up, next to the comprehensive strategy of the opponents, the weakness of his regime played a major role for the success of the Rose Revolution. The president had no authority and support among large parts of the elites anymore. The latter was not willing to use force
against the population in the name of a defeated president. Therefore any steps of Shevardnadze to prevent the revolution were foredoomed to fail.
2.2.2. Ukraine
Hardly one year later similar events took place in Ukraine. In November 2004 the second
round of the presidential elections was marked by widespread fraud. This included restrictions
on oppositional election workers, multiple voting, postal ballot violations and an unusual high
number of mobile ballot boxes. In addition, compared to the first round, turnout figures shifted suspiciously. According to the Central Election Commission, pro-Russian candidate Viktor
Yanukovych had won by a margin of 49.5 to 46.6 per cent. Subsequently supporters of the
pro-western oppositional candidate Viktor Yushchenko began to protest in the streets of Kiev.
Their independent exit polls showed that actually the latter had won by a margin of 52 to 43
per cent. As Joshua A. Tucker remarks, the protesters were well prepared to endure also a
longer period of protest. Tents, stages for bands and speakers, bans on the use of alcohol and
regular garbage removals are a proof of that.174 On the day after the runoff up to 300.000 Kyivites came to the city’s Maidan Square to emphasize that Yushchenko was the legitimate
winner.
In the long run, the meanwhile nationwide existence and persistence of peaceful rallies forced
the authorities to take steps. In fact, this turned the elections and the protests into a revolution.175 The Supreme Court declared the fraudulent run-off to be invalid. In December new
polls have been hold with Yushchenko as winner by a margin of 52.0 to 44.2 per cent.176
173
Ibid., 187-188.
174
Joshua A. Tucker, ‘Orange in a Shade of Gray: Electoral Fraud, Corruption, and Protest in
the Orange Revolution’, in: D’Anieri, Paul (ed.), Orange revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2010, pp. 23-46, pp. 23-24.
175
Nathaniel Copsey, ‘Ukraine’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour
Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge
2010, pp. 30-44, p. 41.
176
Joshua A. Tucker, ‘Orange in a Shade of Gray’, p. 24.
48 A central feature of the Orange Revolution was that a unified opposition had already formed
prior to the 2004 elections. It was based on cross-party repugnance of former president
Kuchma and his entourage. A major political scandal in 2000 had irrevocably undermined the
president’s credibility. Published recordings proved his involvement in the kidnapping of the
later murdered critical journalist Georgiy Gongadze. The subsequent general public outrage
has lead to the unification of several oppositional parties and civic groups, among them the
Pora! (It’s time!) Youth Movement.177
Nathaniel Copsey remarked that during the 2004 electoral campaign the opposition profited
also from ‘negligence, arrogance or outright stupidity of the old regime’. Especially the negative coverage about the oppositional candidate on state-controlled TV was exorbitant and
therefore unlikely. Due to limitations of access to national media the opposition had to work
together with civic groups in order to spread their message at the grass-roots level. Another
fact that bound oppositional forces together was the poisoning of pro-western candidate
Yushchenko at the end of the campaign. The regime thus unintentionally created a huge bloc
of opponents that was extremely determined to win the elections.178
Copsey also notes that high degree of corruption and other shortcomings let the system engulf
in a crisis already long before the Orange Revolution. This already existing discontent among
parts of the population facilitated the outbreak of the protests. Thus, prior to the 2004 elections, Ukrainians had shaken off their Soviet-style passivity. In addition, the growing prosperity of the people contributed to dissatisfaction with the Kuchma-system. Especially corruption
hampered the business interests of an expanding middle class.179
External actors also did play a role during the events. However, their impact should not be
overrated. It is clear that EU and United States supported Yushchenko whereas Russia openly
promoted the election of Russian-orientated candidate Yanukovych. The involvement of the
West focused mainly on the training of civil society groups and public support for the prowestern camp. Russia, on the contrary, engaged more actively in the run-up to the elections by
providing political advisers and money for Yanukovych’s campaign. In addition to that, Russian president Putin personally came to Ukraine demonstrating his support for the candidate.
For the Kremlin the elections were of special importance because Moscow sought to increase
its influence in former Soviet countries, of which Ukraine was one of largest and economical 177
Nathaniel Copsey, ‘Ukraine’, p. 34.
178
Ibid., pp. 34-35.
179
Ibid., 40-41.
49 ly and strategically most important.180 However, despite the involvement of external forces,
the actual determination to change the regime had its origins in the country itself.
Of special importance for the electoral campaign, but above all for the subsequent protests,
was the use of independent digital communication. Michael McFaul notes that ‘The Orange
Revolution may have been the first in history to be organized largely online’. 181 Activists
created for example an independent online discussion board in order to share ideas and experiences about the protests.182 This is in an excellent illustration for the ‘development of some
form of independent media or plans to counteract the state’s monopoly on communication’
that Sharon Wolchik sees as one precondition for a successful regime change.183
Back in 2004,Ukraine was characterised by un-free self-censored mainstream media. Therefore a ‘vibrant alternative media environment, primarily online’ was essential in order to present uncensored information about the elections and possible manipulations.184 Joshua Goldstein, however, rightly wonders how many Ukrainians had access to these alternative sources.
Figures show that only between two and four per cent of the population of 48 million had
access to the Internet in 2004. Thus offline networks were much more crucial. Internet activists approached well-connected people like investigative journalists, human right lawyers or
students. These were asked to forward their messages among non-Internet users.185
Nonetheless, ‘the Internet and mobile phones helped spread jokes, puns and skits’ that contributed to the decision and opinion making process. Goldstein notes that ‘satire, jokes and
puns were often created in online chat rooms but were then distributed via mobile phone or
live at protests to hundred thousands of people’.186 Ukrainian activists used humour not only
to mobilize people but at the same time to motivate protesters to sustain. For Henry Jenkins
the role of the Internet in such a protest movement is essential because it makes ‘more channels of subversion available to opinion makers and other leaders’.187 The way of managing the
protests with the aid of the Internet or SMS in order to coordinate training for voluntary election observers, policy discussions or tactics during the street protests was unprecedented.
180
Ibid., pp. 35-39.
181
Joshua Goldstein, ’The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution’, p.4.
182
Ibid., p. 4.
183
Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, p.64.
184
Joshua Goldstein, ’The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian Orange
Revolution’., pp. 6-8.
185
Ibid., p. 9.
186
Ibid., p. 11.
187
Ibid., p. 13.
50 However, the persistence of the demonstration was only possible because of the regime’s passivity. Similar to Eduard Shevardnadze, Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, at the end of his
presidency, had only limited authority left. Prior to the 2004 elections the elite had already
split into several factions. Consequently, both Kuchma as president and Yanukovych as prime
minister could not profit from the benefit of the incumbent.188 Thus a campaign in favour of
the regime, backed unanimously by the whole elite, was simply not conceivable.
In addition, the fragmentation of the elite prevented the use of violence by the ruler. Polese
notes that, ‘after receiving an oral order to use violence in order to move the people from the
centre of Kiev, the Minister of the Interior replied that he would do it only upon receipt of a
written order that would liberate him from responsibilities’.189 In addition, immediately after
the polls the mayor of Kiev first declared the election results invalid and secondly guaranteed
the non-intervention of the city’s security forces during potential protests.190
Kuchma not only lost authority among the political elite but also within the security apparatus
itself. Paul D’Anieri’s assessment of their behaviour, prior and during the events, demonstrates that the security forces even encouraged the protests. Following the polls they made no
effort to prevent access to Maidan Square. Quite the contrary they signalled that the capital
would be freely accessible and protesters would not be arrested. During the demonstrations
top officials of the intelligence agency Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) addressed the
masses from the stage at Maidan Square, encouraging them to continue the protests. D’Anieri
remarks that, ‘once the crisis started, the elites (…) defected wholesale to the opposition forces. 191
This inner division of the regime boosted the chances of the opposition considerably. Finally
it was the close interaction between a united political opposition, civil activism, new communication technologies and passivity of the regime that contributed to the emergence and success of the Orange Revolution.
188
Nathaniel Copsey, ‘Ukraine’, p. 33.
189
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution”, p. 434.
190
Paul D’Anieri, ‘‘Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions‘,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 3/2006, pp.331-350, p. 344.
191
Ibid., pp. 344-345.
51 2.2.3. Belarus
After looking at two successful electoral revolutions I would like to contrast the events in
Georgia and Ukraine, albeit shortly, with a failed attempt. Even if the electoral-related protests of March 2006 in Belarus did not result in a regime change, similarities with the colour
revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan were evident. Ustina Markus notes that there
was a strident opposition, including political parties and youth movements that had contact
with foreign anti-Lukashenko groups. In addition there was some support from the international community and finally cases of electoral fraud to spark a revolution. Incumbent president Alexander Lukashenko won the presidential elections with allegedly 82.6 per cent of the
votes.192
In view of limitations on candidate registration, intimidation of opponents and critical NGOs,
pressure on independent media and violations on the election day, large numbers of oppositional voters started to protest peacefully on October Square in the centre of Minsk.193 However these rallies lasted only one week, before riot police dissolved them and arrested its leaders. This marked the end of the attempted revolution.
Despite similarities with events in Georgia or Ukraine the failure of the Belarusian movement
can be explained easily. Ustina Markus speaks of several key differences. The degree of political repression was much higher, the regime hampered the work of independent media to a
greater extent and the opposition did not form a cohesive bloc. Finally Lukashenko simply
enjoyed great support among large parts of the elite and population.194
In terms of political repression Belarus ranges among countries like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. It is extremely dangerous to openly display opposition to president Lukashenko because
the regime uses a range of repressive instruments to silence its critics, among them the death
penalty. During the pre-election period oppositional candidates have been arrested regularly,
including presidential candidate Alexander Kazulin.195
Another important difference to the successful colour revolutions was the fact that Belarusian
polices forces were well paid and largely owed their positions to Lukashenko. Logically they
were beholden to the president. Therefore a large switch to the side of the protesters, similar
192
Ustina Markus, ‘Belarus’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010,
pp. 118-135, p. 118.
193
Ibid., pp.122-123.
194
Ibid., p. 118.
195
Ibid., p. 124.
52 to Ukraine, seemed unlikely.196 Finally in view of all these obstacles the opposition could not
mobilize enough Belarusians to bring about a regime change.
2.3. Conclusion
Both the analysis of the theoretical and practical perspectives provided a comprehensive picture of the main features of the colour revolutions. Generally speaking, these were events that
represented ‘a moment in the history of a country where people, civil society and the opposition unite and challenge the legitimacy of a regime’.197 In every case this moment has come in
the course of fraudulent national elections.
In sum, the success of a colour revolution obviously depends on the behaviour of five groups
of actors: the regime, the opposition, external actors, civil society and the common people.
These actors have to be either weak or strong in their manifestation. More precisely this
means that in a less repressive regime a colour revolution is more likely to succeed because
opponents benefit from more freedom than their counterparts in highly authoritarian states. In
such a climate a strong opposition could emerge. We have seen that in Georgia and Ukraine
anti-governmental forces pursued their activities without too many limitations already prior to
the actual challenge of the regime. On the other side, the attempted revolution in Belarus was
from the beginning ill-fated because of the repressive character of the state.
Of special interest are the reaction patterns of the elites that control the security forces. In a
stable regime it is more likely that these are loyal to the ruler and, in case of such an order,
would engage in crushing demonstrations. On the contrary, in a weak regime, where the elite
is fragmented and the president isolated, it is more likely that protests would not be crushed
because the security forces refuse to take action. Thus large-scale protests can only emerge
and persist if the regime is either unwilling or unable to use violence. Both could indicate a
fragmentation or, like in Ukraine, a massive defection of the elites and security forces.
In general the driving forces behind the colour revolutions were domestic political parties,
civil society groups and larger parts of the population. External forces could play a supportive
196
Ibid., p. 131.
197
Abel Polese, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour)
Revolution", p. 426.
53 role, providing trainings, transfer of knowledge or funds. The use of independent media was
essential for the mobilisation of people and organisation of protests.
As a rule, colour revolutions proceeded according to a similar pattern. First there was a popularity decline of the regime that facilitated the unification of the opposition. Together with
civil society groups opponents set up an anti-incumbent election campaign that included the
preparation for non-violent post-election protests. Subsequently, in case of election manipulation and the refusal of the illegitimate winner to leave the office, rallies were organized. Due
to pre-election mobilization of large parts of the population the movements could quickly
mobilise a solid support base. However, in the end always the security forces determine
whether protests will break out and persist. In sum, if one or more of the mentioned crucial
factors are not present, attempts at a colour revolution seem to be deemed to fail.
54 3. Russia’s non-happening colour revolution
Following the analysis of the colour revolutions, the last chapter deals with the reaction of the
Kremlin towards these events in its near abroad. I will examine to what extent Moscow observed these regime changes and whether the Kremlin took steps to prevent similar attempts
at home.
Subsequently, based on the findings of the first chapter I explore the connection between the
recent Russian elections and the following electoral-related protests. A central question will
be whether ballot rigging was the main reason or whether other developments in the country
did play a role for unleashing the wave of demonstrations.
Finally, I discuss the question in how far the events could be labelled as ‘Russia’s nonhappening colour revolution’. In the second chapter we have seen the characteristics of those
regime changes. In addition, I suggested that the success depended on the behaviour of five
groups of actors, including the regime itself, the opposition, external actors, civil society and
the common people. In the context of the Russian protests I analyse whether characteristics of
the colour revolutions have been present with respect to all of the five groups or actors. By
analysing the contributions (or the lack thereof), I hope to figure out which group out of these
five actors could held be responsible for the failure of the Russian attempt at a regime change.
3.1. Moscow and the colour revolutions abroad
The 2003 and 2004 events in Georgia and Ukraine doubtless alarmed the Kremlin. Russian
elites feared the spread of the revolutionary wave into Russia. Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak M.
Brudny note that as a result, the Kremlin initiated strategies to prevent a similar non-violent
regime change in Russia since 2005. The authors argue further that these policies ‘focused on
precisely the fields crucial for colour revolution success’. Striking was the fact that the Kremlin turned democracy promotion methods into democracy prevention strategies. 198
As a first direct reaction to the Orange Revolution, Moscow openly labelled the events as violent coups that presented a serious threat to Russia’s national security. Hence in January 2005
the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergei Ivanov, clarified what Russia planned to counter at-
198
Evgeny Finkel & Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, Democratization, 19:1, (2012), pp. 15-36, pp. 15-16.
55 tempts at a colour revolution on own soil.199 This included restrictions on civil society, changes in electoral legislation, further limitations on independent media and, in order to increase
the regime’s popularity among young people, the creation of a pro-governmental mass youth
movement. In addition the regime’s ideologists propagated the term ‘sovereign democracy’
that should legitimize the planned undemocratic transformations and restrictions on freedom
in the country.200
The Kremlin identified (foreign funded) NGOs, domestic and foreign election observers and
anti-governmental youth groups as the main factors for the emergence of a colour revolution.
According to Moscow, especially external (western) support of these groups amounted to an
unauthorized foreign involvement in Russian affairs. As a consequence, from 2005 on the
Kremlin intensified its already existing struggle against civil society and to a special degree
against NGOs.201 This included strict regulation on the latters’ work or financing and frequent
intimidation of staff, through interrogation by the domestic intelligence service, FSB. Cases
of violence have been noted, as well as the loss of job because of active membership in a critical NGO. In addition, homepages and servers are regularly exposed to virtual and real attacks, 202 In 2012 Putin signed a new, highly controversial law that classifies all members of
foreign funded NGOs as “foreign agents”. All organisations that receive money from foreign
countries need to register. In addition, they are subjected to strict financial control. Cases of
an infringement will be punished with heavy fines or prison. 203 Next to the active struggle
against these organisations, the Kremlin sought to control civil society by creating new political institutions like the Civic Chamber. It should ostensibly serve as a connecting link between citizens, NGOs and authorities but this official state body was obviously designed to
exercise state control over civic activities, too.204
With regard to international election observers and especially towards those of the OSCE, the
Kremlin began questioning their legitimacy openly. Tensions had been present already since
the very negative OSCE assessment of the 2004 presidential elections (see chapter 1.3.4.).
However, after the Orange Revolution Moscow intensified its rhetorical attacks against the
199
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’, p. 138.
200
Evgeny Finkel & Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, p. 16.
201
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’., pp. 138-140.
202
Denis Volkov, ‘Im Stau – Russlands Zivilgesellschaft’, Osteuropa, Vol. 61. 10/2011, pp.
47-60, p. 58.
203
No author, ‘Russland: Putin unterzeichnet umstrittenes Agenten-Gesetz’, Spiegel Online,
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/russland-putin-unterzeichnet-ngo-gesetz-a845640.html, accessed on 26 June 2013.
204
Evgeny Finkel & Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, p. 17.
56 organisation, claiming that the OSCE provoked political and social unrest in Russia’s periphery. In addition, Moscow threatened to block its payments to OSCE.205 The hostile attitude
towards the organisation influenced also the 2007/2008 Russian national elections when
OSCE finally refused to send observers. In the light of its strategy, this has been an acceptable
outcome for the Kremlin because in this way the ability of OSCE to publicize election fraud
was eliminated.
In order to counter the influence of critical youth groups and to prevent the youth from drifting towards revolution, especially with regard to the election period of 2007 and 2008, the
Kremlin created allegedly independent but de facto governmental-managed youth movements. The biggest and the best known was the highly nationalistic, state-funded, “Nashi”
(“Ours”) whose only aim was ‘to block the possibility of an Orange revolution in Russia during elections’.206 In addition, this organisation, designed by the Kremlin’s chief ideologue
Vladislav Surkov and political consultant Gleb Pavlovsky, should integrate the politically
apathetic youth in pro-governmental actions, including the modernisation of the state in accordance with Putin’s policy. Nashi became known for its mass street protests against regime
critics and the West including the latter’s allegedly hostile intentions against the country. The
Kremlin sought to prevent the influence of western-style movements because western democracy promotion has been crucial during the colour revolutions. In order to marginalise oppositional protest, Nashi’s was regularly used for counterdemonstrations, often providing a bigger
crowd than those of the opponents. 207
Nashi imitated features and behaviour of the colour revolution youth movements, like rock
concerts or artistic performances during mass protests. Finkel and Brudny speak of an imitation of ‘carnival-style techniques’. In addition, Nashi used the Internet as major platform for
information, organisation and indoctrination. In order to counter the threat of independent exit
polls, during the 2007 and 2008 elections, Nashi members acted as election observers, in the
name of three pro-governmental parties, United Russia, Free Russia and Just Russia.
The movement supported president Putin in a way that reminded observers of the Stalin personality cult. Nashi even held a mass rally to celebrate Putin’s birthday. In contrast to Otpor,
Kmara or Pora, Nashi was also ready to use violence against opponents. Several attacks on
regime-critics, among them Garry Kasparov, were reported. 208 During the Medvedev term
the Orange threat, and thus the main reason for the existence of Nashi, was almost non 205
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’, p. 136.
206
Ibid., p. 141.
207
Evgeny Finkel & Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, pp. 19-21; 23.
208
Ibid., pp. 22-24.
57 existent. The movement had to reorient. Therefore it started to concentrate on pro-regime education that could also serve as strategy to guarantee the regime’s popularity and survival.209
Next, in order to counter the western approach, the Kremlin redefined its understanding of
democracy. Putin’s ideologists invented the term “sovereign democracy”. In fact this notion
served to veil the real undemocratic character of the system. It should legitimize the strengthening of authoritarian influence of the Kremlin on the Russian political and social system. 210
In this light, the ruling elite constantly stressed that a Russian colour revolution would bring
back the chaotic days of the Yeltsin era. The notion sovereign democracy should stress Russia’s character as a secular and European nation, but nonetheless with its own non-western
interpretation of democracy. However, the concept came under criticism from Russian nationalists, who demanded that Russia rather should isolate itself from the West and concentrate on its (religious) roots. Finkel and Brudny finally remark that the project of sovereign
democracy has lost its appeal among the ruling elite. Instead, during Medvedev’s presidency
state-funded think tanks promoted a more western-style approach of democracy.211
Other direct reactions to the colour revolutions included Moscow’s strategy to accuse the
West of not sticking to liberal and democratic values either. This strategy served mainly to
distract criticism from Russia.212 Another point to prevent the spread of a revolutionary wave
in the region was the support of other authoritarian regimes, in particular the Belarusian. This
included diplomatic and political support as well as positive coverage about Lukashenko on
Russian television. In addition, the Belarusian opposition was criticized and Western governments have been accused of interfering in Belarusian affairs. 213
After regime changes have been accomplished in Georgia and Ukraine and direct influence on
the events became impossible, Moscow proceeded to subvert the new governments. Political
and economic relations between Russia and both countries deteriorated sharply. In the
Ukrainian case Moscow even used its natural resources as instrument of power. After new
Ukrainian president Yushchenko demanded in 2005 the abolishment of bartering in the Russian-Ukrainian gas trade, Gazprom, in close collaboration with the Kremlin, took the opportunity to raise prices for Russian natural gas considerably. In contrast to a pre-election agree 209
Ibid., p. 26.
210
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’, pp. 141-143.
211
Evgeny Finkel & Yitzhak M. Brudny, ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, pp. 27-30.
212
Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Russia’, pp. 143-144.
213
Ibid., pp. 144-145.
58 ment, concluded with then president Kuchma, the new prices were much higher. Gazprom
demanded first 90 then 160 and finally towards the end of 2005 230 dollar per 1000 cubic
metres natural gas. Yushchenko however, was willing to pay only a fair market price that
back then amounted to about 110 dollar. Due to the fact that by the end of the year no accord
has been signed, as from 1 January 2006 Gazprom suspended its gas supplies until the
Ukrainians agreed to the new prices. Observers note that the so-called ‘gas war’ could be regarded in the first place as foreign-policy campaign of the Kremlin. Due to the fact that
Ukraine was and still is a transit country for European gas supplies, the conflict had an impact
on the whole continent. 214
Seeing all these measures taken by the Kremlin, one point is striking. The prohibition of election fraud is not mentioned at all. Bearing in mind that the street protests during the colour
revolutions were also caused by public outrage about manipulations, one could assume that at
least efforts would have been taken to limit level of fraud in upcoming elections, in order to
prevent protests. However, the Kremlin continued to do little against rigging elections simply
because the initiated strategies made sure that there was nobody who would oppose these
practices.
To sum up, Russia initiated a comprehensive strategy to prevent the emergence of a colour
revolution on own soil. The Kremlin analysed the central features of the colour revolutions
and identified its main driving forces. Subsequently Moscow’s policy was to systematically
target these actors. Especially pro-democracy NGOs working in Russia became victims of
sharp repression. In addition the Kremlin sought to imitate colour revolution strategies in order to use them for its own purposes. This included in particular the formation of a progovernmental youth movement. Thus the ruling elite strengthened its control on political and
social life.
3.2. Connection between fraud and protests
Returning to the issue of election fraud but taking into consideration the implemented strategies of the Kremlin to counter attempts at a colour revolution, an electoral-related protest
movement should be theoretically impossible in Russia. However, in practice the country saw
in 2011 and 2012 its biggest protests since the 1990s. Especially striking was the time of out 214
Valery Panyushkin, Mikhail Sygar, Gazprom – Das Geschäft mit der Macht, München:
Droemer Verlag, 2008, pp. 191-199.
59 break, after fraudulent national elections, and the unprecedented civic involvement. Before
examining whether characteristics of the colour revolutions have been present and whether
the events could be labelled as ‘Russia’s non-happening colour revolution’, I want to discuss
first whether there was a connection between election fraud and the outbreak of the rallies. An
important point to establish will be why people protested precisely at this stage and not after
any of the preceding elections.
With regard to the rallies, I mentioned that they first erupted in the biggest cities and subsequently spread to other urban areas throughout the country. According to a sample of the
Levada Centre the protest movement mainly included members of the growing middle class
and several (non)-political opponents of the regime.215 It is clear that the initial protests were
related to the State Duma elections in December 2011. However, given the fact that there was
no hard evidence for a new dimension of manipulation (see chapter 1.4.) there must have been
other reasons for people to protest. One could assume that election fraud was rather the last
link in a chain of widespread abuse of power of the ruling elite and the resulting growing discontent among a part of the population.
Experts noted that already towards the end of last decade the tensions within society began to
loom. Finally at the end of the 2000s the growing and independent thinking urban middle
class started to demand its political voice. Consequently, Maria Lipman claims that the protests illustrated a breach between the regime and this part of the Russian population.216
3.2.1. Urban middle class
In the contemporary political landscape this social group has no representation at all. The
Russian policy focuses rather on other, less prosperous social classes. Nevertheless a change
of the political course is needed because of demographic change. Whereas in the beginning of
the new century the middle class constituted only 15 per cent of the total population, in 2010
this number grew out to more than 25 per cent. Today the middle class is the biggest social
group of the Russian population, comprising around one-third of the adult population. 217
However, it should be noted that only a small part of this middle class really participated in
the protest movement.
215
Benno Ennker, ‘Russland in Bewegung’,p. 54.
216
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, p. 13.
217
Sergei Belanovsky, (et al.), ’Bewegung in Russland – Der Aufstieg der Mittelschicht und
die politischen Folgen’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp. 79-99, p. 83.
60 In general, people from the middle class live a much more affluent life than those from other
social classes. Significantly higher wages allow the purchase of properties like cars, houses or
other consumer goods. In contrast to the rural population, middle class people are more often
highly educated, have sometimes work experience abroad and frequently prefer a western
(influenced) life style, including democratic norms and values. Furthermore they make much
more use of modern communication technologies like the Internet. As a consequence (statecontrolled) TV plays only a small part in their life. This is an important point because the uncensored Internet serves them as alternative platform for an unlimited exchange of ideas and
for independent opinion making. 218
Therefore, in view of the authoritarian character of present-day Russia, including its government’s strategy to counter criticism, it is reasonable to assume that there exists mutual suspicion between the middle class and the state. Due to the widespread preferential treatment of
the rich and the powerful many middle class people demand equality before the law. The rule
of law and a better economic climate is of special importance for the upper middle class who
forms the business elite of Russia. With regard to the persisting economic and political stagnation and the many unredeemed promises by the political leaders it is logic that the wish for
comprehensive reforms increases among the middle class.219
In view of the immediate pre-election period, the announced transfer of power from
Medvedev to Putin and the fear of twelve more years of authoritarian rule therefore certainly
came as a severe blow to the middle class. This move annihilated any hopes for change. The
fact that Medvedev admitted that this switch of position has been arranged already in 2007
evoked massive outrage among the critical part of the middle class. This cynical manipulation
showed the ruling elite’s attitude towards the population. Apparently they felt safe and reckoned on the same indifference of the voters known from preceding elections.220
However the regime underestimated the determination of the urban middle class citizens who
were not willing to accept anymore the unlimited power of the ruling elite. Observers see
Putin’s decision to return to presidency therefore as the main reason for the protests.221 With
regard to my analysis of the OSCE reports and the lacking evidence for an increase in election
fraud I would subscribe to this opinion.
However other developments in the Russian society should be taken into consideration as
well in order to provide a comprehensive explanation for the rallies. So far the regime offered
218
Ibid., pp. 84-86.
219
Sergei Belanovsky, (et al.), ’Bewegung in Russland’, pp. 79 – 91.
220
Benno Ennker, ‘Russland in Bewegung’, p. 43.
221
Ivan Krastev, Stephen Holmes, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, p. 41.
61 the whole population two social contracts, one for the conservative majority and one for the
liberal middle class. With the aid of the oil incomes the loyalty of the first has been bought.
Civil servants, older people and those with lower-incomes profited from increasing salaries,
pensions or social benefits.222 This majority of the population, often living in rural areas and
smaller towns, forms until today the main electorate of United Russia and Putin.223 With regard to the more liberal-minded urban middle class the regime offered those people unlimited
freedom in terms of business, leisure and life style, as long as they stay out of politics. Yet the
protests in 2011 and 2012 made clear that especially this middle class was not willing to accept anymore this unwritten law of non-interference in politics.224
3.2.2. Civil society
Nonetheless, a demographic change does not explain why people got past their fear to massively oppose the regime in public. In view of the fact that preceding elections have been
fraudulent to a similar extent but massive protests were lacking, something must have
changed in the attitude of the voters.
Probably the most important point for the actual decision to protest on the streets was the
newly developed willingness and the courage of citizens to publicly show their discontent
with the regime. Apparently, during Medvedev’s presidency many people grew in new civic
self-confidence. An increasing number of ‘heroes’ of civil courage inspired formerly passive
citizens. Examples of these heroes are police agents who addressed via Youtube the problem
of corruption within the law enforcing authorities, people from the justice apparatus who admit that sentences have been passed by order of the ruling elite or Internet bloggers who accuse state officials of widespread corruption.
A growing number of people thus finally dared to oppose openly the ruling elite and its questionable practices. This changing attitude is one result of people’s increasing engagement in
civil society groups. Despite the state regulations on civic activism, rising numbers of local
protests against illegal practices and injustices throughout the whole country could be noticed
already long before the electoral-related protests. This included protest movements of residents and environmentalists against the construction of a motorway through the forest of
Muscovite suburban town, Chimki or against a planned pipeline near the Lake Baikal. Fur 222
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, pp. 10-13
223
Lev Gudkov, ‘Russland in der Sackgasse – Stagnation, Apathie, Niedergang’, Osteuropa,
Vol. 61, 10/2011, pp. 21-45, p. 26.
224
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, pp. 10-13.
62 thermore up to 10.000 people demonstrated in 2010 in Kaliningrad against the government’s
social policy.225
This growing civic activism is not self-evident in an authoritarian state that seeks to control
every aspect of political and social life. In addition, people with critical opinions always have
to fear repression by the state. Thus likewise important for the emergence of the protests was
the progressive activity of the civil society.
According to a definition the civil society is the social space between individuals or families
and the state. In other words it is the autonomous counterpart to the state. The civil society
consists of people who unite on a voluntarily basis in order to do something charitable. Simplified we can distinguish three groups of actors within the civil society: non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), groups that produce social capital (Cultural, sports or religious associations) and non-governmental charity organisations (Catholic charitable services or the Red
Cross). Theoretically NGOs play the central role in civil activism. NGO members want to
engage politically but without party membership or a function within the state apparatus.
They should act as mediator between state and society in order to foster mutual trust.226
However, in Russia both society and state are in a deep crisis, lacking mutual confidence.
Especially since the coming to power of Putin the work of NGOs was severely restricted.
From his second term on, the state even sought actively to control and to interfere in the work
of these organisations. As already mentioned the main reason to discipline NGOs in Russia
have been the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. During these regime changes domestic and foreign funded non-governmental organisations played a central role. Out of fear
for similar events on own soil the Kremlin logically sought to marginalize the work of any
critical NGO active in Russia.227
Due to the fact that the work of domestic and foreign NGOs was restricted to such an extent,
other forms of civic engagement have developed recently. Those mainly informal groups and
protest movements focused on issues that affect the direct environment of the people. The
already mentioned local protests throughout the country were the consequence. In this context, media coverage spread via the Internet generated nation-wide attention.228
225
Benno Ennker, ‘Russland in Bewegung’, pp. 47-48.
226
Jens Siegert, ‘An der Weggabelung – Zivilgesellschaft und Politik in Russland’, Osteuropa, Vol. 61, 10/2011, pp. 61-75, pp. 61-63.
227
Ibid., pp. 67-69.
228
Ibid., p. 70.
63 The Kremlin made the mistake of underestimating these movements. The politicization of
these informal civic groups brought them closer to political opposition groups. Consequently
a potential group of protest voters developed. The hasty initiated strategy of the Kremlin to
compromise these regime opponents turned out to be too late and counterproductive. What
that precisely meant for the protests will be discussed hereafter. However it is likely that this
heated up the atmosphere still more.229
3.3. Protest movement 2011/2012
I will focus now on the protest movement and its characteristics in order to determine whether
we could speak of ‘Russia’s colour revolution that did not happen’. In order to detect similarities with colour revolutions abroad, I relate the five main factors for the success of such a regime change with the Russian protests of 2011 and 2012. These five main factors have been
the regime, the opposition, external actors, civil society and the common people. Because of
the current disruption of the protest movement, I focus on those aspects that could be held
responsible for the failure of the Russian attempt at a regime change.
First, it should be noted that, even if for Russian circumstances the protests have been remarkably big, the demonstrators represented only a very small minority of the Russian population. 230 The small group of the creative urban middle class, including artists and writers,
formed the backbone of the movement.231
Nevertheless, the demonstrations following the State Duma elections on 4 December 2011
marked the beginning of an extended wave of protests against the Russian regime. Political
observers spoke about the awakening of the Russian civil society. The mainly urban, higheducated participants not only demanded the revocation of the manipulated official election
results and the liberation of political prisoners but also the right to register oppositional parties
as well as the adoption of new democratic electoral law.232
Next to the massive street rallies other artistic forms of protests ermerged. This included
hacker attacks on homepages of state-owned enterprises and the online publication of sarcas 229
Vladimir Gelman, ‘Risse im System’, pp. 32-35.
230
Boris Dubin, , ‘Ende der Alternativlosigkeit – Russlands Gesellschaft im Übergang’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 6-8/2012, pp. 85-100, p. 94.
231
Dmitri Golynko, ‘Das Ende der Apathie – Russland Protestbewegung‘, Osteuropa, Vol.
62, 6-8/2012, pp. 229-240, pp. 229; 231.
232
Aleksandr Kynev, ‘Kontrollverlust, Manipulation, Protest’, p. 30.
64 tic humour about the ruling class. Creative digital protest was possible because of the spread
of new media and the Internet, especially in urban areas. Here we have a clear parallel to the
Orange revolution. In Ukraine the Internet has been used as tool during the protests as well.
The new forms of protests culminated in the actions of groups like “Vojna” or “Pussy Riot”.
After a much-noticed protest action in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow, the
government persecuted members of Pussy Riot in order to use the process as a warning.233
However, the rallies and all following forms of protest that started in December and lasted
roughly until summer 2012 were only a public manifestation of an already longer growing
discontent below the surface. We have seen that the regime has lost popularity already long
before the outbreak of any mass street protest. Throughout Medvedev’s whole term, political
and economic stagnation, high corruption, security problems, arbitrariness by state institutions
and many unredeemed promises of the ruling tandem led to growing discontent among parts
of the population. Nationwide people started to protest against illegitimate practices and began to demand accountability and the right to freely determine their political leaders, on local
as well as on national level. By the end in 2011, especially the transfer of power from
Medvedev to Putin evoked anger and contributed to the willingness to protest.
Next to the decline of popularity of the ruling tandem, other aspects could have contributed to
the outbreak of a regime change. However, taking into consideration the theoretical preconditions for a colour revolution, we notice that actually none of them was distinctive enough to
evoke a successful political change.
Nevertheless, positive aspects included the non-violent character of the protests and the presence of the Internet as independent communication channel. Especially social media like Facebook were used to organize protest actions as well as to coordinate support for arrested persons.234
With regard to this small number of positive aspects there must have been many other factors
that prevented a Russian colour revolution. With regard to the country’s civil society I mentioned that there was indeed a growing activism and politicization remarkable recently. This
included regular marches and demonstrations against abuse of power and state arbitrariness.
However, compared to Georgia or Ukraine, the civic activities did not yet reached the same
extent, especially not with regard to an anti-governmental election campaign. The non 233
Dmitri Golynko, ‘Das Ende der Apathie‘, pp. 237-238.
234
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht, p. 283.
65 political oppositional forces mainly concentrated either on boycotting the 2011 State Duma
elections or on voting ‘for everybody, except for United Russia’.235 Even in the short period
between the parliamentary and presidential elections no systematic campaign has been organized. Thus similar tactics like in December were adopted during the presidential elections in
March 2012 again.236
Masha Gessen emphasized that as a result of Putin’s policy to marginalise both the civil society and public sphere, the Russian population did not form an entity. She notes that ‘the
Kremlin watched its own TV, the business people had their own newspapers and the intelligentsia read their on blogs. None of these groups therefore knew what was going in other
parts of the population’. In that case mass demonstrations of any kind were at least unlikely.237
In addition, the political opposition was highly fragmented. I do not want to go into too much
detail about the state of the Russian opposition, but it is clear that especially the Kremlininitiated repressive strategies had a visible effect. Limitations on party and candidate registration or other methods to undermine the opposition’s relevance in political landscape contributed to this fragmentation. As a result no common candidate could be nominated in order to
challenge at least theoretically the ruling elite. 238
Without a strong civil society and united political opposition there is no colour revolution
achievable. Only with united forces it would be possible to form a coherent bloc and mobilise
big parts of the population against the regime. Thus as direct consequence, the factor ‘common people’ could hardly contribute to a regime change in Russia.
Compared to the influence of external forces on the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, in
Russia this factor was actually non-existent. Again, this can be closely connected to the policies of the Kremlin. As I mentioned, Moscow sought to hamper the work of foreign funded
NGOs in Russia. Therefore external influence was limited to a minimum.
The most important point for the current crack down of the protest movement was actually the
regime itself. In contrast to Georgia and Ukraine, the Russian regime was in a crisis but still
stable enough to regain control. Initially during the first days of protest, the ruling elite, including the president, was surprised about the rally’s dimension and the determination of the
protesters. During the initial perplexity Medvedev instantly thought about shutting down an
independent television station in order to cut the opposition off from one of their sources of
235
Boris Dubin, , ‘Ende der Alternativlosigkeit’, pp. 88-89.
236
Ibid., pp. 92-93.
237
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht, p. 265.
238
Vladimir Gelman, ‘Risse im System’, p. 34.
66 information. However, even if the head of the channel refused to shut down the programme,
the presence of critical coverage could not endanger the integrity of the regime.239
After all, Medvedev and Putin could count on the support of large parts of the population and,
perhaps even more important, their security forces. We have seen that during other colour
revolutions in the end the security forces always determined whether protests could break out
and persist. Whereas the Russian police crushed the immediate post-election protest on 5 December as usual, during the following bigger demonstrations the security forces refrained
from using violence. However, there was no indication for a defection at all. The government
reacted reserved because of the upcoming presidential elections. In case of extensive use of
violence against peaceful protesters, the regime feared another popularity decline. Even the
state-controlled media shortly abandoned their habits and covered the anti-Putin demonstrations in Moscow. The reaction of the regime included also pro-Putin rallies, fueled with people from the administrative apparatus.240 In addition, as reaction to the demands of the protesters, Medvedev announced minor changes in electoral law. However, this was interpreted
as attempt to calm down the atmosphere.241
As a matter of fact, the regime recognized in the period between December and March 2012
that the protests had grown to such an extent that a violent suppression was no viable option
anymore. Instead, the Kremlin tried to confront to the oppositional protesters and organized
its own pro-regime rallies. These were of course much bigger and much more aggressive. In
addition, the ruling elite was able to mobilize sufficient support among local elites and the
common population to guarantee Putin’s victory. The opposition could not oppose this massive pro-regime mobilisation strategy.
Therefore 4 March 2012 marked more or less the collapse of the protest movement and
dashed the hopes for a new Russia among the protesters.242 Indeed, after the polls demonstrations have been hold again but the number of participants had sharply declined. Since the beginning of his third term, Putin does everything to silence his critics and to prevent a new protest movement at all costs.
Thus, given the fact that the regime is still intact and that many of the theoretical preconditions for a colour revolution were lacking during the protests, it would not be legitimate to
label the events as Russia’s non-happening colour revolution. Instead, the protests could rep 239
Masha Gessen, De man zonder gezicht, p. 288.
240
Maria Lipman, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung’, pp. 19-20.
241
Vladimir Gelman, ‘Risse im System’, p. 38.
242
Ibid., pp. 39-40.
67 resent a kind of first round in a proces that could lead indeed to such a revolution one day.
Even if the protests did not yet evoked a regime change, scholars like Vladimir Gelman or
Sharon Wolchik claim that this will happen in the future. According to these scholars, the
opposition will increase its pressure on the regime despite repressions and the regime will
finally collapse. The only question that remains unclear is at which point in time this is supposed to happen.243
3.4. Conclusion
To sum up, we have seen that Moscow monitored the colour revolutions abroad and as direct
response initiated strategies to counter similar attemps in Russia. This had influence on the
protest movement of 2011 and 2012. Central actors that might have contributed to a Russian
colour revolution were not powerful enough to challenge the regime. The civil society was
not yet sufficiently influential, the opposition was disunited, foreign influence non-existent
and most of the common people still supported the regime. In addition, the regime itself was
still too strong to fall because the elites within the system still backed its leaders.
With regard to election fraud, the analysis showed that the protests were only to a degree provoked by these manipulations. Instead, an already longer growing discontent with the system
among a small part of the population, fanned especially by the announced office-switch between Medvedev and Putin, was the main reason. Because of too many differences with preceding colour revolutions, it does not seem legitimate to label the events as Russia’s nonhappening colour revolution.
243
Ibid., pp. 43 -44; Sharon L. Wolchik, ‘Putinism Under Siege’, pp. 68-69.
68 Conclusion
After analysing the development of fraud in Russian elections, the theoretical and practical
characteristics of the colour revolutions and finally the 2011/2012 electoral-related protest
movement we can draw the following conclusions.
First, the analysis of OSCE reports provided indeed evidence for election fraud during the
relevant period. However a constant increase in manipulation until 2012 could not be confirmed. Solely within the first years of Putin rule the fraud increased dramatically but subsequently remained constant on a substantial level.
One could classify the development of the level of fraud in three phases. The first one would
be the period between 2000 and 2004 when the biggest increase of fraud could be noticed.
Back then Russia regressed from a state in transition towards democracy to an authoritarian
ruled country. The next phase would be Putin’s second term as president when a further decline of democratic election procedures was noticeable. However, the shift was not that significant anymore as during his first term. Remarkable though was the fact that the rise in election fraud could be closely associated with the consolidation of power by Putin. Finally the
last phase endured between 2008 and 2012. While Medvedev’s presidency was not characterized by further increase in election fraud, the authorities continued to use the tested methods
of manipulation. The only significant novelty was the change of perception of fraud. The attitude of many voters towards the electoral process changed. As a result citizens more actively
monitored the polls to detect violations.
Thus the development of the level of fraud could not provide a sufficient motive for the outbreak of the protests. Instead developments in society, growing discontent with the regime
and mistakes of the ruling elite lead to the emergence of the biggest protests since the demise
of the Soviet Union. Especially the announced office-switch between Medvedev and Putin
could be seen as the last drop.
Second, both the analysis of the theoretical and practical perspectives of the colour revolutions provided a comprehensive picture of the main features of these regime changes. Generally speaking, colour revolutions are events that represented ‘a moment in the history of a
country where people, civil society and the opposition unite and challenge the legitimacy of a
regime’. In every case this moment has come in the course of fraudulent national elections.
The success of a colour revolution obviously depended on the behaviour of five groups of
actors: the regime, the opposition, external actors, civil society and the common people. The 69 se actors have to be either weak or strong in their manifestation. More precisely this meant
that in a less repressive regime a colour revolution was more likely to succeed because opponents benefitted from more freedom than their counterparts in highly authoritarian states. In
such a climate a strong opposition could emerge. We have seen that in Georgia and Ukraine
anti-governmental forces pursued their activities without too many limitations already prior to
the actual challenge of the regime. On the other side, the attempted revolution in Belarus was
from the beginning ill-fated because of the repressive character of the state.
Of special interest were the reaction patterns of the elites that control the security forces. In a
stable regime it was more likely that these were loyal to the ruler and, in case of such an order, would engage in crushing demonstrations. On the contrary, in a weak regime, where the
elite was fragmented and the president isolated, it was more likely that protests would not be
crushed because the security forces refused to take action. Thus large-scale protests could
only emerge and persist if the regime was either unwilling or unable to use violence. Both
could indicate a fragmentation or, like in Ukraine, a massive defection of the elites and security forces.
In general the driving forces behind the colour revolutions were domestic political parties,
civil society groups and larger parts of the population. External forces could play a supportive
role, providing trainings, transfer of knowledge or funds. The use of independent media was
essential for the mobilisation of people and organisation of protests.
As a rule, colour revolutions proceeded according to a similar pattern. First there was a popularity decline of the regime that facilitated the unification of the opposition. Together with
civil society groups opponents set up an anti-incumbent election campaign that included the
preparation for non-violent post-election protests. Subsequently, in case of election manipulation and the refusal of the illegitimate winner to leave the office, rallies were organized. Due
to pre-election mobilization of large parts of the population the movements could quickly
mobilise a solid support base. However, in the end always the security forces determined
whether protests would break out and persist. In sum, if one or more of the mentioned crucial
factors were not present, attempts at a colour revolution seemed to be doomed to fail.
Third, with regard to the question whether the events in 2011 and 2012 could be labelled as
Russia’s non-happening colour revolution, the answer is negative. Moscow succeeded to prevent a similar situation through the implementation of strategies consciously aiming to prevent the spread of a colour revolution into Russia.
70 The political marginalisation of regime-critics hampered the emergence of a powerful opposition. Civil society was not yet influential enough, the opposition disunited, external influence
non-existent and most of the common people still supported the regime. In contrast to Georgia
and Ukraine, the Russian regime was stable and could also rely on widespread support among
the elites that control the security forces. Finally, the comparison with earlier colour revolutions accented differences rather that similarities of the Russian scenario in 2011-12. Thus it
seems to be illegitimate to label the events as Russia’s ‘non-happening colour revolution’.
71 Bibliography
Books
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Cummings, Sally N., Understanding Central Asia – Politics and contested transformations, London: Routledge 2012.
Gessen, Masha, De man zonder gezicht – De macht van Vladimir Poetin, Amsterdam:
Ambo|Anthos uitgevers 2012.
Marat, Erica, The Military and the State in Central Asia – From Red Army to independence, London: Routledge 2010.
Myagkov, Mikhail, Ordeshook, Peter C. & Shakin, Dimitri, The Forensics of Election
Fraud – Russia and Ukraine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009.
Panyushkin, Valery, Sygar, Mikhail, Gazprom – Das Geschäft mit der Macht, München: Droemer Verlag, 2008.
Popovic, Srdja, Djinovic, Slobodan, Milivojevic, Andrej, Merriman, Hardy and
Marovic, Ivan, CANVAS Core Curriculum: A Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle,
Serbia: CANVAS, 2007.
Pörzgen, Gemma, Gasprom – Die Macht aus der Pipeline, Hamburg: Europäische
Verlagsanstalt 2008.
Rose, Richard & Munro, Neil, Elections without Order – Russia’s Challenge to Vladimir Putin, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002.
Sakwa, Richard, The Crisis of Russian Democracy – The Dual State, Factionalism
and the Medvedev Succession, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011.
Sharp, Gene, From Dictatorship to Democracy – A Conceptual Framework for Liberation, East Boston: The Albert Einstein Institution, 2010.
Shevtsova, Lilia, Russia – Lost in Transition – The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies, Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2007.
Wheatley, Jonathan, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution : Delayed
Transition in the Former Soviet Union, Aldershot: Ashgate. 2005.
White, Stephen, Understanding Russian Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
Articles
•
•
•
•
•
•
Ambrosio, Thomas, ‘Russia’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon:
Routledge 2010, pp. 136-155.
Akiner, Shirin, ‘Violence in Andijan, 13 May 2005: An Independent Assessment’,
Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program, 2005.
Belanovsky, Sergei (et al.), ’Bewegung in Russland – Der Aufstieg der Mittelschicht
und die politischen Folgen’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp. 79-99.
Companjen, Francoise J., ‘Georgia’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.),
The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010, pp. 13-29.
Copsey, Nathaniel, ‘Ukraine’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The
Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010, pp. 30-44.
D’Anieri, Paul, ‘Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions‘,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol.39, 3/2006, pp.331-350.
72 •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dubin, Boris, ‘Ende der Alternativlosigkeit – Russlands Gesellschaft im Übergang’,
Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 6-8/2012, pp. 85-100.
Ennker, Benno, ‘Russland in Bewegung – Die alte Ordnung und die neuen Dekabristen’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp.41-55.
Finkel, Evgeny & Brudny, Yitzhak M., ‘Russia and the colour revolutions’, Democratization, 19:1, (2012), pp. 15-36.
Gelman, Vladimir, ‘Risse im System – Russlands Autoritarismus 2012’, Osteuropa,
Vol.62, 6-8/2012, pp. 23-44.
Goldstein, Joshua, ’The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the Ukrainian
Orange Revolution’, Berkman Center Research Publication, 2007.
Golynko, Dmitri, ‘Das Ende der Apathie – Russland Protestbewegung‘, Osteuropa,
Vol. 62, 6-8/2012, pp. 229-240.
Gudkov, Lev, ‘Russland in der Sackgasse – Stagnation, Apathie, Niedergang’, Osteuropa, Vol. 61, 10/2011, pp. 21-45.
Kara-Murza, Vladimir, ‘Stealing the Vote – The Kremlin Fixes Another Election,
World Affairs, 2011, pp. 47-55.
Krastev, Ivan, Holmes, Stephen, ‘Putinism Under Siege – An Autopsy of Managed
Democracy, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, nr. 3 (2012), pp. 33-45.
Kynev, Aleksandr, ‘Kontrollverlust, Manipulation, Protest – Die Dumawahlen 2011 in
Russland’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 1/2012, pp.25-40.
Levada, Yuri A., Campbell, Alex, ‘What the Polls tell us’, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 15, Nr. 3 (2004), pp. 43 – 51.
Lipman, Maria, ‘Doppelte Polarisierung – Russland gespaltene Gesellschaft’, Osteuropa, Vol. 62, 6-8/2012, pp. 9-22.
Lukinova, Evgeniya, Myagkov, Mikhail, & Ordeshook, Peter C., ‘Metastasised Fraud
in Russia’s 2008 Presidential Election’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, Nr. 4 (2011),
pp. 603 – 621.
Markus, Ustina, ‘Belarus’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour
Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010, pp. 118-135.
McFaul, Michael, Petrov, Nikolai, ‘What the Elections tell us’, Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 15, Nr. 3 (2004), pp. 20-31.
Ó Beacháin, Donnacha, Polese, Abel, ‘Introduction – What’s in a colour?’, in: Donnacha Ó Beacháin & Abel Polese (ed.), The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet
Republics: Successes and failures, Abingdon: Routledge 2010.
Polese, Abel, ‘Russia, the US, “the Others” and the “101 Things to Do to Win a (Colour) Revolution”: Reflections on Georgia and Ukraine’, Debatte: Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, Vol. 19, nr.1-2 (2011), pp. 421-451.
Polese, Abel & Ó Beacháin, Donnacha, ‘The Colour Revolution Virus and Authoritarian Antidotes – Political Protest and Regime Counterattacks in Post-Communist Spaces’, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 19, nr. 2 (2011), pp. 111-132.
Siegert, Jens, ‘An der Weggabelung – Zivilgesellschaft und Politik in Russland’, Osteuropa, Vol. 61, 10/2011, pp. 61-75.
Tucker, Joshua A., ‘Orange in a Shade of Gray: Electoral Fraud, Corruption, and Protest in the Orange Revolution’, in: D’Anieri, Paul (ed.), Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine, Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2010, pp. 23-46.
Volkov, Denis, ‘Im Stau – Russlands Zivilgesellschaft’, Osteuropa, Vol. 61. 10/2011,
pp. 47-60.
73 •
•
White, Stephen, ‘Elections Russian-Style’, Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 63, Nr. 4 (2011),
pp. 531-556.
Wolchik, Sharon L., ‘Putinism Under Siege – Can There Be a Color Revolution?’,
Journal of Democracy, Vol. 23, nr. 3 (2012), pp. 63-70.
OSCE Reports
Presidential Elections 2000
•
•
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March
2000’, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2000.
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 26 March
2000’, OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2000.
Parliamentary Elections 2003:
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation, Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003’, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, 2004.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation, Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003’, Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2003.
Presidential Elections 2004
•
•
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 14 March
2004, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2004.
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 14 March
2004, OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2004.
Parliamentary Elections 2011:
•
•
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 4 December 2011’, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation
Mission Final Report, 2012.
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation State Duma Elections 4 December 2011’, OSCE/ODIHR Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions, 2011.
Presidential Elections 2012
•
OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Election Observation Mission Russian Federation – Presidential Elections 4 March
2012, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2012.
74 Other
• Bidder, Benjamin & Pylyov, Vladimir, ’Massenprotest in Moskau: “Wir könnten den
Kreml stürmen“’, Spiegel Online,
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/massenprotest-in-moskau-wir-koennten-denkreml-stuermen-a-805728.html, accessed on 17 April 2013.
• CANVAS, ‘Who we are‘, http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/who-we-are , accessed on 24 June 2013.
• Encyclopædia Britannica, ‘revolution’, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 2013,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/500584/revolution, accessed on 25
March 2013.
• Freedom House, ‘Russia’, http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/russia, accessed on
17 April 2013.
• Government of the Russian Federation, ‘Constitution of the Russian Federation’,
http://www.government.ru/eng/gov/base/54.html, accessed on 23th January 2013.
• Kunze, Dr. Thomas, ‘Partei “Einiges Russland”’, Länderberichte, Publikationen,
Auslandsbüro Russland (Moskau), Sankt-Augustin: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 2005.
• No author, ’Opposition blogger Navalny arrested for 15 days’, Gazeta.ru,
http://en.gazeta.ru/news/2011/12/06/a_3861462.shtml, accessed on 17 April 2013.
• No author, ‘’Other Russia’ Conference Opens In Moscow’, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1069756.html, accessed on 10 June 2013.
• No author, ‘Rapport Amnesty: Poetin is op heksenjacht’, Volkskrant.nl,
http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2668/Buitenland/article/detail/3431001/2013/04/24/Ra
pport-Amnesty-Poetin-is-op-heksenjacht.dhtml, accessed on 21 June 2013.
• No author, ‘Russia: Opposition Rallies Met With Massive Police Force’, Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1075897.html, accessed on
10 June 2013.
• No author, ‘Russland: Putin unterzeichnet umstrittenes Agenten-Gesetz’, Spiegel
Online, http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/russland-putin-unterzeichnet-ngogesetz-a-845640.html, accessed on 26 June 2013.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Document of
the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the OSCE’,
OSCE/ODIHR, 1990.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Election Observation Handbook, Sixth Edition’, OSCE/ODIHR, 2010.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Existing
Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States’, OSCE/ODIHR,
2003.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘International
Observer Mission – Election of President of the Russian Federation 16th June 1996
and 3rd July 1996 – Report on the Election’, OSCE/ODIHR, 12th July 1996.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),
‘OSCE/ODIHR regrets that restrictions force cancellation of election observation mission to Russian Federation’, OSCE Press release,
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/49438, accessed on 21st January 2013.
• OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), ‘Russian Federation – Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999’, OSCE/ODIHR Final Report, 2000.
• OSCE Press and Public Information Section, ‘What is the OSCE?’, OSCE Secretariat,
p. 1.
75