Five
MacrocosmMacrocosm-I:
Participation and Divine Roots
In the present chapter we wish to raise the following question: How does Eriugena
conceive the spatiotemporal world (his third division) and relates it to God (the first
division of nature) and are there any interesting parallels between him and Ibn ‘Arabī?
We intend to show that our both thinkers conceive the world and its relationship
to the Divine in remarkably similar, if not identical, manner. Eriugena is not primarily
interested in physics, that is to say, nature of the world. He is more interested in relating
it to its principle and Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmology shares this spirit. Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabi>
agree that the world is symbolic of the Divine. Eriugena says “For it is in my opinion
that there is no visible or corporeal thing which is not the symbol of (significet)
something incorporeal and intelligible. (DDN V: 865D-866A) Similar remarks are
scattered here and there in the works of Ibn ‘Arabi>, according to whom the Arabic word
for the world ‫ العالَم‬derives from the same root as “‫ ”عالمة‬which means that the world is a
signpost for God. (See Fut. II: 473; trans. SDG, 3). The scriptural basis of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s
teaching that the entities of the cosmos are signs of God is the Qur’a>n 41: 53 which
reads “We shall show them Our signs upon the horizons and in themselves until it is
clear the them that He is the Real,” (Fut. II: 151; trans. SPK, 93). Moreover, he
comments on the Qur’a>n 22: 32, viz., “Whoever magnifies God’s waymarks, (‫)شعائر ﷲ‬
that is of God weariness of the hearts” by saying that “there is no entity in the cosmos
121
that is not one of God’s waymarks (‫)شعائر‬168 inasmuch as the Real has put there to
signify Him.” (Fut. III: 527; SDG, 10). It goes without saying that these words of Ibn
‘Arabi> resonate completely what we saw Eriugena saying above.
We can understand Eriugena’s position on God-World relationship through an
analysis of his two terms, participatio and theophania. The present chapter deals with
the former while we address the latter in the following chapter. If we look at God-World
relationship from the world’s side, it participates in Him but if we view from God’s side,
He manifests Himself in the world. These two ways can be symbolized respectively as
the upward way “from world to God” and the downward one “from God to the world. It
can be shown that the Eriugenian concepts “participation”and “theophany” correspond
respectively in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s thought to “Divine Roots doctrine” and “al-tajalli>.”
Eriugena and Ibn ‘Arabī alike diverge from usual views regarding creation and are not
ready to accept that the world was created out of absolute nothingness. An investigation
of this question is bound to lead into questions of the nature of nothingness and the
discussion of Six Divine Days of creation (Hexaemeron) according to Eriugena and Ibn
‘Arabi>. We however would not discuss these issues here. We have already made some
comments on the former question in the first and the third chapters. As for the
Hexaemeron, Eriugena presents his more or less allegorical exegesis of Genesis and
168
The word sha‘a>’ir (sing. Sha‘i>rah) is one of the Qur’a>nic terms the basic meaning of which is “a place
[of the performance] of religious rites and ceremonies of the pilgrimage,” and “all those services which
God has appointed to us as signs; as the halting (wuqu>f) [at Mount ‘Arafa>t]…” Edward William Lane, An
Arabic English Lexicon, (Beirut: Librarie Du Liban, 1863), part IV: 1561. Although Chittick has rendered
this word plausibly as “waymark” in many translations of the Qur’a>n it has been translated as “symbol.” It
is also very important to notice that the word comes from the same root as that of shu‘u>r meaning “to
know, understand, be cognizant of something.” Since derivatives from a single root share some element of
the meaning, sha‘i>rah or sha‘a>r is an object which lets one “know of” another thing. Hence, the word
sha‘a>’ir is equivalent of “symbols.”
122
concentrates on what was created on each day. Ibn ‘Arabī seems to be more interested in
the container rather than the content, that is to say, he has to say more on the nature of a
“Divine day” than what God did during that day. One of the reasons for this difference
is that although both Genesis and the Qur’a>n mention creation in six days, the latter
does not give details of the Divine work of each day. However, it provides that “Each
day He is in some affair” and this interests Ibn ‘Arabī more than the contents of the
Hexaemeron. Moreover, the views of the latter have been competently analyzed and
discussed in a recent work by Mohamed Haj Yousef.169
One of the important themes that Eriugena discusses in the first book of his
DDN and which should have been discussed in our third chapter is the relationship
between God and ten categories (Categoriae Decem). We however are going to analyze
this subject in the present chapter since it cannot be understood without elaborating Ibn
‘Arabi>’s doctrine of Divine roots first.
5.1 Eriugena on Participation
5.1.1 Participation: History and Context
Eriugena properly inaugurates discussion of the third division of nature in Book III
630A-634 with an account of “participation.” This concept of participation links the
first division of nature (God) to the second (Primordial Causes) and the second to the
third (the world). In view of this function we do not see any reason to agree with
169
See his book Ibn ‘Arabi>: Time and Cosmology (London: Routledge, 2008), chapter 3, 73-100.
123
Dermot Moran’s view that Eriugena’s “more complex relations of being and non-being
make the concept of participation less relevant.”170
Eriugena is neither the first nor the last thinker to use the term “participation.” It
already was used by Plato to explain the relationship between intelligible forms and
their sensible instances.171 In spite of being critical of Platonic forms, Aristotle himself
used the concept while referring to human participation in the essential life.172 The
concept was popular with Neo-Platonism inherited by the Alexandrines, latter Christian
Platonists like Saint Augustine and his Franciscan followers. It also lurks behind the
medieval proofs for the existence of God from the degrees of being, truth, goodness and
perfection. This fact is epitomized by Augustine who advises: “Look at what you see
and seek Him, Whom you do not see.”173 After Eriugena it was also used by Saint
Anselm in his lesser known a posteriori proofs for the existence of God and by Saint
Thomas Aquinas “who held that things participate in Divine perfections by an imitation
according to an ordered proportion corresponding to their respective modes of being.”174
The contemporary ears are also not completely unfamiliar with this term since Paul
170
Dermot Moran, The Philosophy, 234 n. 23. The way Michael Sells has used the notion in his recent
study for understanding negative theology also shows importance of this concept for Eriugena. See
Mystical Languages, 34-63.
171
Sr. M. Annice, “Historical Sketch of the Theory of Participation,” New Scholasticism, 26 (1952): 49-
79. She concludes the sketch by remarking that “Participation by the diminished and imperfect in the
whole and perfect is held by all outstanding philosophers from Plato to St. Thomas.” Platonic Caveat
(Phaedo 100d) is emphasized by David C Schindler, “What’s the difference? On the Metaphysics of
participation in a Christian Context,” Saint Anselm Journal, 3(2005), 46.
172
173
“Historical Sketch,” p. 56. The reference is to Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book XII, chapter 7, 1072a.
Quoted
in
Ibid.
60
from
the
Saint’s
Sermo CXXVI. Available online at mb-
soft.com/believe/txuf/august7d.htm (last visited on 12-03-2009.)
174
“What’s the difference?” 46.
124
Tillich used it to differentiate between “sign” and “symbol.”175
The concept of participation, however, has been criticized by some Christian
theologians as well. David Schindler thinks, that while being suitable to Christian
thinking, participation also leads away from the Christian Weltanschauung, firstly since
its implied reference to the “beyond” twists participation to pantheism and secondly it
seems to deprive the finite, temporal, and physical world of any reality of its own.176
These two problems have not forced any major dissent within Christian tradition, since
the only dissenting voice we hear is that of Søren Kierkegaard in 19th century. In our
opinion, out of the two issues raised by Schindler only the former posits a serious
question, but can be answered satisfactorily from the standpoints of both Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabī. As for the second problem, it seems to be begging the question. One has to
show first why it is necessary for “the finite, temporal, and physical world” to have “any
reality of its own” especially in the context of Christian worldview. If participation
means metaphysically, as Schindler himself says, “that one thing has what it is with and
indeed after and in pursuit of, another: it has its reality by virtue of something other
than itself” then precisely this is the intent of “impassibility,” recognized by Christian
philosophical tradition as one of the metaphysical Divine attributes. Impassibility also
implies “the ontological dependence of the world on spiritual/intellectual realities and
ultimately on God” something which is expressed by participation, as Schindler himself
admits.177
175
Paul Tillich, “The Nature of Religious Language,” in Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1964), 54-55.
176
Schindler, “What’s the difference?” 2.
177
Ibid. 1.
125
5.1.2 Participation and “All that is (omne quod est)”
Eriugena uses “participation” in order to divide “everything that is” (omne quod est)
into the following three categories: God, the primordial causes and the world. He
divides everything that is into four categories, participant, participated in (i.e. object of
participation), participation and that which is both participated and participant
simultaneously. The Supreme principle of all things is only participated since it
participates in nothing above itself while the first member of this division, created
nature, is participant only since there is nothing below it which should participate in it.
Naturally the realm of primordial causes is what simultaneously participates in the first
division of nature while it is participated by the third division. (See DDN III: 630A630D)
Thus Eriugena gives three levels of being, the highest, the lowest and the
intermediary. It goes without saying that there is nothing above the highest to be
participated in and below the lowest to participate in it. Hence it is only the
intermediate region that can both be participated and participant. It is difficult,
however, to see the point of including “Participation” as a member of this division.
Sheldon-Williams remarks that it is rather general name for things “which are” since
things which are neither participants nor participated nor both would not fall under
“things which are”
178
However, this remark is not of much help since it interprets
Eriugena as having included the whole as one of its parts.
178
See Sheldon-William’s note 5 to the text of DDN.
126
5.1.3 Participation: Literal and metaphorical explication
Eriugena understands that the Latin term particpatio has a reference to “taking parts”
(partem capere) which would imply the existence of “parts” in the thing participated.179
Therefore he not only makes it explicit that “participation is not the taking of some
part, but the distribution of the Divine gifts and graces from the highest to the lowest
through high orders to the lower” (DDN III.631A) but also prefers its Greek
counterparts metoxe and metoxia for its explication. These Greek terms have the
advantage of being free from any reference at all to “parts.” He reads metoxe as if it
were “meta ex ousia” as meaning “having after” or “having second” while metoxia as
simply “meta-ousia”, that is, “after-essence” and concludes that participation means
nothing but “the derivation from a superior essence of the essence that follows [after it]
(ex superiori essentia secundae… deriuationem) and the distribution from that which
first possesses being to that which follows it in order that it may be.” Moreover, his
understanding of participation as something’s coming after another is close to the literal
sense the prefix met gives in compositional words, “after” or “behind.”180 Eriugena’s
exposition, therefore, falls somewhere between literalism and metaphor. Although he
rules out the “partem capere” element he does accept the “having after” sense which is
implied by the Greek met.
Eriugena also resorts to metaphors in order to elaborate the meaning of
participation. He first presents an arithmetical metaphor and says that “between all the
natural orders from the highest to the lowest the participations by which they are related
are similar, just like as the proportions between the terms of numbers, that is, among the
179
180
See Schindler, “What is the Difference?”
See ibid. 1.
127
numbers when they are constituted under one principle, are similar. (DDN III: 631A) He
characterizes “participation” with the distribution of “gifts by which every nature
subsists and graces by which every subsisting nature is adorned.” So the distribution of
these gifts and graces “flows down by degrees from the Supreme Source of all good gifts
and graces through the higher orders to the lower as far as the lowest of all.” (DDN III:
631A-B) This flowing to all orders is important since Eriugena emphasizes that “none of
the nature not even the lowest must be thought to be denied participation in a Divine
grace proportionate to itself.”(Ibid) However, Divine gifts and graces other than being
and well being, like sense, reason, wisdom, “do not descend to the lowest” since, for
instance “life does not extend to the lowest order.” (DDN III: 631C)
Eriugena then draws our attention to the way all radii are already present and
united within the central point of a circle and it is only when they approach toward the
circumference that they become separated. Thirdly, we are given the example of a river
which first flows forth from its source, and through its channel the water which first
wells up in the source continues to flow always without any break to whatever distance
it extends. In the light of these metaphors, the concept of participation can be
considered tantamount to being included in something and then having come out of it.
Out of these three metaphors the last mentioned is most physical of all and reveals this
meaning most clearly. The number and centre metaphors also point in this same
direction since the lines that connect the central point to circumference are contained by
the point itself and all the numbers greater than the unit are nothing but aggregates of
the self-same unit. Therefore, to say that the relationship between the world, primordial
causes and God is that of participation would mean that the world is “derived from” a
higher essence, i.e. the primordial causes, which in turn derive from God. We can also
128
say that whatever the world is, it is with or after the primordial causes and God and
whatever the primordial causes are they are with and after God. As for God Himself
whatever He is or has, is with Himself and in Himself. As Eriugena says, God is God per
essentiam, whereas man is God per participationem. (DDN III: 145C) Similarly, he
states later that the human nature is not the Light but only participates in light. God
alone is the Light per se; we are light per participationem. (Hom. 0292C-D) Moreover
participation implies existence of participant in God and in grace and Eriugena explains
that the participation of effects in the causes means that the causes are nothing but the
essence of all things. (DDN III: 145C)
5.2 Ibn ‘Arabī
‘Arab on “Divine
“Divine Roots”
5.2.1 Divine Roots and Omne quod est
Ibn ‘Arabī states: “There is nothing (‫ )ما ثم‬but the Divine presence (‫)الحضرة اإللھية‬
comprising of the Essence (‫)الذات‬, Attributes (‫ )الصفات‬and actions (‫)األفعال‬.” (Fut. II:
173)181 The essence is God as He is in Himself without reference to anything else. The
attributes/ Divine names, being identical to the Divine Essence, do not have substantial
existence but simply are relations between Divine Self and creatures. Ibn ‘Arabi> equates
“Divine actions” with the created world. The first two constituents of the Divine
presence, essence and attributes, to the exclusion of the world, may be called in Ibn
‘Arabī’s language “the Divine side” (‫)الجانب اإللھي‬.
181
See Frithjof Schuon, “The Five Divine Presences”, in Form and Substance in the Religions (New
Delhi: Third Eye, 2005), 51. At page 55 Schuon identifies “God as creator” i.e. Being with “the degree of
Divine qualities” which obviously is a reference to “Attributes” mentioned by Ibn ‘Arabi>. For more on
five presences also see William Chittick, “The Five Divine Presences: From al-Qu>nawi> to al-Qays}ari>” The
Muslim World, 72(1982), 107-128.
129
We can now formulate our question concerning God-world relationship more
precisely: What relationship the world (Divine actions) has to the Divine Side (Divine
Essence + Names/Attributes), according to Ibn ‘Arabi>? Ibn ‘Arabi> states that “no
property (‫ )حكم‬becomes manifest in existence except that it has a root (‫ )أصل‬in the
“Divine side” by which it (i.e. the property) is supported.” (Fut. II: 508) At another
place he writes that “There is no existent possible thing in everything-other-than-God182
that is not connected to the Divine relationships and lordly realities (‫ )الحقائق الربانية‬which
are known as “the most beautiful names.” Therefore every possible thing (‫ )ممكن‬is in
grasp of a Divine reality.” (Fut. II: 115; trans. SPK, 37)
Before exploring the doctrine of Divine roots we need to make a few
observations by way of clarification and comparison regarding what has just been
mentioned.
Firstly, it can be observed that Eriugena’s participation and Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Divine
roots theory are both set in the context of a classification of totality. Eriugena talks
about omne quod est while Ibn ‘Arabi> uses the negative expression for the same thing
namely, “there is nothing but…” However, there is certain divergence between the two
which must not be lost sight of. Whereas the three members of Eriugenian division
stand in same relation to each other, namely participation, in Ibn ‘Arabi> a participationlike relationship holds only between the Attributes/Names and the World. As far as the
Essence and Attributes/Names are concerned the question of relation does not arise for a
relation would necessitate substantial distinction which in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s theology does
not appear. Since Ibn ‘Arabi> believes in Essence-Attributes identity and moreover, to
182
‫ ماسوى ﷲ‬This is the name Ibn ‘Arabi> gives to cosmos.
130
ask “what relation there is between something and a relationship” would be susceptible
to the third-man argument and will thus lead into infinite regress.
Secondly, the tripartite division of Divine presence (totality) can be considered
to contain origins of the broader doctrine of five Divine presences which came to be
generally accepted in the Sufi circles. Five Divine presences are, in ascending order:
human realm (‫)الناسوت‬, realm of royalty (‫)ملكوت‬, realm of power (‫)جبروت‬, Realm of the
Divine (‫ )الھوت‬and Ipseity (‫)ھاھوت‬.183 The reduction of five to three presences can be
made more conveniently if we have before us Schuon’s description of these, in an
ascending order, as 1) material states, 2) animistic states, 3) angelic states, 4) qualified
being and 5) Beyond-being. Here the first three presences can be reduced to one, namely
the cosmos, or as Schuon himself would have preferred, “existence.” We would thus
acquire three presences namely Existence, Being and Beyond-Being which correspond to
Ibn ‘Arabī’s Actions, Attributes and Essence.
Thirdly, the identification of one component of the Divine presence (viz. actions)
with the world seems to imply that the latter is included in God, an apparently
pantheistic position. However, this inclusion need not necessarily be interpreted as
pantheism. For one thing, Ibn ‘Arabi> does not go for out and out God-world identity but
assigns to the world the mid-way-house of being He/not-He (‫)ھو | ال ھو‬. (Fut. II: 379) He
relates deiform world184 to God via his doctrine of Divine roots. Moreover, the orthodox
teachings of Islamic tradition leave ample room for maintaining the inclusion thesis
without verging on pantheism. Schuon has excellently related the idea with Qur’ānic
183
184
The translation of the terms is taken from Schuon “Five Divine Presences,” 53
Ibn ‘Arabi> believes that God created the world upon His image. See Fut. II: 557. Further details are
discussed in the seventh chapter.
131
teachings. He writes, encapsulating Ibn ‘Arabi>’s spirit185 “But in reality it is the
Principle which envelops everything; the material world is only an infinitesimal and
eminently contingent content of the invisible Universe. In the first case, God is—in the
language of the Qoran—the ‘Inward’ or the ‘Hidden’ (‫)الباطن‬, and in the second, He is
the ‘Vast’ or ‘He who contains’ (‫)الواسع‬, or ‘He who surrounds’ (‫)المحيط‬.” 186 In the third
chapter we have noticed that Eriugena himself extends the definition of God to include
Divine manifestations and the world187 and we have seen that he always attempts to
retain a distinction between God and the world.
Fourthly, when Ibn ‘Arabi> says that “Nothing becomes manifest in existence ( ‫في‬
‫ ”…)الوجود‬he wants us to take the expression “in existence” quite seriously. Therefore,
only positive realities are rooted and not privations like darkness and ignorance. This is
why he refuses to connect ignorance to some Divine root as it “is a quality pertaining to
non existence while the names only bestow existence they do not bestow nonexistence.”
(Fut. II: 592; tr. SPK 55) Talking about the Divine roots of levels he writes that levels
themselves do not have Divine roots since they are only “relations” only their
“designation” is so rooted in divinity. (Fut. II: 468-469)188
Now, if there is a Divine root for every manifestation, contemplation can
proceed in two ways. One can start from a specific Divine name or attribute and
185
Ibn ‘Arabi> writes: “‘Surely He encompasses everything’ (41:54) in the cosmos. ‘Encompassing’ (‫)إحاطة‬
a thing conceals that thing. Hence the Manifest is the Encomapsser (‫ …)المحيط‬Hence within the
Encompasser that thing—that is, the cosmos—is like the spirit within the body…” Fut: II: 151; trans.
SPK, 93).
186
Schuon, “Five Divine Presences,” 51.
187
See chapter 3 section 1 with reference to DDN I: 448B.
188
It is somewhat perplexing, though, to find out the ontological criterion under which “designation”
pertains to existence but “relation” does not.
132
contemplate what stems from that root in the world. Or one could proceed the other way
round. Ibn ‘Arabi> seems to have elaborated his doctrine of Divine roots in both ways.
From the World to the Names
Throughout his al-Futu>ha} t> Ibn ‘Arabi> tries to discover the Divine roots of various
phenomena. He starts by some of the microcosmic or macrocosmic features and tells us
what their Divine roots are. Two basic features of the world, plurality (‫ )الكثرة‬and
polarity (‫ )الزوجية‬have roots in the Divine side. Multiplicity is a manifestation of the
diversity of Divine names and attributes while polarity is rooted in the fact the all
attributes submerge under two basic ones namely, mercy (‫ )الرحمة‬and wrath (‫)الغضب‬.
Divine names are either names of beauty (‫ )الجمال‬or those of majesty (‫)الجالل‬. The former
imply the similarity or proximity of the Divine to the cosmos while the latter show
Divine transcendence. This division is ultimately reducible to “God’s two Hands”
spoken of in the Qur’a>n.189 It is not difficult to see that the cosmic polarities especially
the male-female polarity, are rooted in this fact about the Divine nature.
Multiplicity and polarity respectively imply two further features, hierarchy
(‫ )مفاضلة‬and contention (‫ )منازعة‬and these are also rooted in the Divine nature. Ibn ‘Arabī
writes: “The Divine Names that are attributed to the Real have various levels in
attribution. Some of them depend upon others, some of them supervise others and some
have a more inclusive connection to the cosmos and more effects within it than the
189
Sachiko Murata summarizes this as follows: “In brief, they (i.e. Ibn ‘Arabi> and his followers)
understand the “two hands” to indicate a polar relationship in God Himself. That He should create Adam
with these two hands indicates that He employed this polarity to bring the microcosm into existence. The
microcosm itself, made in the image of God, must have “two hands” in the same qualitative sense that
God has them, not only physically. And so also must the macrocosm, which is the microcosm’s mirror
image.” Sachiko Murata, The Tao of Islam: A Sourcebook on Gender relations in Islamic Thought (New
York: SUNY, 1992), 82
133
others.” (Fut. II: 34) For example the Divine name “Alive (‫ ”)الحي‬has the “most
tremendous degree” among the names since it is the precondition of the other names. 190
(Fut. IV: 228; trans. SPK, 49) This hierarchy is the Divine root of cosmic hierarchy. The
Divine root of the cosmic conflict is the fact that Divine names having diverse
properties demand diverse effects within the cosmos. The name “Avenger” (‫)المنتقم‬
demands the occurrence of vengeance in its object, while the name the Compassionate
demands its removal. (Fut. II: 93; trans. SPK, 55) Hence, the cosmic plurality, polarity
hierarchy and contention between various levels are all rooted in the divinity.
Other cosmic realities whose Divine roots Ibn ‘Arabī mentions include
prophethood (‫ )النبوة‬which is rooted in the Divine name “The All-Hearing (‫( ”)السميع‬Fut.
II: 252), all human character traits rooted, especially love, in Divine character traits
(Fut. II: 241),191 possibility of human transmutation in different forms rooted in Divine
transmutation(Fut. III: 44), changes of states (‫( )تغير األحوال‬Fut. II: 385), days (‫)األيام‬192
and the present moment (‫( )الوقت‬Fut. II: 539) rooted in God’s being “upon a task
everyday (Qur’a>n: 55:29), productivity of and receptivity towards effects in Divine
responsiveness (‫( )إجابة‬Fut. II: 453), feeling of inner sweetness (Fut. II: 507) and spiritual
movement rooted in God’s rejoicing and joyfully receiving his repenting servant (Fut. II:
366) and cosmic contraction (‫ )القبض‬which is rooted in God’s describing himself with
attributes of the creatures especially in being embraced by a believer’s heart. (Fut. II:
509)
190
This means that God has other essential attributes (like Hearing, Speaking, Will, Power etc.) because
He has Life.
191
Vide Fut. II: 241 viz.: “For God is the Necessary Being through Himself while man exists through his
Lord, so he acquire s existence and character traits from Him.” Trans. SPK, 287.
192
For discussion of relationship between solar days and Divine days in Ibn ‘Arabi> see Mohammed Haj
Yousef, Ibn ‘Arabi> time and Cosmology , 73-77.
134
From the Names to the World
In the long 198th chapter of al-Futu>ha} t> Ibn ‘Arabī starts with specific Divine names and
tells us what originated within the cosmos through their particular attentiveness (‫)التوجه‬.
In the main he mentions 28 Divine names but some further names occur within the
discussion of the first name ‫البديع‬. Heterogeneous phenomena manifest from these Divine
names: principles, levels of reality, letters of Arabic alphabet, heavenly spheres and
bodies, days of the week, prophets and genera etc. Through the attentiveness of the
name “The Life-Giver (‫ ”)الحي‬originated “what appeared in water, the letter (‫ )س‬and the
stars included in the Sagitta.” The angels were created through attentiveness of the
Overpowering (‫( )القوي‬Fut. II. 466) while man was created through that of the Uniter
(‫)الجامع‬. (Fut. II: 468) It is easy to see the connection between these Divine names and
feature of things which originate through their attentiveness. Water is the principle of
life, as the Qur’a>n says that “From water we made everything alive.”(21:23) hence its
connection with “The Alive”; the Jinn are subtle creatures hence their connection with
“The Subtle”; the angels are the most powerful of God’s creatures hence they originate
through the attentiveness of “The Overpowering” and it is only man who unites within
him the Divine image and the cosmic image hence his origin is from the name “The
Uniter.” However, it is less clear how certain names, particular days, Arabic alphabets,
heavens, and heavenly bodies, spiritual states can be connected with specific Divine
names. Ibn ‘Arabī remarks that all Divine names related to cosmos have effect in
everything and he specifies one of these only because it has more powerful and effective
rule over it. (Fut. II: 468) This implies that understanding the “sense” of Divine names is
not sufficient for understanding its cosmological connection since the affair is not
entirely amenable to rational investigation but is based on spiritual unveiling.
135
Ibn ‘Arabi> maintains that more than one Divine name concurs in an individual
substance. For example, he provides two Divine names “‫ ”الغنى‬and “‫ ”الدھر‬which jointly
attend to the manifestation of days etc. He has explained earlier that in it there are
numerous aspects requiring a corresponding number of Divine Names. For the reality of
its creation (‫ )إيجاده‬requires the Name, the Powerful ; while the aspect of its perfection
[‫ ]إحكامه‬requires the Name, the Purposer; and the aspect of its manifestation [‫]ظھوره‬
requires the Name, the Seer[‫]البصير‬, the Observer [‫ ]الرائي‬and other [such Names]. (Fut.
I: 100)193 The first two aspects i.e. existence and perfection remind one of Eriugena’s
distinction between Divine gifts and graces in terms of some-things’ being and wellbeing. Thus the relationship between a Divine root and its manifestation is not one-toone relation like the one between Platonic forms and objects. This qualifies William
Chittick’s view that what corresponds to the Platonic Ideas in Ibn al-‘Arabi> is the
Divine names. 194 (SPK 84)
5.2.2 Divine Roots and “participation” literally understood
Like Eriugena Ibn ‘Arabi> would certainly have ruled out the world’s literal taking part
in God since the Divine names which relate the world to God as Divine roots are not
parts of divinity but aspects and relationships. However, as stemming from their Divine
roots, existents might be considered to participate in Divine side in the sense of “being
derived from higher essences.” Things can be considered to “participate” in the sense of
“having with” and “coming after,” not only in the sense of temporal succession but also
of ontological dependence. The world’s “coming after” Divine roots is explicit from the
way Ibn ‘Arabī understands the Qur’a>n 15:21: “There is nothing whose treasuries are
193
The relevant text has been translated by Gerald Elmore, “Four Texts of Ibn al-‘Arabi> on the Creative
Self-Manifestation of the Divine Names.” JMIAS, XXIX(2001), 23.
194
See SPK, 84. In as much as their archetypal function the Divine names do correspond to Platonic ideas.
136
not with us but We only send down thereof in due and ascertainable measures.” This
demands, according to him, that “He bring them out from treasuries which are with him,
that is, from an existence which we do not perceive to an existence which we do
perceive.” (Fut. II>: 587) 195 In one of his prayers Ibn ‘Arabi> says, “From Him (‫ )عنه‬and
with Him (‫ )به‬is the existence of everything.”196 This expression of world’s being
brought and, especially, sustained into existence by God is given a characteristic
metaphysical touch by Ibn ‘Arabī in his commentary upon the cosmology of alphabet.
He uses the first letter ‫ ا‬to symbolize Divine Essence and ‫ ب‬to symbolize attributes.197
This is very apt since ‫ا‬, whose numerical value is 1, is the only letter which never
attaches itself to another, something designating the absolute transcendence of the
Essence. Commenting on Abu Madyan’s saying “I have never observed anything except
that I observed ‫ ب‬written over it” Ibn ‘Arabī says that this letter accompanies all
existents which points to the fact that everything appeared “with Him” (‫)به‬. (Fut. I: 102)
One of the meanings of saying that the cosmos is rooted in divinity is to say that it
appear within it, an apparent parallelism with participation.
5.2.3 Divine Roots and Metaphors of “Participation”
The metaphors Eriugena presented for explication of “participation” are also relevant
for the comparison. His first metaphor highlights the principle that all orders of reality
are identical in being participants but differ from each other in other respects. His view
that “none of the orders of nature how-low-so-ever can be denied participation in Divine
195
Although treasuries do not directly refer to Divine names but to the fixed entities, they do so indirectly
as the entities are nothing but manifestations of Divine names as we saw in the previous chapter.
196
Ibn ‘Arabi>, Awra>d al-Ayya>m wa al-Laya>li> (Oman: Da>r al-Fath}: 2003), 46. Trans. Pablo Beneito and
Stephen Hirtenstein, The Seven Days of the Heart (Oxford: Anqa Publishers, 2008), 28 (with slight
modification).
197
Souad Hakim, Al-Mu‘jam al-S}uf> i (Beirut: Dandarah, 1981), 181.
137
gift or grace appropriate to itself” reiterates the same principle. This principle finds its
application in Ibn ‘Arabī’s cosmology at two levels. First, the Divine names are one in
referring to Essence and in determining it but they are different in view of their specific
meanings. Second, in the created world everything is different and separate from others
in respect of its quiddity but identical to them in being a manifestation of God. Likewise
Ibn ‘Arabī considers all existence “Divine symbols” (‫ )شعائر‬and says that nothing of the
world can be discarded or held in contempt. (Fut. III: 527) He, however, would have
corrected Eriugena’s claim that graces like sense and life do not descend to the lowest
levels of existence since in his view there is nothing in the world which is not alive and
glorifying its Lord with an eloquent tongue. (Fut. II: 504)
Having discussed Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine of Divine roots in general and having
looked at some of its specific examples we now turn to an important issue that is very
dear to Eriugena and which Ibn ‘Arabi> solves in the light of his Divine roots theory,
namely the question of applicability or non applicability of ten categories to God.
5.3 God and Categoriae Decem
5.3.1 Eriugena on God and Categories
After many digressions Eriugena comes at last to treat the question of applicability of
ten categories to God in I: 562 which was asked many passages ago. His position is
clearly stated at the beginning of the long dialogue that ensues. The Alumnus declares
that the categories cannot apply to God since God is neither genus nor species nor an
accident while the application of categories would have implied God’s being a genus.
(See DDN I: 463C) The Nutritor happily accepts this as being in line with the
requirements of via negativa he has propounded in preceding passages, but the Alumnus
himself starts wavering in the assertion he has made. Hence he asks that the category of
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relation should be allowed to be properly predicated to God. This request is not granted
since it is contrary to an assertion already made and agreed upon, namely, that “nothing
can properly be predicted of God.” So this category is also predicated of God
metaphorically. But after discussing the nature of various categories the alumnus again
shows hesitation in accepting that action and affection are not properly predicated of
God, who according to Scripture and patristic writings is said to have made the world,
to love and be loved etc. One of the examples that the Alumnus cites is the saying of
Christ: “Whoso loves me shall be loved by my father and I shall love him and shall
reveal myself to him.” In response Eriugena implies that although “he loves” seems to
be an active verb in fact it is in fact not so since “he who loves or desires suffers himself
while he who is loved or desired acts” therefore we cannot take “God loves” literally
since that would imply that He is moved by His love and God’s loving someone is a
metaphorical expression for His being loved. (DDN I: 505A)198
As is shown by this specific example the categories do not really apply to God
and whenever they are found to be applied in the Scripture they should be taken as
metaphors. However, there is one limitation in the analysis Eriugena presents for God’s
loving; although it shows that “action” cannot apply to God properly it anyway applies
the category of “affection” to God understood in the sense of “being object of an action”
since it replaces “loving” with “being loved.”
198
Interestingly, Ibn ‘Arabi> looks at this issue from a quite different angle and makes a point contrary to
Eriugena’s. He claims that God can love creatures but creatures cannot love Him. Since “love is related to
the non-existent, so no love is conceivable from the creature to God.” (Fut. II: 113) The point being made
is that since love for something or someone implies lover’s lack of that thing or distance from that person
and since it is God who truly is and the creature never was, only God can love the creature by bringing it
from nonexistence to existence.
139
5.3.2 Ibn ‘Arabi> on God and Categories
Ibn ‘Arabi> gives the initial impression that he dislikes the whole discussion as a part of
which the question arises. In his discussion of the combination between the standpoints
of incomparability and similarity Ibn ‘Arabi> observes regarding the debate among
Muslim theologians on the applicability of Categoriae Decem to God that it feels like
the proverb says “I hear the grinding, but I do not see any flour.” (Fut. II: 116; trans.
SPK, 75) At another place he combines this distaste for the discussion of categories and
God with the practical demands of Sufi piety. Indulging into such discussion is not
recommended since it distracts one from focusing on “one thing needful” that is,
“knowing oneself” and makes one do something God has prohibited to do, namely
contemplation upon Divine Essence. The Qur’a>n says, “God warns you regarding His
self.” (Ibid. III: 81-82)
However, many interesting and insightful comments are scattered on the
question of God’s relation to the categories throughout his major as well as some shorter
works. To begin with Ibn ‘Arabi> does not hold a substantial view of the nature of
categories but considers them to “appear with the appearance of substance for itself
when the Real brings it out from its hiddenness.”(See ibid. III: 11)
Quite contrary to Eriugena who holds that the categories apply really to
creatures and metaphorically to God Ibn ‘Arabi> is of the opinion that all are attributes of
God’s perfection and only secondarily apply to other things. (See ibid. II: 473; trans.
SPK, 75–76) Hence Ibn ‘Arabi>’s position regarding the applicability of specific
categories to God is different from Eriugena’s but, interestingly, his understanding of
the nature of these categories and their correlation is same as Eriugena’s. Thus the
140
relational status that he awards to all the categories is indirectly comparable to
Eriugena’s considering the categories to be incorporeal. (DDN I: 478D-479A)
Secondly, as John Marenbon has observed, Eriugena’s was not a pure
Aristotelian version of categories since according to it the first category substance
(ousia) was not an individual of such and such a kind but the most inclusive of all
classes and is conceived as substrate to which accidents are attached.199 That Ibn ‘Arabi>
also understands ousia as a substrate is obvious from the diagrammatical presentation of
the ten categories in his Insha>.200 It appears that for Ibn ‘Arabi> too this category is the
most basic of all and relates to them like a substrate does. This presentation consists of
a circle representing Primordial Matter which comprises all knowable realities, existent,
nonexistent and those which are beyond existence/non-existence. In that diagram ousia
is given the central position while the rest of ten categories form a circumferential circle
around it:
199
John Marenbon, “John Scottus and the Categoriae Decem” in W. Beierwaltes, ed., Eriugena: Studien
zu seinen Quellen, (Berlin: Carl Winter Universitäts Verlag, 1980), 122. At DDN I: 492C Eriugena says
concerning ousia that “it subsists in its subdivisions eternally and immutably as a whole that is always
together and all its subdivisions are always together as an inseparable unity in it.”
200
See Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir, 24-25. The diagram given here is scanned from Fenton-Gloton translation of
Insha>’ cited earlier from Ibn ‘Arabi>: A Commemorative Volume.
141
Ibn ‘Arabi>
Arabi>’s Circle of Categoriae Decem
Coming to the question of the applicability of categories to the Divine nature, as
a point of departure we could consider Ibn ‘Arabi>’s negative response that in view of the
fact that nothing makes God known in positive terms, “there is nothing of the ten
categories, except for a verified passivity and a definite activity.” (Fut. II: 211; trans.
SPK, 349) Hence none of the ten categories can be really applicable to Divine reality
except for the fact that from the passivity observable in the nature one is able to infer
the existence of an agent. But this agent himself remains beyond knowledge. At another
place Ibn ‘Arabi> indicates that he does not construe Divine agency in the sense of first
cause. While discussing the ritual of stoning the Satans, which Ibn ‘Arabi> symbolically
interprets as a dialogue between the pilgrim and Satan, he negates applicability of the
142
word “cause” to divinity since whenever there is cause, effect must be there, while God
was there and there was nothing beside Him, at least in the sense of spatio-temporal
existence. (See ibid. I: 720). Ibn ‘Arabi>, however does not stop at this negative
standpoint but recognizes a correspondence between God and the world characterized by
the categories. We submit that this is an application of one of his Divine roots
doctrine.201 The correspondence between categories and the nature of God is established
in at least two places in al-Futu>ha} t> , at I: 180 and III:11.
At III: 11 after providing that the world consists of the entities of substances and
the relation that follows them, i.e. the remaining nine categories, Ibn ‘Arabi> provides the
principle that since the world is a copy of its archetype in Divine knowledge and Divine
knowledge of the world is identical with Divine self-knowledge the world must be upon
the image of the creator. Then he immediately mentions Divine qualities that
correspond to the ten categories by which the spatio-temporal world is characterized and
crowns this enumeration by commenting that the categories constitute the form of the
world.
If we combine this list of correspondence with the one mentioned at Fut. I: 180
we might see the former as explaining latter and bringing out certain important
differences. This can be seen from the table given below.
201
This can also be seen as an implication of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s commitment to principle-manifestation
continuity along with a discontinuity, which finds its expression in his synthesis of incomparability and
similarity.
143
Table: Divine Roots of Categoriae Decem
Categories
The Roots in the Divine Side ‫األصول في الجانب اإللھي‬
‫المقوالت‬
I.180
I.180
III. 11
Substance
Essence
Essence
Quantity
Names
Number of His Names
Quality
Self-
“Each day He is upon some task”(55:29)
Disclosures
“We will finish with you, O mankind and
jinn.”(55:31) “The All-merciful sat upon the throne.”
(20:5).
Place
Sitting upon
“He came to be in a Cloud” (h}adi}th) “And
He is God in the Heavens.”
Time
Eternity
He is God in the Eternity
Posture
Al-
Allah spoke directly to Moses
fahwa>niyah
(4:164)
Relation
“Master of the Kingdom”
Relation
(3:26); Creator of Creatures
Action
Munificence
A Balance in His Hand, lifts it and lowers it
Affection
Manifestation
He is called upon and Responds; Asked and gives; Is
in forms of asked forgiveness and forgives
beliefs
144
Some Observations on the Correspondence between Divine Nature and Ten
Categories
Posture: The root mentioned for posture at I: 180 is ‫ الفھوانية‬which is a term used by Ibn
‘Arabi> to denote “Face to face address of the Real in the imaginal world.” (‫)عالم المثال‬
(Ibid. II: 128) God’s direct address to Moses is mentioned at III.11 as an instance.
Quality and Place:
Place: The table reveals that one root is assigned to different categories.
Hence “sitting upon” (‫ )اإلستواء‬is assigned to quality202 in the first list and to “place” in
the second one. It seems that istawa>’ itself does not answer the question regarding qua
(‫ )كيف‬as is obvious from the question placed before Ma>lik b. Anas regarding the quality
of istawa>’.203 It is possible to take istawa>’ in the text quoted from Ibn ‘Arabi> not as a
single word but as an abbreviation for the whole statement in which it occurs.204 In that
case the Divine root of istawa>’ not necessary the quality denoted by istawa>’ but some
other fact meant by the words “The All-Merciful sat upon the throne.” From some of his
comments upon these words we do get an idea of the quality to which the word istiwa>’
points. In this case, by mentioning istawa>’ as the Divine root of quality, Ibn ‘Arabi> can
be taken to be pointing to mercy, which clearly corresponds to quality.
State:
State: The category of state is missing from both lists. It is worth our while to try to
complete this list by finding out what Divine root “state” could have. In the circle of
202
At another place Ibn ‘Arabi> has explicitly claimed that istawa>’ is an attribute of God. See Fut. III: 162.
A quality according to Aristotle’s Categories (8a:25), is “that in virtue of which people are said to be such
and such.” The Works of Aristotle (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc.) II. 13.
203
See Abd al-Kari>m al-Shahrista>ni>, Al-Milal wa al-Niùal (Beirut: Da>r al-Ma‘rifah, 1975), chapter 3, Al-
úifa>tiyyah. Certainly “sitting,” even though it is not a very accurate translation of istawa>’, is mentioned
by Aristotle himself as instantiating the category of position. See Categories, 2a.
204
This strategy can be justified by invoking analogy with Ibn ‘Arabi>’s treatment of the category of
quantity in the two lists given in the table. Although at I: I80 the root for quantity is just “names” we
know from III: 11 that this word is just an abbreviation for “number of names.”
145
categories that we came across in Ibn ‘Arabi>’s Insha>’ al-Dawa>’ir, he uses the word ‫حال‬
for the category in question. This word is introduced from philosophy and Kala>m into
Sufism to denote a spiritual state, corresponding to theophany or Divine selfmanifestation. Normally, Ibn ‘Arabi> uses this word in its original linguistic meaning and
at other times as a technical Sufi term. Since a term retains some of its original meaning
even when it is taken over by some specific discipline, we hope to learn something about
the relationship between Divine nature and “state” as one of the ten Aristotelian
categories. We hypothesize that we could find the Divine root of “state” in the Qur’a>nic
words quoted by Ibn ‘Arabi> at III.11 as providing Divine root for the category of
quality. Before we attempt to find textual evidence for our hypothesis from Ibn ‘Arabi>
let us recall that Ibn ‘Arabi> has derived roots of two categories from a single Qur’a>nic
text in the parallel lists of Divine roots shown in the table above. Secondly, Ibn ‘Arabi>
has mentioned the Qur’a>nic verse against the category “quality” and according to him,
“the qualities are states.” (Fut. I: 195)205 At another place while discussing love he
considers the states as subordinate to quality and speaks of one quality’s having
multiple states. (Fut. II: 337)
206
Although at a number of places Ibn ‘Arabi> mentions
that the fact that there are Divine roots of “state,” and for that matter all other
categories, in “Divine states (‫”)أحوال إلھية‬, this does not mean that the predicate can be
applied directly to God, but that there is something about God which causes the
characterization of spatio-temporal world with “state.” In the Eriugenian language of
negative theology we can say that God is beyond states or creator of states. This can be
205
At Fut. II: 305 Ibn ‘Arabi> identifies this term just after quoting Qur’a>nic verse on Divine tasks. At II:
368 he relates the Divine states with certain characteristics mentioned in some traditions like God’s
joyfully receiving His servants and happiness upon repenting servant.
206
Ibn ‘Arabi> writes about the Sixth Pole (‫ )القطب السادس‬that “he does not take any of his states except
from his Lord, so his states are the states of his Lord.” Ibid. IV: 82.
146
seen from what Ibn ‘Arabi> expresses by connecting difference in human states and
Divine relations.
If it is asked why Divine relations have become different we would reply, “due
to difference in states!” … so the one whose state is hunger prays, “O AllProvider” and the one whose state is drowning prays “O Helper.” (Fut. I: 265)
In this passage it is apparent that states characterize engendered existence but are
connected to Divine nature. Here we also find Ibn ‘Arabi> referring to the Qur’a>nic verse
about Divine tasks in the context of states, which encourages us to use it as a source of
their Divine root.
In view of these textual sources, we can finally submit that that the root in the
Divine side of the appearance and existence of “state” is the fact the God is upon some
task every day. This “being upon” is the archetype for the symbol of “state.”
Time:
Time: The primary consideration within God-time problematic is the fact that time is
taken to essentially imply movement, mutability, corruption, finitude and death207 while
God has to be free of all these imperfections. On the one hand this consideration entails
that God is beyond time, on the other hand, it necessitates spiritual attempts to
overcome temporality. As far as Eriugena himself is concerned, since he recognizes that
time implies mutability
208
and since he has maintained that the categories do not
properly apply to God, he had to conclude that “time and place are to be counted among
the things that have been created” and since God is not to be counted among the created
things He cannot properly be called time and place. (See DDN I: 468C) In view of its
supra-temporality Eriugena frequently uses the words “now and always” (nunc et
207
See Dermot Moran, “Time and Eternity in the Periphyseon,” in History and Eschatology in John
Scottus Eriugena and his Time, ed. James McEvoy and Michael Dunne, (Leuven, University Press, 2002),
489.
208
Eriugena writes, “Time is the exact and natural measure of movement and pauses.” DDN V: 890.
147
semper) to denote Divine eternity. (See ibid. IV: 860) However, Eriugena identifies
creation of the world with Divine self-creation and his superlative theology demands
that we transcend this positive attribution. As Moran expresses it, “For Eriugena, time
belongs to the self-expression, self-externalization, self-manifestation or self-creation of
the creator God and also to the self-articulation of nous in sensibility.”209 In a famous
passage
Eriugena
mentions
the
supratemporal’s
making
himself
temporal
(supertemporalis temporalem). (See DDN III: 678C) Therefore while creating the spatio
temporal world God makes Himself temporal. Moreover, since one must proceed from
affirmative to negative to superlative theology, one must say that God is, is not and is
more than eternal.210
A number of scholars have focused on Ibn ‘Arabi>’s concept of time.211 In the
light of these studies Ibn ‘Arabi>’s relevant views can be discussed conveniently by
dividing time into Principial time and theophanic time. The latter can further be divided
into microcosmic time and macrocosmic time. The Arabic word ‫ الدھر‬is taken to mean
Principial time or time with which God has identified himself, while the word ‫ الوقت‬is
considered to be the counterpart of time as it relates to theophany, whether microcosmic
or macrocosmic.
Thus when Ibn ‘Arabi> relates the Prophetic saying “Do not curse Al-Dahr
because Al-Dahr is God” he considers it to be about the Principial time, which “stands
209
Dermot Moran, “Time and Eternity,” 488.
210
Ibid. 497-8.
211
Particularly mention-worthy are Gerhard BÞwering’s “Ibn al-‘Arabi>’s concept of Time,” in Gott ist
Schon und Er liebt die Schonheit: Fetschrift Annemarie Schimmel, eds. A Giese and J.C. Burgel (Zurich:
Lang Verlag, 1994)71-91 and Ibrahim Kalin “From the Temporal Time to the Eternal Now: Ibn al-‘Arabi>
and Mulla Sadra> on Time” in JMIAS, LXI (2007), 31-63 inter alia.
148
above temporal time and thus presents permanence against transience.”212 Therefore,
since this Divine time is eternal time, identifying God with it does not necessarily entail
the implausible consequence of attributing mutability or corruption to God, since time
spoken of here is different from time as we experience it.213
The first subdivision of theophanic time is microcosmic time i.e. time as we
experience it and is called “the moment”(‫)الوقت‬by Ibn ‘Arabi> and other Sufis. An
important principle of Ibn ‘Arabi>’s theory of theophany, as we shall see in the next
chapter, is that the Principle manifests Himself in accordance with the disposition or
preparedness (‫ )اإلستعداد‬of the locus of manifestation (‫)مجلى‬. “Moment,” according to Ibn
‘Arabi> is “what you are with and upon” and “what is decreed by and passed onto
you.”214 This definition which connects time to the category of “state” also refers to
Divine manifestation by mentioning Divine decree. As Kalin has summed it up, “The
moment designates a state of being in which individual acquires God’s decree in tandem
with his disposition.”215 By the macrocosmic moment “every natural event is an
emergence or appearance. Just like the disposition of the individual the universe also has
a disposition according to which God’s decrees emerge in different degrees of
212
Ibrahim Kalin, Ibid. 50.
213
A further step can be taken in the light of Iqbal’s discussion of God and time, according to which even
change can be ascribed to God without thereby implying any imperfection to Him, since one can
understand change in connection with God just like one understands Divine time different from human or
cosmic time. Iqbal writes, for instance, that “The Ultimate Ego exists in pure duration wherein change
ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals its true character as continuous creation,
‘untouched by weariness’ and unseizable by “slumber or sleep.” To conceive the Ultimate Ego as
changeless in this sense is to conceive Him as utter inaction, a motiveless, stagnant neutrality, an absolute
nothing. To the creative Self change cannot mean imperfection.” Muhammad Iqbal, Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam, Ed. M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986), 48.
214
Ibrahim Kalin, “From the Temporal Time,” 47. The first definition of moment is given at Fut. II: 539.
215
Ibid. 48.
149
ontological intensity.”216 Theophanic time of both kinds is rooted in the divinity, as Ibn
‘Arabi> writes that “The support of the present moment in the Divine things is the fact
that He describes himself with the words, “Each day He is upon some task.” (Fut. II:
539; trans. SPK, 38) Hence the category of time (of course theophanic time) is rooted in
the same facet of divinity in which the category of state is rooted.
What we have been calling “Principial time” is called “Eternal time” by Kalin,
“Eternity” by Böwering, who has concluded his article by remarking that “Eternity
belongs to God alone, but God’s creature has the present moment.”217 It would be wrong
to get the impression from these terms that just like we/the world are in time, God is in
eternity. This is a conclusion that Ibn ‘Arabi> tries hard to contest in his Kita>b al-Azal.
With the help of a complex argument Ibn ‘Arabi> seeks to show that azal (eternitywithout-beginning) conceived after likeness of time or as extension leads to absurd
conclusions like attribution of God with nothingness, negation of Divine unity by
positing another eternal existent, naming God illegitimately and finally, of circular
reasoning (‫ )تسلسل‬by posing eternity as one of his attributes, since He has his attributes
eternally and having eternity eternally is circular. After negating this concept Ibn ‘Arabi>
recommends that instead of saying “God spoke in eternity” we should say “Divine
Speech is a beginningless attribute of Allah, without qualification (kayf).218We can
conclude from this that on the one hand we have Principial time which is God, not
216
Ibid.
217
Bowering, “Ibn al-‘Arabi>’s Concept of Time,” 91.
218
Ibn ‘Arabi>, “Kita>b al-Azal” in Rasa>’il Ibn ‘Arabi>, 121-122. Compare Paul Helm: “it is better to think
of timelessness not as separate attribute but as a mode of possessing attributes. It is not that God is both
omniscient and timeless but that He is timelessly omniscient.” Eternal God: A Study of God without
Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 17.
150
something that encompasses Him and on the other hand theophanic time which has its
root in God’s being upon some task each day.
To sum up the discussion of God’s relation to Categoriae Decem, Eriugena and
Ibn ‘Arabi> agree on the main features of the nature of categories and on the view that in
consideration of Divine transcendence none of these categories should apply literally to
God. However Ibn ‘Arabi> connects Divine nature and the existence of these categories
since they constitute the form of the world and in the opinion of latter form of the world
is ontologically connected to Divine Nature. This fact sets him apart from Eriugena’s
position only to a certain extent, because he is drawing implications of a metaphysical
principle of his which is found in Eriugena as well. So the difference is only that one of
these writers is applying his principle to the full while the other keeps it to a certain
limit.
It can safely be concluded from the preceding analysis that Ibn ‘Arabi>’s doctrine
of Divine roots squares fairly with Eriugena’s concept of participation. However, he is
more elaborate than the latter since he not only provides a general principle but also
endeavors to relate particular existential realities to Divine realities. Eriugena, in
contrast, was more elaborate in explaining the meaning of “participation” while Ibn
‘Arabi> gave us more specific information while leaving the task of defining and
discovering principles to his readers.
In the next chapter we turn to the concept of theophany and its counterpart in
Ibn ‘Arabi>’s cosmology.