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Nepal general evaluation
NEPAL A COUNTRY PROFILE
Nepal is a land-locked country sandwiched between two neighbouring giants China (in the
north) and India (in the east, south and west). One of the 49 Least Developed Countries
(LDCs), with an annual per capita income of US$ 230, Nepal is ranked as 143 rd (out of 175
countries) in the Human Development Index (HDI) of UNDP, and falls under the category of
‘low human development’ countries in the human development aggregates (UNDP 2003).
Nepal, which stretches in an area of 147,181 sq km, is a land of enormous geographical
diversity divided east-west into three distinct ecological zones: the plains (terai) on the
south, hills and mountains in the middle and the Himalayas on the north. Thousands of
rivers and streams that flow north-south bisect the landscape into hundreds of small hills
and hillocks isolating the residents from each other and from the rapidly evolving world of
information and development because of the lack of linking infrastructure (transport and
communication). These three regions also display an immense diversity of human
settlement patterns, population, land distribution, productive resources and levels of
economic development.
Home to nearly 24 million people, Nepal is a mosaic of over 61 ethnic groups who
have their own distinct languages, cultures life styles. Officially, however, it is a Hindu
State with a rigid caste system that compartmentalizes the people into 4-tire hierarchy.
This caste framework finds a close nexus historically with the system of governance, in
which the upper caste, the bahun and chhettri castes in particular, have always held the
positions of power and privileges, and by virtue of their being in lower tiers, other groups
are routinely discriminated against and deprived of accessing decisive State structures and
institutions.
1. CULTURE
Nepalese culture builds on its unique geographical, socio-economic and political histories
and structures. Its geographical distinctiveness has given rise to diverse cultural structures
and practices in different ecological zones. The terai, hills and mountains thus are
mutually exclusive in terms of cultural practises. Cultural distinctiveness is also
conspicuous along ethnic lines (to which we return shortly). Feudal and subsistence-based
socio-economic structures also have implications for cultural practices and manifestations.
The following are some of key cultural institutions.
Religion
Table 1: Population by Religion (No &%)
Hindu
The Hindu religion provides an overarching
cultural ideology to the nation. Hinduism is the
state religion and thus influential in shaping
State policies as well. Treating Hinduism as
state religion has long been a contentious issue,
particularly amongst non-Hindu communities
who find their religious ideologies and cultural
practices neglected by the state. Nearly 81
percent of the total population professes
Nepal Interim Report
18,330,121
80.6
2,442,520
10.7
Islam
954,023
4.2
Kirat
818,106
3.6
Others
117,482
0.5
74,682
0.3
22,736,934
100
Boudha
Not Stated
Total Pupulation
Source: CBS (2002)
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Hinduism as their religion. Buddhism, the second main religion, is professed by around 11
per cent of the population. Islam and Kirat, the other main religions, are practised
respectively by around four per cent of the population. Other religious groups which
include, Christian, Sikh, Jain, Garaute, Tapjura and Bahai, make up below one per cent of
the total population (Table 1). Of these minority religious groups, Christian is the biggest
one with around 100 thousand people practising it followed by Sikh and Jain with around
five thousand people practising each of them.
Caste and Ethnicity
Table 2: People of Nepal
Nepalese people are socially segmented
Groups
Population
Percent
along lines of caste and ethnicity. The caste
Bahun
2,896,477
13
system, which flows from the Hindu
Chhetri
3,593,496
16
ideology, compartmentalizes people into 4
Other
caste
groups
3,850,999
17
rigidly vertical hierarchies. A person retains
Newar
1,245,232
5
caste position by birth, and there is no
possibility of change in this position
Ethnic Communities
7,027,319
31
regardless of one’s educational performance
Dalits
2,902,907
13
and economic or social achievements. The
Religious-linguistic groups
988,863
4
caste position has implications for career
Unidentified groups
231,641
1
development and other life-opportunities
one would get from the State. Those in the
upper hierarchies often maintain a close interaction with the state apparatus whereas
those in the lower echelon find themselves discriminated against in political, economic
and social decision-making and accessing opportunities available.
The caste system is responsible for maintaining inequality amongst groups of people. By
its very nature, it restricts the types of work people are allowed to undertake, with the
most demeaning and menial work being the role of the lowest caste groups. The feudal
nature of the caste system leaves lower caste people economically dependent on higher
castes. Refusal to do the allotted work leads to reprisals including cases of economic and
social boycotts of the whole community. Other rights denied include opportunities for
employment, and the right to marry freely, let alone their right to participation in sociopolitical decision making structures and processes.
The linguistic, ethnic and religious minorities and Madhises (people of of terai origin) are
other discriminated groups. The Brahmins and Chhetris, which occupy the first and second
position from the top in the caste ladder, constitute 29 percent of the total population
but control 77 per cent of bureaucracy, and senior positions in army and police; 67 per
cent of state and constitutional bodies; and 63 per cent of current legislature (ESP,
2001:13; 184-185). The Dalits who, according to 2001 census, constitute around 13
percent of the total population do not have a single position of policymaking status in the
bureaucracy, army or police. Similarly the ethnic groups who constitute 31 percent1 of the
total population do have a very negligible participation in state and constitutional
policymaking bodies (see Table 3). The only group that enjoys State privileges besides
Brahmin and Chhetris is Newar, constituting 5 percent of the total population. The Newars
1
Calculating the percent of ethnicity, the Newars, which constitute around 5 percent of the total population
(CBS 2002), have been excluded in this report. In the national discourse on ethnicity, the Newars find a
confusing place in terms of whether or not they constitute an ethnic identity as other groups do (see ESP
2001:180-182).
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are predominantly the residents of the Kathmandu valley, and the descendants of the
rulers who ruled the principalities that existed in the Valley before 1769.
Table 3: Participation of caste and ethnic groups in policymaking and policy enforcing bodies (in
%)
Rank
Bureaucracy, army and police
Judiciary, constitutional bodies,
cabinet and parliament
Bahun &
Chhetri
77
67
Mangol (Ethnic
people)
1
8
Madhise+
Dalit
Newar#
4
13
0
1
18
11
+ The inhabitants of the Terai (madesh) are called Madhise. The term has more a geo-ecological
connotation than a caste and ethnic one. The data are good to speak of regional disparity.
# Newars are predominantly the inhabitants of Kathmandu Valley.
Source: Extracted from ESP 2001:13, 184-185
According to the caste worldview, a person attains social position by birth, not by merits
and qualifications. And it is an unwritten law
that the opportunities available in the State
Table 4: Discrimination against Dalits in Nepal
are the privileges of those borne to upper
Denial of Entry
10
castes. For the lower caste people, it is just
Denial of Services
14
a matter of chance to be able to access the
Denial of Access to common services
16
position of power and privileges. The caste
Denial of Participation
14
worldview
is,
therefore,
inherently
Forced Discrimination
9
torturous, discriminatory and divisive.
The 1990 Constitution, drawn in the
aftermath of the 1990 People’s Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy, prohibits
through Article 11 (2) any discrimination on
grounds of religion, race, sex, caste tribe or
ideological
conviction.
However,
the
practice of ‘untouchability’ continues to
stigmatize some 3 million Dalits even today.
The caste system sustains due to the failure
of the State to implement stringent
measures to protect and promote the rights
of Dalits and to hold the perpetrators—the
so-called high caste people—accountable for
their actions.
Dominance
20
Attrocities
20
Social boycott
3
Attitudional untouchability
18
Occupational discrimination
18
Educational discrimination
11
Political discrimination
10
Government policy and program
10
Government and NGO Offices
11
Development programmes
13
Religious and cultural discrimination
8
205
Total
A recent study (ActionAid Nepal, 2003)—quite comprehensive of its kind— reports 205
kinds of discriminatory practices existing in Nepal (Table 3, also see box 1). Major
discriminations include (a) denial (of entry into the house of upper castes as well as public
places such as temple and shops; of services such as the sale of milk product; of access to
common resources such as drinking water; of kinship such as inter-caste marriage; of
participation such as festivals and public programmes), (b) forced labour (no wages for
work), (c) atrocities (beatings, burning houses), (d) social boycott (in case of inter-caste
marriages or denial of traditional services such as disposing of dead bodies from high-
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caste houses), (e) discrimination (in getting occupation, bank loans in some cases,
participating in socio-cultural life).
The 1991 census included data on the
literacy levels of the different caste and
ethnic groups in Nepal. It revealed that the
four groups with the lowest literacy levels
were all Dalit groups, and they had a
literacy level below the national average.
Although the 2001 census shows that levels
of literacy has improved across the country
(59.6%) since 1991, more than 40 per cent
of the population is still deprived of
education, and the Dalit people could
make only the smallest gains. According to
Gurung (2003), the highest literacy level is
98.5 percent and the lowest one is 11.1.
This indicates the level of disparity of
access to education between different
groups. The literacy level of all Dalit
groups and some of ethnic groups is below
national average with a Dalit group having
the lowest level. Similarly, Dalit women
have a literacy rate of 9% against 42% for
women generally, and a life expectancy of
42, against the national average of 59.8
(Kathmandu Post 21st March 2004)
In 2001, 80 percent of Dalits lived below
the poverty line, compared to a total
population figure of 42 per cent. Dalits
owned only 1 per cent of cultivable land
and 70 per cent were malnourished.
SAAPE (2003:131) noted that the incidence
of poverty was highest among Limbus, one
of over 60 ethnic groups, followed by
Dalits, and lowest among Newars, the
predominant residents of the Kathmandu
Valley, followed by Brahmins, the group
that sits on the top of the caste ladder.
Box 1: A dalit house burnt down
On the night of 13 November 2003, family members
of Komalnath Kandel, an upper caste, burnt down
the house of their Dalit neighbors Manmaya BK,
located in Dhamja VDC-7 of Baglung district, Nepal
after Manmaya BK refused to move away despite
Komalnath Kandel's repeated warnings. At the time
of the incident, Manmaya was at a distant bazaar in
order to call her husband employed abroad and was
not at home. She has left her children in her
parent¡¦s house.
Family of Manmaya BK, a Dalit, has been staying in
the area for years with her house close to that of
Komalnath Kandel. Recently, Manmaya sold some of
her land to her brother Ram Bahadur BK who was to
construct a house on it. Fearing that a Dalit
settlement would come up around his residence,
Kandel had been threatening Manmaya to move away
from the area. However, Manmaya refused to do it
and paid no heed to the threats. According to her,
the fire caused a loss of over Nepali Rs. 300,000
(about US$ 4055).
After the incident, Manmaya has lodged a complaint
with the Baglung District Police Office (DPO)
demanding compensation to the loss by fire. Balaram
Bista, the Sub-Inspector of Police at the Baglung DPO
promised to complete the investigation on the
incident by this week. However, there has not been
any serious action taken by the police on this case
until now. According to the reliable source, a police
officer said that it would take at least one month to
investigate the case because the area, where
incident happened, is remote and unstable because
of Maoist activities. The victim and human rights
activists worry that the police will hush up the case.
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2003/513?pri
nt=yes
Gender
Discrimination on the basis of gender is rife in Nepal. And it cuts across all classes and
ages. In rural areas, where patriarchal traditions remain strong, the intensity of violence
and discrimination is severe. Women run the households, do much of the fieldwork, but
they have a low status in society. They have no right to property.
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Discrimination against women starts from home and right after the birth; it is varied and
far-reaching. Parents are reluctant to invest in a girl's education because her major role is
viewed as nurturing children and remaining in the traditional sector of society. Women
are often denied the right to parental property. They are seen as “second class citizen,
discriminated against in social, cultural, economic, religious and political fronts, and
oppressed, exploited and dominated…” (FWLD, 2000:1).
Although Nepal’s literacy rate has increased in recent years, the percentage of literate
women lags far behind the percentage of literate men. The overall literacy rate of Nepal
is 53.74 percent but the female literacy rate is only 42.49 percent (CBS, 2001). In 1996,
primary school enrolment for girls ranged from 52% of that of boys down to 32%; only 1%
of working women held the status of ‘employer’; and less than 1% of candidates in local
elections were women (HMG, 1996).
The maternal mortality ratio in the country, at 540 per 100,000 live births, is one of the
highest in the region (UNDP, 2003). It is proximately linked, among others, to the low
level of access to antenatal, delivery and postnatal care. Over 90 percent of births in the
country takes place at home and without professional assistance (NESAC, 1998).
The ongoing Maoist insurgency adds another dimension to gendered violence. Women have
been displaced from their homes and communities, and the killing of male members of
the family has increased their burden of family responsibilities (see Section 4).
2. POLITY
In 1769, Prithvi Narayan Shah, the king of Gorkha principality, some 80kms northwest of
Kathmandu, established the modern Nepali state by conquering dozens of petty hill
states. Politically, Nepal is now 235 years old; 219.5 years (93.4%) of its life have been
characterized by autocracy and government repression, the remaining 15.5 years (6.6%)
have seen intermittent democracy (between 1959-1960), which was toppled after 18
months in function by King Mahendra, the father of the current monarch). And from 1990
to the present, Nepal formally remains a multi-party democracy, although the present
king Gyanendra has taken over much of executive power after deposing an elected prime
minister on November 4, 2002.
Trapped in the grips of a handful of aristocrat elites, Nepal’s political history is the one of
conspiracy and in-fighting amidst the rulers. Until 1990, the commoners had hardly an
access to politics. The rule of law, human rights and democracy were considered (by the
rulers) as alien concepts; the voice for which would mete out severe state repression. In
1990, democracy was introduced as a result of a peaceful mass movement (known as the
People’s Movement for Democracy) which toppled the authoritarian polity—the Panchayat
system—that ruled Nepal for 30 years (between 1960 and 1990) with the king as an
absolute ruler. The preceding 10 years (1950-1960) were a period of transition from a 104year old hereditary Rana regime (1846-1950) to one in which the commoners would be
able to participate and articulate. But taking advantage of the 10-year wrangling the
monarchy, which was reduced to titular head of the State during the Rana regime,
consolidated its position as an absolute ruler while the peoples, who fought the Ranas in
favour of monarchy, were reduced to passive subjects.
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In 1990, an interim government formed after the success of the People’s Movement
promulgated the 1990 Constitution, and, as per the Constitution, held national elections
for bicameral parliament in 1992. Thirty-two years after the short-lived democracy, Nepal
re-entered into a democratic regime with people having high hopes and aspirations that
their days of agony were over.
Formally, Nepal is a democratic polity now. But since 4 October 2002, following King
Gyanendra’s takeover of executive powers after deposing an elected government and
forming one of his yes-men, consisting of the stalwarts of erstwhile Panchayat regime,
Parliament does not exist now; nor do local elected bodies. National election is held
pending for the last two years.
Street protests and demonstrations by parliamentary parties have been the order of the
day in order to rectify what they call the ‘royal regressive move’ of October 4, 2002. On
the other side of the political landscape lies an 8-year old armed struggle—the People’s
War—launched since 1996 by the then fledgling hard-liner communist group—Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoists)—aimed at toppling the present state and government to establish
a regime styled after the one formed by Mao Tsetung in China in 1945 (see Bhattarai 2003;
Prachanda 2003).
Currently, the Maoist People’s War has been a major source of political unrest in Nepal.
Except in the cities and Kathmandu Valley, the presence of the state is almost nonexistent. The rural areas daily get caught in crossfire between Maoist militia and security
forces. Between 1996 and 2003, 8,675 people have been killed, 2792 by Maoists; many
thousands have been injured and much infrastructure has been destroyed (see Section 4).
So far, two ceasefires have been observed, one starting July 2001, which lasted 5 months,
and the other starting January 2003, which lasted 7 months, with purported aims of
finding a negotiated settlement. But both have failed without any outcomes. Instead, the
warring parties have blamed each other for using the ceasefires to consolidate their
military logistics. What is true is after the break-up of the ceasefire, the Maoist have
seemingly mounted heavier attacks than before on the security installations.
Politically speaking, Nepal is at the cross-roads trapped between ‘ultra-leftist’ and ‘ultrarightist’ extremism led respectively by the Maoists and the monarchy. Mainstream
politics—that stands for genuine democracy and the rule of law—is in retreat.
3. ECONOMY
Agriculture is the mainspring of Nepal’s economy. It provides livelihoods for a striking
majority of the nation’s population, and employment for four fifths of the total labour
force, “possibly the highest ratio in the world” (NESAC 1998: 100). Nepalese agriculture
operates in a semi-feudal framework. Arable land is very scarce in Nepal. It is in a
fragmented and unevenly distributed. Only 20 percent of the total land area is cultivable,
and of the total cultivable land, 69 percent of the landholdings are less than one hectare
in size. The bottom 40 percent of agricultural households owns only nine percent of the
total agricultural land, while the top six percent occupies more than 33 percent (NESAC
1998: 117-8). And, 24.4 percent households do not own any land (CSRC 2003:8), which
means over 5.5 million Nepali people are landless (the average household size of Nepal,
according to 2001 census, is 5.45).
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In the landless category are primarily two groups of people: the sukumbasis, a name given
to the peoples deprived of land over history for various reasons, and the kamaiays—the
Tharu people in the western terai of Nepal who resisted malaria and nurtured the arable
land there for over 600 years (see Karki 2002). But these people were tricked into
bondage after malaria was eradicated in 1950, which paved the way for migration from
the hills. These people soon held control over the arable land pushing the real masters,
the kamaiyas into margin, and, gradually, into bondage. Losing their land, the only means
of subsistence, to the invaders, the Tharus were forced to work for them for very nominal
wages. To meet socio-cultural obligations (costs for marriages, rites, festivals), they
started borrowing money from the masters pledging their labour as surety. As social
obligations grew, so did the amount of loan which would accrue a large amount of interest
solely imposed by the lenders. Over years a point came where, despite working long
hours—as many as 18 hours a day—by the whole family members, the loan became so huge
that it could not be settled. Instead, it chained them as bonded labourers of the masters.
It is estimated that around 100 thousand kamaiyas are landless.
Having no land of their own, the landless (sukumbasis) and land-poor are left at the mercy
of big farmers and landlords, often forced to sell their labour for a negligible wage. The
surplus so appropriated is diverted to other sectors which do not necessarily support
agricultural growth (Acharya 2003). Appropriating a surplus from a majority in the rural
areas to a minority residing in urban centres is widening a gap between the rich and the
poor. Today, some nine million people are estimated to be below the poverty line with
earnings less than 1 US$ a day.
The dominant mode of production is feudal-agrarian and subsistence-oriented. And the
nation’s economy operates in a neo-liberal framework. The road to economic
liberalization began in Nepal with the reinstatement of democracy in 1990. To globalise
the national economy, trade investment, foreign exchange, financial and industrial
sectors were deregulated, de-licensed and privatized. However, the experience of
privatization has not been encouraging. “Out of 17 enterprises privatised, 4 have already
closed down while others are struggling to survive. For instance, Nepal Bank Limited
(NLB), the oldest bank of the country, which was privatised in 1997, is in a very critical
situation” (SAAPE 2003: 129). Privatization has hit hard the education and health sectors
by decreasing the quality and quantity of public health and education provisions. There is
no evidence that privatization has led to improved services in any sectors.
To look at the current performance of key economic sectors shows the deteriorating
situation of national economy. During the 1990s, the economic growth was 5 percent per
annum. But with the start of the New Millennium, overall growth failed down to become
“negative (-0.6%), for the first time in 19 years” (NPC 2003). Agriculture, the mainstay of
national economy, “which provides employment to 81 per cent of the total population and
contributes to over 80 per cent to the export sector” is not performing well. The
performance has not exceeded over 3.3 percent over years against the planned target of
annual 4 percent growth.
Manufacture industry, the other important sector, faces similar fate, particularly after
the start of the Maoist People’s War in 1996 (See the relevant section). Industrial
production in the fiscal year 2001/02 reduced to 5.9 per cent from the 10.8 per cent
production level of the first half of 1990s.
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Trade accounts for a relatively small percentage of GDP. In 2002, exports accounted for
11.3 per cent of GDP, while the agricultural sector accounted for 40 per cent (ADB 2003),
and the trade deficit stood at 14.1 per cent of GDP (SAAPE 2003).
Foreign aid forms an integral part of Nepal’s economy ever since the door to foreign aid
was opened in 1952. Nepal’s dependency on foreign aid is on the rise as compared to
other countries in South Asia. This dependence on foreign aid has contributed to an
alarming amount of foreign debt accumulation. As commentators argue, more than half
the annual government revenue goes to foreign debt servicing today with each citizen
owing more than US$ 100 to foreign creditors (Pradhan 2000). Currently, NRs. 221.99
billion (approximately US$ 3 billion) stands as outstanding loan.2
4. THE MAOIST PEOPLE’S WAR
On 13 February 1996, six years after the restoration of democracy by the 1990 People’s
Movement, a faction of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared an armed
insurgency (the People’s War) against the present socio-economic structure and state with
the aim of establishing, what they called, a New Democratic State (see Prachanda, 2003;
and Bhattarai, 2003).
Pointing to the failure of the successive governments of the last 150 years, including those
formed in the 1990s, to guarantee equality and justice in all fronts affecting the personal
as well as collective life of the people, the Maoists saw the inevitability of an armed
struggle against the State which, in their judgment, imposed ‘unjust war’ on the peoples.
To right the wrongs of the “unjust war”, they declared a “just war”. A leaflet, which was
distributed widely to herald the People’s War on 13th February, speaks of the method as
well as the goal of the People’s War—“March along the Path of the People’s War to Smash
the Reactionary State and Establish a New Democratic State” (Karki and Seddon
2003:187).
Prior to the start of the War, the Maoists had submitted a 40-point demand to the
government addressing nationalism (9 demands), issues related to the public and its
wellbeing (17 demands) and people’s livelihoods (14 demands). They had set a dead-line
for government response at 17th February 1996, but 5 days before the deadline, they
launched series of attacks and assaults on police posts, development project offices,
private and public infrastructure.
People’s War feeds on the frustrated experience of the masses, particularly of the youth.
It is a common perception that the change of polity in 1990 only changed the political
figures, but not the style of governance (Karki 2001). The change did not contribute to
decentralization of opportunities and resources nor did it make “any attempts to radically
change the stagnant socio-economic structure” (Kattel 2000:2). Resultantly, the people,
as in the erstwhile regimes, continued to languish in want, deprived of basic amenities,
whereas their leaders soon found themselves at luxury with house servants, imported
alcohol, computers, cars, name-brand imports and grotesque modern cement houses
(Miksell 1998). Corruption increased. Politics was criminalized and state institutions and
government bureaucracy was politicised to serve the interest of the party in power.
2
See, http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/englishmonthly/businessage/2003/nov/cover.htm
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Increasing unemployment and unchecked inflation of basic commodities made the life of
the people more miserable and difficult. Maoists seized rightly on all this characterising
the state as an instrument of corruption, exploitation and injustice thereby garnering the
support of socio-economically and culturally marginalised people in their favour.
The War started from a few western districts of Nepal: Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and
Salyan, which are treated still today as private estates of the descendants of pre-1800
feudal kings who ruled the then Karnali province with utmost barbarism. During the 30
years of the Panchayat regime, not to speak of the previous ones, no developmental works
were initiated in the areas of education, health, transport and communication “because
by doing so people would have become conscious of their social deprivation, which would
have weakened the political power base of privileged feudal elites” (Karki 2001:184).
Following the advent of democracy the local feudal lords, moneylenders and elites, the
stalwarts of the previous panchayat regime, joined the Nepali Congress Party (ibid: 185).
The commoners joined leftist parties, particularly the United People’s Front (UPF) as
evidenced by the results of 1991 general elections, which brought 9 UPF MPs to the House
of Representatives, including 2 MPs from Rolpa and 1 from Rukum.
Overall, the Nepali Congress Party won majority in 1991 elections and formed the first
democratically elected government (excepting a short-lived one in early 1960s) in the
history of Nepali politics, long tainted with authoritarianism. Unfortunately, as soon as the
Congress Party, the major architect of the 1990 People’s Movement, came to power, it
adopted a policy of political confrontation against communist parties, the allies of the
1990 Movement that toppled the Panchayat system and paved the way for the Congress to
come to power. In Rolpa and Rukum, a large number of people, other than Congress
supporters, were implicated in fabricated criminal cases, charged and convicted with the
help of Chief District Officers (the senior-most government officials responsible for law
and order in the district). Having all door to legal adjudication closed, most of the
accused had to run away from their homes and villages (see Karki 2001: 184-187). Unlike
popular expectations that things would better following democracy, the situation turned
more barbaric than it was during the time of Rana regime and the autocratic Panchayat
System (ibid). The people in Rolpa and Rukum were thus left in a dilemma like the one
Peter Limqueco (1997) visualizes:
“If poverty, oppression and government neglect gets unbearable, the people
have a choice either to take up arms or to move elsewhere. It is more likely that
they will take up arms because usually such people have nowhere to go. Ruling
elites who have no concerns for social justice and equity, driven as they are only
by greed and the quest for power, should not be surprised when peasants,
workers and ordinary people decide enough is enough. And the banners need not
be red, they can be green or blue or pink.”
Reading Karki (2001) and INSEC (1996) suggests that the ordinary people in those parts of
the country were compelled somehow to carry a ‘banner’ against repression. And, the
banner available to them was ‘red’.
The root causes of the People’s War are thus “the complex web of interacting factors”
that include what Loocke and Philipson (2002) have rightly noted:
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uneven development within the country; endemic corruption; the politics of
the Palace, both internally and externally, and their relationship with the
army; ethnic and caste inequalities; intense politicisation; human rights abuse;
social exclusion and deprivation, and inadequate infrastructure development.
Eight years into full swing, it has spread nation-wide, 73 (of 75) districts are under its
direct effect. The state has seemingly withdrawn from rural areas, which make up nearly
90 per cent of the country. The Maoist insurgency and the State counterinsurgency has
resulted in the conflict to become one of the ‘highest intensity internal conflicts in the
word’ as Murshed and Gates (2003) have noted. Consequently, the situation of law and
order has reached an all-time low level. All the organic social security systems, which
were functional in societies and communities over times providing social and communitylevel safety measures for the people concerned, have broken down completely. What
prevails now is the psyche of terror and fear of what-would-happen-next. Killing,
decimation and destruction has become an order of the day. Just in between 2 and 20
March 2004, within three weeks, two major bloody assaults were made by Maoists, one in
Bhojpur in the eastern hills and the other in Myagdi in the western hills, the fiercest of its
kind ever since the People’s War has started. In these two assaults, over 500 people,
including unarmed civilians, have been feared dead, at least 250 confirmed. A number of
private houses and almost all public infrastructures were destroyed. And, there is no sigh
of abetment. In the last eight years, nearly a dozen of such assaults have been made.
The real cost, impact and implications of the War is beyond one’s imagination as various
sources suggest various estimates, which too are mostly tentative than real. In addition to
the data of those killed and variously tortured—as reviewed in the following sections—
near-true data are not available in relation to displacement, migration, destruction,
school closure and other kinds of impact. Preliminary estimates have already painted a
horrible picture. In 2002, 17,564 people were reported to have displaced throughout the
country (INSEC 2003). A Geneva-based organization—the Global IDP Project, estimates the
total number of the displaced to be somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000. The
displaced are believed to have fled to urban district headquarters, big cities like
Kathmandu, Nepalgunj and Biratnagar and to India. The reasons for displacement are
many: the fear of being caught in the crossfire; fear of food blockades, torture and
killings by both the Maoists and security forces; and, the fear of forceful enlistment of
youths in the Maoist army. The displaced live in “very varied conditions.” Young children
particularly fall into “unhygienic conditions and hostile environments… some live on the
street, denied an education and exposed to a variety of threats, including sexual
exploitation and other forms of child labour.” Those who could not leave their places—
particularly the elderly, women, children and poor villagers—are left behind to “face
worsening poverty, food shortages, and harassment by both the Maoists and security
forces” (Global IDP Project, 2003).
By the end of 2003, around 3,000 teachers were estimated to have left teaching in highly
conflict affected districts affecting as many as 100,000 students; around 700 schools
across the country were reported to have been closed. The Maoists, through its student
wing (All Nepal National Independent Free Student Union), disrupted school education
throughout the country through a series of bandhs (shut-downs) and protests. Most
horrendous of all, the Maoists are using children directly in the War “as human shields, as
porters to carry dead Maoist fighters, as housekeepers and cooks and in some extreme
cases, as sex slaves” (Thapa with Sijapati, 2003:161-162). In one of the fiercest attacks
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made so far (in Myagdi), the Maoists are blamed for using a large number of children as
reported by The Kathmandu Post in its commentary of March 26, 2004. According to a
recent study, 156 children have lost their lives so far; at least 2000 children lost at least
one parent and more than 4000 have been displaced (FDM, 2004:46). Besides being direct
victims of its kind, the series of killing, looting and terror—that children have been
compelled to watch—have developed a psyche of violence, hatred, and fear in their
fledgling minds. The implication of all this is very grave.
By 2003, 8,688 people have been killed, at the rate of three lives a day, 5,883 by the
State. Many thousands have been reported injured. The cost of infrastructural destruction
is paramount. Nearly half of VDC Offices have already been destroyed.
Telecommunication system was destroyed in 13 districts, 5 hydropower plants ceased
functioning and 6 airports stopped operations due to conflict. Last year, it was estimated
that at least 20 billion rupees—US$13.7 million—could be required for the reparation of
the damage (Kantipur daily, 5 April 2003). Given that the scale of destruction has been
intense after the breakdown of ceasefire in August 2003, currently it is difficult to
imagine the real financial cost the War has claimed.
The effect of People’s War on women is worse and multifaceted. Besides being directly
victimized as Maoist members and combatants, for, which they could be prepared, they
have to often pay price for their family members’ participation in the War. They are
targeted by security forces when their husbands or sons are identified as Maoists. Sita Devi
Chaudhary of Kailali was widowed when she was 19: “They [police] killed my husband
before my eyes and raped me in front of everyone during broad daylight” (FDM 2004:43).
She was not only widowed, psychologically decimated as well. During the last eight years,
as many as 48 women have been raped by security personnel, 600 have been killed and
around 70 disappeared. The displacement of youths and able-bodied men has added
additional burden on women to take up agricultural works, which would otherwise be the
domain of male chores.
The insurgency has weighed heavily on the overall socio-economic life. Tourism, one of
the main sources of income, has suffered badly. The destruction of infrastructure,
including airports, bridges, power plants and telecommunication centres has posed a
serious obstacle to communication, transport and development. Rural areas are running
short of food and medical supplies because of restrictions imposed both by Maoists and
government. The displacement of able-bodied men and women has had a serious impact
on agricultural growth. All this dangerously points to impending crisis that may result in
famine and hunger, which have time and again haunted the western hills known for a long
time to be food insecure (SAPEE 2003).
That militarization has been the system of governance is revealed by the unnatural rise in
military expenditure in recent years. The expenses rose 7 fold between 1991 and 2003.
Slightly more than 14 per cent of the total budget (including the one allocated for the
Ministry of Home) was allocated for security in 2002/2003, which was higher than the one
allocated for social services (Table 7). The increase in security expenses has been at a
cost: “thousands of teachers could not draw their salary, smooth operation of schools
were disrupted in many villages, development activities had to be stalled in many cases”
(FDM 2004: 31-32) because the money allocated for these headings was diverted to
finance rising military demands.
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Table 5: Occupation-wise Killing (in%)
To sum-up, the People’s War has been a major
State
source of direct violence in Nepal for nearly a
Occupation
Maoists
decade now. It is in the locus of national,
Political Workers
65
10
regional and internal concerns when it comes to
Agricultural Workers
16
14
developmental, social security and peace
Police Personnel
0
33
discourses. Just to look at the background
Unidentified Persons
11
3
suggests two primary factors responsible for the
Civil Servants
0
15
upsurge of the War: deprivation and inequality.
General People
3
9
It started from one of the least developed parts
Army Personnel
0
8
of the country which were from time
immemorial under a strong influence of feudal
practices and which unfortunately underwent state repression even after the change of
polity in the 1990s. The participation of unemployed youths and poor farmers in the War
shows the correlation between resource deprivation—the violation of economic and social
rights—and violence.
Looking at the Maoist targeted infrastructure and the category of people also indicates an
interesting correlation. The centre of Maoist targets have been banks, security
installations and communication infrastructure, which, as the rebels see, are the support
base of feudal elements. Most of those killed by Maoists, except security personnel (33%),
are civil servants (15%) and political opponents (10%) seen as belonging to or having close
nexus with the socio-economically affluent class. ‘Agricultural workers’ (which includes
small farmers, landless/land-poor and the farmers with some land and land-based
business)—the other category of those killed—are targeted by the State as potential
Maoists. Because they are poor, they are perceived to be violence-prone. Agricultural
workers are targeted by Maoists for, arguably, two reasons. First, the middle class farmers
have some good land in villages; some of them also operate money-lending or other agrobased business. They thus have some influence in socio-political decision making. This
perceived ‘resourcefulness’ position has made them vulnerable although they may not be
so in reality. Second, they are killed for failing to provide what Maoists call ‘donations.’
Some of them have been killed for failing to feed them.
Table 6: Trend of Budget Distribution in Some of Key Areas (Nepali Rupees in millions).
Fiscal
Year
1990/91
1995/96
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
Total
Budget
1979
5165
9162
9979
9612
General
Expenditure
764
2282
4351
4932
5744
Royal
Palace
04
06
09
11
39
Defence
Home
111
219
381
582
728
75
193
781
753
753
Social
Services*
75
159
948
1353
1413
Dept
Servicing
231
723
1276
1411
1635
* Expenses for education, health, drinking water and local development are included in
the expenditure for social services. See, SAAPE (2003:144)
5. LAWS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
5.1 THE LAWS
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Nepal’s modern legal system is less than half-a-decade old (see, CVICT 2001). Until 1960s,
Hindu shastras (religious scriptures) would form the basis of laws interpreted locally—by
local priests, mostly Brahmin graduates of Sanskrit education—in the light of the traditions
of local customs and practices. As the interpretation would vary along diverse sociocultural make-up of Nepal, so would justice addressing the same case/issue in a particular
cultural set-up.
The Muluki Ain (National Code)
The Muluki Ain (translated variously as ‘Civil Code’, ‘Country Code’ or ‘National Code’;
we use ‘National Code’ in this context) sets the history of the legal system of Nepal. Jung
Bahadur Rana, the founder of the hereditary-dictatorial Rana Regime that ruled Nepal
between 1846 and 1950 completely centralized and closed, introduced in 1854 the
National Code thereby bringing uniformity in penal system and practices. Initiated by a
dictator who came to power following a bloodiest massacre of kin and kiths, the Code
might have been drawn—basing solely on the Hindu value systems—to further his personal
and familial interests by imposing heavily punitive measures on his opponents. It was
utterly against women, workers and the so-called low-caste, and loaded with grossly
discriminatory provisions which legally sanctified sati system 3, bonded labour system4 and
slavery system. One of the serious implications of the National Code is the legal
formalization of the caste system compartmentalizing the Nepali people into four vertical
strata with no possibility of upward mobility. But an upper group could move downwards
on certain conditions. In sum, “the Code was discriminatory in the application of laws on
the ground of religion, race, sex, caste and tribe. There was difference in punishment for
men and women and for the person of ‘lower caste’ and ‘upper cast’” (FDLD, 2000: 5).
By default, one could argue, the Code helped to synchronize legal practices scattered
otherwise variously throughout the country.
From 1854 and now, the Code has undergone a dozen of amendments, and each
amendment has seen a bit of progressive step forward but a number of discriminatory
clauses still remain in place. The first amendment was done in 1963, after 1010 years of
its life, and this amended version, with other minor subsequent amendments, provides a
major legal reference till today.
The provisions of the Code are wide-ranging covering matters from development related
issues to the inheritance rights of women to lost and found animals to adoption. In recent
years some of the issues it used to address have been superseded by new legislation. For
example, cases pertaining to ‘adoption’ are now handled as per the Child Act 1992 (see
below). But where no specific laws exist, the Code stands as the only reference point. Of
particular reference here are the issues relating to women’s rights—such as the provisions
on rape, inheritance and marriage—which are discriminatory and unconstitutional as per
the 1990 Constitution, but still in practice.
3
4
The practice of self-immolation of widows on dead husband’s funeral pyres
A social system where laborers and/or their family members work for the masters—mostly the landlords—in
repayment of debts taken by them or their forefathers for various socio-economic purposes. Tied to debts,
the account of which is maintained unilaterally by the masters and interest rates are imposed by them on
their will, the labourers do not get wages despite working for infinite working hours. Once in bondage, the
exit is hardly possible.
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However, the provisions on rape, which are still the only legal provisions under Section 3
of the National Code, are of particular relevance to this discussion. As per the provisions,
rape of a girl of 14 or below is punishable by six to 10 years' imprisonment; rape of a
woman above 14 amounts to three to five years' imprisonment. The Code treats rape in
custody more seriously imposing punishment by an additional year's imprisonment over the
maximum punishments specified in Section 3.
The Social Welfare Act 1992
The Social Welfare Act 1992 sets up a framework for HMG to undertake social welfare
activities through social organizations or associations. It vests authority on Social Welfare
Council to coordinate between HMG and social organizations and associations, and monitor
social welfare activities of the organizations/associations.
The Act also enables HMG to undertake social welfare programmes through appropriate
ministries and social organizations for the purpose of supporting the all-round
development of the nation. It empowers HMG to undertake ‘special programmes’ aimed to
serve the interests and ensure the welfare of children, the old, disabled; protect and
promote the rights of women; ensure a respectable life for unemployed, poor and
illiterate people.
The Child Act 1992
The Child Act 1992 aims to establish a comprehensive structure for the protection of child
rights, and for the physical, mental and intellectual development of children. The Act
protects the rights to maintenance, upbringing, education and health care, rights not to
be discriminated on the ground of sex, rights not to be tortured or cruelly treated, the
right to contact with biological parents, right not to be forced into begging, and the right
to protect the rights guaranteed by the Act in the courts.
The Act imposes duties on different adults vis-à-vis the protection and promotion of the
rights set out in the Act. It also attempts to create a framework of administrative
agencies, agents and other institutions to regulate activities in relation to young people.
These administrative agencies range from the Central Child Welfare Committee and
District Child Welfare Committees to Child Reform Homes, Orphanages, and Centres for
the Mentally Retarded, Management Committee and Administrators for the supervision
and running of Child Reform Homes. Through Article 55 (4), the Act provides for a child
bench in each district court.
Section 11 (1.2.3) spells out conditions for imposing punishment for child: children below
10 are not liable for any punishment, those between 10 and 14 at the time of offence
shall be warned and, if it is grave in nature punishable with imprisonment, they shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six month. If the children are
between 14 and 16 at the time of offence, they shall be punished with half of the penalty
to be imposed by law on adults.
The functions, powers and duties of each of the administrative agencies, agents and
institutions created by the Act are set out in the Act and have been supplemented by the
Child Rights Rules 1995. The Act, above all, purports to implement Nepal’s obligations to
the UNCRC into Nepali law.
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The Labour Act 1992
The Labour Act 1992 prohibits the employment of under-14 children in any establishment.
It also regulates working hours for women and children between age 14 and 18. It draws a
lot on the UNCRC and CEDAW. Chapter 3 limits the working hours for the workers at 48
hours a week at the maximum. Chapter 5 sets out minimum levels of health and safety
protection and Chapter 6 details relating to pension funds. It also provides for the
creation of Central Labour Advisory Board, Labour Relations Committees and a Labour
Court to hear complaints and settle disputes.
The Human Trafficking Control Act 1986
This pre-democracy Act seeks only to prevent traffic of any sort inhuman beings. It
defines trafficking as buying and selling of a human person, as well as forcing a woman
into prostitution.
Its has two significant features: (a), if a complaint is made under the Act, the onus of
proof lies with the offender to prove that he is not guilty, and that the contents of the
complainant’s statement are false; and (b) the Act claims jurisdiction for Nepali courts
over offences committed elsewhere which are punishable under the Act.
5.2 LAW ENFORMCEMENT
The Courts
Nepal has a three-tier court system: District Courts (75), Appellate Courts (16) and
Supreme Court (1). All 75 districts of Nepal have a District Court, appellate (appeal)
courts are spread across Nepal and the Supreme Court—the highest court—is in
Kathmandu, the capital city of the country.
The District Courts are the first instance courts which hear and decide cases both of civil
and criminal nature. The Appellate Courts hear complaints against the District Courts. The
Supreme Court is the final avenue for legal adjudication for all cases except those falling
under the jurisdiction of the Military Court. The interpretation given to a law or any
principle established in course of hearing a case by the Supreme Court is binding on
government, all offices and courts. The Constitution also provides for the provision of
establishing especial courts or tribunals if required to hear special types of cases (Art 85).
The courts are independent entities with fairly comprehensive scope. But they are not
free of the allegations of undue influence, corruption and inefficiency (CVICT, 2001). The
Nepalese justice system is thus marred by the low rate of conviction and long delays in
holding trials. According to Pathak (2000), the conviction rate for government cases for
the year 1995-1997 was around 45 percent. In the year 2001/2002, the clearance rate was
found to have increased to 55.31 percent (Supreme Court, 2058/2059BS).
Besides, the inherent weakness of Nepal’s court system is that the sentence orders are
frequently amended by higher courts, sometimes contradicting with the subsidiary courts.
The other flaw is linked to the socio-economic status of the judges and legal
professionals, who, in majority of cases, are high-caste, come from better-off socio-
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economic status, and are predominantly males (CVICT, 2001). This asymmetrical make-up
of the justice system is said to have affected in the delivery of justice as the better-off
are alleged of not being sensitive to the plight of the disadvantaged and the high-caste
ones would tend to reinforce the patriarchal values and norms of the Hindu ideology.
To see from human rights perspective, “most of Nepal’s judges are reluctant” about
“applying the principles of international human rights laws at the national level for the
protection and promotion of human rights” partly because of their “unfamiliarity with”
the principles and partly because of their “conservative outlook” (CVICT, 2001: 36).
The Police
Nepal’s police force, which operates under the Ministry of Home Affairs, is responsible for
maintaining law and order, domestic security, apprehending criminals and guarding
Nepal’s prisons which are managed by the Prison Management Department. There is a
separate crime investigation department within the force and several specialized cells,
one of them human rights cell.
Although there is no direct provision in the Constitution regarding the power of police, the
Police Act 1955, the Essential Services Act 1957, the Customs Act 1962, the Anti-State
Crimes and Penalties 1989 and the Public Security Act 1989, all predating the
Constitution, give power to police to investigate crime and maintain law and order.
Enacted during the authoritarian regime, when suppressing dissent and opposition would
mean maintaining law and order, most of these acts are discriminatory, repressive,
contrary to human rights principles and, hence, out-dated. But they still remain in place
by virtue of Article 131 of the 1990 Constitution—the ‘inconsistency’ proviso—which
provides that all laws in force at the time of the commencement of the Constitution shall
remain in force until repealed and amended.
There are two types of police officials in Nepal: the civil police and armed police. The
total number of civil police is 46’851 and the armed police are to the tune of 17’000. The
institution of armed police, which is seen as an extended arm of the Royal Nepal Army,
was specifically arranged for border security, the security of airport and places of its kind
in response to the security threat created by the Maoists Insurgency.
To speak numerically, the number of civil police as a proportion of Nepal’s population is
1:512 today. As CVICT (2001) has recorded, in 1995, it was 1:515 and in 1998 the
proportion slightly increased to 1:486. On average, the police-population ratio of the last
10 years has remained at 1:504.
An efficient and independent police force is crucial for the enforcement of law, thereby
to maintain law and order in society. However, the Nepalese police force has a tarnished
image historically. It is often seen as an ally of those holding Executive portfolios of the
State rather than a friend of the people in need. For the common people, the police force
maintains an image of a coercive institution responsible for maintaining the interest of the
powerful. It is well noted that “personal and politically motivated nepotism in
appointment and promotion has beset Nepal’s police at all levels” (CVICT, 2001: 34), not
only in the ancien regime, but also during democratic era, which marked frequent changes
of governments, with each change resulting in the change in high-ranking police
personnel.
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Police institution thus stands as a failed institution in the minds of the commoner. Its
image has further tarnished particularly after the start of the People’s War, when it has
completely failed to take into confidence the trust of peoples.
6. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION
In the case of Nepal, human rights are relatively new, both in concepts and practices. As
reviewed earlier, Nepal’s history has not been human rights friendly for centuries. Only in
the late 80s, in the run-up to the People’s Movement, were human rights brought to
public discourse, and from the 1990s, they form part of the governance process, at least
in theory. The following sections critically look into key structures protecting and
promoting human rights and, then, performance in the light of human rights practices of
the last 14 years with the help of relevant data.
6.1. STRUCTURES/LAWS THAT BACK-UP HUMAN RIGHTS
a. The 1990 Constitution
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1990 seeks—through Part 3 and 4—to protect
most of the human rights recognized by international law. Part 3 lists down 'fundamental
rights,' most of what is understood as 'civil and political' rights, and some of 'social and
cultural' rights. The fundamental rights are enforceable in the courts. Article 88 (2) of the
Constitution gives the Supreme Court "extraordinary powers to issue necessary and
appropriate orders to enforce such rights or settle the dispute" arising from the violation
or infringement of these rights. Part 4 provides for 'directive principles and policies' vis-àvis what can be termed as 'economic rights.' As principles, they are not enforceable in any
court, but are "fundamental to the activities and governance of the State…" (Art. 24 (2)),
which is obligated "to promote conditions of welfare on the basis of the principles of an
open society, by establishing a just system in all aspects of national life…” (Art. 25 (1)),
and by pursuing "a policy of raising the standard of living of the general public…" (Art.
26(1)).
More than anything else, the 1990 Constitution helped institutionalise human rights
movement in the country by providing an open environment for civil society organizations
to operate, which so far was legally prohibited. Now human rights monitoring has been
one of key NGO contributions to the country—thanks to the 1990 Constitution—thereby to
obligate the State to reform its performance. Although the State may deny the NGO
claims, it cannot defy them.
The following presents a brief commentary of human-rights specific laws (also refer to the
previous section) and, then, a cursory analysis of human rights performance.
b. National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)
To give effect to the constitutional provision protecting and promoting human rights, a
few institutions have been developed. One of such institutions is the National Human
Rights Commission established in the year 2000 as per the Human Rights Commission Act
1997 and what is known internationally as Paris Principles. The Commission is vested with
responsibility to protect and promote human rights. It is mandated to investigate into
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complaints, monitor and report on human rights situation, inspect prison conditions and
other institutions under His Majesty's Government (HMG) with a view to assessing their
compliance with human rights standards, submit to the government opinions or
recommendations, promote research on human rights, disseminate information on human
rights, laws/mechanisms protecting human rights through interactions, seminars, media
and publications, contribute to the reports the State is to submit to UN and other bodies.
The mandate of the commission does not cover three areas: (a) issues under military
jurisdiction, (b) issues being dealt with under prevailing criminal laws and procedures as
notified by the Attorney General of the country, and (c) issues claimed by the Principal
Secretary of HMGN as having adverse effect in the security of the kingdom and in relations
or treaties entered into between HMG Nepal and foreign governments or other
international institutions.
The only statutory body responsible for human rights is thus not without obstructions. And
it has no mandate to adjudicate in cases of allegations. Yet the role of the Commission is
crucial to “bring the culprit to book, if not to justice” thereby creating “moral pressure
on the government and other concerned institutions to respond accordingly” (Kattel
1999).
c. Torture Compensation Act (TCA) 1996
The Torture Compensation Act deals with the cases of torture at the hand of the State.
Article 3 (1) stipulates that no one can be subjected to torture or inhuman and degrading
treatment while under investigation or awaiting trial. If any person is proven to have been
torture-inflicted, compensation is provided to the victims or their relatives by the
government of Nepal with an amount not exceeding to Rs. 100’000, which is paid to cover
any loss of earnings or, in the event of death due to torture, the expenses required for the
livelihood of the dependants of the victim. Compensation claims are decided by districts
courts, and if a decision is made in favour of the victim, compensations are to be claimed
(by the victim themselves or their families) within a year after the court decision.
The TCA is however blamed for its inherent faults more than it is praised as a tool to aid
torture victims. And the faults start right from the definition.
The definition: The TCA defines
‘torture’ very narrowly and
simplistically, as a civil offence
and not as a criminal offence.
Further, Amnesty International
contends that the definition “is
not in line with the definition in
the Convention against Torture”
(AI 2001), to which Nepal is a
State Party. Since torture is not
defined as a crime, impunity
prevails,
and
no
judicial
inquiries of alleged incidents
are conducted.
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BOX 2: KEY INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS
NEPAL HAS RATIFIED
Convention
CAT, 1984
CCPR, 1966
CCPR-OP 1, 1966
CCPR-OP 2, 1989
CEDAW, 1979
CEDAW OP
CERD, 1965
CECSR, 1966
CRC, 1989
CRC-OP (re armed conflict)
CRC-OP (re sale of children…)
Status
Accession
Accession
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Signature only
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Signature only
Signature only
Date
14/05/1991
14/08/1991
14/08/1991
04/06/1998
22/05/1991
01/03/1971
14/08/1991
14/10/1990
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Further, Article 11 may encourage the perpetrators to shroud their guilt when it says that
“the pain that may occur due to being in prison as per the existing law shall not be
considered as torture for the purpose of this Act.”
Torture compensation: The ceiling of the amount is very low; it does not really
compensate the loss, particularly in the event of the loss of earning due to the result of
torture or death of the victim, which puts the livelihood of dependants under threat. The
way the compensation is paid, if any, does not hold perpetrators responsible since the
payment is made by the State. Rather, it winks at the perpetrators to continue what they
are doing giving them—the police in particular—a sense of protection rather than scrutiny
of their actions.
Legal remedy: Under the Act, the judge can only recommend departmental action against
the perpetrator, but is not authorized to order investigations into the incidences of
torture thereby to bring alleged perpetrators to justice. ‘Departmental action’ is
discretionary upon the concerned department. It may or may not be implemented (mostly
not). There is no provision that the department concerned report back to the court about
the action taken or that the court intervene into follow up information. As per the Act,
government attorneys can appear on behalf of the alleged perpetrators. But in the case of
victims, they should have their own lawyers. All this discourages the victims to file for
compensation which is not only unworthy, for the reasons mentioned above, but risky as
well as the victims have, in some cases, been reported being threatened and intimidated
by the police for filing cases against them (AI 2001).
d. International Instruments
Nepal is the State Party to almost all measure international human rights instruments
ranging from Slavery Convention (1926) to CRC (1989). It has also ratified key ILO
Conventions abolishing forced labour, guaranteeing equal remuneration for equal work,
granting rights to association and collective bargaining, eliminating worst forms of child
labour, and setting standards for entry into employment (Box 2 and 3). Protecting and
promoting all human rights is thus obligatory upon the Nepali government.
6.2 HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE
The unprecedented advancement made in legal promotion of human rights in the 1990s
however did not match with practical actions protection. The State acted swiftly and
boldly when it came to being Party to intern ational instruments. But, back home, it often
chose to deny the required actions to domesticate the international commitments until
civil society pressure became insurmountable. (It is the pressure that forced the
government to enact Human Rights Commission Act and the Torture Compensation Act).
When the State was left to act on its own accord, its actions appeared contrary to human
rights norms and principles. The State deviation is exemplary in various harassing
provisions inserted in the Acts cited above thereby making the implementation complex
and lengthy. This State defiance to human rights encouraged the perpetuation of
household and societal level violations as well, contrary to the popular expectation that
anti-human rights socio-cultural values would be discoursed by the rule of law. The
People’s War—perhaps the bloodiest armed insurgency in Asia now—stems in large part
from the inactions and wrong actions vis-à-vis human rights of democratic governments of
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BOX 3: OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED INSTRUMENTS NEPAL HAS RATIFIED
a. Slavery Convention, 1926
b. Protocol amending the Slavery Convention signed at Geneva, 1926
c. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, 1956
d. Convention on the Political Rights of Women, 1952
e. Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution
of Others, 1949
f. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 1973
g. International Convention against Apartheid in Sports, 1985
h. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide, 1948
Nepal has also ratified the following key ILO Conventions.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
No 98: Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
No 100: Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951
No 105: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
No 111: Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958
No 138: Minimum Age Convention, 1973
No 182: Convention for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, 1999
the 1990s. The following gives a short overview of the trend of human rights violations in
relation to a few key torture-specific variables.
a. Killings
Talking of killing events in Nepal, the Maoist Insurgency comes to limelight today, which
claims 12 lives a day comparing the data between 28 August 2003 and 9 February 2004. In
the hands of Maoists, 3 people are losing lives where as the State is responsible for killing
9 persons a day in a manner that would amount to ‘encounter killings’. 5 The dearth of
pre-1990 data makes it impossible to compare the trend of killings between democratic
and non-democratic regimes. But in the pre-1990 era, Nepal never experienced the trend
of killings of the kind it is today. Table 1 presents the trend of killings starting from the
year 1996, the year that marked the start of the
People’s War. Ever since, by the end of 2003,
Table 1: Killings by State and Maoists
8,675 people have been killed, 5883 by the
By State By Maoists Total
State. Over the last 8 years, 3 people are being
59
22
Year 1996
81
killed daily. Today’s Nepal is trapped into the
16
32
Year 1997
48
crossfire between Maoist guerrillas and the state
334
75
Year
1998
409
security forces.
Most of the killings in the context of the
People’s War are believed to be ‘extrajudicial’
ones although the State has reported them to be
‘encounter killings’, until forced to refute, as,
for example, in the case of Doramba incident
(see below). The state has not taken any
accountability in relation to extrajudicial
Nepal Interim Report
Year 1999
328
141
469
Year 2000
179
219
398
Year 2001
244
390
634
Year 2002
3297
1358
4655
Year 2003
1426
555
1981
Total
5883
2792
8675
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Nepal general evaluation
executions as in other forms of human rights violation. The bodies of those killed are
either disposed of on the spot or left unaccounted. This stands contrary to existing legal
provisions that the body of anyone who has died in suspicious circumstances has to
undergo post-mortem. Immune as the security force is, this legal provision is overlooked
(AI 2002).
A few cases of ‘extrajudicial killings’ follow:
•
•
•
On 28 November 2001 at Tribhuvannagar, Dang district, 11 farmers (Asharam,
Krishna, Jogi, Ripu, Ramu, Parashu, Situ, Jagaman, Khushilal, Rup Lal and Sangra
Chaudhari) were reportedly lined up by the army after they had admitted to being
sympathizers of the Maoists and deliberately killed. These people were not armed
(AI 2002).
Chandradip Yadav, Uttimlal Yadav and Devkumar Yadav, relatives of a known
Maoist leader, were reportedly killed by police at Janakpur town, Dhanusha district
on 6 December 2001. According to the Superintendent of Police, they were killed
while trying to escape from a police van on their way to the district police office,
after arrest. However, other sources allege they were forced to get out of the van
and told to run, and then deliberately killed by police (AI 2002).
On 17 August, just when the government and Maoist rebels were sitting down for
official peace talks in Nepalgunj and Dang, 20 unarmed people (18 Maoists and 2
civilians) were killed by army, 19 of them after taking into control from the house
of Yubaraj Moktan, a local resident, where the Maoists were holding a clandestine
meeting. They were arrested at 10:30 in the morning. A little earlier, a person
called Bibek (Take Bahadur Thapa) was shot dead while he was coming towards the
meeting place.
An hour after the arrest, all the 20 people were taken on a three-hour trek away
from the house, with their hands tied up at the back, to a place called
Dandakateri. There, 18 of them were lined up and shot dead from a close range.
The fate of a lady identified as Usha, who was one of the 20 arrested from
Yubaraj’s house, remained unclear. “There had been no encounter at the place;
people were brutally killed by making them stand in rows,” the report quotes a
local, name withheld for security reason, as saying.
Physical examination of 18 dead bodies—done by the fact-finding committee sent
by the National Human Rights Commission which also included a doctor, lawyers
and journalists—showed that 15 had bullet injuries on the head, 10 were hit from
the front side and the rest from other sides. 6
Maoists have been no less brutal in killing common people (teachers, political opponents,
common farmers) after taking them into their control. Some representative cases have
been discussed below.
See, the NHRC report of the fact finding mission of Doramba Incident at (www. http://www.nhrcnepal.org/doclinks.asp?group=Reports).
6
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b. Death in detention
Table 7: Death in Detention
After the start of democracy in 1990, no cases of detentionYear 1997
25
deaths were reported until 1996. But in 1997, a horrible
Year
1998
8
record of 25 detention deaths was recorded, the highest
number so far. Ever since, detention deaths have been a
Year 1999
4
regular pattern of Nepalese criminology. It is crystal clear
Year 2000
7
that detention deaths have emerged as a way of State
Year 2001
12
response to the Maoist insurgency. Until the end of 2002, 66
Year 2002
10
detention deaths have been recorded. It is likely that a
Total
66
dozen more will be added to this number by the time the
number of detention deaths of 2003 will come to public.
However, “not a single police officer suspected of being responsible for a death in custody
in the context of the ''people's war'' has been brought to justice (AI 2002).
c. Disappearances
Disappearance is a disturbing phenomenon in Nepal and it cuts across all regimes. It was a
major tool of pre-1990 regime to silence perceived dissidents. And, the democratic
government has also burrowed it in ditto, particularly after the start of the People’s War
in 1996. Amnesty International (2003) has recorded “over 250 cases of disappearances
throughout the country”. INSEC sources estimate that only in the last 8 years, a total of
717 people became victims of disappearances, while Maoists abducted 2,744 people at
various times. 7 But, the NHRC estimation of the last four years (2000-2003) puts the
number of disappeared to 812, 666 by the State, and the rest by Maoists. 8 Although the
exact number of the disappeared is contentious, what is doubtless is the distracting
pattern of disappearance the State has adopted to deal with the opponents.
After the state of emergency was imposed on 26 November 2001, “there was an alarming
rise in reports of "disappearance" and Amnesty International recorded over 100 cases of
"disappearance" from this period” (AI 2003) at the hands of the military. Today, anyone
suspected to be a Maoist becomes an easy victim of military disappearance. Nearly a
dozen of disappearances have been unresolved so far starting from 1985. The State has
often turned a deaf year in disappearances claims (see AI 2003).
d. Torture
Torture, it goes without saying, is a longstanding phenomenon in a country characterized
by a long history of despotism. Expectations were high that with the introduction of the
multi-party democracy, no one would be subjected to torture and cruel treatment. But all
hopes were dashed as soon as a democratically elected government came to power. Just
because of participating in demonstrations against the government, 350 people were
arrested in the year 1992 and 137 of them were tortured in custody. As in the ancien
regime, the police authority was trained violent so that they would contain any kind of
things perceived by the ministers to be threatening to them. The police highhandedness of
7
The number of those abducted and arrested refers to the total number of those who have disappeared and
abducted during this period time and again and were released.
8
See, www. http://www.nhrc-nepal.org
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Nepal general evaluation
the newly democratized regime can best be described by the following incident: Kajiman
Kami, a resident of Makawnapur district, was tortured dead by police for denying giving
them a chicken which he bought to feed his wife who had just given birth to a baby
(INSEC 1993:328).But The culprits were never brought to justice.
“Nepal has a historical tradition of torture and humiliation of criminals by police and local
authorities” (AI 2001). Despite the prohibition of torture in the 1990 Constitution, and
later in the Torture Compensation Act, it is still in widespread acceptance to extract
information from the suspects and make them confess the crime, sometimes even noncommitted. Torture methods include many, the most common ones are:
falanga (beatings on the soles of the feet) with bamboo sticks, iron or PVC pipes;
belana (rolling a weighted bamboo stick or other round object along the prisoner's
thighs, resulting in muscle damage); telephono
Table 8: Torture Victims
(simultaneous boxing on the ears), rape, electric
Year 1996
2071
shock and beatings with sisnu ( a plant which causes
painful swellings on the skin). The latter method of
Year 1997
1568
torture is often inflicted on women, more particularly
Year 1998
2665
on their private parts (AI 2001).
The victims of torture include criminal suspects, political
opponents, currently Maoist sympathisers, and people
taken into custody in relation to disputes over land or
other private matters. Mainly police are responsible for
torture. In recent years, added to police are military
personnel.
Year 1999
1139
Year 2000
1035
Year 2001
2195
Year 2002
3430
Total
14,103
To speak in the context of the People’s War, rape and attempted rape has been used by
security personnel (police, armed police and army) as a systematic tool of revenge and
harassment. Maoist cadres, sympathisers or family members of suspected Maoists have
been the victims of this atrocity. After the start of the People’s War, increasing cases of
rapes have been reported at the hand of security personnel. The year 2002—which was
nearly completely under the state-of-emergency—has seen the highest cases of rapes and
attempted rapes so far.
Given that rape victims face social stigma and apathy because of the context of culture
and religion, many cases of rape go unreported. The state of impunity, which the security
personnel have entertained over history, does not encourage rape victims to report rape
cases. It instead backfires on them. Amnesty International (2002) has, however, reported
a case of legal action—the rarest of its kind—taken against an assistant sub-inspector of
the District Police Office in Sindhuli district for raping an 18-year-old woman in 2001. He
was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment; the court also ordered that half his property
be transferred to the victim. Such a verdict is very rare.
Between 1996 and 2003 48 have been raped and 29 have suffered rape attempts. In 2002,
which saw the emergency rule almost round the year, there had been 12 reported rapes,
including 5 gang-rapes (in which 2 or more security personnel were involved), and six
attempted rapes which victimised 13 and 6 females respectively, including a child as old
as 11, (INSEC 2003), the highest number to be recorded after the People’s War started.
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The following two examples explain the mentality of the security personnel towards the
‘suspects’ and the level of impunity they enjoy despite the public knowledge of their
crimes.
•
A woman aged, 30, of Bardibas VDC-3 was gang-raped by a group of armed police
on 7 July 2002. Before being gang-raped, she was dragged to a nearby jungle from
her house. After rape, she was left in the jungle to be found unconscious by
herdsmen the next day. The trauma and wound was so serious that she could not
be treated in Janakpur Zonal Hospital. She was referred to the Teaching Hospital,
Kathmandu and was treated with the help of CVICT (Centre for Victims of Torture).
A case was filed against the perpetrators, but no action was reported to have
taken until the end of the year (INSEC 2003: ).
•
On 3 April 2002, about 15 army personnel with Captain Ramesh Swar leading them
came to Masgit Maniyar's home. When they found he had gone to India they asked
for the young girls, Tarnum and Tabsum Maniyar. The girls tried to hide on the roof
of the house but were arrested by the soldiers. After their arrest, the two girls
were taken to army vehicles parked near their house. Captain Ramesh Swar kept
Tarnum with him in his own vehicle while Tabsum was asked to stay with the other
army men in the next vehicle. On the way to Chisapani army camp, Captain
Ramesh Swar repeatedly told Tarnum that the reason for their arrest is the "escape
of Masgit", their father. At about 9pm, Tarnum was taken to the room of Captain
Ramesh Swar, where she found him drinking beer. He reportedly told her that she
has to pay for her uncle's mistake. She cried and pleaded her innocence but was
threatened to obey his orders if she cared for her life. She reports that he then
raped her. In the meantime, Tabsum was taken to another officer, referred to by
everyone at the army camp as "Saheb". She was also allegedly raped.
After about two and a half hours, Tarnum was again taken to Captain Ramesh
Swar's room. The captain gave her a toothbrush and towel and asked her to brush
her teeth and take a shower. She did so. Then she was raped again. Tarnum alleges
that Captain Ramesh Swar raped her three times during that night.
Both the sisters were told by Captain Ramesh Swar that the reason why he raped
them was just to take revenge against their father and uncle. He said he would
release them if they did not tell anyone. They were then threatened that if they
told anyone, they will be caught again, raped and shot dead. He also told them
that he would visit them every week to make sure that they had not left the place
and had not told anybody (Also see, AI INDEX: ASA 31/016/2002)
These cases represent only a tip of iceberg. There are dozens of reported cases of rapes
and attempted rapes. There could be dozens more not brought to public attention
because of socio-cultural reason and the state denial of justice to the victims.
To look at the available data, the number of victims (who suffered all kinds of tortures)
seems on the rise (Table 2) every passing year. Between 1996 and 2002, a total of 14,103
people have been subjected to torture, at the rate of 6 persons a day, at the hand of the
security personnel. (Basing on this trend, it can be argued that around 2000 torture
victims have been added to this list in the year 2003.)The number of torture victims has
increased in a terrible proportion in the year 2002 when the nation was under the
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emergency rule imposed to deal with the Maoists. Ever since, torture has been a
systematic tool to deal with the opponents, Maoists as well as others perceived to be
standing against the repressive dictums and rules imposed by the current cabinet formed
by the king which does not enjoy popular support. The actions of the security forces today
are protected by a draconian law--the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and
Punishment) Act (TADA) 2002—which gives security forces the power to arrest without
warrant and detain suspects in police custody for up to 90 days. The TADA was enacted,
despite heightened opposition from human rights groups, with the sole aim of giving
security forces all powers required to contain the Maoists. It is after the enactment of
TADA that the cases of disappearances and ‘extrajudicial’ killings have been on daily
records.
Whereas the number of torture victims is so alarmingly on the rise, the efforts to get
torture claims investigated, and victims compensated, have been very slow. In the last 8
years (1996-2003), only 117
Table 9:Number of Victims and Compensation Claims
cases of torture allegations
have been filed in various
Total Victims (TV) Compensation Claims
Total Clearance
courts
nationwide.
In
No.
% (of TV)
For
Against
percentage terms, the rate
14,103.00
117.00
0.83
13
12
of
compensation
claims
stands below 1 per cent of the cases of torture. Of the 117 cases filed, 25 have been
cleared by the courts with 13 for the victims and 13 against them. Three cases were
settled by the victims and perpetrators themselves without referring the case to the
court. The highest amount decided to be paid so far is Nrs 100,000 (US$ 135.14), the
amount set as the ceiling in the Compensation ACT, and the lowest amount is NRs 1,000
(US$ 1.35). It needs to be noted however that these are just court decisions and none has
been implemented so far. Except in the 3 self-settled cases, no victim has so far received
the compensation to be paid (as per the Act) by the State. In the case of the 3, the
perpetrator (police) paid Nrs 9000 (US$ 121.62) to each victim.
On 20 May 2001 The Katmandu Post reported that the Inspector General of Police (IGP)
Pradeep S.J.B. Rana had acknowledged that human rights violations by police had been a
significant factor in the escalation of human rights abuses generally. The IGP was reported
to have stated: ''The police killed innocent people, discriminated against ordinary people
based on their social status and maltreated the locals during their patrols.''
Nepal Interim Report
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Scenario of Non-State Torture and Violence The presence of violence is not surprising in
any society which is in short supply of livelihood opportunities and productive resources.
Table 10: The Scenario of Violence
State
Table 11: Number of Violence Victims
Non-State Total
State
Non-State Total
Year 1996
438
1,247
1,685
Year 1996 NA
Year 1997
449
3,770
4,219
Year 1997
2,616
7,722
10,338
Year 1998
1,020
3,383
4,403
Year 1998
4,537
4,509
9,046
Year 1999
783
3,877
4,660
Year 1999
1,938
4,624
6,562
Year 2000
3,663
4,638
8,301
Year 2000
2,774
3,704
6,478
Year 2001
1,458
3,689
5,147
Year 2001
4,256
5,876
10,132
Year 2002
996
2,705
3,701
Year 2002
13,847
22,542
36,389
8,807
23,309
32,116
29,968
48,977
83,288
Total
Total
NA
4,343
To buy a tablet of medicine, a pair of trousers and arrange a handful of grains or a loaf of
bread to feed themselves and their family members, people would be forced to beg in the
street or commit to theft or robbery or killing. Everyone’s conscience condemns this but
in the face of a hard choice between a death and a life; people would do still commit such
crimes for want of living, whatever the consequences. Nepali society is not an exception
to this scenario. The household level and societal level violence are thus as common as
the State-involved one. Table 4 and 5 present a comparative picture of the incidences of
violence and the number of people affected both at the State and non-State level. 9
The analysis of the data of the last 7 years shows that 12 incidences of violence take place
every day in Nepal victimizing 33 people each day, nearly 20 of them at the household and
societal level. Being itself a perpetrator, the State has failed to protect the victims, who
are mostly resource poor caste and ethnic minorities. Gendered-based violence has a lot
to do with women being deprived of property rights. Nepalese women suffer various levels
of violence: household level, societal level, Maoists level (as everyone is affected) and
State level. However, in recent years the Maoist violence has been very alarming. The
following presents some examples of violence occurred in the context of the People’s
War.
•
On 16 January 2002, Muktinath Adhikari was reportedly abducted by Maoists while
teaching at the Pandini Sanskrit Secondary school at Duradanda, Lamjung district.
A group of four Maoists tied his hands behind his back, and took him about 200
metres from the school. There he was tied to a tree and shot in the head. He died
on the spot. It is suspected that the reason for the killing was Muktinath Adhikari's
membership of the Nepal Teachers' Association (NTA) considered close to the NC.
According to a communication purportedly from the Maoists to Amnesty
International, Muktinath Adhikari was killed because he was ''a person with long
record of anti-people activities and had proven charges against him of being an
informer leading to the killing of a number of innocent people by the royal army in
Lamjung''. According to other sources, however, he was killed because he had
earlier refused to give ''donations'' demanded by the Maoists and had received
several threats as a result (See, AI 2002).
9
The term violence refers, to speak in the household and societal context, to killing, manhandling, abduction,
verbal abuse, threats and intimidations, social boycotts, land disputes, discrimination on grounds of caste and
ethnicity, gendered violence and so on. The Maoist involvement finds a significant share in all these
incidences.
Nepal Interim Report
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Nepal general evaluation
•
•
•
In November 2003, Maoist buried alive a 27-year-old farmer (Kal Bahadur Budha) of
Pals Village in the remote Kalika Village Development Committee. After abduction
from his him village Budha was moved to Seri Village of the neighbouring Madana
VDC where he was buried alive in a ditch he was forced to dig himself. Villagers at
Seri said that the rebels first goaded him to dig a ditch and then forced him to lie
in it. "When he resisted lying down in the ditch, the Maoists chopped off his legs
and buried him alive despite pleas for mercy," said the villagers, who were forced
to watch the gory act. Locals said that Budha was an ordinary farmer and had no
links with any political parties (Source: The Kathmandu Post, 21 November 2003)
Women, children and elderly—as old as 80—are forced by Maoists to work as their
sentries in rural areas in Doti where most of youths have left villages due to Maoist
terror. Ram Bohara, a victim, told Nepal Samacharpatra that women had been
forced to work as sentries—even carrying a baby—if they were no males. Another
victim said, ‘We need to work as sentry for the security of Maoists from nearby
hilltop, stone or tree. Maoists sleep in our house, we stay in jungles.” (Nepal
Samacharpatra March 30)
On September 1, 2003 Maoist rebels killed Relimai Moktan, a woman health
worker, in Doramba, Ramechhap, after abducting from her home. The Maoists
killed her on charges of tipping-off the security forces about their activities in
Doramba, where the security forces had shot dead 18 rebels and two civilians on
August 17. (The Kathmandu Post, 4 September 2003)
1. OVERVIEW OF ESCR VIOLATIONS
“… it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to
rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule
of law …” (UDHR, Preambular Para 3)
The foregoing discussion suggests that the systematic denial of economic, social and
cultural rights in the poorest parts of the country has led to the current insurgency, which
in fact has turned to be a civil war in Nepal. INSEC (2003, p.75) rightly notes that the
human rights abuses from 1992 to 1995 show that “…government indifference towards the
structural problems existent in the society and dependence on police and administration
for the maintenance of authority was resulting in conflict and violence. The government’s
policy of oppression had pushed the nation to the threshold of violence.” Similarly, in
2000, Amnesty International had stated “Continued poverty and corruption are seen as
among the main factors behind this conflict. Support for the ''people's war'' has been
particularly strong in the most economically and socially deprived areas of Nepal.”
The human development statistics for Nepal demonstrate the level of denial of the right
to a dignified life for the population in general, and deprived groups in particular.
The 2001 census shows that, across the country, the male literacy rate is 65.08%, while
only 42.49% of the female population is literate. In rural areas, the female literacy rate
sinks to 32.3%. Across the country the population per doctor is 18,439, and the overall HDI
is 0.466. Enrolment in secondary school is only 20%, and the mean number of years of
education is 2.9. 54% of households have no access to toilet facilities and 33% do not have
access to safe drinking water.
These statistics give some indication of the inability of Nepalis to access their rights to
health, education and a dignified life. But regional comparisons demonstrate that the
Nepal Interim Report
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Nepal general evaluation
situation is much worse in the poorer regions of the country, namely the mid-western and
far-western mountains and hills.
Table 12: Human Development Index (HDI)
Region
HDI value
2000
Life expectancy
at birth 2000
Mean years of
schooling 2000
NEPAL
0.466
59.5
2.89
Rural
0.446
58.7
2.5
Urban
0.616
71.1
4.87
Mountains
0.378
49.8
2.52
Hills
0.510
65.1
3.04
Terai
0.474
62.4
2.81
Eastern
0.484
62
2.76
Central
0.493
61.3
2.98
Western
0.479
62.8
3.33
Mid-West
0.402
53.2
2.69
Far-West
0.385
52.1
2.19
Eastern Mountains
0.424
52.4
2.83
Eastern Hill
0.513
66.7
2.79
Eastern Terai
0.488
62.9
2.74
Central Mountain
0.437
57.2
2.97
Central Hill
0.510
58.5
3.37
Central Terai
0.462
63.1
2.57
Western Mountain
0.414
55.5
2.87
Western Hill
0.487
64.8
3.22
Western Terai
0.435
53.5
3.52
Midwestern Mountain
0.322
45.9
2.76
Midwestern Hill
0.433
58.3
2.74
Midwestern Terai
0.458
60
2.71
Far-western Mountain
0.286
41.6
1.25
Far-western Hill
0.393
56.9
1.86
Far-western Terai
0.425
53.5
3.05
District Demographic Profile of Nepal, INSEC, 2002, p.41
GDP per
capita (PPP
US$) 1999
1237
1094
2133
898
1262
1267
1073
1713
1022
861
899
1003
1012
1109
1023
2059
1520
731
858
1276
731
741
1040
629
744
1144
Ratio to
national HDI
100
95.65
132.18
81.05
109.36
101.73
103.89
105.75
102.76
86.37
82.52
91.09
110.03
104.80
93.75
109.54
99.14
88.86
104.62
93.45
69.12
92.84
98.21
61.29
84.41
91.14
This information demonstrates the regional differences across the country, but there is
little information available about the different access to services and rights for different
caste/ethnic groups or different socio-economic groups at the micro-level. Nationally,
however, statistics show that low caste groups, some ethnic groups and women all have
disproportionately little access to socio-economic resources.
Some information is available about the levels of abuses of ESCR across the country. For
2002, INSEC (2003) separately enumerated abuses of ESCR, abuses against women and
children, racial discrimination and inhuman behaviour.
Table 13: Violation of ESCR in 2002
Event
State:
No. of
events
Nepal Interim Report
State:
No of
victims
%
female
Maoists:
No. of
events
Maoists:
No. of
victims
%
female
Nonstate:
No. of
events
Nonstate:
No of
victims
%
female
Page 28 of 44
Total
no. of
victims
29
Nepal general evaluation
Racial
discrimination
Landless and
squatter
Abuse of
women*
Abuse of child
rights
ESCR
Inhuman
behaviour+
5
5
0
0
0
0
38
50
26
55
18
1263
Na
0
0
0
0
0
0
1263
18
19
100
7
10
100
348
409
100
438
3
5
Na
14
756
Na
138
171
67
932
11
0
123
0
Na
0
39
8
41
10
Na
Na
27
13
278
18
1
27
442
28
ESCR abuses (no. of victims)
Total no. of victims of hr abuses
ESCR as a % of total
State
1,415
13,847
10.2
Maoist
817
18,795
4.3
Non-state
926
3,747
25
Total
3,158
36,389
8.7
* includes trafficking, attempted trafficking, rape, attempted rape, torture, polygamy, sexual abuse and
family violence.
+ includes punishment for witchcraft and other culturally demeaning practices, like being wreathed with
shoes
Specific abuses of ESCR included:
•
•
•
•
Gender discrimination: women charged with practicing witchcraft were beaten,
tortured, forced to eat excrement, and expelled from their houses; domestic
violence (including in relation to not providing a dowry) included murder; rape;
trafficking.
Caste discrimination: social boycott and expulsion from their house because of
inter-caste marriage; low-caste people forbidden from entering public places;
beatings for drinking water from a public tap; beatings for participating in public /
political activities; loss of jobs.
Child rights: child workers, including living with employers; rape of children; child
soldiers.
Abuse of religious rights: Dalilts being refused entry to temples, other abuses
included Maoists not allowing proper burial rites to be performed (INSEC, 2003,
p.123)
In many of the reported cases, the perpetrators do not face trial, and enjoy impunity.
Apart from cases where the rights of individuals have been abused, the population in
general has suffered abuses of their ESCR, often as a direct consequence of the conflict.
These include:
•
•
Right to earn one’s own living: War has closed schools, hospitals, and cut off
access to district headquarters by people from the surrounding villages, thus
disrupting economic activity and making it impossible for public employees to
work. The fear of being caught between the Maoist offensive and State
counteroffensive has caused many to leave their land, the primary means of
livelihood for the majority of the rural people.
Right to adequate food and freedom from hunger: Government embargoes on the
transportation of food in Maoist-affected areas has also affected the local
Nepal Interim Report
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Nepal general evaluation
•
•
•
•
•
•
population; In 2002, the State placed an embargo on the supply of rice to hilly
districts like Mugu (INSEC 2003), while in march 2004 Maoist declared a two-week
bandh in 17 western districts, stopping the movement of goods and people. The
bandh, as Chandi Raj Dhakal, first vice president of Federation of Nepalese
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) noted, paralysed the entire western
region. “Thirty districts are now directly affected and all industries west of Butwal
are closed.” Ram Shankar Kandu, the Chairman of the Siddharthanagar Chambers
of Commerce and Industries (SCCI), pointed to a more alarming scenario. He said
that unless the embargo was lifted, it would severely affect public life in the
entire region (The Himalayan Times, March 16, 2004).
Right to adequate housing: The internally displaced people have been deprived of
their right to housing. The response of the government to this has “remained quite
inadequate and turned out to be a complete failure” (FDM, 39).
In addition, the kamaiyas (former bonded labourers) are denied of proper housing.
Similar is the status of the sukumbasis (the landless).
Right to health: A policy paper prepared by the Ministry of Health (MoH) states
that there exists a wide health disparity in the country. “The life expectancy in
Kathmandu is 74.4 years, whereas it is only 37 years in Mugu (one of the midwestern hill districts). Ninety percent of maternal deaths occur in rural areas
compared to only 9.8 percent in urban centres.”10 In the context of the People’s
War, the health scenario has further worsened. Health services have been used as
a weapon of counterinsurgency by the State embargoing the supply of medicines in
conflict-hit districts with the fear that “the Maoists would use such medicines if
taken to village health posts” (FDM, 2004:48). The Maoist imposed blockades at
various times has added additional insult to the already injured health sector.
Health workers face “harassment from both sides, from the Maoists, who force
them to treat their cadres anywhere, anytime, and from the security forces who,
under draconian seize and interrogate laws, can hold anyone without trial for up to
three months.” Health workers working in rural areas are often accused by the
security forces of working for the Maoists, when in fact they have been compelled
by the insurgents to treat their colleagues. 11
Right to education: The conflict has disrupted education, with schools being
closed, and them being used by the Army as camps, and by Maoists for meetings.
Rights of Women: the State still does not meet the requirements of CEDAW
particularly in relation to nationality rights. Violence against women continues (see
above), and in particular the conflict has led to many more women becoming
widows. Many cultural taboos apply to widows, who are condemned to live at the
margins of society because of their widow status.
Rights of Children: children have been affected by the conflict through curtailment
of their education, through economic hardships faced by their communities and
families, and by their direct involvement as child soldiers or porters and
messengers for the Maoists. Child marriage, child labour and trafficking of children
continues. According to the 2001 census, 63,231 children under 16 live with their
employer. A report by CWISH (Children-Women in Social Service and Human Rights)
states that 80% of domestic workers they surveyed were under 14. (Himalayan
Times, 22 March 2004). Only 19% received their own wages. More broadly, high
10
See, the Kathmandu Post, April 6, 2004 at www.kantipuronline.com
See, “NEPAL :: ‘Destruction before Construction’ Civil war grips western Nepal, making humanitarian aid
difficult, but essential” at http://www.msf.org.au/tw-project/027twp.html
11
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levels of poverty seriously hinder children’s rights to development - nearly 50% of
children are stunted, and the child mortality rate is 91/1000.
2. CORRELATION OF VIOLENCE AND POVERTY
This section has made an attempt examine the relationship between socio-economic
factors, specifically development indicators, and levels of violence experienced at the
district level. The correlation has been based on the cases reported in the Human Rights
Yearbook 2003, covering events in 2002. This information provides a snapshot, rather
than a detailed analysis of the situation. It is likely that different districts have been
differently affected by violence during 2003 and 2004, as the civil war has entered new
phases and the Maoist tactics have developed.
It should also be noted that assessments of levels of violence can only be based on reported cases,
and it is likely that many cases go unreported, particularly in remote or conflict-affected
districts. A gap in the information is in relation to the socio-economic status of victims of abuses.
Whilst it is possible to identify the caste/ethnicity of victims from their names when available, no
information about their employment or economic status is available. In addition, little
information is available about the broader circumstances surrounding abuses, particularly those
relating to arbitrary arrests and disappearances, or civilians caught in the crossfire of the conflict.
The development indicators are also limited in their range. Although they provide a broad
overview of which rights e.g. to food, shelter and education are not available to what percentage
of the population, no statistics are available with which to examine access to services for
different communities within districts. Similarly, no data is available about which groups or
communities are suffering violence, except in relation to specific caste or gender based
discrimination. Data is not available to enable an analysis of violence experienced by different
socio-economic groups.
In order to try to ascertain the impact of socio-economic factors on the incidence of
violence, development indicators have been correlated against levels of violence for each
district. The development indicators were taken from ICIMOD & CBS 2003b, while the
information on levels of violence was collated from INSEC 2003, based on 2002 data.
Please see table, appendix 1 for details.
Overall, the districts that were least developed by all indicators are all in the mid or far
west. (ICIMOD, CBS 2003b: p11). The mid and far west have the largest number of least
developed districts, but there is also a block of contiguous districts in the central Terai
which are least developed. Child deprivation, gender discrimination and women’s
empowerment are all worst in districts with lower literacy rates. The gender imbalance
for literacy is worst in the mid and far west, and in the least developed districts of the
central Terai.
The percentage of the population from educationally disadvantaged groups is highest in
the same least developed districts.
Generally, the least developed districts are also those which have experienced the highest
levels of violence. In particular, there are 13 districts in the mid and far west which fall
into the bottom 20 for almost all indicators.
Overall rank compared to violence
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Of the top 20 districts (i.e. those with the best overall development indicators) 12 also
fall into the top 20 for the lowest levels of overall violence. This is also the case for the
top 20 according to the poverty indicator.
Conversely, of the 20 districts with the worst overall development indicator, 13 also
experience the highest levels of violence. For the poverty indicator, of the worst 20, 12
fall into the worst twenty for violence.
Of the 20 districts experiencing the least state violence, 5 fall into the worst 20 for nonstate violence, and a further 3 record very high levels of non-state violence. Of the 20
experiencing the least Maoist violence, 4 fall into the worst 20 for non-state violence and
a further 4 record very high levels of non-state violence.
Of the 20 districts experiencing the most state violence, all except two experienced low
levels of non-state violence. Similarly for the 20 experiencing high levels of Maoist
violence, only 5 experienced high levels of non-state violence. These correlations seem to
imply that conflict-related violence displaces community violence to some extent.
However, these statistics should be considered with caution because of the practical
difficulties of reporting abuses.
Of the 20 districts experiencing the highest levels of state violence, six also experienced
high levels of Maoist violence. Of the districts experiencing high levels of Maoist violence,
14 also experienced high levels of state violence.
Of the 15 districts that experienced the highest levels of violence (total number of victims
more than 150 / 100,000 or total number of events greater than 100 / 100,000 population)
in 2002, 11 fall into the category of least developed districts (ICIMOD & CBS, 2003b). Six
have been classified as “highly conflict-affected” districts by the Government of Nepal.
Of the 20 districts that experienced lower levels of violence (total number of victims
fewer than 30 / 100,000 and total number of events fewer than 20 / 100,000 population)
in 2002, 10 fall into the category of most developed districts.
Gender
Women are major victims of community violence, but less so of conflict-related violence.
This is not surprising, given women’s relatively lower involvement in activities outside the
home and community, which means they are likely to have less contact with state or
political forces.
Table 14: Gender Violence Index
Region
% total
abuses
committed
by State
% victims
of state
abuse are
women
% total
abuses
committed
by Maoists
% victims
of Maoist
abuse are
women
% total
abuses
committed
by non-state
Eastern
Central
Western
Mid
54.2
54.8
77.8
62.5
8
7
n/a
n/a
21.3
25.4
14.5
34.5
6
n/a
5
n/a
24.4
19.8
7.7
3
Nepal Interim Report
% victims
of nonstate
abuse are
women
52
34
51
52
Page 32 of 44
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Nepal general evaluation
Western
Far
Western
36.5
n/a
59.4
n/a
4
42
For the gender index, of the top 20 districts, i.e. those with highest indicator of women’s
empowerment, 13 are also in the top twenty for the lowest levels of violence against
women. However, there is no correlation between the gender indicator and violence
against women for the 20 districts with the lowest gender indicator, perhaps because the
gender indicator is low because of overall poverty rather than specifically gendered
poverty.
Of the nine districts where abuses of women are more than 70%, the gap in levels of
literacy between men and women was more than 10% in all of them.
Out of 75 districts, the literacy difference between men and women is greater than 10% in
49. Of the 11 districts where abuses of women are less than 20% of the total, only 3 have
a literacy difference of more than 10%
Violence against women constitutes more than 50% of non-state violence in 28 out of 71
districts for which information was available, and there is some evidence that there are
more abuses of women in districts where the disparities between the genders are higher.
Despite the fact that women are less likely to be direct victims of conflict-related
violence, the conflict has affected them in several ways. The conflict has increased the
number of widows and female-headed households and women have had to take on
different roles within the village because of the exodus of men from conflict-affected
communities. Conversely, some women are directly involved in the conflict, with large
numbers reportedly joining the Maoist forces. Eye witness accounts of the Maoist attack in
Beni in March 2004 report that around 50% of the Maoist combatants were women. The
eye witnesses also reported their shock at seeing women in positions of power and
authority.
Caste and ethnicity
Little information is available about the levels of violence experienced by different caste
and ethnic groups. However, ICIMOD &CBS (2003b) ranks districts according to the
percentage of the population belonging to educationally disadvantaged ethnic and caste
groups. These are defined as groups whose literacy rates were below 30% of the general
population of the district. Of the ten districts with the highest proportion of the
population from these groups, seven are among the twenty districts with the worst
development indicator and 4 experience high levels of violence.
Despite the fact that untouchability and caste-based discrimination are outlawed by the
constitution, no enforcement mechanism exists. The ALRC report (2003) notes the lack of
effective legal avenues for the prosecution of perpetrators and redress for victims, and
the lack of legislation for the protection of dalits, who make up 20% of the population.
The institutions set up to address caste-based discrimination are ineffective and subject
to political influence.
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Dalits are also increasingly identified with the Maoist insurgency, and therefore
increasingly targeted by the security forces. In this sense, the socio-economic status of
this group is a direct contributing factor to the levels of abuses of civil and political rights
which they experience. In addition, the involvement of the security forces in attacks on
dalits, empowers the general public to do likewise, thus ensuring the culture of impunity
spreads downwards from the state authority.
At the same time, the denial of economic, social and cultural rights to different ethnic
groups fuels the conflict. The madhesis of the Terai are denied opportunities to work in
public posts and actively excluded from the police and army, because they are not
considered to be Nepalis. This reinforces the sense of alienation from the state and
increases the likelihood that the army and police – recruited from non-local ethnic groups
– will be viewed more as the security wing of an occupying power than as protectors of
the population. Thus, the Maoists find ready recruits because the population is already
alienated from the state and the divisive state policies (ethnic, political, economic) fuel
the conflict.
Analysis of appeals
Very little data is available about the socio-economic status of victims of human rights
abuses. Therefore it is very difficult to draw any conclusions about the link between socioeconomic conditions and abuses of civil and political rights. However, an analysis of
Urgent Appeals issued by human rights organisations sheds some light on the issue.
Appeals issued by the Asian Human Rights Commission, for 2004 and 2003, were studied.
For 2004, 12 cases were recorded up to March 2004. Of those, five incidents affected
Dalits - though the number of individuals involved was much higher, as one case involved a
family and another case involved a village of 80 people; three incidents affected chhetris,
2 janajatis and 2 brahmins. In each case the police either failed to investigate, or
protected the perpetrator for instance by claiming that the victims were Maoists killed in
an ‘encounter’.
In 2003, of 27 cases reported, 14 incidents involved (52%) janajatis, 6 (22%) brahmins, 3
chhetris, 1 Newar, 2 dalit (but the number of individuals was higher because one case
involved a whole family), and 1 unknown. In cases where the perpetrators were members
of the public (for instance the property of a dalit family destroyed by a neighbour), state
inaction was recorded. In other cases, where the state forces were the perpetrators, the
state refused to comply with court orders relating to allowing access to lawyers and
medical facilities, or denied the event had taken place, or pressurised the victims to drop
charges. The majority of state-perpetrated abuses were arbitrary arrest, torture, denial
of access to family or lawyers and disappearances. The majority of arrests recorded by
AHRC, particularly in Kathmandu, were related to criminal activity.
Appeals from Amnesty International for 2004 (up to March 2004) were also studied. AI’s
urgent appeals are all for cases perpetrated by the state, in relation to the abuse of civil
and political rights. The majority of cases involved arbitrary arrest, disappearances and
torture, and the majority of arrests were related to terrorism, suspected connections to
the Maoists or other political activity. A large number of the recorded cases took place in
Kathmandu (47%). Of the 34 cases recorded by March 2004, 20 victims (59%) were
brahmins, 7 (21%) were janajatis, 4 were dalit, 1 chhetri and 2 unknown.
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Although only a small sample has been examined, it is possible to identify a trend: in
urban areas the state targets the politically active class, which is predominantly brahmin,
thus the high-caste group disproportionately suffers arbitrary arrests, disappearances and
torture. However, across the country as a whole, janajatis are the victims of state abuses
in disproportionate numbers.
6. THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The State plays a vital role in enabling the continuing abuse of human rights by different
groups in society. Despite the outlawing of caste-based discrimination, the kamaiya
system and certain forms of discrimination against women, perpetrators of such abuses
rarely face justice. In many cases, the perpetrators are state actors themselves, and the
culture of impunity for such crimes pervades society. In 2000, Amnesty International
stated that “… although many changes occurred throughout society following the
introduction of multi-party democracy in 1990, the civil service and police force have so
far not been the subject of major reforms. They wield substantial power, often without
being subjected to close scrutiny by the legislative or judicial authorities. .. There is a
complete lack of accountability in relation to alleged unlawful killings, including
extrajudicial executions and indeed in relation to many other forms of human rights
violation.” (AI, 2000)
Similarly, in 2002, AI reported:
“.. On 20 May 2001 The Kathmandu Post reported that the Inspector General
of Police (IGP) Pradeep S.J.B. Rana had acknowledged that human rights
violations by police had been a significant factor in the escalation of human
rights abuses generally. The IGP was reported to have stated: ''The police
killed innocent people, discriminated against ordinary people based on their
social status and maltreated the locals during their patrols.'' (AI, 2002)
These comments all refer to violence perpetrated by state actors, and the impunity they
enjoy. However, in many of the cases of abuse reported by AI, AHRC and INSEC, the
perpetrators, whether state or non-state actors, do not face trial or any punishment.
State inaction in relation to abuses committed by others is a key factor in enabling the
continuation of the abuse of the human rights of deprived sectors of the population. ALRC
(2003) condemns the government approach to reducing caste-based discrimination, which
is limited to education programmes and poverty alleviation programmes. ALRC reports
that experience shows that education without enforcement fails, and that the approach
undermines the principle of the rule of law.
This state inaction is also visible in terms of the provision of basic services to deprived
communities, and demonstrates the lack of motivation on the part of the state to address
the rights to food, freedom from hunger, development, education and health for vast
swathes of the population.
7. CONCLUDING NOTE
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Nepal is a poor country both in terms of economic and social development. Violence is
rampant at all levels extending from household level up to the State. Resource denial and
deprivation lies in the heart of violence.
Despite the 1990 change in polity, there could not be any substantial change in the nature
of governance, in the structure of economy and social institutions. Frustrated by the
failure of the 1990 governments to create livelihood opportunities, the People’s War
broke out from western hills in 1996 which now extends nationwide. People’s War has
been a major source of violence and a pretext of State inaction. The cumulative effect of
all this has been the persistence of violence and degrading treatments. Looking at the
data of the agricultural workers killed (16%), next to political activists (47 per cent), it
can be argued that the poor and oppressed centre around the People’s War, a fact
indicative of a correlation between denial and violence.
There is a very limited study of violence linked purely to economic and social structures
and institutions. This makes a comparable or contrasting analysis, in statistical terms,
difficult. But given the experience, crimes and disturbances, some of them very grave,
attributable to socio-economic deprivation have been regular. The State response to them
has been harsh punishment.
Nonetheless it is clear from the available data that there is a correlation between levels
of violence and poverty. It is also clear that the poorest groups of society experience
systematic discrimination and denial of their basic rights to food, shelter, education,
health and a dignified life. This denial of rights is a major contributory factor to the
conflict, and the abuse of civil and political rights by the state has contributed to the
escalation of the conflict. The situation in Nepal highlights the indivisibility of all human
rights and the correlation between the denial of human rights and the escalation of
violence.
6. REFERENCES
Acharya, M. 2003. “Towards Conflict Transformation in Nepal: Recent Trends in
Government Maoist Dialogue.” In Shrestha, AP and Hari Uprety (eds.) Conflict
Resolution and Governance in Nepal. NEFAS: Kathmandu
AHRC (Asian Human Rights Commission). 2004. Urgent Appeals for 2003 and 2004,
www.ahrchk.net/ua
AI (Amnesty International). 2000. Human Rights and Security. Available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports
AI
(Amnesty
International).
2001.
Nepal:
Make
Torture
a
Crime.
At
http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports
AI (Amnesty International). 2002. Nepal, a Spiralling Human Rights Crisis. Available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-npl/reports
AI (Amnesty International). 2003. Nepal Widespread “disappearances" in the context. At
(http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA310452003?open&of=ENG-NPL)
ALRC (Asian Legal Resource Centre). 2003. Alternative Report on CERD in Nepal. Available
at http://www.alrc.net/index.php
Bhattarai, BR. 2003. “Political Economy of the People’s War.” In Karki, A and D Seddon
(eds.) The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit Publishers: Delhi
CBS (Centre Bureau of Statistics). 2001. Statistical Pocket Book. CBS/HMGN: Kathmandu
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CBS. 2002. Statistical Pocket Book. CBS/HMGN: Kathmandu
Central Bureau of Statistics (2003) Statistical Yearbook of Nepal 2003, CBS, Kathmandu
CSRC (Community Self Reliance Centre). 2003. Land Rights in Nepal: Present Realities and
Strategies for Future. CSRC: Kathmandu
CVICT (Centre for Victims of Torture). 2001. Nepal’s Penal System: An Agenda for Change.
CVICT: Kathmandu
Enabling State Programme (ESP). 2001. Pro-Poor Governance Assessment Nepal. ESP:
Kathmandu
FDN (Foundation for Development Management). 2004. Cost of War: Economic and Sociocultural Impacts of the People’s War. (Unpublished report available at RRN Library)
FWLD (Forum for Women, Law and Development). 2000. Discriminatory Laws in Nepal and
their Impact on Women. FWLD, Kathmandu
Gurung, H. (2003), Social Demography of Nepal – Census 2001, Himal Books, Lalitpur
HMG Nepal (1996), Children and Women of Nepal, Situation Analysis, 1996 - Unicef Beijing
Plus Five Country Report, HMG, Nepal downloaded from: http://www.azeeconlwf.com/lwf/burning_issues/women.html
ICIMOC (International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development) and Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS). 2003a. Mapping Nepal Census Indicators 2001 and Trends. ICIMOD:
Kathmandu
Informal Sector Research and Study Centre. 2002. District Demographic Profile of Nepal.
Informal Sector Research and Study Centre, Kathmandu
INSEC (Informal Sector Service Centre). 2002. Nepal Human Rights Yearbook 2002. INSEC:
Kathmandu
INSEC. 2003. Human Rights Yearbook 2003. INSEC: Kathmandu
International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD) and Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS). 2003b. Districts of Nepal Indicators of Development – update 2003.
ICIMOD: Kathmandu
Karki, A and D Seddon. 2003. The People's War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit
Publishers: New Delhi
Karki, A. 2001. The Politics of Poverty and Movement from Below in Nepal. PhD Thesis,
University of East Anglia, School of Development of Studies, UK
Karki, AK. 2002. “Movements from Below: Land Rights Movement in Nepal.” Inter-Asia
Cultural Studies (Vol 3, No 2, August)
Kattel, Mukunda. 1999. “An Act without Action: A Nepalese Experience.” FOCUS AsiaPacific, December 1999, Vol. 18. HURIGHTS OSAKA: Japan
Limqueco, Peter. 1997. “No Revolution without Democracy, No Democracy without
Revolution.” HImal. Kathmandu September/October 1997
Murshed, SM and Gates, S. 2003. Spatial-Horizontal Inequality and the Maoist Insurgency in
Nepal.
NESAC (Nepal South Asia Centre). 1998. Nepal Human Development Report 1998. NESAC:
Kathmandu
NPC (Nepal Planning Commission). 2003. The Tenth Plan (Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper). NPC/HMGN: Kathmandu
Prachanda. 2003. “Inside the Revolution in Nepal.” In Karki, A and D Seddon (eds.) The
People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives. Adroit Publishers: Delhi
Pradhan, S. 2000. Foreign Aid No Answer to Nepalese Poverty. Asia Times Online, May 9,
2000 (http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BE09Df02.html)
SAAPE (South Asia Alliance for Poverty Eradication). 2003. Poverty in South Asia 2003.
SAAPE: Kathmandu
Supreme Court. 2058/2059 BS. Annual Report of the Supreme Court. Kathmandu
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The Global IDP Project. 2003. Nepal: A hidden IDP crisis. Available at
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efault?CreateDocument
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2003. Human Development Report 2003.
Oxford University Press: New York
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Annex 1: Development indicators and human rights abuses by district (based on 2002
information)
District
Population
Literacy
Women’s
Literacy
HDI
Pop.
per
doctor
Abuses
by
state –
events
State:
No. of
victims
State:
% of
victims
that
are
women
Abuses
by
Maoists
–
events
Maoist:
No. of
victims
Maoist:
% of
victims
that
are
women
Ab
by
ot
ev
Eastern Region
Jhapa
Ilam
Panchthar
Taplejung
Morang
Sunsari
Dhankuta
Tehrathum
Bhojpur
Sankhuwasabha
Saptari
Siraha
Udayapur
Khotang
Okhaldhunga
Solukhumbu
688,109
282,806
202,056
134,698
843,220
625,633
166,479
113,111
203,018
159,203
570,282
572399
287689
231,385
156,702
107,686
66.93
66.23
55.31
52.21
56.74
60.38
63.98
59.02
54.52
55.31
42.8
40.31
53.31
49.87
49.12
45.81
58.65
58.23
45.51
42.34
46.21
50
54.13
47.85
44.15
45.51
35.18
26.8
42.16
38.44
36.12
35.41
0.421
0.38
0.328
0.328
0.421
0.382
0.401
0.339
0.351
0.365
0.374
0.35
0.355
0.318
0.34
0.354
30,145
47,134
40,411
33,675
14,054
69,515
27,747
28,278
40,604
39,801
28,514
6332
57,538
46,277
78,351
26,922
62
21
22
34
32
66
12
31
11
101
49
46
46
29
24
14
75
22
27
40
66
83
13
60
17
180
62
76
100
66
79
27
8
5
7
3
11
11
0
7
24
8
6
5
9
17
7
14
15
51
32
6
4
9
15
25
4
9
28
16
14
12
11
17
38
53
45
7
6
10
17
42
4
22
48
27
22
22
27
6
5
2
4
84
17
18
12
45
20
1
18
5
11
14
12
45
6
1
5
Central Region
Dhanusa
Mahottari
Sarlahi
Sindhuli
Ramechhap
Dolakha
Rautahat
Bara
Parsa
Chitwan
Makwanpur
Lalitpur
Kabhre
Bhaktapur
Kathmandu
Dhading
Sindhupalchowk
Nuwakot
Rasuwa
671,364
553,481
635,701
279,829
212,408
204,229
545,132
559,135
497,219
472,048
392,604
337,785
385,672
225,461
1,081,845
338,658
305,857
288,478
44,731
48.37
34.36
36.17
50.13
39.05
50.64
32.5
4235
42.4
70.76
63.18
70.77
63.75
59.15
77
43.48
40.19
51.15
33.96
36.07
22.3
25.13
38.11
26.37
36.32
20.3
17.5
14.5
62.84
53.71
60.26
52.53
49.8
66.44
33.81
29.12
40.41
24.53
0.329
0.322
0.295
0.295
0.315
0.34
0.308
0.309
0.355
0.37
0.309
0.523
0.38
0.393
0.603
0.258
0.277
0.312
0.246
19,746
79.069
79,463
55,452
70,803
58,637
21,805
93,189
12,127
14,752
35,691
21,112
96,418
10,248
3,948
67,732
58,744
48,080
22,386
83
50
68
73
89
39
51
23
15
128
12
34
47
36
69
59
53
21
9
120
75
73
240
101
68
126
40
20
400
14
145
157
122
101
216
107
42
17
8
11
8
7
5
21
1
15
0
17
4
32
41
48
36
23
15
1
29
16
28
21
14
33
25
46
18
3
20
7
51
104
258
90
37
24
4
42
25
37
51
17
100
42
76
25
3
5
43
8
8
Western Region
Tanahun
Gorkha
Lamjung*
Syangja
Kaski
Manang
Nawalparasi
Rupandehi
Palpa
Kapilvastu
Arghakhanchi
Gulmi
Baglung
Parvat
315,237
288,134
177,149
317,320
380,527
9,587
562,870
708,419
268,558
481,976
208,391
296,654
269,937
157,862
61.68
53.85
56.61
66.32
71.9
59.91
52.99
65.95
65.96
41.46
55.9
57.78
61.4
56.82
52.68
45.18
46.04
57.31
61.52
52.11
40.68
55.71
57.55
29.27
46.72
47.78
52.02
47.52
0.384
0.308
0.375
0.378
0.45
0.306
0.3
0.361
0.337
0.286
0.331
0.326
0.337
0.357
21,016
48,022
44,287
45,331
7180
4994
70,359
18,643
44,597
68,854
41,678
49,442
29,882
52,609
38
31
40
46
18
4
32
16
9
35
26
53
51
177
92
56
122
64
68
5
69
26
44
1,013
111
81
81
237
14
18
10
12
4
0
6
4
18
25
21
14
10
14
37
40
15
10
16
11
5
0
0
25
15
4
5
18
19
44
25
18
20
5
5
34
82
62
35
18
15
0
0
3
1
2
3
5
Nepal Interim Report
14
6
4
9
6
8
14
6
9
12
7
Page 39 of 44
0
0
6
0
0
15
11
9
14
3
5
0
0
5
8
12
2
3
0
0
69
56
17
30
32
5
21
24
35
19
27
17
22
58
12
14
6
2
1
15
2
1
2
21
4
54
29
10
14
5
7
4
13
40
Nepal general evaluation
Myagdi
Mustang
114,447
14,981
55.74
51.75
45.6
40.7
0.309
0.316
38,149
38,149
26
2
56
4
17
0
19
0
Mid Western
Dang*
Pyuthan
Rolpa*
Salyan*
Rukum*
Banke
Bardiya*
Surkhet*
Jajarkot
Dailekh
Dolpa
Jumla*
Kalikot
Mugu
Humla
462,380
212,484
210,004
213,500
188,438
585,840
382,639
288,521
134,868
225,201
29,545
89,427
105,580
43,937
40,595
57.7
35
37.25
48.15
39.75
57.36
45.41
62.48
39.36
47.44
34.66
32.41
37.51
27.79
26.62
46.72
33.71
22.88
35.98
28.6
48.9
35.64
51.49
28.36
31.82
19.61
16.7
16.98
9.19
11.52
0.299
0.323
0.264
0.25
0.27
0.309
0.304
0.357
0.21
0.246
0.218
0.218
0.177
0.147
0.244
46,238
14,166
105,002
15,161
62,813
12,446
63,775
26,987
44,956
56,300
22,071
23,075
5,755
31,465
13,532
83
24
123
66
71
207
142
184
24
95
14
63
25
13
34
393
36
285
198
496
452
313
339
36
176
43
178
72
33
97
5
17
18
53
13
45
45
107
44
71
97
100
138
11
32
33
12
71
196
23
164
124
199
90
108
167
116
182
12
204
43
18
92
Far Western
Kailali
Achham*
Doti*
Bajura
Bajhang
Kanchanpur
Dadeldhura
Baitadi
Darchula
616,697
231,285
207,066
108,781
167,026
377,899
126,162
234,418
121,996
52.06
33.36
42.56
33.73
35.26
59.65
51.62
51.55
49.39
47.71
15.8
25.18
17.07
15.08
46.91
35.06
33.43
32.38
0.299
0.235
0.249
0.201
0.201
0.332
0.265
0.256
0.286
28,032
77,095
34,511
50,313
41,757
20,994
42,054
46,884
40,665
65
39
9
21
30
35
53
24
35
123
124
124
86
54
170
85
40
44
74
17
19
38
45
29
61
26
11
123
156
227
74
300
38
374
78
11
5
11
4
23
5
7
21
8
10
0
* Identified at “most conflict-affected” districts by the Government of Nepal.
Nepal Interim Report
Page 40 of 44
1
0
3
4
11
7
7
3
7
17
9
0
9
17
3
1
7
16
29
8
14
4
8
2
4
4
12
4
2
12
3
0
34
9
17
13
2
41
Nepal general evaluation
Annex 2: Correlation of development indicators and levels of human rights
abuses, by district.
In the table below, ranking of districts is based on the development indicators
developed by ICIMOD and CBS – see ICIMOD&CBS 2003b. Twenty-nine indicators were
used to develop composite indices of development. The indicators capture various
dimensions of socio-economic conditions. All 29 indicators were used to develop the
overall index; eight indicators (measuring child deprivation, gender discrimination,
concentration of disadvantaged groups, marginal farm households and food
production) were used to develop the poverty and deprivation index; four indicators
(examining aspects of women’s participation in economic activity and education) were
used to develop the gender index. In the table, districts are ranked according to their
relative development, with 1 implying the highest level of development, and 75 the
lowest amongst the districts.
The levels of violence recorded in each district are based on the events reported in
INSEC 2003. The districts are ranked according to relative levels of violence, with 1
implying the lowest level of violence and 75 the highest, or worst violence situation.
Nepal Interim Report
Page 41 of 44
42
Nepal general evaluation
District
Eastern Region
Jhapa
Ilam
Rank by
Overall
Development
Index
Rank by
Poverty and
Deprivation
Index
Rank by
Women's
Empowerment
Index
Rank by
total no. of
victims per
100,000
population
Rank by
state
violence
(victims per
100,000
population)
Rank by
Maoist
violence
(victims per
100,000
population)
Rank by
nonstate
violence
(per
100,000)
Rank by
%
women
affected
by nonstate
violence
3
12
1
6
16
19
19
12
11
5
7
17
63
53
5
4
Panchthar
Taplejung
Morang
Sunsari
Dhankuta
23
33
11
14
7
17
27
5
10
2
23
28
24
27
12
27
44
10
14
3
16
34
7
14
6
44
53
16
5
12
59
54
50
52
3
3
Tehrathum
Bhojpur
Sankhuwasabha
Saptari
Siraha
17
31
18
47
58
13
15
7
37
49
25
36
22
62
65
46
7
59
4
9
49
8
67
10
15
27
24
49
2
13
66
18
46
26
20
2
5
3
4
2
Udayapur
Khotang
Okhaldhunga
Solukhumbu
43
38
39
29
41
30
32
28
39
29
37
20
42
29
41
35
38
32
47
28
43
35
41
46
67
32
5
55
5
2
7
3
Central region
Dhanusa
Mahottari
Sarlahi
46
65
61
46
61
57
59
71
64
23
22
13
23
17
12
9
6
23
58
65
24
5
7
4
Sindhuli
Ramechhap
Dolakha
Rautahat
Bara
49
51
41
68
55
56
53
47
68
42
35
50
41
72
67
58
67
45
25
6
65
45
37
27
4
52
69
59
20
15
62
64
22
33
45
5
3
4
4
2
Parsa
Chitwan
Makwanpur
Lalitpur
Kabhre
52
2
26
5
15
43
3
26
21
18
63
8
35
9
21
2
51
5
40
38
3
63
1
43
42
4
28
18
33
39
47
34
48
57
43
3
5
3
1
3
Bhaktapur
Kathmandu
Dhading
Sindhupalchowk
Nuwakot
4
1
44
48
36
12
9
51
60
29
13
2
30
43
38
65
8
47
39
15
52
9
54
39
18
22
30
37
48
26
71
10
40
14
7
1
1
2
2
Rasuwa
53
62
44
32
41
19
16
Nepal Interim Report
Page 42 of 44
5
3
43
Nepal general evaluation
Western region
Tanahun
Gorkha
Lamjung
Syangja
16
32
22
9
23
34
35
22
7
18
14
1
30
24
43
16
33
24
57
26
36
40
25
10
36
8
2
4
3
Kaski
Manang
Nawalparasi
Rupandehi
Palpa
6
10
37
13
8
4
25
36
11
14
3
5
33
31
4
21
48
18
1
11
22
48
13
2
19
14
5
11
3
8
49
70
60
31
27
Kapilvastu
Arghakhanchi
Gulmi
Baglung
54
42
27
24
48
50
38
45
58
26
15
10
70
49
34
28
73
50
31
35
21
54
47
38
28
21
17
12
1
2
2
1
Parvat
Myagdi
Mustang
20
25
19
39
44
33
11
6
17
63
33
17
71
46
30
34
1
Dang
Pyuthan
Rolpa
Salyan
Rukum
21
50
64
45
60
8
54
65
40
55
32
48
54
46
53
57
20
69
61
73
64
20
69
66
75
58
32
64
61
67
35
11
1
25
56
1
5
6
6
1
Banke
Bardiya
Surkhet
Jajarkot
Dailekh
30
34
28
59
63
16
20
24
58
64
47
40
34
51
55
50
52
66
54
62
59
62
68
29
60
42
50
60
66
65
37
15
42
23
30
6
4
6
6
1
Dolpa
Jumla
Kalikot
Mugu
Humla
67
69
70
75
74
69
67
71
75
73
56
70
69
75
73
68
74
53
55
75
70
72
56
58
74
55
72
56
57
71
44
39
29
4
6
6
Far Western
Kailali
Achham
40
72
31
74
42
68
26
56
25
51
45
62
Doti
Bajura
Bajhang
Kanchanpur
Dadeldhura
66
71
73
35
56
66
72
70
19
52
61
66
74
49
57
64
60
71
37
72
53
61
36
44
55
68
63
70
31
73
Baitadi
62
63
60
36
21
51
na
na
6
2
2
51
na
na
6
na
na
Mid Western
Nepal Interim Report
Page 43 of 44
na
na
69
5
6
9
4
41
na
6
na
68
19
61
4
3
1
38
1
44
Nepal general evaluation
Darchula
Nepal Interim Report
57
59
52
31
40
Page 44 of 44
29
13
4