PHIL 385, Assignment Schedule #2
(5) Foundationalism
(A8) Read Lehrer, Chapter 3 and Chisholm, “The myth of the given”
22. Consider the case of the man who mistakes itches for pains. What is it supposed to show? How does
Lehrer respond to the objection that the man simply means ‘pain or itch’ when he says ‘pain’? Do you
think his response is successful? Explain.
23. Explain how Lehrer’s point about hypothetical (contrary to fact) statements works as an objection
against reductive versions of foundationalism.
24. What does Chisholm mean when he says beliefs are “self-justified”? How does this turn out to be the
same as their being “neither justified nor unjustified”?
(A9) Read Lehrer, Chapter 4 and BonJour, “Can empirical knowledge have a foundation?” along with the
short “Remarks on Foundationalism” from the website.
25. Suppose one is “experiencing elliptically” (having an experience as of an ellipse on a board) and
forms the belief that one is so experiencing. How would Chisholm describe the situation? How would
Lehrer reply? Do you find Lehrer’s response persuasive? Explain.
26. Consider the argument sketched by BonJour on p. 113. How is it supposed to present a problem for
the foundationalist? Return to your discussion in the previous problem. Can you see Lehrer’s response
to Chisholm as an instance of this reasoning? Explain.
27. In his last section, BonJour develops a dilemma for the givenist (Chisholm). Explain how this reasoning
is supposed to work. Do you find his argument convincing? Explain.
(6) Coherence Theory
(A10) Read Lehrer, chapter 5 and BonJour “The Coherence Theory of Empirical Knowledge,” Philosophical
Studies 30 (1976): 281-312. Available through Pfau electronic journals.
28. On p. 95 Lehrer gives his official statement of the explanatory coherence theory. Carefully explain
the different parts of his account.
29. Lehrer thinks the notion of explanatory coherence is either undefined or not sufficient for justification.
BonJour thinks he can avoid the question altogether. Why does BonJour think this?
30. How does BonJour respond against objection II on p. 289? What does Lehrer think of his reply? Who
do you think is right? Explain.
(A11) Read Lehrer, chapter 6 and BonJour “In Search of Coherentism” (handout)
1
(A11) Read Lehrer, chapter 6 and BonJour “In Search of Coherentism” (handout)
31. In this chapter Lehrer develops an alternative to explanatory coherence. Briefly explain why Lehrer
thinks he needs this alternative (this may take you back to some criticisms from the previous chapter).
Then explain the (final version of) his alternative.
32. How does (old) BonJour depend on the “doxastic presumption” (check out the fourth point starting
on 297 of the first article)? What are his objections against it? Extra: Do you think Roy’s “collapsing”
strategy will work for the coherentist? Explain.
33. How does (old) BonJour account for observational input? Why does he now think that this response
invites the alternate coherent systems objection all over again? Extra: Do you think Roy’s “coherent
system of mental states” strategy will work for the coherentist? Explain.
(7) Externalism
(A12) Read Lehrer, chapter 7 and Goldman, “What is Justified Belief?”
34. How is complete justification supposed to get Lehrer out of the isolation objection?
35. What is Goldman’s positive account of justification? Suppose Sally forms a belief based on a reliable
extra-sensory capacity, even though she has no beliefs (positive or negative) about its reliability.
Considering his brief remarks about animals and young children as well as the larger discussion in III, how
do you think Goldman would respond to this case?
36. Contrast Lehrer’s view to Goldman’s. On what ground does Lehrer agree that his theory is a version
of reliabilism? How would Lehrer respond to the Sally case?
(A13) Read Lehrer, chapter 8 and BonJour, “Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge”
37. We finally meet Mr Truetemp. Consider Lehrer’s discussion of Trutemp and BonJour’s discussion of
Norman. How do these cases work, and why are they supposed to tell against externalism? Do you think
they are right? Explain.
38. Given his objections against reliabilism, what does Lehrer think is correct about it? How does this
translate into his own account of complete justification?
39. Toward the end of his article, BonJour gives a case where Agatha is selected for a philosophy
experiment by a Cartesian evil demon. It is basically a lottery cases with “tickets” and probabilities,
subject 1 is not deceived
subject 2 is not deceived
etc.
99/100
99/100
Explain how Lehrer, in his personal justification game, could hold that Agatha is not justified in accepting
that she is not deceived and so is not justified in accepting that she sees the cup. Compare this response
to BonJour’s account of the case.
2