Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests: An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining
Model
Author(s): James D. Fearon
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2, Arms, Alliances, and Cooperation:
Formal Models and Empirical Tests (Jun., 1994), pp. 236-269
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Signaling versus the
Balance of Power and Interests
AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF A CRISIS BARGAINING MODEL
JAMES D. FEARON
Universityof Chicago
Conventionalwisdom holds thatin internationaldisputes,a state'smilitarythreatsare more
likely to work the more the state is favoredby the balance of power or the balanceof interests.
Analysis of a game-theoreticmodelof crisissignalingsubstantiallyrefinesandrevises this claim.
Due to selection effects arisingfrom strategicbehavior,measuresof the relative strengthof a
defender's intereststhat are availablebefore a crisis begins (ex ante) should be relatedto the
failure of the defender's threatsduringthe crisis. Ex ante measuresof the defender's relative
militarystrengthshould correlatewith the success of the defender's crisis threats,but due to
strategicdynamics that are not graspedby the standardarguments.A reanalysisof Huth and
Russett'sdataon immediatedeterrentthreatslends supportforthese andotherhypothesesdrawn
from the game-theoretictreatment.
Among themost importantquestionsin social science arethecauses andeffects
interestedin
of threatsandforce.In international
politicswe areparticularly
when threatsprotectthe state and when, by contrast,they set off a spiral of
counterthreatsthatleave both sides worse off thanthey would have been had
the state adoptedan alternativepolicy.
-Robert Jervis (1989, 183)
Jervis'squestionaboutthe effects of threatsin internationalpolitics seems
ripe for theoreticallyinformedempiricalanalysis. On the one hand,we have
a growingtheoreticalliteraturethatuses recentdevelopmentsin game theory
AUTHOR'SNOTE:Thisarticleis basedon chapter5 of J. Fearon,Threatsto Use Force: The
Role of Costly Signals in InternationalCrises, Ph.D. Dissertation,University of California,
Berkeley, 1992. For helpful commentson the articleI wish to thankPaul Huth,Bruce Russett,
Barry O'Neill, and conference participants.I am especially indebtedto Paul Huth and Bruce
Russettfor access to their dataon immediatedeterrence.
Vol.38 No. 2, June1994 236-269
JOURNAL
OFCONFLICT
RESOLUTION,
Inc.
? 1994SagePublications,
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Fearon /TEST OF A CRISISBARGAINING
MODEL
237
to studythe evolution and dynamicsof internationaldisputes(e.g., Nalebuff
1986; Powell 1990; Morrow 1989b; Fearon 1990, forthcoming-a;Wagner
1991; Kilgour 1991; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). On the other
hand,we have seen slow but steadyimprovementsin the numberandquality
of data sets on internationalconfrontations(e.g., Gochmanand Maoz 1984;
Brecher,Wilkenfeld,and Moser 1988; Huth and Russett 1988; Leng 1993).
But with the notable exception of Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman (1992),
therehave been few effortsto test theoreticalresultsempiricallyusing these
data sets. Relevant to the main concerns of this article, there have been
virtuallyno efforts to draw specific hypotheses about the effects of threats
from the new game-theoreticcrisis models and to evaluatethem empirically.
There are at least two reasons for this gap. First, as yet no crisis data set
has been constructedwith any game-theoreticmodel (or models) in mind. In
consequence,distinctionsthatappearcriticalfromthe theoreticalperspective
providedby variousmodels arenot recognizedin organizingcrisis data,and
evidence thatmighthelp evaluatethemis notcollected. This makesassessing
theoretical results difficult by making it more difficult to translateeasily
between the theoryand the data.
Second, modelershave probablynot done enoughto drawout hypotheses
thatcan be testedusing simple,plausible,andreadilyavailablemeasures.For
example, given the importanceof "power"and "interest"variablesin informal argumentsabout internationalpolitics, it would seem desirable for a
model to yield resultson how observableandmeasurableaspects of military
power and foreign policy interestswould affect leaders'choices in disputes.
But this can be a challengefor a game-theoreticanalysis,in which unobservable factorssuch as privateinformationaboutcapabilitiesor "resolve"often
figure prominently.
In this article,I use an incomplete-informationmodel of an international
crisis to develop hypotheses on the impact of observable dimensions of
militarypower andnationalintereston threatmakingin crises. The hypotheses are evaluatedusing Huth and Russett's (1988) dataon a particularclass
of internationaldisputes-58 cases of "extended immediate deterrence"
since 1885.
More than any otherI know of, Huthand Russett's (1988) crisis data are
structuredin a way appropriatefor evaluating a limited-informationgame
model of crisis bargaining.In the firstplace, HuthandRussettcode crises as
sequential,step-by-stepevents. In each of theircases, a "challenger"issued
a threatto a "protege"state, and a "defender"repliedby issuing a deterrent
threaton behalf of the protege. Huthand Russett ask aboutthe next steps in
the sequence-whether the challengerdecidedto act on its initial threat,and
whetherthe defenderrespondedwith militaryforce if the challengeracted.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
These coding rulesrepresentcrises in essentiallythe same way thatthe model
summarizedhere does.1 Second, Huth and Russett have measures for the
relativemilitarycapabilitiesof the challenger,defender,andprotege, and on
the extent of the defender'sinterestin the protege.
Finally,the dataarewell suitedfor askingaboutthe effects of threatsmade
in internationalcrises andfor comparinghypothesesderivedfrom the gametheoretic approach to older and more mainstreamarguments. Huth and
Russett(1988) andHuth(1988b) used the datato test a numberof hypotheses
on the conditions underwhich a defender's"immediatedeterrent"threatis
most likely to succeed or fail-that is, whatpredictswhetherthe challenging
stateactedor did not act on its initialthreatagainstthe protege?Most of their
hypotheses are based on informalrationalistargumentsaboutthe impact of
the balanceof capabilitiesandthe balanceof interestson the credibilityof a
threat.The centralidea is thatthe defender'sdeterrentthreatshould be more
likely to succeed the morethe defenderis favoredby the balanceof capabilities or interests.This idea is both highly intuitive and widely accepted by
studentsof internationalpolitics (Fearon1992, chap. 2).
The game-theoreticanalysis sketched below substantiallyrevises and
qualifiesthese claims abouttheeffects of relativepowerandrelativeinterests
in crisis bargaining.The main problemwith the standardargumentsis that
they do not grasp the consequencesof strategicdynamics linked to the fact
thatcrises aresequencesof decisions to threatenor escalate.In particular,the
full empirical implications of strategic behavior by challenging states is
missed. To the extent that relative capabilitiesand interestsare observable
before a crisis begins, rationalchallengersshould take these into account.
When the observablebalanceof interestsfavorsthe defender,only relatively
resolved challengers will choose to threaten,implying that the defender's
effortat immediatedeterrencewill be relativelyunlikelyto succeed (contrary
to the standardhypothesis). When the observable balance of capabilities
favorsthe defender,challengeswill tendto occuron issues thatareof initially
doubtful interest to the defender.Hence a strong deterrentsignal by the
defender will be relatively likely to work in response, but due to the challenger's initial beliefs and choice of issue ratherthan (directly) due to the
defender'ssuperiormilitarypower.
Takento the data,these hypothesesfare quite well (althoughthere is one
variablethat acts anomalously)and yield an interpretationof the evidence
quite differentfrom that based on the standardbalance of capabilitiesand
1. For moreextendedtheoreticaltreatmentsof the model employedin this article,see Fearon
(1990, 1992); for a more generalformulation,see Fearon(forthcoming-a).
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Fearon / TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
MODEL
239
interesthypotheses. In brief, relative power and relative interestsinfluence
the effects of threats made in internationalconfrontations,but in ways
differentand more subtle thanthe mainstreamargumentsenvision.
The articleproceeds in four sections. In the first, I briefly introducethe
crisis bargainingmodel behind the empiricalanalysis. The second section
considers some testable hypotheses based on equilibriumanalysis of the
model. In the third section, I reanalyze and reinterpretHuth and Russett's
(1988) dataon immediatedeterrencein light of the game-theoreticarguments
and hypotheses.A fourthsection concludes.
A SIGNALING MODEL OF CRISIS BARGAINING
Since George and Smoke (1974), empiricalwork on internationalcrises
has emphasizedthatthey are sequentialin nature-one state challenges, the
otherresponds,the firstrepliesagain,andso on untileitherwar,capitulation,
or some settlementis reached.This section presentsand analyzesa model of
a crisis as a four-step sequence. A challenger and a defender alternatein
making threats or warnings; each begins the crisis uncertain about the
adversary'swillingness to fight over the issues at stake.Because the focus of
the articleis empiricaland to save space, I do not fully characterizeequilibrium resultsfor the game (see Fearon1990, 1992, chap. 4).
The structure of the crisis. The model depicts crises as having four
principal stages or steps, as illustratedin Figure 1. In the first step, the
challenger considers whetherto take an action that explicitly or implicitly
threatensanotherstate. If the challengerdecides not to threaten,the status
quo prevails. If threatened,the defenderchooses in the second step whether
to respondwith some threator warningof its own. The responsemightbe an
action such as mobilization, a public declarationof intent to resist if the
challengerchooses to act on its threat,or a declarationof intentto restorethe
statusquo ante if the challengerhas alreadybegun changingthe statusquo.
In the thirdstep, after observingthe defender'sresponse, the challenger
chooses whether or not to act on its initial threat,or to continue if it had
alreadybegun.If the challengerchooses not to act, the crisis ends. Finally,in
the fourthstep, if the challengeracts, the defenderchooses whetheror not to
resist with militaryforce.
The model is much simpler than any particularhistoricalcase of crisis
bargaining.In the real world, states have opportunitiesto send a greater
varietyof messages to each otherthroughmultiplechannels;the choices of
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
C
not threaten
threaten
not
mobilize
status quo
remains
mobilize
c
not
act
ot
act
\act
\D
/
D
/
C backs
off
\act
C backs
not
status quo
revised
off
war
notght
D backs
down
war
Figure 1: A Signaling Model of Crisis Bargaining
more thantwo statesmay be relevant;and policies areproducedand carried
out not by unitaryactors, but by organizations.Nonetheless, informal versions of this model appearrepeatedlyin empiricalstudiesof crises, including
GeorgeandSmoke(1974,101-3), HuthandRussett(1984,1988,1993), Huth
(1988b, 20-25), and Lebow and Stein (1990b). It also captures,in a natural
way, a conceptualdistinctionthathas played a majorrole in recentempirical
studies of crisis bargaining.Morgan(1977, chap. 2) distinguishedbetween
generaldeterrence-which holds if no threatsare issued between states that
are involved in a generally adversarialrelationship-and immediatedeterrence-which becomes an issue afterone statehas decided to threatenor to
take other actions that suggest the possible use of force. This distinction
presupposesa sequential,step-by-steppatternfor crisis bargaininglike that
representedin Figure 1. There, general deterrencefails if the challenger
decides to threatenratherthan accept the status quo. Immediatedeterrence
fails if the challengeracts on its initialthreatafterobservinga toughresponse
by the defender,such as mobilization.
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Fearon/ TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
MODEL
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C
not threaten
threaten
0
C
not/
act
"
m
C
not /
act
\act
\act
-z
-D
D
DD
D
D
Figure 2: The Signaling Game with Payoffs
Payoffs. For convenience,statusquo payoffs may be normalizedto (0, 0),
where the first componentis the challenger'sand the second the defender's
expected utility for living with the status quo. These, as well as the other
payoffs, are depictedin Figure 2.
If war results when the defender has not mobilized, challenger and
defenderreceive theirexpected utilities for conflict, (we, wD). If war occurs
aftermilitarypreparationby the defender,the challenger'svalue for conflict
is reducedandthe defender'sincreasedby m > 0. Thus they receive (wc - m,
WD + m).
I have arguedelsewherethatin most crises, threateningor makinga "show
of force" generatesaudience costs that a leader might suffer if he backed
down later (Fearon 1990, 1992, forthcoming-a).These costs arise from the
actionof domesticpoliticalaudiencesconcernedwith whetherthe leadership
is successful or unsuccessfulat foreignpolicy. In the game, if the challenger
backs down afterthe defendermobilizes, it will suffer an audiencecost rc >
0, whereas the defender enjoys a "foreign policy success" worth rD > 0.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Payoffs arethen(-rc, rD).If the challengerbacksdown when no show of force
has been made, it bears a small cost z, whereas the defenderreaps a small
benefit z, where 0 - z < rc. So (-z, z) results.2
Finally,if the defenderbacks down afterit has mobilizedand afteraction
takenby the challenger,it loses the value of the issue at stake, aD> 0, along
with its audiencecost rD.Conversely,the challengergains ac > 0, its intrinsic
value for whateveris at stake,plus rc,the extrabenefitof havingsuccessfully
stood up to the defender'sattemptat "immediatedeterrence."Payoffs for this
outcome are(ac + rc, -aD - rD).On the otherhand,if the defenderbacksdown
without having made a show of force, it suffers only the loss of the issue at
stake, and the challenger receives only its value for the issue itself. Thus
payoffs are (ac, - aD).
To summarize,threekey variablesdefine the states'preferencesover the
several possible crisis outcomes:the states' values for the issues at stake in
the dispute(ac and aD);the audiencecosts createdby public displaysof force
(rc and rD);and the states' values for the war outcome (wc and wD). Each of
these values is defined relative to a player's value for the statusquo, which
is normalizedto equal 0.
Equilibriumwith incompleteinformationabout valuesfor war. When all
of the above payoffs are common knowledge, the game has three possible
subgameperfectoutcomesdependingon the states'valuesfor war.Eitherthe
challengeraccepts the status quo; the challengerthreatensand the defender
cedes the issue at stake withoutresistance;or war occurs aftermobilization
by the defender.So, with completeinformation,the defender'scounterthreat
fails wheneverit is actuallymade-challengers can anticipatethe defender's
actions and so will not threatenexpecting resistanceunless they are themselves willing to go to war.The question,"Whendo deterrentthreatswork?"
becomes interestingonly when we bring incomplete informationinto the
picture:if challengersare uncertainaboutthe defender'struewillingness to
fight over the issues in question, then there is a potential role for the
defender's counterthreatto "signal resolve" to a challenger,so dissuading
furtheraggressive action.
To model uncertaintyof this sort,we supposethatbeforethe crisis begins,
the states'expected utilitiesfor war,wc and WD,are distributeduniformlyon
the intervals [-j, ac] and [-k, 0], respectively.At the outset, challengerand
defenderareinformedof theirown value for war,wc and wD, but know only
the distribution of their adversary'svalue. Thus the distributionof WD on
2. No resultsare affected if these are (-Zc, ZD).
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[-k, 0] representsthe challenger's initial belief, or uncertainty,about the
defender's willingness to fight, whereas the distributionof wc on [-j, ac]
representsthe defender'sinitial belief about the challenger's value for war.
Theparametersjandk (withk takento be greaterthanaDandbothas common
knowledge) determinethe natureof the states' initial beliefs: the largerj or
k, the greaterthe initial belief thatthe challengeror defenderprobablyhas a
low willingness to go to war over the issues at stake.3
So defined, the game proves to have a unique sequential equilibrium
distributionon outcomes for any set of parametervalues. Equilibriumis
characterizedby piecemeal or step-by-stepseparationof states accordingto
theirprivatelyknown values for conflict. Relatively tough challengers(i.e.,
high wc) choose to threatenand then act on their threat.Relatively tough
defenders choose to mobilize against a threat and then fight back if the
challengeracts. Challengerswith lower values for conflict choose eithernot
to threatenor to try a limited probe-to threatenand then back off if they
encounter an immediate deterrentthreat by the defender.Defenders with
lower willingness to fight choose eithernot to offer resistanceto a threator
to try immediatedeterrenceand then back down if it fails.
A crisis in the incomplete-informationgame thus appearsas a succession
of "costly signals" that allow states to learn about their adversary'strue
willingness to use militaryforce.4On seeing mobilizationby the defender,
the challengercorrectlyincreasesits belief thatthe defendermight in fact be
willing to use force. The reason is that tough defendersare more likely to
mobilize thanweak defendersbecausetoughdefendersdo not have to worry
aboutpaying audiencecosts for backingdown-they preferto go to warif it
comes to this. However,althoughlearningdoes takeplace, it is not necessarily complete. On seeing a threat,the defenderwill typically be unableto tell
with certainty whether immediate deterrencewill succeed or fail if tried.
Likewise, on seeing an immediate deterrentthreat by the defender, the
challengermay not be able to judge whetherthe defenderwould actuallybe
willing to use force on behalf of the protge'.
3. An alternativespecificationwould have the states uncertainaboutthe adversary'svalue
for the issue (ac and aD),while values for war were common knowledge. The same qualitative
results hold, at least for the case of one-sided incomplete information(challenger's value for
conflict is known). I use the more complicatedcase of two-sided incompleteinformationhere
to make possible challengerself-selection into crises by type (wc).
4. On costly signals, see Spence (1973) and Fearon (1992) for discussion of signaling in
internationalcrises. The costs that make signaling informativein this model differ somewhat
from the "classical"costly signals of Spence. In the classical case, the act of sending the signal
is itself costly, whereashere it is the act of backingdown afterit has been sent thatis costly. The
term "bridgeburningsignals"has been suggested,butwith incompleteinformationthe receiver
may be unsurewhetherthe bridgeis really burned.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
Even so, states in the model can form expectationsabout the likelihood
that their threatsor counterthreatswill succeed, and in equilibriumthese
probabilisticestimatesareaccurate.Wecan use these equilibriumprobability
estimatesfromthe model to derivehypotheseson whenthreatsused in crises
are more or less likely to succeed. In particular,equilibriumresults allow us
to ask how the probabilityof immediate deterrencesuccess-that is, the
probabilitythatthe challengerbacks down afterseeing a deterrentthreatby
the defender-varies with the severalparametersof the model.
In the next section, I develop and intrepretsome of these results on the
effects of crisis threats,contrastingthem with the "mainstreamrationalist
theories"thatdominatethe literature.
COMPARATIVESTATICSAND
HYPOTHESES ON IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE
Mainstreamrationalisttheories characterizeinternationalcrises as contests decided by a critical factor-the side with more militarycapabilities,
more resolve, or strongerintrinsicinterestsis predictedto prevail.Although
the logic is not always spelled out, these argumentsaretypically defendedin
rationalistterms.The core idea is that(1) havingmore of the relevantcritical
factor(capabilities,resolve, etc.) allows a stateto makea morecrediblethreat
to escalate a crisis to militaryconflict, and that (2) the side not favored by
the balanceof the criticalfactorwill realize its disadvantageand so is more
likely to back down.5
In theirworkon immediatedeterrence,HuthandRussett(1984, 1988) and
Huth (1988b) base most of their hypotheses on these arguments.In operational terms, they predict that, first, the greaterthe ratio of the defender's
capabilities to the challenger's, the more likely is an immediate deterrent
threatto succeed. Second,they arguethatthe strongerthe defender'slevel of
interest in the protege, the greater the chance of immediate deterrence
success. I will refer to the twin claims that (a) a favorable balance of
capabilities,and (b) a favorablebalance of interestsimprove the prospects
for immediatedeterrencesuccess as the mainstreamhypothesis.
5. Mainstreamrationalisttheoriesare really a bundleof argumentsfound repeatedlyin the
literatureon internationalconflict,ratherthana single coherenttheory.Forexamples,see Osgood
and Tucker (1967), Jervis (1971), Maxwell (1968), George and Smoke (1974), Snyder and
Diesing (1977, chap. 3), Huthand Russett(1984, 1988), Huth(1988b), Shimshoni(1988), and
Pape (1990). Mainstreamrationalistaccountsof internationalcrises are discussed at length in
Fearon(1992, chap. 2).
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Fearon / TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
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Note that neitherthis hypothesis nor the argumentfrom which it derives
predictsany differencebetween generaland immediatedeterrenceconcerning the effect of the balanceof capabilitiesor interests.Nor does it suggest
any distinctionbetween indicatorsof capabilitiesor intereststhat are available before the crisis begins, and informationthat emerges after the initial
threat,in the course of the crisis.
Equilibriumresults for the model outlined above suggest an alternative
specification. In particular,comparativestatics analysis draws attentionto
the importanceof states'priorbeliefs abouttheiradversaries'willingness to
use force. If crises are characterizedby private information and costly
signaling, then stateswill "selectthemselves"into or out of crises according
to these prior beliefs, and this fact will have implications for subsequent
inferences and choices. One consequenceis that rationalisthypotheses that
are true for general deterrence may be exactly reversed for immediate
deterrence.For relatedreasons,informationabout,say, the balanceof interests, may have a differentimpacton the probabilityof immediatedeterrence
success dependingon whetherit is known ex ante (before the initial threat)
or ex post (afterthe initial threat).
In brief,equilibriumresultsindicatethatthe challenger'spriorexpectation
that the defenderprefersfightingto conceding the issue (aJk, in the model)
will significantly influence the probabilityof both general and immediate
deterrencesuccess, althoughin oppositedirections.The more the challenger
initially expects the defenderto preferwarto concedingthe issue (the larger
aD/k),the more likely is general deterrenceto succeed, other things equal.
But if general deterrencedoes fail, immediate deterrencewill then be less
likely to succeed, despite the defender's initial credibility. By the same
token, if the challenger initially expected that the defender would probably prefer concessions to war,then generaldeterrencewill be less likely to
succeed, but subsequentefforts at immediatedeterrencewill be more likely
to work.
The reasonis thatrationalchallengerswill select themselves into a crisis
according to their beliefs about the defender's preferencefor war versus
concessions, and will do so in a mannerthat influences the probabilityof
immediatedeterrencesuccess (Fearonforthcoming-b).When the defenderis
initially expected to prefer war to backing down, only highly motivated,
hard-to-deterchallengers(high wc) will choose to threatenin the first place.
Whenthe defenderis initiallyexpectedto probablypreferconcessions to war,
thenthe incentivefor "opportunistic,"
probingchallengesis increased;in this
set of cases (low aJk), thechallengerswill tendon averageto have low values
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
for conflict and so will be relatively easily dissuaded by an immediate
deterrentthreat.6
One majorimplicationis thatempiricalevaluationsof immediatedeterrence ought to specify whetherinformationaboutrelative interestsor capabilities is availablebefore or afterthe initial challenge. Considera measure
of the defender'sinterestin theprotegethatis availableex ante-for example,
the presenceof an alliancebetweenthe two. We would expect such a measure
to be positively relatedto the challenger'spriorbelief thatthe defendermight
be willing to use force on behalfof the protege.Thusit shouldhave a positive
impacton the likelihoodof generaldeterrencesuccess, buta negative impact
on immediatedeterrence-challengers who threatenprotegeswith allies will,
on average, be more highly motivated and less deterrable.7By contrast,
informationabout the defender's commitmentto the protege that emerges
afteran initialthreatobviously cannotinfluencethe challenger'spriorbeliefs
or generaldeterrence.It would, however,be expectedto influencepositively
the likelihoodthatan immediatedeterrentthreatwould work.8This argument
is summarizedin hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis1: Measuresof the strengthof thedefender'sinterestin theproteg6
thatareavailablebeforea crisisbeginsshouldbe relatedto generaldeterrence
failure.Measuresof defenderinterest
success,but to immediatedeterrence
success.
revealedduringa crisisshouldbe relatedto immediatedeterrence
Understandinghow,by thistheory,a measureof the balanceof capabilities
will be related to immediate deterrenceis more involved. It is naturalto
suppose thatthe more the ex ante balanceof forces favors the defender,the
greaterwill be the challenger'spriorbelief thatthe defendermight be willing
to use force, for a given issue aD.9If this were the only effect of the balance
6. In the model, the equilibriumprobabilitythat the challengerwill act on its initial threat
(conditionalon a threatfollowed by mobilization)weaklyincreasesas aD/kincreases.See Fearon
(1990, 1992, chap. 4) for details.An equivalentresultemergesin a moregeneralmodel (Fearon
forthcoming-a)thatallows for an arbitrarydistributionof states'values for war:a rightwardshift
in the distributionof a state'spossible values for warincreasesthe chancethatits opponentwill
not escalate the dispute,butit also increasesthe chance thatthe opponentwill not back down if
it does choose to escalate.
7. HuthandRussett(1984) reporteda negativeeffect of allianceties on immediatedeterrence
success and gave a brief "selectioneffect" explanation.See, also, Huthand Russett(1993).
8. In the model, for example,the informationrevealedwhen the defendermobilizes lowers
the probabilitythat the challengerwill act on its threat.It can be shown that if the defender
chooses not to mobilize in responseto a threat,the challengerwill always act and the defender
will not resist (Fearon 1990, lemma 1).
9. In the model, increasingrelativecapabilitiesin favor of the defendermeans shifting the
distributionof the defender'svalues for conflict (wD)upwardwhile shifting the distributionof
challengervalues (wc) downward.
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Fearon/TEST OF A CRISISBARGAINING
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247
of forces on prior beliefs, then we would make the same predictionas for
measuresof the balanceof interests:ex anteindicatorsof relativecapabilities
shouldbe relatedto generaldeterrencesuccess,butimmediatedeterrencefailure,
while ex post indicatorsshould be relatedto immediatedeterrencesuccess.
However,priorexpectationsaboutthe balanceof forces will also influence
the interestson which challengerswill choose to threaten.For example,in the
model the probabilitythata militarilytoughdefenderwill be threatenedon an
importantissue (largeaD)is lowerthantheprobabilitythatthisdefenderwould
be challengedon an issue of lesserimportance.Intuitively,a statenot favored
by the balanceof capabilitieswill be reluctantto challenge a vital interestof
the defender.Ex antemeasuresof thebalanceof capabilitieswill thusbe related
to thestakesof a dispute,acandaD,in a waythataffectsthechancesforimmediate
deterrencesuccess. The morethe ex antebalancefavorsthe defender,the less
likely a challenge on a vital interest;hence the lower the expectationthatthe
defenderwill preferwarto concessions;hence a greaterchanceof immediate
deterrencesuccess. If the choice of issue by the challengeris endogenous,
then across cases, observable measuresof the defender's relative military
strengthwill be relatedto the success of immediatedeterrentthreats.10
Thus the ultimatepredictionis the same as thatgiven by the mainstream
hypothesis: the more the (ex ante observable)balance of forces favors the
defender, the more likely is the defender's threat to work. However, the
reasoningbehind the predictionis quite different.In the mainstreamtheory
the challengerbelatedlyrecognizes thatit has inferiormilitarycapabilities,
and so backs down. In the signaling model, issues and strategicbehavior,
ratherthanrelativecapabilitiesper se, drivethe result.The challengeris more
likely to back down when not favored by the militarybalance because it is
more likely to challenge when it is highly uncertainabout the defender's
willingness to respond,as summarizedby hypothesis2.
favorsthe defender,
Hypothesis2: Themoretheex antebalanceof capabilities
to the
willthreaten
themorechallengers
onlyonissuesof dubiousimportance
themorelikelyis a costlysignal(animmediate
defender,andin consequence,
deterrent
threat)to succeed.Ex postmeasuresof therelativemilitarystrength
10. Ideally,the choice of issue by the challengershouldbe made endogenousin the model,
ratherthan deducingthe effects of relative power on issue selection from comparativestatics.
modificationof the model given aboveis to allow the challengerto select a = aC=
An appropriate
aDin the first step of the crisis. In the case of one-sidedincompleteinformation(the defender's
value for conflict is privatelyknown), the propositiongiven in the text holds: The more the
observablebalance of capabilitiesfavors the defender,the smallerthe initial demanda by the
challenger,andthe greaterthe probabilityof immediatedeterrentsuccess. Two-sidedincomplete
informationintroducesrefinements-relatedcomplicationsthat I consider in work in progress.
For anothercrisis bargainingmodel that has the propertythat greaterrelative power by the
defenderreducesthe equilibriumdemandsmade of it, see Fearon(1992, chap. 1).
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
of the defenderrevealedduringa crisisshouldalso increasethe chanceof
deterrent
immediate
success.
So far, I have focused on the distinction between ex ante and ex post
measures of relative capabilities or interests, and how these should be
expected to influence the outcomes of the defender'sthreats.Ex ante measures,I have argued,influenceimmediatedeterrencevia theirinfluenceon the
challengingstate's priorbeliefs aboutthe defender'sresolve.
Anotherimportantinfluenceon the challenger'spriorbeliefs is the history
of relationsbetween defenderand challenger.If there was a previous crisis
betweenthe two, this implies thatthereis at least one issue betweenthem on
which both have high enough values for conflict to lead them to incur the
costs andrisks of crisis bargaining.In the equilibriumof the signalinggame,
states with the lowest values for conflict on an issue eitherdo not challenge
or do not respond with a costly signal if challenged. Thus a previous
confrontationmay reveal something about the states' private information:
regardlessof which side backeddown, the merefact thattherewas a resisted
challenge means that the states involved have higher than expected values
for conflict on some issue. It suggests, further,thatany subsequentchallenge
will be made with a higherthan usual initial belief that the defenderwould
be willing to resist."
So if we comparea set of crises between states that had no priorconflict
to a set in which the statesinvolved did have some priorconflict, we should
expect immediatedeterrenceto be less likely to workin the second set. A first
crisis revealsinformationaboutthe states'valuesforconflict,andthis implies
that a second challenge will be made with an initial belief aboutthe chance
of resistancethatis on averagehigherthanin cases withouta priorconflict.
Hypothesis3 follows.
threatswillbe less likelyto succeedin crises
deterrent
Hypothesis3: Immediate
whofacedeachotherin a previouscrisis.
betweenadversaries
A REASSESSMENT OF THE EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE ON IMMEDIATE DETERRENCE
This section uses the hypothesesandargumentsgiven above to reevaluate
Huth and Russett's (1984, 1988) data on the effects of immediatedeterrent
11. To the extentthatstatesanticipatefuturecrises with each other,the reasoninghere really
should be checked againstthe resultsof repeatedversions of the game. The one repeatedcrisis
model in the literature(Morrow 1989a) lends supportfor the argumentgiven in the text.
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Fearon / TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
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249
threatsin internationalcrises. I consider,in turn,the impactof the balanceof
capabilities,the balanceof interests,and the historyof a conflict, beginning
in each case with a review of Huth's(1988b) and HuthandRussett's (1984,
1988) empiricalfindings.
THE BALANCE OF CAPABILITIES
Huth(1988b) tests fourmeasuresfor the balanceof capabilities.Threeare
expressedas a ratioof the defender'sandprotege'sforces to the challenger's
forces: (1) the long-termbalance,measuringthe two sides' overall military
and industrialcapabilities; (2) the short-termbalance, measuringrelative
capacityto call up andmobilize troopsin the space of a few months;and (3)
the immediatebalance,measuringthe ratio of forces presentat the point of
conflict immediatelypriorto the onset of hostilities or retreatby eitherside.
The fourthmeasureis a dichotomousvariable:whetheror not the defending
state possessed nuclearweapons.
Note that the immediatebalanceis the only ex post indicatoramong the
four.The long- and short-termbalancesandthe defender'snuclearstatusare
all observableor known priorto an initial threatby the challenger.
Drawingon work by Mearsheimer(1983), Snyder(1984), Posen (1984),
andVanEvera(1984), Huth(1988b) presentsarelatively nuancedversionof
balance of capabilities theory. The core idea is the mainstreamargument
given above: "Theprobabilityof deterrencesuccess increasesas the balance
of military forces between attackerand defendershifts to the advantageof
the defender"(p. 41). Huthelaborateson this by linking specific capabilities
to specific military strategies.Following Mearsheimer(1983), he suggests
that challengers might adopt three possible approaches:a "limited aims"
strategy;a rapidoffensive attack,or blitzkrieg;or a war of attrition.
Huth hypothesizes that the long-term balance will influence the challenger's calculations concerning a possible war of attrition,whereas the
immediateand short-termbalanceswill shapeits considerationsconcerning
a blitzkriegor a limited-aimsstrategy.Further,because the consensus is that
militariespreferthe offensive-andwish strongly to avoid wars of attrition,
Huth(1988b) expects that"Theimmediateandshort-termbalanceof military
forces will have a greater impact on deterrenceoutcomes than will the
long-termbalanceof forces"(p. 41).
For the final element of the military balance-the defender's nuclear
status-Huth (1988b, 42) originallyarguedthatnuclearweapons should not
be expected to influence immediatedeterrenceoutcomes because the threat
to use them is incredible, at least for cases of extended deterrence. A
"combinationof salient political, military,and ethical questions about the
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250
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
immediate and long-term consequences of nuclear use by the defender
againsta non-nuclearpower raise seriousdoubtsas to the credibilityof such
a decision" (1988a, 428). This is a mainstreamrationalistargument:more
crediblethreatsare more likely to succeed.
In the 1988 dataanalysis, all of Huth'sexpectationsaboutthe balanceof
capabilitymeasureswere born out. Immediatedeterrenceappearedsignificantlymorelikely to succeedthe morethe immediateand short-termbalance
favored the defender.By contrast,the effects of the long-termbalance and
nuclearweaponson immediatedeterrencecould not be reliablydistinguished
from zero. In a later article,Huth (1990) alteredhis model specification to
includeinteractiveeffects andthenfoundevidencethatpossession of nuclear
weapons had a significantpositive impacton immediatedeterrencesuccess.
He explained the finding with the suggestion that, due to psychological
biases, nuclearthreatsmay be more credibleto leadersthan they rationally
ought to be (pp. 272-73).
Reassessment
The hypotheses and argumentsdrawnfrom the signaling model suggest
a differentinterpretationof these results.WhereasHuthdistinguishesamong
his measureson the basis of hypothesizedmilitaryandpolitical attributesof
the capabilities,I have arguedthatthe distinctionbetweenex anteandex post
measuresis at least as important.As in the mainstreamhypothesis,both ex
anteandex post measuresof the ratioof defenderto challengerforces should
be positively related to immediate deterrencesuccess. But the proposed
mechanismdiffers.An ex post measuresuch as the immediatebalance-the
local balance of forces afterthe defenderhas respondedto the challenger's
initial threat-reflects new informationabout the defender'swillingness to
resist and also how effectively it would be able to resist. By contrast,ex ante
measures such as the long- and short-termbalances and the defender's
nuclearstatus will be relatedto immediatedeterrencesuccess because they
will act as proxiesfor thechallenger'sinitialbeliefs aboutthe defender.When
any of these balances strongly favors the defender,threatswill most often
have been made with the initial belief that the defenderwas probablynot
willing to use force on the issue. Hence a costly signal in response will be
comparativelylikely to succeed.
Evidence for this latterinterpretationcan be seen by looking at how the
short-termbalancevariabledivides up the cases in HuthandRussett's(1988)
sample. This variable is constructedas a ratio of mobilization capacities,
based on the states'"standinggroundand airforces andfirst class of trained
reserves"(Huth 1988a, 432). Table 1 lists the set of cases in which the ratio
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Fearon/TEST OF A CRISISBARGAINING
MODEL
251
TABLE 1
Cases For Which the Ratio of Short-Term
MobilizationCapacitiesIs above Average(in favor of the defender)
Year
Challenger
2
3
5
9
18
20
25
28
39
41
42
43
47
51
52
1885-1886
1886
1897
1903-1904
1913
1913
1921
1935-1936
1950
1957
1961
1961
1964-1965
1970
1971
Bulgaria
Greece
Greece
Columbia
Rumania
Serbia
Panama
Japan
United States
Turkey
Iraq
NorthVietnam
NorthVietnam
Syria
India
54
55
56
58
1975
1975
1977
1983
Morocco
Guatemala
Guatemala
Libya
Case
Protege
Serbia
Turkey
Crete
Panama
Bulgaria
Albania
Costa Rica
Mongolia
NorthKorea
Syria
Kuwait
Laos
S. Vietnam
Jordan
Kashmir
(Pakistan)
W. Sahara
Belize
Belize
Chad
Defender
Outcome
Austria-Hungary
Britain
Britain/Turkey
United States
Russia
Austria-Hungary
United States
Soviet Union
China
Soviet Union
Britain
United States
United States
Israel
China
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Success
Success
Spain
Britain
Britain
France
Failure
Success
Success
Success
is above averagefor the sample (thus in favor of the defender),along with
the deterrenceoutcome.
It is striking-although, on reflection, unsurprising-that the defenders
in this list are predominantlymajor powers whereas the challengers are
predominantlyminorpowers. For the whole dataset, the short-termbalance
is above average for 15 of the 20 minor-majorcrises (75%), whereas it is
above averagefor only 4 of the 38 remainingcases (11%).12
12. In a minor-majorcrisis, the challengeris a minorpower andthe defendera majorpower.
I have used Singer and Small's (1972, 23) designations,which were given for 1816-1965. If
these areextendedto the present,the majorpowerssince 1885 are:Austria-Hungary,1885-1918;
Britain,1885 on; China,1949 on; France1885-1940, 1945 on; Germany1885-1918,1925-1945;
Italy 1885-1943; Japan 1895-1945; Russia/Soviet Union 1885-1917, 1922 on; United States
1898 on. Werethe list updated,clearlyJapanand Germanyshouldrecovermajorpowerrankby
some point in the 1970s or 1980s. This is immaterialfor the studybecause neitherhas recently
been involved in an extended immediate deterrence crisis. One could argue about Japan
startingat 1895 ratherthan 1904; Italy being included at all; and perhapsChina, Britain, and
France after 1945. But changingany of these would not materiallyaffectthe results.Essentially,
these designations provide a crude index of military power and reputation,which is what is
needed.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
In addition,note thatthe list in Table1 containsa high proportionof cases
in which a minorpower threatenssome overseas interestof a majorpower,
aboutwhich thereis roomfor considerableuncertaintyconcerningthe major
power's willingness to defend with force. A few examples:Iraqfirst overtly
threatens Kuwait in 1961, shortly after Kuwaiti independence had been
negotiatedfrom Britain.Libya threatensto intervenea second time in Chad
in 1983, in the wake of French military withdrawalfrom the country in
1979-1980 and a French decision not to resist the first Libyan advance in
1981. TurkeythreatensSyria in 1957 following governmentalshifts within
Syria thatled to increasedcooperationwith the Soviet Union; the extent of
military support the latter would give Syria in a crisis had to be quite
uncertain,given thatthis was a recentlychangedrelationship.Newly elected,
Kennedy'swillingness to providearmedsupportfor the Laotiangovernment
againstthe PathetLao and NorthVietnamwas similarlyuncertain,ex ante.
Thinkingaboutthe cases on the list suggests that the short-termbalance
is separatingout a set in which observablyweakerchallengersare making
limited probes, highly uncertainabouta more powerful defender'swillingness to use force. If so, thenthe defender'simmediatedeterrentthreatis more
likely to succeed in these cases not because of ex ante misperceptionof the
defender'sabilityto blunta rapidoffensive, butratherdue to the challenger's
prior expectationsconcerningthe defender'sresponse. The short-termbalance may be proxying for initial beliefs aboutthe defender'swillingness to
use force on the issue.
Examining how deterrenceoutcomes vary with minor-majorstatus of
challengerand defenderreveals a strikingpatternconsistent with this argument. The set of minor-majorcases-challenger is a minorpower, defender
is a majorpower-is listed along with the effect of the defender'sthreatin
Table 2. Here we see even more clearly a set dominatedby limited probes
made when the challenging minor power was quite uncertain about the
defender'sresolve on the specific issue. For example, this list picks up two
relatively opportunisticventures by Turkey (1906 and 1922) and two by
Serbia (1908 and 1912) in which the short-termbalance variableis below
average.13
At the same time, immediatedeterrencesucceeded in 18 out of the 20
minor-majorconflicts (90%), as compared with 16 out of the other 34
major-major,minor-minor,and major-minordisputes (47%). This distribution would arise purely by chance in less than 1 out of 1,000 samples (chi
13. On the cases involvingSerbia,forexample,Lebow andStein(1990a) arguethatin neither
did Serbian officials have any "serious intention"of going to war, but ratherchallenged in
the hope of attractingdiplomatic,and particularlyRussian,supportfor their demands(pp. 31,
35-36).
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253
TABLE2
Extended Immediate Deterrence Crises In Which the
Challenger Is a Minor Power and the Defender Is a Major Power
Case
Year
Challenger
2
3
5
9
12
13
17
18
20
25
26
41
42
43
46
47
52
1885-1886
1886
1897
1903-1904
1906
1908-1909
1912-1913
1913
1913
1921
1922
1957
1961
1961
1964-1965
1964-1965
1971
Bulgaria
Greece
Greece
Columbia
Turkey
Serbia/Russia
Serbia/Russia
Rumania
Serbia
Panama
Turkey
Turkey
Iraq
NorthVietnam
Indonesia
NorthVietnam
India
55
56
58
1975
1977
1983
Guatemala
Guatemala
Libya
Protege
Serbia
Turkey
Crete
Panama
Egypt
Austria-Hun.
Austria-Hun.
Bulgaria
Albania
Costa Rica
Greece
Syria
Kuwait
Laos
Malaysia
S. Vietnam
Kashmir
(Pakistan)
Belize
Belize
Chad
Defender
Outcome
Austria-Hungary
Britain
Britain/Turkey
United States
Britain
Germany
Germany
Russia
Austria-Hungary
United States
Britain
Soviet Union
Britain
United States
Britain
United States
China
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Failure
Success
Britain
Britain
France
Success
Success
Success
square is 12.4). Moreover, minor-major status is more strongly correlated
with immediate deterrence success than either the long-term balance or the
short-term balance and remains the only significant variable in a logistic
regression with deterrence outcome as the dependent variable, including the
other military balance variables as independent variables.
The empirical pattern is striking: over the past 100 years, extended
immediate deterrence almost always worked when applied by a major against
a minor power. To explain this pattern as the result of consistent ex ante
misperception of the relevant military balance by minor power challengers
is possible, but implausible. It requires us to believe that minor power
challengers systematically fail to recognize that their major power adversaries possess superior forces and then suddenly realize this fact after the
defender responds.
If this were the explanation, then we might also find a set of cases in which
minor powers resist challenges by major powers. Systematic misperception
should lead some minor powers to resist threats in which they subsequently
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254
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
realize they will have to acquiesce. But despite the fact that majorpowers
have much moreactive foreignpolicies thanminorpowers, thereis only one
major-minordisputein the dataset.14
Turningto the effect of nuclearweaponson immediatedeterrence,we find
a sharperdifferencebetweenthe two theories.Hypothesis 1 predictsthat as
an ex ante indicator,possession of nuclearweapons by the defendershould
be relatedto immediatedeterrencesuccess. As with the short-termbalance,
a nuclear-armedstatewill tend not to be threatenedon issues known to be of
majorimportanceto it; thus we shouldfind nuclear-armeddefenders'immediate deterrentthreatsworkingmore often. By contrast,Huth (1988b) originally arguedthat possession of nuclearweapons will not make immediate
deterrencemore likely to work because the nuclearthreatwill be incredible
in most extendeddeterrencecrises.
Huth's empiricalresults appearedat first glance to supporthis original
hypothesis. When included in his "most powerful equation," a dummy
variablecoded 1 when the defenderhas nuclearweapons is not statistically
significantat the .05 level used as a cut-off (Table3).15
Note, however, that the estimatedeffect of having nuclear weapons is
positive andrespectablylarge.The nuclearvariablewas discardedessentially
because the standarderrorof its coefficient is also somewhatlarge-there is
a slightly less than one-in-five chance that a coefficient of this size would
appearif in fact nuclearweapons had no effect on immediatedeterrence.
It is not hard to see why this standarderroris as large as it is: nuclear
weaponsexisted only after 1944 and were possessed by the defenderin only
15 of the 58 cases in the sample.Because the dummyvariabledoes not vary
much, logistic regression produces an unbiased but relatively uncertain
estimate.In essence, in the 1988 analysisHuthdiscardedthe nuclearweapons
variablefor lack of informationratherthan evidence that nuclearweapons
do not affect immediatedeterrence.
What evidence there is supportsthe hypothesis that there is a positive
relationship.16Because nuclear weapons were simply not available before
1945, it seems reasonableto focus on the postwarcases. In this set (N = 24),
14. And this dispute is a 1911 conflict between Italy and Turkey-one can reasonably
questionItaly's majorpower statusat this time.
Minorpower leadersmay tend to have lower domestic political audiencecosts for backing
out of a crisis (Fearon 1992, forthcoming-a).If so, then this may be anotherreasonfor the high
rateof immediatedeterrencesuccess when appliedby majoragainstminorpowers.In the model,
if minorpower signalingcosts arelow, opportunisticchallengesaremadeworthwhileeven given
initialbeliefs aboutthe likelihoodof resistancethatwould lead a statewith higheraudiencecosts
to shy away.
15. The definitionof severalof the controlvariablesin this equationwill be discussedbelow.
16. As notedabove, Huthreachesthis sameconclusionvia a differentroutein his 1990 paper.
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TABLE3
Logit Equationfor the Effect of the Defender'sNuclear
Statuson ImmediateDeterrenceOutcome(1 = success, 0 = failure)
IndependentVariable
Nuclear defender
Immediatebalance
Short-termbalance
Tit-for-tat
Firm-but-flexible
Diplomaticdefeat
Diplomaticput-down
Constant
N=58
Log likelihood = -22.24 (6 df)
Coefficient
1.36
1.28
1.76
1.59
1.85
-2.12
-1.31
-3.78
StandardError
1.00
.63
.80
.84
.91
1.30
.88
defender'snuclearstatusis more stronglycorrelatedwith immediatedeterrence success than any other variable in Huth's preferredequation. The
bivariatecorrelationswith the dependentvariableare nuclearweapons, .57;
immediate balance, .08; short-termbalance, .34; tit-for-tat,.07; firm-butflexible, .44; diplomaticdefeat,-.08; diplomaticput-down,-.29.17
To get a sense of whatlies behindthe relativelystrongcorrelationbetween
nuclearstatusand immediatedeterrence,it is helpfulto look more directlyat
the postwar cases. In these, immediatedeterrenceworked 80% of the time
when defendershad nuclearweapons (12 of 15) and only 22% of the time
when they did not (2 of 9 cases; this distributionwould arise by chance in
less than 1 out of 100 samples).
Table 4 lists the postwar cases and results of the defender's threat,
accordingto the defender'snuclearstatus.Comparingthe nuclearand nonnuclearsets reveals a fairly clear difference.When the defenderhad nuclear
weapons, challenges tended to be probes on peripheraland often far-away
interests.For example, in only 1 of 15 cases did a nucleardefendershare a
common borderwith the threatenedprotege.By contrast,when the defender
did not have nuclearweapons, crises more often concernedissues expected
to be importantto challenger and defender alike. In 5 out of the 9 cases,
nonnucleardefenderswere contiguouswith the threatenedprotege.
Diplomatichistoricalworkon these crises would also seem to supportthe
view thatchallenges to protegesof nucleardefenderswere rarelymade with
17. The same results can be seen in logistic regression of deterrenceoutcome on these
variables:the dummyvariablefor nuclearstatushas the largestcoefficientandthe largestt ratio.
However, because thereare so few data,none of the coefficients are significantat the .10 level.
(It is somewhatreassuringthatthe estimatedeffects are not very unstable.)
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE4
Post-WorldWarII Cases of ExtendedImmediate
DeterrenceListed by NuclearStatusof the Defender
Case
Year
Challenger
Protege
Defender
35
36
37
38
40
1946
1946
1948
1950
1954-1955
41
42
43
46
47
52
1957
1961
1961
1964-1965
1964-1965
1971
55
56
57
58
1975
1977
1979
1983
Defenderhas nuclearweapons
Soviet Union
Iran
United States
Soviet Union
United States
Turkey
Soviet Union
WestBerlin
United States
China
Taiwan
United States
China
United States
QuemoyMatsu
Soviet Union
Turkey
Syria
Kuwait
Britain
Iraq
NorthVietnam
Laos
United States
Indonesia
Britain
Malaysia
NorthVietnam
S. Vietnam
United States
India
Kashmir
China
(Pakistan)
Belize
Guatemala
Britain
Guatemala
Belize
Britain
China
Soviet Union
Vietnam
Chad
France
Libya
39
44
45
48
49
50
51
53
54
1950
1961
1961-1962
1964-1965
1967
1967
1970
1974
1975
Defenderdoes not have nuclearweapons
China
United States
NorthKorea
India
Goa
Portugal
Netherlands
Indonesia
WestIrian
China
United States
N. Vietnam
Israel
Syria
Egypt
Greece
Turkey
Cyprus
Jordan
Israel
Syria
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey
W. Sahara
Morocco
Spain
Outcome
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Failure
Success
Success
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Failure
Failure
Success
Failure
Failure
Success
Failure
Failure
much expectation of forcible resistance. For example, the first three nuclear
cases are well-studied crises of the cold war-Soviet probes in the immediate
postwar years (Iran 1945-1946, Turkey 1946, West Berlin 1948). Although
analysts differ on whether Stalin's aims were primarily offensive or defensive, most agree that these challenges were judged relatively safe because
they were on issues of uncertain and possibly low import for the (initially
demobilizing) United States (for example, George and Smoke 1974 on Berlin
1948). The only nuclear cases for which evidence suggests the challenger
expected military resistance to be likely are North Vietnam's threat to the
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South, with the United States as defender,and possibly Guatemala'ssecond
challenge to Britainover Belize in 1977. By contrast,in at least six of the
nine nonnuclearcases, historical evidence suggests the challenger began
expecting resistanceto be eitherfairly or quite likely.'8
To summarize,although there are not many data, what data there are
suggest ratherstrongly that immediatedeterrentthreatsare more likely to
work when the defender possesses nuclear weapons. In one sense this is
counterintuitive.If we considerthe cases in Table4, we find at most two in
which thereis any possibility thata nuclearthreatby the defenderpersuaded
to the challengerto backoff (BerlinandQuemoy-Matsu;Betts 1987). So how
could it be thatnuclearweaponsaffect the likelihoodof immediatedeterrent
success? This initially intuitiveargumentmisses the strategicconsequences
of the fact that challengersselect themselves accordingto theirpriorbeliefs
about the defender's willingness to resist. Immediatedeterrentthreats by
nuclearstates are comparativelylikely to work because such states are less
likely to have been challengedon issues expectedto be of majorimportance
to them.
THE BALANCE OF INTERESTS AND THE EFFECTS OF THREATS
To gauge the effect of the balance of interestson immediatedeterrence
success, Huth(1988b) employs six measures.These areall ex anteindicators,
observable by the states prior to the challenger's initial threat. Three are
arguedto reflectthe strengthof the defender'stie to the protegestate:whether
defenderandprotegehave a militaryalliance;the level of armstransfersfrom
defender to protege; and the level of foreign trade between them. Huth
hypothesizesthatthe presenceof an alliance,more armstransfers,and more
tradeshouldeachbe associatedwith a greaterchanceof immediatedeterrence
success (pp. 44-46).
'Ihree other measuresare said to reflect the strengthof the challenger's
interestin the protege: whetherchallengerand prot6geare contiguous; the
populationof the protege; and whetherthe prot6geis a source of strategic
raw materialsfor the challenger.Contiguity,a largerpopulation,and source
of strategic materialsare all predictedto make immediatedeterrenceless
likely to succeed because the challenger is argued in each case to have a
greaterinterestin controlof the prot6ge(Huth 1988b, 46-48).19
18. See citationsand discussion in Fearon(1992, chap. 6).
19. At least by the argumentsgiven in Huth(1988b), it is not clearwhy we shouldnotexpect
thatthese variableswould be equallyvalid as measuresof the defender'sinterestin the protege.
More generally,the criteriafor selecting which interestmeasuresshould apply to the defender
and which to the challengerare unclear.
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
In contrastto the balanceof capabilityvariables,Huth'sdataanalysisdoes
not supportprior expectations concerning the ex ante balance of interest
variables. None of the six measures has an effect on the likelihood of
immediatedeterrencesuccess thatcan be reliably distinguishedfrom zero.
This contrastswith the resultsof HuthandRussett's(1984) first study,in
which some of the relative interest variableswere found to be statistically
significant. Huth (1988b) conjecturesthat the inclusion of new indicators
measuringthe defender's bargainingbehaviorrendersthe ex ante interest
variables insignificant (p. 83). The suggestion is that how the defender
respondsto the challenge is probablya more reliable signal of interestthan
an indirectmeasuresuch as tradeor armstransfers.Huth'stwo measuresof
defenderbargainingbehaviorarebothstronglyrelatedto immediatedeterrent
success. These comprise a variablecoded 1 when the defender adopted a
tit-for-tatmilitaryresponse to the challenger,and a variablecoded 1 when
the defender'sdiplomaticposturewas firm-but-flexibleratherthanbullying
or conciliatory.Note thatfromthe perspectivedevelopedhere,these areboth
ex post measuresof defenderinterestin the protege(they arenot knownprior
to the challenger'sthreat).
Reassessment
The signaling theory agrees with the mainstreamhypothesis concerning
ex post measuresof defenderinterestin the protege:if the use of tit-for-tat
militaryresponsesand/ora firm-but-flexiblediplomaticposturereveals new
informationaboutthe defender'slevel of interest,these measuresshould be
relatedto immediatedeterrencesuccess, as they arein this dataset (see Maoz
1983 for similarresults using a differentdataset).
Predictionsdiffer, however, concerningthe ex ante measures.Whereas
mainstreamrationalistargumentssee no reasonto treatex ante and ex post
interest measures differently, the signaling theory suggests that ex ante
measuresof the defender'scommitmentto the protege should be relatedto
generaldeterrencesuccess, but immediatedeterrencefailure(hypothesis 1).
More generally, the signaling theory implies (1) any measure of the defender'sinterestin the protegethatpredictsthatthe defenderwould actually
fight should be relatedto immediatedeterrencefailure,and (2) any measure
of the defender'sinterestthat predictsthe defenderwill not fight should be
relatedto immediatedeterrencesuccess.
Whatevidence thereis tendsto supportthese two hypotheses-although,
as in the case of nuclearweapons, thereare not many data,and thereis also
one anomalousfinding.
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To see this, considerfirstthatif an ex antemeasureof the defender'slevel
of interestin the protegeis a good one, it oughtto predictwhetherthe defender
will fighton behalfof the protge6.Thuswe can empiricallyevaluatebalanceof
interestmeasuresby examiningwhetherthey predictthe use of force by the
defenderin the set of cases where immediatedeterrencefailed. For this set,
Table5 reportsbivariatecorrelationsbetweenthe defender'sdecision to fight
(1 = fight, 0 = back down) and Huth'sthreemeasuresof the defender'slevel
of interestin the prot6ge(presenceof an alliance,level of trade,level of arms
transfers).As in HuthandRussett(1988),I havealso includeda fourthmeasure,
called contiguity,which is coded 1 when defenderandprotegearecontiguous
states or are separatedby a shortstretchof waterand is coded 0 otherwise.
With the notableexception of armstransfers,the measuresare positively
correlatedwith the defender's decision to fight, as one would expect and
hope. The signaling theorypredictsthatthese signs should all reversewhen
the same variablesarecorrelatedwith the immediatedeterrenceoutcome(the
challenger's decision to back off or press aheadwith its threat).An ex ante
measurethat predictsthe defender'sdecision to fight (not fight) should be
relatedto immediatedeterrencefailure(success).
Table6 reportsthese correlationsbetween the four measuresof defender
interestin the protege and immediatedeterrenceoutcome (1 = success, 0 =
failure). The predictedreversals occur for three of the variables (alliance,
arms, and contiguity), whereas the sign moves toward zero for the fourth
(trade).Exceptingthe tradevariable,these signs remainthe same in the fully
specified logit model with immediatedeterrenceoutcome as the dependent
variable(Table7).
To summarizethese resultsverbally,the predictedsign reversalsoccurfor
threeof the fourmeasures.Two of these threeinterestmeasuresarepositively
related to the defender's decision to fight but negatively affect immediate
deterrence.Immediatedeterrenceis significantly less likely to work when
protege and defenderhave an alliance,and the same appearstrueif defender
and protege are geographicallyclose, althoughthe level of statisticalconfidence is lower.
The thirdvariable,armstransfersto the protege, is relatedto immediate
deterrencesuccess at the same time as it predictsthat the defenderwill not
fight. This is as anticipatedby the theory:if defendersare less likely to be
willing to resist with force in the cases where arms transfersare relatively
high, then we should observe more opportunisticchallenges in these cases
(i.e., challengers with lower values for wc on average), and thus more
successful immediate deterrentthreats. The puzzle is why higher arms
transfersarerelatedto decisions notto fightfor theprotege.The smallnumber
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260
JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE5
Correlationof InterestMeasureswith
Defender's Decision to Fight for the Protege(N = 24)
Measureof DefenderInterestin Protege
R (with decision tofight)
Alliance (1 = alliance,0 = none)
Contiguity(1 = close, 0 = not)
Trade(percentageof all tradefor defender)
Arms (percentageof all deliveredto prot6g6)
.17
.44
.45
-.20
TABLE6
Correlationof InterestMeasures
with ImmediateDeterrenceOutcomes(N = 58)
DefenderInterestin Protege
Alliance (1 = alliance, 0 = none)
Contiguity(1 = close, 0 = not)
Trade(percentageof all tradefor defender
Arms (percentageof all deliveredto prot6g6
R (with immediatedeterrencesuccess)
--.12
-.17
.02
.14
of cases makes speculationhazardous,but it could be that arms transfers
sometimes act as a low-cost substitutefor a more serious commitmentin
cases where, for other reasons, the defenderwould be reluctantactually to
fight. Forexample,the Portuguesedecision not to fightIndiafor Goa in 1961,
the Spanishdecision not to supportthe break-awaySaharanrepublicagainst
Morocco in 1975, and the Soviet decision not to fight with Vietnamagainst
Chinain 1979 may fit this pattern(in each instancepriorarmstransferlevels
were quite high).
Finally, the fact that the level of trade between defender and protege
predicts both the decision to fight and immediate deterrence success is
anomalous from the perspectiveof the signaling model. If not a statistical
accident, this finding appearsas evidence of systematic misperceptionby
challengingstates:they apparentlyare not making use of the fact that trade
ties between defender and prot6ge predict that the defender will in fact
supportthe protegemilitarily.20
is thatall of these measures(alliance,trade,
20. My only reservationaboutthis interpretation
arms transfers,contiguity) are incredibly crude and noisy comparedto the specific ex ante
informationavailableto state leadersin each particularcase. I would expect that such specific
informationwould in every case allow a sharperestimateof the defender'sresponsethanwould
a regression formula using these crude measures. Thus, even though I would not be at all
surprisedif systematicmisperceptionalong these lines did occur,I would be surprisedif it were
picked up by such crudemeasures.
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Fearon/ TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
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TABLE7
Logit Equationfor the Effect of Balance of InterestVariables
on ImmediateDeterrenceOutcome(1 = success, 0 = failure)(N = 58)
IndependentVariable
Variablesmeasuringdefender
interestin prot6eg
Alliance
Contiguity
Trade
Arms
Controlvariables
Immediatebalance
Minor-major
Tit-for-tat
Firm-but-flexible
Past crisis
Constant
Log likelihood = -17.07 (9 df)
Coefficient
StandardError
-7.27
-2.11
.98
.41
3.33
1.75
.45
.19
.61
4.32
4.41
3.09
-2.72
-2.80
.76
1.84
2.17
1.43
1.34
BARGAINING BEHAVIOR OF THE DEFENDER IN PRIOR CRISES
Huth's(1988b) final set of independentvariablesdescribesthe defender's
bargainingbehavior in past confrontations,which are used to address an
interestingand much debatedquestionaboutthe role of a state's bargaining
reputationin crises:do challengersdrawany significantinferencesaboutthe
defender's resolve from how the defenderacted in previous confrontations
with the challengeror with otherstates?
Huth (1988b) uses three dummy variables to measure the defender's
behavior in past crises. One is coded 1 if the defender bullied its earlier
opponentinto backingdown (diplomaticput-down).A second is coded 1 if
the defender"retreat[ed]underpressureandconced[ed]on the criticalissues
in orderto avoid a directmilitaryconfrontation"(diplomaticdefeat).A third
is coded 1 if the defender and challenger reached a stalemate, in which
"firm-but-flexiblebargainingby the defender[failed]to reachan agreement
which resolves the underlyingissues" (pp. 69-70). Eachof these is coded for
both the defender's last confrontationwith any challenger and for its last
confrontationwith the currentchallenger,if one occurred.
Huth offers two hypothesesconcerningthese variables.First, following
Jervis's(1976, 239) argumentthatstateleadersaremoreinfluencedby events
that they experience firsthand,he proposes that "The past behavior of the
defenderin confrontationsin whichthecurrentattackerwas directlyinvolved
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
will have a greaterimpacton deterrenceoutcomesthanin cases in which the
currentattackerwas not directlyinvolved"(1988b, 55).
Second, concerning past encounters with the currentchallenger, Huth
argues that diplomaticput-downs and diplomaticdefeats (defenderbullied
or caved in) should be related to immediate deterrencefailure, whereas
stalemates produced by firm-but-flexiblebargainingshould be related to
successful immediatedeterrencein the later crisis. For put-downs,the idea
is thatthe challengerwill be left unhappywith the statusquo, anddetermined
to protect its bargainingreputationand avoid another retreat before the
defender.For diplomatic defeats, Huth (1988b) argues that, as apparently
happenedfor Britainand FranceafterMunich,backingdown "weakensthe
defender'sfuturecredibility,"makingthe challengermorelikely to disregard
future threats. For stalemates, Huth simply conjectures that a record of
firm-but-flexible bargaining will stand the defender in good stead in a
subsequentcrisis (p. 55).
In sum, Hutharguesthatvariablesmeasuringthe defender'spast bargaining behaviorwill allow at least a partialempiricaltest of a contentiousissue
in the field of securitystudies-how importantis reputation?He hypothesizes
will matterless thanSchelling(1966) andothers
considerations
thatreputational
have suggested, but will nonetheless play a role in determiningboth the
motivationof challengerandthe inferencesit drawsfroma defender'sthreats.
On balance, the empiricalresults appearto supportthe hypotheses. Past
behavior mattersonly when the earlier conflict involved the currentchallenger.And when the defenderhad eitherbullied the challengeror caved in
to its demands,immediatedeterrencewas significantlyless likely to work.
However,the dataprovideno supportfor the hypothesesthatstalematesand
a record of firm-but-flexiblebargainingwill improve one's chances for
dissuadinga challengerin subsequentencounters.
Reassessment
A closer look at how these results emerge calls this interpretationinto
doubt.Considerthe propositionthathow the defenderbargainedin its most
recent conflict with the currentchallenger matters.Huth assesses this by
looking at the relationshipbetween immediatedeterrenceoutcomes and the
dummy variablefor each of the three broadstyles of bargainingand crisis
outcomes he identifies: diplomaticput-down (bullying); diplomaticdefeat
(highly conciliatory); and stalemate (firm-but-flexiblebargainingby the
defender).Eachvariableis coded 1 if thedefenderused this style in aprevious
crisis with the same challenger.It is coded 0 if either (1) there was a past
confrontationbut the defenderused one of the other styles, or (2) therewas
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Fearon / TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
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no past confrontationbetweenthe challengeranddefenderin question.Thus
there is a set of cases in the data set that are coded 0 for all three dummy
variables-these arethe cases for which therewas no previousconfrontation
between defenderand challenger.
When the three variablesare included with Huth's other preferredindependent variables,the logit results reportedin Table 8 appear.Note that all
three bargaining styles/past crisis outcomes have a negative impact on
immediatedeterrence(althoughthe estimatedeffect of stalemateis only a bit
more thanone standarddeviationfromzero). The reasonbecomes clearwith
a little thought.The effect of these variablesis negativerelativeto the cases
in the excluded category-that is, relativeto the cases in which therewas no
previous crisis between defenderand challenger.It follows that the correct
interpretationof the significantnegativecoefficientsfor diplomaticput-down
and diplomaticdefeat is not thathow the defenderbargainedor the outcome
of the last crisis matters. Rather,these coefficients indicate simply that,
comparedto cases with no priorconflict,immediatedeterrencewas less likely
to work when there was a prior crisis and one of these bargainingstyles/
outcomes obtained.
The appropriateway to test if the defender'sbargainingstyle in the last
crisis mattersis to ask whetherthereare significantdifferencesbetween the
coefficients for the three dummy variables. Do the data allow us to reject
the hypothesis that bullying, conciliatory,or firm-but-flexiblestrategiesall
have the same effect on the chancethatthe defender'sthreatwill workin the
currentcrisis?The appropriatestatisticaltest is an Ftest of the null hypothesis
thatthe threecoefficientsarethe same.Whenapplied,this indicatesthatthere
is abouta one-in-threechance thatcoefficients this differentwould appearif
the null hypothesis were correct.So the datareally do not allow us to reject
the possibility that it does not matterhow the defenderbargainedor what
outcome resultedin its last confrontation.It may matter,but the datado not
provide firm evidence.
What the data do suggest is that it matters whether the defender and
challenger had a previous crisis encounter,consistent with hypothesis 3
above. Immediatedeterrencefailed in only 2 of the 18 cases wheretherewas
no prior crisis between defenderand challenger(11%), as opposed to 18 of
the 40 cases with a history (45%). If we construct a new independent
variable-past crisis, coded 1 when therewas a priorcrisis betweendefender
andchallenger,and0 otherwise-we find thatit has a significantindependent
effect on immediate deterrencefailure, as seen in the logistic regression
reported in Table 9.21
21. Theresultsdo notchangeif we includeallof theindependentvariablesforwhichthisanalysis
has found a theoreticaland/orempiricalrationalefor inclusion (see Fearon 1992, chap. 6).
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE8
Logit Equationfor the Effect of Defender'sPast Behavior
on ImmediateDeterrenceOutcome(1 = success, 0 = failure) (N = 58)
IndependentVariable
Variablesmeasuringpast
bargainingbehavior
Diplomaticput-down
Stalemate
Diplomaticdefeat
Controlvariables
Immediatebalance
Short-termbalance
Tit-for-tat
Firm-but-flexible
Constant
Log likelihood= -22.57 (7 df)
Coefficient
StandardError
-2.32
-1.21
-3.01
1.12
1.09
1.44
1.08
1.59
1.56
1.97
-2.34
.54
.77
.83
.91
This empiricalpatternis more plausibly explained by selection effects
producedby strategicbehaviorthanby considerationsof bargainingreputation. The fact thatthe defenderwas willing to resist or challengeon the same
(or a related) issue in the past is an ex ante indicator of the defender's
willingness to use force (relativelyhigh wD in the model). As such, a previous
crisis implies, for a subsequentcrisis, a greaterinitialbelief thatthe defender
might resist, and hence a lower chanceimmediatedeterrencewill succeed.
What is slightly counterintuitivehere is that regardlessof how the defender acted or the outcome of the previouscrisis, challengers'priorbeliefs
shouldon averagebe less optimisticin the set of cases withpreviousconflicts
than in the set without. Thus, even when the defender "caved in" in the
previous crisis, any subsequentchallenge will be made with an initial belief
higher(on average)thanfor cases with no priorcrisis. This is a consequence
of costly signaling and the propertiesof equilibriumin the model. The fact
that a state was willing to try resistance,even if it ultimatelymade concessions, reveals a higher willingness to use force on the issue than if the state
had not resistedat all (andno crisis hadoccurred).In otherwords,regardless
of the outcome, the fact that a past crisis occurredsuggests that there is at
least one issue on which both states have higher than normal values for
conflict. In turn,this implies that a subsequentchallenge will be made with
a higherinitialbelief aboutthe defender'swillingnessto resist,which implies
thatimmediatedeterrencewill be less likely to work.22
22. Again, this argumentshouldbe checkedwith a repeatedversion of the crisis game.
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TABLE9
Logit Equationfor Effect of Defender'sPast Behavioron Immediate
Deterrence(1 = success, 0 = failure):An AlternativeInterpretation(N = 58)
IndependentVariable
Past crisis
Immediatebalance
Minor-major
Tit-for-tat
Firm-but-flexible
Constant
Log likelihood= -23.47 (5 df)
Coefficient
-1.91
.86
2.29
1.56
1.38
-1.04
StandardError
.97
.48
1.00
.77
.77
In sum, the empiricalrelationshipobserved in the cases is not between
immediatedeterrenceandthe defender'sbargainingbehaviorin its last crisis
with the currentchallenger.Althoughit may be true,the datado not provide
significantsupportfor the hypothesisthatbullying the challengermakes the
state more eager to defend its "bargainingreputation"the next time around,
or that being highly conciliatory leads the challenger to discredit the defender's threats in subsequent crises. Rather, the empirical relationship
measuredby the past behaviorvariablesis between the fact of therehaving
been a previouscrisis andsubsequentimmediatedeterrencefailure.Strategic
dynamics arisingfrom costly signalingmay explain this relationship.
This argumentcasts a somewhatdifferentlight on theremainingfindingthat immediate deterrenceis unaffectedby how the defenderbargainedin
past crises with states other than the currentchallenger.This result does
indeed undercuta strongclaim aboutchallengers'perceptionsof the interdependence of commitments.If potentialchallengersdrew strong inferences
aboutan adversary'sresolve fromits behaviorin unrelatedconflicts, then we
might well expect an effect of such behavioron immediatedeterrence.
However,if thereis no clearlink between immediatedeterrenceand how
the defenderbargainedin a past crisis with the same challenger,then it is not
at all surprisingthatcrises with otherstateshave no apparentinfluence.Based
on the precedingdata analysis, I would arguethatthe key to understanding
variationacross cases in immediatedeterrenceoutcomes is each side's prior
expectations about the importanceto the other side of the issues at stake.
Relative power variablesappearto matter,for example, but theireffects are
mediatedby strategicchoices concerningthe issues in dispute.If most of the
action concerns the natureof the issues between challenger and defender,
then even if states do sometimes draw inferences about an adversaryby its
behavior in other confrontations,such behavior may have little value for
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JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
explaining variation in immediate deterrence outcomes in an aggregate
analysis.
CONCLUSION
This articlehas examinedthe questionof how relativemilitarycapabilities
and relative political interestsinfluence the efficacy of threatsmade during
internationaldisputes. I have contrastedsome widely accepted rationalist
claims-namely, threats are more likely to work when the threateneris
favored by the balance of capabilities or interests-with the results of a
strategicallyrichergame-theoreticanalysis. I hope to have shown how this
second approachprovides more compelling explanationsfor observed empirical regularitiesand also enables the discovery and explanationof new
patternsin the data.
To summarize,Huth's (1988b) interpretationof evidence, guided for the
most part by mainstreambalance of capabilities and balance of interests
arguments,yielded the following conclusions:
threatsaremorelikelyto workwhenthedefenderhas
deterrent
1. Immediate
theabilityto blunta rapidoffensiveattack.
deterrence.
2. Possessionof nuclearweaponshasno influenceon immediate
of thedefender'slevel of interestin a threatened
3. Ex anteindicators
protege
state do not appearto influencepositivelythe prospectsfor immediate
to expectations.
deterrence,
contrary
in theirmostrecent
established
anddefender
4. Challenger
bargaining
reputations,
success.
deterrence
influencetheprospectsforimmediate
pastconfrontation,
When the dataare analyzedin light of the equilibriumresults sketchedin
the second section, a differentset of conclusions emerges:
1. Althoughthecapacitytoblunta rapidoffensivemaymakegeneraldeterrence
is notdue
deterrence
effectonimmediate
morelikelyto succeed,its apparent
of thebalance.Rather,whenthedefenderis
to thespecificmilitaryattributes
on issueson whicha concerted
tendto threaten
relativelystrong,challengers
hencea costlysignalin response
responseby thedefenderis quiteuncertain;
is likelyto work.
2. Possessionof nuclearweaponsdoes appearto be relatedto immediate
but
havefearednuclearescalation
deterrence
success,notbecausechallengers
againbecauseof selectioneffects.Statesareunlikelyto challengenuclear
will
to them.Instead,challengers
powerson issuesperceivedto be important
nuclearpowersoverissueson whicha concerted
tendto threaten
responseby
andhencea costlysignalin replyis
thedefenderis initiallyquiteuncertain,
morelikelyto work.
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Fearon / TESTOF A CRISISBARGAINING
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3. Ex antemeasuresof the balanceof interestssuch as allianceties or geographical contiguitybetweendefenderandprotegeappearto be relatedto the failure
of immediatedeterrentthreats.This is contraryto the predictionsof standard
balanceof interestsaccounts,but as predictedby the costly signaling model.
4. Although bargainingreputationsacquiredin past confrontationsmay influence the likelihood that a state's immediatedeterrentthreatswill work, the
datado not allow rejectionof the contrarypropositionthatthey do not matter.
Instead,the evidence indicatesthatimmediatedeterrentthreatsare less likely
to workwhen therewas some previouscrisisbetweenchallengeranddefender.
Thisfindingis bothpredicted
andexplainedby theequilibrium
resultsof the
crisisgamediscussedabove.
I conclude with two broader comments. First, the problem with the
mainstreamrationalistargumentsaboutthe impactof relativecapabilitiesand
interestsis not thatthe argumentsareflat-outwrong.There are situationsin
which an advantagein militarycapabilitiesof "intrinsicinterests"should be
correlatedwith the success of a state's threatsor warnings.For example, in
the model describedabove, this is exactly what we would expect for general
deterrentthreats.Problemsarise when we attemptto apply the mainstream
hypothesis to specific strategiccontexts-such as threatsmade during an
internationaldispute-without thinking about their potentially distinctive
features.
Second, the analysis suggests that empiricalstudies of political matters
that involve strategic behavior should be guided, or at least informed, by
developed theoreticalanalysesof the strategicproblemsfaced by the agents.
Both the constructionof datasets andthe interpretationof empiricalfindings
tend to be strongly shaped by the implicit or explicit theoreticalapparatus
employed by the analyst. Making the theoreticalanalysis explicit, particularly in game-theoreticform,may suggestproblemswith conventionalinformal argumentsandprovidea new understandingof whatto look for andhow
to interpretempiricalresults.
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