Interests, Information and Influence:
A Comparative Analysis of Interest Group Influence in the
European Union
Adam William Chalmers
Department of Political Science
McGill University, Montreal
April 2011
A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the
requirements of the degree of Ph.D. in Political Science
© Adam Chalmers, 2011
Abstract
Faulty assumptions about the nature of interest group activity have misled scholars'
assessments of interest group influence in the European Union (EU). The influence
literature portrays interest groups as commonly using undue pressure and purchase
tactics in order to change the minds of decision-makers. However, this work on
influence has yet to take seriously insights from the rest of the interest group literature,
which has long established that interest groups are much more likely to lobby decisionmakers who already share their views (friends) rather than to attempt to change the
minds of those who do not (foes). Moreover, in lobbying friends, interest groups are best
understood as informational service bureaus, providing policy-relevant information to
decision-makers in exchange for legitimate access to the policy-making process. This
dissertation brings these insights to bear on interest group influence in the EU. I
conceive of interest group influence as a function of an interest group’s ability to
efficiently and reliably provide policy-relevant information to EU decision-makers. To
this end, I examine the information processing capacity – how interest groups gather,
filter, make sense of, generate and transmit information – of EU interest groups within a
comparative framework. I find that, in general, interest group influence in the EU is
balanced with no particular set of groups dominating the EU policy-making process at
the expense of others.
Résumé
Des hypothèses erronées quant à la nature de l'activité des groupes d'intérêt ont induit
en erreur plusieurs experts dans leur analyse de l'influence de ces groupes au sein de
l'Union européenne (UE). Leur travaux sur l'influence des groupes de pression affirment
que les groupes d'intérêt recourent couramment à une pression inutile et à des
techniques de vente dans le but de faire changer d'avis les décideurs politiques.
Toutefois, cette lecture de l'influence de ces groupes n’a pas su intégrer les conclusions
du reste des travaux scientifiques sur les groupes d'intérêt qui affirment depuis
longtemps que ces groupes d’intérêt sont bien davantage susceptibles de faire pression
sur des décideurs qui partagent déjà leur point de vue (alliés) que d'essayer de faire
changer d'avis ceux qui ne le partagent pas (adversaires). De plus, dans le cercle des
lobbyistes, les groupes d'intérêt sont davantage perçus comme des bureaux de
renseignements, qui fournissent des informations pertinentes d'un point de vue
politique aux décideurs en échange d'un accès légitime au processus décisionnel. Ce
projet de recherche s'attarde à illustrer les principes qui sous-tendent l'influence des
groupes d'intérêt dans l'Union européenne. Je considère l'influence des groupes
d'intérêt comme fonction de leur capacité à fournir de manière efficace et fiable des
informations pertinentes d'un point de vue politique aux décideurs de l'UE. À cet effet,
j'examine la capacité des groupes d'intérêt au sein de l'UE à traiter l'information, à
savoir comment ces groupes rassemblent, sélectionnent, analysent, génèrent et
transmettent l'information, dans une analyse comparative. J'estime qu'en général,
l'influence des groupes d'intérêt de l'UE n'est pas caractérisée par la présence de
certains groupes en particulier qui domineraient le processus décisionnel européen au
détriment d'autres groupes.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ i
List of Figures, Tables and Graphs ........................................................................................................... ii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................... 1
CHAPTER 2
An Information Processing Theory of Interest Group Influence .............................................. 23
CHAPTER 3
Researching Interest Group Influence in the EU .............................................................................. 47
CHAPTER 4
Information Gathering: Monitoring, Information Sources, Filtering & Research................ 64
CHAPTER 5
Information Networks: The Strength of Strong and Weak Ties ...............................................100
CHAPTER 6
Information Transparency: Interest Group Probity and Dishonesty in Information
Provision ........................................................................................................................................................134
CHAPTER 7
Information Transmission: Types, Tactics & Targets ..................................................................163
CHAPTER 8
Information Processing and Interest Group Influence in the EU .............................................196
CHAPTER 9
Interest Groups and the Future of Associative Democracy in the EU ....................................221
WORKS CITED .............................................................................................................................................................. 241
APPENDIX: Sample Questionnaire ................................................................................................................... 261
Acknowledgements
This project would not have been possible without generous financial support from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Deutscher Akademischer
Austausch Dienst, the Alexander Mackenzie Fellowship and the European Field Research
Scholarship. This funding facilitated two stints of fieldwork in Brussels (four weeks in
fall 2009 and one week in fall 2010) and also made possible visits to the Berlin Graduate
School of Social Sciences at the Humboldt University in Berlin and the Institute of
Governance at the University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank colleagues and friends
in both cities for their wonderful support and helpful insights.
I am very much indebted my wonderful supervisor, Juliet Johnson, who offered
guidance, encouragement and her keen insight every step of the way. I also would like to
thank Hudson Meadwell and Maria Popova for their comments and support at various
stages of the dissertation process.
Thanks also to my colleagues and close friends at McGill who made my time there
interesting and enjoyable. In particular, thanks to Ece, Melanee, Marc André, Mark D.,
Mark M., and Theo.
Most importantly, thanks to my wife, Julia Honnacker, who tirelessly read through early
chapter drafts, helped with editing the final version, provided the German translation of
the survey, supervised the French translation, and selflessly offered her constant
support and encouragement through it all.
-i-
Figures, Tables and Graphs
FIGURES
Page
Figure 1: Two Stages of Information Processing
40
TABLES
Table 1: Distribution of Online Survey Responses by Interest Group Type
61
Table 2: The Importance of Monitoring for Interest Groups in the EU
67
Table 3: Information Sources Used to Keep Track of EU Activities
76
Table 4: Interest Group Research Strategies
92
Table 5: Making New Contacts versus Maintaining Existing Contacts
111
Table 6: Reasons for Contact with Other Groups
114
Table 7: Strong-ties and Weak-ties in EU Interest Groups
118
Table 8: Reasons for Providing Information to Decision-Makers
145
Table 9: Type of Information Transmitted to EU Decision-Makers
170
Table 10: Information Tactics used to Transmit Information to EU Decision-Makers
178
Table 11: Information Targets
187
Table 12: Interaction of Information Types, Tactics and Targets
191
Table 13: Determinants of Interest Group Interaction with EU Decision-Makers
212
GRAPHS
Graph 1: Interest Group Monitoring
69
Graph 2: Information Sources
79
Graph 3: Research Strategies
93
Graph 4: Making New Contacts versus Maintaining Existing Contacts
112
Graph 5: Reasons for Contact with other Groups
115
Graph 6: Strong-ties and Weak-Ties (Cumulative Scores)
119
Graph 7: Interest Group Reasons for Information Provision
147
Graph 8: Reasons why Decision-Makers speak to Lobbyists
149
Graph 9: Poor Lobbying Practices in the EU
151
Graph 10: Interest Group Transparency
152
Graph 11: Is inappropriate influence-peddling by lobbyists a problem?
155
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Graph 12: Are rewards for compliance / penalties for violations effective?
157
Graph 13: Should transparency be mandatory or voluntary?
158
Graph 14: Information Types
172
Graph 15: Information Tactics
180
Graph 16: Information Targets
188
Graph 17: Interaction and Information Processing
216
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The cartoon above paints a decidedly insidious portrait of lobbying in the
European Union (EU).1 Behind a stark-naked Commission President Barroso we see a
group of lobbyists portrayed as gangsters, hoodlums, con artists and crooks. The men
wear pinstriped suits and long trench coats, black fedoras and high-raised collars. One
man conceals his identity with a paper bag on his head while another wears a small,
metal bucket. The women lobbyists are equally menacing, with hats pulled down low to
conceal shifty eyes or wearing preposterous fake noses complete with glasses and a
moustache. All of the lobbyists are enthusiastically applauding as Barroso walks by with
the new Commission “Register of Interest Groups” in hand. The Register, the centrepiece
of the larger 2005 “European Transparency Initiative,” was meant to address a
perceived lack of order, professionalism and probity in EU lobbying. While lobbying was
acknowledged as being an “important and legitimate part of the EU decision-making
process,” as then Administrative Affairs, Audit and Anti-Fraud Commissioner Siim Kallas
1
This cartoon was originally published in the Corporate Europe Observatory (2008).
-1-
remarked, “rumours of undo influences, biases, conflicts of interest and shady contacts”
provided the impetus for a push for greater transparency (Kallas, 2007a: 3-4). But the
message of the cartoon is that “the emperor is naked” and the initiative has failed. After
all, as the little girl points out, the Register has no names in it. The sinister grins of the
lobbyists suggest a continuation of business as usual in EU lobbying – exercising undue
influence on EU policy outcomes in an opaque and unaccountable manner.
In addition to revealing the pretentions and emptiness of powerful institutions,
like the original Hans Christian Andersen fable, this cartoon also says something
important about the interest groups who have presumably duped the naked emperor. In
this particular sense, the cartoon is illustrative in two related ways. First, it calls
attention to two of the most important but tricky questions of political science research.
How influential are interest groups? Furthermore, which types of interest groups
exercise the most influence and which ones the least? Very few studies actually address
these questions, not least because it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to
categorically attribute a policy outcome to a specific interest group activity (Mahoney,
2008: 183; Dür, 2008a & 2008b). That is to say, attempting to measure influence in this
way typically leads to a methodological dead-end.
This brings us to the second point that this cartoon helps illustrate. I argue that
this methodological dead-end is directly related to the assumptions we make about the
nature of lobbying itself. In other words, the things we look for as evidence of influence
are informed by what we think is going on in the lobbying process. In blunt terms, the
assumption, as the cartoon above illustrates, is that the relationship between interest
groups and decision-makers is inherently conflictual. This is an important point. While
they may not all be crooks or hoodlums, within the context of assessing influence,
interest groups are usually assumed to pressure decision-makers to change their minds
-2-
on a particular issue and thus pursue specific policy aims (Michalowitz, 2007a; Cowles,
1995; Warleigh, 2000; Edgell and Thomson, 1999; Pappi and Henning, 1999; Schneider
and Baltz, 2003 & 2005; Mahoney, 2008; Klüver, 2009).
The scant scholarly work that attempts to measure interest group influence
forms an isolated niche area of the larger interest group literature. There is surprisingly
little cross-pollination between the two and, more importantly, scholars in the different
areas of study tend to speak at cross-purposes. Indeed, I argue that conceiving of the
relationship between interest groups and decision-makers as inherently conflictual is
completely at odds with what the rest of the interest group literature says about interest
group behaviour. More precisely, there is an overwhelming consensus among scholars
that interest groups generally do not try to change the minds of “unfriendly” decisionmakers whose policies are in opposition to their interests. Instead, interest groups tend
to work to support “friendly” decision-makers who already agree with them on
particular policy issues (see Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963; Berry, 1977; Hall and
Deardorff, 2006). While dominant in other areas of interest group scholarship, this
scholarly consensus is completely overlooked by those measuring influence.
I suggest that the study of influence has been led into a methodological dead-end
because it has unwittingly saddled itself with false assumptions about the nature of
lobbying – more precisely, assumptions about the inherently conflictual nature of the
relationship between interest groups and decision-makers. The present analysis
proposes a way out of this dead-end by developing a new theory of interest group
influence that is non-conflictual. I begin with the assumption that influence is exercised
through the work interest groups do in supporting friendly decision-makers rather than
in trying to the change the minds of unfriendly ones. This supportive work takes the
form of a type of informational service that sees well-informed interest groups
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providing policy-relevant information to decision-makers in exchange for legitimate
access to the EU policy-making process. Being well informed, anticipating the
informational needs of decision-makers and being able to strategically supply
information is part of what I call “information processing.” The central hypothesis of the
present analysis is that the more efficient interest groups are at information processing,
the more influence they will have. I test this hypothesis with reference to 64 elite
interviews and a large-scale online survey of 308 interest group representatives active
in lobbying at the EU level. Data is collected on eleven different types of interest groups
within a systematic comparative framework. Comparing variation in influence among
different types of interest group provides insight into which groups dominate the EU
policy-making process and which are relatively excluded. When influence is balanced,
policy outputs are generally more legitimate and efficient. However, when one type of
group or set of groups dominates then the legitimacy of the policy-making process is
threatened, outputs are likely to be less efficient, economic development is hindered and
even state collapse may follow. However, the main finding of this analysis is that interest
group influence in the EU is, on balance, fair and impartial. No single type of group or set
of groups dominates at the expense of others.
Conceiving of influence as information processing takes us some distance from
locating the evidence of influence in the degree to which interest groups are capable of
bringing about specific policy changes through tactics of pressure and purchase. It also
takes us some distance from the hyperbolic representation of lobbyists as crooks and
con artists propagated in the cartoon above. While the details and implications of this
new theory of influence will be fleshed out in upcoming chapters, the purpose of the
present chapter is to place this new theory in the broader context of the interest group
scholarship in the EU. By showing where the extant academic work has already been we
-4-
will get a better idea of where we need to go. I will also draw attention to the importance
of measuring interest group influence by examining what I call the “crisis of
participatory democracy” in the EU. The failure of parliamentary politics and the decline
of party politics in the EU have led to a legitimacy crisis in the EU commonly referred to
as the democratic deficit. Interest groups, however, are positioned to assuage this crisis.
If the EU is legitimized through institutions that bring decision-making to the people
directly, then interest groups take on a new and important role in assuaging the EU’s
democratic deficit. This assessment requires a consideration of the promises and
dangers of so-called “associative democracy.” Finally, the introduction concludes with a
chapter-by-chapter outline of this analysis.
Interest Groups in the European Union
The question of interest group influence, and especially measuring influence, is
central to the study of interest groups in the EU. After all, wielding influence is one of the
primary tasks of all interest groups – something already implied in the way that interest
groups represent the concerns and welfare of their members to decision-makers.
Despite being such a fundamental aspect of what interest groups do, surprisingly little
scholarly work has taken up the task of measuring influence (Dür and de Biévre, 2008;
Mahoney, 2007a; Grant, 1989). As Baumgartner and Leech explain in their impressive
survey of interest group research, the problem of measuring influence remains an “area
of confusion” in the literature, avoided less because of a lack of time and effort and more
because of a general “inability of previous generations of scholars to generate positive
conclusions despite the investment of tremendous energies”(1998: 13). It has thus
become commonplace, and even expected, for scholars to “avoid the topic altogether” if
not “at all costs” (Dür and de Bièvre, 2007a: 3; Mahoney, 2007: 35).
-5-
Aside from the question of influence, however, the study of interest groups in the
EU is as old as the EU itself and is impressive in size and scope. This literature can be
divided between early international relations-oriented work focused on the grand
narrative issue of EU integration and more recent work that draws heavily on the
comparative politics tool-kit and which focuses on mid-range issues of interest
intermediation and policy-making.
Ernst Haas (1958), under the theoretical rubric of neo-functionalism, was the
first to assess the role of interest groups in the EU (then the European Community).
Importantly, for Haas, interest groups, and in particular business interests and trade
unions, were key to further EU integration. Integration, following Haas, emerged from
the relationship between interest groups and the Community’s central institutions as a
function of their shared interests in the transfer of Member State competencies to the
EU. In this way, interest groups were thought to promote bottom-up spillover effects
that Haas associated not only with further European integration but also with the
emergence of a European supranational sphere.
Events of the 1960s, 70s and early 80s, which included the famous de Gaulle-led
empty chair crisis, the Luxemburg compromise, the British budgetary rebate and
“Eurosclerosis” more generally speaking, challenged the perception that interest groups
were performing as Haas had predicted. As such, theories of intergovernmentalism
(Hoffmann, 1966) and, later, liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998), drawing
on this resistance to EU integration, challenged the neo-functionalism paradigm by
stressing that Member States alone steered integration and that interest groups played
an insignificant role beyond the national level where they were implicated by Moravcsik
in processes of “national preference formation” (1998).
-6-
The study of interest groups in the EU, however, was given a boost by a more
recent shift in focus away from the grand narrative issue of integration and toward midrange issues of policy-making and interest intermediation. This shift was accompanied
by an important sea-change in perspective: the EU was no longer taken as a sui generis
system of government standing beyond the pale of comparison, but was rather a system
of government similar in many ways to other established democracies (see Hix, 2005).
This move allowed scholars to draw freely on their familiar theoretical and
methodological tool-kits from comparative politics. It also opened up new avenues of
research that borrowed from a rich tradition of American scholarship on interest
groups.
From this mid-range, comparative politics perspective, most research has centred
on four main areas of study (see Woll, 2006; Eising, 2008). First, and perhaps the most
dominant area of study, is identifying the system of interest intermediation at work in
the EU. A broad consensus emerged early on that, due to its multiple points of access
and openness to a vast array of different types of interest groups, the EU had not
adopted the national corporatist systems of its most powerful and influential Member
States (in particular, France and Germany), but instead had developed a rather
American-styled pluralism or even elite pluralism (Streek and Schmitter, 1991; Mazey
and Richardson, 1997; Coen, 1998; Cowles, 2001). Nevertheless, some scholars argued
that these pluralist structures do not apply to all aspects of the EU. For instance,
relations between farmers and the DG Agriculture (Greenwood, Grote and Ronite, 1992)
as well as the more formalized consultations between interest groups and
Commissioners (Michalowitz, 2004: 29) seemed to suggest a type of limited, informal
corporatism.
-7-
A second dominant research agenda draws on the work of Mancur Olson and
takes up the question of collective action and group mobilization in the EU. Scholars
were tasked with assessing the degree to which collective action problems hindered
lobbying at the supranational level. Several studies concluded that, rather than
providing a new route to influence that avoided traditional national and sub-national
channels, the atypical and sometimes unpredictable multi-layered, non-hierarchical
nature of supranational lobbying in the EU made lobbying even more difficult –
especially for new and inexperienced interest groups (McLaughlin and Jordon, 1993;
Aspinwall and Greenwood, 1998; Greenwood, 2002; Grant, 1989). It should be expected,
then, that most groups will strengthen their links to familiar political actors and
institutions (i.e., national governments, agencies and other national interest groups) and
only slowly learn to find their way to the EU (Grossmann, 2004: 638).
The “europeanization” of interest groups, a third research area, has also been
subject to considerable academic attention. Europeanization is evinced in the
convergence between national and supranational systems of interest intermediation –
both bottom-up effects of the impact of national traditions on the EU system and topdown effects of the impact of the EU on national traditions. A central finding was really a
type of compromise: it seems that national political traditions continue to matter, even
though some convergence has occurred (Coen, 1998; Sidenius, 1998; Beyers, 2002;
Auken, Buksti and Sorensen, 1974; van Schendelen, ed., 1993).
Lastly, and most directly related to the present analysis, a fourth research area
tries to understand the nature of the political system of the EU through examinations of
interest groups and, more broadly speaking, civil society (Woll, 2006). This research
agenda gets much of its impetus from the Commission’s own 2001 White Paper in which
interest groups were implicated in “European governance;” the interaction of state and
-8-
non-state actors in a fluid, multi-level and non-hierarchical decision-making process
(European Commission, 2001, Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). Central to this
research area is the EU’s so-called democratic deficit: the idea that the EU decisionmaking process somehow lacks the same type of political legitimacy as full-fledged
democratic states (Føllesdal, 2005; Føllesdal and Hix, 2006; Lord, 1998). Interest
groups, as several scholars proposed, have the potential to lend legitimacy to EU
decision-making by bridging the gap between the EU’s decision-making institutions and
the EU citizenry (Eichener and Voelukow, 1994; Héritier, 1999; Warleigh, 2000;
Saurugger, 2008).
The Crisis of Participatory Democracy in the EU
It is this last research area on EU governance and the democratic deficit that is
most important for the present analysis. Indeed, it places the issue of measuring interest
group influence within the broader context and debate concerning the legitimacy of the
EU decision-making process. While I will discuss the ability of interest groups to
effectively bring legitimacy to this process below, it is first prudent to address the
question of why interest groups have been thrust into this role in the first place.
Concerns about the legitimacy of the EU decision-making process, commonly
referred to as the “democratic deficit,” emerged as a response to the various difficulties
the EU encountered in passing the Maastricht Treaty in 1993. Not only was the Treaty
ratified with the slimmest of margins in Denmark and France (both at 51% to 49%) and
only with the greatest difficulty in the UK House of Commons, but the German and
Danish supreme courts took the new Treaty to task for its incompatibility with existing
national constitutions (in particular with regard to the supremacy clause that mandated
the supremacy of EU over national law) (Føllesdal, 2006: 152f). These problems led to a
-9-
period in EU politics of intense introspection, in particular with regard to bridging the
gap between a rather technocratic EU decision-making process and the European
people.
While a rather nebulous term that is, in a very real sense, opposed to definition,
the democratic deficit has been usefully linked to a particular set of related issues.2 At an
institutional level, the democratic deficit reflects matters of unaccountable decisionmaking and weak preference representation in the EU.3 At issue is the unelected
character of the European Commission (the chief legislative branch of the EU in which
Commissioners are hand-picked by Member State governments rather than being
popularly elected), the relative weakness of the European Parliament (the only directly
elected institution in the EU), the increase in Member State executive powers at the
expense of national parliaments, and a general lack of transparency in the EU decisionmaking process (see Lord, 1998; Føllesdal and Hix, 2006). Underlying all of these
institutional shortcomings is the more fundamental issue of the perceived distance
between EU citizens and the EU decision-making process. Schmitter puts it vividly, citing
compelling evidence that individuals and groups within the EU have become
aware of how much its regulations and directives are affecting their daily lives,
and that they consider these decisions to be taken in remote, secretive,
unintelligible and unaccountable fashion. Europeans feel themselves, rightly or
wrongly, at the mercy of the process of integration that they do not understand
and certainly do not control (2004: 4).
Empirically, this deeply felt sense of alienation and distance has made itself
evident in two ways. First, and perhaps most persistent, are the low turnout rates for
European Parliament elections. These elections have long since been described as
2
It is not only difficult to define the democratic deficit but several scholars have argued that it simply
does not exist. For instance, see Majone (1993 & 1998), Moravcsik (2002), and V. Schmidt (2004).
3 The democratic deficit also has an important psycho-social dimension related to the fact that there is no
EU-identity or EU demos which would presumably give legitimacy to EU decision-making.
- 10 -
“second order competitions” for which, compared to first-order national elections, there
is little is at stake, parties compete using “their trademark platforms” rather than
tailoring a platform to EU-specific issues, and parties even intentionally down-play their
differences regarding EU integration (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1997). As a result,
voters, aware of the limited power of the Parliament vis-à-vis the other EU decisionmaking institutions, do not vote for the parties (or candidates) they believe to be the
best qualified to run the EU (Kuechler, 1991) and cast their ballots to make a statement
about the national political arena (Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004).
Peter Mair has compellingly argued that it is not just the Parliament that is the
problem, but rather party politics more generally speaking. Increasing “Euroscepticism”
in the EU as well as a general “democratic malaise” in many Western democracies is the
result of the political party’s inability “to legitimate their governance” (Mair, 2006: 6).
Decreasing party membership and low turnout levels in elections undermine the tacit
legitimacy of the political party as a platform for citizen representation. Importantly,
Mair’s findings draw substantial support from a large number of related studies
announcing the decline of party politics in modern democracies (see Russell and
Wattenberg, eds., 2000; Katz and Mair, 1995).
The failure of parties to maintain their representative functions have led to
important reconsiderations at the level of public opinion regarding what democracy
entails. As Mair explains, democracy has become more “about rights rather than voice,
about output rather than input, and about a process that need not involve a substantial
emphasis on popular involvement and control” (2006: 6). It is this last point that brings
us back to our consideration of the potential ameliorating function of interest groups on
the EU’s democratic deficit. What the above illustrates is that the democratic deficit is
principally a crisis in participatory democracy -- the failure of the institutions that
- 11 -
permit citizens to steer the decision-making process through elections, parties and
parliamentary politics (whether national or supranational). However, as Mair suggests,
this crisis of participatory democracy has shifted the emphasis away from “mass
engagement” and electoral participation and thus toward “stake-holder involvement”
(2006: 8). In the EU this means that the crisis of participatory democracy has hollowed
out a new space for interest groups to not only take over the representative function
that parties once filled but to also help steer and legitimate the EU policy-making
process.
Interest Groups to the Rescue?
Legitimacy gained through interest group involvement has a long history in the
EU. The European Economic and Social Committee, for instance, established in 1957,
formalized EU consultation with “employers, workers, and various interests” (Westlake,
2009). The Committee of Regions was added later in 1993 to provide a similar platform
for those interests emerging at the sub-state (city, municipality and regional) level.
Additionally, the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) institutionalized a form of “social
dialogue” or consultation between the Commission and designated European social
partners representing business interests and workers’ unions -- namely, The Union of
Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (BUSINESSEUROPE), the European
Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP) and the European Trade Union
Confederation (ETUC). Indeed, the Commission itself has long followed a specific
mandate, first outlined in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam and recently re-minted in the
2009 Lisbon Treaty, to “consult widely (…) with representative associations and civil
society” (European Commission, 2007: Art1, 8b). The logic behind these interactions
between decision-makers and interest groups is simple: the faltering institutions of
- 12 -
participatory democracy requiring citizens to steer the decision-making process would
be buttressed (if not replaced) by a robust and flourishing associative democracy that
found legitimacy in institutionalizing interest group involvement in the decision-making
process (Saurugger, 2008; Maloney, 2009). Associative democracy does not demand that
interest groups replace citizen engagement. Rather, groups act as ersatz channels for
these preferences to be voiced. In fact, in some cases, interest groups may offer
opportunities for participation in the policy-making process that infrequent elections do
not (Grant, 1989; Saurugger, 2008)4 – a point that becomes increasingly important when
institutions of citizen engagement, like elections and party membership, have lost their
efficacy and power. As the Commission is careful to acknowledge, “there is no
contradiction between wide consultation with interest groups and the concept of
representative democracy” (European Commission, 2002: 3; see also European
Commission, 1993: 1). Interest groups bring legitimacy to the EU decision-making
process by replacing parties as the main means by which citizen preferences are voiced.
The key to the success of associative democracy in the EU, however, depends on
interest group input remaining diverse and balanced. When input is received from a
variety of different types of interest groups reflecting a wide array of the citizenry,
interest groups can act as important checks and balances to government decisions. This
type of input, in addition to providing legitimacy to the decision-making process, has
even been implicated by a number of scholars in providing more efficient policy
outcomes and increased aggregate welfare (Lehmbruch and Schmitter, 1982; Streeck
and Schmitter, 1985; Mayntz and Scharpf, 1995; Lindblom, 1965; Esterling, 2004).
4
Grant maintains that interest groups even “permit citizens to express their views on complex issues” in a
way that parties and elections do not. “In systems of voting,” Grant explains, “each vote counts equally, but
numerical democracy can take no account of the intensity of the opinion on a particular issue. Democracy
cannot be simply reduced to a head-counting exercise; it must also take account of the strength of the
feelings expressed, and of the quality of the arguments advanced” (1989: 21). This is something that
interest groups do very well.
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Necessarily, however, the danger of associative democracy arises when input comes
from just a handful of powerful groups. Such interest group input would only reflect a
fraction of the citizenry, and thus not only be illegitimate and skewed, but, according to
several studies, the real-world results might entail economic decline and even state
collapse (Olson, 1982 & 2000; Lowi, 1962; Schattschneider, 1960; Horgos and
Zimmerman, 2009; Unger and van Waarden, 1999).
The Commission is aware of both the promises and dangers of relying so heavily
on interest groups. A 1993 Commission Communication, for instance, explains that
interaction with interest groups must be carefully mediated to ensure the “equal
treatment of all special interest groups” and promises that “all groups with an interest in
a given subject should have the opportunity to express their views” (European
Commission, 1993: 8). By the time of the 2001 White Paper, the Commission had
recognized that if it is not to “just listen to one side of the argument” then it will need to
actively “arbitrate between competing claims” (European Commission, 2001: 17).
Nonetheless, the Commission insists on a rather ad hoc method for doing this. The
framework for interaction with interest groups must be “coherent, yet flexible” enough
to be determined on a “case-by-case basis” (European Commission, 2002: 10). There is
no set list of initiatives on which the Commission will turn to groups, just as there is no
set list of groups that will be contacted. What is more, interaction will not be formalized
in a legally binding way. While the Lisbon Treaty stresses that it “shall consult
widely”(emphasis added), the Commission draws a clear line dividing the formal EU
policy-making process and its own consultative initiatives prior to this process.
Mediating interest group input in this ad hoc manner has certainly been strained
by the explosive influx in the number of interest groups in Brussels over the years. As a
general rule, the more competencies are transferred from Member States to EU
- 14 -
institutions, the more reason interest groups have to pursue their interests through EU
channels (Eising, 2008; Watson and Shackelton, 2008; Andersen and Eliassen, 1995).
The numbers paint a clear picture. In 1985, Butt Philip reported the existence of “almost
five hundred Europe-wide pressure groups” as well as numerous “industrial pressure
groups” (8). By the 1993 Maastricht Treaty estimates of over 3,000 “lobbying
organisations” with “almost 10,000 lobbyists” were being reported by the Commission
(European Commission, 1993: 1). According to Wessel’s survey of Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) around the same time, this amounted to about 67,000
contacts with lobbyists per year (Wessels, 1996: 109). By 2007, the estimated number of
interest groups in Brussels had again increased considerably. Reports placed the
number somewhere between 15,000 and 20,000, with contacts rising to more than
70,000 per year (Kallas, 2007a: 4; Coen, 2007: 3; Earnshaw and Judge, 2006). At last
count, Lehmann and Bosche submitted that these groups are staffed by are an
astonishing 500,000 to 1 million lobbyists actively engaged in pursuing their interests in
the EU (2009: 48).
The increase in the number of interest groups and lobbyists active in Brussels
gives a certain exigency to ascertaining the extent to which the EU’s commitment to
associative democracy, and the prospective promise that this is a real remedy to the
democratic deficit, allows for diverse and balanced input from interest groups. Indeed, if
groups are to act as ersatz channels for citizen preferences, buttressing or even
replacing institutions of participatory democracy, then their input in the policy-making
process becomes crucial. This, of course, brings us back to the central motivating
question of the present analysis. How can we measure interest group influence and how
does influence vary among different types of interest groups?
- 15 -
Measuring Interest Group Influence
As already intimated above, there is a paucity of scholarly work addressing the
question of measuring interest group influence in the EU. Scholars tend to shy away
from the study of influence because measuring influence leads to a methodological deadend. The present study provides a way out of this dead-end. As illustrated in the example
of the cartoon, measuring influence is linked to the assumptions we make about the
nature of lobbying itself, and in particular the nature of the relationship between
interest groups and decision-makers. The work that has thus far attempted to measure
influence begins with the assumption that this relationship is inherently conflictual. In
more precise terms, interest groups exercise influence by getting decision-makers to
change their minds about policy. The problem, however, is that this conception of the
relationship between interest groups and decision-makers is largely erroneous. An
interest group representative from the automotive sector interviewed for this study put
it this way.
Of course we would like to fight for our own interests. This is the original, former
meaning of lobbying. But, there is a second dimension (of lobbying) that is
unfortunately not mentioned very often. It’s not only a matter of fighting for your
own interests, but also it is also a kind of ‘know-how’ exchange. Sometimes they
(EU decision-makers) ask what the reality of the economy looks like. And then it
is a kind of ‘consultancy job’. We deliver, let’s say, how our relationship to
suppliers looks like. How the year of manufacturing looks like. It’s not a matter of
fighting for interests, but a matter of delivering ideas and know-how. This is
something we would really like to point out and to have mentioned; also getting
away from the negative connotations of ‘lobbyist’. It is also a kind of consultancy.
Changing the minds of decision-makers is not really the point. If there is a
proposal for legislation, you just want to get it right. It’s a matter of delivering
- 16 -
your point of view and to ensure that political decision-makers have a 360degree view of the issue.5
The present study, taking these insights very seriously, begins with the
assumption that interest group lobbying consists primarily of a type of know-how
exchange or consultancy task that is not meant to change the minds of decision-makers
but rather to give them a fuller perspective on an issue. I propose assessing this knowhow exchange in terms of the ability of different interest groups to provide decisionmakers with policy-relevant information. To be sure, scholars have long recognized the
importance of information to the processes of lobbying. “Information,” according to
Baumgartner et al. “is the currency of lobbying,” much more so than old fashioned
pressure and purchase tactics of coercion and manipulation (2009: 123). In the EU, in
particular, to speak with Broscheid and Coen (2007) “the key to successful lobbying is
not political patronage or campaign contributions, but the provision of information”
(349; see also Eising, 2008; Crombez, 2002). But, while information is accorded a central
role in the lobbying process, how it relates to influence in the EU has yet to be assessed
in any systematic way. This is precisely what the present study aims to do. I hypothesize
that the better interest groups are at providing decision-makers with information, the
more influential they will be.6
It is only in accurately measuring interest group influence that we can be assured
that the EU’s commitment to associative democracy, in light of its crisis of participatory
democracy, adds legitimacy to the EU decision-making process. Thus, the issue here is
not just measuring influence, but also measuring influence within a comparative
framework that includes a whole host of different types of interest groups. I define
5
Interview, official, Daimler AG, Brussels, 7/10/2009.
Influence, as I will discuss in detail in the following chapter, is not evinced in changed minds or policy
outcomes. Rather, influence is defined as the frequency of interaction between interest groups and
decision-makers.
6
- 17 -
interest groups as any group that seeks to influence the policy making process but does
not seek to be elected.7 Like the question of measuring influence, the systematic
comparison of different types of interest groups in the EU is relatively uncharted
territory (Woll, 2006). To address this lacuna, eleven different types of interest groups
will be considered: professional associations, companies, law firms, public affairs
consultancies, chambers of commerce, academic organisations, trade unions, NGOs and
associations of NGOs, representatives of religions, churches and communities of
conviction, think-tanks, and, lastly, public authorities like regions, cities and
municipalities. Including all of these types of groups under the more general (and
loaded) label of “interest group” is itself a contentious issue and will be addressed in
chapter 3. It is important to note here, however, that this more inclusive approach is
necessary for estimating interest group influence in the EU within a broadly
comparative framework. Given the promises and dangers of interest group influence,
this is absolutely central to assessing the extent to which interest groups assuage the
EU’s democratic deficit and act as a viable alternative to the legitimacy otherwise
obtained through the institutions of participatory democracy.
Chapter-by-Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 begins by laying down the theoretical foundations of this analysis. I
start with an examination of the existing scholarly work on interest group influence both
in the EU and elsewhere. Work on influence is a very isolated, niche area of the larger
interest group literature and there is little cross-pollination between what we know
about interest group behaviour and activity and the work on influence. I bring insights
about interest group behaviour – in particular, the near consensus in the literature that
7
This definition will be discussed in detail in chapter 3.
- 18 -
interest groups tend to lobby friends rather than foes – to bear on the study of interest
group influence. I do so by rethinking influence as a function of an interest group’s
information-processing ability. That is, in other words, influence relates to an interest
group’s ability to provide decision-makers with timely and policy-relevant information. I
propose a study of information processing in two stages across four dimensions: the
pre-advocacy stage consisting of information gathering and information networking;
and the advocacy stage consisting of information transparency and information
transmission. These four dimensions constitute the main substantive portion of this
analysis.
Chapter 3 outlines how I empirically test an information processing theory of
interest group influence in the EU. A major obstacle to any empirical analysis of interest
groups is defining the interest group concept. This is crucial to establishing the
population under study and defines the conditions for generalizing from discrete
observations to the total interest group population. It also determines the comparative
scope of the study (which groups are included in the definition and which are not). As
such, I begin by defending a rather inclusive definition of interest group. I continue with
a discussion of the sampling procedure used for both elite interviews and for a largescale online survey with interest group representatives active in lobbying at the EU
level. I also discuss issues related to response rate, coverage problems and item nonresponse.
Chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 are the main substantive chapters of this analysis and
examine the four dimensions of information processing: information gathering,
information networking, information transparency, and information transmission.
Information gathering, examined in chapter 4, is about having reliable
information at the earliest possible stage of the policy-making process in order to best
- 19 -
anticipate and meet the informational needs of EU decision-makers. This requires
effectively monitoring EU activities, parsing and filtering information from a variety of
different sources and even pursuing different research strategies. The main finding
presented in this chapter is that efficient information gathering turns heavily on an
interest group’s ability to gather information at the earliest possible stage of the policymaking process but only to the extent that information quality and reliability are not
compromised.
Information networking, presented in chapter 5, examines the social side of the
pre-advocacy stage of information processing. Information is shared among interest
groups through their network connections. I examine how different types of networks
facilitate the flow of information that interest groups need to stay up-to-date on EU
activities. To this end I compare the informational advantages of participating in large,
diffuse networks of many “unlike” members to participating in small, tight-knit
networks of a few “like” members. I use Granovetter’s strength of weak-ties hypothesis
as a point of departure in this chapter. Empirical analysis suggests that interest groups
in the EU do not, in general, opt for weak-tie networks despite the alleged informational
advantages they offer their members. In fact, interest groups in the EU tend to
participate more frequently in strong-tie networks. This finding is explained by two
factors: the unique nature of competition for information in the EU and the EU’s
preference for network “representativeness.”
Chapter 6 moves into the advocacy stage of information processing and begins
with a consideration of information transparency. Here I examine the basic conditions
under which interest groups transmit information to EU decision-makers. To what
extent do decision-makers need to employ costly monitoring, oversight and information
verification procedures on the information they receive from interest groups? How
- 20 -
honest and transparent are interest groups in their interactions with decision-makers
and can we expect them to provide accurate and complete information? Similarly, how
dishonest and opaque are interest groups and can we expect them to provide erroneous
and incomplete information? I find that interest group dishonesty in the EU is very
uncommon. Interest groups tend to provide decision-makers with complete and
accurate information in a transparent and open manner. Interest group dishonesty is
constrained by an extensive, multi-layered system of oversight and monitoring that adds
a prohibitive exogenous cost to dishonest behaviour. In addition, probity is fostered by
the nature of the relationship that most interest groups have with EU decision-makers:
lobbying to support friends rather than to change the minds of foes.
Next, in chapter 7, I examine information transmission through a framework that
focuses on the types of information interest groups provide decision-makers, the tactics
they use to do so, and the specific decision-makers they target with this information. In
short, information transmission consists of types, tactics and targets. This chapter tests a
long-standing assumption that information types, tactics and targets are predetermined
by an interest group’s membership structure. Private interest groups (like companies
and professional associations) are assumed to transmit technical information to obliging
technocrats in the Commission using so-called inside lobbying tactics. Diffuse interest
groups (like NGOs and trade unions) are assumed to transmit information about public
opinion and ethnical concerns to the more politically minded Members of the European
Parliament (MEPs) using so-called outside tactics. I argue that these assumptions are
overly deterministic and provide little insight into how a full range of interest groups
(not just private and public groups but also consultancies and public authorities) differ
in their capacity to transmit information to EU decision-makers. I find that membership
structure does not determine the information transmission process. Rather, most
- 21 -
interest groups in the EU strategically transmit a whole host of different information
types, using a range of tactics and targeting decision-makers in many of the EU’s main
institutions.
Chapter 8 shifts the point of focus of this study to a confirmatory analysis of
information processing and interest group influence in the EU. Regression analysis and
descriptive statistics are used to assess the degree to which different types of interest
groups exercise influence on the EU policy-making process. This chapter also tests the
assumption that the EU system of interest intermediation is best characterized as a form
of elite pluralism – where private interests, having privileged access to EU decisionmakers, exercise considerably more influence than diffuse interests, which are
effectively shut out of the EU policy-making process. I find that these assumptions are
largely unfounded. No single interest group type dominates the EU policy-making
process. Rather, interest group influence in the EU appears to be balanced and unbiased.
Finally, chapter 9 takes stock of these various empirical findings and brings them
to bear on issues of interest intermediation in the EU as well as on associative
democracy and the EU’s democratic deficit. I conclude with discussions of the policy
implications of this analysis and how future research might best use an informationprocessing approach to better measure and understand interest group influence.
- 22 -
CHAPTER 2
AN INFORMATION-PROCESSING THEORY OF INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE
Measuring interest group influence is tricky business. Unlike marked areas of
advancement in interest group research such as group mobilization, group recruitment
and the factors that draw groups into the political sphere, interest group influence
remains an “area of confusion” in the literature, to speak with Baumgartner and Leech
(1998). Not only does a general theoretical uncertainty restrict our ability to find
reliable and accurate indicators to measure influence, but a paucity of large-N empirical
studies limits the scope of theory testing and marks an inability to generate positive
conclusions. Measuring influence is “indeed one of the most fraught, difficult and
complex problems in political science research” (Beyers, Eising, Maloney, 2008: 1115).
This chapter presents a new way of measuring interest group influence in the EU.
It begins with the insight introduced in the previous chapter that how we measure
influence is linked to the assumptions we make about the nature of lobbying itself. The
few studies that have attempted to measure influence head-on invariably begin with the
assumption that lobbying is inherently conflictual: interest groups, using traditional
pressure and purchase tactics, try to change the minds of decision-makers in an effort to
bring about specific policy outcomes. Examining influence in this way, however, is out of
step with what we already know about interest group behaviour. First, there is
overwhelming evidence that interest groups are less likely to try to change the minds of
decision-makers who disagree with them than to support those who agree with them
(Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Berry 1977; Hall and Deardorff 2006). Interest groups, in
other words, tend to lobby friends, not foes. Second, in lobbying friends, interest groups
are best understood as “service bureaus,” to speak with Hall and Deardorff (2006),
- 23 -
offering a form of professional labour to friendly decision-makers. The service they offer
is largely informational. Well-informed interest groups provide understaffed decisionmakers with policy relevant information in exchange for legitimate access to the policymaking process (Ainsworth 1993; Austen-Smith 1993; Crawford and Sobel 1982;
Hojnacki and Kimball 1999).
So far, however, our theories of influence do not match the realities of interest
group activity. Conceiving of influence as inherently conflictual not only means turning a
blind eye to the fact that interest groups tend to lobby friends not foes, but also leads the
study of influence into methodological dead-ends. It is the acknowledgment of the
methodological difficulties of measuring influence that prompt scholars to shy away
from the topic altogether. The way out of this methodological dead-end, however, is not
through improving our measurements of influence. Rather, I argue that it begins by
rethinking the nature of interest group influence and bringing the study of influence in
line with what we know about interest group behaviour. Only in this way will we
achieve reliable measures of interest group influence. To this end, I begin with the
assumption that interest groups tend to lobby friendly decision-makers and conceive of
influence as a function of an interest group’s ability to provide these decision-makers
with policy-relevant information. While the importance of information in the policymaking process has long been acknowledged in the literature, a systematic study of how
groups gather, filter, generate, make sense of, synthesize, share and transmit
information– what I call “information processing” in short – is still missing.
This chapter proceeds as follows. I first outline the scholarly work that has
already addressed the issue of interest group influence in the EU and elsewhere. I
demonstrate that the existing research invariably conceives of influence through a
Weberian lens of power and thus assumes that exercising influence implies conflict
- 24 -
between interest groups and decision-makers. I next examine both methodological and
substantive challenges to conceiving of interest group influence in this way. Most
importantly, I suggest that the methodological dead-end of measuring influence,
resulting from the theoretical assumptions we make about lobbying, can be avoided if
we begin to take insights from related work on interest group lobbying seriously. Third,
I lay out some preparatory groundwork for re-thinking the notion of interest group
influence divested of assumptions of conflict. Finally, I propose a new way to measure
interest group influence based on these non-conflictual theoretical assumptions centring
on how interest groups provide policy-relevant information to decision-makers.
Interests, Influence and Power
Attempts to measure interest group influence in the EU invariably conceive of the
relationship between interest groups and decision-makers as inherently conflictual. This
assumption emerges because scholars conceptualize influence through a Weberian lens
of power. According to Weber, power is “the opportunity to impose one’s will in a social
relationship, even against resistance, without consideration to what this opportunity
rests on” (Woll’s translation, 2007: 75.n2). Robert Dahl’s classic reformulation
developed in his study of pluralistic power in New Haven helps clarify further: “A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise
do” (1957: 203). This holds for interest group influence as well. As James March explains
in a now seminal study of interest group influence:
Suppose that a prediction of the following form is made: ‘Congressman X will vote
for bill Y.’ Suppose further that a sequence of events is observed culminating in
Congressman X, in fact, voting for the bill. Such an observation obviously is
consistent with the proposition that no influence has occurred (…) On the other
hand, suppose that a sequence of events is observed culminating in the
Congressman’s not voting for the bill. It can then be said that (…) what has
- 25 -
occurred between the original prediction and the observed non-fulfilment of the
prediction will fall within the general definition of influence (1955: 435).
Influence is thus a force exercised by one actor that makes another deviate from his or
her “predicted path of behaviour” (March, 1955: 435). The point, put plainly, is for an
interest group to control outcomes, to get what it wants or, at least, to bring it “closer to
(its) ideal points”(Dür and de Biévre, 20007: 3).
(Mis)understood in such a way, influence remains a nebulous concept that cannot
be measured directly. Rather, a series of proxies have been put forward for measuring
both the causes and effects of influence. As “cause,” or the ability to control outcomes,
influence is usually related to interest group resources (Mahoney, 2007 & 2008; Dür,
2008; Dür and de Bièvre, 2007; Michalowitz, 2007). Resources can refer to “anything
used to sway another individual,” to use Dahl’s broad definition (1961: 23). This might
include financial and staff resources, campaign contributions, political support, the
location and size of the group’s office, the prospective legitimacy that a group offers to
decision-makers by taking part in the legislative process as well as technical / expert
information and data (see Dür, 2008: 1214). These resources define part of the
conditions of an exchange relationship between interest groups and decision-makers:
interest groups exchange resources for specific policy-related outcomes. Groups with
more resources presumably exercise more influence.
A number of mediating factors indirectly temper this system of exchange. For
instance, the internal organisation of a given interest group is thought to increase or
decrease its potential influence (Olson, 1982). So-called specific or concentrated interest
groups, having fewer members and specific aims or goals, face fewer free-rider
problems and therefore wield considerable influence. By contrast, so-called diffuse or
cause interest groups, having a great many members with just as many goals and aims,
- 26 -
face greater free-rider problems thus reducing their potential influence. Influence is also
restricted by the rules governing the way that interests interact with decision-makers
(Schmitter and Steeck, 1991; Czada, 2004). Corporatist systems with highly regulated
interaction between a few “peak” interest groups and decision-makers curb the ability of
other groups to exercise influence. By contrast, pluralist systems have more frequent
and less formal institutions that provide channels of access to (potentially) all interests
groups. Much of this depends on the organisation of interest group intermediation
determined at the state level. Finally, influence is also affected by the specific policy area
in which lobbying is taking place (Mahoney, 2008). The salience that a particular policy
issue has for a given interest group affects that group’s determination in lobbying as
well as their relative stake in lobbying outcomes. Moreover, the type of policy matters in
terms of its scope in engaging lobbying agents. Following Lowi (1964), regulatory
policies present large-scope issues that engage many different agents in a conflictual,
zero-sum way. Distributive and redistributive policies are less conflictual, have lower
stakes and thus present less opportunity for countervailing forces to engage in lobbying
the same issue.
While influence describes a group’s ability to control outcomes, as effect,
influence is evinced in the extent to which an interest group is able to realize its own
preferences. Preference attainment is implicitly conflictual (in the Weberian sense) and
observable in how much one actor has forced another to deviate from his predicted
path. While this might be evinced in a decision-maker’s change of mind (Michalowitz,
2007), or even just giving more or less consideration to an issue (Betsill and Corell,
2001), influence is more concretely measured as the similarity between what a group
wants and the final policy outcome (Grant, 1989; Mahoney, 2008; Schneider and Baltz,
2003 & 2005; Dür, 2008a). It is on this last point that content analysis has proven quite
- 27 -
useful. Klüver (2009) has recently used this approach to measure the similarity of a
group’s stated aims and objectives, either deduced in interviews, policy reports or
position papers, and the actual outcome of an issue, as reflected in EU official
documents, opinions or even legislation. Preference attainment might obtain completely,
where all of a group’s objectives are wholly translated into policy, or just partially,
where just a particular element of an objective becomes part of legislation (Mahoney,
2007). Either way, the effects of interest group influence are the result of some kind of
conflict between the actors involved that is resolved through the exercise of force.
The Methodological Dead-End of Measuring Influence
Conceiving of influence in this way has led to a series of methodological deadends, related primarily to issues of causation. There are four main issues.
First, it is difficult to establish a one-to-one causal link between interest group
activities and policy outcomes that categorically brackets off the (perhaps unintended)
influence of other interest groups as well as a host of other exogenous and endogenous
causal factors (Dür, 2008b; Grant, 1989). Even more difficult is establishing correlations
between outcomes in direct proportion to the intensity of the force being exercised by
an interest group. How much more pressure or how many more resources equate to
how much more of a policy change or related outcome? And while it might be clear that
more money buys more policy, it is unclear how more of other types of “resources” like
public support or legitimacy can be measured, never mind correlated with proportional
policy outcomes.
A second issue is that measuring the effects of influence relies heavily on
counterfactual arguments. Recall March’s example of the Congressman, above. Influence
is evinced in the “non-fulfilment of a prediction,” namely, the Congressman does not
- 28 -
vote for bill Y. In other words, influence is that force that prevents a predicted
occurrence. Measuring influence requires being absolutely certain about the predicted
path of the Congressman or, using Dahl’s terms, about what B would have done in the
absence of pressure from A. But when we measure influence as changed minds or
preference attainment we can only be certain of initial preferences and final outcomes,
not about non-events or the non-fulfilment of predictions. As Woll perceptively explains:
“If the American president wants it to rain the next morning and it actually does, we
have not proven that he has actually influenced the weather” (Woll, 2007: 61). The nonoccurrence of the event is not evidence of the intervention of a force that has pushed the
event off its “predicted path.”
In addition to problems of establishing causation and dealing with
counterfactuals, measuring influence as realizing preferences in concrete outcomes
requires establishing what these preferences are. What is needed is a reliable list or
catalogue of interest group preferences (Tsebelis, 2002; Grant, 1989). One issue is that
some interest groups simply do not have well defined preferences. For instance, groups
that lobby on multiple, semi-related and cross-cutting issues not only have preferences
that are difficult to ascertain with any degree of reliability, but these preferences would
be difficult to observe in concrete, singular policy outcomes. What is more, interest
groups themselves are not always clear about their own preferences, sometimes even
“strategically or unconsciously” misrepresenting their own preferences to social science
investigators interested in cataloguing these preferences (Dür, 2008: 568).
A fourth concern is that the link between influence and the outcomes of influence
lacks any consideration of how the former impact the latter. There are no causal
mechanisms that translate factors of influence, like resources, political support,
campaign contributions and even group type into the specific policy outcomes or
- 29 -
changed-minds. As with many formal rent-seeking models, an “influence function” is
assumed to represent the transformation of interest group input into political influence
(e.g., Becker 1985). The problem, as Potters and van Winden have pointed out, is that
these models posit no real interaction between interest groups and decision-makers. In
fact, decision-makers are assumed to respond mechanistically to the pressure produced
by interest groups by spending resources (Potters and van Winden 1992). Decisionmakers, as Heinz et al. put it colourfully in their study of lobbying in Washington, are
assumed to be akin to “billiard balls” unconsciously reacting to influence and thus going
“wherever the interest group sends them” (1993: 12).
Challenges from the Existing Literature
The acknowledged methodological difficulties of measuring influence have
prompted most scholars to shy away from the issue altogether. I argue, however, that
even if we did have perfect measures of influence and did overcome these
methodological problems, being based on underlying Werberian assumptions the
results would still be misleading. All of the methodological difficulties listed above,
however, can be swept aside if we bring the study of influence in line with the rest of the
interest group literature – if we stop assuming that influence is inherently conflictual.
Robert Salisbury, making a similar insight, argues that the real difficulty of measuring
influence is how we are posing the question. The current literature suffers from “a view
of influence as a game, where clear winners and losers can be identified.” For Salisbury,
however, the political process is more “continuous, with no clear resolution and
identifiable end point at which to sort out winners from losers” (1994: 13f). David
Lowery takes this critique one step further, suggesting that the term influence, as it is
typically employed in the literature on lobbying, “provides a very poor understanding of
- 30 -
the actual nature of the relationship between organized interests and government
representatives” (Lowery, 2007: 36). Three particular insights from the current
research level a serious challenge to assumptions that influence is inherently conflictual.
In fact, these insights suggest that the work on interest group influence is out of step
with the actual nature of interest groups, their activities and, perhaps most importantly,
how they interact with decision-makers.
First, and perhaps most important to the present study, is the insight that interest
groups tend to lobby friends rather than foes. Central to this insight is an informational,
rather than pressure and purchase, perspective on lobbying. In general, interest groups
are better informed on certain policy issues that concern them directly than decisionmakers. Interest groups therefore provide their expertise in the form of policy-relevant
information to decision-makers in exchange for legitimate access to the policy-making
process (Austen-Smith, 1993). However, given their limited resources, interest groups
tend to transmit information to those who are already most likely to support their cause
rather then those who oppose them. This is both less costly and more rewarding than
lobbying foes (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1968; Crombez, 2004; Heinz et al., 1990;
Hojnacki and Kimball 1999). The implied result, therefore, is that the goal of lobbying is
not to change the minds of those who do not agree with you, but rather to subsidize the
work of those who already do. It is in this light that Hall and Deardorff have argued that
interest groups are better understood as “service bureaus” or “adjunct to staff” of
friendly decision-makers than as agents of pressure (2006: 72).
A second insight is that the main purpose of interest groups is not to influence
policy outcomes at all, but rather to ensure group survival (Lowery, 2007). Interest
groups spend far less time pursuing pressure and purchase tactics of lobbying and far
more time ensuring their own existence through activities of “niche maintenance.” This
- 31 -
might involve recruiting or maintaining members, nurturing and creating new contacts,
managing inter-group dynamics through networking, and producing technical and
constituent-related reports for allies (Lowery, 2007; Gray and Lowery 1996a). In terms
of the interaction between interest groups and decision-makers, then, niche
maintenance amounts to groups proving their value to friendly decision-makers where
this value is most pronounced in supplying them with important and timely policyrelevant information. Niche maintenance is facilitated by lobbying friends rather than
foes, and by using information to subsidize legislation.
Third, and more broadly applicable, various empirical studies from the US
suggest that the link between resources and influence is altogether specious, finding
little evidence of a correlation between the expenditure of resources and securing rents
and/or changing policy. For instance, Heinz et al. (1990) show how the lobbying
environment is marked by profound uncertainty with no clear relation between means
and goals. Further, in a study on the role of interest groups in determining the outcomes
of direct legislation initiatives, Gerber found that “massive infusions of cash” by business
interests “almost always fail to move votes” (Gerber, 1999: p.6). Lastly, Baumgartner et
al.’s massive comparative study of lobbying in the US found that, “for the most part,
resources have no significant correlation with a positive policy outcome” (2009: p203).
Money simply does not buy policy.
Rethinking Interest Group Influence
Taking insights from the current interest group literature seriously, and adopting
them in the study of influence, means rethinking both the causes and effects of interest
group influence. One central challenge is thinking about how influence is exercised
through a non-conflictual form of lobbying. Naturally, to say that interest groups only
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lobby friends would be just as short sighted as proposing that all lobbying is inherently
conflictual. This is simply not the case. Further, examining interest group influence in
the new way I am proposing here is not to assume that politics writ large is free of
domination, coercion and conflict. This is also clearly not the case. The problem is that
attempts to measure influence have thus far completely bracketed off friendly lobbying
from their considerations. Given that there is an overwhelming consensus in the
literature that interest groups tend to lobby friends and not foes, it seems then that
measuring influence would be well served to take such an insight very seriously.
First, consider the effects of interest group influence. The central difference
between treating interests as informational service bureaus rather than as agents of
pressure is that the former lobby friends rather than foes. Lobbying friends implies that
interest group preferences are congruent with decision-maker preferences. By contrast,
lobbying foes implies a dissonance of preferences between the two groups of actors.
This difference speaks to the type of outcome (effects) we can expect from interest
group influence. Only in the case of lobbying foes could we expect the outcomes of
lobbying to reflect how far interest groups have forced decision-makers to deviate from
their predicted path of behaviour. This outcome becomes irrelevant, however, when
interest group and decision-maker preferences are already aligned. There are no minds
to change, in other words, and tactics of coercion, manipulation and persuasion are
simply irrelevant. Of course, this does not mean that interest groups do not favour
certain policy outcomes. Naturally they do. It is simply to say that they tend to pursue
these outcomes by providing a type of professional informational service to those
decision-makers that already agree with them about these desired policy outcomes.
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While it might be the case that “attained preferences” can be evidence of both
lobbying foes and friends8 (in the second case, when interest group and decision-maker
preferences converge and both get the outcome they want), serious and persistent
methodological problems make this approach unfeasible. Ruling out influence from
other groups and assessing influence in proportion to interest group involvement in the
policy outcome are only secondary concerns to the more basic possibility that the
decision-maker simply did not require interest group input for a particular policy
outcome to obtain. In short, the decision-maker affected a policy outcome alone.
The fact that interest groups tend to lobby friends rather than foes directly
challenges the Weberian notion of power upon which the current research on interest
group influence is based. The interaction between interest groups and decision-makers
cannot rightly be conceived as inherently conflictual. In the parlance of Weber, Dahl,
March and others, A is not trying to get B to do something that B would not otherwise
do. Rather, A exercises influence by assisting B so that both actors arrive at some shared
outcome. There is no dissonance of preferences and, consequently, there is no conflict of
desired outcomes. Weber’s notion of power is simply too narrow to capture the nature
of interest group influence.
Scholars weighing in on the “faces of power” debate of the 1990 and early 2000s
make a useful conceptual distinction between “power over” and “power to” (Dowding,
1991; Morriss, 2002; Lukes, 2005; see also Pitkin, 1972). “Power over” stems from the
Weberian tradition and refers principally to an asymmetrical social relation between
two or more actors that is inherently conflictual. Such a concept of power, to speak with
Lukes, virtually collapses into the concept of “harming” (2005: 5). Power over is really
just a synonym for domination, or “being in somebody’s power.”
8
In essence, the idea of preference attainment is neutral in terms of the nature of lobbying (whether
friendly or conflictual). Nonetheless, I am unaware of any research that measures preference attainment
and works from the assumption that interest groups lobby friends not foes.
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The problem with “power over” is that it only presents one specific aspect of
power. As Morriss argues, “our ability to kick others around (or to harm their interests,
or get them to do things they don’t want to do) can scarcely encompass everything we
understand as power in social contexts” (1987: 33). By contrast, the notion of “power to”
helps us think about power divested of notions of domination, harm and conflict. “Power
to” is defined as the ability of an actor to “effect outcomes” rather than “the ability to
affect others” (Morriss, 2006: 126).
This notion of power has its own important sociological tradition reaching back
to Hannah Arendt’s (1969) understanding of power as “acting in concert” and Talcott
Parsons’ (1963) notion of power as “working toward some collective goal,” both of
which diverge radically from Weber. Morriss helps clarify the difference between the
Weberian tradition and its alternative with reference to the distinction between affect
and effect. “To affect something is to alter it or impinge on it in some way (any way); to
effect something is to bring about or accomplish it (…) you can affect something if you
can alter it in some way; you can effect something if you can accomplish it” (2002: 29f).
Influence through lobbying friendly decision-makers, then, does not impinge, coerce or
dominate. What is more, it does not imply one actor affecting another. One the contrary,
it sees like-minded actors, with converging preferences, working together to bring about
some desired outcome.
How does conceiving of influence in terms of “power to” rather than “power
over” change what we should look for as evidence of influence? We begin with the
insight that interest groups, conceived of as service bureaus rather than agents of
pressure, provide a form of professional informational labour for friendly decisionmakers. Decision-makers, who are understaffed, underfunded and short on time,
necessarily value timely, efficient and reliable information. Importantly, not all interest
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groups are equally capable of supplying information. Thus, decision-makers, in an effort
to maximize the probability of receiving policy-relevant information, will seek to
interact with those interest groups that are the most informed on a given topic, and that
are the most reliable and efficient “information processors.” The main point is that,
rather than changing minds, influence is reflected in the actual interaction between
decision-makers and interest groups.
In some ways thinking about the evidence of influence in this way is akin to
measuring interest group “access” to decision-makers. Access, while admittedly a
“necessary” but not “sufficient” condition for influence, has been used by several
scholars as a proxy for measuring influence (for instance, Eising, 2007; Bouwen,
2004a&b). Following David Truman’s seminal work, “power of any kind cannot be
reached by a political interest group, or its leaders, without access to one or more key
points of decision in the government. Access, therefore, becomes the facilitating
intermediate objective of political interest groups” (quoted in Bouwen, 2004b: 338). But
the point here is that interaction with decision-makers is important in ways other than
as a condition for exercising power-over. Instead, interaction with decision-makers is a
precondition for interest groups acting as service bureaus to friendly decision-makers.
The assumption made here is that groups with more frequent interaction will also be
those providing decision-makers with more information. Given the dependency of
decision-makers on this information, we can further assume that those groups that
provide more information will have more influence on EU policy. What is more,
interaction begets interaction. Decision-makers, being understaffed and pressed for
time, would presumably return to efficient, accurate and reliable sources of information
time and time again. It therefore pays for groups to be reliable efficient information
processors.
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The factors that determine the causes of interest group influence also need to be
reconsidered. Resources and an interest group’s capacity for collective action, typically
used to operationalise influence, not only fail to explain how influence is transformed
into specific outcomes but also overlook the central role played by information in the
interactions between interests and decision-makers. This is not to say that resources
and collective action are not important. Clearly, an interest group’s ability to effectively
process information is to a great degree dependent on its resources and internal
membership structure. Hiring skilled employees to gather and filter information as well
as to do research would increase an interest group’s information-processing capacity.
Similarly, placing resources at the disposal of those running campaigns, finding network
partners, and developing new tactics to transmit information to decision-makers would
also help. The issue, however, is how resources are directed to these activities. Clearly,
interest groups, despite being resource-rich (many employees and plenty of money),
could very well direct few resources at information processing just as resource-poor
groups could place all of their resources in information processing. Thus, while
resources and internal structure matter, they only tell us a small and potentially very
misleading part of the story of interest group influence. By contrast, the theory of
information processing developed here provides a direct way of assessing interest
group influence in the EU.
Focusing on resources and internal group structure also leads to a particularly
grave oversight given that the main EU institutions actively generate a huge demand for
policy information. The Commission in particular has long instituted a policy of
consultation with interest groups, legally binding them to consult widely in the prelegislative stage (European Commission, 2007: Art 1, 8B). While aimed at adding a
further dimension of democratic legitimacy to the EU policy-making process, the
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mandate to consult should not be confused with the Commission’s need to seek out
expert information and advice on key policy issues. It is well documented that the
Commission is grossly understaffed and under-resourced, especially compared to the
extent of its tasks (van Schendelen, 1996; Crombez, 2002; Dür and de Bièvre, 2007).
Putting this in perspective can be useful: “the Commission’s bureaucracy has
approximately 16,000 members, the size of a larger city administration” and thus
necessarily must rely “to a large extent on private actors to supply it with information
and help it draft legislation” (Broscheid and Coen, 2003: 167). In practice, Commission
staff actively and frequently seek out information from interest groups. As Eising
estimates, “Commission officials discuss EU policies as frequently with interest
organizations as with members of the European Parliament or the Council of Ministers”
(2007: 330). While less of a focus in the existing literature, the Parliament, the Council,
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) as well as the EU’s two
consultative bodies, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the
Committee of the Regions (CoR), are also deeply affected by the conditions of
informational asymmetry and rely on interest groups for a steady supply of policy
relevant information (Bouwen, 2009; Hayes-Renshaw, 2009; Lehmann, 2009).
To be sure, it has long been recognized that information is the currency of
lobbying in Brussels, much more so than old-fashioned pressure and purchase tactics
(Broscheid and Coen, 2007; Crombez, 2002). Indeed, information is quite commonly
catalogued alongside other lobbying “resources,” like finances, political support and
legitimacy, as central to exercising influence.9 Nonetheless, most of the research that
does address the informational nature of EU lobbying tends to focus on the demand-side
of this informational relationship, examining the institutional factors that draw EU
9
Importantly, however, information provided to friendly decision-makers is not meant to “sway another
individual,” as Dahl argues (1961: 230)
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decision-makers to consult with interest groups in the first place (Eising, 2007). The
very limited work that does address the supply-side is overly deterministic. Bouwen, for
instance, adopting the exchange metaphor of lobbying, suggests a direct link between an
interest group’s organizational type (whether a group is a diffuse cause group or a group
with concentrated interests, like business groups) with the type of information it is able
to provide (Bouwen, 2004a&b). For instance, business interest groups, being active in
the market and in possession of high financial and personnel resources, are presumably
able to provide technical and expert knowledge on market-related policy.10 The real
weakness of Bouwen’s model is that he does not unravel how interest groups actually
obtain this information or how they provide it to EU decision-makers. What is more, this
theory cannot tell us how different business interests, for example, vary in their ability
to provide expert or technical knowledge.
What is missing from the existing research is a systematic consideration of the
supply-side of this informational relationship between interest groups and decisionmakers. How, for instance, do interest groups gather information, filter it and make
sense of it? How do interest groups generate or produce new information and data
through different research strategies? How do interest groups share information with
other interest groups and how do networks of interest groups facilitate information
sharing? Further, what types of information do interest groups transmit and to which
decision-makers? What techniques do interest groups use to provide this information?
All of these questions are part of what I refer to, in short, as “information processing.” In
what follows I will explain information processing in greater detail, developing a theory
10
By contrast, following Bouwen, European associations, while having fewer resources, are composed of
different national firms and can thus provide information on the so-called “European encompassing
interest.” Lastly, national associations are able to provide high quality information about domestic
encompassing interests, but are less apt in the provision of expert or technical knowledge.
- 39 -
of information processing that will allow us to measure and compare the influence that
different interest groups exercise in the EU decision-making process.
An Information-Processing Theory of Interest Group Influence
I conceive of information processing in two distinct stages, each with two
dimensions (Figure 1). Stage one, the pre-advocacy stage, consists of information
gathering and information networks; stage two, the advocacy stage, consists of
information transparency and information transmission.
Figure 1: Two Stages of Information Processing
STAGE 1
Pre-Advocacy
 Information Gathering
STAGE 2
Advocacy
 Information Transparency
(timely monitoring and research)
(accuracy and reliability)
 Information Networks
 Information Transmission
(sharing information among groups)
(types, tactics and targets)
The pre-advocacy stage, as its name implies, is more a preparatory stage where interest
groups conduct various activities that will allow them to act more efficiently in the
advocacy stage. It is, in this sense, akin to what Heinz et al. refer to as the “organisational
management” of interest groups, which includes monitoring and compiling technical
data (1993: 88). Van Schendelen gathers the same basic set of activities under what he
calls “public affairs management,” a broad term that marries more typically thought of
lobbying activities with monitoring, research, networking and coalition building (2005:
44&103). But making a distinction between these two stages really does not capture the
dynamic interactions that exist between them. Indeed, there are feedback mechanisms
that affect how groups perform in both stages. In this sense, the two stages represent
ideal types and a heuristic device for operationalising variables related to the activities
in both stages. I will discuss each in turn.
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Stage 1: Pre-Advocacy
Information Gathering
Information gathering is a matter of how: (1) interest groups manage to keep upto-date on EU policy initiatives through various monitoring activities and (2) how they
generate information through different research strategies. The two are linked.
Monitoring allows interests to anticipate the informational needs of decision-makers
and is carried out in the gathering, parsing, and filtering of various formal and informal
information sources (from newspapers to official documents to word of mouth).
Generating information through research is a type of expertise building and can be
understood as a response to the anticipated needs of the decision-maker. While some
recent work has highlighted the conditions under which interest groups use research in
the policy-making process, surprisingly little work considers the ways in which this kind
of information is generated and what this might mean in terms of influence (Esterling,
2004). The key to information gathering is timing. Efficient information gathering
allows interest groups to accurately and efficiently anticipate and respond to the
informational needs of decision-makers. There is a premium on early, efficient and
reliable information in the EU. Late information has little or no value in the EU decisionmaking process.
Information Networks
Keeping up-to-date on EU activities and anticipating the informational needs of
decision-makers also has a very important social dimension. After all, as Heclo has
compellingly argued, “lobbyists are more than mere technical experts, they are network
people” (1978: 103). To a great extent, interest groups gather information through their
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formal and informal networks with other interest groups. But not all networks are
created equal. On this point, Granovetter’s (1978) seminal work on the strength of
weak-ties is particularly helpful. Strong-ties exist in small networks of tightly knit
individuals whose salient similarities nurture enduring links based on trust and social
capital. Weak-ties, by contrast, exist between members in large, loosely connected
networks where similarities among actors are broad and corresponding levels of social
capital are diminished. Despite the many clear benefits associated with strong-ties, such
close-knit networks tend to circulate redundant information: a function of the similarity
of each member and the diminutive size of the network. Weak-ties, by contrast, are
“strong” in an information-sharing sense. With more members from different
backgrounds offering different forms of expertise and information, weak-tie networks
facilitate the circulation of novel information, approaches and strategies. As such, weakties provide the conditions for a more efficient form of information sharing among
network members, thus enhancing a network’s ability to gather, filter and generate
policy relevant information useful to decision-makers (Heinz et al.; Carpenter et al.,
2004; Carpenter et al., 1998).
Stage Two: Advocacy
Information Transparency
The advocacy stage moves from the preparatory tasks that interest groups
conduct in order to keep up-to-date on EU activities and to anticipate the informational
needs of EU decision-makers to the actual provision of this information to decisionmakers. The first issue that needs to be addressed relates to the basic conditions of
information transmission. To what extent is the process transparent and open? Do
decision-makers need to employ costly oversight, monitoring and information
- 42 -
verification procedures? When can we expect interest groups to provide decisionmakers with accurate, reliable, timely and complete information and when can we
expect them to “dissemble” – that is, to mischaracterize, exaggerate and even
strategically withhold information? Formal modelling conducted in the US lobbying
context frames the conditions for answering these questions. Put briefly, dissembling
occurs when interest groups lobby foes (when interest group and decision-maker
preferences diverge) and the provision of honest and accurate information occurs when
interest groups lobby friends (when interest group and decision-maker preference
converge). Thus, information transparency is about the nature of lobbying in the EU and
about the nature of the relationship between EU interest groups and EU decisionmakers. It therefore speaks to the basic assumption about lobbying friends made in the
present analysis. It also speaks to interest group influence in the EU. The provision of
accurate, reliable and complete information reduces oversight, monitoring and
verification costs and nurtures a process of informational exchange that would see
“honest” interest groups interacting more frequently with friendly decision-makers.
Information Transmission
The final stage of information processing involves the actual transmission of
information from interest groups to EU decision-makers. Information transmission
refers to three interrelated strategic choices that face interest groups. First, groups need
to consider the type of information (ranging from legal information to highly technical
and expert information about the social and economic impact of a given policy, to
information about public opinion) to send to decision-makers. Second, groups are also
faced with a choice among various tactics to use when transmitting information. These
range from old-fashioned shoe-leather strategies like face-to-face meetings, letter
- 43 -
writing or making phone calls to large-scale “outside” strategies like hosting public
events and launching media campaigns. Third, the target at which information is aimed
is also an important strategic decision. There are six such targets in the EU, each of
which present interest groups with different incentives for transmitting information: the
European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP), the Council of Ministers,
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC) and the Committee of Regions (CoR).
Groups are thus faced with a series of interrelated strategic choices when it
comes to information transmission. How do choices with regard to one aspect of
information transmission affect choices with regard to the other two? Do groups
sending one type of information tend to send it to only certain targets using certain
tactics? Further, which interest groups tend to send which types of information using
which tactics to which targets?
In general terms, efficiency in each of the four dimensions of information
processing is related to increased interest group influence. More specifically, we can
generate a set of general working hypotheses for each of the four dimensions. For
information gathering, timing and information reliability are key. Thus, influence is a
function of quickly and efficiently monitoring EU activities, gathering and filtering
reliable and timely information and generating relevant information through various
research strategies. The strength of weak-ties argument provides the working
hypothesis for information networks. Influence is a function of interest groups
belonging to weak-tie networks that facilitate the sharing and dissemination of novel
information and new contacts. Information transparency speaks to the costs that EU
decision-makers face when receiving information from interest groups. In this case,
interest group probity, reducing these costs, places considerably less burden on the
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informational exchange process and nurtures a sense of trust and openness between
decision-makers and interest groups. Thus, influence is a function of interest groups
providing complete and accurate information in a transparent manner. Lastly,
information transmission refers to the types of information sent to decision-makers, the
tactics used to do so and the decision-makers targeted. In this case, more is better.
Influence is therefore a function of transmitting more types of information, using more
tactics and targeting more decision-makers.
Conclusion
This chapter has sketched out a theory of information processing for interest
group influence in the EU. Perhaps the most important point made above is that the
assumptions upon which this theory rests differ markedly from existing ones. More
precisely, it eschews a conception of influence that presupposes a Weberian notion of
power, implying conflict in the interactions between interest groups and decisionmakers. Such a conflictual relationship is far from the reality of lobbying in the EU and
elsewhere. Rather than trying to change the minds of unfriendly decision-makers,
interest groups are far more likely to lobby friendly decision-makers. Divested of its
conflictual nature, lobbying is better understood as a process whereby interest groups
provide a type of professional labour to friendly decision-makers. This labour consists
principally of providing these decision-makers with policy-relevant information. While
it would certainly be an exaggeration to claim that all lobbying is friendly (just as much
as it would be erroneous to claim that all lobbying is inherently conflictual), this analysis
contends that thinking about lobbying in this way helps bring the study of influence in
line with the rest of the interest group literature and gives a more accurate picture of the
nature of lobbying itself.
- 45 -
Taking these insights seriously, I thus propose measuring influence in terms of an
interest group’s ability to provide this professional service to decision-makers. I analyse
a group’s ability to carry out such a service under the rubric of information processing.
Putting this into more concrete terms requires examining information processing as a
matter of information gathering, information networks, information transparency and,
finally, information transmission. This theory is consistent with treating lobbying in
non-conflictual terms, arguing that evidence of influence cannot be observed in policy
outcomes. Doing so, I have argued, will lead us out of the methodological dead-end that
has otherwise dogged the study of interest group influence in the EU.
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Chapter 3
RESEARCHING INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE IN THE EU
The present analysis offers a new way of thinking about interest group influence
in the EU. Several key insights frame my argument: influence is not based on a Weberian
notion of power that is inherently conflictual; influence is not about interest groups
trying to change the minds of decision-makers; influence, moreover, is not evinced in
specific policy outcomes. Instead, influence is a function of an interest group’s capacity
to provide policy-relevant information to friendly decision-makers. That is, influence is a
function of information processing -- information gathering, networking, transparency
and transmission – and groups that are more efficient information processors also have
more influence. Having established a new theory of interest group influence and having
presented a hypothesis to bear out this theory, we are now in a position to determine
how to empirically test both. As such, this chapter will outline a research design suitable
for collecting and testing data with regard to an information processing theory of
interest group influence.
By eschewing a notion of influence rooted in faulty assumptions concerning
preference attainment and a Weberian notion of power, my new theory avoids the
methodological issues hindering traditional analysis of interest group influence.
However, the present analysis is still faced with a number of key methodological
dilemmas. Chief among them is the very basic but fundamental issue of defining the
interest group concept. Indeed, without a workable definition of “interest groups” we
neither have a clear idea of our basic unit of analysis nor of the population that we are
studying. It follows that, without these two elements, we cannot generalize from our
- 47 -
data about interest groups nor make reliable and relevant comparisons across different
cases.
This chapter begins with a consideration of the interest group concept and a
proposal for an inclusive, precise and workable definition. It follows with a detailed
description of how I have assessed the interest group population in the EU and the
methods used for developing a sampling frame used in this analysis. This sample
provides the basic list of interest groups used in testing my hypothesis. It is to this end
that I have conducted elite interviews as well as a large-scale online survey. Issues
related to the techniques used in the interviews and questions of survey design and
dissemination will also be discussed.
Defining the Interest Group Concept
The study of interest groups suffers from a serious ambiguity with regard to its
basic unit of analysis – namely, the interest group concept itself. A major issue is the
multitude of competing and quite often incommensurate neologisms on offer: interest
groups, political interest groups, interest associations, interest organisations, organised
interests, pressure groups, specific interests, concentrated interest groups, cause
groups, diffuse groups, special interest groups, citizen interest groups, public interest
groups, non-governmental organisations, social movement organisations, and civil
society organisations, to list just a few (see Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008: 1106). In
fact, the lack of a shared vocabulary in social scientific analyses of what, in essence, is
the same phenomenon, acts as a formidable “barrier to accumulation” of knowledge in
interest group research (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 22). The inability to pin down
the interest group concept has been implicated in “the marginalization of interest group
studies within the political science discipline” (Jordan, Halpin and Maloney, 2004: 196)
- 48 -
as well as a balkanization within the research area that has led scholars to speak at cross
purposes (Eising, 2008: 5). Ultimately, without a clear definition of what an interest
group is (or is not), research is hard pressed to adequately gather data, make
comparisons and draw out any positive conclusions.
The problem of clarifying the interest group concept in the EU context has been
exacerbated by the inability of the EU itself to settle on the consistent use of a single
term referencing these groups. Following its 1993 shift in focus to associative
democracy, the Commission began making specific reference to institutionalising
interaction with so-called “special interest groups” (European Commission, 1993: 1). By
the time of the 2001 White Paper on European Governance, however, the less pejorative
but similarly nebulous term “civil society” was appropriated (European Commission,
2001). But the vocabulary changed again just a few years later, this time with the
Commission referring first to “interested parties” in a 2002 Communication as well as a
2006 Green Paper, and second to “interest representatives” in a 2009 Communication
(European Commission, 2002; 2006; 2009). Indeed, this last term has been most
recently codified by the Commission’s online Register. Making the problem worse still is
the EU’s careless, imprecise and tenuous inclusion (and exclusion) of the types of
interest groups that fall under these different labels. Initially, the Commission worked
from an ill-defined range of so-called non-profit (including primarily European and
(inter)national associations/federations) and for-profit groups (like legal advisors,
public relations and public affairs firms, and consultants) (European Commission, 1993:
1). This was later expanded to include trade unions, employers’ unions, nongovernmental organisations, professional associations, charities, grass roots
organisations, and even organisations that involve citizens in local and municipal life
(European Commission, 2001: 14, n9). Most recently, the list of relevant groups has
- 49 -
been extended even further to include “representatives from regional and local
authorities,” “academics and technical experts,” “interested parties from third countries”
(in 2002) as well as think tanks, legal advisors (or law firms) and consultancies (in
2006) (European Commission, 2002 & 2006).
Clearly, bringing clarity to the interest group concept requires a careful
negotiation of the inclusiveness of the concept (to include as many ‘like’ groups as
possible) with a rigorous limpet test for similarity of ‘kind’, and not degree, between
cases. The major difficulty here is that as we move up the ladder of abstraction to
include more groups, the likelihood of degreeism, parochialism and concept stretching
radically increases (see Sartori, 1970). In this analysis, following Beyers, Eising and
Maloney (2008), I opt for the basic term “interest group” and define it across three
dimensions: organisation, political interests, and informality. These dimensions are
crucial for determining which types of groups fall under the auspices of the term
“interest group” and which groups do not. First, interest group organisation is geared
toward the representation of either aggregate individual interests or, likewise,
organised forms of political behaviour (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008: 1106; see also
Jordan, Halpin and Maloney, 2004). While including groups that have members, like
trade unions and NGOs, and those that do not, like companies and consultancies, it
excludes broad social movements and fleeting waves of public opinion. This
differentiates the study of interest groups from the social movement and contentious
politics literature and also acknowledges evidence that groups like think-tanks, public
relations consultancies and foundations reflect a new type of “member-less” group
(Skocpol, 2004). Second, interest groups have political interests insofar as they seek to
influence the policymaking process (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008: 1106). This is
perhaps the least contentious characteristic of interest groups and has found
- 50 -
considerable consensus in the literature (Michalowitz, 2007; Watson and Shackelton,
2008; Coen, 2007; Woll, 2006). The third characteristic, that groups are informal, acts on
and helps clarify the second characteristic. Group informality means simply that groups
do not “normally seek public office nor compete in elections” (Beyers, Eising and
Maloney, 2008: 1106f: see also Gerber, 1999; Coen, 2007; for a different view see
Mahoney, 2008). This characteristic is crucial in that it differentiates interest groups
from elected actors who can also very well seek to influence policy. For interest groups,
importantly, goals are pursued through “informal” interaction with elected actors,
politicians and bureaucrats. Taking these three characteristics together, we can define
interest groups as follows: any group that seeks to influence the policymaking process but
does not seek to be elected.
This encompassing definition of interest groups is key to the comparative
dimension of the present analysis. While necessarily excluding office seekers and social
movements, it captures the four basic sub-types of interest group that are most
commonly referred to in the EU related literature: diffuse interest groups (like NGOs and
trade unions), private interest groups (like companies and professional associations), as
well as consultancies (both public affairs and media relations consultancies) and public
authorities (namely, representations of cities, regions, local authorities and
municipalities) (Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008; Watson and Shacketon, 2008; Eising,
2007b; Michalowitz, 2007b; Greenwood, 2007). These four basic sub-types, insofar as
they are deeply entrenched in the literature, are useful when talking about interest
group activities and influence. This is particularly the case with the private and diffuse
sub-types. There are, for instance, a series of long held but rarely tested assumptions
about private and diffuse interest groups drawing on insights from research on
collective action as well as interest group intermediation at the state level. Thus, private
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interest groups are assumed to easily provide selective incentives to curb free-riding,
have considerable resources to lobby effectively, and by consequence, have privileged
access to the policy-making process. Diffuse interest groups, by contrast, are assumed to
struggle to curb free-riding among a diverse and large membership. By the same token,
diffuse groups are assumed to have limited resources and, consequently, little access to
the policy-making process. Research applying these sub-types rarely disaggregates
among group types and therefore tends to make generalizations across otherwise
different group types (i.e., conflating trade unions and NGOs as diffuse interest groups).
While the present study does disaggregate between different group types within each
sub-type it is still useful to retain these sub-types to compare how conclusions made
here hold up to the assumptions made in the literature. Additionally, by moving beyond
the traditional dichotomy of private and diffuse groups, the inclusion of public
authorities and consultancies will enhance the comparative power of this analysis.
Establishing the Interest Group Population
Defining the interest group concept is just the first step in the process of
empirically testing an information processing theory of interest group influence in the
EU. The next step is more pragmatic and turns on the use of this definition to determine
a workable list of interest group types to include in the analysis. Doing so will give us a
sense of the size and scope of the interest group population in the EU as well as the tools
for determining a sampling frame from which we can begin our empirical analysis.
A central challenge for any research on interest groups in the EU is that there is
no single, reliable list or register of these groups outlining the interest group population.
Instead, there are several different lists serving different purposes and aims, and which,
to speak with Berkhout and Lowery, enjoy “surprisingly little overlap” (2008: 509).
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Traditionally, scholars have relied almost exclusively on the now defunct CONNECS list
(replaced by the Commission’s Register of Interest Representatives) or the “European
Public Affairs Directory” published by Landmarks. Both lists carry some baggage.
CONNECS, for instance, had a specific Brussels-focus and thus “over-sample(d)”
European associations at the expense of national interest groups. The “European Public
Affairs Directory” is more comprehensive, listing corporate interests, think-tanks and
regional interest representations alongside national, supranational and international
group, but is generated by altogether unclear selection criteria (Ibid.: 493). The main
point is that the choice of data source from which a sample is drawn “may have real
consequences” on one’s empirical results (Ibid, 506). Indeed, having a concrete idea of
the interest group population is a fundamental prerequisite to generalizing from our
data.
Rather than relying on a single list of interest groups, I have generated my own
list from three different existing sources: the Commission’s online Register of Interest
Representatives, the 2008 edition of the “European Public Affairs Directory,” and the
online “Brussels-Europe Liaison Office” list of sub-national offices in Brussels from the
Brussels Capital Region office (2009).11 The Commission’s Register, while effectively
replacing the CONNECS list of interest groups, has been received somewhat critically by
scholars and the media. To be sure, the introduction to this analysis reproduced a
cartoon highlighting the perceived limitations of the Register in the press (for similar
sentiments, see EurActiv, 2009; European Voice, 2009; Corporate Europe Observatory,
2009). Additionally, recent academic work, although recognising that it “could be an
important new data source”(Wonka et al., 2010: 474), still does not fully embrace the
Register. While part of the problem is the representativeness of the Register, the main
11
The Brussels-Europe Liaison Office list is available online at: http://www.blbe.be/directory/find.asp.
This web-site was accessed in September 2009.
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issue is quality and comparability of the information registered groups have provided -for instance, ambiguous financial disclosures (Ibid). None of this information, however,
is necessary for this analysis. Rather, I have used the Register, together with two other
sources, to collate a list of contact information for interest groups active in the EU. What
is more, issues of representativeness have more recently been largely assuaged, with the
Register now boasting over 3,100 entrants. While still not achieving its “full potential,”
to speak with a 2009 Commission Communication, coverage is “already quite
significant” (European Commission, 2009: 2).
The use of the European Public Affairs Directory, perhaps the most commonly
used list by scholars, helped flesh out the Commission’s registry. Further, the addition of
the Liaison Office list was critical for including a full range of regional, municipal and city
interest groups (public authorities). At the time of accessing this list in September 2009,
there were almost 200 regional, municipal and city interest groups listed. The main
function of this list is to provide up-to-date and reliable contact details for these groups.
Importantly, this list was not restricted to groups in the EU-27, but included many
groups from third countries as well.
A list of eleven different types of interest groups was generated from a
comparison of these three sources and define the population of interest groups used in
this analysis: professional associations, companies, law firms, public affairs
consultancies, chambers of commerce, academic organisations, trade unions, NGOs and
associations of NGOs, representatives of religions, churches and communities of
conviction, think-tanks, and, lastly, public authorities like regions, cities and
municipalities. It is important to note that my list is not limited to interest groups
situated in Brussels, but rather includes groups with offices in EU Member States as well
as in third countries. In this sense, I follow Wonka et al. in acknowledging that there are
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“a large variety of interests, from countries within and outside of Europe and
geographically rooted at the regional, national, supranational and international levels”
that pursue their goals through the EU (2010: 464). Excluding interest groups without a
Brussels-based office, as Mahoney does in a 2004 study, requires bracketing-off a
significant portion of the interest group population.12
Working from the Commission’s Register, the Brussels-Europe Liaison Office list
and the European Public Affairs Directory, a list of 2,500 interest groups was generated.
I used a simple proportional sampling technique (systematically selecting every nth
group on the list (see Rea and Parker, 2005: 163)) to minimize sampling biases (more
on sampling biases below). From this, I established a sampling frame of 1,000 interest
groups. This list was used to solicit responses for a large-scale online survey.13
Research Design Implementation
The sheer size of the EU interest group population and the differences among the
various types of interest groups considered in this analysis pose significant issues when
we move to empirical analysis. This general complexity is one of the reasons why much
of the extant work falls into the category of case studies of one or just a few different
types of groups (Beyers, Haplin and Maloney, 2008). “Most of the time,” as Beyers,
Halpin and Maloney note, the results of these case studies “are restricted to particular
types of groups and their influence with regard to specific issues or policy areas under a
specific set of conditions” (Ibid.: 1108). Systematic comparative research among many
different types of interest groups is rare. The little work that is systematically
comparative restricts the interest group population to just of few of the usual suspects,
12
Mahoney argues, I think wrongly, that “a Brussels base is a prerequisite for any interest seeking a role
in the EU and for whom the stakes involved in European public affairs are significant” (2004: 452).
13 Selecting interest groups for interviews was based less systematically on opportunity and snowball
sampling.
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like business groups, NGOs and trade unions (see Mahoney, 2008; Greenwood, 1997;
Coen, 1997; 2002). Otherwise, extant comparative analyses serve more of a stocktaking
function, outlining the basic lobbying footprint in Brussels without explicitly addressing
the question of interest group influence (Greenwood, 2007; Coen and Richardson, eds.,
2009).
While case studies are useful for providing detail-rich narratives of interest group
activities and for identifying the causal mechanisms of interest group influence, they are
limited in their ability to draw out generalisable conclusions (van Evera, 1997; George
and Bennett, 2004). I contend that testing the theory of information processing
proposed in this analysis is best served by conducting semi-structured interviews and a
large-scale online survey. First, the theory of interest group influence posited in this
analysis marks a considerable departure from existing research on interest group
influence. Surveys are particularly useful in gathering data from a large number of
respondents in a manner that will help flesh-out, in broad terms, the framework of
interest group influence in the EU. Given that an information processing theory of
influence is relatively uncharted territory, this type of data gathering exercise is an
essential first step toward translating theory into empirical analysis. Second, surveys are
a useful way to address the comparative dimension of this analysis. They can be used to
rather easily gather data from a vast array of different types of interest groups.
Interviews
I carried out 47 semi-structured elite interviews with interest group
representatives in October and December 2009 with 17 follow-up interviews in
November 2010. Interview requests were made via both email and phone (depending
upon availability of contact information) and were aimed at interest group presidents,
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directors, and department heads. In order to increase participation and put respondents
at ease, the interviews were offered in the EU’s three official working languages: English,
German and French. Interviewees were assured of their anonymity from the point of
solicitation and, at the end of each interview, were provided, in writing, with the option
of being identified or not identified in any future reports resulting from this research.
When possible, interviews were voice recorded.
Interviews were structured around a set number of core questions. Questions
were tailored to be open-ended in nature, thereby inviting interviewees to provide
details about what they thought was important. Nevertheless, questions centred on the
four main dimensions of information processing -- gathering, networking, transparency
and transmission -- as well as more general questions about the nature of influence,
lobbying and interaction with decision-makers in the EU. While such semi-structured
interviews are useful in generating long, rich narratives about a topic, they also push the
boundaries of social science validity and reliability. As Berry put it in a useful analysis of
interviewing techniques, semi-structured interviews are perhaps “the riskiest but
potentially the most valuable type of elite interviewing”(2002: 679). Nevertheless, the
careful and timely use of probes and prompts were used to help reign in interviewees
who strayed too far from the interview protocol.
In addition to gathering useful qualitative data about interest group activities in
the EU, the interviews served a second purpose, namely to pre-test my online survey.14
Such pre-tests are useful for optimising the design of the survey in terms of its layout
and question wording (Fowler, 2009: 122). As such, when time permitted, a short,
researcher-administered survey was conducted at the end of each interview. Attention
was paid to question order, wording and comprehensibility. Interviewees asking for
14
Pre-test survey results were only used to improve the final survey and were not used in the analyses.
- 57 -
clarification about a question or those who were unsure about the meaning of a word or
question were taken as potential indications of a weakness in the survey itself.
Interviewees giving “inadequate answers” also suggested that survey questions might
need to be re-worked or even dropped (Ibid: 123). Attention was also paid to the
interviewees’ use of language, and in particular the jargon used in their answers. Using
jargon can be helpful in making a survey “speak the language” of the target population
rather than that of social scientists. The pre-tests also provided insight into how long the
online questionnaire should be, paying careful attention to interviewee stamina and
degree of interest for each question.
Surveys
Requests to complete an online survey were sent to 1,000 interest group
representatives active in lobbying in Brussels. Three different solicitation emails were
sent to prospective respondents at two-week intervals. Each email contained a
hyperlink to the actual survey. While following the hyperlink might admittedly pose a
challenge to a few less technologically savvy respondents, the dangers of providing the
survey in the email or as an attached file are greater. Surveys that are part of an email
look objectionably long and tedious and do not allow for simple “point and click”
responses. Additionally, attached surveys can run into any number of formatting and
downloading issues not to mention the added burden placed on the respondent to send
the survey back via a separate email (Couper, 2000). As with the interviews, group
presidents, directors and office heads were targeted as much as possible and emails
were addressed personally to the relevant individual.
The survey consisted of ten questions and was, like the interviews, made
available in English, German and French. All questions were close-ended and required
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respondents to input answers on a basic, five-point Likert scale (from 1 to 5). A Likert
scale was chosen to provide respondents was a “neutral category” (represented by 3) in
order to not frustrate respondents who were not comfortable providing more
substantive / evaluative responses for certain questions (Sue and Ritter, 2007: 74).
Instructions about how to complete the survey were kept to a minimum, as were the
different question formats. In fact, only two different types of question were used: either
“how important” or “how frequently” questions, both of which could be answered on the
same 1-5 Likert scale (see appendix for the English version of the survey).
While online surveys present a new and powerful tool for social science research,
Internet access still poses a serious challenge for avoiding coverage errors (Couper,
2000: 467). This is a particularly salient issue when dealing with a geographically and
socio-economically diverse target population. Those who do not have convenient access
to the Internet are systematically excluded from the survey. However, researchers have
acknowledged that “for some groups, such as company employees, members of
professional associations, or college students, email access has reached nearly all and
these groups can relatively easily be surveyed via email” (Schaefer and Dillman, 1998:
387). Interest groups are thus an ideal population to be targeted by online surveys.
Nonetheless, coverage errors, specifically “unit non-response” and “item non-response,”
still require careful attention with regard to survey design. I will discuss both in turn.
Unit non-response is a “function of selected respondents choosing not to
participate in the survey” (Sue and Ritter, 2007: 35). Clearly, some reasons for unit nonresponse are beyond our control, like the survey never reaching the individual for
whatever reason or the individual simply refusing to respond. However, two specific
challenges of unit non-response were identified for this survey. First, some of the
interest groups included in this analysis do not necessarily consider themselves to be
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interest groups. Negative connotations linked to the concept “interest group” and,
perhaps more so, lobbying, lead some types of interest groups to eschew the interest
group label. To give a recent example, the Commission’s new Register of Interest
Representatives was initially “boycotted” by both law firms and think-tanks – these
groups did not to be saddled with the more pejorative connotations related to lobbying
(EurActiv, 2009). These groups simply do not self-identify as interest groups. To assuage
the potential effects of this issue, the survey and solicitation letters avoided using such
charged terminology. Rather, neutral terms were used as much as possible; for instance,
reference was made to each respondent’s organisation (not group) and to its efforts to
pursue its goals (not interests) at the European level. Further, each survey respondent
was able to identify their type of group from a large, drop-down menu in the survey,
which also contained a comment box for groups that preferred to describe their
organisation in other terms altogether (this accounts for the “other” category in Table 1,
below). The fact that the information processing theory of interest group influence
already eschews assumptions about interest group pressure and purchase tactics also
made avoiding such charged vocabulary easier.
A second related issue is language. As noted, the survey was made available in
English, German and French. Survey translation is, itself, a very powerful strategy for
minimizing coverage errors of unit non-response (Sue and Ritter, 2007: 85). Of course,
the broad geographic focus of this analysis, ranging from all 27 EU Member States to
third countries, makes translation to all response languages impossible. Even translation
into the EU’s 23 official languages would be prohibitively costly and incredibly difficult
to control in terms of translation quality. Nonetheless, giving respondents a choice of
three different language options goes some distance in making the survey more
understandable and perhaps even more culturally accessible to respondents.
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The second potential source of coverage error, item non-response, is a function of
respondents skipping a question or series of questions in the survey. Item non-response
is more specifically about survey design. In particular, skipping questions has been
linked to survey length. As van Selm and Jankowski note plainly, “the longer the
questionnaire, the less likely people will respond” (2006: 441; see also Rea and Parker,
2005: 46, who recommend that surveys require no longer than fifteen minutes).
Working from insights gathered in the survey pre-tests, I opted for a short ten-question
survey. The solicitation letter itself stressed that the survey was short and would only
take, on average, about 15 minutes. Importantly, even this time frame proved to be too
demanding from some respondents. For instance, I received a response email from one
respondent indicating she would not complete the survey because even a ten-minute
survey is too demanding.
Of the 1,000 interest groups solicited, 308 responses were received, putting the
response rate at about 30%. A breakdown of responses organised by interest group
types is presented in Table 1, below.15
Table 1:
Distribution of Online Survey Responses by Interest Group Type
Interest Group Type
Companies
Professional Associations
Public Affairs Consultancies
Trade Unions
Chambers of Commerce
Law Firms
Academic organisations
NGOs/Association of NGOs
Think-Tanks
Representatives of religions, churches and
communities of conviction
Public Authorities (regions, cities, municipalities)
Other
Frequency
44
73
30
28
4
0
2
78
4
1
Percent
14.29
23.70
9.74
9.08
1.30
0
0.65
25.32
1.30
0.32
34
10
11.04
3.25
Total
308
100.00
15
Since interest groups identify their “group type” in the survey it is impossible to determine response
rates per group type.
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Clearly, the response rates for chambers of commerce, law firms, academic
organisations, think-tanks and religious organisations are disappointingly low.
Admittedly, some of these groups are not commonly thought of as interest groups in a
traditional sense. It is not that these groups do not pursue their interests through EU
channels, but rather that they do so only infrequently. They are primarily “latent”
interest groups (see Beyers, Eising and Maloney, 2008: 1107). Respondents being
unable to self-identify as interest groups and therefore thinking that the survey simply
does not apply to them might explain low response rates. Despite efforts to use neutral
terms and concepts in the survey to avoid negative connotations commonly linked to
lobbying, and thereby expanding the applicability of the survey, further work needs to
be done to solicit responses from these groups. Law firms pose a further obstacle in that
they are bound to a code of professional secrecy that would effectively and radically
restrict their ability to participate in any survey. Nonetheless, response rates for the
remainder of the other types of interest groups were sufficient to conduct comparative,
empirical analyses.
Conclusion
The survey design presented in this chapter is meant to address the challenges
and requirements of testing a theory of information processing. Elite semi-structured
interviews coupled with a large-scale online survey best meet the requirements of data
gathering across a vast array of different types of interest groups. Many steps were
taken to ensure that conclusions and empirical findings meet basic social-scientific
requirements for generalising across different groups as well as inferring the
characteristics of the target population from the responses provided by the sample
population. More specifically, a sampling frame was generated using data from three
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different lists of interest groups in the EU. While each list is limited on its own, a collated
list has the benefit of being more inclusive and exhaustive. Further, proportional
sampling was used to ensure that all population members were given an equal chance of
being selected in this study. In this way, both sampling biases and coverage errors were
minimised. The use of an online survey, as opposed to more traditional mail-in survey or
researcher-administered survey, while providing the advantage of ease-of-access and
quick turnaround, posed several methodological challenges in terms of unit and item
non-response. Several measures were taken to address these issues.
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CHAPTER 4
INFORMATION GATHERING:
MONITORING, INFORMATION SOURCES, FILTERING & RESEARCH
The task of providing information to decision-makers is preceded by a series of
activities that I have labelled “information gathering.” Before interest groups can send
information to decision-makers they first need to acquire it and decide when and where
to send it. Information gathering is about keeping track of the policy activities of the EU,
anticipating the informational needs of decision-makers and preparing to respond to
these needs. To this end, interest groups engage in expansive monitoring activities
whereby they act as “early warning radar systems” for their members, clients or
stakeholders. To the same end, interest groups turn to any number of information
sources for details about policy changes, important issues, upcoming events, and various
opportunities for consultation. Information gathering, however, does not entail pouring
aimlessly over newspapers, press releases and official EU documents, but rather making
sense of these information sources and, perhaps more importantly, efficiently sifting and
sorting the relevant from the irrelevant information. While these activities help interest
groups anticipate the informational needs of decision-makers, it is through various
research strategies that interest groups prepare to respond to these needs. Research can
involve post hoc and predictive evaluations, reports summarizing and synthesizing other
publically available data as well as large-scale studies that generate new data.
Timing is the central issue for information gathering. There is a premium on
early, efficient and reliable information in the EU. Decision-makers value policy relevant
information but only if it is received in time for it to be useful in the policy-making
process. Too late, and information loses all of its value. Therefore, interest groups must
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quickly and efficiently determine what the issue is, what information is needed, who
requires it and, lastly, how to respond. Interest groups, in other words, need to be
efficient information gatherers. I assess the extent to which different types of interest
groups are able to efficiently gather information using data collected from elite
interviews with interest group representatives active in the EU as well as data from an
online survey. I contend that efficient information gathering is a function of four related
factors: (1) prioritizing monitoring activities over other interest group activities, (2)
prioritizing information sources that provide interest groups with the most timely
information, (3) implementing filtering strategies that allow for the quick and precise
differentiation of useful from less useful information, and (4) prioritizing research
strategies that are meant to address the informational needs of decision-makers. The
main finding presented in this chapter is that efficient information gathering turns
heavily on an interest group’s ability to gather information at the earliest possible stage
of the policy-making process, but only to the extent that information quality and
reliability are not compromised.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section I place these arguments in
context, examining the extent to which interest groups prioritize monitoring over other
activities like influencing EU decisions and securing EU funds. Next I examine the
different information sources that interest groups use for information gathering. I
differentiate between formal, informal and EU information sources and assess which
sources provide both the most reliable as well as the timeliest information. This is
followed by an examination of various information filtering strategies used by interest
groups to shift efficiently through these information sources. Finally, I look at the
different kinds of research strategies interest groups tend to implement and assess why
certain types of groups tend to place more emphasis on research than others.
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Information Monitoring
The paucity of empirical work on information gathering is surprising given the
general importance attributed to monitoring in the interest group literature. As the neopluralist literature has stressed, lobbying is not a singular activity unilaterally focused
on pressuring decision-makers to make particular policy changes. As service bureaus
providing information to friendly decision-makers, interest groups are driven to
perform a host of diffuse organisational activities of which monitoring is one of the most
important (Beyers et al., 2008; Lowery, 2008; Hall and Deardorff, 2006). For instance,
Baumgartner and Leech’s 1998 comprehensive review of the literature stresses that “the
ability to monitor” is one of the most important activities of the Washington lobbyist
insofar as it translates into an “ability to mobilize quickly” (1998: 97). Salisbury points
out that broad monitoring activities are less the exception than the rule in the American
lobbying context (1990). Heinz et al., in their effort to challenge journalistic assumptions
about lobbying heavyweights in Washington, found compelling evidence from their
large-scale survey that interest groups allocate more than 40% of their time to so-called
“organizational activities,” in particular “monitoring changes in rules, regulations and
laws” (1993: 99).
While work in the EU context also attributes significant importance to
monitoring, much of what has been written is impressionistic. Michalowitz, for example,
observes that monitoring activities, as part of a system of “political analysis” that also
consists of a type of radar and early warning system, are “the largest part of all interest
group lobbying activities” (2007: 75; see also Busch-Janser, 2004). Similarly, Lehmann
(2003) lists monitoring as one of the primary working tools for EU interest groups, and
Goergen (2006) identifies it as one of the five main stages of lobbying in the EU.
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But to what extent are these impressions accurate? Does the same significant
focus on monitoring activities that Heinz et al. found present in the US context extend to
the EU? These questions are inherently comparative. How important is monitoring for
EU interest groups and how important is it in relation to typical pressure and purchase
priorities like influencing policy and securing funding? Survey results help provide an
answer to these questions. Respondents were asked about the importance (ranked on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all important” and 5 being “very important”) of the
following four activities: monitoring EU activities, influencing EU decisions, and securing
EU funding. The results are presented in Table 2, below.
Table 2
The Importance of Monitoring for Interest Groups in the EU
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Importance
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
Monitoring EU activities
19 (6.23)
10 (3.28)
19 (6.23)
66 (21.64)
191 (62.62)
Influencing EU decisions
12 (3.93)
14 (4.59)
53 (17.38)
69 (22.62)
157 (51.48)
Securing EU funds
60 (20.76)
71 (24.57)
59 (20.42)
49 (16.96)
50 (17.30)
Total
Mean
Standard deviation
305 (100)
4.31
1.13
305 (100)
4.13
1.10
289 (100)
2.85
1.38
Monitoring clearly is the most important activity for interest groups in the EU.
Over 62% of respondents report that monitoring is “very important,” while about 51%
report the same level of importance for influencing EU decision-makers. Another typical
pressure and purchase lobbying activity, securing EU funding, is even less important,
with a great many respondents claiming that it is “not at all important” (just over 20%).
Clearly, these results support Heinz et al.’s findings regarding the central place of
monitoring for Washington interest groups (see also Baumgartner and Leech 1998). In
Brussels, as in Washington, monitoring appears to trump pressure and purchase tactics
like influencing decisions and securing funds.
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Monitoring is not just one activity among others for interest groups in the EU. It
is, to speak with one interest group representative, their “raison d’être.”16 The
importance attributed to monitoring reflects the pivotal role that information plays in
the EU lobbying process. Timing is again absolutely crucial. Monitoring is commonly
referred to by interest group representatives as a kind of “horizon gazing,”17 a process of
“hearing the grass grow”18 or even as a type of “early warning radar system.”19 The idea
is to “be in right from the start,” “at the earliest possible stage (…) because when you
have a written proposal it is always more difficult to change.”20 “Keeping up to date is
not enough. You must be able to anticipate what the (EU) agenda will be.”21
The exigency interest groups face to act at the earliest possible stages of the EU
policy-making process is reinforced by the Commission’s formal and informal
consultation procedures with interest groups. Weighing in on consultation, in so far as it
precedes the formal initiation of legislation by the Commission, ultimately means
shaping the agenda-setting stage of the policy-making process. This is also the time
when EU decision-makers are most in need of the informational input interest groups
typically provide, a fact evinced in the multitude of working groups, committees and
even open online consultation forums it coordinates. Timing is also crucial in the
Parliament and Council, where decision-makers often find information most useful
during the early stages of composing policy briefs and position papers.
Does the importance of monitoring vary among different types of interest
groups? Graph 1, below, organises the same data by interest group type.
16 Interview, Dominic Rowles, European Officer,
Local Governmental Association, Brussels, 16/10/2009.
Interview, Julian Carroll, Managing Director, Europen (The European Organisation for Packaging and
the Environment), Brussels, 17/11/2010.
18 Interview, Dr. Volker Löwe, official, Das Büro des Landes Berlin bei der EU, Brussels, 28/10/2009.
19 Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
20 Interview, Martin Romer, General Secretary, ETUCE (European Trade Union Committee for Education),
Brussels, 17/11/2010.
21 Interview, official, Conseil regional d’Aquitaine, Brussels, 12/10/2009.
17
- 68 -
One point of consistency in Graph 1 is the general prioritization of monitoring by most
interest groups. Indeed, monitoring is the most important activity for companies,
consultancies, NGOs, professional associations, and public authorities. Again, we can
explain this prioritization of monitoring with reference to the informational nature of
lobbying in the EU and the premium placed on acting at the earliest possible stages of
the legislative process. Nonetheless, trade unions break this trend, conferring somewhat
greater importance on influencing EU decisions. How can we explain this result?
While monitoring remains a very important activity for trade unions, the greater
relative importance attributed to influencing decisions can be explained by the unique
place that trade unions have in the EU decision-making process. Since the 1993
Maastricht Treaty, trade unions have been a formal component of the EU decisionmaking machinery as part of the so-called “Social Dialogue.” Eighty-two Member State
and third-country trade unions are currently represented at the EU level by a single
“peak” trade union association, the European Trade Unions Conference (ETUC). The
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Social Dialogue legally obliges the Commission to consult with the ETUC, as well as peak
business and consumer associations (BusinessEurope and the European Centre of
Enterprises with Public Participation or CEEP), on all relevant legislation. Importantly, if
the Social Dialogue members can reach a collective agreement on a particular policy
issue, it can “serve as a direct substitute for EU legislation” (Hix, 2005: 217). Clearly,
Social Dialogue provides a powerful channel for trade unions at the European level, so
much so that national peak trade unions, unlike their business and consumer interest
counterparts, rely exclusively on their representation in the ETUC for all of their
European level lobbying activities.22 The Social Dialogue, however, is a highly
institutionalized process, resembling a robust form of neo-corporatism (see Czada,
2004; Greenwood, Grote and Ronite, 1992; Michalowitz, 2004). The highly regulated
nature of the Social Dialogue, and the fact the individual national trade unions turn
exclusively to the ETUC for European level representation, can explain the reduced
importance trade unions attribute to monitoring. Trade unions, through the wellstructured mechanisms of the Social Dialogue, are aware of precisely when they will be
asked to provide information to decision-makers, exactly what the process will entail
and even what the Commission’s expectations will be. There are, to put it differently, few
surprises. It is not that trade unions do not engage in horizon gazing, it is just that their
view is already quite clear.
Information Sources
Information gathering is a task primarily determined by the information sources
that a given interest group turns to when monitoring. At one level, information
Business interests, like companies, professional associations, as well as consumer groups, while taking
advantage of the powerful Social Dialogue mechanism, also pursue other avenues of interest
representation at the European level. This explains how they can act as formal Social Dialogue members
but still place a great deal of importance on monitoring.
22
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gathering implies “trawling through transcripts of legislative proceedings and press
releases (Lehmann, 2003) as well as “newspapers and other media” (Beyers et al.,
2008). At another level, interest groups track more formal sources of information, like
“changes in rules, regulations or laws”(Heinz, 1993). Finally, information gathering also
deals with less tangible information sources like the “identification of information
providers” (Goergen, 2006) and simply “observing activities in a wide range of
governmental departments” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998). Given the premium on
timely information, what sources offer the best means for interest groups to obtain
information as early as possible? Moreover, how do groups weigh the costs and benefits
of early information with information accuracy, relevance and detail? Answering these
questions requires taking a closer look at the types of information sources that interest
groups use during the information gathering process and, subsequently, developing a
framework for comparing which sources offer the best bet for acquiring the timeliest
information.
I differentiate between three distinct types of information sources: formal
information sources, EU information sources, and informal information sources. I
discuss each in turn.
First, and perhaps the type of information source that comes immediately to
mind when we think about information gathering, are newspapers, newsletters, TV
news, radio news, as well as books and magazines. There is no shortage of this kind of
information in Brussels. In addition to any number of national or regional newspapers
(like “Le Monde” in France, “Die Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung” in Germany or “El
País” in Spain), a vast array of both print and online news sources specialize in EU
politics. Some, like “Europe Today,” “EUobserver,” “Euractiv,” and “Politikportal,” are
free of charge, offer news in (at least) the three main EU working languages (English,
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German, French) and follow the headlines across a broad range of news areas. Others,
like “Europe Voice,” “Agence Europe,” and “Aqui Europa,” are more exclusive, offering
select and policy specific articles and requiring user subscriptions for full access to all
articles. Even here there are major differences. For instance, a subscription to “European
Voice” costs €193 per annum, while “Agence Europe” carries the far heftier price tag of
€1580 per annum. These higher prices are justified not only by the exclusivity of the
information provided and availability in different languages, but also by offering
customized email alerts to subscribers. Books, magazines, newsletters as well as TV and
radio news are also common formal sources of information, but they are not subject to
the same sort of specialization and frequency of distribution that make print and online
newspapers so prevalent and useful.
EU sources are the second type of information source and refer to information
made public by the EU itself. The Commission’s annual work programme is perhaps one
of the most important EU sources of information and certainly a source that allows
interest groups to anticipate the informational needs of decision-makers. Each year the
Commission publishes its priorities for the upcoming year in its work programme,
detailing policy areas that will be on the agenda and issue areas that will receive the
most attention.23 Interest groups also keep up-to-date on EU activities by monitoring the
Commission’s Green Papers and White Papers. Green Papers are published rather
frequently – a total of 77 since 2000, with an average of about eight papers per year –
and are meant to spark discussion on particular policy topics. Green Papers put forward
competing ideas, draw interested parties into discussion and even invite parties to
participate in consultation procedures. White Papers, by contrast, are published less
frequently, with a total of 19 publications since 2000 and an average of just two per
23
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/programmes/index_en.htm
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year. The less frequent publication of White Papers reflects their function: they
generally follow Green Papers and contain specific proposals for EU action in a
particular policy area.24 While the work programme and the White and Green Papers
provide sporadic news, EU press releases provide a much more immediate and flexible
news source. EU press releases are organised and run by DG Communication and consist
of an online search engine, “EU Rapid,” which assembles all press releases and provides
an additional platform for their storage and dissemination.
Informal informational sources are the third type of information source that
interest groups draw on in the information gathering process. Unlike formal and EU
sources, issues of publication frequency, formatting and dissemination do not
circumscribe informal information sources. Indeed, informal sources of information can
refer simply to meetings over lunch or drinks or at a conference or exhibition. Informal
sources are also sometimes a matter of simply knowing the right people and word of
mouth. In fact, many interest groups justify their presence in Brussels by citing the value
of this kind of information. “It would be very easy if I got all of the information via
newspapers and newsletters,” explains one NGO representative, “but it doesn’t work like
that. I try to have meetings with people (…) and we share information about what’s
happening.”25 The value of informal sources is manifest in the immediacy of the
information it provides. “The key,” as one interest group representative put it, “is to get
information before it is even published” in formal sources and to be “earlier than EU
publications.”26 In a sense, informal sources provide tomorrow’s news today.
Importantly, informal sources are social sources and require frequent personal
All information on White Papers and Green Papers was obtained from the Europa Portal website, at:
http://europa.eu/documentation/official-docs/index_en.htm
25 Interview, official, Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry, Brussels, 7/12/2009.
26 Interview, Nicolas Cuesta Santiago, official, Delegación de la Junta de Andalucia en Bruselas, Brussels,
19/10/2009.
24
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interaction.27 The general rule of thumb, then, for obtaining informal information was
expressed by a public affairs representative as this: “the less time we spend in the office
the better.”28 Conferences and exhibitions can also facilitate social interaction. In fact,
many interest group representatives explained that they decide to attend such events
based more on the list of participants than on the actual topic under consideration.
In addition to providing early information (tomorrow’s news today), informal
sources also offer access to leaked information. Interest group representatives refer
variously to this as “black information,” “early information,” “soft information,” and
“information limitée,” and generally mean information produced by the EU institutions,
but for EU eyes only. It might entail knowing the contents of a Green Paper before its
official release, or circulating data from an EU research report before its publication.
While some cases of stolen official documents have been a matter of concern for both
the Commission and the Parliament (European Commission 1993; European Parliament,
2009), leaked information is generally less surreptitious and depends on knowing
“someone on the inside,” as a business interest representative put it, who can pass along
confidential reports, strategies and data.29 One example is “Sources Say …,” a daily inhouse report put together by DG Communication that takes the form of a simple,
photocopied pamphlet. In its banner it claims that it “contains fresh news” and warns to
“distribute only to Commission officials and agents.” While we might doubt the
seriousness of these kinds of statements, “Sources Say …” is held to be an important,
exclusive and much sought-after news commodity by many interest groups in the EU.
27
Informal sources of information have an important social dimension. They are passed along through
both formal and informal networks of interest group and EU actors. The present chapter focuses on the
content and advantages of interest groups using informal sources during the information gathering
process. In the following chapter I will examine how network characteristics facilitate informal
information flows between actors.
28 Interview, official, South Finland EU Office, Brussels, 14/10/2009.
29 Interview, official, Ferrovie dello Stata, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
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Clearly, informal sources seem to be an interest group’s best bet in obtaining
early information, whether that is tomorrow’s news today or leaked information.
Moreover, in obtaining these types of information, interest groups are given their best
chance of acting in the timeliest manner possible. Given the premium on good timing in
the EU legislative process, groups that can tap into these sources appear to have an
advantage over groups that cannot.
But what types of sources do interest groups say they prioritize when keeping
track of EU activities? Further, how does this vary among different types of interest
groups? In the context of the survey, respondents were asked the following question:
“How important are the following sources of information for keeping track of EU
activities?” with importance measured on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being “not at all
important” and 5 being “very important”). The information sources listed were
newspapers (print and online), newsletters, television news, radio news, books /
magazines, the Commission’s work programme, EU press releases, White Papers, Green
Papers, conferences / exhibitions, face-to-face meetings, and word of mouth. From the
above discussion, these twelve sources fit into three broad categories: formal sources,
EU sources and informal sources. Table 3, below, presents the results.
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Table 3
Information Sources Used to Keep Track of EU Activities
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Formal Sources
Importance
1 (not at all
important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
Total
Mean
Standard Deviation
Newspapers
Newsletters
TV news
Radio News
12 (4.08)
7 (2.41)
52 (17.69)
71 (24.32)
Books /
Magazines
26 (8.97)
46 (15.65)
68 (23.13)
87 (29.59)
81 (27.55)
37 (12.76)
76 (26.21)
93 (32.07)
77 (26.55)
116 (39.46)
82 (27.89)
30 (10.20)
14 (4.76)
124 (42.47)
67 (22.95)
18 (6.16)
12 (4.11)
90 (31.03)
111 (38.28)
47 (16.21)
16 (5.52)
294 (100)
3.37
1.16
290 (100)
3.68
1.07
294 (100)
2.47
1.04
292 (100)
2.26
1.01
290 (100)
2.79
1.00
EU Sources
Commission Work
Programme
4 (1.37)
25 (8.53)
64 (21.84)
74 (25.26)
126 (43)
EU Press Releases
White Papers
Green Papers
Importance
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
5 (1.71)
17 (5.82)
48 (16.44)
97 (33.22)
125 (42.81)
9 (3.06)
20 (6.80)
39 (13.27)
87 (29.59)
139 (47.28)
9 (3.11)
18 (6.23)
37 (12.80)
89 (30.80)
136 (47.06)
Total
Mean
Standard Deviation
293 (100)
3.98
1.05
292 (100)
4.10
.98
294 (100)
4.12
1.06
289 (100)
4.13
1.05
Informal Sources
Conferences /
Exhibitions
15 (5.10)
35 (11.90)
71 (24.15)
118 (40.14)
55 (18.71)
Face-to-face meetings
Word of Mouth
Importance
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
11 (3.73)
17 (5.76)
18 (6.10)
71 (24.07)
178 (60.34)
12 (4.15)
29 (10.03)
71 (24.57)
88 (30.45)
89 (30.80)
Total
Mean
Standard Deviation
294 (100)
3.58
1.08
295 (100)
4.34
1.06
289 (100)
3.79
1.12
Generally speaking, formal sources are considered to be rather unimportant for
staying up to date on EU activities. TV news, radio news and books and magazines have
the lowest mean scores and are thus perceived to be the least important sources of
information. Newspapers and newsletters fare only somewhat better. The limited
importance accorded formal sources can be explained with reference to three points.
First, formal information sources present information that is already out of date. As one
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public authority representative explained, “newspapers are really just second-hand
news” and the information they provide “is already too late.”30 Second, there is also
considerable duplication and therefore redundancy of information among various
formal news sources. Top EU-niche newspapers, like “European Voice” and “Agence
Europe,” like any common national and regional newspaper, tend to present similar
stories and cover the same “newsworthy” topics. Third, formal sources provide only a
superficial level of information. It is just a “top level of information” whereas the job of
monitoring is more like “being a detective” and requires “digging deeper.”31 In more
general terms, formal information sources, while being too broad in scope, too late and
too superficial, really represent the bare-minimum level of news an interest group must
know in order to operate.
Informal sources and EU sources, by contrast, are clearly the most important
information sources for keeping track of EU activities. While informal sources like
interaction at conferences / exhibitions and word of mouth rank high in importance,
face-to-face meetings are considered to be the most important source of information by
over 60% of respondents. Prioritizing informal sources speaks to the exigency interest
groups face to gather early and leaked information. Further, having informal sources,
especially leaked and early information, legitimates the work of interest groups in the
EU. For the consultancy firm FD Blueprint, “good information is information that we get
earlier than others. It is not only the quality of the information itself, but also the
exclusiveness of the information.”32 Interest group members, clients and stakeholders
value information exclusivity. Having leaked or early information “will impress the
client,” speaking again with the FD Blueprint representative, “otherwise the client will
30
Interview, Dominic Rowles, European Officer, Local Governmental Association, Brussels, 16/10/2009.
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
32 Interview, Kerstin Duhme, Director, FD Blueprint, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
31
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say, ‘I can read the newspaper myself, and I can look at the website’.”33 A representative
from AEGPL, a professional association representing the interests of the LPG (liquefied
petroleum gases) industry, expressed a similar point. “There is a value of showing (our
stakeholders) that we have access to information, that we know things before they are
published. That kind of thing demonstrates the value of having a presence here in
Brussels. Members are very excited when you send them a leaked document or talk to
them about something you’ve heard in a corridor. Even if the stakes are quite low, they
like it …”34
All four EU sources are also accorded relatively high levels of importance, with
White Papers and Green Papers considered to be somewhat more important than the
Commission work programme and EU press releases. This might reflect the frequency of
dissemination of these sources as well as the fact that, in the case of Green Papers, they
sometimes alert interest groups about upcoming opportunities for consultation with the
Commission. EU sources are accorded more importance than formal information
sources because there is far less duplication and redundancy (there is only one working
programme, for instance) but also because EU sources are timely, commonly being
issued before legislation is initiated by the Commission. What is more, EU sources
provide information directly from EU decision-makers and act as valuable primary
sources for legislation, proposals and briefings. Although most interest groups would
certainly prioritize leaked information about the contents of an upcoming Green Paper,
for example, official EU information sources are nonetheless valued for their reliability
and accuracy.
The key comparison here is among informal sources, formal sources and EU
sources. As such, individual responses were combined to provide mean scores for each
33
34
Ibid.
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
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of the three basic types. The central question is: which interest groups prioritize which
type of information source? More specifically, given the value of early information and
leaked information, which interest groups prioritize informal information sources?
Graph 2, below, organises the data for formal, informal and EU information by interest
group type.
Graph 2, reflecting the more general findings presented above, show that all six
types of interest groups accord very little importance to formal sources of information.
Information lateness, duplication and superficiality explain these results. Differing
markedly for the general findings is the importance different interest groups accord
informal and EU sources. Consultancies, professional associations, public authorities and
trade unions stress EU sources while only companies and, to a much lesser extent, NGOs,
stress informal sources. Given the clear benefits of gathering informal information, how
can we explain the fact that four of the six types of interest groups under consideration
in this study prioritize EU sources? Moreover, why do only companies and NGOs
prioritize informal sources?
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Informal information sources provide interest groups with the earliest
information possible and even help interest groups justify their existence in Brussels.
Nonetheless, informal information is, by nature, less reliable than both EU and formal
information sources. Thus, while the pay-off of gathering informal sources might be
bigger in terms of anticipating the informational needs of EU decision-makers and
reputation building with members, interest groups are forced to check the accuracy of
this type of information before passing it along to others or using it for their own
purposes. This adds a hidden cost to informal sources in terms of person-hours spent on
fact checking. As an ETUCE representative explains, “there are lots of conversations and
they are, as usual, a combination of information and gossip. It is not systematic.”35 A
common strategy is to either confirm with the source of the information or check it
against a second source. Of course, double-checking informal information sources in this
way takes time and thus undermines the initial value of the information: having it early
and before anyone else. A further point of caution for informal information is that
passing it along without first double-checking puts the reputation of the interest group
at risk. After all, “you can only piss in the box once,” as a trade union representative put
it colourfully, the second time and you risk putting your reputation on the line.36
The reliability issues associated with informal information explain why most
interest groups end up prioritizing EU sources: they are direct, specific and reliable. But
how can we explain why companies and, to a lesser extent, NGOs nonetheless prioritize
informal sources? First, companies’ preference for informal sources can be explained
with reference to their superior resources. Double-checking becomes less of a burden
and far less time-consuming when you have any number of staff that can work in
35
Interview, Martin Romer, General Secretary, ETUCE (European Trade Union Committee for Education),
Brussels, 17/11/2010.
36 Ibid.
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ensuring the reliability of this information. That NGOs, typically under-staffed and
resource-poor, also prioritize informal sources seems to undermine this explanation.
However, it needs to be stressed that the data suggests that the priority NGOs accord
informal information is very marginal (only one-tenth of the mean score over EU
sources). But even if NGOs put informal sources on par with EU sources, the data still
present an important finding. The key to understanding the results of the survey lies
with the broad policy focus of most NGOs. NGOs typically represent the interests of an
extremely broad sub-section of the population on equally broad issues (human rights,
animal rights, culture and the arts, and environmental protection, for instance). Such a
broad policy focus rarely fits squarely into one EU policy area. Rather it is strewn across
different bureaucratic and regulatory bodies, agencies and committees and commonly
falls under the auspices of a wide range of directives. In other words, NGOs concerned
with issues of racism (like ENAR), the arts and culture (like Culture Action Europe) or
animal rights (like Vier Pfoten), would find that their concerns are not sufficiently
covered by a EU Green Paper, White Paper or the Commission’s work programme. A
representative for Eurogroup for Animals explains: “the more you do, the less you get.
The more areas you try to cover, you tend to not get the information you need. By doing
more and more, it becomes hard to keep track of everything.”37 It is, then, this paucity of
relevant information derived from EU sources that would drive NGOs to seek out
alternative information sources despite the added costs associated with them. Their
broad policy foci demand it. The potential downside for NGOs, however, is that without
the resources to double-check information accuracy they are putting their reputations
on the line. Further, following information that is ultimately unreliable can severely
37
Interview, Martyn Griffiths, Executive Officer, Eurogroup for Animals, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
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undermine an NGO’s potential for adequately preparing to meet the informational needs
of decision-makers.
Information Filtering
As the discussion of information sources suggests, there is no shortage of
information for interest groups to monitor, scan and gather. Rather, the opposite is the
case. “One is constantly overloaded with information,” as one NGO representative
explained. “It’s not an issue of not being able to find out the information (…) it is about
sifting the information you get.”38 While decision-makers are starved for policy-relevant
information, interest groups are faced with severe “information overload.” “I get over
200 emails a day,” as a consultancy representative noted, “and 170 are news. It’s just a
pure nightmare.”39 Interest groups in the EU are drowning in an avalanche of
information, an issue that seems to be exacerbated with each additional Member State
and with each additional expansion of the EU into further areas of Member State
economic and political sovereignty. How can interest groups make sense of this
information overload?
Herbert Simon provides some useful remarks about information overload in
more general terms. We live in an “information-rich world,” he argues, where
“information is plentiful” but “time to attend to it is scarce.” Information is produced and
flows at ever-greater speeds and rates, creating a “capacity bottleneck” (1997: 175) that
forces interest groups to divide their time and attention. In short, managing information
overload requires information filtering. The importance of filtering cannot be
38
39
Interview, Martina Weitsch, official, Quaker Council for European Affairs, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
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overstated. As one interest group representative put it: “too much information is no
information at all.”40
Interviews with interest group representatives revealed two general
information-filtering strategies. First, interest groups use a division of labour strategy to
help manage information overload. Some groups report employing “communications
officers” whose sole job is to conduct a daily “media sweep” through all the relevant
information sources, and, in some cases, prepare in-house newsletters for executives
and policy-officers. In most cases, the division of labour corresponds to the areas of
expertise of the policy officers themselves so that policy officers specializing in transport
issues, for instance, scan the media for news only relating to transport policy. The real
value of this type of division of labour is a matter of simple math. As one public authority
representative explained: “it is always easier to listen with sixty ears than with just two
of them.”41
A second strategy is the use of electronic filtering services. Various online
information sources offer built-in filtering devices that allow subscribers to determine
the type of news they receive. This is the case for “Agence Europe” and “Euractive,” for
example. These services, however, can be costly, as the subscription prices mentioned
above suggest, and thus must be weighed against their real value and the fact that
formal sources of information typically report information that is already outdated.
Despite acknowledgment of these filtering strategies, most interest group
representatives were uncertain when asked to outline their formal filtering procedures.
It is the “60 million dollar question” as one representative quipped.42 Another confessed:
40
Interview, official, Délégation Générale de la Région Rhone-Alps, Brussels, 23/10/2009.
Interview, official, Generalitat de Catalunya. Delegación del Gobierno en Bruselas, Brussels, 7/12/2009.
42 Interview, Martina Weitsch, official, Quaker Council for European Affairs, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
41
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“If I find a way, I will let you know.”43 The problem with understanding information
filtering is that effective filtering cannot be explained by a simple step-by-step set of
rules. Filtering is too context dependent. The nature of the policy environment, with its
multiple information sources and information overload, demands that filtering remain a
fluid and intuitive process. In this context it is useful to think of interest group
representatives as satisficers and not maximizers, to speak again with Simon. The real
world is a “blooming, buzzing confusion” that does not easily permit individuals to know
all of their alternatives and rationally select the best from among them. Satisficers
reduce this complexity by perceiving the world in a “drastically simplified” way and by
looking for courses of action that are “satisfactory” or “good enough” rather than
optimal (Simon, 1997: 119). Information is not scarce, time is. Thus, satisficers filter by
developing various heuristic shorts cuts, rules of thumb and “seat of the pants
strategies” that allow them to remain flexible and respond quickly and efficiently to the
current situation (Baumgartner and Jones, 2005: 56). It is really the fluid nature of
efficient information filtering that leaves interest group representatives at a loss for
words when asked to explain the process. Efficient filtering requires such a rapid and
largely intuitive response that “a valid account of either the process (…) or the grounds
for judging it correct” cannot be given, to speak again with Simon (1997: 130).
How can we assess an interest group’s ability to filter information if it is based on
a type of intuitive logic? Here we are in largely uncharted territory. Simon, however,
provides some further points of orientation.
Intuition is no mystery. It is simply a capacity to recognize familiar cues in the
situations that arise, and to use cues to retrieve information. It is not a special
faculty, but the inevitable by-product of the acquisition of knowledge (1997:
178).
43
Interview, official, Daimler AG, Brussels, 7/10/2009.
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Intuition, in this case, is part of accumulated experience. As Baumgartner and Jones
explain, even “seat of the pants” heuristic strategies for managing information overload
are developed and evolved over time (2005: 56). “Filtering is” as one business interest
representative explained, simply “a matter of experience in the field.”44 “Over time you
develop a feeling for which (information sources) are more useful than others.”45 More
experience translates as an ability to employ heuristic strategies and to pinpoint
particular cues and useful shortcuts. One representative from the pharmaceutical sector
called this “Herrschaftswissen,” a type of tacit, trial-and-error knowledge gained through
extensive experience.46 In a similar sense, a representative for a consultancy explains
how efficient filtering develops with experience. New interns and colleagues tasked with
filtering information face a very steep learning curve. “You can see how, at the beginning
they send you a lot of news which is not very relevant. After a number of months it
becomes more concrete and, over time, the sheer volume decreases and the relevance
(of the information) increases.”47
Cues required to efficiently filter information also require a sound understanding
of what to look for. At issue is an interest group’s capacity for collective action – or, more
specifically, the relationship between interest group representatives and their members.
In plain terms, knowing what to look for is partially facilitated by knowing what the
membership wants. Collective action problems not only reflect a group’s inability to
mobilize, but also a profound “disconnect” between those who do the lobbying (interest
group representatives) and those who constitute an interest group’s members. But
comparing how this disconnect affects different types of interest groups requires a
44
Interview, official, Coca-Cola Ltd., Brussels, 8/12/2009.
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
46 Interview, official, Bayer AG, Brussels, 9/12/2009.
47 Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
45
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consideration of the different membership structures of these different interest groups.
Indeed, the notion of membership is different for different types of interest groups. For
NGOs, members can be citizens, for trade unions it means employees, while for
companies and professional associations members refer to stakeholders. For public
authorities the members are ultimately the citizens of a region, city or municipality.
However, political actors elected to represent these citizens at the sub-state level are
much more directly linked to Brussels-based representations. Lastly, consultants do not
represent members, but rather have clients whose interests direct the filtering process.
The ability to efficiently filter information depends to a certain extent, then, on a sound
system of engagement and communication between interest groups and members.
Interest groups need to be well connected to the needs and interests of their members.
However, members that invest little importance in what the interest group is doing, who
have very little understanding of how they are doing it or have little concern for acting at
the EU level will typically be remiss in providing the right cues necessary for efficient
information filtering.
There is no single and convenient indicator that directly measures efficient
information filtering. The intuitive logic underpinning the rules of thumb and various
heuristic short cuts used in filtering are, by nature, difficult to measure in empirical
research. We can say something, however, about how different types of interest groups
seek to ensure that they have a sound system of communication with their members. In
fact, data collected from interviews reveals a wide range of strategies implemented to
nurture the relationship interest groups have with their members. A few examples can
be helpful in understanding the nature of the disconnect between interest groups and
their members as well as how such a disconnect affects an interest group’s information
filtering capacity.
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A disconnect between members and interest groups results from three general
issues. First, for many interest groups getting members to “take the EU seriously” is a
central barrier to efficient information filtering. For the managing director of CEPLIS, a
Brussels-based professional association, the “biggest problem is bringing awareness of
the importance of the information coming in from my own members, persuading
members to contribute in discussions (…) and that they should be interested in what is
going on in Europe.”48 A small animal rights interest group, Vier Pfoten, similarly
reported that its members “sometime completely forget about Europe (…) I have to run
after them for information, and, of course, without this information we cannot do our
work.”49 While EU law enjoys supremacy over national law in an ever-increasing
number of policy areas and even accounts for over 70% of legislation implemented at
the national level, many interest groups find themselves hard pressed to convince their
members of the importance of acting at the European level. The information that should
be flowing from members to interest groups is stemmed by the misperception of the
diminished importance of the EU level.
Many interest groups in the EU have implemented various strategies to reduce
the “disconnect” between themselves and their members. The general approach is to
inform members of the importance of the EU through training programmes,
roundtables, seminars and twinning projects. The Berlin public authority office, for
instance, recognizing that its members were functioning at a remove from the EU,
implemented the “Europamitdenken” project in 2006. Loosely translated as “Thinking in
terms of Europe,” the project sought nothing less than the “Europeanization of the Berlin
administration” at the national level.50 As the Berlin office representative explained, “we
48
Interview, Dr. Theodoros Koutroubas, Director General, CEPLIS, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
Interview, Dr. Marlene Wartenberg, Director, Vier Pfoten, Brussels, 19/11/2010.
50 Interview, Dr. Volker Löwe, official, Das Büro des Landes Berlin bei der EU, Brussels, 28/10/2009.
49
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want our stake-holders (… ) to be more informed about, and to be more prepared for,
European work.” To this end, the stakeholders were brought to Brussels on a two-day
visit with the intention of “bombarding them with presentations about various policy
areas and how it affects them.”51
Less intrusive strategies implemented to reduce the “disconnect” between
interest groups and their members typical involve frequent meetings where the groups
impress the importance of the EU on the members. The Trade Union Council (TUC), the
peak British trade union organisation at the EU level, hosts what it calls “The European
Network” every two months. This meeting provides a platform where national unions
and European representatives are brought together not so much to rally for the
importance of the EU but rather for the opportunity to “find out from (particular
members) what issues are of interest to them.”52 A similar but somewhat more
ambitious strategy was described by ENAR, an anti-racism NGO. In order to extract
important information about member activities and interests, ENAR has implemented a
yearly roundtable meeting with members and EU officials. “The idea is to see what is
positive activity at the national level and compare it to the European perspective.”53 The
problem is a persistent tension between member and interest group perceptions. ENAR
“wants to try to implement a European perspective at the national level” while its
members “want the opposite, to have a national perspective that is adapted into
European objectives.”54 While the type of information requested of ENAR’s members is
admittedly “very basic and simple,” and while it is crucial for efficient filtering at the EU
level, members continue to be either reluctant or unconvinced about the importance of
the EU in their own activities.
51
Ibid.
Interview, Sarah King, Trade Union Council, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
53 Interview, Juliana Wahlgren, Networking and Campaigns Officer, ENAR, Brussels, 18/11/2010.
54 Ibid.
52
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In addition to these specific examples, we can make some broader
generalizations based on what we know about the “disconnect” problem and how
interest groups differ with respect to their membership structures. First, diffuse interest
groups, like NGOs and trade unions, should face the greatest hurdles in overcoming the
disconnect problem if only because their membership structure is inherently diverse
and widely encompassing. More diverse members simply increases the likelihood of an
interest group representing members with little regard for the importance of the EU
level in their own activities. It is also more difficult for these interest groups to
systematically implement strategies to assuage the disconnect problem in any
structured way. These assumptions are at least partly confirmed by the difficulties an
NGO like ENAR has faced in attempting to extract information from its members. By
contrast, companies and professional associations should fare better because their
stakeholders, in the act of establishing EU-level representation, express their concern
and understanding of the importance of the EU level. Pubic authorities, as the example of
the Berlin office demonstrates, face disconnect issues that result from state structure. In
the first instance, regions, cities and municipalities with greater devolved or
decentralized competencies also have a greater stake in pursuing their interest through
European channels (Moore, 2008; Keating and Hooghe, 1996; Jeffery, 2000; Hooghe and
Keating, 1994). A 1996 study carried out by Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk confirms this
assumption for regional representation in Brussels -- regions with greater autonomy
were also the most like to have established interest representations in Brussels (1996).
Unlike diffuse interest groups (like NGOs and trade unions) and public
authorities, consultancies face very few problems in their relationship with members.
Indeed, consultancies are hired by clients expressly to monitor, gather and filter
information. Clients would be expected to, first, place considerable value on the
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importance of the EU level for their own activities and, second, to be open and
forthcoming with consultants regarding their interests. The real value that consultancies
provide their clients is Herrschaftswissen – that tacit, trial-and-error knowledge that
comes from experience. This is evinced in how consultancies go about filtering
information. As an ADS Insight representative explains,
part of the value-added we provide is filtering information and passing it on to
our clients (…) by commenting on it, by saying, for example , ‘this MEP has said
this but in fact he is a very isolated far-right member you can easily ignore. Our
competence is in understanding the system and being able to comment on the
relative importance of things.55
Consultancies appear to trade on Herrschaftswissen; the product they provide is
expertise, insight and understanding of the EU decision-making process. Filtering
becomes less a task of shifting and sorting the useful from less useful information, and
more a task of commenting on the information in a way that transforms it in a userfriendly, or client-friendly, way.
Research
Monitoring activities and filtering strategies allow interest groups to anticipate
the informational needs of decision-makers. It is through research, in large part, that
interest groups prepare to respond to these needs. Admittedly, monitoring and filtering
already imply a type of research insofar as these activities see interest groups “digging”
for timely and relevant information. Much of the information that tells an interest group
when to act also informs them how to react. It is, nonetheless, useful to distinguish the
research implicit in monitoring and filtering activities from more formal research
strategies carried out by interest groups in the information-gathering process. Research
55
Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
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can take the form of evidence-based reports, post hoc and predictive policy evaluations,
large-scale data-driven projects, as well as short syntheses and summaries of publicly
available data (Hansen, 1991; Esterling, 2004; Baumgartner et al., 2009). Uniting these
diverse research practices is the use of what Esterling calls “extrinsic” rather than
“intrinsic” preferences. Extrinsic preferences are “preferences about the consequences
of government action (…) framed in cause-effect terms.” Intrinsic preferences, by
contrast, turn on moral, cultural or symbolic arguments without regard for “real world
outcomes” (2004: 48f). The use of cause-effect logic gives research its distinguishing
characteristic as “evidence” and establishes its value for decision-makers who require
policy-relevant information.
Interest groups conducting research usually do so in one of two basic ways:
either commissioning private research studies or carrying out the research themselves.
Commissioned studies refer to research that has been outsourced to third parties like
service providers or consultancies. Research done in-house, however, should not be
considered less valuable or rigorous. In fact, while in-house research can involve the
engagement of executives, policy officers, and even interns or stagiaires in researchrelated projects, it can also refer to trained research experts, like engineers, technicians
and scientists working for an interest group or its members. Both are powerful research
strategies and can imply the costly engagement of experts and the generation of original
data. Interest groups that stress both research strategies should also be those groups
that are best prepared when it comes time to address the informational needs of
decision-makers.
What type of research do interest groups in the EU tend to prioritize? Moreover,
which interest groups prioritize which types of research? To answer these questions,
survey respondents were asked about the importance, again on a 1 to 5 scale, of (1)
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commissioning private research studies and (2) doing research. The results from the
survey are presented in Table 4, below.
Table 4
Interest Group Research Strategies
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Commissioning Private Research
Doing Research
Importance
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
110 (38.33)
69 (24.04)
67 (23.34)
24 (8.36)
17 (5.92)
40 (13.56)
75 (25.42)
84 (28.47)
51 (17.29)
45 (15.25)
Total
mean
standard deviation
287 (100)
2.19
1.20
295 (100)
2.95
1.25
Clearly, commissioned research does not appear to be much of a priority for
interest groups in the EU. A great number of respondents – 38%, in fact – consider
commissioned research to be “not at all important.” A mere 5.9% disagree, reporting
that this form of research is very important. The results for “doing research” show a
different picture, with over 15% of respondents stating that it is “very important” and
only 13.6% reporting that this form of research is “not at all important.” But doing
research is clearly not a priority for all interest groups in the EU. This is evident in the
fact that most survey responses for doing research accord it a level of importance
between the extremes, neither “very important” nor “not at all important.” While
commissioning research and doing research cannot be distinguished in terms of costs
incurred by the interest groups or research type, the general reluctance to commission
research might be explained with reference to a general mistrust of consultancies and
other third-party research providers in the EU. The main issue is that third party
researchers have less of a vested interest in the research than the interest group
representatives themselves. They are, after all, at a triple remove from the member’s
interests. Doing research in-house, as a representative from a professional association
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explained, “is better by definition because you’re actually interested in the stuff that is
actually useful. You are not interested in selling something. You don’t attribute value to
something that isn’t really worth anything.”56 Although many interest group
representatives admitted to using consultancy services for carrying out research in a
limited way, there was nonetheless a general scepticism about the real value of their
contributions. These third-party research service providers are at best ambivalent to the
needs of an interest group and at worst are perceived as “parasites,” to speak with one
interest group representative, on the EU system of interest representation.57
Perhaps the more pertinent question, given these results, is which interest
groups prioritize which research strategies. Organising the mean scores from the above
results by interest group types, as presented in Graph 3, below, provides an answer.
56
57
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
Ibid.
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The data in Graph 3 show a clear prioritization of both research strategies for
companies and consultancies. NGOs, professional associations and public authorities
accord significantly less importance to both research strategies while trade unions
attribute very little importance to research. Consistent with the data presented above,
all six types of interest groups stress “doing research” over “commissioning private
research studies.” This reflects a general reluctance to engage third-party researchers
who might be significantly less invested in the research than the interest group
representatives themselves. Despite these similarities, how can we explain the
noticeable difference attributed to the importance of both research strategies by
different types of interest groups?
Clearly, companies stress doing research and commissioning research more than
any other interest group type. Once again differences in available resources might help
explain this trend. Representatives of companies interviewed for this project noted that
research was necessary to provide highly technical data related to issues of engineering
and manufacturing. Equally, however, companies also pursued research on consumer
and market data. This was also, not surprisingly, the case for professional associations.
As private economic actors, both companies and professional associations conduct a
type of information-gathering strategy that tends to combine a concern with supplying
EU decision-makers with policy-relevant technical data and producing data on how new
EU directives might affect market shares. A representative from a major soft drink
company confirmed this, explaining how they engage various third-party service
providers: one is “analytic,” carrying out research on the debates in the European
Parliament, while another is “specific,” conducting research on consumer and market
strategies that can be used both internally and externally.58 It is perhaps the
58
Interview, official, Coca-Cola Ltd., Brussels, 8/12/2009.
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combination of research concerns that compels companies to stress both doing research
and commissioning private research studies. This double-sided focus, when sufficiently
coupled with efficient monitoring and filtering, should also give companies considerable
advantage in producing information that addresses the informational needs of EU
decision-makers.
In contrast to companies, trade unions appear to place very little importance on
research strategies. As a diffuse type of interest group with diverse members, trade
unions rely heavily on their individual members for “case studies and grass roots
evidence,” to speak with a representative from the TUC.59 But a reliance on members
should not be an indicator of the importance attributed to doing research. In fact, for the
ETUC, the peak trade union at the EU level, research is given a clear priority in the form
of its sister organisation, the European Trade Union Institute or ETUI. The ETUI is the
research arm of the ETUC, carrying out extensive research projects, producing various
studies and reports and also working to establish links with the academic and research
community. The ETUI boasts 60 full-time researchers from all over Europe and with
backgrounds in economics, finance, trade policy and European law. Clearly, if the size
and scope of the ETUI is any indicator, then trade unions do indeed place a great deal of
importance on conducting research. How, then, do we explain the survey results? It
might be the case the trade unions place little stress on research simply because the
ETUI takes care of it for them. As the research arm of the ETUC, the ETUI frees its
individual trade union members from the burden of pursuing independent research
strategies. Clearly, given the existence of the ETUI, the perception of the importance of
research of trade unions might be significantly diminished.
59
Interview, Sarah King, Trade Union Council, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
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The relative emphasis that NGOs place on research is, at first glace, a surprising
result. Indeed, it challenges a resource explanation, which would suggest that resourcerich interest groups, like companies are able to prioritize research, while typically
resource-poor interest groups, like NGOs, are unable to prioritize research.
Nevertheless, NGOs stress research more than professional associations, public
authorities and trade unions. The results reflect an important misperception of NGOs as
somehow less invested in, and perhaps less capable of, conducting research than private
interests. While far from enjoying the same level of resources as large multi-national
companies, like the soft drink provider discussed above, many NGOs understand the
importance of providing EU decision-makers with useful technical and scientific
information and thus accordingly employ experts to carry out detailed and extensive
research projects in-house. Take, for example, Eurogroup for Animals. This NGO
employs a multitude of in-house experts who carry out various research projects. As a
representative explains,
we have someone who specializes in farm animals, someone who specializes in
wild animals, exotic animals and zoo animals. We have doctors who are looking
into cloning and all of these issues. We also have an expert who overviews
everything and also looks at EU foreign policy, common agriculture policy and all
of that.60
As in a large company, in this small NGO in-house experts are employed in technical,
scientific and policy-related research. The primary difference, however, is the
engagement of third-party research services. Unlike companies, NGOs place very little
importance on outsourcing research projects. It is here that a resource explanation for
how groups stress research still appears to hold. The extent to which this is
symptomatic of other NGOs is evinced in the survey data.
60
Interview, Martyn Griffiths, Executive Officer, Eurogroup for Animals, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
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While the survey results provide some insight into which interest groups
prioritize research and which do not, it is still unclear how useful such interest group
research ultimately is in addressing the informational needs of decision-makers. For
instance, although Eurogroup for Animals clearly stresses in-house research it is unclear
how much purchase this research has at the European level. In plain terms: how useful
is research on animal welfare if the EU provides few opportunities for consultations on
these issues? In fact, this is precisely the problem faced by Eurogroup for Animals. The
fact that there are very few opportunities to impact EU directives related to animal
welfare has recently forced this NGO to forego strategies that target legislation and
adopt instead broad-based “campaigning work” that targets citizen perceptions. The
issue of how these research strategies translate into information that addresses the
informational needs of decision-makers will be taken up in detail in chapter 8. Here it
suffices to say that the survey results on both research strategies are perhaps best
understood alongside monitoring, information sources and filtering. The purpose of this
chapter has been well served by disaggregating these different dimensions of the
information gathering process. However, in real world terms, all three work hand-inhand. Thus, pursuing research strategies that best address the informational needs of
decision-makers requires efficient monitoring, procuring early and reliable information
sources and implementing effective filtering strategies.
Conclusion
The present chapter has examined interest group information gathering in a
systematic way. This task was facilitated by separate considerations of information
monitoring, information sources, information filtering, and research strategies. In each
instance, data collected from interviews and an online survey provided an empirical
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basis from which to assess information gathering. One of the most important findings of
this chapter is that interest groups in the EU prioritize monitoring activities over other
activities, and in particular those most closely related to so-called pressure and
purchase tactics. Influencing EU decisions, while still perceived as important to many
interest groups in the EU, is overshadowed by the importance these same groups
attribute to monitoring. This speaks to the neo-pluralist insights on which this analysis
is based: that interests serve less as agents of pressure trying to change the minds of
decision-makers and more like service bureaus providing policy-relevant information to
allied decision-makers.
The second central finding presented in this chapter is that timing is central to
efficient information gathering. Interest groups monitor not only what is going on in the
EU policy-making process, but also must scan the horizon in an effort to anticipate the
informational needs of decision-makers. Acting and reacting in the timeliest possible
manner places a considerable premium on informal information source (in particular,
early or leaked information) as well as efficient filtering strategies. Interest groups,
however, tend to weigh the exigency to act quickly with a careful consideration of
information quality and reliability. This is why most interest groups tend to prioritize
reliable EU sources rather than informal information sources. Information filtering, by
the same token, turns less on electronic filtering services or a division of labour between
interest group representatives and more on the relationship between an interest group
and its members. Interest groups that receive little information from their members find
themselves rudderless in an overwhelming ocean of information. Lastly, stressing
research strategies is an effective way for interest groups to prepare to respond to the
informational needs of decision-makers. While groups that emphasize research should
be better positioned in this regard than other groups, research must be considered
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alongside monitoring, information sources, and filtering. Doing these effectively will
help ensure that the research will prove to be useful at the European level.
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CHAPTER 5
INFORMATION NETWORKS:
THE STRENGTH OF STRONG AND WEAK-TIES
Being well informed about policy issues and the activities of EU decision-makers
is, to a great extent, a function of an interest group’s internal capacity to monitor, gather,
filter and generate information. But this is only part of the story. Information also has an
important social dimension. In other words, interest groups also acquire a great deal of
useful information through various informal and formal networks, alliances and
coalitions. As intimated in the previous chapter, these network connections help interest
groups share the latest news, pass along tips on upcoming events, forward early
information and leaked information, circulate research data and even pool their
resources to generate new research. The importance of these networks as a means of
acquiring information and staying well informed cannot be overstated. In fact, as one
business interest representative claimed, “success in lobbying depends entirely on doing
things together.”61
The present chapter examines how interest group networks facilitate the sharing
of information between network members. This information is understood to be
essential for keeping up to date on the activities of EU decision-makers and the state of
affairs in the EU more generally speaking. In this sense, the present chapter shares a
similar point of focus with the preceding chapter. However, whereas the previous
chapter compared the advantages and disadvantages of different information sources,
the present chapter examines how information is shared among interest groups. The
question here is how interest groups use networks to maximize their chances of staying
61
Interview, official, Coca-Cola Ltd., Brussels, 8/12/2009.
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well informed. The basis for this analysis is the “strength of weak-ties” hypothesis first
proposed by Granovetter (1973). It holds that some types of networks are better at
circulating information than other types. Small, strong-tie networks of individuals with
salient similarities nurture enduring bonds of trust. But large, diffuse, weak-tie networks
of individuals without salient similarities are superior for the sharing of new and novel
information critical for keeping up to date on EU activities. In other words, weak-tie
networks are presumably strong in terms of keeping their members well informed.
I test the strength of weak-ties hypothesis using data collected in interviews and
from an online survey with interest group representatives active in EU lobbying. I
examine three related questions: (1) what specific EU level factors create incentives for
interest groups to nurture strong-tie and weak-tie networks?; (2) how do interest
groups allocate their time between strong-tie networks and weak-tie networks?; and (3)
which interest groups belong to a greater number of weak-tie networks and which
belong to a greater number of strong-tie networks? The main finding is that interest
groups in the EU do not, in general, opt for weak-tie networks despite the alleged
informational advantages they offer their members. In fact, interest groups in the EU
tend to participate more frequently in strong-tie networks. This finding is explained by
two factors: the unique nature of competition for information in the EU and the EU’s
preference for network “representativeness.” In the first case, low levels of competition
for information diminishes the benefits associated with weak-tie networks. In the
second case, the EU encourages networks to be as representative as possible – to speak
for an entire industry, sector or sub-section of the population. The highly specialized and
segmented nature of many interest groups, in particular private interests and public
authorities, encourages homogenous networks of like-minded members.
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This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section puts the argument of this
chapter in context, outlining the nature of interest group networking in general and
explaining how network structure is linked to information circulation. I then discuss the
various formal and informal institutions that influence how interest group networks
form in the EU. Lastly, I test the strength of weak-ties thesis using data from an online
survey with interest groups active in EU lobbying.
The Value-Added of Interest Group Networks
Networking62 among interest groups is a commonplace but also a very costly
lobbying behaviour. Not only does networking sometimes require interest groups to
make considerable compromises on their preferences and goals, but also the spoils of
successful networking are inevitably split between network members (Gray and
Lowery, 1998; Salisbury, 1992). Networking, however, also offers a number of
important benefits to offset these costs. In particular, networking is an efficient and
common way for interest groups to pool valuable and scarce resources (Berry, 1977,
1989; Hula 1999; Ornstein and Elder 1978; Schlozman and Tierney, 1986; Hojnacki,
1998; Heclo, 1978). Resources refer not only to time, staff and money, but also to
“politically relevant resources” like access to geographically and ideologically diverse
members, to valued contacts, and, of course, to information (Hojnacki, 1998: 439).
Importantly, networking does not only expand an individual group’s resources, it also
provides new and sometimes more efficient frameworks for coordinating resources in a
way that enhances lobbying efforts.
Networking here refers simply to interactions between interest group actors. This definition is
intentionally broad in order to capture both the formal and informal dimensions of networking. As such, a
network can refer to well-established, highly organised groups with permanent secretariats and funding
schemes, ad hoc coalitions founded on a set of policy issues, roundtable groups and working groups as
well as completely informal meetings and discussions between interest group actors. Such a broad
definition is necessary for capturing differences in information flows between so-called weak-tie and
strong-tie networks.
62
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Information sharing within networks has been subject to considerable theoretical
deliberation and debate. The main issue here is explaining how network structures
determine the conditions under which information sharing takes place. Two questions
in particular are relevant to this research: first, how do different types of networks vary
in terms of their effectiveness in circulating information among network members?; and
second, what factors restrict an interest group’s ability to form these effective
information-sharing networks?
Granovetter (1973 & 1983) has provided a partial answer to these questions by
distinguishing between strong-tie networks and weak-tie networks. Strong-ties exist in
small networks of tightly knit cliques of “friends” whose salient similarities nurture
enduring links based on trust. Weak-ties, by contrast, exist between “acquaintances” in
large, loosely connected networks where similarities between members are broad and
corresponding levels of trust are diminished. Despite the ostensible benefits associated
with close-knit networks, Granovetter argues that the weakness of strong-ties is that
they tend to circulate redundant information. This is a function of the similarity of each
network member and the diminutive size of the network. As Granovetter explains
prosaically: If someone “tells a rumor to all his close friends, and they do likewise, many
will hear the rumor a second and third time, since those linked by strong-ties tend to
share friends” (1973: 1366). Information, in other words, is recycled and even rerecycled among members of strong-tie networks. Weak-tie networks, by contrast, are
“strong” in an information-sharing sense. In particular, these types of networks bring
individuals together “from distant parts of the social system,” with sometimes radically
divergent backgrounds, expertise and preferences (Granovetter, 1983: 202). Weak-tie
networks, insofar as members share new ideas, new information and access to new
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contacts, curb the circulation of redundant information. In short, the real strength of
weak-ties is that they circulate novel information.
Despite garnering considerable support from related scholarly work (Rogers and
Bhowmik, 1971; Liu and Duff, 1972; Friedkin, 1982; Carpenter, Esterling, Lazer, 1998),
some recent research offers important amendments to Granovetter’s hypothesis.
Various scholars, while acknowledging that weak-tie networks facilitate the flow of
novel information, argue that this type of information comes at a price. The issue is
related to trust, or, more specifically, the lack of trust that characterizes weak-tie
networks. The dissimilarity of preferences and goals of mere “acquaintances” in weaktie networks account for both the circulation of novel information but also the
possibility that this information is unreliable. The issue is that all information received
through weak-tie networks must be scrutinized for accuracy and reliability. The real
strength of strong-ties, then, is the trust that links close-knit members (Levin and Cross,
2004; Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer, 2003 & 2004; Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1996 & 1997).
Members of strong-tie networks are simply more accessible, more willing to be helpful
and to provide reliable information to other members. Strong-tie networks are therefore
not burdened by the added costs of mistrust and unreliable information. While some
scholars describe a “trade-off” between maintaining trusted strong-tie contacts and
making new, weak-tie contacts, it is far more likely the case that interest groups can
pursue both strategies simultaneously (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2003). Interest
groups, in other words, could very well maintain existing contacts while pursuing new
ones. In fact, implementing such a dual strategy would confer considerable
informational advantages: groups would receive novel, but less reliable information as
well as sometimes redundant, but wholly reliable information.
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A second important amendment to Granovetter’s hypothesis is related to
competition for information (Boorman, 1975; Carpenter, Estering, and Lazer, 2003).
Granovetter’s argument is somewhat indifferent to the context in which groups make
the decision to establish weak-tie or strong-tie networks. In fact, in a purely theoretical
sense that brackets-off context-related considerations, all interest groups should prefer
weak-tie networks to strong-tie networks all of the time. That is, all things being equal,
groups should prefer novel information to redundant information. But information is a
commodity that is subject to ebbs and flows, scarcity and abundance, and competition
for information has an effect on interest groups’ preferences for certain networks. The
problem is that, under circumstances of information scarcity and thus fierce
competition, weak-tie connections become increasingly unreliable. Thus, as competition
for information increases, trust becomes a greater concern, forcing groups to turn to
reliable strong-tie networks (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 2003; Gray and Lowery,
1998).
Conditions of Strong and Weak-tie Networks in the EU
In the EU, where decision-makers trade legitimate access to the legislative
process for timely, policy-relevant information, being well informed is critical. Given the
potential informational advantage of weak-tie networks, it seems clear that interest
groups that are able to capitalize on them also position themselves to be better informed
than other groups. Interest groups that participate more frequently in weak-tie
networks should receive more novel information than interest groups that participate
more frequently in strong-tie networks. However, context matters and, while weak-ties
provide the required network structure for the circulation of valuable, novel
information, interest groups are not wholly free in their choice of networks. Thus, before
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presenting survey results regarding which interest groups in the EU participate most
frequently in which types of networks, it is prudent to first consider the EU-specific
costs and benefits of both types of network.
Conditions of Competition for Information
As discussed above, competition for information can lead interest groups to
prioritize the reliable, albeit largely redundant information gained through strong-tie
networks. Competition increases the value of trust between close friends by
exacerbating the unreliability of information gained from mere acquaintances.
Importantly, most scholarly work on lobbying both in the EU and elsewhere assumes
that relations among interest groups are invariably conflictual (Salisbury, Heinz,
Laumann and Nelson, 1987; Schattschneider, 1960; Olson, 1982). Groups in the EU are
considered “contestants” that necessarily adopt Machiavellian strategies toward one
another and engage in a process much akin to “long drawn-out trench warfare”
(Richardson and Coen, 2009; van Schendelen, 2005). But to what extent are these
assumptions accurate with regard to how interest groups circulate information through
networks? How competitive are groups with regard to information in the EU?
Interviews with interest group representatives in Brussels paint a picture that is
at odds with assumptions of fierce competition for information. In fact, most interest
group representatives reject the notion of competition with other interest groups
altogether, arguing instead that information in the EU circulates within a veritable “gift
economy” – where valuable goods (here information) are not exchanged within a typical
system of qui pro quo, but rather given without regard for debt, reimbursement or
reward (see Mauss, 1950). In fact, Brussels nurtures “more of a sharing environment,” as
one interest group representative explained, that is based on the rules and commitment
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of “fair play.”63 “Sharing information is a way of building strength in networks. There is
no advantage to being competitive or thinking competitively.”64 Moreover, “there is an
unwritten law in Brussels that you share information because everybody is in a
comparable situation.”65 In fact, it seems that those interest groups that buck the trend
are only doing themselves harm. Ultimately, “they’ll learn that if you don’t share,” as
another representative put it starkly, “you’ll be done very soon.”66 The only exception to
free informational sharing is leaked and early information as well as contacts. Several
interest group representatives indicated that, while most information flows freely
among network members, more sensitive types of information as well as personal
contacts (in particular with Commissioners, Council members and MEPs) are subject to
considerable competition. “This is where the real competition is,” reported one interest
group representative.67
What factors account for the near absence of competition for information in the
EU? From interviews, two primary factors become clear: first, the EU’s own preferences
for dealing with “representative” networks, and second, the overload and consequent
devaluation of (some types of) information among interest groups in Brussels.
The EU has a long-standing preference for interacting with networks of interest
groups that are “representative” of an EU-position rather than individual positions
(European Commission, 2001 & 2002; Greenwood and Halpin, 2007). The Commission,
in particular, is a consensus-driven institution that actively seeks out networks that
speak with a unified voice across a variety of policy areas, that represent as many
member-states as possible and that present, especially for private sector groups, a so-
63
Interview, Maria Lozano Uriz, Delegacion del Gobierno de Navara en Brusselas, Brussels, 15/10/2009.
Interview, official, Region Friuli Venezia Giulia, Brussels, 16/10/2009.
65 Interview, Dr. Volker Löwe, official, Das Büro des Landes Berlin bei der EU, Brussels, 28/10/2009.
66 Interview, official, Vertretung des Landes Niedersachsen bei der EU, Brussels, 20/10/2009.
67 Interview, official, West Midlands in Europe, Brussels, 14/10/2009.
64
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called “industry position.” As scholars from Mayhew (1974) to Kingdon (1995) to
Esterling (2005) have shown, policy support can influence how decision-makers pass
legislation. As such, interest groups can steer the legislative process by showing where
the “bulk of support lies” for a particular policy as well as signalling to decision-makers
that diverse interests have themselves worked out their differences on certain issues
(Mahoney, 2007: 368; see also Hula, 1999). In a different way, however, by prioritizing
representativeness in the networks it engages with, the EU is also able to affect the
semblance of greater legitimacy (Greenwood, 2007: 343; Wonka et al., 2010: 465).
Another part of the issue is simple efficiency. As one NGO representative explains:
“Decision-makers don’t want to talk to 100 NGOs. They want to know what NGOs think
together (…) They don’t really care who shows up, they want to speak one time, get the
one position and that’s it.”68 But this priority of representativeness has a clear impact on
the nature of competition among groups in the EU. According to one public authority
representative, “competition is bad for generating a collective voice and this collective
voice is necessary for being effective” at lobbying.69 Consequently, “information that is
not shared,” according to another interest representative “is useless.”70 There is “no real
advantage in having information and not sharing it. The value of it comes from sharing
it.”71 As such, the EU’s prioritization of representativeness has come to affect the nature
of competition for information in the EU.
Competition for information in the EU is also affected by its availability. As
discussed in the previous chapter, while decision-makers are short on policy-relevant
information (thus explaining their reliance on interest groups), interest groups face an
68
Interview, Karen Schorh, PLAN, Brussels, 8/12/2009.
Interview, Arjan Stoffels, Representative, Oost-Nederlandse Provinces, Brussels, 15/10/2009.
70 Interview, official, Regione Europea del Tirolo-Trentino-Alto / Südtirol, Brussels, 19/10/2009.
71 Interview, official, Daimler AG, Brussels, 7/10/2009.
69
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over-abundance of information in the EU. Many interest group representatives explain
how they are “drowning in information”72 and how they even “have more information
than (they) need.”73 Like any commodity, the value of information is reduced when it is
in abundance. What is more, the decreased value also assuages competition. “If
information wasn’t so available,” as one representative put it bluntly, “it would be more
competitive.”74 Many interest group representatives relate the conditions of information
overload to advances in technology. It is the “current society, the internet society,” as
one representative notes, that “forces you to distribute information as much as
possible.”75 “There may have been competition 20 years ago, but today information is
available and easy to access and everyone can have it.”76 Technology, then, ensures that
even the most private information will not stay private for long. While this clearly
applies to formal information sources, like newspapers, it is less clear how it applies to
informal information sources and leaked information. Nevertheless, insofar as interest
groups “get brownie points for sharing information”77 that inevitably circulates among
networks anyways, groups are quick to make private information public.
Testing the Strength of Weak-ties Hypothesis in the EU
Given the apparent lack of competition for information in the EU as well as the
EU’s preference for network representativeness, we can assume that interest groups
should be relatively free to pursue weak-tie network strategies. In fact, it seems as if the
conditions in the EU are optimal for establishing weak-tie networks. To test these
72
Interview, Martin Andersen, Head of Office, Kalundborg EU-Office, Brussels, 13/10/2009.
Interview, official, Bureau Alsace, Brussels, 22/10/2009.
74 Interview, Dr. Reinhard Boest, Informationsbüro des Landes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern bei der EU,
Brussels, 19/10/2009.
75Interview, official, Generalitat de Catalunya. Delegación del Gobierno en Bruselas, 7/12/2009.
76 Interview, official, Vertretung des Landes Niedersachsen bei der EU, Brussels, 20/10/2009.
77 Interview, Martina Weitsch, official, Quaker Council for European Affairs, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
73
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assumptions we will need a way to measure the extent to which different types of
interest groups in the EU participate in strong and weak-tie networks. This is no easy
task, and it is one that is fraught with theoretical and methodological difficulties.
Following the existing literature, there are three ways to approach the problem of
assessing strong and weak-tie networks. First, I look at how interest groups allocate
their time between either “maintaining their existing contacts” or “making new
contacts.” Second I examine the reasons why interest groups interact with other groups
in the first place. Is the motivation for participating in networks the pursuit of novel
information, for example, or is it because network members have similar interests and
goals? Third, I measure strong-tie and weak-tie networks through an examination of
network structure: which interest groups participate in networks of predominately
“like” members and which participate in networks of predominantly “unlike” members?
A cumulative strong-tie and weak-tie score will also be calculated using the results from
all three measures. In what follows I will first present the results from all three
measures before discussing the findings in detail.
Maintaining Existing Contacts v Making New Contacts
A central element of establishing strong-tie networks and weak-tie networks is
an impulse or attitude to either bunker down with trusted friends or reach out to mere
acquaintances. Do interest groups, in other words, seek to maintain existing contacts or
to make new ones? Arguably, it might be the case that, at the time of the survey, an
interest group already has its weak-tie networks firmly in place and thus, maintaining
contacts could indicate maintaining weak-tie contacts. However, this would be to reify
the network concept. As noted above, networks are not just well established, formal,
highly organised structures. To really measure weak-tie networks, we need to also allow
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for networking as highly informal discussions and meetings – in other words, the simple
interaction between actors. Talking about networking in this informal sense means
understanding it in terms of two different impulses: first, the impulse to seek out and
make new contacts, and second, the impulse to nurture and maintain the ones you
already have. Importantly, this decision does not necessarily involve a trade-off between
being in a position to receive reliable but largely redundant information or unreliable,
largely novel information. Interest groups can very well pursue both impulses – both
bunkering down with trusted friends and reaching out to mere acquaintances –
simultaneously. To shed some light on this question, respondents were asked about the
importance (measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all important” and 5
being “very important”) of “making new contacts” and “maintaining existing contacts.”
The results are presented in Table 5, below.
Table 5:
Making New Contacts v Maintaining Existing Contacts
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Importance
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
Making New Contacts
24 (8.08)
26 (8.75)
38 (12.79)
94 (31.65)
115 (38.72)
Maintaining Existing Contacts
23 (7.77)
17 (5.74)
31 (10.47)
96 (32.43)
129 (43.58)
Total
Mean
Standard deviation
297 (100)
3.84
1.25
296 (100)
3.98
1.21
The difference between the importance interest groups attribute to making new
contacts and maintaining existing contacts is very small and the average responses vary
only marginally. Perhaps the only notable difference is between those respondents that
think maintaining existing contacts is “very important” (44%) and those who think that
making new contacts is “very important” (39%). From these results it appear as if
slightly more groups prioritize nurturing existing contacts with friends (strong-ties)
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than establishing new contacts with acquaintances (weak-ties). Otherwise, there is no
notable divergence in how groups allocate their time in these regards. It is, however, the
lack of divergence that is the most interesting result. On the one hand, it reflects the fact
that interest groups do not face an inscrutable trade-off between pursuing strong and
weak-ties. Rather, groups can do both. On the other hand, it undermines our assumption
that a lack of competition for information between interest groups in the EU should
encourage groups to invariably seek out new contacts. This is clearly not the case. If
anything, groups tend to prioritize, if only marginally, maintaining their existing
contacts. Does this trend persist for all types of interest groups? Graph 4, below,
provides an answer to this question by organizing the same data by interest group type.
As we can see in Graph 4, the same marginal prioritization of maintaining existing
contacts appears to persist across all six interest group types. Only consultancies
attribute the same importance to both maintaining contacts and making new contacts.
The difference between the two impulses is most pronounced for trade unions, where
the average response for making new contacts is only 3.08 of 5 and the average for
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maintaining contacts is 3.5 of 5. More importantly, there appears to be a correlation
between making contacts and maintaining contacts. Stressing one tends to equate with
stressing the other. Again, the implication here is that there is no trade-off between
these two impulses. For instance, consultancies, placing the greatest amount of
importance on making new contacts, also place the greatest amount of importance on
maintaining existing contacts. Understood as an impulse that directs interest groups in
their interactions, it seems as if both impulses can be nurtured simultaneously. The
impulse to maintain contacts or make new contacts, however, is just one aspect of the
strength of weak-tie hypothesis. The various reasons why interest groups choose the
contacts they do as well as the number of weak-ties and strong-ties interest groups
maintain is still to be assessed.
Reasons for Interacting with Other Interest Groups
Underlying interest group networks is the notion that network members bring
something valuable to the table. This is the basis for resource-pooling explanations of
network activity. But what reasons do interest groups have for establishing networks
that facilitate the circulation of information between members? As discussed above,
individual members who have many important and salient similarities constitute
strong-tie networks. That is, members have similar interests and goals. These networks,
although circulating redundant information, are thought to offer network members
added trust and reliability. By contrast, weak-tie networks, although lacking in trust
between members, offer novel information, ideas and contacts. What motivates interest
groups in the EU to seek contact with other interest groups? Respondents were asked
the following question: “How important are the following factors in determining with
whom your organization interacts?” (importance is measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1
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being “not at all important” to 5 being “very important). They were given four options:
we have similar interests and goals; they have new or novel ideas; they have information
we don’t have; and, they have access to contacts we don’t have access to. The results are
presented in Table 6, below.
Table 6
Reasons for Contact with Other groups
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Importance
We have similar
interests and goals
They have novel
ideas
13 (4.85)
49 (18.28)
87 (32.46)
78 (29.10)
41 (15.30)
They have
information we
don’t have
4 (1.49)
27 (10.07)
67 (25)
67 (36.19)
73 (27.24)
They have
contacts we
don’t have
13 (4.81)
38 (14.07)
56 (20.74)
98 (36.30)
65 (24.07)
1 (not at all important)
2
3
4
5 (very important)
1 (.37)
5 (1.85)
35 (12.96)
74 (27.41)
155 (57.41)
Total
Mean
Standard deviation
270 (100)
4.39
.81
268 (100)
3.31
1.08
268 (100)
3.77
1.00
270 (100)
3.60
1.13
There is a clear prioritization of interest groups making contacts based on shared
similarities and goals in the EU. Fifty-seven percent of respondents think that this is a
“very important” factor for determining their interactions with other groups. Indeed, the
average response in this category was a very high 4.39 out of 5. Factors related to weaktie networks were not as important for most interest groups in the EU. Interactions
offering new information and new contacts were markedly less important than those
based on similar interests and goals. Twenty-seven percent of respondents think that
new information is a “very important” factor for determining contacts and just 24%
attribute the same importance to gaining new contacts. This latter result might reflect
increased competition for valued contacts identified by interest group representatives
interviewed for this project (discussed above). Only 15% of respondents think that
network members offering new or novel ideas is “very important.” The reasons given for
why interest groups interact with other interest groups seem to clearly favour strong-tie
networks. In fact, the novel information, contacts and ideas that weak-tie networks offer
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seem to be of little importance to most interest groups in the EU. Again, we are led to the
following question: does this trend persist across all types of interest groups in the EU?
Graph 5, below plots the same data organized according to interest group type.
When we disaggregate the results by interest groups types we still see a clear
priority for making contacts with other interest groups based on strong-tie factors,
namely, similar interests and goals. In fact, all interest groups report average responses
of at least 4 out of 5 for this factor. Clearly, having similar interests and goals is a very
important consideration when making contacts for all interest groups in the EU. Reasons
related to weak-ties are somewhat less important. Interactions based on the promise of
new information, new contacts and novel ideas have average responses of about 3 out of
5. The most important weak-tie factor is receiving new information from network
contacts. In particular, public authorities attribute the greatest amount of importance to
this factor, with an average response of 4.13 out of 5. Access to new contacts and novel
ideas are less important factors. As with the results for how interest groups allocate
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their time between maintaining contacts and making new contacts, the results here
appear to suggest that interest groups value some networks because of shared interests
and goals and others because of the novel ideas, information and contacts they promise.
Public authorities are the most prominent case in this sense, placing the greatest
amount of importance on networks with similar ideas and goals, as well as those that
offer new information and contacts.
The above results provide substantial evidence that groups can pursue both
strong-tie and weak-tie strategies simultaneously. They also show, however, a slight
tendency of most interest groups in the EU to favour strong-tie network strategies.
These results only really tell us about how interest groups allocate their time and the
motivating factors that draw them into networking. We still need to examine network
structure in order to get a better picture of how frequently interest groups interact with
“like” groups and with “unlike” groups.
Strong-Tie Networks v Weak-Tie Networks
One of the central problems of assessing strong and weak-tie networks is
operationalising the concept of “tie strength.” Granovetter’s famously nebulous
definition is little help: “The strength of a tie,” he writes, “is a (probably linear)
combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual
confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize a tie” (1973: 1361).
Unpacking this definition, there appear to be two different dimensions related to tie
strength: (1) the character of the bond between individuals and (2) the frequency of
interaction between individuals. Perhaps as a testament to Granovetter’s definition,
scholars tend to disagree about which measure to use and even speak at cross-purposes
with regard to the two dimensions of tie strength. Some scholars focus on the bond
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characteristics between individuals in networks (Carpenter, Esterling, and Lazer, 1998;
2003; 2004; Rogers and Bhowmik, 1971; Liu and Duff, 1972) while others insist that
frequency of interaction between network members best reflects tie strength (Freidkin,
1982; Hansen 1999; Levin and Cross, 2004). In the following analysis I will combine
both dimensions. First, assessing bond characteristics translate as how “like” or “unlike”
network members are. Strong-tie bonds, therefore, are evinced in the interaction
between “like” members who share many preferences, interests and goals. Weak-tie
bonds are evinced in the interaction between “unlike” members who are from different
backgrounds, with difference preferences, interests and goals. For this analysis, a very
simple measure of “like” and “unlike” is whether interest groups interact with their own
“type” or with other “types” of interest groups. Hence, do companies interact with other
companies or with public authorities and NGOs, for instance? But we still need a way to
quantify interaction. The infrequent interaction of companies with NGOs, for instance, is
not necessarily reflective of a weak-tie. Thus, frequency of interaction, the second
dimension of tie strength, can be used to assess how strong these bonds are. Hence, the
question is: how frequently do different interest groups interact with “like” interest groups
and how frequently do they interact with “unlike” interest groups? Groups that interact
frequently with a diverse array of “unlike” groups can be said to have “strong” weak-ties.
Within the context of the online survey, respondents were asked how frequently
(one a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “never” and 5 being “very often”) their organisation is
in contact with the following eleven types of interest groups: NGOs / associations of
NGOs; companies; professional associations; trade unions; law firms; public affairs
consultancies; think-tanks; academic organisations; chambers of commerce;
representatives of religions, churches, and communities of conviction; and associations
of public authorities (like regions, cities, and municipalities). The mean scores for
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frequency of interaction that all six types of interest groups have with a possible eleven
potential network partners are presented in Table 7.
Table 7
Strong-ties and Weak-ties in EU Interest Groups
(Mean scores)
Network
Partners
Consultancies
NGOs
Professional
Associations
Companies
Trade Unions
Public
Authorities
Laws firms
Think Tanks
Academic
Organisations
Chambers of
Commerce
Religious
Organisations
Consultancies NGOs
3
3.69
Professional
Trade
Public
Associations
Companies
Unions
Authorities
2.22
2.39
2.22
1.78
2
4.52
2.92
3.05
4
2.83
4.3
4.41
2.92
3
2.86
2.3
4.4
4.19
2.24
3.94
4.16
1.94
1.78
2.64
4.85
2.77
2.67
2.16
3.07
2.46
3.3
2.81
2.12
2.71
2.27
2.39
2.41
2.88
2.16
2.5
2.23
2.07
2.35
4.58
1.32
2.51
2.69
3.01
2.58
2.41
2.5
2.58
2.69
2
2.12
2.27
1.71
2.5
1.3
1.84
1.29
1.27
1.5
1.13
Notably, most interest groups in the EU tend to interact most frequently with
“like” groups. NGOs, for example, tend to interact most frequently with other NGOs,
companies with companies, professional associations with professional associations,
and so forth. Even interest groups that have rather frequent interactions with an array
of “unlike” groups, as is the case for NGOs, nonetheless have far more frequent contacts
with “like” groups. Importantly, the only exception is consultancies, which maintain
much more frequent contact with a diverse array of “unlike” groups and thus can be said
to participate in a considerable number of weak-tie networks. By contrast, public
authorities interact only very rarely with “unlike” groups, indicating their tendency to
participate frequently in strong-tie networks.
A more complete picture of the weak-tie and strong-tie networks in which
different interest groups in the EU participate can be obtained by combining the results
from the three different tests above. A cumulative weak-tie and strong-tie score for all
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six types of interest groups is presented in Graph 6, below. Weak-ties are the sum of
“making new contacts,” the importance of interactions based on them having “new and
novel ideas,” “information we don’t have” and “contacts we don’t have” as well as the
frequency with which various interest groups interact with “unlike” groups. Strong-ties
are the sum of “maintaining existing contacts,” the importance of interactions based on
having “similar interests and goals,” as well as the frequency of interaction with “like”
groups.
The cumulative weak-tie and strong-ties scores presented in Graph 6 above
reflect the results in Table 7. Most interest groups have very low weak-tie scores,
averaging an importance of 2.8 where 1 is not at all important and 5 is very important.
By contrast the strong-tie scores are much higher, with an average mean score of about
4.5. It appears that, despite a lack of competition for information and the EU’s
preference for network representativeness – two factors that should encourage weak-tie
networks – there is a marked tendency in the EU for interest groups to participate more
frequently in strong-tie networks.
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Explaining the Results
Data from the empirical tests, above, present evidence that interest groups are
not limited to pursuing either strong-tie or weak-tie strategies. A strategy of making
new contacts and pursuing new ideas, information and contacts can be coupled with a
strategy for maintaining existing contacts with like-minded members. Indeed, it appears
as if most interest groups in the EU, in particular NGOs and to a lesser extent companies,
professional associations and trade unions, place considerable emphasis on both
strategies. Nonetheless, the same data does suggest that most interest groups
participate more frequently in strong-tie networks. The strength of strong-ties appears
to trump the strength of weak-ties in the EU. Importantly, this tendency supports similar
findings in the US context. Heinz et al.’s seminal study of Washington lobbyists, for
instance, found that the most important variable explaining network membership is
organisational type. More specifically, groups have a distinct tendency to form
“homogenous networks” with groups that are similar to their own (1993: 181).
Carpenter, Esterling and Laser (2003), using social network analysis, also found that
network membership among American interest groups is predominantly based on social
trust: “groups tend to seek information from others they can trust in order to develop a
coherent interpretation of policy” (226).
While supporting evidence from the US context, the results presented here raise
several questions specific to interest group networking in the EU. First, how can we
explain the prevalence of strong-tie networks despite the apparent lack of competition
for information between interest groups and the EU’s preference for network
representativeness (both factors that should encourage weak-tie networks)? Second, do
interest groups pursuing weak-tie networks reap any sort of informational advantage
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like the receipt of new and novel information from diverse network members? By the
same token, do strong-tie networks perhaps offer their own informational advantages in
the form of largely redundant but nonetheless reliable and accurate information? The
survey results can only take us so far in examining the reasons interest groups
participate in strong and weak-ties networks. To answer these questions, therefore, we
need to take a closer look at how different interest groups in the EU pursue weak-tie and
strong-tie strategies. In what follows I will consider NGOs, public authorities and
consultancies. The selection of these cases is predicated on the cumulative strong-tie
and weak-tie scores presented in Graph 6. NGOs present an interesting case where both
strong-tie and weak-tie networks appear to be pursued in tandem. Public authorities, by
contrast, rarely participate in weak-tie networks but have very frequent interactions in
strong-tie networks. Finally, consultancies have the highest weak-tie score and the
lowest strong-tie score. Additionally, consultancies deserve further attention insofar as
their interaction patterns are primarily a function of their role as information brokers
for a diverse array of different types of interest groups.
NGOs
NGOs, according to the data presented above, have rather frequent contact with a
diverse array of ‘unlike’ interest groups, most predominately academic organisations,
professional associations, companies, public authorities and even trade unions, as well
as frequent interaction with other NGOs. In other words, NGOs appear to more or less
equally pursue both strong-tie and weak-tie strategies. To what extent do NGOs reap the
informational advantages associated with weak-tie networks? Further, how do their
equally important strong-ties affect information sharing?
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NGO participation in weak-tie networks cannot be explained in terms of resource
pooling. Typically resource-poor, NGOs have little to bring to the table that would be
immediately useful to resource-rich private interest groups, like companies and
professional associations, for example. What NGOs do offer, however, is legitimacy:
NGOs have the support of a diffuse sub-section of the population on a broad range of
policy issues. Take, for example, the recently formed “Ad hoc Expert Group on
Promoting Equality in Employment,” that brought together ENAR, an anti-discrimination
NGO, with well-known companies like IBM, L’Oreal and Adecco. According to an ENAR
representative, the main benefit of this network is “added visibility,” “being seen as a
serious NGO” and taking advantage of the superior information and research capabilities
of the private interest group members.78 But when asked what the same private
interests take from networking with ENAR, the story was much different. For private
interests, networking with NGOs is a matter of affecting the semblance of “corporate
social responsibility.” They “need to save face, to get a better image of their work and to
show that they are doing a lot internally on diversity management.”79 This same
legitimacy is hard-won without NGOs.
Exchanging a rather intangible good like legitimacy for a place in a weak-tie
network has its shortcomings. Importantly, with little else to offer beyond legitimacy,
NGOs are commonly viewed as second-order network members. A representative from
Eurogroup for Animals put it succinctly: it is not only “always quite difficult” to network
with private interest groups, but these same private-sector interest groups have a
tendency to “demonize” NGOs, sometimes even characterizing them as “extremists.”80 A
trade union representative offered a less hyperbolic but equally telling insight. NGOs
78
Interview, Juliana Wahlgren, Networking and Campaigns Officer, ENAR, Brussels, 18/11/2010.
Interview, Juliana Wahlgren, Networking and Campaigns Officer, ENAR, Brussels, 18/11/2010.
80 Interview, Martyn Griffiths, Executive Officer, Eurogroup for Animals, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
79
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“are not working in the same manner that we are working in. We are working in a more
structured, planned way. When you’re working with NGOs you never know who’s there.
It might be people you don’t even know or maybe something big has changed in the
NGO.”81 With the value of network members contingent on each member bringing
something valuable to the table, these common negative perceptions of NGOs would
certainly restrict information sharing within weak-tie networks. While we might expect
these weak-tie networks to afford NGOs some informational advantages – they are, after
all receiving information from a whole host of diverse and well-resourced interest
groups – their second-order status has the potential to seriously limit the expected
informational benefits of weak-ties.
NGOs, while boasting a high weak-tie score, nevertheless tend to interact most
frequently with other NGOs. Unlike weak-tie networks, NGO strong-tie networks owe
much of their existence to the benefits of resource pooling. Equally important, however,
is the EU’s preference for dealing with NGO networks that demonstrate a certain degree
of representativeness. For NGOs networks, this means two things: first, coverage across
as many Member States as possible, and second, coverage across as many issue areas as
possible. The result is the type of mega-network of NGOs that is most common in
Brussels. Social Platform, for instance, a mega-network association with members
representing millions of citizens, advocating nothing less than “the advancement of the
principles of equality, solidarity, non-discrimination and the promotion of fundamental
rights,” can clearly boast wide coverage across many EU Member States as well as large
sub-sections of the EU population. Concord, another typical NGO mega-network,
represents no less than 16,000 NGOs on issues ranging from AIDS in Africa to
environmental issues in the Arctic as well as gender issues and trade. Given the size and
81
Martin Romer, General Secretary, ETUCE (European Trade Union Committee for Education), Brussels,
17/11/2010.
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scope of these mega-networks, it is perhaps not too much of an exaggeration to say, as
one NGO representative put it, that they “cover the whole world.”82
These mega-networks of NGOs seem to stretch the definition and usefulness of
the strong-ties concept. These are clearly not tight-knit, small networks with shared
aims, interests and goals. Nonetheless, these are still networks of “like” groups and do
correspond in at least this one important way to strong-tie networks. Further, these
networks, as Granovetter predicts, seem to only circulate largely redundant information.
But rather than similarity of group type and aims, it is network “representativeness”
that limits the ability of these networks to circulate useful, novel information. A few
examples will help explain this point.
NGO strong-tie networks, like Concord and Social Platform, are broad in scope
primarily because these adhere to the EU’s own preference for network
representativeness. For Culture Action Europe, a Brussels-based NGO, the result is that
information circulated within these strong-tie networks “is extremely broad. It focuses
on overarching issues that might be of interest to the whole NGO sector but that is just
too general to be useful.”83 Furthermore, these networks serve more as information
depositories than information exchange hubs, with each network member providing
expert information on their own topic but benefiting little from the information
provided by others. The broad focus of these networks means very little substantial
overlap between network members’ interests. The only information that an individual
member would find relevant is the information they have themselves provided. As the
ENAR representative put it succinctly: “If (the networks) have information, we already
82
83
Interview, Vincent Forest, Head of European Union Office, Front Line, Brussels, 7/12/2009.
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
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know it.”84 Information in these strong-tie NGO networks is, as Granovetter’s theory
suggests, largely redundant.
Exacerbating the problems related to the diffuse interests of NGO network
members in strong-tie networks are important internal collective action problems.
NGOs face serious problems cooperating within their networks. Geyer (2001) and
Warleigh (2001) found evidence in separate analyses of “clear antagonisms” between
members of NGO networks, with divisions based on differences in resources and
interests creating clear distinctions between so-called “in” and “out” groups. Large, wellfunded NGOs have little reason to put time and effort into helping smaller NGOs, just as
smaller NGOs “fear that cooperation with a larger (NGO) would merely overwhelm their
own activities”(Geyer, 2001: 480). Clearly, these barriers to cooperation would undercut
the benefits of trust that we associate with strong-tie networks. As such, the very broad
and even relatively useless information shared in NGO networks also seems to lack a
dimension of trust and reliability that is thought to naturally accompany information
flow through strong-tie networks. Information that is already irrelevant and useless
seems to also be unreliable.
Public Authorities
Public authorities (sub-state actors like cities, municipalities and regions),
according to Graph 6 above, have the second lowest weak-tie network scores. The
frequency with which public authorities interact with other public authorities is far
higher than with any other type of interest group. What is more, public authorities stress
the importance of sharing interests and goals with network members more so than any
other interest group type under consideration in this study. How can we explain this
84
Interview, Juliana Wahlgren, Networking and Campaigns Officer, ENAR, Brussels, 18/11/2010.
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proclivity for strong-tie networks? Further, do public authorities reap the benefits of
reliable and trustworthy information that presumably accompany strong-tie networks?
The tendency for public authorities to frequently interact with other public
authorities and only rarely with other types of interest groups is the result of three
factors: substantial EU funding made available to public authorities; the unique nature
and scope of representativeness for public authority networks, and the existence of the
Committee of the Regions.
EU funding has long been a major draw for public authorities in Brussels. The
introduction of Regional Policy in the 1980s, a large-scale redistributive strategy aimed
exclusively at EU regions, cities and municipalities, compelled many public authorities to
establish representations in Brussels in order to steer the redistributive process
(Huysseune and Jans, 2008; Jeffrey, 1997; Mazey, 1995). “While you’re over there in
Brussels,” so the idea goes, “get us a grant”(Laffan, 1989). In addition to the funds
available for individual public authorities, the EU has also made a substantial amount of
funding available for public authority networks. INTERREG and more recently EGTC
(European Grouping for Territorial Cooperation), both components of Regional Policy,
go a great distance in promoting cross-border, transnational and interregional
cooperation. In short, both initiatives provide considerable funding for projects that not
only involve several regions, cities and municipalities, but also ones from as many
Member States as possible.
The draw of EU funds and the requirement to network with other sub-state
actors affects the nature of representativeness for public authorities. While
representativeness for NGOs relate to both coverage in Member States and across issue
areas, for public authorities it is only the former. That is, coverage across Member States
facilitated by sub-state cooperation becomes more important than coverage across
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many issue areas. This is clearly evident in the type of networks that public authorities
participate in. While the bases for networks of public authorities can be very broad and
defined by national and sub-state level constitutional competencies (as is the case for
REGLEG, Regions with Legislative Powers), most public authority networks are defined
geographically. The EU’s preference for coverage across many states evinced through
cross-boarder cooperation has clearly left its mark on these networks. The Alps-Adriatic
Working Group, the European Association of Elected Representatives from Mountain
Areas, the Baltic Sea Group, the Alliance of Maritime Regional Interests in Europe, the
Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions, and the Working Community of the
Pyrenees are just a few typical example. Importantly, all of these networks turn on
issues of interregional cooperation and reserve exclusive membership for public
authorities. Strong-tie networks among public authorities lack diversity in membership
because of the strong incentives to network with other pubic authorities.
The existence of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) also helps explain why
public authorities tend to pursue strong-tie networking strategies. Again, EU funding is a
central factor. CoR, along with the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC),
represent the only two official EU consultative bodies at the European level. The idea is
to provide a direct channel for the representation of sub-state interests to the main EU
decision-making institutions. While many scholars have questioned the power of the
CoR, the Commission is nonetheless mandated to consult with this consultative
institution on all relevant legislation. Further, CoR, representing the interests of over
344 regions, cities and municipalities to the EU, has an impressive critical mass of substate-level actors. What is more important here, however, is how CoR functions: rather
than looking outward to encourage interactions with a broad array of other types of
interest groups, it fosters networks exclusively with other public authorities. This is
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clear in its mandate for promoting regional cooperation through the INTEREG and EGTC
funding mechanisms. In fact, CoR provides assistance in putting networks together,
providing information on upcoming calls for tender and even facilitating the exchange of
best practices between its members. By focusing on funding opportunities that stress
networks of sub-state actors with (exclusively) other sub-state actors, CoR helps
reinforce the tendency for public authorities to pursue strong-tie strategies. What is
more, public authorities face few incentives to branch out and network with a diverse
array of “unlike” groups.
Do these strong-tie strategies provide public authorities with informational
advantages like added trust and reliability? Evidence from interviews suggests that they
in fact do. “The regional world,” according to the director of the Delegación de la Junta
de Andalucia en Bruselas, “is marked by a cooperative approach.”85 For many public
authorities, there is “too much information”86 and early information or leaked
information gets freely passed around between representatives from other public
authorities. As such, competition for this information is very low. Trust among network
members is also important. For the West Midlands office, for instance, most “contacts
are also friends. You get more information from them. We get lots of information about
(EU) funding programmes from these people because they trust us and we trust them.
So the trust relationship is what we always work on.”87 Strong-ties, despite being weak
in terms of transmitting novel and new information, have the benefit of providing
network members with reliable information. Trust within strong-tie networks ensures
that information that is passed along has been checked and double-checked and is,
therefore, reliable.
85
Interview, Nicolas Cuesta Santiago, official, Delegación de la Junta de Andalucia en Bruselas, Brussels,
19/10/2009.
86 Interview, official, Vertretung des Landes Niedersachsen bei der EU, Brussels, 20/10/2009.
87 Interview, official, West Midlands in Europe, Brussels, 14/10/2009.
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Consultancies
The data presented here show that consultancies are unique among interest
groups in the extent to which they pursue weak-tie network strategies. They have the
highest weak-tie score as well as the lowest strong-tie score, as presented in Graph 6,
and relatively high scores for stressing involvement in networks that circulate new
ideas, information and contacts. Importantly, these finding appear to be consistent with
Lahusen’s earlier, but much more general survey (2002) that also found that
consultancies tend to interact with a diverse array of other interest groups, ranging from
companies, public authorities, think tanks, professional associations and NGOs. How can
we explain the tendency for consultancies to participate in weak-tie networks? Further,
do these weak-tie networks indicate that consultancies enjoy informational advantages
like the circulation of new and novel ideas between network members?
Consultancies differ from all other interest group types in that they do not have
their own interests. They are more like guns for hire, carrying out a series of related
lobbying activities for clients (namely, other interest groups). Competition for clients
makes interaction among consultancies rather difficult. “We are direct competitors,”
explains a representative from FD Blueprint, a Brussels-based consultancy, “networking
with other consultancies is tricky to say the least.”88 Thus, there are not only few
incentives but also considerable disincentives for establishing strong-tie networks of
consultancies. An exception to this rule is EPAC, the European Public Affairs
Consultancies’ Association. Importantly, however, this network of “like” groups does not
function as a strong-tie network. First, its aim is not to represent the interests of
consultancies to the EU but rather to simply reinforce an independent shared code of
88
Interview, Kerstin Duhme, Director, FD Blueprint, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
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conduct among consultancies. Second, there is little if any information sharing in this
network, and trust levels are compromised by the general climate of competition among
members.
The fact that consultancies do not have their own interests does not make the
concept of network representativeness irrelevant. Representativeness has an important
effect on information sharing in weak-tie networks. Without their own interests guiding
their lobbying activities, consultancies find themselves in the unique position to
facilitate representativeness in networks that bring together their clients. What is more,
the EU’s preference for dealing with representative networks compels individual
interest groups to seek the services of consultancies: there is, to speak with one
consultancy representative, “more clout if you can speak on behalf of an industry
coalition.”89 For instance, Europen (The European Organisation for Packaging and the
Environment) a professional association based in Brussels, engaged a consultancy to
organize its “Stakeholder Outreach Program,” with the purpose of putting it “in touch
with the right partners, including green groups, environmental NGOs, officials, industry
people, and also from some of the other agencies.”90 By the same token, FD BluePrint
capitalizes on the value of representative networks by hosting its own BluePrint
Breakfast Clubs. Essentially, a type of informal roundtable, FD BluePrint moderates what
a representative describes as a “respectful, controversial and open debate” between
NGOs and industry representatives.91
Consultancies are well positioned to act as facilitators of representative networks
in part because they face few networking challenges. This is the result of the type of
professional lobbying service they provide their members and their increasing
89
Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
Interview, Julian Carroll, Managing Director, Europen (The European Organisation for Packaging and
the Environment), Brussels, 17/11/2010.
91 Interview, Kerstin Duhme, Director, FD Blueprint, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
90
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importance in a changing EU political environment. The expanding complexities of EU
law, the ever-changing nature of EU treaties, the extension of EU competencies into new
policy areas and the EU’s slow expansion to new Member States creates a need for the
services that consultancies offer. As Lahusen puts it: “the need for technical support is
thus one of the main reasons for the success of consultancies” in the EU (2002: 709). As
a consequence, more and more interest groups, from companies to NGOs to public
authorities, seek out these services, marking the “professionalization of lobbying” in the
EU and elsewhere (Lahusen, 2002; Maloney, 2009). The result is the extensive and
diverse weak-tie networks that seem to centre on consultancies. It is perhaps little
wonder that a consultancy representative finds that networking is “easier for us than for
an individual association because we have good relationships with all of those
associations. This is the strategic advantage of consultancies.”92
Facilitating representativeness in networks also means that consultancies
effectively act as “central hubs” of extremely diverse interest group networks that
disseminate new information, contacts and ideas. But consultancies are far more than
just neutral conduits through which this information flows. Rather, as we saw in the
previous chapter, a large part of their job is make this information use-friendly, to
translate it into context-specific terms and to assess it with reference to their own
political expertise. The fact that they do not represent their own interests also suggests
that consultancies can do these things without a separate and potentially antagonistic
agenda. Information sharing within these networks is therefore free and unbiased.
Competition for information among network members is diminished by the exigency to
form representative networks. Information sharing is the first crucial step in finding the
right members for an issue-driven coalition, for example, as well as developing
92
Interview, Timo Schubert, Associate Director, ADS Insight, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
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compelling joint decision papers and for securing meetings with decision-makers. In a
very important way, the real strength of the weak-tie networks that consultancies foster
is the dissemination of novel information, ideas and contact. Consultancies, in other
words, bear out Granovetter’s strength of weak-ties hypothesis.
Conclusion
The preceding sections have provided considerable evidence that interest groups
in the EU place more emphasis on strong-tie network strategies than weak-tie network
strategies. First, interest groups tend to stress maintaining existing contacts more than
making new ones. What is more, group interaction in networks is based mostly on
network members having similar interests and goals rather than on the promise of novel
ideas, new information and new contacts. Lastly, most interest groups in the EU tend to
belong to strong-tie networks rather than weak-tie networks. That is, most interest
groups in the EU interact most frequently with “like” groups, and interaction with
“unlike” groups (and especially a diverse array of unlike groups) is infrequent and rare.
In the EU, then, strong-ties seem to trump weak-ties.
How can we explain these results given the lack of competition for information in
the EU and the EU’s own preferences for representative networks? These conditions, as
discussed above, should be ideal for establishing weak-tie networks. Being well
informed in a situation where decision-makers are starved for timely information would
even seem to necessitate weak-tie networks. The results are simply counter-intuitive.
Brief case studies focusing separately on NGOs, consultancies and public authorities help
explain these results. In general, the conditions of information competition as well as the
nature and scope of network representativeness differ among interest group types.
NGOs suffer from a second-order status in their weak-tie networks, thus severely
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limiting information sharing among network members. NGO strong-tie networks fail to
provide reliable albeit redundant information among network members sharing few
interests and there are significant antagonisms among members based on differences in
resources. Public authorities, by contrast, present a case where, first, there are
considerable incentives for participating in strong-tie networks and, second, where trust
facilitates information circulation within these networks. Lastly, the results for
consultancies present a strong case for the strength of weak-ties hypothesis.
Consultancies facilitate the creation of representative networks with a multitude of
diverse interest groups thus enabling the sharing of new and novel information, contacts
and ideas. Taken together, these brief case studies of NGOs, public authorities and
consultancies suggest that the strength and importance of both strong-ties and weakties is largely dependent on interest group type, on competition for information among
network members, and on how different groups face different networking incentives
provided by the EU’s preferences for network representativeness.
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CHAPTER 6
INFORMATION TRANSPARENCY:
INTEREST GROUP PROBITY AND DISHONESTY IN INFORMATION PROVISION
Lobbying in the EU sees well-informed interest groups providing policy-relevant
information to decision-makers in exchange for legitimate access to the policymaking
process. The preceding chapters have examined how interest groups keep up-to-date on
EU activities in order to anticipate the informational needs of decision-makers as well as
the role that interest group networks play in this process. We are now ready to consider
the process of how interest groups provide information to decision-makers. But before
we examine the types of information groups provide and the various tactics they use to
do so, the point of focus on the next chapter, we need to first examine the basic
conditions under which information is provided to decision-makers. The central concern
here is the extent to which decision-makers receive complete and accurate information
rather than incomplete, inaccurate, and even erroneous information from interest
groups. A few guiding questions follow. Can the information provision process be
characterized as open and transparent, or do interest groups behave in an opaque and
even dishonest manner? To what extent can decision-makers verify the information they
receive from interest groups and what strategies do they have for doing so? Further,
how effective and necessary are these measures in the EU?
These questions also touch on the central assumption made in the present study
about the nature of lobbying in the EU. Namely, that interest groups in the EU tend to
lobby friends, not foes, providing information to support decision-makers rather than in
an effort to change their minds. Lobbying friendly decision-makers not only implies a
more open and transparent process of information provision, but it also suggests that
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decision-makers should face fewer issues with information verification. By contrast,
decision-makers who are seen as foes can be less certain about the accuracy and
completeness of the information they receive and thus must implement costly oversight,
monitoring and verification procedures. In this sense, this chapter presents an
opportunity to put the main assumption of this analysis to the test.
Interest group probity and dishonesty also reflects to interest group influence in
the EU. Rampant dishonesty places considerable strain on the information transmission
process, forcing decision-makers to implement costly oversight, monitoring, and
verification procedures and creating a general sense of mistrust and uncertainty in the
interactions of interest groups and decision-makers. Information transmission under
open and transparent conditions, where groups act in an honest manner and provide
complete and accurate information, nurtures a sense of trust and reliability between
interest groups and decision-makers. Decision-makers would turn to trusted interest
groups for their information input more readily than to those groups they do not trust.
There is an inherent difficulty in empirically assessing interest group probity and
dishonesty with regard to information provision. The issue is sensitive and does not
lend itself well to empirical analysis using surveys and interviews. Nevertheless, we can
get a good sense of the conditions underpinning the information provision process by
focusing on two factors: first, the nature of the relationship between interest groups and
decision-makers and how this encourages probity and/or dishonesty; second, the formal
and informal institutional constraints that work to limit dishonesty and that encourage
probity in the EU. The main finding is that interest group dishonesty in the EU is very
uncommon. Interest groups, in other words, tend to provide decision-makers with
complete and accurate information in a transparent and open manner. Interest group
dishonesty is constrained by an extensive, multi-layered system of oversight and
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monitoring that adds a prohibitive exogenous cost to dishonest behaviour. In addition,
probity is fostered by the nature of the relationship that most interest groups have with
EU decision-makers: lobbying to support friends rather than to change the minds of foes.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section places the question of interest
group dishonesty in the context of the existing scholarly research and examines the
conditions that determine interest group dishonesty and probity. I then examine
dissembling in the EU context specifically. This is, to a large extent, uncharted territory.
Thus, the insights garnered from the existing literature, mostly based on lobbying in the
American context, are reconciled with the specifics of lobbying in the EU. What follows
is a presentation and discussion of the results of empirical analyses which addresses the
question of interest group dishonesty and probity in three ways: first, in terms of the
nature of lobbying in the EU (whether interest groups tend to lobby friends or foes);
second, EU decision-maker perceptions of interest group dishonesty and probity; and
third, EU interest group perceptions of the need for, and effectiveness of, EU oversight
and monitoring procedures.
Conditions of Probity and Dishonesty
Interest groups have long been saddled by decidedly negative assessments of
their lobbying behaviour -- they are treated as notoriously dishonest, deceptive and
lacking in transparency. This assumption is deeply rooted in the interest group
literature. It reaches back to the likes of Rousseau and Madison and is taken up more
recently in the seminal works of Marcur Olson, E. E. Schattschneider, Theodore Lowi,
and Gary Becker. In essence, interest groups are routinely, if not necessarily, seen as
undermining the basic fabric of democracy and threatening economic prosperity. The
dominance of this tradition has even left its mark on studies of how interest groups
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lobby by providing information to decision-makers. Studies of informational lobbying
are primarily US-based and draw heavily on formal modelling techniques, casting the
information provision process in excessively rigid, abstract terms. Almost invariably, the
information provision process begins with the assumption that interest groups
“dissemble” – that they provide incomplete, inaccurate, and even erroneous information
to decision-makers (Potters and van Winden, 1992). Indeed, scholars assessing the
information provision process tend to make dissembling the near default position of all
interest groups all of the time (for example, Milbrath, 1963; Berry, 1977; Grossman and
Helpman, 2001). Thus, formal models of information provision operate under the strict
conditions of a “cheap talk game:” decision-makers cannot verify the accuracy of the
information they receive and there are no added costs for interest groups to send
inaccurate, biased or erroneous information (Grossman and Helpman, 2001; AustenSmith, 1993).
Faced with a situation where all interest groups are potentially sending
erroneous or incomplete information all the time, decision-makers must necessarily rely
on oversight and monitoring activities to ensure information accuracy and to encourage
interest group probity. Controlling dissembling and dishonesty generally requires
exogenous constraints backed up by credible and known rewards and/or penalties.
While this can refer to a whole host of informal activities like shaming and praising
techniques, it takes its most concrete form as lobbying codes of conduct, lobbyist
registries and systems of lobbyist accreditation. Both are meant to influence interest
group lobbying activities in general and inform how interest groups interact with
decision-makers more specifically. Extant research on dissembling deterrence through
oversight activities commonly begins with a basic “principal-agent” arrangement, where
oversight is the natural purview of decision-makers (Ainsworth, 1993). That is, decision-
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makers are tasked with the job of evaluating the veracity of the information they receive
from interest groups. Importantly, while efficient oversight can be an effective deterrent
to dissembling, it is also prohibitively costly. This is a particular concern in the EU where
decision-makers who are already short on time and resources are doubly hard pressed
to implement any kind of thorough and efficient scrutiny and verification of the
information they receive from (sometimes a multitude of) interest groups.
Given these conditions, a central concern for decision-makers is reducing the
costs and effectiveness of their oversight and monitoring procedures. At one level, this
means tweaking oversight instruments and codes of conduct. At another level, however,
the costs of information verification are radically affected by the nature of the
relationship between interest groups and decision-makers. Importantly, to whom
interest groups provide information and why they do so has the potential to undercut
the costs of information verification and assuage concerns of dishonesty and
dissembling. The costs of verifying information depend largely on the degree to which
the preferences of interest groups and decision-makers converge or diverge. This brings
us back to issues of lobbying friends and foes. When preferences converge then interest
groups and decision-makers are said to favour the same specific, policy outcome. The
policy-relevant information that interest groups provide these friendly decision-makers,
then, functions as a type of informational support in the form of a legislative subsidy
helping to actualize a desired policy outcome (Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Potters and van
Winden, 1992). When preferences diverge, however, then decision-makers and interest
groups necessarily favour different policy outcomes. In this case, interest groups are
understood as providing information to unfriendly decision-makers not to support them
but rather to change their minds (Austen-Smith, 1993; Grossman and Helpman, 2001). It
is important, however, that while interest groups still have an incentive to provide
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information to foes, they do so in a way that is most sympathetic to their own favoured
outcome. This brings us back to issues of information verification. Grossman and
Helpman make the point succinctly:
if policymakers had exactly the same objectives as the lobbyists, then the
costliness of verification would pose no problem (…) Whenever a policymaker
has even a slightly different objective than (an interest group), she must guard
herself against exaggeration and misrepresentation by the lobbyists (2001: 105).
Thus, interest groups providing information to support friendly decision-makers not
only makes dishonesty and dissembling less of an issue, but it also undercuts the costs of
information verification. Similarly, when interest groups provide information in order to
change the minds of decision-makers, this is more likely to encourage dishonesty and
dissembling and thus increase the costs of information verification.
Conditions of Dissembling in the EU
In contrast to the abundant empirical research on informational lobbying in the
US, related EU research is scant (Mahoney, 2008: 112). Issues of corruption and bribery,
more generally speaking (and with regard to politicians and big business), have been
compellingly linked to the increasingly complexity of EU law and its liberal market
structures (Warner, 2007). The little work that examines similar issues with specific
reference to interest groups tends to draw on the US-based formal modelling research.
As with the American literature, parsimony trumps accuracy. For instance, Crombez
(2002), assuming the conditions of a cheap talk game, argues that there are no
important restrictions on interest group dissembling in the EU. In an investigation of
differences in the number of interest groups active in various EU policy areas, Broscheid
and Coen make a similar assumption and posit “babbling,” a form of dissembling, as the
default position of interest groups. “Instead of providing useful information to decision- 139 -
makers” interest groups “present a biased view on issues, reflecting their commonly
known position” (2007: 350).
Some scholars, however, are sceptical about transporting these models across the
Atlantic. Eising, for instance, in a study of the Commission, rules out dissembling
altogether. Decision-makers in the Commission, he explains, “have recourse to several
sources of information” in addition to interest organisations; international
organisations, Member State administrations and independent scientific experts also
provide policy-relevant details. “The incentives of actors to withhold or manipulate
information are reduced by this broad variety of sources” (2007a: 336; see also Lehman,
2009). More generally, Mahoney (2008) has argued that the question of targeting
friends or foes is not applicable in the EU context. EU decision-making institutions, she
suggests, simply do not afford interests with enough flexibility to make this question
relevant.
In order to make sense of these conflicting reports, it is important to combine
insights from the formal modelling research with the realities of policymaking in the EU.
What mechanisms in the EU limit interest group dishonesty? How are interactions
between interest groups and EU decision-makers institutionalized and how does this
limit dishonesty and dissembling? Only by taking these points into consideration will we
get a more complete picture of interest groups’ dishonesty and probity in the EU.
EU Institutional Constraints on Dissembling
As noted above, the scant scholarly work that does address the issue of interest
group dishonesty and dissembling in the EU invariably begins with the conditions of a
“cheap talk” game: interest groups indiscriminately dissemble and decision-makers have
little control over these practices (Crombez, 2002; Broscheid and Coen, 2007). While it
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is acknowledged that oversight activities can be useful deterrents to dissembling, they
are seen as far too costly to implement in an effective and reliable manner. This
assumption does not hold, however, as we move beyond the abstractions of formal
modelling. EU decision-makers employ a series of far-reaching oversight and monitoring
procedures that considerably increase the costs of interest group dissembling and help
decision-makers verify information. Indeed, EU decision-makers have increasingly
sought to expand their purview with regard to regulating their interactions with interest
groups over the last few decades. While the Council has committed itself to enforcing
greater transparency in its dealing with interest groups, in particular through its
transparency initiative in the 1990’s that brought TV streaming into Council meetings
(Hayes-Renshaw, 2009: 73), the most important institutional constraints are found in
the Parliament and the Commission. I will briefly discuss each in turn.
The Parliament was the first of the EU decision-making institutions to address
the issue of interest group dishonesty directly. As the powers of the Parliament
increased with each subsequent EU treaty reform since 1979, the number of interest
groups targeting the Parliament also rose dramatically. MEPs began to notice apparently
obtrusive lobbying behaviour, infringements on the democratic process and even cases
of unethical behaviour like stealing and selling EU documents (McLaughlin and
Greenwood, 1995: 144). Following the Galle Report in 1991, the Parliament introduced
two regulations that are still in place today. First, the Parliament implemented a formal
accreditation system that required all interest groups lobbying in the Parliament to be
listed on a public registry and noticeably display a “pass” when in the Parliament
buildings. Second, the Parliament introduced a mandatory code of conduct to be
followed by all interest groups listed on the public registry (European Parliament,
2009). This code of conduct commits groups to refrain from obtaining EU documents
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dishonestly and from circulating them for profit. Groups must also disclose their
interests or the interests of their clients to the MEPs they speak with and must not claim
any formal relationship with the Parliament and its MEPs in any dealings with third
parties (Ibid).
The Commission also enforces stringent regulations in its interaction with
interest groups. In fact, it was the Commission’s impetus, stemming from the 1993
Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU), to increase the scope of its consultation
procedures that has slowly led to a corresponding demand to increase its various
monitoring and oversight activities. Thus, as in the Parliament, an increase in the
number of lobbyists has led to subsequent regulations about how interest groups should
comport themselves with decision-makers during the policymaking process. The
Commission, therefore, also established a public registry of interest groups, first with
the now defunct “CONNECS” (Commission Registry of Civil Society Organizations) in
1993 and more recently in 2008 with the much more ambitious online “European
Commission Register of Interest Representatives.” The new Register also introduced a
mandatory code of conduct for all who register. Although the Register itself is voluntary,
it nonetheless has the capacity to induce interest group compliance by providing two
specific incentives.
First, those who register receive important automatic “alerts” for up coming
Commission proposals and opportunities to join the open consultation process. In a
sense, the Commission uses the exigency for interest groups to act in an efficient and
timely manner to constrain their behaviour. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the
Commission has made it clear that those who fail to register can easily be overlooked
during the consultation process. “The Register is voluntary,” as a Commission
communication states, but “when choosing to consult in the context of advisory groups
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or consultative committees, (the Commission has) the possibility to introduce criteria
including a minimum level of transparency toward the public, such as signing up to the
Register” (European Commission, 2009: 4). The Commission also enforces a mandatory
code of conduct that registered interest groups are required to follow. As with the
Parliament, interest groups commit to identifying themselves and the interests they
serve, to not misrepresent their links to Commission officials and to not obtain
documents dishonestly. The Commission’s code of conduct, however, also has a specific
provision regarding how interest groups provide information to decision-makers.
Interest groups are to “ensure that, to the best of their knowledge, information which
they provide is unbiased, complete, up-to-date and not misleading” (European
Commission, 2010). There are therefore clear constraints on dissembling backed up by
various sanctions and the threat of being excluded from the policy-making process
altogether that make it a costly behaviour.
Empirical Analysis
The various formal and informal regulations controlling how interest groups
interact with EU decision-makers seem to clearly suggest that dishonesty and
dissembling in the EU should be quite rare. Incentives to join the online register and
follow the mandatory code of conduct go a long way in nurturing probity and curbing
dishonesty. But to what extent do these assumptions hold true? That is, to what extent
are interest groups in the EU open, transparent and honest when providing information
to decision-makers? Or, alternatively, to what extent do groups mischaracterize,
exaggerate and even strategically withhold information? As intimated above, empirically
assessing these questions is difficult, not least because questions of probity and
dishonesty do not lend themselves well to interviews and survey questions. I propose
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approaching these questions in three ways. First, and touching on the central
assumption of the present analysis, I will examine the nature of lobbying in the EU with
an eye on determining the extent to which interest groups provide information to
support friends or to change the minds of foes. Second, I will examine data from a survey
of EU decision-makers on the issue of interest group transparency and probity in EU
lobbying. Third, I will examine the perception of EU interest groups on the need for, and
effectiveness of, EU oversight and monitoring mechanisms with reference to survey data
from a recent OECD study on interest group attitudes towards lobbying transparency.
The Nature of Lobbying in the EU
A decision-maker’s ability to effectively ensure the receipt of accurate and
complete information is seriously hindered by the considerable costs associated with
information verification. Decision-makers in the EU are pressed for time and lack the
staff and resources to not only gather policy relevant information but to verify the
information they receive from interest groups. A central factor determining the costs of
information verification relates to the basic conditions of lobbying in the EU. Interest
groups that provide a type of informational service to friendly decision-makers tend to
reduce the costs of information verification. But interest groups who provide
information to unfriendly decision-makers in order to change their minds tend to
increase the costs of information verification. In other words, whether or not interest
groups lobby friends or foes provides considerable insight into the costs of information
verification. Both tendencies were tested using the results of a survey of interest group
representatives active in the EU. Respondents were asked how frequently they provide
information to EU decision-makers for the following reasons (frequency is measured on
a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “never” and 5 being “very often”): (1) To support the
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position of EU decision-makers, (2) To change the minds of EU decision-makers. The
results are presented in Table 8, below.
Table 8
Reasons for Providing Information to Decision-Makers
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets.)
Frequency
Support EU Decision-makers
1 (never)
2
3
4
5 (very often)
Change minds of EU decisionmakers
17 (6.25)
50 (18.38)
94 (34.56)
86 (31.62)
25 (9.19)
Total
Mean
Standard deviation
272 (100)
3.19
1.04
274 (100)
3.79
.93
3 (1.09)
23 (8.39)
68 (24.82)
114 (41.6)
66 (24.09)
The results in Table 8 show little evidence of dishonest interest group behaviour
and dissembling in the EU. An impressive 24% of respondents confirmed that they
“very often” provide information to EU decision-makers in order to support them. By
contrast, only 9% of respondents reported “very often” providing information to change
the minds of decision-makers in the EU. The results overwhelming point to the fact that
interest groups in the EU provide information to friendly decision-makers (those whose
preferences converge with their own) far more frequently than to unfriendly decisionmakers (those whose preferences diverge with their own). Given that dissembling and
dishonesty is a function of preference divergence, it appears as if dissembling and
dishonesty should be only rare behaviours in the EU.
These survey results not only help confirm the basic assumption of the present
study, but also lend further support to a near consensus in the literature that interest
groups tend to lobby friends rather than foes (Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Berry 1977;
Hall and Deardorff 2006). In the EU, two additional factors reinforce this type of
lobbying. First, decision-makers are ill equipped to gather and assess policy-relevant
information on their own and therefore necessarily rely on interest groups to provide
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this service for them. Second, acknowledging their informational dependence, decisionmakers nurture a robust form of associative democracy in the EU that is
institutionalized in mandated consultations and encouraging interest group input at
nearly every stage of the EU decision-making process. What is more, interest groups in
the EU are not only aware that information is the currency of lobbying in Brussels, but
appear to genuinely lobby in an effort to support friendly decision-makers. Interview
data bears this out. Dishonesty and dissembling for interest groups in the EU simply do
not seem to be viable options. “We are not here to influence the direction that the
Commission should go,” explained one interest group representative, “we are just here
to refine legislation.”93 “We are exchanging information that is needed for both sides to
work better; (decision-makers) need information to produce the best legislation they
can.”94 Other interest group representatives explained how they provide information in
order to “defend Commission proposals”95 and, rather than changing the minds of
decision-makers, to give them “a 360 degree view of an issue.”96 Interest groups do so in
many cases because they understand their interaction with EU decision-makers more as
a “partnership (based on having) the same values.”97 Of course, providing erroneous
information or simply withholding information translates as a betrayal of this
partnership. This is why many interest group representatives explained that the
greatest key to lobbying success is not money or power, but rather credibility. And
credibility, as one representative put it succinctly, is based on the fact that “what you are
saying is true, founded and relevant.”98
93
Interview, official, Renault, Brussels, 9/12/2009.
Interview, official, Generalitat de Catalunya. Delegación del Gobierno en Bruselas, 7/12/2009.
95 Interview, official, Coca-Cola Ltd., Brussels, 8/12/2009.
96 Interview, official, Daimler AG, Brussels, 7/10/2009.
97 Interview, Vincent Forest, Head of European Union Office, Front Line, Brussels, 7/12/2009.
98 Interview, official, Ferrovie dello Stata, Brussel, 10/12/2009.
94
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Do these trends vary significantly across different types of interest groups? Graph
7, below, organises the same data according to different interest group types.
Disaggregating the data by interest group types mirrors the cumulative results
presented in Table 8, above. In fact, all six different types of interest groups in the EU
provide information to support EU decision-makers far more frequently than in order to
change their minds. The difference in frequency between both reasons for providing
information is most pronounced for trade unions and least pronounced for
consultancies. While these differences are only marginal, they might reflect two facts.
First, trade unions, through the Social Dialogue, enjoy a highly structured
institutionalized relationship with EU decision-makers. As discussed in chapter 4, trade
unions are organised around one peak organisation, the ETUC, and lobby at the EU level
exclusively through it. This makes for a highly structured, predictable and, indeed,
reliable process of information provision. Consultancies, by contrast, might be said to
have the least institutionalized relationship with EU decision-makers. They are more
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like guns for hire, taking on the interests of their clients and working to support them
principally through monitoring and networking activities. It should be stressed,
however, that, despite these important differences, consultancies also tend to provide
information to support decision-makers rather than to change their minds. In this sense,
even with a less institutionalized and structured system of interaction with EU
decisions-makers, the information consultancies provide to decision-makers should not
significantly increase the costs of information verification. Indeed, for all six types of
interest groups examined here, providing information to support decision-makers
should significantly decrease these costs.
Decision-Maker Perceptions of Dishonesty and Probity
The EU has sent mixed signals with regard to its own perspective on interest
group dissembling. On the one hand, the EU’s long history of regulating its interactions
with interest groups and the exigency expressed for implementing interest group
registries, accreditation systems and mandatory codes of conduct might indicate that
dissembling in the EU is a serious and common problem. On the other hand, however,
the EU’s concerns have been expressed in more precautionary terms. For instance, the
2006 Green Paper marking the launch of the Commission’s new “Transparency
Initiative” noted authoritatively: “up to now no cases of (interest group) misdemeanour
have been reported in the context of these voluntary codes of conduct” (European
Commission, 2006: 9). But the extent to which dissembling occurs in the EU is a question
that can perhaps best be levelled at EU decision-makers themselves.
Data from a 2009 empirical study conducted by Burson Marsteller paints a less
equivocal picture. Based on interviews with over 500 EU decision-makers from the
Commission, Parliament and Council, this study examines questions of transparency and
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poor lobbying practices in the EU. Importantly, this study finds that issues of
transparency and poor lobbying practices seem to only be a minor concern in the EU.
Three issues in particular require a closer look: the reasons why decision-makers
interact with interest groups; the type of “poor lobbying practices” perceived to be the
most common in the EU; and decision-maker perceptions of interest group
“transparency” in the EU.
Within the context of the survey, EU decision-makers were asked about the
factors that determine their “decision to speak to a lobbyist.” The following options were
given: (1) if the lobbyist is transparent about whom he represents; (2) if the topic is in
my field of expertise; (3) if the topic is of interest to me; (4) if the lobbyist is well
prepared; (5) if I know the lobbyist; (6) I have an obligation to speak to anyone calling
me; (7) if the lobbyist is listed in a public register of lobbyists; and (8) I never speak to
lobbyists. The results are presented in Graph 8, below.
While interest group transparency is an important factor, the policy-related
“topic” under consideration is just as important for determining with whom decision- 149 -
makers interact. Seventy-three percent of respondents indicate that they speak with
interest groups “if the topic is in their field of expertise.” This is followed by 71% who
indicate that they speak with interest groups whose “topic is of interest to me.”
Following closely, 69% note that interest group transparency plays a role in their
decisions to speak with them. Being listed on a public register is a less important factor.
Clearly interest group transparency is a concern for decision-makers, but only to the
same extent that an interest group is working in a similar field of expertise or if their
topic is of interest to the decision-maker. In order to disaggregate the importance of
interest group transparency we need to look more closely at the problems related
specifically to probity and dishonesty that decision-makers think are most prevalent in
the EU?
In this vein, decision-makers were asked about the frequency with which they
think interest groups commit the following types of “poor practice”: (1) not being
sufficiently transparent; (2) being too aggressive; (3) failing to understand process and
procedure; (4) being too early or too late in the process; (5) lobbying by press release;
(6) inappropriate briefing materials; (7) basing a position on emotion rather than facts;
and (8) offering unethical inducements. The report evaluated so-called “industry
interest groups” (private sector groups like companies and professional associations)
and NGOs separately. The results are presented in Graph 9, below.
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According to EU decision-makers, a lack of transparency in both industry interest
groups and NGOs does not seem to be a major issue. Forty percent of respondents
mentioned this form of poor practice for industry groups, and only 21% for NGOs. More
insidious behaviour, like “offering unethical inducements,” is a more minor problem
(10% for industry groups and 8% for NGOs). Indeed, the types of poor practices that
decision-makers most often mention are far less insidious. For example, basing a
position on emotion rather than facts was the most frequently mentioned form of poor
practice for NGOs. For industry interest groups, the most frequent poor practice appears
to be failing to understand process and procedure. For both types of interest groups,
being too aggressive was mentioned as a considerable problem. However, being
aggressive does not necessarily imply dishonesty or deceit. It can also imply
overzealousness and enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the point here is that while transparency
is a relatively important concern for decision-makers, the type of behaviours there are
worried about are far from insidious. Decision-makers seem to be more concerned with
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transparency issues that irritate them -- issues related to procedure and the
policymaking process – much more so than unethical inducements.
Decision-makers were asked to assess how transparent different types of interest
groups are in the EU. Transparency was defined simply as whether a decision-maker
knows or does not know whom an interest group represents. As such, this measure
already refigures “transparency” as a type of behaviour far less insidious than providing
unethical inducements. It does, however, address transparency concerns linked to
interest group misrepresentation. Decision-makers were asked the following question.
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being “I never know who they represent” and 10 being “I
always know who they represent,” “to what extent would you say (different types of
interest groups in the EU are) transparent in lobbying. The results are presented in
Graph 10 below.
As the results in Graph 10 show, decision-makers accord the greatest degree of
transparency to companies, trade unions, NGOs and trade associations. There is a
significant change in perception, however, when it comes to law firms, consultancies and
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think tanks. Scores for transparency for these types of interest group all hover around
the mid-range point while scores for companies, trade unions, NGOs and trade
associations verge on a very high 8 points on a 10-point scale. The high transparency
score for trade unions might reflect the high scores for lobbying to support friendly
decision-makers discussed above. Trade unions interact with decision-makers in a very
structured and predictable way. Similarly, the low transparency score for consultancies
might reflect their unique position within the EU interest system of intermediation. That
consultancies do not have a recognized and institutionalized place in consultation, for
instance, might negatively effect perceptions of their transparency. Companies and
NGOs, while less institutionalized than trade unions, nevertheless are welcomed
participates in the various EU consultation procedures and are recognized as crucial
components of a robust form of associative democracy in the EU.
Interest Group Perceptions of Dishonesty and Probity
The mechanisms that the EU has in place to deter dishonesty and dissembling,
namely the Commission and Parliament registers and their codes of conduct, are only
effective insofar as they are able to pose credible and known penalties and rewards. The
rewards for registering are the alerts that interest groups receive about future
consultations. Threats for non-compliance involve being left out of the consultation
process, expulsion for the register, and various shaming techniques. There have already
been two high-profile cases of non-compliance that have led to expulsion. GPlus, a
Brussels-based consultancy, was banned for eight weeks for “failing to disclose the
identities of all its clients”(EurActiv, 26.1.2009). Similarly, CEFIC, a large chemicals
company and perhaps the biggest interest group in Brussels, was also expelled from the
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register for misrepresenting information about the finances used for lobbying EU
decision-makers. Expulsion from the register was only part of the penalty.
The far greater penalty, though, came in the form of public shaming in the media.
Reports of these transgressions circulated very widely through the various EU-niche
newspapers, including “EurActive,” “European Voice,” “EUObserver” and
“AgenceEurope,” and was quickly picked-up by interest group in-house reports and
newsletters. Indeed, perhaps because Gazprom, the world’s largest natural gas extractor,
was one of their clients, the GPlus story was even reported in the Financial Times
(Chaffin, 2009). Public shaming has even taken a more organised form. Beginning in
2005, the annual “Worst EU Lobbying Awards” has “recognized” interest groups that are
suspected of shady dealings in EU lobbying. The “winners” are announced at large public
events in Brussels that generate a great deal of media attention. Past winners include:
C4C for claiming to be a grassroots group representing artists but which in fact was a
front for big software companies; ExxonMobil for paying “climate sceptics to manipulate
the EU climate debate;” and EBPS (European Business and Parliament Scheme) for
claiming to be a neutral liaison organisation but in fact was granting privileged access to
MEPs (van Schaik, 2010, 135f).
Clearly, EU mechanisms of oversight and monitoring appear to be buttressed by
credible and known penalties and rewards. How necessary are these mechanisms? Do
their exacting requirements and credible threats offer realistic deterrents to dishonesty
and dissembling? While the preceding section approached similar questions from the
perspective of EU decision-makers, in this section I will focus on interest group
perceptions of lobbying dishonesty and probity.
Data on the perspective of interest group representatives comes from a 2009
OECD survey of over 1,000 “European lobbyists” tapping attitudes about issues of
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lobbying transparency, codes of conduct and lobbyist registers (OECD, 2009: 10). Two
points from the OECD study need to be highlighted: the perceived need for lobbying
codes of conduct and the effectiveness of these codes of conducts. A series of survey
questions tap these two points.
The perceived need for lobbying codes of conduct was tapped by the following
survey question meant to gauge the general prevalence of dishonesty and dissembling in
the EU. Interest group representatives were asked if they “think that inappropriate
influence-peddling by lobbyists, such as seeking official favours with gifts or
misrepresenting issues, is a problem?” Results are presented in Graph 11 below.
The data presented above suggests that, according to interest groups, instances of
“inappropriate influence” are rare. Only 9% of respondents think there are frequent
instances of inappropriate interest group influence, while 30% believe such instances
happen only occasionally. The majority of respondents indicate “not often” (about 38%)
and “never” (19%) for such occurrences. Naturally, it would be unrealistic if the data
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showed a complete lack of “inappropriate” lobbying behaviour among interest groups in
the EU, especially given that “inappropriate influence peddling” is a vague concept that
could mean anything from misrepresenting clients to offering “unethical inducements.”
What is notable here, however, is how these results tend to mirror those of EU decisionmakers presented above. Both interest groups and decision-makers appear to see EU
lobbying in rather positive terms: there are few serious lobbying misdemeanours and
issues of undo influence and inappropriate behaviour are rare. Of course, it might be
argued that interest groups have an incentive to misrepresent the reality of lobbying in
the EU in order to help improve their image. This, however, would not explain similar
positive reports from decision-makers.
Interviews with interest group representatives also support the general findings
in Graph 11. Most representatives simply noted that lobbying in the EU was transparent,
well structured and that interactions with decision-makers were even amicable: “we
don’t have anything comparable to what they have in the US,”99 as one interest group
representative put it. When pushed for examples of poor lobbying practices, another
interviewee pointed to the existence of so-called “corporate-front lobbies,” admitted
that “this is all very anecdotal” and that “I don’t have any data. I have very little personal
experience with that.”100 Interviewees were not only reluctant to provide specific
examples, but also tended to level vague and anecdotal criticisms at the “usual suspects,”
“big multinational companies”101 as well as the likes of “Marlboro or Camel.”102 Of
course, this is not to say that interest group dishonesty and dissembling do not exist in
the EU. The high-profile examples of GPlus, CEFIC, C4C and Exxon-Mobile, above,
99
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels, 16/11/2010.
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
101 Interview, Martin Romer, General Secretary, ETUCE (European Trade Union Committee for
Education), Brussels, 17/11/2010.
102 Interview, Dr. Theodoros Koutroubas, Director General, CEPLIS, Brussels, 17/11/2010.
100
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provide some evidence of dishonest behaviour. But the point here is that this type of
behaviour seems to be more the exception than the rule.
The perceived effectiveness of lobbying codes of conduct can be assessed by
examining the use of credible and known rewards and penalties. Two questions from
the OECD data are particularly relevant. First, respondents were asked to assess the
effectiveness of “rewards for compliance” and “penalties for violations” of lobbying
codes of conduct. Second, respondents were asked if they thought “lobbying
transparency” should be mandatory or voluntary. Together, the results reflect interest
group attitudes about how exacting and stringent lobbying controls should be. The
results of the two survey questions are presented in Graphs 12 and 13, below.
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According to interest group respondents, penalties for code of conduct violations
are significantly more effective than rewards. Twelve percent of respondents answered
“yes” to rewards being effective compared to almost 38% who answered that penalties
are effective. The “no” responses are equally telling. Thirty-six percent do not think that
rewards are effective at all, while only 12% questioned the effectiveness of penalties. In
general, then, it seems that interest groups favour penalties to rewards and, by
extension, more stringent lobbying codes of conduct. Similar attitudes are reflected in
responses for the second question. It seems that the majority of respondents (about
61%) indicate that lobbying transparency should be mandatory. By contrast, 15% were
neutral on the topic and only about 19% thought that lobbying transparency should be
voluntary. It appears, then, as if interest groups favour more exacting, rigorous and
stringent codes of conduct over lenient and moderate ones. Reinforcing violations
through penalties and making lobbying transparency mandatory would not only act as
effective deterrents to dishonesty and dissembling, but also seem to suggest that
dishonesty and dissembling are real problems that need exacting answers. Why would
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interest groups prefer stricter guidelines and rules to more lenient ones? Clearly, more
exacting lobbying standards would necessarily constrain an interest groups’ ability to
pursue its own interests. Does this penchant for stricter standards, then, suggest that
there is, in fact, a perceived issue with lobbying dishonesty and dissembling in the EU?
I suggest that interest groups’ penchant for more exacting codes of conduct does
not imply that there is a marked lack of lobbying transparency in the EU. Rather, these
attitudes demonstrate how interest groups seek to increase their credibility and
reputation by working under rigid restrictions mandated by Registries and codes of
conduct. In the same sense, interest groups advocate penalties rather than rewards
because it is unlikely that they will violate the conditions of a lobbying code of conduct.
This is particularly evident in the nature of criticisms levelled at the Commission’s
Register upon its inception in 2008. Rather than balking at the idea of a register of
lobbyists, most interest groups thought the project to be “extremely unambitious”
(Corporate European Observatory, 2008). Two points were of major concern. First,
interest groups were incensed by the voluntary nature of the register. Newspapers like
EuropeanVoice reported on the need for “a mandatory, legally enforceable register”
(King, 2009) while Euractive declared the existing register ““weak and unclear”
(EurActiv, 31.10.2008). Official interest group responses in the form of position papers
put these concerns in formal terms. NGOs like Transparency International and Civil
Society Contact Group (CSCG) where joined by the Council of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe, the BEUC (the European Consumers Organisation), and SEAP (The Society of
European Affairs Professionals) in their insistence on making the register mandatory
and legally binding. Indeed, CSCG, aided by AlterEU, an EU transparency watchdog
group, developed an alternative register that addressed all of the shortcomings of the
existing one. In addition to being mandatory, the proposed register gave voice to other
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common concerns that would make the Register decidedly more stringent. They insisted
on disclosing the names of individual lobbyists and making financial disclosures clearer
and more comparable across different types of interest groups. Taken together,
criticisms of the Commission’s Register amounts to a general consensus among different
types of interest groups that transparency is an important issue and that more needs to
be done to ensure it.
That many interest groups insist on greater transparency and more exacting
standards for the Register and code of conduct speaks to their desire to increase their
credibility in a system that is, very often, heavily influenced by journalistic
interpretations about the nature of lobbying in the EU. The reality of lobbying in the EU,
however, is far less sinister than anecdotes of lobbying “fronts” and stories of undue
lobbying influence suggest. Many interest groups not only recognize the importance of
oversight and monitoring mechanisms, but also insist on making them more exacting
and rigorous in order to prove their credibility and even legitimacy within the EU
interest group system. It is perhaps in an effort to escape the shadow of poor lobbying
practices in the US that EU interest groups express an exigency to make the Register
mandatory and legally binding, to reveal the names of their lobbyists and to determine
clearer methods for disclosing their finances.
Conclusion
The present chapter goes a long way towards dispelling assumptions about the
dishonest, deceptive and misleading behaviour of interest groups in the EU
policymaking process. Indeed, the central finding presented here is that dissembling and
dishonest interest group behaviours are not the norm in the EU. The empirical analysis
presented above supports this finding in three ways. First, interest groups in the EU
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provide information to decision-makers more frequently in order to support their
legislative work than to change their minds. This type of interest groups / decisionmaker dynamic suggests that decision-makers should be faced with only occasional
issues related to information verification. Second, EU decision-makers report that
instances of interest group dishonesty and dissembling in the EU are not common.
Decision-makers more frequently report “poor lobbying practices” like basing a position
on emotion or not understanding the procedures of the EU policymaking process than
more insidious behaviours like unethical inducements. Lastly, the oversight and
monitoring practices implemented by EU decision-makers provide interest groups with
credible and known rewards and penalties for lobbying violations. Importantly, many
interest groups, rather than balking at these oversight mechanisms, have insisted on
making them more exacting. Interest groups have consistently pushed for mandatory
and legally binding lobbyist registers and codes of conduct as well as clearer methods
for the disclosure of relevant information related to their lobbying activities. In addition
to challenging long-held assumptions about interest group probity and dishonesty, these
findings also provide greater nuance to Warner’s 2007 argument that the EU’s liberal
market structures should facilitate behaviour related to bribery and corruption. Of
course, as Warner notes in the case of bribery and corruption in the EU, the solution
involves the implementation of exacting oversight and monitoring activities.
A central caveat of this chapter is that dishonest and deceptive behaviour is
notoriously difficult to measure empirically and does not lend itself well to social science
methods. Approaching the question of interest group dishonesty from three different
directions, however, and with reference to data from various existing empirical studies
does lend some purchase to the central finding that interest group dishonesty and
dissembling in the EU is not the norm. To say, definitively, that dishonesty and
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dissembling are not issues in the EU would require more research and reliable data on
actual instances of “inappropriate lobbying.” Nonetheless, the largely attitudinal data
presented above provides some initial and important insights into interest group
dishonesty in the EU not only from the perspective of interest groups but also from that
of EU decision-makers.
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CHAPTER 7
INFORMATION TRANSMISSION:
TYPES, TACTICS, & TARGETS
When it comes time for interest groups to transmit policy-relevant information to
EU decision-makers they are faced with a series of strategic choices. First, what kind of
information do they send? Is it technical data or expert knowledge about some specific
issue of a specific policy? Is it perhaps legal information meant to aid decision-makers in
the drafting of legislation? Or is it information about citizen preferences and the political
salience of a policy? Second, groups also must consider how to send the information.
Again, there are multiple options. Will a group use outside lobbying strategies,
mobilizing citizen support behind a policy via media campaigns, rallies, or public events?
Or, will they opt for good old-fashioned shoe-leather strategies like writing a letter or
meeting over dinner or drinks? Perhaps information is transmitted via a phone call or an
email? Finally, once the type of information and the tactic for sending it have been
determined, interest groups are faced with the task of choosing where to send the
information. Which decision-makers in which of the EU’s various decision-making
institutions are to receive the information?
Clearly, the process of transmitting information to decision-makers is complex
and interest groups are faced with a whole host of strategic options from which they can
choose. But how are these choices made? What constraints limit a group’s repertory of
strategies? Further, how do decisions about one strategy influence decisions about
others? The present chapter seeks to answer these questions. To do so, it is first
necessary to bring some order to the complexity of the information transmission
process. Thus, I propose a framework for examining information transmission that turns
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on three related questions: what type of information is being transmitted? What tactics
are used to transmit the information? At which decision-makers is the information being
targeted? In short: types, tactics, and targets. I use this framework to provide answers to
the questions raised above as well as to test the widely-held assumption in the existing
literature that an interest group’s choice of information types, tactics and targets is
mainly a function of that group’s membership structure (Kohler-Koch, 1997; Mahoney,
2008; Eising, 2007; Michalowitz, 2004; Bouwen, 2004a&b; Dür and de Biévre, 2007b).
First, private interest groups (like companies and professional associations) are
assumed to transmit technical information to the Commission using direct tactics like
letters and phone-calls. Second, the literature assumes that diffuse interest groups (like
NGOs and trade unions) have little capacity to provide any type of information and in
those rare instances when they do it is assumed to be limited information about public
opinion or ethical arguments sent to members of the European Parliament using tactics
that mobilize the public.
I argue that these assumptions are overly deterministic and provide little insight
into how a full range of interest groups (not just private and public groups but also
consultancies and public authorities) differ in their capacity to transmit information to
EU decision-makers. Moreover, they assume that private interest groups naturally have
more influence on the EU policy-making process than diffuse groups. The main finding
of this chapter is that membership structure does not determine the information
transmission process. Rather, most interest groups in the EU strategically transmit a
whole host of different information types, using a range of tactics and targeting decisionmakers in many of the EU’s main institutions.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by providing some background on
information transmission in the existing scholarly literature. I follow this by examining
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types, tactics and targets respectively, testing in each case the extent to which an
interest group’s membership structure determines it information transmission ability.
After considering types, tactics and targets separately, I examine how different
transmission strategies interact. Using statistical analysis I examine which types of
information and which tactics are used with which targets. Finally, I present some
concluding remarks.
Transmitting information to decision-makers
The existing research on the information transmission process is broad in scope
and ranges from abstract formal models to large-scale stocktaking survey work. Indeed,
we know a great deal about the different types of information that interest groups
transmit to decision-makers, the various tactics they use to do so and the decisionmakers at which this information is targeted. Despite this wealth of detail, what we
know about how interest groups make strategic choices with regard to the information
transmission process is quite limited.
Formal models of informational lobbying provide the present study with its
central working framework. Information transmission, in its most basic form, consists of
“two agents, one of whom has private information relevant to both. The better informed
agent sends a message to the other agent whose decision affects the welfare of the first
agent” (Crawford and Sobel, 1982: 1431f). All three elements of the information
transmission process are already present – a type, a tactic and a target – albeit in
skeletal form. The same parsimony persists through most other formal models of the
transmission process. Information type is invariably “specialist information” or “private
information;” information tactics are reduced to the act of sending the message and the
only distinguishing feature of targets is that they are motivated by an information
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asymmetry (Grosmann and Helpman, 2001; Potters and van Winden, 1990 & 1992;
Austen-Smith, 1993). These models are clearly ill-suited for explaining how different
information types, different transmission tactics and variation among targets influences
the choices that interest groups face in the information transmission process.
Stocktaking survey research is somewhat more useful in that it unpacks the
concepts used in these formal models. In fact, the various aspects of the information
transmission process have been thoroughly identified, enumerated and itemized in this
research, giving us a good picture of the strategic toolkit available to many interest
groups. Scholzman and Tierney’s 1986 seminal work on American interest groups, for
example, identifies twenty-three such activities, ranging from direct and informal
contact with legislators, presenting research results, talking to journalists, advertising,
writing letters, giving testimony, organising protests, helping draft legislation, agenda
setting, to campaign work. Similar surveys conducted by Walker (1991), Heinz et al.,
(1993), Berry (1977), Knoke (1990), and more recently Baumgartern et al. (2009) find
“remarkably robust” support for Scholzman and Tierney’s exhaustive list of interest
group strategies despite “using different questions, different sampling frames, and
(going) to the field in different years” (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998: 149).
Although these survey results paint a comprehensive picture of the strategies
available to interest groups in a general sense, they do not say much about how interest
groups make choices between different types, different tactics and different targets. A
number of related insights from the EU-based literature have, however, made some
headway in this respect. It is this work that will act as an important point of orientation
for the present analysis. The basic premise in this research is that the choices that
interest groups make between different types, tactics and targets are largely determined
by the membership structure of a given group. The main distinction is between broadly
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defined private interest groups (like companies, professional associations) and diffuse
interest groups (like NGOs and trade unions). The former have concentrated interests
revolving around technical, economic issues while the latter have wide-ranging interests
reflecting the preferences of many citizens. Two broad but widely held assumptions
about the strategic choice of types, tactics and targets follow from membership structure
(see Kohler-Koch, 1997; Mahoney, 2008; Eising, 2007; Michalowitz, 2004; Bouwen,
2004a&b):
 first, private interest groups naturally have recourse to technical information
which they transmit to the obliging technocrats in the Commission, typically
using direct and personal tactics like writing letters and face-to-face meetings;
 second, diffuse interest groups naturally have recourse to information about
public opinion; they send it to the more politically-minded members of the
European Parliament and are limited to using indirect tactics that mobilize the
public.
One of the central aims of this chapter is to empirically test these assumptions. As such, I
provide more detailed accounts of how interest group membership structure is thought
to determine types, tactics and targets in what follows below.
Information Type
The type of information that interest groups transmit to decision-makers has
been variously described as “expert information” about the technical details of policy
(Ainsworth, 1993: 44; Esterling, 2004; Crombez, 2002), as “private information” that
only certain interest groups possess (Crawford and Sobel, 1982: 1431; Hansen, 1991), as
well as “specialist information” related to the “consequences of some policy” (AustenSmith 1993: 799). It can also be information that conveys “political intelligence”
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necessary to anticipate another actor’s reactions or details about procedure (Hall and
Deardorff, 2006; Pappi and Hennig, 1999: 259) as well as information about the
“political salience” and “public support” of a policy proposal (Ainsworth, 1993; Pappi
and Hennig, 1999: 259). Given the multiplicity of information types, the important
question is this: Which interest groups have access to and subsequently transmit which
types of information? Further, what factors determine a group’s strategic choice
between different information types?
As already mentioned, much EU related research assumes a strong link between
the type of information a group can transmit and a group’s membership structure.
Private interest groups have very specific economic interests related to issues of
production, manufacturing, trade, and profit maximization. As such, they are thought to
“naturally” have recourse to technical information, expert knowledge and, to a lesser
extent, legal information about these matters (Michalowitz, 2004: 89; Eising, 2007;
Mahoney, 2008; Kohler-Koch, 1997). By contrast, so-called diffuse interest groups have
a large membership base and wide-ranging interests reflecting the preferences of many
citizens. Thus, NGO and trade unions, for example, have no recourse to technical and
expert information but instead naturally have access to information about public
opinion, citizen preferences and the political salience of various policies. Some scholars
go so far as to suggest that this inability to access technical and expert information
means that diffuse groups are invariably “compelled to constantly appeal to general
principles like equity, social justice, and environmental protection” making their
informational contribution of “little value” to decision-makers (Dür and de Biévre,
2007b, 82; see also Mahoney, 2008: Esterling, 2004).
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While intuitively appealing and even gaining some support from survey-related
research (see Mahoney, 2008103), the link between group membership structure and
information type seems deterministic, leaving little room for group agency. To what
extent, then, do these assumptions hold up under further scrutiny? A related issue is that
the existing literature only provides insight into the type of information that so-called
private and diffuse groups transmit. This begs the question: can we differentiate
between different types of private and diffuse groups in terms of information
transmission and, moreover, what kind of information do other types of interest groups,
like public authorities or consultancies, transmit to EU decision-makers?
A more complete picture of the types of information that interest groups transmit
is provided with reference to survey results. It is important to note that, while we have
already listed a number of different possible information types that groups might
transmit to decision-makers, this survey uses a typology of information types that is
tailored to the EU context. That is, insights from the extant literature have been coupled
with data collected from interviews with interest group representatives to form a
manageable list of information types that was used in the context of the survey.
Respondents were asked to identify how frequently (on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being
“never” and 5 being “very often”) their organisation provides the following six types of
information to EU decision-makers: (1) Information about public opinion; (2) Legal
information; (3) Information about the feasibility of implementing a proposal; (4)
Information about the economic impact of a proposal; (5) Information about the social
impact of a proposal; and (6) Information that makes technical or scientific data
understandable / relevant. The results are presented in Table 9, below.
103
Mahoney (2008) finds that citizen groups tend to transmit information about “broad community
shared goals” while business interests transmit “technical” information (83).
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Table 9
Type of Information Transmitted to EU Decision-Makers
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets)
1 (never)
2
3
4
5 (very
often)
Total
Mean
Standard
Dev.
Information
about
public
opinion
69 (24.91)
93 (33.57)
60 (21.66)
39 (14.08)
16 (5.78)
Legal
Information
Information
about
economic
impact
22 (7.86)
38 (13.57)
80 (28.57)
88 (31.43)
52 (18.57)
Information
about social
impact
60 (21.51)
73 (26.16)
75 (26.88)
55 (19.71)
16 (5.73)
Information
about
feasibility of
proposal
21 (7.50)
37 (13.21)
73 (26.07)
87 (31.07)
62 (22.14)
16 (5.69)
60 (21.35)
65 (23.13)
84 (29.89)
56 (19.93)
Information
that makes
technical data
understandable
44 (15.71)
52 (18.57)
64 (22.86)
75 (26.79)
45 (16.07)
277 (100)
2.42
1.17
279 (100)
2.62
1.18
280 (100)
3.47
1.18
280 (100)
3.39
1.16
281 (100)
3.37
1.18
280 (100)
3.08
1.31
The results in Table 9 clearly reflect what one interest group representative
identified as the prioritization of “evidence-based policymaking” in the EU.” “It is no
longer good enough to go to the Commission or anyone else with a position that isn’t
scientific in nature and that isn’t reinforced by data.”104 As another interest group
representative explained, “serious lobbying has to be based on facts and figures. Just to
say, ‘we want this’ and ‘we don’t want that’ amounts to nothing. The basis always has to
be science.”105 Accordingly, the top three information types as shown in Table 9 are
information about the feasibility of a proposal, information about the economic impact
of a proposal and information about the social impact of a proposal. In these cases, about
20% of respondents indicated sending these information types “very often,” and about
30% slightly less frequently. Information that makes technical data understandable is
transmitted somewhat less frequently, with only about 16% selecting the “very often”
option in the survey. The main contrast, and reflecting the requirement for transmitting
a position backed-up by “science” and “data,” is information about public opinion and
104
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels,
16/11/2010.
105 Interview, Dr. Marlene Wartenberg, Director, Vier Pfoten, Brussels, 19/11/2010.
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legal information, which are sent only very infrequently to EU decision-makers. Indeed,
only 5% of respondents indicated sending these information types very frequently. By
the same token, more than 50% noted that they either never send these information
types or only transmit them very infrequently.
Importantly, the three information types most frequently transmitted to
decision-makers share in the fact that they are highly technical in nature and, moreover,
draw on an explicit cause-effect logic highlighting the consequences of some proposal.
“We try to assess what would happen if such a proposal passed”106 according to one
representative. “In very few cases,” to speak with another, “do we send just raw data. We
are always analyzing the possible consequences.”107 There are clear advantages to
transmitting this kind of information. Namely, by highlighting the feasibility of a
proposal or its social and economic impact, an interest group is able to reduce the
perceived uncertainty of various policy outcomes. As discussed in chapter 2, it is this
same uncertainty about outcomes that compels decision-makers to seek out interest
group expertise in the first place. By contrast, information about public opinion and legal
information naturally place less stress on assessing potential policy consequences. In
particular, information about public opinion can tell decision-makers where the political
support lies but cannot help them realize the policy outcome that will speak to this
support. Without sound and more certain policy outcomes, information about public
opinion does not matter.
Do these trends persist across all types of interest groups in the EU? Further, to
what extent is the type of information a group transmits linked to a group’s membership
structure? Graph 14, below, organises this data according to six different types of
interest groups.
106
107
Interview, official, Bureau of Nordic Family Forestry, Brussels, 7/12/2009.
Interview, official, Ferrovie dello Stata, Brussel, 10/12/2009.
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The same prioritization of consequence-based information holds across all six
types of interest groups considered here. Information about the feasibility of a proposal
and the social and economic impact of a proposal is transmitted to decision-makers far
more frequently than information about public opinion and legal information.
Information that makes sense of technical information, as with the above results, falls
between these two extremes for most interest groups. With the results now organised
by interest group type, what can we say about the assumptions linking interest group
type to information type discussed above? Do private interest groups invariably send
only technical and expert information? Do diffuse groups only send information about
public opinion? Lastly, are diffuse interest groups unable to send technical information
and are thus compelled to provide information that “appeals to general principles like
equity, social justice, and environmental protection” (Dür and de Biévre, 2007b: 82)?
Perhaps the most important result presented in Graph 14 is that most interest
groups in the EU have considerable agency in the information types they transmit to
decision-makers. There are not, as argued in the extant literature, categorical barriers
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that prevent diffuse groups from transmitting technical information or that restrict
private interest groups from transmitting less technical information about public
opinion or even appealing to ethical arguments of social justice and equity. Transmitting
information that synthesizes different types of argument seems to be a standard
strategy for most interest groups in the EU. What motivates interest groups to do this?
Interview data helps flesh out the survey data. Generally speaking, private interest
groups appear to seek to legitimize technical information about policy outcomes by
referencing information about public opinion and even using ethical arguments. Diffuse
interests, by contrast, recognizing the power of “evidence-based policymaking,” use
technical information to give greater weight and purchase to ethical arguments and
information about public opinion. A few examples will help explain this trend.
AEGPL, a Brussels-based professional association specializing in the extraction,
transport and sale of liquefied petroleum gas, provides a good example for private
interest groups. The issue, according to an AEGPL representative, is marrying the
private economic aims of the association with ethical notions of increasing the aggregate
welfare of all Europeans. “It is not the job of the EU institutions to help gas companies
make money. But the mission of this office is to improve the business environment of
our members. This is clear. But that is not an acceptable objective once you engage in a
negotiation with the EU.”108 While purely technical information could convey the steps
necessary for making more money, they do not provide compelling arguments for
decision-makers. As such, AEGPL “often points out that LPG, as a portable gaseous fuel,
makes economic activity possible and more sustainable in areas where there is no
natural gas grid. We talk about rural areas, islands, mountains, and so forth, those who
need access to clean, modern energy. LGP provides that. That’s a much more compelling
108
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels,
16/11/2010.
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argument than, ‘we’d like to sell X amount of gas’.” Providing the technical details is just
part of the equation, “you also have to demonstrate that it makes sense for someone
other than yourself.”109 Stressing the environmental and social welfare dimensions of a
policy is like sweetening bad medicine: it helps the technical details and expert
knowledge go down.
While ethical arguments support technical information for a private interest
group like AEGPL, for NGOs it is the reverse: using technical details to give greater
weight and credibility to their ethical arguments. The specific interest that an NGO
represents, however, can seriously restrict its ability to do this. Consider first the Quaker
European Council, representing Quaker beliefs at the European level. This interest group
took a strong stance against the construction of the Nabucco pipeline that would link
Turkey and Austria. The ethical position of the Quaker Council was that the EU, given
that “Turkmenistan, being the country that it is,” should not go “hell for leather to get
their gas but rather try to influence the situation in Turkmenistan for the better.”110 To
support its position, Quaker Council published a position paper outlining how the
pipeline could be contingent on Turkmenistan “signing-up to the industry’s
transparency initiative,” thereby allowing for the “opening up a civil society, NGO
activity, transparency and democracy in Turkmenistan.”111 The Quaker Council’s broad
mandate to represent Quaker interests around the world, here translated as
transparency and democracy promotion in Turkmenistan, made couching an ethical
issue in largely technical terms a rather uncomplicated process.
Other NGOs, however, are limited in the extent to which they can synthesize
different information types by the very interests that they represent. It seems that the
109
Interview, Paul Voss, Manger for Energy and Environment Policy, AEGPL Europe, Brussels,
16/11/2010.
110 Interview, Martina Weitsch, official, Quaker Council for European Affairs, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
111 Interview, Martina Weitsch, official, Quaker Council for European Affairs, Brussels, 10/12/2009.
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broader an interest becomes, the more difficult it is to couch ethical issues in technical
terms. Culture Action Europe’s “70 Cents for Culture Campaign” is a case in point. The
basic aim of this campaign is to increase the EU’s overall budget for culture and support
for the arts in Europe. The problem, according to a Culture Action Europe
representative, is the notion of “culture” itself. “There is not a lot of statistical data,” in
this area, “and there is almost no comparable European-level data. I cannot say, for
example, the cultural sector provides 5,000,000 jobs and contributes X to the combined
GDP.”112 As such, Culture Action Europe relies almost exclusively on “rhetorical
arguments,” as a representative explained, at the expense of “data-driven arguments.”113
In this case, the issue area seems to limit this NGO’s ability to participate in so-called
“evidence-based policy making.” Arguments for increasing the Commission’s budget for
culture, while appealing to broad concerns about the importance of culture and the arts
in Europe, are just not easily couched in technical terms.
Both private and diffuse groups are not only able to access a diverse range of
information types but recognize the importance of combining them to make their
message as strong and compelling as possible. But for NGOs, some messages make such
combinations easier than others. It is on this point that NGOs face certain hurdles that
other interest groups do not. The main distinction between diffuse and private interests
in terms of information type is not membership structure, however, but the nature of
the interest being represented.
112
113
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
- 175 -
Information Tactics
How information is sent is just as important as the type of information that is
sent. There are several different tactics that interest groups can use to transmit
information to decision-makers. The most notable distinction in this regard is between
outside lobbying tactics and inside lobbying tactics. Outside lobbing tactics refer to the
attempts by interest groups “to mobilize citizens outside the policymaking community
to contact or pressure officials inside the policymaking community” (Kollman, 1998: 3).
This might involve interest groups using the media by placing advertisements in
newspapers or magazines as well as writing editorials. Interest groups may also host
public events where members and decision-makers are invited to take part and hear the
issues. Inside lobbying, by contrast, involves a more direct form of contact between
interest groups and decision-makers and is what we usually have in mind when we
think of lobbying. It involves old-fashioned shoe leather tactics like writing letters,
making phone calls and having face-to-face meetings as well as the use of newer
technologies for writing emails, for example (Watson and Shackleton, 2008).
Like research on information types, work on information tactics is also marked
by an assumption that links interest group type to the use of particular tactics. Again, the
focus is on the difference between private interest groups and diffuse interest groups. It
seems that, among the various tactics available to interest groups, some are explicitly
driven by “personnel resources” while others are driven by “monetary resources”
(Gerber, 1999: 88). An interest group’s choice of tactics is assumed to be determined by
its abundance of one type of resource or another. Thus, diffuse groups are assumed to be
“personnel rich” and poor in monetary resources and thus transmit information to
decision-makers circuitously by reaching out to the public and mobilizing them on an
issue. Private groups are poor in personnel resources but rich in monetary resources.
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Thus, they do not need to resort to outside strategies that involve the public and instead
focus their resources on strategies that bring them in direct contact with decisionmakers – namely, inside strategies (see Hojnacki and Kimball: 1998 & 1999; Mahoney,
2008; Dür and de Biévre, 2007b). These distinctions, however, are too stark. Clearly,
tactics that are meant to mobilize the public would require considerable monetary
resources. Further, many inside tactics – like writing letters and making phone calls –
bear very few monetary costs. It remains unclear why resource-poor groups, like NGOs
would be assumed to forgo these less expensive tactics. The following analysis will help
clarify these issues.
To what extent is there a discernable link between interest group types and the
choice of certain tactics? Once again we will use survey results to examine the question.
A note on tactics needs to be mentioned before presenting the survey results. While the
tactics I consider in this analysis can be categorized loosely as either inside or outside
strategies, the typology of tactics I use is more precise, and, as with information types
discussed above, is tailored to lobbying in the EU context. Differentiating among
different tactics is also important to unpack the presumed link between certain tactics
and certain resources (whether personnel or monetary). To this end, I consider four socalled inside tactics (face-to-face meetings, writing letters, writing emails, making phone
calls), two so-called outside tactics (starting media campaigns and hosting public
events), and one tactic that does not fit nicely into either category, namely participating
in the Commission’s ‘open consultation’ process. We will recall from the previous
chapter that open consultation is an invitation for interest groups to provide
information to decision-makers on a particular issue. Importantly, unlike either inside
or outside tactics, open consultation means that groups are not proactively transmitting
information to decision-makers. Moreover, open consultation is unique in the sense that
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it makes information transmission a formal part of the EU policy-making machinery. To
this extent, open consultation has the potential to give a greater sense of legitimacy to
interest group informational input.
To examine information tactics, respondents were asked to identify how
frequently (again on a 1 to 5 scale, with being “never” and 5 being “very often”) their
organisation provides information to EU decision-makers in the following seven ways:
(1) Face-to-face meetings; (2) Write a letter; (3) Write an email; (4) Make a phone call;
(5) Start a media campaign; (6) Host a public event; and (7) Participate in the ‘open
consultation’ process. The results are presented in Table 10, below.
Table 10
Information Tactics used to Transmit Information to EU Decision-Makers
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets)
Inside Tactics
Outside Tactics
write
letter
write
email
make
phone call
media
campaign
1 (never)
face-toface
meeting
17 (6.05)
18 (6.45)
4 (1.41)
83 (29.96)
2
32 (11.39)
38 (13.62)
20 (7.04)
3
60 (21.35)
77 (27.60)
4
92 (32.74)
92 (32.97)
5 (very
often)
80 (28.74)
54 (19.35)
63
(22.18)
97
(34.15)
100
(35.21)
31
(11.11)
40
(14.34)
35
(23.30)
75
(26.88)
68
(24.37)
21 (7.58)
host
public
event
31
(10.95)
74
(26.15)
80
(28.27)
71
(25.09)
27 (9.54)
Total
Mean
Standard
Dev.
281 (100)
3.66
1.17
279 (100)
3.45
1.13
284 (100)
3.94
.99
279 (100)
3.39
1.29
277 (100)
2.40
1.25
283 (100)
2.96
1.15
78 (28.16)
58 (20.94)
37 (13.36)
Open
Consultation
open
consultation
8 (2.84)
25 (8.87)
49 (17.38)
10. (36.17)
98 (34.75)
282 (100)
3.91
1.06
As Table 10 makes clear, writing an email is the most frequently used tactic for
transmitting information to decision-makers in the EU. In fact, 35% of respondents
indicated that they use this tactic “very often.” This is followed closely by participating in
open consultations and face-to-face meetings. Old fashioned shoe leather tactics, like
writing letters and making phone calls are used somewhat less frequently. So-called
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outside lobbying tactics, like media campaigns and hosting public events, are clearly the
least frequently used for lobbying in the EU. More specifically, a majority of respondents
indicate that they rarely use these tactics to transmit information to EU decisionmakers.
Cost seems to be a major factor determining the tactics that interest groups use
to transmit information to decision-makers. A simple email or a phone call requires, in
general, fewer monetary resources and less time than hosting public events and starting
media campaigns. Importantly, timing and reliability are also crucial factors in terms of
choosing tactics. Emails, for instance, are used more frequently than written letters
likely because of their immediacy. As discussed in chapter 5, there is a premium on
timely information in the EU. Information that is too late loses all of its value. Delivering
a letter simply takes longer to transmit than an email. Face-to-face meetings, however,
are still very important for most interest groups. While emails are fast, fast-to-face
meetings lend a greater reliability to the message that is transmitted. Questions can be
raised and answered, alternative options explored and rejected and decisions can be
made with a handshake all without the tedium of the back-and-forth of multiple emails.
Importantly, open consultations are also a key tactic for interest groups in the EU. The
frequent use of this particular tactic might be explained by the fact that it provides a
formalized and legitimate way for interests groups to provide their input into the
legislative process. It carries less of the stigma and negative connotations that other
more traditional tactics might have. While public events and media campaigns can bring
the public’s attention to an issue, these tactics are unreliable, costly and inefficient. The
information transmitted using these methods must be simplified to reach a wide
audience or to fit on a banner or pamphlet. Moreover, these tactics, while perhaps
reaching a large audience, run the risk of going unheard by decision-makers.
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To what extent do these trends hold up when we disaggregate the data by
interest group type? Moreover, does interest group type affect information transmission
tactics? Graph 15, below, provides insight into these questions.
Mirroring the results in Table 10, most interest groups in the EU use inside tactics more
frequently than outside tactics. Slight differences between tactic-choice exist between
different types of interest groups. NGOs and public authorities tend to transmit
information most frequently via emails. Consultancies, by contrast, use face-to-face
meetings while companies, professional associations and trade unions use the EU’s open
consultation procedure most frequently. There is, however, little evidence that diffuse
interests tend to invariably use outside tactics or that they prioritize them over other
tactics. Indeed, the use of outside tactics by NGOs is not noticeably more frequent
relative to other groups. In fact, consultancies and trade unions tend to use outside
tactics more frequently than NGOs. Like other types of interest groups, NGOs are not
limited to outside tactics. “We have a whole range of strategies,” as a representative
from Culture Action Europe explains, that involves presenting a position paper, carrying
- 180 -
out a large scale campaign, sending emails and making phone calls.114 ENAR uses a
similar, multi-tactic strategy, sometimes even transmitting essentially the same
information but using open consultation, position papers, emails and by hosting public
events.
While assumptions about NGOs using outside tactics are clearly challenged by
these results, those regarding private interests using inside tactics do find some support.
For instance, companies tend to transmit information via face-to-face meetings and
emails and rarely rely on hosting public events or starting media campaigns.
Professional associations, in addition to other inside tactics, tend to transmit
information via phone calls and also only infrequently use typical outside tactics. This
might be the result of the fact that these private interests are relatively “personnelpoor.” It could also simply be the case the private interests have little use for outside
tactics. Of course, a similar trend can be seen for public authorities and consultancies.
What is more, for all interest groups, providing information via the open consultation
process is an obvious priority. It is therefore wholly unclear how much the membership
structure of an interest group determines the choice of tactics used to transmit
information to EU decision-makers.
Although used sparingly, transmitting information through hosting public events
is clearly used more frequently than media campaigns. Interest groups’ general focus on
networking, strong-ties and face-to-face interaction, as examined in previous chapters,
can help explain this preference. According to the results in Graph 15, consultancies and
public authorities employ these tactics more frequently than other interest groups. For
consultancies, the public event is a crucial venue for bringing together different clients
and EU decision-makers. It is also used to help nurture bonds between clients in an
114
Interview, Illona Kish, Secretary General, Culture Action Europe, Brussels, 15/11/2009.
- 181 -
effort to facilitate the formation of issue-based coalitions. Public authorities also host
public events to spread ideas and bring people together. To some degree, however, these
public events serve as a platform to sell the region or city on the merits of its potential
for tourism. Thus, many public authority offices in Brussels are outfitted with special
halls or conference areas. The Bavarian regional office, for instance, boasts an
Octoberfest-styled beer hall serving up traditional wheat beer and white sausages to
guests. The Baden-Württemberg office has a meeting room decorated to resemble the
Bodensee area, a tourist hot spot in southern Germany. While somewhat less
extravagant, the foyer of the Puglia office resembles a tourist gift shop, with shelves
stocked with regional wines and glossy books on local culture and cuisine.
As with information type, considered above, there is no firm and fixed relation
between interest group type and the tactics it uses to transmit information to decisionmakers. The process is much more fluid. “There is,” as an ETUC representative put it, “no
single template for” choosing how to provide decision-makers with information.115 The
results above do, however, provide evidence for what Greenwood (2007) describes as
the bureaucratization of interest group engagement with EU decision-makers. This is
particularly relevant for companies, professional associations and trade unions, which
indicate that they most frequently transmit information via open consultation. Open
consultation formalizes the information transmission process in that EU decisionmakers ask interest groups for their informational input. For companies, professional
associations and trade unions, then, the most frequently used information transmission
tactic is not proactive (sending unsolicited information via letters and emails) but rather
entirely reactive.
115
Interview, John Monks, General Secretary, ETUC, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
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There are several important advantages to transmitting information through
open consultation. First, decision-makers would be entirely more receptive to the
information they receive through open consultation especially compared with
unsolicited information sent via an email or, in particular, a media campaign. Second, by
receiving a request for information, interest groups can provide very detailed and pointon responses. Open consultation specifies not only the issue at hand but also the
information that is required by decision-makers. Other transmission tactics, because
they rely on interest groups acting proactively, could very often fall on deaf ears.
Importantly, even given these conditions, there does not appear to be a distinct division
between diffuse and private interest groups. Companies, professional associations and
trade unions all prioritize this information transmission tactic.
Information Targets
The previous sections examined both the type of information interest groups
send to decision-makers as well as the tactics used to send this information to decisionmakers. In this section I will examine how the decision-makers themselves serve as
informational targets for interest groups. Two questions will provide the focus of this
section. First, which interest groups send information to which targets? Second, what
factors influence how interest groups choose between different targets?
There are several decision-making institutions in the EU that serve as viable
targets for the information transmitted by interest groups. While an informational
asymmetry exists within all of these decision-making institutions (Bouwen 2009; HayesRenshaw 2009; Lehmann 2009), each has its own specific informational needs. As
Mahoney has argues, these needs are determined by the role of each institution in the
legislative process as well as its openness or transparency with regard to interest group
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input (Mahoney, 2008). Thus, for example, the European Commission is commonly
thought to serve a largely apolitical function in the policymaking process, relying on
interest groups to provide it with expert knowledge and technical information (Peterson
2006; Bouwen 2009; Michalowitz, 2004). Importantly, the Commission is also legally
mandated to consult widely during the legislative process, ensuring input from many
different types of interest groups. By contrast, the informational needs of the European
Parliament follow its internal bifurcation as an effective branch of the legislative process
and as a public arena for wider political debate (Lehmann, 2009: 55). For this reason,
the Parliament relies on interest groups to supply it with “technical details and scientific
expertise” as well as information about “wide ranging” issues, “like a cleaner
environment, higher employment” that are “known to be of interest to a large number of
citizens” (Ibid., 52; see also Michalowitz, 2004). It is also important that, while the
Parliament is open to interest group input, it enforces a strict “code of conduct” that
limits access by interest groups. The Council of Ministers, while perhaps less frequently
lobbied than the Commission and the Parliament, is nonetheless an important lobbying
target (Eising, 2007; Bouwen, 2002). However, whereas the Commission and Parliament
are relatively open institutions, the Council is notoriously “opaque, closed, elusive and
inscrutable, secretive, and intractable” (Hayes-Renshaw, 2009: 73). As such, it is less
clear what the informational needs of the Council might be. The executive function of the
Council means that technical details and expert knowledge are less important than in
both the Commission and Parliament in that these details have already been worked out
by the time they reach the Council (ibid).
Research on the informational needs of EU decision-makers is closely linked to
research on information type, and in particular, how information type is a function of
interest group membership structure. The basic idea is that groups that have a natural
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supply of some type of information will necessarily and deterministically transmit it to
those decision-makers that require that type of information. Again, the focus is on
private and diffuse interest groups. Thus, diffuse interests, having recourse to
information about public opinion, will naturally target the Parliament because of its
apparent need for information about public opinion. Further, private interests, having
recourse to information about technical matters, will naturally target the Commission
because of its apparent need for technical information. Of course, it is less certain which
types of interest groups would lobby the Council or how other types of interest groups
(consultancies and public authorities) might factor in.
To what extent are assumptions about the informational needs of the
Commission, the Parliament and the Council accurate? To which targets, more generally
speaking, do interests groups transmit information? These questions are examined with
reference to survey results. Importantly, this study considers the Commission,
Parliament and Council as well as the Committee of Permanent Representatives
(Coreper), and the two advisory bodies, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). The last three targets receive very
little attention in the existing literature and are rarely considered alongside the
Commission, Parliament and Council as viable information targets. A few words on the
informational needs of these other decision-making institutions are necessary before
examining the survey results.
Coreper is officially part of the working machinery of the Council and plays a
pivotal gate-keeping role with reference to most legislation. Its work consists mainly of
preparing the Council’s agenda by dividing the work into three categories: points where
no ministerial decision is needed, points where decisions can be made without debate
and points where debate is need. Importantly, members of Coreper are more like
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political generalists, at least when compared to ministers, and are “experts in the
substantive questions” of each issue (Lewis, 2006: 276). We might therefore expect
interest groups to transmit technical information and expert knowledge to the Coreper.
The CoR and EESC only have advisory roles in the EU policymaking process. This means
that, on certain issues, the Commission and Council must consult with these institutions.
Whether these consultations amount to anything is a different question altogether.
Nonetheless, there is some evidence to suggest that both committees do play important
roles in the EU legislative process and would therefore be important targets for various
interest groups. The two committees’ respective representative mandates suggest which
interest groups might view them as viable information targets. First, CoR represents
sub-national governments in the EU, ranging from regional level governments to cities
and municipalities. As such, we should expect to see public authorities taking advantage
of this additional representative body. The EESC has a very specific mandate to
represent employers, workers and, to a lesser extent, civil society (Westlake, 2009: 129).
In particular, this implicates trade unions and perhaps NGOs as ideal interlocutors and
information providers.
This brings us to the survey results. Respondents were asked to identify how
frequently (again on a 1 to 5 scale, with being “never” and 5 being “very often”) their
organisation provides information to the following six EU decision-making institutions:
(1) European Commission; (2) European Parliament; (3) Council of Minister; (4)
Coreper; (5) Committee of the Regions; (6) European Economic and Social Committee.
The results are presented in Table 11, below.
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Table 11
Information Targets
(Frequency of individual responses with percentages in brackets)
1 (never)
2
3
4
5 (very often)
Total
Mean
Standard
Deviation
European
Commission
8 (2.95)
25 (9.23)
53 (19.56)
86 (31.73)
99 (36.53)
European
Parliament
23 (8.36)
36 (13.09)
67 (24.36)
72 (26.18)
77 (28.00)
Council of
Ministers
70 (25.83)
68 (25.09)
74 (27.31)
39 (14.39)
20 (7.38)
Coreper
CoR
EESC
109 (40.37)
74 (27.41)
53 (19.63)
23 (8.52)
11 (4.07)
119 (44.07)
78 (25.89)
36 (13.33)
11 (4.07)
26 (9.63)
107 (39.05)
79 (28.83)
51 (18.61)
22 (8.03)
15 (5.47)
271 (100)
3.89
1.09
275 (100)
3.52
1.25
271 (100)
2.52
1.22
270 (100)
2.08
1.14
270 (100)
2.06
1.26
274 (100)
2.12
1.17
The targeting of different EU institutions appears to follow mainly from two
factors: institutional transparency and influence. As expected, the Commission is most
frequently targeted by interest groups, followed be the Parliament and then, to a much
lesser extent, the Council. It is likely the Commission’s open consultation procedure, its
mandate to consult widely and its clear requirement for technical information that
makes it such a viable target for interest groups. The Parliament’s dual role as legislative
agent and arena for public debate makes it the target of much information coming from
interest groups. Similarly, the Council’s lack of transparency and hence uncertain
informational needs makes it less of a target despite the fact that it occupies a decisive
position in the EU policymaking process. As expected, interest groups only very
infrequently target the CoR and EESC. In fact, most respondents indicate only rarely
targeting these committees. This might reflect the marginal role each institution plays in
the decision-making process as well as their narrow representative mandates. Interest
groups also rarely target the Coreper (in fact, less frequently than they target the EESC).
These results are hard to explain given the decisive function of the Coreper and its
apparent requirement for technical information.
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Looking at the results organised by interest group type (in Graph 16, below), we
can see that the Commission and the Parliament are the most frequent information
targets for most interest groups in the EU.
The only exception is public authorities, which transmit information more frequently to
the CoR. This can be explained by CoR’s exclusive focus on sub-state representation. As a
representative from the Catalonian EU office remarked, CoR is “the only real place
where Catalonia has a voice.” To the Commission, Parliament and Council, by contrast,
Catalonia needs to seek influence through the Spanish permanent representation in
Brussels. This is the case for all public authorities. “When we speak at the Committee of
Regions,” however, “we speak as Catalonia.”116 Just as public authorities were expected
to frequently transmit information to CoR, the results show trade unions and NGOs to be
the main suppliers of information to the other advisory body, the EESC. This likely
reflects to the EESC mandate to represent workers, employers and civil society groups.
116
Interview, official, Generalitat de Catalunya. Delegación del Gobierno en Bruselas, Brussels,
7/12/2009.
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The Commission’s requirement for technical information and expert knowledge
seems to be addressed by all types of interest groups. Indeed, no single interest group
dominates in this regard, especially not, as assumed, private interests like companies
and professional associations. The fact that all types of interest groups frequently
transmit information to the Commission clearly reflects the Commission’s mandate to
consult widely during the early stages of the policymaking process. The Parliament’s
presumed requirement for both technical information and wide-ranging information
about citizen preferences is also addressed by a number of different types of interest
groups. Information is most frequently transmitted to the Parliament by consultancies,
followed closely by trade unions, professional associations and NGOs. Clearly, there is no
natural link between diffuse interest groups and the Parliament’s apparent
informational needs.
The EU’s main decision-making institutions each have their own informational
needs as a consequence of their unique place in the EU policy-making process. These
needs are far more important in determining how interest groups transmit information
than an interest group’s membership structure. Indeed, as the results above suggest,
most interest groups in the EU frequently target the entire gamut of different decisionmakers at different times during the policy-making process. The clear prioritization of
the Commission and Parliament reflect, once again, the exigency of providing
informational input at the earliest stages of the legislative process.
Interaction between Transmission Strategies
So far we have examined strategies related to types, tactics and targets
separately. But clearly, making choices about one requires consideration of the other
two. None of these strategic choices exist in a vacuum. Hojnacki and Kimball (1999)
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make this point in the context of lobbying in the committee stage of the legislative
process in the US. Although bracketing off information type, they demonstrate that
tactics and targets are “nonseparable”: “Both types of choice derive from the same set of
strategic considerations, and it is likely that different tactics are more effective for
reaching different targets” (1004) Baumgartner and Leech (1999) have also made a
similar point. They argue that the strategies an interest group selects really depends on
“which governmental targets to focus on and what type of approach to use”(147). I use
these insights about the interdependence of strategies as the basis for an examination of
how choices about types, tactics and target interact. The question here is: which types of
information and which tactics are used for sending information to which targets?
As we have seen, there is no deterministic link between certain groups and
certain targets. But to what extent do assumptions about informational need, more
generally speaking, hold up to empirical scrutiny? In particular, does the Commission
receive substantially more information about technical and expert matters than the
other decision-making bodies? Further, is this information sent, as assumed, via typical
inside lobbying tactics? Is the Parliament a target primarily for information about public
opinion that is sent via typical outside lobbying strategies? More generally, which types
of information and which types of tactics are used to transmit information to the
Council, Coreper, CoR and EESC? To answer these questions I have used survey data in
an OLS regression analysis. This statistical analysis tests correlations between results
for the three survey questions already discussed above: how frequently are different
types of information transmitted to decision-makers; how frequently are different
tactics used to transmit information to decision-makers; and how frequently do interest
groups transmit information to different decision-makers. The results are presented in
Table 12 below.
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Table 12
Interaction of Information Types, Tactics and Targets
Information
Type
Information
Tactic
Commission
Parliament
Information Target
Council
Coreper
CoR
EESC
public opinion
.04(.04)
.001(.05)
-.04(.06)
-.06(.06)
.2(.07)**
.07(.06)
legal Information
feasibility of
implementation
economic impact
social impact
making technical
/ expert
information
understandable
face-to-face
meeting
open consultation
write letter
write email
-.06(.04)
.18(.06)**
.07(.05)
.07(.07)
.13(.06)**
-.16(.08)*
.14(.06)**
-.001(.08)
.11(.07)
-.04(.1)
.05(.06)
-.2(.09)**
.03(.06)
.01(.05)
.04(.04)
-.04(.07)
.18(.06)**
-.009(.05)
.05(.08)
-.001(.06)
.11(.06)*
-.08(.08)
.06(.06)
.27(.06)**
-.01(.1)
-.02(.08)
-.03(.07)
.13(.09)
.05(.07)
-.09(.06)
.15(.03)**
.17(.08)**
.41(.08)**
.12(.08)
-.21(.1)
-.05(.09)
.27(.05)**
.12(.05)**
.05(.07)
.3(.06)
.13(.06)**
.02(.08)
.03(.07)
.17(.06)**
.03(.09)
-.13(.08)
-.02(.08)
-.02(.1)
.13(.08)
.008(.07)
.17(.09)
make phone call
start media
campaign
host public event
.02(.06)
-.04(.04)
.08(.07)
-.01(.05)
-.03(.07)
.21(.06)**
.03(.07)
.14(.07)**
.26(.08)**
.07(.07)
.15(.06)**
.17(.09)
-.09(.07)
-.16(.08)*
.27(.06)**
.08(.05)
.18(.06)**
-.04(.06)
.02(.07)
.21(.08)**
.05(.07)
Constant
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
N
.47(.24)*
.51
.48
-.5(.28)
.51
.48
-.38(.30)
.39
.36
.36(.31)
.30
.26
1.8(.38)**
.11
.06
.9(.34)**
.20
.16
256
260
257
257
257
260
Note: entries are unstandardised OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
Two of the assumptions made above linking types and tactics to targets are given
some support in these results. First, interest groups do tend to use inside lobbying
tactics with the Commission in order to transmit detailed, expert information about the
feasibility of implementing certain policies. Second, there is a statistically robust
correlation between sending information to the Parliament and that information
containing details of the social impact of a policy. Further, the Parliament is the only
institution to which interest groups transmit information through public events – a
typical outside lobbing strategy. Nonetheless, and perhaps reflecting the bifurcated
nature of the Parliament as both an effective legislative branch as well as an arena for
public debate, information is also commonly transmitted to the Parliament via face-to-
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face meetings and written letters (typical inside lobbying tactics). Generally speaking,
then, it does appear as if the assumed informational needs of the Commission and
Parliament affect the type of information that interest groups transmit as well as the
tactics used to do so. Interest groups recognize, to speak with a representative from
BusinessEurope, a large, Brussels-based professional association, that Commission
“technocrats” are open to “technical arguments” while MEPs, being “political animals”
are more open to receiving information about “the effects on everyday people, rather
than dry arguments about some regulation.”117 NGOs also recognize the need to tailor
information type and tactic to different targets. “You have to have the right message for
the right audience,” as one NGO representative put it.118 “We have to change the
message” for each EU institution, as Eurogroup for Animals representative explains. “For
example, if you talk to the Commission, you can talk scientist to scientist. Whereas, when
you go to the Parliament, you have to give the MEP something that they can show their
citizens. So they like, much more, the ethical and the moral messages. We have to change
the way we deliver the message too. The message can be the same, but it can be
delivered in different ways depending on the audience.”119 Importantly, then, the target
helps determine the type and tactic used, not interest group type.
The above results illuminate some other interesting trends regarding the
interaction of interest group strategies. For instance, the information sent to the Council
tends to either be information that makes technical information understandable and
relevant or legal information. This information is typically transmitted via face-to-face
meetings, written letters and media campaigns. Importantly, there is a statistically
robust negative correlation between sending information to the Council and sending
117
Interview, Andrew Jackson, Advisor, BusinessEurope, Brussels, 11/12/2009.
Interview, Dr. Marlene Wartenberg, Director, Vier Pfoten, Brussels, 19/11/2010.
119 Interview, Martyn Griffiths, Executive Officer, Eurogroup for Animals, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
118
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detailed information about the feasibility of implementing a particular proposal. This
result does seem to support the expectation that, by the time a proposal reaches the
Council, most of the technical details have already been worked out. Like the Council,
information sent to Coreper also tends to be legal in nature as well as information meant
to make technical information understandable and relevant. But for Coreper, this
information does not appear to be transmitted via face-to-face meetings but rather only
through written letters and media campaigns. This result is difficult to explain given the
fact that Coreper works on substantive issues that would best be served by direct
information transmission tactics. Information sent to the CoR tends to be about public
opinion that is transmitted via the hosting of public events. Public authorities are clearly
implicated in these results in that they both target CoR more frequently than any other
group and also tend to use these outside tactic very frequently. As discussed above,
many public authority offices are outfitted with special halls or reception rooms for just
such events. Lastly, the results for the EESC are rather ambiguous. While there is no
specific information type robustly correlated with sending information to the EESC,
there is an important negative correlation between transmitted information and
information about the feasibility of implementing a policy. Perhaps this type of detailed,
expert information is of little value to the EESC, which is more concerned with providing
a form of representation to employers, workers and civil society groups.
Conclusion
One of the central purposes of this chapter was to bring some order to the
complexity of the information transmission process. Examining information types,
tactics and targets separately addressed this issue and also revealed some interesting
trends regarding which interest groups transmit which types of information, using
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which tactics to which decision-making targets. The results, drawing on an online survey
and elite interviews, spoke to various long-held assumptions about how the
membership structure of so-called private and diffuse interest groups determines a
group’s strategic choices during the information transmission process. In particular, the
results suggest that groups have a great deal of flexibility in selecting from a wide range
of different information types. The results also challenged the assumption that diffuse
groups transmit information via outside strategies while private groups transmit
information via inside strategies. It seems that interest groups also enjoy considerable
flexibility in this regard, with fast and reliable tactics being prioritized by most groups.
Assumptions that diffuse groups target the Parliament while private groups target the
Commission were also laid to rest. It appears the choice of targets is part of a much more
complex set of strategic choices. Nonetheless, there are strong links between the two
advisory institutions and the types of interest groups that prioritize them as information
targets.
This analysis also considered how strategic choices in the information
transmission process interact. Three assumptions in particular were given some
support: first, the Commission is a prime target for technical information and expert
knowledge; second, the Parliament is a prime target for information about the social
impact of particular policies; and third, the Council, perhaps reflecting its executive
function, is not a good target for technical information.
One of the central aims of this chapter was to expand the range of interest groups
considered beyond the standard dichotomy of private and diffuse interests, providing
insights into how other types of groups, in particular public authorities and public
affairs consultancies, transmit information to EU decision-makers. Of course, it would
prove useful to expand the list of interest groups under consideration to include groups
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of religious representatives, thinks tanks and law firms. Only with the inclusion of these
groups will a more complete picture of information transmission the EU be obtained.
Nonetheless, the comparison of the groups considered in this chapter represents a good
start in this direction.
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Chapter 8
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE IN THE EU
The central aim of most lobbying activity is to influence the policymaking
process. Indeed, this is implied in the way that interest groups represent the concerns
and welfare of their members to decision-makers. Despite being such a fundamental
aspect of what interest groups do, surprisingly little scholarly work has taken up the
task of measuring the extent to which different interest groups exert influence. One of
the reasons for this lack of scholarly attention is the difficulty associated with
empirically measuring influence – it is incredibly difficult, if not impossible, to
categorically attribute a policy outcome to a specific interest group activity (Mahoney,
2008: 183; Dür, 2008a&b). It is thus commonplace, and even expected, for scholars to
“avoid the topic altogether” if not “at all costs” (Dür and de Bièvre, 2007a: 3; Mahoney,
2007: 35).
Addressing this lacuna, the preceding chapters have taken up an information
processing theory of interest group influence in the EU. The starting point for each
chapter was that interest groups are not primarily agents of pressure trying to change
the minds of “unfriendly” decision-makers using various pressure and purchase tactics.
Rather, interest groups are much better understood as informational service bureaus
most commonly providing a form of professional labour to “friendly” decision-makers.
The basic premise examined in this analysis is that interest group influence is a function
of this informational service; more specifically, information gathering, information
networks, information transparency, and information transmission – what I refer to
together as “information processing.” The present chapter moves beyond a
consideration of the component parts of information processing and sets out to provide
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a confirmatory analysis linking information processing to interest group influence. This
requires a consideration of not only the causes of interest group influence (information
processing) but also its effects. To this end, I argue that, insofar as information
processing is not meant to change minds it will not be evinced in policy outcomes.
Rather, the effects of efficient information processing are evident in interest group
interaction with decision-makers. Presuming that decision-makers wish to maximize the
probability of receiving policy relevant information, they will seek to interact with those
interest groups that are the most informed on a given topic, and that are the most
reliable and efficient information providers. In short, decision-makers will seek out the
most efficient information processors. As such, I propose the following primary
hypothesis: The more efficient interest groups are at information processing, the more
frequently they will interact with EU decision-makers.
As with the previous chapters, one of the central aims here is also comparative.
Thus, I ask: how do different types of interest groups vary in terms of their information
processing ability? The extant interest group literature suggests that diffuse interests,
like NGOs and trade unions, are systematically excluded from the EU decision-making
process and that private interest groups, like companies and professional associations,
exercise considerable influence on policy-outcomes. The results from an information
processing theory of influence find, however, that these assumptions are largely
unfounded. I find that no single interest group type dominates the EU policy-making
process. Rather, interest group influence in the EU appears to be balanced and relatively
unbiased.
This chapter is organised as follows. First, I briefly review the conceptual and
methodological issues related to measuring influence. Next, I put forward an
information processing theory of interest group influence examining how we need to
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rethink both the causes and effects of interest group influence. I then outline my
research design, discussing the variables I use to measure interest group influence in the
EU. This is followed by a presentation of the results from an empirical analysis of a
large-scale online survey of interest group representatives in the EU.
Measuring Interest Group Influence
Measuring interest group influence is tricky business. Methodological difficulties
have led scholars to shy away from the topic altogether. As discussed in detail in chapter
2, the research that does address the issue of influence invariably conceptualizes it in
terms of a Weberian notion of power: the ability of one actor to force another actor to
pursue a course of action they would not otherwise have pursued. Influence, therefore,
is the power that makes a decision-maker “deviate from (his) predicted path of
behaviour” (March 1955: 435). Influence, however, remains a nebulous concept that is
typically operationalised using a series of proxies for measuring both its causes and
effects. As “cause,” or the ability to control outcomes, influence is typically related to
interest group resources, group organisation (i.e., diffuse or private) and, to a lesser
extent, the institutional setting of the policy process and the policy issue itself (Mahoney
2007 & 2008; Michalowitz 2007; Eising 2007). As “effect,” influence is evinced in the
extent that an interest group is able to realize its own preferences. This is measured as
the degree to which groups have changed the minds of decision-makers (Michalowitz
2007; March 1955) or the similarity of a group’s initial aims and the end policy outcome
(Mahoney 2008; Burnstein and Linton 2002; Klüver 2009).
The scant work that has been done on interest group influence in the EU provides
only limited insights derived from institutional analyses and small-N studies. Most of
this work suggests that, on balance, private interest groups tend to have more influence
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than diffuse interest groups.120 Indeed, diffuse interest groups are systematically
excluded from the policy-making process while private interest groups exercise
considerable influence. For Pollack (1997), the multiple points of access made available
to diffuse groups at the European level provide unique opportunities for influence but
they are, importantly, strongly tempered by risks. Persson’s examination of the Open
Consultation process found that companies and professional associations “contributed
more” to the policy-making process than NGOs (223). By the same token, Dür and de
Biévre (2007) present evidence that, while NGOs have access to EU decision-makers,
they are hard pressed to translate it into real influence.
Additional evidence that private interest groups have more influence than diffuse
interest groups comes from widely held yet largely untested theoretical assumptions
about the nature of interest intermediation in the EU. The basic premise is that different
systems of interest intermediation provide different constraints and opportunities for
different interest groups to influence policy outcomes. In the EU, scholars have long
debated the nature of the system of interest intermediation. Has the EU adopted the
neo-corporatist model of its most powerful Member States (Germany and France)? Or is
the system more akin to an American-style pluralism? While various features of the EU
system suggest a form of neo-corporatism, in particular through the mechanisms of the
Social Dialogue that institutionalizes interaction with peak employer and employee
associations at the European level, a number of scholars agree that the EU system of
interest group intermediation can best be described as a unique form of elite pluralism
(Mazey and Richardson, 1997; Coen, 1997 & 1998; Cowles, 2001). Elite pluralism is a
system that privileges only a select type of interest groups. The EU’s multiple points of
access at different levels of government potentially provide access to a wide range of
120
For an exception, see Mahoney’s admittedly “initial investigation” that finds that the EU is “responsive”
to a broad range of interest groups (2008: 205).
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different types of interest groups. The regulatory rather than political priorities of the
EU, however, make decision-makers particularly open to input on market-related issues.
It is in this sense natural for EU decision-makers, requiring market-related technical
information, to invariably turn to private interest groups and not diffuse interest groups
for their informational needs (Coen, 1997 & 1998; Cowles, 2001; Hueglin, 1999).
Information Processing and Interest Group Influence
Do private interests really have more influence than other types of interest
groups in the EU? What about consultancies and public authorities? Answering these
questions requires rethinking the nature of influence itself. As I have argued in chapter
2, conceiving of influence through a Weberian lens of power is out of step with recent
insights from the rest of the interest group literature. Studies of interest group
behaviour form a near consensus that interest groups tend to lobby friends and not, as
expected, foes. Lobbying consists of the exchange of information between well-informed
interest groups and decision-makers who are pressed for time and under-staffed.
Sending information to unfriendly decision-makers in order to change their minds is too
costly and the results too uncertain (Lowery, 2007). Given their limited resources,
interest groups therefore focus on transmitting information to those who are already
most likely to support their cause (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1968; Crombez, 2004; Heinz
et al., 1990; Hojnacki and Kimball, 1999). The goal of lobbying is not primarily to change
the minds of those who do not agree with you (foes), but rather to subsidize the work of
those who already do (friends). It is in this light that Hall and Deardorff (2006) have
argued that interest groups are better understood as service bureaus or adjunct to staff
of allied decision-makers rather than agents of pressure (see also Potters and van
Winden, 1992).
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Thinking about influence in terms of the informational service that interest
groups provide decision-makers requires rethinking both the causes and effects of
interest group influence. It is prudent to consider each in turn.
First, consider the effects of interest group influence. The central difference
between treating interests as service bureaus rather than agents of pressure is that the
former lobby friendly decision-makers rather than unfriendly ones. Lobbying friends
implies that interest group preferences are congruent with decision-maker preferences.
By contrast, lobbying unfriendly decision-makers implies a dissonance of preferences
between the two groups of actors. This difference speaks to the type of outcome we can
expect from interest group influence. Only in the case of lobbying unfriendly decisionmakers could we expect the outcomes of lobbying to reflect how far interest groups have
forced decision-makers to “deviate from their predicted path of behaviour” (March
1955: 435) or the extent to which interests approach their “ideal points” (Dür and de
Bièvre 2007a: 3). None of these outcomes remain relevant, however, when interest and
decision-maker preferences are already aligned.
The factors that determine the causes of interest group influence also need to be
reconsidered. Resources and interest group organisation, typically used to
operationalise influence, fail to explain how influence is transformed into specific
outcomes and overlook the central role played by information in the interactions
between interest groups and decision-makers.121 This is a particularly grave oversight
given that legislative institutions in the EU actively generate a huge demand for policy
information (as discussed in detail in chapter 6 and 7). Both informal and formal
121
As I state in chapter 2, the argument is not that resources do not matter. Clearly, resources can play a
big role in effective information gathering, information generation through research, as well as
information transmission tactics. The issue is how resources are directed to these activities in a timely and
efficient manner. Clearly, resource-rich interest groups could very well place few resources in its
information processing activities while a resource-poor group could place all its resources in its
information processing activities. Thus, while resources matter, they only tell us a very small and
potentially very misleading part of the story.
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institutions mandate EU decision-makers in the Commission, for instance, to consult
widely with interest groups during the legislative pressure (European Commission,
2002: 3). Indeed, all of the EU’s decision-making bodies are deeply affected by the
conditions of informational asymmetry and rely on interest groups for a steady supply
of policy relevant information (Bouwen, 2009; Hayes-Renshaw, 2009; Lehmann, 2009).
To be sure, it has long been recognized that information is the currency of
lobbying in Brussels, much more so than so-called pressure and purchase tactics
(Broscheid and Coen, 2007). But the research that does address the informational
nature of lobbying in the EU tends to focus on the demand-side of this informational
relationship, examining the institutional factors that draw EU decision-makers to
consult with interests in the first place (Crombez, 2002; Eising, 2007; Bouwen, 2004).
What is missing from the existing research is a systematic consideration of how interest
groups provide decision-makers with policy-relevant information. In the previous
chapters we have examined this process in terms of four related activities: information
gathering, information networks, information transparency and information
transmission. We can now bring these four factors together to empirically test how they
determine interest group influence more directly.
Measuring Influence
How can we measure influence if it is a function of interest group information
processing? Which factors account for the causes of influence and which the effects? I
argue that interest groups, understood as informational service bureaus, exert influence
through information gathering, information networks, information transparency and
information transmission. As presented in the previous chapters, groups that can
quickly gather and filter information, generate it through flexible research strategies,
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circulate and share it within networks, provide accurate and complete information to
reduce the verification costs of decision-makers, and pursue multiple strategies for
transmitting it to decision-makers have a strategic advantage over groups that cannot.
Proficiency in gathering, networks, transparency and transmitting information all cater
specifically to decision-makers’ needs for timely, reliable and efficient information.
The effects of influence also need to be rethought. If influence is not evinced in
changed minds and specific policy outcomes, then how do we know when influence has
occurred? I propose that the effect of interest group influence is reflected in the
frequency with which interest groups interact with decision-makers. Decision-makers,
short on time, resources and staff, will actively seek to interact with interest groups
providing efficient and reliable information. Moreover, assuming that some groups will
be better information processors than others and that decision-makers wish to
maximize the probability of receiving as much policy relevant information as possible,
decision-makers will seek out those groups that are the most reliable and efficient
information providers. Interaction also begets more interaction. Decision-makers would
presumably return to reliable and efficient information providers time and time again,
rather than run the risk of interacting with unproven and uncertain groups.
Having refigured both the causes and effect of interest group influence in this
way, I hypothesize: The more efficient interest groups are at information processing, the
more frequently they will interact with EU decision-makers. In what follows I will
discuss how I measure information processing and frequency of interaction using
survey data.
The Dependent Variable: Interaction with Decision-makers
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The effects of interest group influence can be measured by looking at the
frequency of interactions between interest groups and EU decision-makers. Interaction
was tapped in the survey by asking respondents how frequently their organisation was
in contact with the European Commission, European Parliament, Council of Ministers,
Coreper, the Committee of Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee.
This is an admittedly blunt measure and it might be argued that simple interaction,
especially self-reported by interest groups, does not capture the type of mutually
beneficial relationship between interest groups and decision-makers sketched above.
However, this measure not only draws considerable support from research on how
interest groups lobby friends rather than foes (Bauer, Pool and Dexter, 1963; Berry,
1977; Hall and Deardorff, 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2009) but also from empirical
research on the perspective of EU decision-makers in the Commission, Parliament and
Council. There is compelling evidence from a recent Burson Marsteller study that EU
decision-makers do indeed value interest group “lobbying” because it can “translate
technical and scientific information into relevant information,” and because it can
provide an arena for “sharing expertise.” Perhaps even more importantly, EU decisionmakers consider interest groups crucial for “providing (them) with what (they) need to
make informed decisions” (Burson Marsteller, 2009: 11 & 23).
Frequency of interaction was measured on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “never”
and 5 being “very often.” Individual interaction with each institution is less important
then a given interest group’s overall frequency of interaction with all groups. As such, a
composite measure of interaction was calculated as the sum of the averages of an
interest group’s contact with decision-makers. It is important to add that this measure
does not disaggregate between different decision-makers in the various institutions, for
instance, between the committees of the Parliament and the MEPs themselves (cf. Eising,
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2007). This measure also does not account for differences between the EU’s main
decision-making institutions. For instance, it has long been held that the Commission is
the royal road to influence, and groups seeking access are advised to target this
institution. Nonetheless, following several treaty revisions that have empowered the
Parliament and the general importance of Council in the EU legislative process, the
Commission is certainly not the only target that interest groups have in their sights. All
of the EU’s decision-making institutions are slowly being recognized as important
lobbying targets.
The Independent Variable: Information Processing
As previously stated, information processing is conceived in four dimensions:
information gathering, information networks, information transparency, and
information transmission. In what follows I first operationalise information processing
in each dimension and then present a series of working sub-hypotheses for each of these
four dimensions.
Information Gathering
Information gathering refers to how interest groups monitor EU activities using a
multitude of information sources and how they generate information through research.
The key to information gathering is timing: knowing when and how to act and react in a
timely and efficient manner. Indeed, being too late or missing a window of opportunity
to provide information to decision-makers makes all of the other activities related to
information processing irrelevant. I measure information gathering with three
variables: monitoring EU activities using EU formal and informal information sources to
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keep up to date on EU activities and conducting research in order to respond to the
informational needs of decision-makers.
First, monitoring was tapped in the survey by asking respondents how much
importance they accord “monitoring EU activities.” The assumption is that interest
groups that place greater importance on monitoring are better able to keep up-to-date
on EU activities. Second, respondents were asked to identify the importance of twelve
different types of information sources. Following insights presented in chapter 4, I have
re-coded these different sources into three basic types: EU information, formal
information and informal information. The assumption, following from the results
presented in chapter 4, is that EU and informal information sources are an interest
group’s best bet for keeping up-to-date on EU activities. The use of formal sources, by
contrast, should prove less useful in this sense. Third, research was tapped by asking
groups about the importance of both “doing research” and “commissioning private
research studies.” A composite research variable was calculated as the sum of both types
of research. The assumption is that groups that place more importance on research will
be better prepared to respond to the informational needs of decision-makers than
groups that place less importance on research.
Information Networks
Drawing on the strength of weak-ties argument, information networks refer to
the frequency and diversity of contact that interest groups have with other
organisations. Frequent contact with “unlike” interest groups presumably nurtures the
sharing of new but largely unreliable information among network members. By contrast,
frequent contact with “like” interest groups presumably nurtures the flow of largely
redundant but reliable information among network members. Following Granovetter,
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the strength of weak-ties lies in the alleged informational advantage of new and novel
information. Networks are the social side of the information gathering processing in that
they play a key role in how groups are able to keep up to date on EU activities and act or
react in a timely and efficient manner. Chapter 5, however, presented evidence that
weak tie networks might not be as important for information circulation in the EU as
expected. Strong-tie networks are favoured because of the EU’s prioritization of network
representativeness and the nature of competition for information between interest
groups. This chapter provides a further opportunity to test the strength of weak tie
argument. Strong-ties and weak-ties were tapped by asking respondents about the
number and diversity of their contacts with other organisations as well as questions
about an interest group’s basic prioritization of strong-tie or weak-tie tendencies. A
strong-tie and a weak-tie measure were calculated using all of these data (interacting
with other groups because they have similar goals and interests or because they offer
new information, contacts and ideas as well as interacting based on the underlying
impulse to either make new contacts or maintain existing contacts).
Information Transparency
Information transparency relates to the basic conditions under which
information is transmitted to EU decision-makers. To what extent do decision-makers
receive accurate and complete information (reflecting interest group probity) and to
what extent do they receive erroneous and incomplete information (reflecting interest
group dissembling)? Rampant dissembling places considerable strain on the
information transmission process. It forces decision-makers to implement costly
oversight and monitoring procedures and creates a general sense of mistrust and
uncertainty in the interaction of interest groups and decision-makers. Information
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transmission under open and transparent conditions, where groups act in an honest
manner and provide complete and accurate information, nurtures the mutual benefits
that interest groups and decision-makers derive from interacting with each other.
Decision-makers receive policy-relevant information to help actualize policy outcomes,
and interest groups receive legitimate access to the decision-making process as well as a
reliable and cost-effective way to represent their interests at the EU level.
Transparency was tapped by asking interest groups about the reasons why they
provide information to decision-makers: To change the minds of decision-makers or to
support them. Changing minds implies a divergence between interest group and
decision-maker preferences. This same divergence is linked to increased interest group
dissembling. Supporting decision-makers implies a convergence of interest groups and
decision-maker preferences and is linked to increased interest group probity.
Information Transmission
Information transmission refers to the actual provision of information by interest
groups to decision-makers. It involves the various types of information being provided,
the tactics used to provide this information, and the decision-makers at which this
information is targeted. Importantly, both the type of information sent and the tactics
used to send it have been linked to interest group influence in the existing literature.
First, there is some evidence suggesting that the transmission of more types of
information might provide certain groups with an advantage over other groups (Eising,
2007; Baumgarter and Leech, 1997). It is really a matter of odds. Sending more
information increases a group’s chances of further interaction with decision-makers.
Second, the way information is sent has been linked to the persuasiveness and perceived
importance of the actual content of the information itself (Rasmusen, 1993). For
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instance, certain tactics (or modes of information transmission) have a particular
“attention-getting” value and can be used to effectively transmit otherwise “content-less
information” (Ibid.). Similarly, tactics can be used to enhance the message contained in
the information. The frequent use of costly tactics, for instance, increases the
persuasiveness, political salience, importance and even reliability of information
(Potters and van Winden, 1999). There is, then, a significant difference between
transmitting information via an email and doing so via a large-scale public event or
media campaign.
For information type, respondents were asked to identify how frequently they
provide decision-makers a range of different information types (see chapter 7 for a full
discussion of types, tactics and targets). Working from the assumption that groups that
are able to transmit more diverse types of information to decision-makers will have an
advantage over groups that cannot, I have calculated the sum of survey responses for all
information types to generate a composite measure.
A similar composite measure is calculated for tactics. The basic premise here is
that the tactic that is used has an effect on the persuasiveness, importance and salience
of the information being sent. Costly tactics increase the importance of the information
and lead decision-makers to take it more seriously. It is, however, very difficult to
definitively rank-order these different tactics in terms of costliness. For instance, how
and in which way is writing a letter more costly than participating in open consultation?
Using a greater number of tactics, however, is more costly then using fewer tactics and
can reasonably be expected to affect the importance and persuasiveness of information.
I therefore measure tactics by calculating the sum frequency of all channels used by a
given interest group.
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Lastly, the information asymmetry that defines the relationship between
interests and EU decision-makers persists in all of the EU’s main decision-making
institutions. As such, interests are faced with various targets that are open to
information transmission at different stages of the legislative process. As with
information type, the general rule of thumb for information targets is that more is
better. Frequently sending information to a greater number of decision-makers
increases a group’s odds of impacting policy whether it is early on in the proposal stage
of legislation or later, at the decision-making stages. A sum of the scores for all
responses provides a composite measure of information targets.
Following from the above, I posit the following set of sub-hypotheses:
Information
Gathering
H2
the more importance interest groups place on monitoring, the more frequently
they will interact with EU decision-makers
H3
the more EU and informal sources of information interest groups use to keep track
of EU activities, the more frequently they will interact with EU decision-makers
H4
the more importance interest groups place on research, the more frequently they
will interact with EU decision-makers.
H5
the more weak tie networks interest groups have, the more they will interact with
EU decision-makers
H6
the more importance interest groups place on providing information to “support”
decision-makers, the more frequently they will interact with EU decision-makers.
H7
the more types of information interest groups transmit, the more they will interact
with decision-makers
H8
the more tactics interest groups use to transmit information, the more they will
interact with EU decision-makers
H9
the more types of decision-makers at which interest groups target information, the
more frequently interest groups will interact with EU decision-makers.
Information
Networks
Information
Transparency
Information
Transmission
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Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis uses results from an online survey of interest
group representatives active in lobbying EU decision-makers. I examine the survey data
in two ways: first, through an OLS regression analysis and, second, using descriptive
statistics. The regression analysis tests my hypothesis using data from all 308
respondents without distinguishing among interest group types. OLS regression was
selected because survey data represent continuous variables where each observation is
from a single interest group. The descriptive statistics, by contrast, compare information
processing and interaction with decision-makers in six different types of interest groups.
OLS Regression Analysis
Table 13, below, displays results for an OLS regression analysis of thirteen
variables related to information processing and correlated with interest group
interaction with EU decision-makers.
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Table 13
Determinants of Interest Group Interaction with EU Decision-Makers
Variable
Importance of
Monitoring
EU Sources
Formal Sources
Informal
Sources
Research
Strong-ties
Weak-ties
Support
Decisionmakers
Change Minds of
DecisionMakers
Information
Types
Information
Tactics
Information
Targets
INFORMATION
PROCESSING
Constant
R-squared
Adjusted Rsquared
N
Model 1:
Information
Gathering
.06(.06)*
Model 2:
Information
Networks
Model 3:
Information
Transparency
Model 4:
Information
Transmission
Model 5:
Information
Processing
.17(.06)**
.16(.07)*
.2(.07)**
.1(.04)*
.1(.07)
.4(.08)**
.23(.05)**
.2(.04)*
.03 (.03)
.09 (.03)**
.67 (.03)**
.9(.08)**
.26(.33)
.25
.24
1.14 (.3) **
.13
.12
1.2(.2)**
.22
.21
.68 (.59)*
.75
.75
-.2(.2)
.41
.41
211
217
236
242
192
Note: entries are unstandardised OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.05; **p<0.01.
Model 1 tests information gathering measured as the importance of monitoring,
the use of EU, formal and informal information sources and the importance of research.
The results suggest that all four variables are important determinants of an interest
group’s frequency of interaction with decision-makers. As expected, the use of EU and
informal information sources appears to be a somewhat more important determinant
than formal information sources. EU and informal sources, as discussed in chapter 4,
provide interest groups with the timeliest and most reliable means for keeping up-todate on EU activities and anticipating the information needs of decision-makers. Formal
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sources, by contrast, while still important, tend to be less timely and provide more
redundant information to interest groups. Monitoring EU events and activities as well as
stressing research strategies also lead interest groups to more frequent interaction with
EU decision-makers. The results in model 1, then, provide support for hypotheses 2, 3,
and 4.
Model 2 tests the significance of information networks on interest group
interaction with EU decision-makers. There is a high statistical significance and a
positive correlation between weak-ties and an interest group’s frequency of interaction
with decision-makers. By contrast, strong-ties are negatively correlated with interaction
and the results are not statistically significant. The results lend support to the strength
of weak-ties hypothesis and the notion that such networks facilitate the efficient flow of
new and novel information between network members. The trust and reliability of
information that characterizes strong-tie networks appears to be a less important
determinant of interaction frequency. These results contrast with the results presented
in chapter 5 where it was shown how strong-tie networks tend to trump weak tie
networks in the EU. It is difficult to explain the ambiguity of the results. One potential
explanation that is not captured in chapter 5 is that networking is not only limited to
networking with other interest groups but also with decision-makers. Strong-tie and
weak-tie data is derived from two sources: an interest group’s interaction with “like”
and “unlike” interest groups as well as the extent to which interest groups prioritize
seeking out new contacts and the reasons why they do so (novel ideas, new information,
new contacts). This second set of indicators not only refers to contacts with other
interest groups but can potentially include contacts with decision-makers. Prioritizing
new contacts and the reasons for doing so might be part and parcel of interacting with
EU decision-makers. This might explain why weak-tie scores are highly correlated with
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interaction. Despite contrasting with the results in chapter 5, the results of the
regression analysis do lend support to hypothesis 5 and Granovetter’s strength of weakties hypothesis.
Model 3 tests information transparency and interest group interaction with EU
decision-makers. Unlike model 2, the results here do provide support for the findings
presented on transparency in chapter 6. Providing information to decision-makers in
order to support them is a better determinant of interaction than providing information
to change their minds. Interest group honesty and probity in the information
transmission process means that decision-makers need to be less concerned with issues
of information verification as well as oversight and monitoring practices. By the same
token, when decision-makers trust interest groups and the information they get, they
will be more open to interacting frequently with these interest groups. Hypothesis 6 is
borne out by these findings.
Model 4 tests information transmission and interest group interaction with
decision-makers. Results suggest that those groups using a greater variety of
information tactics and targets will also interact more frequently with decision-makers.
By contrast, the type of information being sent is statistically less important. Sending
more types of information does not appear to relate to more interaction with decisionmakers. It is, then, not the type of the information that is important, but rather the way
that this information is being sent. One interest group representative explained how
what you say is less important than how you say it: “the first thing you have to do is get
them to listen. You have to make your case in an attractive way” and this means
selecting tactics that transforms “didactic” information that makes “people switch off”
into something more appealing.122 For another interest group representative, the
122
Interview, John Monks, General Secretary, ETUC, Brussels, 15/11/2010.
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determinant of “if something will be on the table and how long it will be on the table is
the ‘how’. The more professional, the more serious you are presenting a topic, the higher
the success is.”123 It appears as if groups can dramatically enhance the persuasiveness,
salience and importance of the message by using different tactics to send information.
As such, the evidence for information transmission clearly bears out hypotheses 8 and 9
but not 7.
Finally, model 5 brings gathering, networking, transparency and transmission
together in a single information processing score. The regression results support the
primary hypothesis of this chapter. That is, interest groups that are better information
processers will also have more frequent interaction with EU decision-makers.
Descriptive Statistics
While the OLS regression results show some evidence that information
processing determines interest group interaction with EU decision-makers, they do not
distinguish between different types of interest groups. Moreover, they cannot say much
in terms of the assumed dominance of private interest groups at the expense of diffuse
interest groups in the EU (discussed above). To this end, descriptive statistics are used
to compare how variation in information processing in different types of interest group
correlates with interaction with EU decision-makers.
Graph 17, below, plots the dependent variable, frequency of interaction with
decision-makers and cumulative scores for information processing (bringing together
gathering, networks, transparency and transmission). All values are aggregate mean
scores organised by interest group type.
123
Interview, Dr. Marlene Wartenberg, Director, Vier Pfoten, Brussels, 19/11/2010.
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Graph 17, above, reflects the same correlation between information processing
and interaction with decision-makers that was established in the regression analysis.
Those groups that are more efficient information processers, in other words, tend to
have more frequent interaction with EU decision-makers. This trend holds for all six
interest group types. The same data, however, provide little support for elite pluralism
in the EU -- the assumption that private interest groups have more influence than
diffuse interest groups. In fact, companies and professional associations (private
interests) as well as trade unions and NGOs (diffuse interests) have remarkably similar
scores on both variables. The presumed superior resources of private interest groups
coupled with privileged access to the EU decision-making process based on the EU’s
need for so-called technical information do not appear to be important determinants of
influence. Resources, while important for effective information processing, are not
deterministically correlated to it. Moreover, as discussed in previous chapters, private
interest groups and diffuse interest groups (as well as consultancies and public
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authorities) all have access to the type of technical information the EU requires given the
regulatory dimensions of its main policies. Lastly, the results lend some support to the
effects of the Commission’s own mandate to consult widely with a diverse array of
interests groups in order to curb the potential for the systematic exclusion of some
interest groups. There appears, then, to be a diverse and fair representation of different
types of interest groups in terms of interest group influence.
Comparing interest group influence is best served by not only disaggregating
diffuse and private types of interest groups, but also by expanding the comparison to
include public authorities and consultancies. The results in Graph 17 suggest that public
authorities are, indeed, very similar to other types of interest groups in terms of both
information processing and interaction with decision-makers. Regions, cities,
municipalities and local authorities cannot be discounted as providing an important
informational service to EU decision-makers. By the same token, their effect on the EU
policy-making process needs to be considered alongside other interest groups.
Consultancies also cannot be overlooked. Indeed, as the results above indicated,
consultancies stand out on both variables: they have the highest scores for both
information processing and interaction with decision-makers. This should not be
interpreted as consultancies dominating the EU policy-making process. Consultancies,
after all, do not represent their own interests but rather the interests of others, ranging
from private to diffuse interests as well as the interests of public authorities. The high
scores of consultancies, therefore, reflects what Lahusen (2002) recognizes are the
professionalization of lobbying in Brussels. More and more, interest groups are seeking
out the services of consultancies in the EU. The ever-increasing complexity of EU politics
as well as the acknowledgment that interest representation starts with effective
monitoring and networking increases the value-added of consultancies. The more
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important question, given the high scores for consultancies, is which interest groups
consultancies have as clients – after all, as Lahusen points out, “clients say something
about the type of interests which consultancies tend to serve” (2002: 707). Lahusen’s
study found that consultancies tend to have a diverse client base, ranging from trade
associations, companies, NGOs and government institutions. However, when asked to
rank the importance of their clients, most consultancies placed private interests slightly
ahead of trade unions, governmental institutions and NGOs, reflecting what Lahusen
identified as the apparent “predominance of economic and industrial interests in the EU”
(707f). This ranking could be misleading in that the parameters of “importance” are not
clearly identified. Is importance based on amount of time spent with a client or the
amount of money the client generates for the consultancy or even the perceived
importance of a client in a given policy area? What is clear, however, is that
consultancies in the EU stress the formal and informal management of representative
issue coalitions – that is, pairing NGOs with private interests, for example, on a single
issue in order to cater to the EU’s strong preference for dealing with groups
representing a broad spectrum EU citizens from a wide number of EU Member States
(discussed in detail in chapter 5). The fact that many consultancies work as facilitators
of representative networks tempers the findings presented in Graph 17. It even provides
further support that interest group influence in the EU tends to be fair and diverse
across a wide range of interest group types. Again, the conditions for elite pluralism are
not substantially present in the EU.
Conclusion
This analysis has presented evidence that an interest group’s information
processing ability (understood as information gathering, information networks,
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information transparency and information transmission) is an important determinant of
how frequently interest groups interact with EU decision-makers. From the theoretical
framework developed above, this reflects a measure of interest group influence that is
more in step with current thinking about the nature and activities of interest groups,
less as agents of pressure and more as service bureaus to allies. Providing reliable and
efficient information to friendly decision-makers is key to exercising influence and those
groups that are more efficient information processors wield more influence than other
interest groups.
The comparative dimension of this study provides considerable evidence
challenging long-held assumptions about the dominance of private interest groups in
the EU. Rather than an elite pluralism, where only private interest groups influence the
EU decision-making process, my findings suggest a much more balanced and unbiased
influence coming from a wide range of different types of interest groups. Broadening the
comparison to public authorities and consultancies also provides some new insights into
the nature of interest groups influence in the EU. The results for public authorities show
them as comparatively efficient information processors, operating in many regards like
other interest groups. This result gives purchase to the vast literature on the role of substate actors in the EU legislative process (Hooghe and Keating 1994; Keating and
Hooghe, 1996; Moore, 2008). The high scores for consultancies do not suggest that
consultancies themselves have more influence than other groups. Rather, it underscores
the professionalization of interest representation in the EU as well as the importance of
information input from networks of groups that embody “representativeness.” More
generally speaking, the results of this analysis suggest not only that a theory of
information processing provides a new way of understanding interest group activities
but also that it provides new insights into the nature of the EU system of interest group
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intermediation. Insofar as the theory of information processing put forward in this
analysis does away with long-held misconceptions of interest group influence, it gives a
more accurate impression of the overall footprint of lobbying in the European Union.
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CHAPTER 9
Interest Groups and the Future of Associative Democracy in the EU
This analysis began with the basic insight that the assumptions we make about
the nature of interest group activity have a strong bearing on how we understand
interest group influence. Negative characterizations of interest group lobbyists as cheats
and con artists are not only ubiquitous in the media but seem to pervade much of the
scholarly work on interest group influence as well. Indeed, the extant research on
interest group influence has invariably been based on the idea that interest groups
employ (undue) pressure and purchase tactics in an effort to change the direction of
policy outcomes as well the minds of decision-makers. Yet, as I have argued throughout,
these assumptions are inconsistent with the rest of the interest group literature.
Research on influence seems to exist as a small and isolated niche area of study suffering
from a lack of cross-pollination with work on issues like group mobilization and
behaviour. There is indeed a large body of research suggesting that interest groups are
far less likely to lobby in order to change the minds of those who disagree with them
than to lobby those who already do. Interest groups, in other words, tend to lobby
friends, not foes. Understanding interest group influence in this new way challenges
how we think about both the causes and effects of influence. As such, I have argued that
interest groups represent their interests at the European level primarily by providing an
informational service to friendly, information-starved decision-makers in exchange for
legitimate access to the policy-making process. One of the central goals of this analysis
was to unpack and understand what this informational service entails and how it can be
related to interest group influence within in a comparative context. The theory of
information processing established in chapter 2 did just that.
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Rethinking interest group influence in terms of information processing not only
brings the study of influence in line with the rest of the interest group literature, but its
also leads us out of the methodological dead end that has dogged previous studies. The
empirical examination conducted here, then, provides a more accurate picture of
interest group influence in the EU. Moreover, the comparative nature of this analysis
tells us about the relative influence of different types of interest groups in the EU. It is
therefore time to take stock of these findings and ask how and why they matter within
the context of larger debates about interest group influence, EU intermediation of
interest group activity and the role of associative democracy in the EU.
Thus, by way of conclusion, the present chapter will serve several purposes. First,
it reviews the main empirical findings of this analysis organised around the four
dimensions of information processing: information gathering, information networks,
information transparency, and information transmission. Second, it examines what this
analysis adds to the related questions of fair and diverse interest group influence in the
EU and the issue of how interest groups (via associative democracy) assuage the EU’s
democratic deficit. Third, I examine the policy implications of these findings with
reference to recent developments in EU policy. Lastly, I look at the direction that future
research on interest group influence might take and how future studies can improve
upon the current analysis.
Taking Stock: Interests, Information and Influence
Information processing consists of four dimensions in two stages. The preadvocacy stage consists of information gathering and information networks and centres
on the preparatory work that interest groups are tasked with before engaging with
decision-makers. The advocacy stage consists of information transparency and
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information transmission and centres on the actual process of how interest groups
provide information to decision-makers. Very broadly speaking, more or less efficiency
in each of these dimensions adds up to more or less influence.
The chapter on information gathering focused on how interest groups monitor,
gather, filter and generate information. Keeping up-to-date on what is going in the EU
allows interest groups to anticipate the informational needs of EU decision-makers and
prepare to respond to these needs. Empirical analysis suggested that having information
at the earliest possible stage of the policy-making process, facilitated by efficient
monitoring and filtering practices as well as the use of informal and EU information
sources of information, was only part of the story. Having information that was reliable
and trustworthy was just as important. Groups that balanced information timeliness
with reliability were also those groups that were best positioned to anticipate and
respond to the informational needs of decision-makers.
Information networking picks up on the social dimension of the pre-advocacy
stage of information processing. It examined how information is shared among
networks of interest groups and, more specifically, how different network
characteristics either hinder or facilitate information sharing. To this end I tested
Granovetter’s strength of weak-ties hypothesis. Tight-knit groups of “like” members
nurture bonds of trust but tend to share largely redundant information. Diffuse groups
of “unlike” members tend to circulate novel information but lack the type of trust
necessary to ensure information reliability. Empirical analysis provided, despite
apparently optimal conditions for weak tie networks, little support for Granovetter’s
thesis. Rather, interest groups in the EU tend to participate in strong-tie networks of
tight-knit “like” members. The main explanation for this trend is the EU’s
encouragement for network representativeness. Representativeness implies, for most
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types of interest groups, forming an “industry position” among members of “like” groups
in strong-tie networks. Case studies of NGO, public authority and consultancy networks
fleshed out these differences.
Consideration of the advocacy stages of information processing began with an
examination of the basic conditions under which interest groups transmit information to
EU decision-makers. I examined the extent to which we could expect interest groups to
provide complete and accurate information as opposed to incomplete and erroneous
information to decision-makers. In other words, are groups honest or dishonest in their
provision of information? Importantly, this chapter provided the opportunity to test one
of the central underlying assumptions of this analysis: namely, that interest groups in
the EU tend to lobby to support friendly decision-makers rather than to change the
minds of foes. Empirical analysis provided compelling evidence that, indeed, interest
groups do tend to lobby to support friends in the EU and, on balance, provide complete
and accurate information to decision-makers. A robust system of oversight and
monitoring as well as a professionalized culture of interest group lobbying in the EU
explains these results.
Chapter 7 examined information transmission through a framework of
information types, tactics and targets. This chapter examined long-held assumptions
that interest group membership structure determines the types of information that
interest groups transmit to decision-makers, the tactics they use to do so and, finally, the
decision-makers that they target. Empirical analysis revealed that there is no firm or
fixed relationship between interest group membership structure and information
transmission. Rather, most interest groups in the EU can draw on a whole host of
different types and tactics and use them strategically depending on the target. Indeed,
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considerations of a target’s informational needs are the main determinant of the
strategic choice of type and tactics by most interest groups in the EU.
Finally, in chapter 8 I brought the four dimensions of information processing
together for a confirmatory analysis of interest group influence in the EU. Recasting the
effects of influence as “frequency of interaction with EU decision-makers” provided a
more accurate measure of influence than commonly used variables like “changed minds”
or “policy outcomes.” What is more, this new measure also provided a way out of the
methodological dead-end of measuring interest group influence. This chapter tested the
broad assumption that private interests have considerably more influence than diffuse
interests in the EU policy-making process. In other words, it tested the validity of claims
that the EU is best characterized as a form of “elite pluralism” where private interests
dominate at the expense of diffuse interest. Empirical analysis revealed little evidence of
elite pluralism in the EU. Influence from a variety of different interest groups seems to
be diverse and fair, with no single group dominating the EU policy-making process.
Assuaging the Democratic Deficit: a Case for Associative Democracy
A central concern raised at the beginning of this analysis was whether interest
groups might be able to assuage the EU’s democratic deficit. The failure of participatory
democracy in the EU, reflected in a decline in voter turnout, party membership, and
trust in politics and politicians, or what Maloney colourfully calls the “democratic
squeeze” (2009: 277), leaves the door open to other modes of citizen engagement and
voice. It was thus suggested that a robust form of associative democracy might best
address the conditions of a general “democratic malaise” in European politics, rampant
Euroscepticism in the EU Member States and the democratic deficit more generally
speaking. A long tradition of scholarship supports these views. First, the pluralist turn in
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the study of interest groups the 1940s and 1950s, detailed in the work of David Truman
(1951), Lazarsfeld et al., (1948), and Kornhauser (1959), “solidly anchored the idea that
interest groups are the cornerstone of every democratic political system” (Saurugger,
2008: 1275). More recently, a veritable cottage industry of scholarship has emerged
around “Tocqueville’s view that the virtue and viability of a democracy depends on the
robustness of its associational life” (Ibid.: 1285; see also Warren, 2001). While the role
of interest groups in the democratic process has long been acknowledged, the claim they
make regarding legitimacy needs to be addressed. What contribution do the results of
the present analysis make in this regard?
Two main concerns about interest group involvement in the policy-making
process frame the issue. First, unmediated interest group activity can lead to policy and
economic inefficiencies. Second, unlike participatory democracy, associative democracy
has been criticized for being too “hands off” and many groups appear to lack any form of
internal democratic structure. The legitimacy that interest groups can bring to the EU
depends on circumventing these problems. I will briefly discuss each with reference to
the empirical findings of the present study.
Owing much to the groundbreaking work of Mancur Olson, interest group activity
has been linked to both policy efficiency and economic performance. For Olson, if
interest groups are left to their own devices, affecting polices in their own favour rather
than for the aggregate welfare of all, the inevitable outcomes are inefficient policies that
led to economic decline and even state collapse. Olson’s hypothesis has found some
empirical support in the literature (Nardinelli et al., 1987; Tang and Hedely, 1998; Unger
and van Waarden, 1999) and continues to provide the starting point for many
considerations of interest group intermediation in governance systems. Thus, in the EU,
concerns about elite pluralism have produced a general scepticism about the role that
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interest groups might play in the policy-making process as well as the extent to which
associative democracy can help assuage the EU’s democratic deficit (see Saurugger,
2008). Of course, these assumptions about elite pluralism, in addition to largely going
untested, rely heavily on an erroneous and misleading conception of interest group
influence. Assessed in terms of an information processing theory of interest group
influence, by contrast, the real potential of associative democracy begins to emerge. As I
have demonstrated in this analysis, the influence exercised by interest groups in the EU
is, generally speaking, diverse and balanced. No small set of interest groups dominates
the process just as no important interest group is excluded. Thus, rather than elite
pluralism, interest group influence in the EU is perhaps characterized simply as a form
of “pluralism,” where a wide range of different groups are able to present their interests
at the European level without biased constraints or limitations.
Associative democracy, even when based on the diverse and balanced influence
of most interest groups, has still been criticized for its inability to provide an adequate
link between citizens and decision-makers. Groups act as poor ersatz channels for
citizen preferences not least because many groups have, to speak with Warleigh, poorly
functioning internal democratic processes (2000; 2001; see also Grande, 2000). Drawing
on de Tocqueville and, more recently, the social capital literature, interest group
legitimacy turns on the extent to which interest groups act as “schools of democracy,”
engaging citizens in politics and thus producing “‘better democrats’ via ‘in-group’ prodemocratic and pro-civic experiences” (Maloney, 2009: 278; see also Halpin, 2006). It is
for this reason that some scholars bemoan the rise and prevalence of so-called
“memberless groups” (Haplin, 2006) “credit card participation” (Richardson, 1995),
“Astroturf participation” (Cigler and Loomis, 1995) or “mail order groups” (Jordan,
Halpin and Maloney, 1997). These groups are understood as mere “locales where
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supporters have few, if any, internal democratic rights – campaigns, strategies, tactics
and policies are centrally formulated and supporters have no direct means of influence”
(Maloney, 2009). Without legitimacy, then, interest groups would be very hard pressed
to help assuage the EU’s democratic deficit.
I argue, following Maloney (2009), Halpin (2006) and O’Neill (2001), that these
concerns are largely unfounded. First, it seems unclear how interest groups would
escape the same general “democratic malaise” that has made itself felt in the crisis of
participatory democracy in the EU. Citizens are disengaged from interest group politics
just as they are disengaged from party politics. The difference, however, is that “citizens
find such limited involvement (in interest groups) appealing” (Maloney, 2009: 279). As
Loomis and Cigler argue, “for a relatively modest fee, citizens can make an ‘expensive
statement’ without incurring other organisational obligations” (2002: 24). “Credit card
participation” is easy. Further, it is unrealistic to hinge interest group legitimacy on
something that can theoretically only apply to a small number of interest group types.
Apart from typical “membership” groups, like NGOs and trade unions, many groups
simply cannot directly engage citizens because they either do not represent the interests
of citizens or they do not have members. For example, various interest groups represent
the interests of non-humans, the environment and future generations (i.e., the World
Wildlife Fund or Greenpeace) while others have clients (i.e., consultancies) or
stakeholders (private interests). None of these groups is adequately equipped to act as
“schools of democracy” in any clear and explicit way. The legitimacy of many interest
groups, as Halpin compelling argues, cannot simply be based on linking citizens to the
EU decision-making process (2006, see O’Neill, 2002).
Interest groups are not only too diverse to fulfil the “school of democracy”
criteria of legitimacy, but their functioning and purpose has changed in a way that
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further challenges the legitimacy they might gain through citizen engagement. The
traditional idea of interest groups mobilizing citizens or organising large-scale
demonstrations and petitions has given way to what has been recognized as a
“professionalization of lobbying” (Maloney, 2009). The modus operandi of a great many
interest groups is less participatory and more about democratic efficiency. This brings
us to the very heart of the present analysis. The language of lobbying in the EU, as
argued throughout this analysis, is not old-fashioned pressure and purchase tactics, but
rather about providing policy relevant information to decision-makers. This
information, being largely technical in nature, requires bringing experts on board,
gathering, filtering and sharing information as well as conducting research. Lobbying is
not about shouting slogans and waving banners. Instead, it is about approaching the
policy-making process as policy experts and speaking the language of decision-makers.
Importantly, professionalized lobbying in the EU is recognized in the different ways that
interest group involvement in the policy-making process has been institutionalized by
the EU. As seen in the previous chapter, this takes the form of open consultation, Social
Dialogue, expert committees and less formal information exchanges.
What then, if not internal democratic structures, accounts for interest group
legitimacy in associational democracy? I suggest that the policy relevant information
and expertise that interest groups bring to the table is the locus of interest group
legitimacy. When interest group influence is diverse and balanced, as the results of this
analysis suggest, then interest group input has a greater potential for ensuring efficient
policy outcomes. To speak with Cohen and Rogers: “certain forms of group organisations
play a central role in resolving problems of successful governance, not causing them”
(1994: 394). The point is that expecting more in terms of how interest groups engage
citizens is wrong-headed and overlooks the scope and severity of Europe’s “democratic
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malaise.” Attempts to redress the democratic deficit by nurturing citizen engagement
mean approaching the problem from the wrong angle. Increasing the powers of the
European Parliament, which many scholars envision as the cornerstone of greater EU
legitimacy (Wessels and Katz, 1999; Hix, 2008; Bache, Føllesdal, 2005; Lord, 1998),
cannot address the underlying problem of citizen disenchantment and disengagement.
As Mair convincingly argues, it is not just that European Parliament elections are
second-order elections, but that citizens are disengaged from politics even in so-called
first-order elections (2006). Interest groups provide a way to allay the democratic
deficit not only because they provide a new route for citizen engagement, but also
because they provide non-governmental policy inputs and policy expertise into the EU
policy-making process. Of course, this only works if these inputs remain diverse and
balanced across a wide range of different types of interest groups. Thus the real burden
for assuaging the democratic deficit falls to the EU institutions themselves. This means
two things in particular: continuing to encourage interest groups to provide their
informational inputs to EU decision-makers as well as carefully mediating these
processes in order to ensure that these inputs remain balanced and representative. But
what is the EU currently doing in this regard? What does the future of interest groups in
the EU look like?
Policy Implications
The future role of interest groups in the EU policy-making process has been
enshrined in 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The EU institutions, under the conditions of the
Treaty, will continue to “give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to
make known and publically exchange their views in all areas of Union action,” to
“maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative associations
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and civil society” and to “carry out broad consultations” with interest groups (European
Commission, 2007). New to the Lisbon Treaty, and marking a significant departure from
previous treaties, is the so-called “European Citizen’s Initiative” (ECI), a novel channel
for interest group involvement. These four points provide a framework for assessing the
future of interest group influence on the EU policy-making process as well as the role the
interest group might play in assuaging the EU’s democratic deficit. Two points in
particular need to be considered. First, how interest group input is continuing to be
mediated under the auspices of the European Transparency Initiative; second, how the
new European Citizen’s Initiative provides a novel route for interest group
informational input in the EU.
The European Transparency Initiative
Since its inception in 2005, the ETI has posed new and rigid constraints on
interest group activity in the EU. As outlined in detail in chapter 6, the ETI places
relations between interest groups and decision-makers in a highly institutionalized and
controlled setting. The future mediation of interest group influence depends largely on
the success of this initiative. Recent adjustments to the ETI, in particular to the
Commission’s Register of interest groups, reflect the EU’s continued commitment of fully
and legitimately integrating interest groups into the EU decision-making process.
Perhaps garnering the most media attention was the Commission and Parliament’s
recent commitment to create a joint Register and code of conduct, a type of “one-stop
shop” for lobbying and lobbyists in the EU (Europa Press Releases RAPID, 6.52010). Not
only will synching the two registers result in a more complete list of interest groups in
the EU, but many hope that the more stringent conditions of the Parliament’s Register, in
particular the fact that it is mandatory for all interest groups, will find a place in the new
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joint register (see Alter-EU, 2010). While we must wait to see the shape that the joint
Register will take, there are several key weaknesses and omissions in the ETI that might
threaten to undermine effective interest group intermediation in the EU.
The greatest hurdle facing the ETI is adequate coverage of interest groups listed
on the Register. A recent survey conducted by Alter-EU, a Brussels-based transparency
watchdog group, noted that about “60% of EU lobbying consultancies are still not
registered” on the Commission’s Register, and that nearly two years since the launch of
the Register. Others have noted the apparent “boycott” of the Register by think tanks,
consultancies and law firms. While the numbers for think tanks and consultancies have
since increased, law firms are still radically underrepresented on the register.
Inadequate coverage not only skews the overall impression of the interest group
footprint in Brussels, but also means that many interest groups are working beyond the
purview of the lobbying code of conduct and are not required to disclosure information
about their lobbying activity. What is more, these coverage problems would threaten to
undermine the success of the proposed joint Commission-Parliament Register.
But it is not just the issue of interest group coverage that seems to threaten the
success of the Register and the ETI. Unlike the American Lobbying Disclosure Act and
the Canadian Lobbyists Registration Act, to take two prominent examples, there is no
clear EU stance on the so-called “revolving door issue” – high-ranking EU officials who
move on to lucrative private sector lobbying jobs after their tenure. Suggestions put
forward include greater transparency of officials’ activities after leaving office as well as
a “three year cooling-off” period between posts (Alter-EU, 2010). Commissioners
already subscribe to a public “declaration of interests,” disclosing information about
previous posts and location of assets.124 There is also a mechanism for the public
For Commissioner disclosures of information, see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/interests/index_en.htm
124
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disclosure of gifts received by Commission officials.125 However, this appears hopelessly
inadequate. The list is available only in French and contains a mere twenty-one items at
the time of writing.
A somewhat less tangible but nonetheless significant challenge facing the ETI is
the absence of Commissioner Siim Kallas. As noted in the introduction, it was Kallas who
spearheaded the ETI as part of his job as Administration, Audit and Anti-Fraud
Commissioner, a post he left in 2010. The ETI was very much Kallas’ pet project and the
initiative threatens to run out of steam without him. The new Barroso Commission
(Barosso II), since entering office in 2010, has reassigned this portfolio to three separate
Commissioners: Algirdas Šemeta, Maros Šefčovič, and Janusz Lewandowski. The
problem, to speak with one MEP, is that none of them “seems to have been assigned
clear responsibility for increasing transparency concerning lobbying and for following
up the ETI in other areas” (European Commission, 2009c). There are already superficial
signs that without Kallas, the ETI will be relegated to the dustbin of other stalled and
forgotten Commission projects. For example, the current ETI website is a mere shadow
of the website under Kallas. Not only has the amount of information linked to the site
been radically reduced, but Kallas’ penchant for providing online forums for discussion
about the ETI has not been adopted by the new ETI caretakers. In effect, the ETI now
lacks the type of transparency it promulgates. It might also be that the EU’s interest, and
the original motivation for the ETI, was not regulating lobbying at all. Rather, the ETI
was an aftershock of the EU’s now waning enthusiasm for “good governance”
(Obradovic, 2009: 305).
The European Citizen’s Initiative
125
For the list of gifts the Commission receives see: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_20102014/pdf/cadeaux_recus_par_le_college3_fr.pdf
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The ECI might prove to be one of the most important advances in how groups
represent their interests at the European level. Emerging from what The Economist calls
a “barely debated clause” adopted in the final days of ironing out the details of the
Lisbon Treaty, the ECI draws out a new and direct route for citizens to affect EU
legislation (Economist, 2010). The conditions of the ECI are as follows. “An initiative
must be backed by at least one million citizens from at least one quarter of the (EU’s)
Member States” (European Commission, 2009b). While taking inspiration as much from
Californian-styled “popular initiatives” and Swiss-styled referenda, the ECI has been
hailed as nothing less than a bold “experiment in direct democracy” (Economist, 2010)
as well as a crucial step to generating a “European demos” (Nilssson and Westlake,
2010: 12). However, such a characterization radically misreads the conditions of the ECI.
At base, the ECI is not a vehicle for individual citizens but rather one for associations,
organisations, and groups that can muster up the type of organised support and funding
required for submitting a proposal. In other words, the ECI has less to do with direct
democracy than with a new and institutionalized form of associative democracy.
The Commission, in a 2009 Green Paper, has even noted the important place that
interest groups will play in the ECI. In the first instance, the Commission rejects the idea
that proposals “must be presented by citizens or by committees made up of a certain
number of citizens. The Commission considers that such a requirement may be too
burdensome at the EU level and would therefore prefer not to impose any restriction on
who may present an initiative – i.e., organisers can either be individual citizens or
organisations” (European Commission, 2009b: p11). Indeed, the Commission is fully
aware that “launching and organising a campaign for a proposed European citizens’
initiative will in most cases require support from organisations and/or funding” (ibid).
Clearly, not only has the Commission left the ECI open for interest group involvement,
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but the conditions of the ECI also make such involvement almost mandatory. The details
of the ECI are still being debated and the initiative has yet to be ratified by the Council
and the Parliament. However, if the ECI does enter EU legislation it will provide an
important new point of access for interest groups in the EU. The question that remains,
however, is how the EU will provide regulations in the ECI to ensure fair balanced access
to different types of interest groups. In its present form, the “no less than one million”
signatures condition is a far less important constraint than the requirement for
representation across EU Member States – a condition that would force interest groups
to seek out transnational support. The Commission also retains considerable agency in
blocking so-called “silly petitions” (like abolishing the EU, for instance) and promises
safeguards like requiring groups to “provide details about who is behind the petition”
(EurActiv, 6.5.2010). In this sense, the ECI follows the Commission’s open consultation
process: the Commission acknowledges the value of input from interest groups but
retains its privileged right and monopoly over the agenda setting process.
If interest groups are to bring new legitimacy to the EU policy-making process
then the EU will need to continue to ensure that interest group influence continues to be
diverse and balanced. Addressing the shortcomings of the ETI and setting out
responsible and workable conditions for the ECI would be a first step in this direction.
Directions for Future Research
The theory of information processing used to measure interest group influence in
the EU marks an important shift in how we understand influence as well as how we
measure it. The present analysis aimed to take the first few steps toward rethinking
influence in terms of information processing and measuring it empirically via elite
interviews and a large-scale online survey of interest groups. In its most ambitious
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moment, this analysis aimed to provide an assessment of interest group influence in the
EU from a comparative perspective including eleven different types of interest groups.
Several factors contributed to placing certain limits on the success of this project.
Assessing these limitations also provides the impetus for the direction of future research
taking up the task of assessing interest group influence in the EU and elsewhere.
One of the most conspicuous limits of the present analysis is the scope of
comparison across different types of interest groups. While initially setting out to gather
data on eleven different types of groups, survey response rates limited the analysis to
just six group types. Thus, academic institutions, chambers of commerce, religious
groups, think tanks and law firms were necessarily excluded from comparative analysis.
Future analysis would be well served by finding ways to collect data on these excluded
groups. The challenge here is that these groups are wary of self-identifying as “lobbyists”
or even interest groups -- the negative connotations attached to these terms make many
shy away from adopting such labels. While the present analysis avoided the term
“lobbying” and tried to use neutral terminology (like “organisation” rather than “interest
group”) in the survey and interviews, low response rates for several groups suggest that
more work needs to be done and/or new approaches tried. One simple solution is to not
have groups self-identify in the survey. Rather, future research could determine group
type independent of the group itself. Care, however, would need to be taken to ensure
anonymity of responses and accuracy in labelling groups. Indeed, some interest groups
appear to be hybrid public-private groups, for example, and would therefore be very
difficult to accurately label.
A second point of focus for future research is how different policy areas factor
into interest group influence. The present analysis bracketed off policy area in an effort
to increase the generalizability of results. Clearly, however, redistributive policy areas
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differ markedly from regulatory areas, attracting different types of interest groups and
different types of gathering, networking, transparency and transmission approaches.
Controlling for policy area, however, requires a much larger survey response rate and
thus data set. The challenge is not only to assess which groups are active in which areas.
The bigger issue is that most groups are active in many different areas at the same time.
Disentangling types, tactics and targets for each area as well as the “intensity” of a
group’s activities in a single area would be very challenging. Indeed, case studies and
process tracing might be best suited to bringing a consideration of policy area into a
study of information processing.
A third issue is drawing out clearer linkages between interest group resources,
issues of collective action and information processing. In chapter 2 I maintained that an
information processing theory of interest group influence does not mean that resources
and collective action simply do not matter. Rather, information processing opens up
what is otherwise the black box of influence; it explores that intermediate step after
resources and collective action get translated into information processing. Clearly,
having more resources and a greater ability to overcome collective action problems can,
but does not necessarily, lead to more efficient information processing. For instance, a
group can be resource rich but not allocate these resources to gathering, networking and
transmitting information. But what are the causal mechanisms that transform resources
and a capacity for collective action into better information processing? Again, the
answer lies in case studies and, in particular, process tracing. While the present analysis,
based primarily on a large-N study, has mapped out and tested the general parameters
of an information processing theory of influence, future research might carry out smallN research teasing out the links between resources, collective action and information
processing.
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Lastly, the present analysis has limited itself to interest group influence at the
European level. Thus, I considered how interest groups exact influence in the
Commission, Parliament, Council, Coreper, CoR and EESC. While going beyond most
studies of interest groups in the EU, typically including only the Commission and
Parliament, I did not consider other, non-EU lobbying routes. Interest groups can lobby
at the EU level without directly approaching EU decision-makers. Clearly, interest
groups can lobby the EU through “national routes.” A group, for instance, could provide
information to national decision-makers who would, in turn, use this information at the
European level (most typically in the Council). Making things somewhat more
complicated are those groups that take a “sub-national” route to lobbying at the EU level.
Many public authorities, for instance, pursue their interests first through sub-national
governmental structures at home and are only subsequently taken to the Council or, in
some cases, the CoR. While it might be argued that these different levels of access
provide more opportunities for interest groups (Pollack, 1997; Kohler-Koch, 1997),
some scholars have pointed out that the complexity of such a polycentric, multi-level
system poses serious challenges for most interest groups (Grande, 2000). Clearly,
accounting for these non-EU routes would be a central component of any future
research. Another issue would be to compare how information processing differs
between the different routes. How do gathering and networking activities differ
between EU and non-EU routes? Further, to what extent does the strategic use of types,
tactics and targets depend on the different routes?
Conclusion
The empirical analysis presented here provides compelling evidence that interest
group influence is the EU cannot be accurately described as a type of elite pluralism.
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Moreover, the balanced and representative influence of groups in the EU lends purchase
to the idea that interest groups are the key to assuaging the EU’s democratic deficit. The
policy implications are important. Legitimacy gained through interest group
involvement in the policy-making process depends less on the democratic character of
groups and more on the EU’s ability to ensure that interest group input remains diverse
and balanced. In short, this means negotiating a difficult balance between continuing to
encourage interest group input while mediating it as well. As it stands, the ETI is not
well suited to this task. Changes will need to be made to the interest group Register and
a new source of momentum will need to be given to the initiative in Kallas’ absence.
While the ECI provides a new point of access for interest groups, it is still unclear how it
will continue to encourage diverse and balanced interest group input in the EU policymaking process.
Thinking about interest group influence in terms of information processing has
taken us some distance from existing work on influence. Influence is no longer
conceived of in necessarily conflictual terms and many of the more pejorative
connotations associated with lobbying seem less applicable to the study of interest
group influence. Indeed, this present analysis suggests that interest groups and decisionmakers enjoy a much more symbiotic relationship that turns on the exchange of
information. Surprisingly, while the extant literature has long given a privileged place to
information in the lobbying process, our understanding of the process has been very
limited. As I have argued throughout, understanding influence means understanding the
role that information plays in this relationship. This took us through a consideration of
how information is gathered, filtered and generated, how it is shared and how it is
finally transmitted from interest groups to EU decision-makers. Unpacking the
- 239 -
information exchange process has revealed the true nature of interest group influence in
the EU.
- 240 -
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APPENDIX: Sample Questionnaire
“Interests, Information and Influence in the European Union.”
Question 1
From the list below, which category best describes your organisation?
 NGO / Association of NGOs
 Company
 Professional Association
 Trade Union
 Law Firm
 Public Affairs Consultancy
 Think-tank
 Academic Organisation
 Chamber of commerce
 Representation of religion, church, and communities of conviction
 Association of public authorities (regions, cities, municipalities)
 Other, please specify
Section 1: Activities
Question 2
How important are the following activities to your organisation? Please indicate
importance on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being 'not at all important' and 5 being 'very
important').
 monitoring EU activities
 Influencing EU decisions
 Securing EU funds
 Doing research
 Commissioning private research studies
 making new contacts
 maintaining existing contacts
Section 2: Information Sources
Question 3
Keeping track of what’s going on in the EU can be important, and information about the
EU’s current activities can come from different sources. How important are the
following sources of information for keeping track of EU activities?
 newspapers (print and online)
 newsletters
 television news
 radio news; books / magazines
 the Commission’s work programme
 EU press releases
 White Papers
 Green Papers
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 conferences / exhibitions
 face-to-face meetings
 word of mouth
Section 3: Information
Question 4
Sometimes, organisations like your own provide information to EU decision-makers.
"Information" can mean different things and can take many different forms. In general,
how frequently does your organisation provide the following types of information to
EU decision-makers? Please indicate frequency on a scale of 1 to 5 (with 1 being 'never'
and 5 being 'very often').
 Information about public opinion
 Legal information
 Information about the feasibility of implementing a proposal
 Information about the economic impact of a proposal
 Information about the social impact of a proposal
 Information that makes technical or scientific data understandable / relevant
Question 5
There are also different ways that information can be provided to EU decisionmakers. In general, how frequently does your organisation provide information to EU
decision-makers in the following ways?
 Face-to-face meeting
 Write a letter
 Write an email
 Make a phone call
 Start a media campaign
 Host a public event
 Participate in the ‘open consultation’ process
Question 6
There can be different reasons for providing EU decision-makers with information.
In general, how frequently does your organisation provide information to decisionmakers for the following reasons?
 to support the position of EU decision-makers
 to change the minds of EU decision-makers
 to offset the influence of other organisations
 EU decision-makers request information from my organisation
Question 7
In general, how frequently does your organisation provide information to EU decisionmakers in the following EU institutions?
 European Commission
 European Parliament
 Council of Minister
 Coreper
 Committee of the Regions
 European Economic and Social Committee
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Section 4: Information and Contacts
Question 8
Often, when organisations like your own are pursuing their interests and goals they will
be in contact with other organisations. "Contact" means any kind of interaction.
In general, how frequently is your organisation in contact with the following types of
organisations?
 NGO / Association of NGOs
 Company
 Professional Association
 Trade Union
 Law Firm
 Public Affairs Consultancy
 Think-tank
 Academic Organisation
 Chamber of commerce
 Representation of religion, church, and communities of conviction
 Association of public authorities (regions, cities, municipalities)
Question 9
How important are the following factors in determining with whom your
organisation interacts? Please indicate importance on a scale from 1 to 5.
 we have similar interests and goals
 they have new or novel ideas
 they have information that we do not have
 they have access to contacts that we do not have access to
Question 10
Finally, I would like to ask you about how frequently your organisation is in contact with
the main EU institutions. Again, contact means any kind of interaction.
 European Commission
 European Parliament
 Council of Minister
 Coreper
 Committee of the Regions
 European Economic and Social Committee
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