This paper has been prepared for presentation at the
24th World Congress of Political Science - “Politics in a World of Inequality”
International Political Science Association
23 to 28 July 2016, Poznan, Poland
POLITICAL DYNASTIES IN A DEMOCRACY
Why Political Families Exist and Persist in the United States of America
Bryan T. Cranston
PhD Candidate, Swinburne University of Technology (Melbourne, Australia)
[email protected]
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
2
ABSTRACT: In its pursuit of liberty and determination to prevent the rise of a political monarchy, the United
States’ developed a highly democratic system of government that may have inadvertently fostered pseudoaristocratic tendencies in enabling an oligarchy. The political dynamics and lived experiences of its ostensibly
democratic development appear at odds with the nation’s founding principles. In America’s úber-democracy,
voters elect almost every conceivable public office; yet the democratic process often contradicts its egalitarian
foundations. One such contradiction is the prevalence of political elites within the public sphere, and the
hegemonic role of America’s political dynasties. The existence and prevalence of political families speaks to the
enduring power of pedigree in a society that supposedly apportions democratic authority based on merit.
The persistence of political families in a democratic country raises concerns about imperfections in popular
representation. My research focuses on twelve US case study families with at least four successive generations
in the direct line elected to state or federal office. I will outline what I have found thus far that accounts for the
perpetuation of these families throughout the decades; why political dynasties so entrenched in American
politics; and what causes one dynasty to ultimately decline, only to have their place taken by another. This
examination aims to understand why American voters elect members of the same family to public office,
generation after generation what this ultimately tells us about the value of class merit in American democracy.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
3
The United States of America was born of revolution against a monarchical government, yet despite
rebelling against the dynastic rule of the British Empire and being founded upon a beacon of egalitarianism
with the Declaration of Independence stating that all men are created equal, Americans have proved
remarkably tolerant of political dynasties. The persistence of political families holding the reins of power in
a democratic country raises concerns about imperfections in popular representation. What factors enable
some families to proliferate in politics, what accounts for their perpetuation, and why do political dynasties
appear entrenched in American politics?
Democratic theory presumes that merit, competence and consent through free and fair elections are the
hallmarks of political leadership.1 The principle of ‘competitive theory of democracy,’ can be viewed as the
institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.2 Yet the dynastic nature of politics is not a new
notion. Classical theorists such as Mosca and Michels have long written about the persistence of political
elites, and the disproportionate social and political power held by a few. 3 Scholars have long considered
the principle of elite theory in relation to democratic politics; however, the idea of a ‘dynastical democracy’
is a contradiction, so how can dynasties exist and flourish in a democracy? 4
Whilst there is a plethora of literature devoted to biographical studies of prominent American political
families, few studies have attempted multi-family analyses to identify commonalities that may determine
reasons for dynastic success in politics.5 Hess noted that the scholarship of politics plays little attention to
the phenomenon of dynasties, and fifty years on, little has changed.6 Dal Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder, and Smith
concurred on the scarcity of academic research on the link between family relations and political power,
noting that the persistence of dynasties in developed countries requires further examination. 7 Despite the
familial transmission of political power within the United States receiving little formal scholarly review,
there has been greater attention paid to the study of non-US dynastic politics, particularly in South
America,8 the Philippines,9 India,10 and Japan.11
1
Paschalis A. Arvanitidis and Nicholas C. Kyriazis, ‘Democracy and Public Choice in Classical Athens’, Peace Economics, Peace Science, &
Public Policy 19, no. 2 (August 2013): 213–48; Mijat Damjanovic, ‘Discourses on Democracy’, Megatrend Review 10, no. 1 (2013): 445–
61; Serhat Kurt, ‘Conducting Democratic Evaluations Where Democratic Principles Are Not Always Practiced’, Journal of
MultiDisciplinary Evaluation 8, no. 17 (January 2012): 25–32; Joseph Siegle, ‘Overcoming Dilemmas of Democratisation: Protecting
Civil Liberties and the Right to Democracy’, Nordic Journal of International Law 81, no. 4 (2012): 471–506; Milan W. Svolik, ‘Learning
to Love Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the Success of Democracy’, American Journal of Political Science 57, no. 3 (July
2013): 685–702.
2
Stephen Welch, Hyperdemocracy (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 36.
3
Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica), ed. Arthur Livingston, trans. Hannah D. Kahn (New York, NY: McGrawHill, 1939); Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy (Piscataway,
NJ: Rutgers University, 1999).
4
Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica); Pareto Vilfredo, The Rise and Fall of the Elites (Totowa, NJ: Bedminster Press,
1968).
5
Jean H. Baker, The Stevensons: A Biography of an American Family (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co, 1996); Peter Collier, The
Roosevelts: An American Saga (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995); Lillian Rogers Parks, The Roosevelts: A Family in Turmoil
(New York, NY: Prentice Hall, 1981); Ishbel Ross, An American Family: The Tafts, 1678-1964 (Cleveland, OH: World Publishing Co.,
1964).
6
Stephen Hess, America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy (New York, NY: Doubleday & Co, Inc, 1966), 1.
7
Ernesto Dal Bo, Pedro Dal Bo, and Jason Snyder, ‘Political Dynasties’, The Review of Economic Studies, no. 76 (2009): 82; Daniel
Markham Smith, ‘Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies’ (University of California, San Diego, 2012), 203.
8
Daron Acemoglu, ‘Oligarchic Versus Democratic Societies’, Journal of the European Economic Association 6, no. 1 (March 2008): 1–44;
Daron Acemoglu and James. A Robinson, ‘Persistence of Power, Elites, and Institutions’, American Economic Review 91, no. 1
(2008): 267–93; Roderic A. Camp, ‘Family Relationships in Mexican Politics: A Preliminary View’, The Journal of Politics 44, no. 3
(1982): 848–62; Martin Rossi A., ‘Political Dynasties: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Argentina’ (Universidad de San Andres,
2009); Martin Rossi A., ‘The Causes of Political Dynasties in Democratic Countries’’ (Universidad de San Andres, 2009); Martin
Rossi A., ‘The Origins of Political Power: The Role of Wealth’ (Universidad de San Andres, 2010); Martin Rossi A., ‘Wealth and
Political Power: Evidence from the Foundation of Buenos Aires’, in 2011 Parallel Meetings (European Economic Association &
Econometric Society, Oslo, Norway, 2011).
9
Edsel Beja, Jr et al., ‘Inequality in Democracy: Insights from An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress’
(Ateno de Manila University, Asian Institute of Management, 15 July 2012); Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, ‘The Politics of “Public Opinion”
in the Philippines’, Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29, no. 4 (2010): 97–118; Pablo Querubin, ‘Family and Politics: Dynastic
Persistence in the Philippines’ (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010), http://economics.mit.edu/files/6365; Pablo Querubin,
‘Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines’ (Harvard Academy for International
Studies, Harvard University, 2011); Rollin F. Tusalem and Jeffrey J. Pe-Aguirre, ‘The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective
Democratic Governance: Evidence From the Philippines’, Asian Politics and Policy 5, no. 3 (July 2013): 359–86.
10
Mark R. Thompson, ‘Asia’s Hybrid Dynasties’, Asian Affairs 43, no. 2 (2012): 204–20.
11
Yasushi Asako, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, and Michiko Ueda, ‘Dynastic Legislators and Electoral Competition: Theory and Evidence from
Japan’ (Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2010).
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
4
Why do political dynasties appear entrenched in American politics, and what causes one dynasty to
ultimately decline, only to have their place taken by another? America’s first vice president, John Adams,
acknowledged a natural aristocracy when he suggested that although some may view aristocrats as being
wise and good, in practice those who were rich, beautiful and well born were more apt to succeed, writing,
“What chance have Talents and Virtue in competition with Wealth and Birth? And Beauty?”12 Adams
believed in these five pillars of aristocracy, writing in 1787, “Go into every village in New England and you
will find that the office of justice of the peace has descended from generations to generation in three or
four families at most.”13
Most research in the field identifies the following features as successful requirements for dynastic success:
name recognition; the value of a political education by virtue of growing up in a political household; and an
established political network of friends, supports and donors. 14 However, not all children of politicians enter
public life, and if they do, why do dynasties rarely exceed three generations? My research aims to examine
what factors contribute to longevity in twelve case study families whose political success extends beyond
three generations, by documenting and analysing their experiences and reasons for success in order to
identify what is distinctive about these dynasties, and what this may ultimately tell us about the value of
merit in American politics. This examination will contribute empirical and theoretical insights through an
analysis of these case studies within the broader concept of political inequality in a democracy, and
contribute to the fields of elite democracy versus participatory democracy, majoritarianism, and pathdependency theory. My study is in three parts: identification of case study dynasties; biographical
examination of identified dynasts; and analysis of commonalities, trends, and traits to explain why these
identified families succeeded in perpetuating a more durable political dynasty. This study aims to fill a gap in
the available research of how a family’s political estate can be transferred across at least four generations.
I.
BACKGROUND
In 1896, Mosca wrote, “every class displays the tendency to become hereditary, in fact if not in law.” 15 Why
then should the political class be exempt? In 1963, Hofstadter suggested that egalitarianism was a major
cause of social anti-intellectualism when he argued that although men often described as intellectual elites
founded the United States, the rise of populist democracy eroded the nation’s governing strength. 16 More
recently, Beja, et al, stated that “undeveloped democratic institutions could be associated with weak
political participation, and thus produce … political dynasties.”17 The United States has arguably the most
highly developed democratic governance structure in the world, yet throughout its history has continually
produced dynasties; directly challenging Beja’s assertion. Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder found that political
power is self-perpetuating, and politicians who held elective office for more than one term in Congress
were far more likely to have a relative serve in Congress in the future, suggesting that political power in
democracies can in fact become inheritable.18 In 2014, Larry Diamond wrote that from 1999 to 2011, almost
12
Lester J. Cappon, The Adams-Jefferson Letters. The Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson & Abigail & John Adams.
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina, 1959), 371.
13
Richard Brookhiser, America’s First Dynasty: The Adamses, 1735-1918 (New York, NY: The Free Press, 2002), 5.
14
Robert Biersack, Paul S. Hernson, and Clyde Wilcox, ‘Seeds for Success: Early Money in Congressional Elections’, Legislative Studies
Quarterly 18, no. 4 (November 1993): 535–51; David T. Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United
States (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1990), 89; Alfred B. Clubok, Norman M. Wilensky, and Forrest J. Berghorn, ‘Family
Relationships, Congressional Recruitment, and Political Modernization’, The Journal of Politics 31, no. 4 (1 November 1969): 1036,
doi:10.2307/2128357; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, ‘Political Dynasties’; Brian D. Feinstein, ‘The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in
Congressional Elections’, Legislative Studies XXXV, no. 4 (November 2010): 575; John A. Ferejohn, ‘On the Decline of Competition in
Congressional Elections’, The American Political Science Review 71, no. 1 (March 1977): 172; Donald Philip Green and Jonathan S.
Krasno, ‘Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections’, American
Journal of Political Science 32, no. 4 (November 1988): 884; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy; Cindy D.
Kam and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, ‘Name Recognition and Candidate Support’ (Centre for the Study of Democratic Politics,
Princeton University, 28 April 2011), www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Kam04282011/Kam04282011.pdf; Donn M. Kurtz, ‘Inheriting a
Political Career: The Justices of the United States and Louisiana Supreme Courts’, The Social Science Journal 32, no. 4 (1995): 441;
Hilde Van Liefferinge, Carl Devos, and Kristof Steyvers, ‘What’s in a Name? Current Effects of Family Politicization on Legislative
Candidates’ Career Start in Belgium’, The Social Science Journal 49 (2012): 220; Keena Lipsitz, ‘Why Tough Campaigns Are Good for
Democracy’, in New Directions in American Politics (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 162; Julian N. Marewski et al., ‘Do Voters Use
Episodic Knowledge to Rely on Recognition?’, in Proceedings of the 31st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (31st
Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., 2009), 2232,
http://141.14.165.6/CogSci09/papers/523/paper523.pdf; Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica), 61–62; Larry J. Sabato
and Howard R. Ernst, Encyclopedia of American Political Parties and Elections (New York, NY: Infobase Publishing, 2007), 235; Smith,
‘Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies’.
15
Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica).
16
Richard Hofstadter, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (New York, NY: Random House, 1963), 407.
17
Beja, Jr et al., ‘Inequality in Democracy: Insights from An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress’, 2.
18
Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, ‘Political Dynasties’, 138.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
5
twenty percent of the world’s democracies ceased operating under democratic rule, which was almost
double the rate of the preceding twelve years.19 He accounts for this decline in democracy as the world’s
most popular system of government on the basis that formal democratic institutions have not sufficiently
reined in undemocratic and corrupt informal practices, and that nepotism has seemingly vitiated the rule of
law and the quality of governance and politics. 20
Elections are the democratic tool by which citizens choose delegates to represent their interests based on
merit; however, this assumes that voters make informed decisions in the polling booth based on
knowledge of the candidate. Casey suggests that either consciously or unconsciously, voters often
substitute merit in favour of candidates with superior political resources. 21 In 2013, Crowley and Reece
found that incumbent US governors who were ineligible to run for re-election, made policy decisions
designed to favour accountability to voters in order to support potential future dynastic family members. 22
Although scholars have examined the factors behind individual electoral success, there is a significant gap
in the literature as to why voters continually support members of the same family for public office.
Feinstein is one of the few to examine the voter impact of dynastic candidates, and found that in US
congressional elections, dynastic politicians received on average, an additional four percent of the public
vote.23 Asako, Matsubayashi and Eueda’s 2012 study into the implications of dynastic politicians on public
policy in Japan also considered the consequences of political dynasticism, including electoral
competitiveness.24 Although their study makes no analysis of why voters elect dynastic legislators, Asako,
Matsubayashi and Eueda concluded that dynastic politicians have a higher probability of electoral success,
and obtain a higher vote share than non-dynastic candidates. All of this is concerning in a democracy,
because as Mills wrote, “As the institutional means of power and the means of communication that tie
them together have become steadily more efficient, those now in command of them have come into
command of instruments of rule quite unsurpassed in the history of mankind.” 25 Does this therefore mean
that the United States is in fact a democracy without meritocracy?
Diamond suggests that citizen disengagement from the electoral process is the primary cause of this
decline in democracy, writing that rising levels of education, income and access to information are factors
that undermine the legitimacy of non-democratic rule.26 However, although this suggestion may appear
valid, it may not necessarily to apply to the United States, where despite its citizens being amongst the
most educated and wealthy in the world, America’s apparent love for dynastic politicians has more in
common with what Diamond suggests is the primary factor that contributes to democratic decline - loyalty
to leaders.27 Greer suggested in his discussion of American democracy that, “What was once one of the
world’s liveliest and most robust democratic systems has lapsed into a sham democracy uncomfortably
reminiscent of the old Eastern Bloc states, where everyone had the right to vote for a preselected list of
candidates who all support the same thing.”28 Contrary to Diamond’s view a more educated population will
see democracy become more entrenched, Zaller concluded that that despite the United States comprising
an educated electorate, the population is less inclined to challenge entrenched government policy, and that
despite its importance in understanding voter behaviour, is a neglected area of scholarly research.29
Winters and Page similarly described the United States as an oligarchy, stating that the US has engineered a
political system of “extreme political inequality.” 30 Barker too suggests that the American political system is
radically inegalitarian.31 All of these views contrast with participatory democratic theory, which contends
that widespread participation of the citizenry is fundamental to democratic legitimacy.
A principle that guided the establishment of American democracy was a fear of unelected government and
a ruling class; thus, the Founding Fathers ensured the power of democratic government was spread
amongst many, adhering to the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. In an egalitarian system, Corbin
19
Larry Jay Diamond, ‘The Next Democratic Century’, Current History 113, no. 759 (2014): 8.
Ibid., 9.
21
Kimberly L. Casey, ‘Political Families in American Electoral Politics’ (University of Missouri - St. Louis, 2008), 14.
22
George R. Crowley and William S. Reece, ‘Dynastic Political Privilege and Electoral Accountability: The Case of the U.S. Governors,
1950-2005’, Economic Inquiry 51, no. 1 (January 2013): 735–46.
23
Feinstein, ‘The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections’.
24
Asako, Matsubayashi, and Ueda, ‘Dynastic Legislators and Electoral Competition: Theory and Evidence from Japan’.
25
C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford, UK: Oxford University, 1956), 23.
26
Diamond, ‘The Next Democratic Century’, 10–11.
27
Ibid., 9.
28
John Michael Greer, Decline and Fall: The End of Empire and the Future of Democracy in 21st Century America (Gabriola Island, Canada:
New Society Publishers, 2014), 197.
29
John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 305, 308–9.
30
Jeffrey A. Winters and Benjamin I. Page, ‘Perpectives on Politics’, Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 4 (December 2009): 731–51.
31
Derek W.M. Barker, ‘Oligarchy or Elite Democracy? Aristotle and Modern Representative Government’, New Political Science 35, no. 4
(2013): 549.
20
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
6
and Parks questioned how democracy could produce an apparent oligarchic ruling class, which seems to
dominate American politics, and Tocqueville suggested that democracy eventually empowers collective
institutions rather than individuals.32 Is it possible that America’s system of democracy is actually the tool
that empowers oligarchic tendencies? In a democracy, do political dynasties result in lesser-qualified
individuals winning elected office? The persistence of political families holding the reins of power in a
democratic country raises concerns about imperfections in popular representation, but what accounts for
the perpetuation of these families throughout the decades?
Studies of political elites have argued that even within a democracy, a society’s ruling class is able to
perpetuate its power over the less organised masses, and that the presence of political kinship in politics
could be interpreted as a lack of modernity of a democracy.33 Tocqueville warned that modern democracy
might be adept at inventing new forms of tyranny, because radical equality could lead to an expanding
bourgeoisie, and that such a scenario could lead to a system of ‘soft despotism’. 34 Soft despotism is an idea
whereby a country is governed by a network of small, complicated rules, which is not necessarily obvious to
the people. Mills believed that American democracy was constructed upon a theoretical basis of
homogeneity, but I assert that it represents more of a gradation of power. 35 Despite the constitutional
rejection of hereditary power, and the ideal of democratic meritocracy, families are entrenched in American
politics, which has led to the legitimation of families as an enduring political force. As Smith noted in 2012,
“Studies of political elites have often argued that the ruling class of a society is able to perpetuate its power
over the less organised masses, even within [a] democracy.”36 What accounts for the perpetuation of these
families throughout the decades?
II.
DEFINITION
In the study of politics, there is no standard for what constitutes a political dynasty. Hess defined a dynasty
as any family with at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office, whilst Dal Bo, Dal Bo
and Snyder defined a dynastic legislator as one who belongs to a family that had previously placed a
member in Congress.37 Clubok, Wilsenky and Berghorn examined members of Congress who were related
as sons, grandsons, nephews, brothers or first cousins. 38 Smith offered a more liberal definition with just
two or more family members serving in national office; whilst Casey similarly defined a political family as
two or more persons related by blood or marriage, in a first or second generation, either as a candidate or
elected office holder at the local, state or national level.39 These varied interpretations demonstrate that
there is no clear definition of what constitutes a political dynasty; however, I believe there is confusion
between a political family and a political dynasty.
The Oxford Dictionary defines ‘dynasty’ as, “A line of hereditary rulers of a country.” 40 For my study, I
define a political dynasty as having at least four successive generations in the direct line, elected to state or
federal office. Whilst Bill and Hillary Clinton could be considered a political family, my definition does not
consider them a dynasty as their political lineage extends to a single generation. The definition of dynasty is
a critical element in this study as it frames the scope of the examination: multi-generational, direct family
line, scope of office, and a strict interpretation of elected.
Whilst Hess required at least four members of the same family, he did not specify a multi-generational
requirement, which would therefore allow a family with a single generation of four siblings in elected office
32
David Corbin and Matt Parks, ‘Hyper-Democracy and Progressive Oligarchy’, The Federalist, 25 August 2014,
http://thefederalist.com/2014/08/25/hyper-democracy-and-progressive-oligarchy/; Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America,
trans. Henry Reeve, 1998th ed. (Hertfordshire, UK: Wordsworth, 1835).
33
Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1961); Robert A. Dahl, On
Political Equality (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 2006); Mills, The Power Elite; de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.
34
de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 362.
35
Mills, The Power Elite, 18.
36
Smith, ‘Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies’, 6; Vilfredo, The Rise and Fall of the Elites; Michels, Political Parties: A
Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy; Mosca, The Ruling Class (Elementi Di Scienza Politica); Mills,
The Power Elite.
37
Stephen Hess, America’s Political Dynasties (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 1; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, ‘Political
Dynasties’, 115–42.
38
Clubok, Wilensky, and Berghorn, ‘Family Relationships, Congressional Recruitment, and Political Modernization’, 1035–62.
39
Smith, ‘Succeeding in Politics: Dynasties in Democracies’, 9.
40
‘Dynasty: Definition of Dynasty’, Oxford Dictionary (British & World English), 2014,
www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/dynasty?q=dynasty.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
7
to be called as a dynasty; for example, the Washburn family.41 It is my opinion that specifying multigenerational political lineage provides a more thorough examination of dynasty, rather than family, through
the idea of pseudo-aristocratic lineage in the guise of democracy. My definition encompasses only those
elected family members in the direct line, ie grandfather-son-grandson, and does not include indirect family
members, such as nieces and nephews, or in-laws. My examination also excludes those families where
there is a generational break. For example, the Manning family had four successive generations elected
governor of South Carolina, but none was in the direct line; and whilst the Archer-Chamberlain family had
four generations serve in the US Congress, only three were successive.42
My definition also differs from others in that I include family members elected to state office, such as state
legislatures, and statewide offices. Almost all previous studies on US political families have focused on
federal office, with the sole exception being Casey in 2008. My study is not following the path well
ventured by examining families in the context of a specific institutional office, such as the presidency, or the
United States Congress, because it is my contention that limiting scholarly review to a single institution
does not present a true reflection of the depth of the broader dynamic and immersion of dynasties in
American public life.43 It is understandable though why most studies limit their focus to federal office, as
the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-present, allows for easy review of members
who have served in federal elective office; the absence of a similar directory for state or local offices
requires a more onerous level of research.44 Non-state offices, such as elected judicial and local offices were
originally included in my research, but this significantly widened the study, and access to primary source
data was less accessible and reliable. For example, with the inclusion of local office, Arizona’s Goldwater
family would have met the definition with four successive generations, but the first two generations only
served as mayor, whereas the latter two both served in the US Congress.
The final parameter is that a family member is only considered where they were elected; and this study will
apply that term in a strict sense to mean elected ‘by the people’. This application is most relevant to those
who served in the US Senate prior to the ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, which allowed
for direct election by voters of each state. Prior to this, state legislatures elected US Senators; therefore, to
include politicians not elected by a public vote may distort my examination of why voters appear to favour
certain families. In addition, this study focuses only on elected offices in the United States of America,
which means that offices held prior to the formation of the Union in 1789 have not been considered, nor
have offices of the Confederate States of America during the US Civil War. The parameters of this dynastic
study have been rigidly set in order to focus on the pure political dynasty; that is, a multi-generational
succession of pseudo-aristocratic rulers, albeit elected.
Perhaps the most contentious element of this definition is that some noted families have not classified as a
dynasty. Although the Roosevelt family spawned two US presidents, one US vice president, and two New
York governors, the family only reaches two generations of elective office. Similarly, whilst the Rockefeller
family features one US vice president, one US senator, and three state governors, they also only span two
generations.45 The Frelinghuysen family spans America’s entire history, with Frederick Frelinghuysen
serving as a delegate to the Continental Congress, and a member of the US Senate, whilst his great-greatgreat-great grandson Rodney Frelinghuysen, is a current member of the US House of Representatives. The
family though has only ever had three successive generations, and the only public office held by all three of
those generations was the US Senate, to which they were appointed by the New Jersey state legislature.
And whilst the Kennedy family features one US president, three US senators, and four members of the US
41
From 1855-1861, three Washburn served simultaneously in the US House of Representatives, representing three different states:
Israel Washburn Jr (Maine); Elihu Brown Washburn (Illinois); and Cadwallader Colden Washburn (Wisconsin). A further brother,
William Drew Washburne, later represented Minnesota, from 1879-1885.
42
James Burchill Richardson was governor of South Carolina from 1801-1802; his nephews Richard Irvine Manning and John Peter
Richardson II were also elected governor (1824-1826 and 1840-1842 respectively); John Lawrence Manning, son of Richard Irvine
Manning, served as governor from 1852-54; John Peter Richardson III, son of John Peter Richardson III served as governor from
1886-1990; and Richard Irvine Manning III, nephew of John Lawrence Manning, was governor from 1915-1919. John Archer served
in the US House from 1801-1807; Robert Harris Archer (1825-1829) and Stevenson Archer (1811-1817, 1819-1821, sons of John Archer,
also served in the US House; Stevenson Archer [II], son of Stevenson Archer, served in the US House from 1867-1875; and George
E. Chamberlain, grandson of Stevenson Archer, served in the US Senate (Oregon) from 1909-1921.
43
Casey, ‘Political Families in American Electoral Politics’; Clubok, Wilensky, and Berghorn, ‘Family Relationships, Congressional
Recruitment, and Political Modernization’; Dal Bo, Dal Bo, and Snyder, ‘Political Dynasties’; Hess, America’s Political Dynasties: From
Adams to Kennedy.
44
‘Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-Present’, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774Present, accessed 27 April 2015, http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp.
45
This does not include Nelson Rockefeller’s maternal grandfather, Nelson Aldrich, who served in both the US House and US Senate,
as there was a break in the direct generational line.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
8
House of Representatives, including one current member, the family only extends to three successive
generations in the direct line (through Robert F. Kennedy, his son and grandson, Joseph P. Kennedy II).
III.
METHODOLOGY
According to data compiled by Congressional historians, since the first US Congress met in 1789, 400
parent-child duos have served in Congress, along with 190 pairs of siblings, with the percentage of ‘legacy
lawmakers’ reaching its highest point in 1848, when more than 16% of members of Congress had been
preceded in office by a relative.46 It is my contention that limiting scholarly review to a single institution
does not present a true reflection and understanding of the broader political democratic dynamic. Instead,
I will examine American political dynasties more broadly via elected office at both the federal and state
level, in order to gain a clearer view of the immersion of dynasties in American public life. The reason for
expanding the boundaries of this study is that political families appear more prevalent at the state level,
perhaps because electoral and political opportunities are more numerous, and may provide increased
opportunities for involvement in public office. The rigidity of my definition also enables a manageable
framework because if marriage, non-direct generational succession, or families with generational gaps
were included, then the number of families would have ranged in the hundreds. I do acknowledge though
the limitations of my framework, which has been set for practicality. The following sources have been
utilised to date:





Biographical Directory of the United States Congress
Office of the Historian of the United States Congress
Electoral records held by state historical societies, state libraries, state archives, and offices of
state Secretaries of State. Particular assistance has been provided by:
o Office of the Texas Secretary of State
o Illinois State Library, Office of the Illinois Secretary of State
o Tennessee State Library & Archives, Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State
o Minnesota Historical Society
o Texas Library and Archives Commission
o Massachusetts State Archives, State Library of Massachusetts
o Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin State Historical Society
o Maine State Library, and Maine State Archives
Stephen Hess, Senior Fellow Emeritus, Governance Studies, The Brookings Institute, whose office
graciously provided me with an uncorrected draft of an updated appendix for a to-be-published
revised volume of America’s Political Families.
The Political Graveyard
Are political dynasties that common in the United States? If my definition was relaxed to a minimum of
three successive generations, then I identified 117 families. This was too many families to examine in detail,
which is why the study looks at a minimum of four generations. The fact that only twelve families out of 117
continue in elected office beyond three successive generations does add a curious strength to the crosscultural aphorism, “there’s nobbut three generations atween a clog and clog.” 47 The accepted modern
translation, “shirtsleeves to shirtsleeves in three generations,” is certainly applicable, considering the
plethora of families that extend to three generations in politics, with a 91% drop-off in families extending
beyond this. My twelve identified families are the normative exceptions, which is why I am focusing on
them in order to examine whether they have commonalities or causalities that may explain their
longitudinal success, by identifying demographic features or trends from which we may discern why their
time in public office lasted beyond three generations. As ten of these families have ceased involvement in
public office, their final and subsequent generations will be examined to determine any common features
or trends that may predict the future of the two families still active in public life (Bush and Kean).
The biographical reviews of dynasts will then examined to assess whether prevalence, causation or
correlation of particular factors, or if factors need to occur in a particular order, lead to certain events
unfolding in the formation, sustention and decline of political dynasties. As the case study review may
46
Kathy Kiely, ‘Elections Test Power of Political Dynasties’, USA Today, 3 August 2010, www.usatoday.com/news/politics/2010-08-031Adynasties03_CV_N.htm.
47
Whilst this description is a Lancashire proverb, a similar adage exists in other languages. Italian – “dalle stalle alle stele alle stalle”
(from stalls to stars to stalls); Spanish – “quiren no lo tiene, lo hance; y quien lo tiene, lo deshance” (who doesn’t have it, and who
has it, misuses it).
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
9
introduce new and unexpected results, the final research design may yet be adjusted. Drawing cross-case
conclusions will give some indication of common and casual issues or events to enable further elaboration
and hypothesis creation, with the overall approach designed to provoke reasoned debate. The key factors
of this will then be analysed to understand whether dynastic success can in fact be determined.
IV.
DYNASTIC FAMILIES
Table 1 presents the twelve families that have at least four successive generations in the direct line, elected
to state or federal office, and thus for the purpose of this study, are considered America’s political
dynasties. The Breckinridge family actually qualifies for two entries in this study, with five successive
generations through the lineage of Joseph C. Breckinridge, and four successive generations through the
lineage of Robert J. Breckinridge. The patriarch of the Kean dynasty, Hamilton Fish Kean, was named for his
great-uncle, Hamilton Fish, the patriarch of the Fish dynasty, with both families achieving separate entries.
Table 1 - Cranston's US Political Families
Family
State(s)
No. Gens
No. Dynasts
Span
No. Years
Adams
Massachusetts
4
6
1789-1873
84
Breckinridge
Arkansas, California, Kentucky, Virginia
5
8
1792-1895
103
Bachhuber
Wisconsin
5
5
1860-2011
151
Bush
Connecticut, Florida, Texas
4
5
1952-present
64
Fish
New York
4
4
1843-1995
152
Goff
Tennessee, West Virginia
4
4
1863-1963
100
Kean
New Jersey
4
5
1883-present
133
Fitzgerald
Michigan
4
4
1895-1996
101
Harrison
Indiana, Ohio, Virginia, Wyoming
5
6
1793-1969
176
Stevenson
Illinois
4
4
1875-1981
106
Scott
North Carolina
4
5
1888-2003
115
Taft
Ohio
4
5
1909-2007
98
Table 2 identifies the sixty-one dynasts across the twelve families to be biographically reviewed in this
study, and encompass 7 US presidents, 4 US vice presents, 15 US senators, 22 US representatives, 10 state
governors, 11 other statewide offices (eg lieutenant governor, state attorney general), 9 state senators, and
31 state representatives.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
10
Table 2 - Dynastic Family Members to be biographically reviewed in This Study (with generational indicator)
ADAMS
BRECKINRIDGE
BACHHUBER
BUSH
1. John Adams
2. John Quincy Adams
2. Thomas Boylston Adams
3. George W. Adams
3. Charles Francis Adams
4. John Quincy Adams II
1.
2.
2.
3.
4.
4.
5.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
3.
4.
FISH
GOFF
KEAN
FITZGERALD
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Hamilton Fish
Hamilton Fish II
Hamilton Fish III
Hamilton Fish IV
Robert Breckinridge
James Breckinridge
Joseph C. Breckinridge
Robert J. Breckinridge
John C. Breckinridge
William C.P. Breckinridge
Clifton Breckinridge
John W. Breckinridge
Nathan Goff Sr
Nathan Goff Jr
Guy D. Goff
Louise Goff Reece
Max Bachhuber
Andrew Bachhuber
Frank E. Bachhuber
Ruth Bachhuber Doyle
James E. “Jim” Doyle
Hamilton Fish Kean
John Kean
Robert W. Kean
Thomas H. Kean
Thomas H. Kean Jr
Prescott Bush
George H.W. Bush
George W. Bush
John Ellis “Jeb” Bush
George P. Bush
John Wesley Fitzgerald
Frank D. Fitzgerald
John Warner Fitzgerald
Frank M. Fitzgerald
HARRISON
STEVENSON
SCOTT
TAFT
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
2.
3.
4.
1.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Carter Bassett Harrison
William Henry Harrison
John Scott Harrison
Benjamin Harrison
Russell B. Harrison
William H. Harrison
V.
Adlai E. Stevenson
Lewis Stevenson
Adlai E. Stevenson II
Adlai E. Stevenson III
Robert W. “Bob” Scott
W. Kerr Scott
Ralph H. Scott Jr
Robert W. Scott
Meg Scott Phipps
William Howard Taft
Charles Phelps Taft
Robert A. Taft
Robert Taft
Robert A. “Bob” Taft II
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
This study comprises three stages: identification of dynasties; biographical review of identified dynasties;
and the subsequent analysis to determine how political office is transferred across generations. The study is
currently in the midst of the second stage, but some interesting initial observations have begun to emerge.
Since the formation of the United States in 1789, these twelve families have featured at least one dynast
holding elected office every year, with just six exceptions: 1830, 1862, 1866, 1869, 1871 and 1872. The onset
of the Civil War from 1861 to 1865 and the subsequent years of reconstruction, may account for some of
these gaps. Conversely, 1952, 1953 and 1969 were the peak years, wherein each year, seven of the twelve
families held public office. An initial analysis of dynast activity by year and century reveals the emergence of
an interesting picture, not the least of which is the fact that the peak period for dynastic activity took place
in the twentieth century. Of the forty-four years that featured the most number of identified families active
in elected office, eighty-two percent were in the twentieth century. By narrowing the focus to the years
when six plus families was simultaneously active, the period ranges from 1929 to 1971; with the peak period
being 1952-1953, plus 1969. The average dynastic span is 115 years, with the median being 104.5 years. Each
family spans more than one century, with five spanning three centuries (Bachhuber, Kean, Scott, Taft, and
Harrison), with the first four continuing their span into the twenty-first century. Noted periods of
consecutive service includes the Scott family, who held elective office in North Carolina for eighty-five of
the ninety-two year span from 1888 to 1979; the Taft family held elective office in Ohio for thirty-nine of
forty-one years from 1939-1980; and the Breckinridge family, predominantly of Kentucky, who held office
for forty consecutive years from 1789-1828. Why dynastic engagement peaked in the mid-twentieth century
is something that deserves further scrutiny.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
11
Figure 1 - Span (Years) of Dynastic Families
200
No. Years
150
100
50
Adams
Breckinridge
Bachhuber
Bush
Fish
Goff
Kean
Fitzgerald
Harrison
Stevenson
Scott
Taft
0
Historically, voters appear more willing to elect members of the same family at the state level rather than
on a national scale. One possible explanation may be that voters in a particular state are more familiar with
the candidate, family, or family name than elsewhere in the country, although occasionally some families do
transcend this geographic barrier. Eight of the twelve families held elective office in a single state, which
supports the notion that geographic or regional support fosters dynastic development. The exceptions are
the Harrison, Breckinridge, Goff and Bush families. Whilst members of the Harrison family represented
more than one state, they do present an interesting study. The first two generations represented Ohio,
whilst the next three generations represented the neighbouring state of Indiana, so there is an argument
for continuous regional representation. It was only fifth generation dynast William H. Harrison, who won
non-regional electoral success in Wyoming, although he did win his first elected office in Indiana; thus
becoming one of the few individuals to sit in the legislatures of more than one state. The Breckinridge
family won public office almost wholly in Kentucky, with the four-generational lineage through Robert J.
Breckinridge, and the first four generations of the lineage through Joseph C. Breckinridge. It was only fifth
generation members Clifton and John Breckinridge, who won office elsewhere (Arkansas and California
respectively). The first three generations of the Goff family all held elective office in Tennessee, with the
exception of fourth generation dynast, Louise Goff Reece, who won a special election to the US House of
Representatives in nearby Tennessee to fill a vacancy following the death of her husband, Representative
B. Carroll Reece. The Bush family are arguably the dynasty that has found the most success at winning
office in varied state or regional areas. The first generation represented Connecticut, and whilst most
members of the next three generations represented Texas, one third generation member won major office
in Florida. The caveat to the family’s third generation success though could stem from the fact that they are
the sons of a president, and so held much broader public recognition.
Of the forty-three men who have held the office of President of the United States, seven are from the case
study families identified in this study, with six from just three families: Adams, Harrison and Bush. Although
four families have seen two of its members attain the presidency, the Roosevelts are not considered in this
study because the families of Theodore and Franklin Roosevelt (who were fifth cousins), extend to just two
generations. If the presidency is the regarded as the nation’s highest political office, how then in a
democratic republic can 16% of office holders have come from just four families?
There have been fifty-seven presidential elections, with only four being won by a candidate who lost the
popular vote (1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000). Interestingly, three of these elections were won by the second
member of each family to have held the presidency - John Quincy Adams (1824), Benjamin Harrison (1888)
and George W. Bush (2000). Whilst the election of 1876 did not feature a dynast considered in this study,
Charles Francis Adams, son of John Quincy Adams, did play a significant role in the election when he
endorsed a candidate from his opposite party, which may have helped Samuel Tilden win the popular vote,
whilst losing the Electoral College.
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
12
Whilst the presidency might be considered the pinnacle of political office, of the four families in this study
who feature a president, three of them (Adams, Bush, and Taft) actually have the shortest dynastic span,
each with less than 100 years. In addition, the only two examples in American history of an ‘inherited’
presidency, where both father and son held the office (Adams and Bush), are also the two dynasties with
the shortest span (84 and 64 years respectively). The Harrison family is the outlier as they are the longest
spanning dynasty of all twelve (176 years), and feature two presidents, but there was a generational gap
between them: grandfather-grandson. Could this suggest that overt examples of attaining elected office at
the highest level reinforces in voters’ minds the idea of monarchy, which leads them to rejecting further
political encroaches by those families? Could it suggest that the dynasts themselves develop a sense of
political entitlement, and thus become less focused on attaining office through merit, and consequently
become less palatable to voters? There is certainly further research needed in this area.
Of the sixty-one dynasts across the twelve families, only three are women: Ruth Bachhuber Doyle, Louise
Goff Reece, and Meg Scott Phipps. It’s no surprise that women aren’t overly represented in dynasties
considering they weren’t eligible to vote until the ratification of the nineteenth amendment in 1920,
although they were able to run for and hold elective office prior to this. Ten of the twelve families had a
dynast that held office after 1920, encompassing 32 post-nineteenth amendment dynasts, of which just
three were women. In other words, women account for 4.9% of identified dynasts, and 9.3% of post-1920
dynasts. Is this underrepresentation of women in dynasties the result of the families not having daughters?
Are these results akin to the representation of women more generally in US politics? Or is this merely a
reflection of the general role of women in politics prior to the 1990s?
VI.
CONCLUSION
The existence of political dynasties has important consequences for the democratic legitimacy of the
American republic, and exemplifies a particular form of elite persistence in which a small number of family
groups have the potential to monopolise political power, thereby undermining the quality of democracy. I
am not asserting that political dynasties are good or bad; rather, by examining twelve families I am seeking
to understand how they exist and persist despite competitive free elections, when their very notion
appears to be in conflict with the constitutional provision for equal representation of the masses. Are there
observable factors and commonalities that these families have that enable them to achieve and maintain
electoral success across a greater number of generations than others? By their very nature, political
dynasties enact perpetuation of power, which contradicts the guiding principle of the Declaration of
Independence that all men are created equal. How then can political dynasties exist and succeed in the
United States?
Cranston, Bryan T., Political Dynasties in a Democracy, 24th World Congress of Political Science, 2016
13
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