Is India Becoming More Democratic?
Author(s): Ashutosh Varshney
Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (Feb., 2000), pp. 3-25
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Is India Becoming More
Democratic?
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
(A) long traditionofideologicalsubjectionhas made (the lowercastes)stagnate....
Centurieshave instilledinto them a meek acceptanceof the existing(order)....
This can change.In fact,thismustchange.The revoltagainstcasteis theresurrection
ofIndia or,shallwe say,thebringingintobeingofa uniquelyand hithertounrealized
occasion,whenIndia shall be trulyand fullyalive. Is such a revoltpossible?
RammanoharLohia, TheCasteSystem
A great deal of confusion exists on how to discuss, and theoreticallycharacterize,
political developments in India during the last decade and a half. There is, of course,
a consensus that the Congress party,a towering political colossus between 1920 and
1989, has unambiguously declined. While there are legitimate doubts about whether
the decline of the Congress partywill continue to be irreversible,it is clear that much
of the political space already vacated by the Congress has so far been filled by three
differentsets of political forces. The firstforce, Hindu nationalism, has attracted a
great deal of scholarly attention (Basu 1997; Hansen and Jaffrelot1998; Jaffrelot
1993; Varshney 1993). The second force,regionalism, has also spawned considerable
researchof late (Baruah 1999; Singh forthcoming;Subramanian 1999). A third force,
not so extensivelyanalyzed, covers an arrayof political parties and organizations that
encompass groups normally classified under the umbrella category of "lower castes":
the so-called scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes, and the "other backward classes"
(OBCs). How should we understand the politics of parties representingthese groups?
How far will they go? What are the implications of their forwardmarch, if it does
take place, forIndian democracy?
In an attempt to answer these questions, this essay compares political
developments in Northern and Southern India. My principal claim is that our
judgments about contemporaryNorth Indian politics will be wrong ifwe do not place
South India at the center of our analytic attention. In this century, the South has
experienced caste-based politics much more intenselythan the other regions of India.
If the Hindu-Muslim cleavage has been a "master narrative"of politics in North India
formuch of the twentiethcentury,caste divisions have had the same status in Southern
AshutoshVarshneyis an AssociateProfessor
of Governmentand International
Studiesat
the Universityof Notre Dame. For comments,the writeris gratefulto Hasan Askari-Rizvi,
JagdishBhagwati,Kanchan Chandra,Robert Hardgrave,Pratap Mehta, Philip Oldenburg,
Vibha Pingle, Sanjay Reddy,AlfredStepan,the late MyronWeiner,Yogendra Yadav, and
two anonymousreviewersof thisjournal.
TheJournalofAsian Studies59, no. 1 (February2000):3-25.
C) 2000 by the AssociationforAsian Studies,Inc.
3
4
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
India (Dirks 1997; Varshneyforthcoming).'Partlybecause electoralpolitics was
organizedaroundcastelinesin theSouthand notarounda Hindu-Muslimaxis,lower
cameto powerin virtuallyall southernstates
castes,constituting
an electoralmajority,
by the 1960s. Our analysisof recentNorth Indian politics will be deeper if we
oflowercastestookplace in theSouth.An exclusive
appreciatehowtheempowerment
focus on Hindu-Muslim divisionsdeflectsattentionaway fromwhat is clearlya
caste-basedchurningin the North.
significant
but
The majorSouthIndian conclusionabout casteis culturallycounterintuitive
politicallyeasilygrasped.Sociallyand ritually,castehas alwayssymbolizedhierarchy
democracy,castecan
and inequality;however,when joined with universal-franchise
ofequalizationand dignity(Beteille1996; Dirks 1997;
paradoxically
be an instrument
Kothari1970; Rudolphand Rudolph 1987 and 1967; Weiner1997). Weigheddown
by tradition,lower castes do not give up their caste identities; rather,they
and "reinvent"castehistory,deployin politicsa readilyavailableand
"deconstruct"
easilymobilizedsocialcategory("low caste"),use theirnumbersto electoraladvantage,
of
and fightprejudiceand dominationpolitically.It is the uppercastes,beneficiaries
the caste systemforcenturies,that typicallywish caste did not existwhen a lower
castechallengeappearsfrombelow.
North India today,and in future,may not followin South India's footsteps
entirely,but the rise of lower-castepolitics in the North alreadybears striking
similarities.Even Hindu nationalism,thoughfundamentally
opposedto lower-caste
politicsin ideologicaltermsand quite formidablein theNorth,has not been able to
dictatetermsto northern
lower-castepoliticians.By implicationas well as intention,
Hindu nationalismstandsforHindu unity,not forcaste consciousness.Lower-caste
partiesare againstHindu unity.ArguingthatHindu uppercasteshave long denied
power,privilege,and even dignityto the lowercastes,theyare advocatesof casteof power. Such has been the
based social justice and a caste-basedrestructuration
powerof lower-castepoliticsin recentyearsthatit has forcedHindu nationaliststo
makeideologicallydistasteful
but pragmatically
necessary
politicalcoalitions.Forthe
sake of power, the Hindu nationalists-afterthe twelfthand for the thirteenth
nationalelectionsheld in 1998 and 1999, respectively-hadto team up with other
parties,severalofwhomwerebased amongthe lowercastes.The latter,amongother
things,ensuredthat the ideologicallypure demands of Hindu nationalism-the
building of a temple in Ayodhya;a common civil code and no religiouslybased
personallaws forminorities;abolitionof the special statusofJammuand Kashmir,
the only Muslim majoritystate of Indian federation;eliminationof the Minorities
Commission-weredroppedand a programmoreacceptableto thelower-caste
parties
was formulated.
Thus, in theirmomentof glory,the Hindu nationalistshave been ideologically
deceived. As they have ended theirlong isolation in Indian politics and formed
in Delhi, theyhave also been forcedby lower-castepoliticiansto make
governments
While Hindu nationalistshaveindeedcometo powerin
programmatic
compromises.
Delhi, Hindu nationalismas an ideologyhas not.
Can Hindu nationalismfinallyoverpowerthe lower-castemobilizationin the
are lower-castepoliticiansstrongenough to defeatHindu
North? Alternatively,
'With the prominentexceptionof the formerprincelystate of Hyderabad(Varshney
1997). As to how Britishrule mayhave turnedcaste into a masternarrativeofSouth Indian
politics,parallelingthe Hindu-Muslimnarrativein NorthIndia, see Dirks (1987). In strictly
politicalterms,Dirks says,Hindu Brahminscan be describedas "theMuslimsofSouthIndia"
(Dirks 1997, 279).
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
5
thecharacter
ofHindu nationalismas it tries
nationalists,
or,less radically,transform
somehow to accommodatea lower-castesurge? Our understandingof India's
democracywill be shapedby how thesequestionsare answeredin the comingyears.
Hindu nationalismis majoritarianin impulse.In its ideologicalpurity,it is deeply
threateningto non-Hindu minorities,who constituteabout 18 percent of the
but,much
country's
population.Lower-caste
politicsalso endeavorsto be majoritarian
as working-classpolitics was in late nineteenth-century
Western Europe, its
ideological aim is to put togethera plebeian, not a religious,majority.It is
nonthreatening
to religiousminoritiesand inclinedtowardsthe socioeconomically
disadvantaged.
and
More thaneverbefore,we need to pay greaterattentionto thedeterminants
clear,lower-caste
dynamicsof India's plebeianpolitics.As is becomingincreasingly
partiesmay not be able to come to poweron theirown, but it is unlikelythatany
in Delhi in the foreseeablefuturecan be formedwithoutthem.Even if
government
theCongresspartyreturnsto power,it is almostcertainthatsucha returnwill either
thelower-caste
incorporate
partiesin a coalition,or havemanylowercastepoliticians
in the Congresspartyhierarchy.
as visiblepower-centers
The LargerPicture:
From a North-SouthDivide to an Emerging
Southernizationof North India
Let us begin witha briefcomparisonof the castecompositionofIndian politics
today with the situationsoon afterindependence.In the 1950s, India's national
urbanpoliticianstrainedin law. Most
politicswas dominatedby English-speaking,
politicianscame fromtheuppercastes,and manyleadersweretrainedabroad.Lower
an agrarianand "vernacular"elite dominatedlocal and
down thepoliticalhierarchy,
statepolitics(Weiner 1962), but even the lower-levelpoliticalleadershiptendedto
come fromthe uppercastesin NorthIndia.
Southernpoliticianswere not only "vernacular"but,
South India was different.
fromthe lowercastes(Hardgrave
as the 1950s evolved,theywere also increasingly
1965; Subramanian1999). By the 1960s, much of South India had gone thougha
theDravidaMunetraKazgham(DMK) came
relatively
peacefullowercasterevolution:
partyin the 1960s, and theCommunist
to powerin Tamil Nadu as an anti-Brahmin
basedin theEzhavacommunity,
party,firstin powerin Keralain 1957, was primarily
a low casteoftraditional
engagedin theproductionofindigenousliquor
toddy-tappers
(Nossiter1982).2
The social indignitiesinflictedon the Nadars of Tamil Nadu, anothertoddytappingcasteoftraditionalSouthIndia, areall too well known(Hardgrave1969). To
to get
appreciatehow much the stateof Kerala has changed,it would be instructive
a sense of the humiliationthe Ezhavas routinelysuffered
until the earlydecades of
thiscentury:
Theywerenotallowedto walkon publicroads.... TheywereHindus,butthey
thepremises
of
couldnotentertemples.
Whiletheirpigsandcattlecouldfrequent
2in the two otherSouth Indian states,Karnakataand AndhraPradesh,the lowercaste
thrustofpolitics,thoughpresent,has been less pronounced.ForKarnataka,see Manor(1990);
forAndhra,Ram Reddy(1990).
6
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
the temple,theywere not allowed to go even there.Ezhavas could not use public
wells or public places....
... An Ezhava should keep himself,at least thirtysix feet away froma
Namboodiriand twelvefeetaway froma Nair. ... He mustaddressa casteHindu
man,as Thampuran(My Lord) and womanas Thampurati(My Lady).... He must
stand beforea caste Hindu in awe and reverence,assuminga humble posture.He
should neverdress himselfup like a caste Hindu; neverconstructa house on the
uppercastemodel.... The womenfolkofthecommunity... wererequired,young
and old, to appear beforecaste Hindus, alwaystopless.About the ornamentsalso,
therewere restrictions.
There were certainprescribedornamentsonly which they
(could) wear.
(Rajendran1974, 23-24)
By the 1960s, in much of the public sphere in Southern India, not simply in
Kerala, such egregious debasement and quotidian outrage had been radicallycurtailed,
if not entirely eliminated. A democratic empowerment of the lower castes was the
catalytic agent forthe social transformation.The lower castes were always numerically
larger than the Brahmins, but were unable to use their numbers before the rise of
universal franchise.
A classic distinction between horizontal and vertical political mobilization
proposed by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1967) captured the essence of North-South
political differencesat the time. In South India, lower castes had already developed
their own leaders and parties by the 1950s and 1960s, whereas in North India the
model of mobilization was top-down, with lower castes dependent on the upper castes
in a clientelistic relationship. At the national level, the Congress party aggregated
horizontally,as it brought together differentlinguistic and religious groups, but at
the local level, it was a typical clientelisticparty,building a pyramid of caste coalitions
under the existing social elite (Weiner 1967).
In the 1980s and 1990s, a southern-styleplebeian politics has rocked North India.
The names of Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Yadav, Kanshi Ram, and Mayawati-all
"vernacular" politicians who have risen frombelow-repeatedly make headlines. They
are not united. Indeed, substantial obstacles to unity, both vertical and horizontal,
remain. Vertically, though all lower castes are below the upper castes/varnas
(Brahmins, Kshtariyas, and Vaishyas), there are serious internal differentiationsand
hierarchieswithin the lower-castecategory.And, horizontally,even though castesystem
is present all over India, eachcastehas only local or regional meaning, making it hard
to build extralocal or extraregional alliances. Thus, horizontal mobilization tends to
be primarilyregional or state-specific,not nationwide.
Nonetheless, these and other lower caste leaders have often made or broken
coalitions in power. Their total vote share continues to be lower than that for the
Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) respectively,but it is enough to force
concessions fromthe two largest parties. In the three national elections held between
1996 and 1999, the various parties explicitly representing lower castes, in the
aggregate, received between 18 to 20 percent of the national vote, as against 20 to
25 percent forthe BJP, and 23 to 29 percent forthe Congress Party.3Disunity at the
3Basedon the ElectionCommission1996, 40-51, and ElectionCommission1998, 4956. The 1999 data areprovisional.The explicitlylower-castepartiesare:JD (variousversions),
RJD, SP, BSP, JP, ADMK, DMK, MDMK, PMK, BJD, and RPI.
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
7
level ofpoliticalpartiesnotwithstanding,
lower-caste
politicshas come to stay.4It has
pressedthepolityin newpolicydirections,
and introduceda newcoloringofphrases,
diction,and stylesin politics.
The powerof the new plebeianpoliticalelite is no longerconfinedto the state
level, thoughthat is whereit is most prominent.The centerhas also been socially
reconfigured.
Delhi has twicehad primarily
lower-caste
coalitionsin power-between
1989 and 1991 and between1996 and 1998. In K. R. Narayanan,India todayhas
its firstex-UntouchablePresident.In a parliamentary
system,ofcourse,thePresident
is onlya head ofstate,nota head ofgovernment.
What lendsNarayanan'selectiona
special politicalmeaningis thatno politicalpartyin India, with the exceptionof a
regionalparty(the Shiv Sena), had thecourageto opposehis nomination.Narayanan
was electedPresidentby a near-consensus
vote in 1997, a featnot easilyachievable
in India's adversarialpolity.
Government
policiesand programshavealso acquireda new thrust.An enlarged
affirmative
actionprogramand a restructuring
ofthepowerstructure
on thegroundstreet-levelbureaucraciesand police stations-have been the battle cryof the new
plebeianelite. By far,theirmoststrikingnationalsuccessis the additionof an extra
27 percentreservation
forthelowercastesto centralgovernment
jobs and educational
seats.In the 1950s, only22.5 percentofsuchjobs werereserved,
and morethanthreewereopenlycompetitive.Today,theseproportions
are49.5 and 50.5 percent,
fourths
respectively.
At the statelevel,the reservedquota has been higherfora long timein
muchof southernIndia.
Indianpoliticsthushas a new lower-castethrust,now prevalentbothin muchof
the Northas well as the South. Democracyhas been substantiallyindigenized,and
the shadow of Oxbridge has left India's political center-stage.Does the rising
mean that India's democracyis becomingmoreparticipatory
vernacularization
and
inclusive,or simply more chaotic and unruly?Or, are such developmentsmere
cosmetic changes on the surface,a political veneer concealing an unchanging
socioeconomicstructure
ofpowerand privilege?
To understandwhatthe riseof lowercastescan do to politics,stateinstitutions,
and policy,we needto understand
thetwentieth-century
historyofSouthIndia,where
thelowercasteshaveexercisedremarkable
powersincethelate 1950s and early1960s.
Plebeian politicsin South India was primarilyconceptualizedin termsof caste,not
class. Even the ideologicallyclass-basedCommunistsin the stateof Kerala foundit
necessaryto plug into a discourseof caste-basedinjusticein the 1930s and 1940s,
and they relied heavilyon the traditionallydepressedEzhava caste for theirrise
(Nossiter1982).
Indeed, with isolated exceptions,caste ratherthan class has been the primary
mode of subalternexperiencein India. The risingmiddle class of a low caste has
customarilyhad to fightsocial discriminationand disadvantage.For contesting
theemergingeliteoflowercasteshaseveryreason
and domination,therefore,
hierarchy
to use caste identitiesin politics.Whetherthisstrategymeansthatin the long run
caste itselfwill disappear,as some lower-casteintellectualsand leadershave long
wished (Ambedkar 1990), remainsunclear. What is clear is that, relyingon a
horizontalmobilization,a large proportionof the lower castes would ratherfight
prejudicehereand now,whateverthe long-runconsequences.
4In the 1999 elections,it was widelypredictedthat the electoratewould deal a serious
blow to lower-castepartiesin the North.In UttarPradesh,SP and BSP increasedtheirshare
ofseats,evenas theirvotesmarginallydeclined;in Bihar,RJD kept its voteshareintact,but
lost seatsdue to the BJP's superiorcoalition-making
strategy.
8
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
The Scheduled Castes, the Scheduled Tribes,
and the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in
North India
The papersin thissymposiumgo beyondtheaggregateprofilesummarizedabove,
and addressin detail the recentpoliticalfortunesof threedifferent
and historically
underprivileged
social groupsin NorthIndia:5theex-Untouchables,
officially
named
scheduledcastesby India's constitution,
and oftenalso called the Dalits; the tribals,
called scheduledtribessince 1950;6 and the otherbackwardclasses(OBCs) among
the Hindus. Technically,the termOBC incorporatestwo different
disadvantaged
communities-Hindu and non-Hindu.Of these,Hindu OBCs are the low castes
socialand ritualstatushas beenabovetheex-Untouchable
scheduled
whosetraditional
castes,but below the uppercastes(figure1). Hindu OBCs overlapmostlywith the
a categoryconsistingmainlyof peasantsand
Sudra varnaof traditionalhierarchy,
artisans.
Accordingto the 1991 census,thescheduledcastesconstituted
about 16.5 percent
ofIndia'spopulation,and thescheduledtribes8.1 percent.Becauseno fullcastecensus
has beentakenin India since 1931, statisticalexactitudeon theOBCs, Hindu or nonHindu, is not possible. We do have approximatefigures,however.The Mandal
Commission,theonlynationwidesourceavailableon theOBCs, suggeststhatHindu
unless
OBCs constituteabout 43.7 percentof the totalpopulation(OBCs hereafter,
a distinctionis necessary
betweenHindu and non-HinduOBCs).7 These threegroups
constitutea majorityof India's populationand electorate.8
Since independence,the scheduledcasteshaveprimarilysupportedtheCongress
partyin India. Though the leadersof the Congresspartytypicallycame fromthe
uppercastes,theywereable to get scheduledcastesupportpartlybecausetheCongress
action program,and partlybecause
partywas the firstarchitectof the affirmative
in villageswereon thewholealive and robust.
traditionalpatron-client
relationships
In 1984, a new political partyof the scheduledcastes-the Bahujan Samaj Party
(BSP)-was launched.Receiving4.0, 4.7, and 4.3 percentofIndia's votein the 1996,
1998, and 1999 nationalelections,respectively
(up from1.6 percentin 1991), the
BSP may not yetbe a powerfulforcein nationalparliament.However,on the basis
5Strictly
speaking,the argumentsin thisessayapplyonlyto Northand SouthIndia but
theycan, in a modifiedform,be extendedto the westernstatesof Gujarat and Maharashtra
too. Lower-castepartiesmay not have played a similarrole in the West, but a lower caste
churningfrombelowhas affected
politicsseriously(Wood 1996; Omvedt1993). It is,however,
not clearhow fartheseargumentswill apply to stateseast of Bihar.
6Thoughtechnicallyscheduledtribesare not part of the Hindu caste system,therehas
been a consensusin politicalcirclesthatalong withthescheduledcastes,theywerehistorically
themostdeprivedgroupin India. It shouldalso be notedthatin somecircles,theterm"tribal"
is viewed as pejorative.However,we don't yethave an appropriatesubstitute.For want of a
betterterm,I will use the term"tribal"in thisessay,withoutimplyinganythingpejorative.
7Non-HinduOBCs are about 8.40 percentof India's population.Thus, in all, theOBCs
constitute52 percentof the country(Mandal Commission,1980, 1:56).
the size of
8Thereis some dispute overwhetherthe Mandal Commissionoverestimated
consensusthatthese
theOBCs, but thenatureofthatdisputedoes notchangetheprofessional
threegroupstogetherconstitutea majorityofIndia's population.Since thepopulationgrowth
are typicallyhigherat lowerends of economicscale,it also
rates,accordingto demographers,
means thatthe OBC proportionof the electorateis likelyto be higherthantheirpercentage
in the population.
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
9
Dominant
Castes6%
Sudras
43%
HinduOBCs (mostly)
Scheduled
Castes16.5%
and
Scheduled
Tribes8.1%
Figure 1. All-IndiaHindu Ritual Hierarchy.Note: (1) The nonScheduledCastesand Tribesfiguresare bestguesses.Beyondthe
ScheduledCastesand Tribes,castecensushas not been takensince
1931. These bestguesses,however,are widelyviewedas statistically
exact.(2) Since a fractionof Scheduled
reasonable,if not statistically
Tribesare Christians,the numbersabove add up to morethan82%.
Source:(1) For ScheduledCastesand Tribes,Governmentof India,
CensusofIndia, 1991; (2) forothercastes,Government
of India, Report
of
theBackwardClassesCommission
(Mandal CommissionReport),
FirstPart,Vol. 1 (1980).
of the shareof nationalvote,it has alreadybecomethe fourthlargestpartyin India,
followingthe Congress,the BJP,and the CommunistPartyMarxist(CPM).9
the BSP has developed a substantialpolitical presencein
More importantly,
almostall NorthIndian states,especiallyUttarPradesh(UP), Punjab, Haryana,and
MadhyaPradesh(MP). In UP, India's largeststate,thepartyhas been twicein power,
and withthesupportofotherparties.By 1996, theBSP had
thougheach timebriefly
startedreceivinga whopping20 percentof UP's vote, cripplingthe once-mighty
In the 1996, 1998, and 1999 national
Congressin itscitadelofgreathistoricstrength.
elections,the Congressparty'svote in UP was considerablybelow thatof the BSP.
Well until the mid-1980s, such scenariosforthe Congressin UP were altogether
inconceivable.
'?
9At 5 to 5.5 percent,the CPM's shareof the nationalvote has been onlyslightlyhigher
thanthatof the BSP in 1996, 1998, and 1999. But the CPM has each timewon manymore
seatsthantheBSP, fortheBSP's voteis notas geographically
concentrated
as thatoftheCPM.
'Oltis arguablethatif Mrs. Gandhi had not been assassinatedbarely3-4 monthsbefore
the 1984 nationalelections,the lowercaste upsurgewould have shakennationalpoliticsin
1984 itself,insteadof waitingtill 1989. Her assassinationchangedthe issuesentirelyin the
1984 elections.
10
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
How did theBSP breakthedependenceofthescheduledcasteson theCongress?
Kanchan Chandra,in her paper forthe symposium,providesan answerby taking
researchdown to the constituency
level. The resultsfromHoshiarpur,Punjab, are
reportedhere,supplemented
also withresearchdoneat theconstituency
levelin Uttar
Pradesh.
Chandraarguesthat the BSP's successin replacingCongressis built upon two
factors.First,affirmative
actionforthe scheduledcasteshas led to the emergenceof
a middle class among them. The new middle class is made almost entirelyof
officers
government
and clerks.Despite experiencing
upwardmobility,theseofficers
have continued to face social discrimination.Endured silently earlier, such
has bynowled to a firmresolveto fightforrespectand dignity.Second,
discrimination
the scheduled castes within the Congress experiencedwhat Chandra calls a
"representational
blockage." Most districtcommitteesof the Congresshave been
dominatedby upper-castepoliticians.Scheduledcaste leadersweremeretokensand
symbolsin the party structure.Since the early 1990s, such meager rewardsof
clientelismhave been consideredlargelyinsufficient
by the newlymobile scheduled
castes.
The new middle class eventuallytook overas local BSP leaders.Their strategy
was to arguethathumiliation,
ratherthaneconomicdeprivation,
was themainproblem
of the scheduledcastes,and thatgreaterpoliticalrepresentation,
insteadof material
advantage,was the principalsolution.The scheduledcasteshad to be horizontally
mobilized,had to havea partyoftheirown,and had to win assemblyseats.Financed
by the new middle class,the BSP took offin much of NorthIndia and developeda
largegroupof cadres.
newpoliticalrealitieshavedawned.
However,as the BSP has progressedfurther,
In no Indianstatedo thescheduledcastesconstitute
even30 percentofthepopulation,
norare theygeographically
concentrated,
norforthatmatterdo all scheduledcastes
vote forthe BSP, thougha large proportiondoes (Chandra,in this volume). As a
consequence,the BSP cannotcapturepowerat the statelevel,unlessit incorporates
othergroupsor developsallianceswith otherparties.The need foralliancemaking
has led to a moderationin BSP's rhetoric.Still, such moderationis different
from
fortheBSP now capturesbetween7 and 20
beinga clientin theCongresshierarchy,
percentofthevotein Haryana,Punjab,MP, and UP (ElectionCommission1996 and
1998) and thus,in a fragmented
politicalspace dominatedby no single party,the
BSP has the politicalmuscleto strikebargainsoverlegislativeseats,appointments,
werenotbargainedfor,but handed
policies,and materialgoods. In thepast,benefits
top-downby the Congresspartyand assumedto be sufficient.
Unlike thescheduledcastes,thescheduledtribesaregeographically
concentrated.
For example,in the stateof Bihar,the site of StuartCorbridge'sresearchreportedin
this symposium,theylive mostlyin the South. Since 1981, Corbridge'sfieldwork
amongBihartribalshas repeatedlytakenhim fromsomeofthe state'surbancenters,
wheremostofthetribalgovernment
and publicsectoremployeeswork,to threetribal
villages,fromwheretheycome. Combiningparticipantobservationand statistical
to compare the situationof tribals in
research,Corbridgeis able systematically
action
government
jobs withtheirruralbackgrounds.He arguesthatbothaffirmative
and democracyhaveoffered
newopportunities
to thetribes.Theyhavemadepossible
materialadvancementformany,and led to a new awarenessofpoliticsand powerfor
thewholegroup.
One consequenceof affirmative
action is that the tiny middle class of the
scheduledtribeshas becomeconsiderably
larger.And a resultof democraticpolitics
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
11
is thata tribal-based
politicalpartyhas been headinga movementfora separatestate
in theIndianfederation,
wherethetribalpopulationwould be in a majority.Though
several prejudicesand exclusionsremain,Corbridgeargues that the benefitsof
democracyand affirmative
actionhavebeen quite considerable,
and mayevenexpand
if a new statewith a scheduled-tribe
further
majorityis born in the comingyears.
The latterpossibilitycan no longerbe ruledout.
The OBCs, coveredby Christophe
Jaffrelot
in thissymposium,
aredifferent
from
theothertwo groups.As alreadynoted,comparedto the scheduledcastesand tribes,
the OBCs commandmuch largernumbers:accordingto the Mandal Commission,
Hindu OBCs constituteabout 43.7 percentofIndia's totalpopulation.Being mostly
Sudras,the OBCs have facedmanysocial and economicdisadvantages,but the fit
betweenthe two categories-OBC and Sudra-is not perfect.
If one goes by the all-India classification
of castes,a national-levelabstraction,
the picture that emerges is unable to capture the many regional variationsin
dominanceand power.Sociologistsand socialanthropologists
construethetermSudra
to include,but the categoryofOBC on the wholeexcludes,theso-called"dominant
castes": the Jats, Reddys, Kammas, Patels, Marathas,and others.The notion of
"dominantcastes"was coinedbyM. N. Srinivas(1966) to specifythosegroupswhich,
in a ritualisticor formalsenseoftheall-Indiacastelvarna
havebeentermed
hierarchy,
Sudras,but the ritualisticusage of the termis vacuous because thesegroups have
been substantiallandownersand ratherpowerfulin theirlocal or regional
historically
settings.In any realisticsense,the termSudra can not be applied to them,nor are
theytypicallyincludedamongthe OBCs.
Jaffrelot
arguesthatthe riseoftheJanatapartyto nationalpowerin 1977 was a
turningpointfortheOBCs. Since then,theshareofupper-castelegislatorsin North
Indian assembliesand nationalparliamenthas,by and large,been decliningand that
of the OBCs going up, the stateof Rajasthanbeing the onlyexception.In the first
Lok Sabha (1952-57), Jaffrelot
calculates,64 percentof North Indian Membersof
Parliament(MPs) werefromthe uppercastesand only4.5 percentfromthe OBCs;
by 1996, the formerproportionhad declinedto 30.5 percentand the latterrisento
24.8 percent.
Jaffrelot
withinthe sprawlingSudra category
also showshow the contradictions
have producedtwo different
kindsof plebeianpoliticsin NorthIndia. For political
mobilization,an urbanversusruralideologywas proposedby theredoubtableCharan
Singh,and an upperversuslowercasteconstruction
by Ram ManoharLohia. Charan
Singh'swas a sectoralworldview.It subsumedthe lowercastesin a largerpolitical
categoryoftheruralsector,in whichthelowercasteswerea clearmajority.His main
demandswereeconomic:highercropand lowerinputpricesin agriculture,
andgreater
in thecountryside.11
In contrast,
sincebothcitiesand villageshave
public investment
lowercastes,Lohia's ideologycut throughthe urban-rural
sectorsas well as Hindu
actionforthelowercasteswas Lohia'sprincipalthrustand a social
society.Affirmative
of state institutions-especiallythe bureaucracyand police-his
restructuring
primaryobjective(Lohia 1964).
Afterseveralups and downs,the biggestvotariesof sectoralpoliticshave been
defeatedin electoralpolitics. Nonpartypolitics is now their principal arena of
and castehas trumpedsectorin plebeianpolitics.If demandsforhigher
functioning,
agriculturalpricesare expressedtoday,it is the lower-caste
partiesthatprimarilydo
rural
so, not
parties.
11For
further
details,seeVarshney
(1995).
12
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
riseofOBCs, however,aretwocountervailing
Checkingthefurther
forces:Hindu
nationalismand the disunitywithinthe OBCs. With an ideologicalstresson Hindu
unityratherthancaste distinctions,the Hindu nationalistsseek to co-optOBCs in
the larger"Hindu family";and new distinctionsare also gettinginstitutionalized
betweenthe upperOBCs, such as the Yadavas, and the lowerOBCs, such as the Telis
and Lodhas.These differences
havealreadyunderminedtheOBC cohesionevidentat
the timeof the Mandal agitationof the early1990s.
It is notyetclear,saysJaffrelot,
whetherthelowerOBCs will risefurther,
oronly
the upperOBCs will. But, at any rate,a reestablishment
of uppercastedominance,
he suggests,is now ratherunlikelyin NorthIndianpolitics.Politicalpowerin North
India has moved downward.Even Hindu nationalists,the biggest proponentsof
Hindu unity,areincreasingly
caughtbetweengivinga greatershareofinternalpower
to the OBCs and emphasizingHindu unityover caste considerations.The latter
tendency,traditionallyunquestioned in Hindu nationalist politics, is being
challenged.Fightingit is a newideologicalposture- "socialengineering"
-proposed
by somepartyideologues,who would rathergive OBCs morepowerand visibilityin
the BJP. "Social engineering"is not anotherexpressionof vertical clientelism
organizedunderupper caste leadership,but an attemptto build Hindu unityby
lowercastesmoreequally.
incorporating
The New Plebeian Upsurge and Democracy
Has the rise of lower castes in the North, now added to their southern
The collectivejudgmentabove,as well as
empowerment,
changedIndiandemocracy?
the view of severalothers,is thatIndia's democracyhas becomemoreinclusiveand
participatory
(Sheth1996; Nandy 1996; Varshney1998; Weiner 1997; Yadav 1996a
and b, 1999). A relative professionalconsensus is building around Yadav's
thatIndia is going thougha "seconddemocraticupsurge."The first
characterization
upsurge,forhim,was the beginningof the end of Congressdominancein the mid1960s. In a century-long
perspective,
however,it is perhapsfairto saythatthisis the
fourthdemocraticupsurgein India. The rise of mass politics in the 1920s under
Gandhi's leadership was the first,and the universalizationof franchiseafter
independencethe second.
Such judgments,ofcourse,havenotremaineduncontested.
Even thosewho agree
thatpowerhas decisivelymoveddown the caste hierarchy
are unsureabout what it
meansforthecountry's
India's English-language
democratichealthor longevity.
press
has, on the whole,bemoanedthe riseof the new plebeianpoliticians,holdingthem
oftenresponsibleforthedeclineofpoliticalstandards.The anxiouschorusofeveryday
howthelanguageofpoliticshas becomemore
criticismhas acquiredstandardrefrains:
coarseand thestylemorerough,comparedto thesophistication
ofpoliticaldialogue
and conductunderNear; how menof "dubiousprovenance"havetakenoverelectoral
politics;and howthegovernmental
stabilityofa previouserahasgivenwayto unstable
and unrulycoalitions,in which mutual differences
quickly turn into unseemly
bickeringand intemperateoutbursts.Though rarelyopenlystated,the subtextof
English-languagecommentary
appearsto be that a democracymovingdownwards
maywell be a poorerand shakierdemocracy.
Such anxietyis genuinelyfeltand shouldnotbe lightlydismissed.It is notsimply
a swan song of an anglicized,globally linked, upper-casteelite, dominatingthe
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
13
powerfulEnglish-language
pressbut findingits politicaldeclinefrustrating.
We do,
however,need to put the anxietyin perspective.
A large number of political theorists today, not simply the so-called
lamentthe declineof moralvalues,or "civic virtue,"in all liberal
communitarians,
democracies.No currentlyfunctioningdemocracyin the world seems to have
institutions
or mechanismsin place to ensurea durablemoralor civic enhancement
ofthepoliticallife.Democraticpoliticians,saythesetheorists,
areincreasingly
turning
politics into a marketplace,paying attentionmerelyto the utilitariancalculus of
routinepolitics: winning electionsregardlessof what it takes to do so; making
promisesto citizensthatcannotbe fulfilled;
"misbehaving"whilein office
butseeking
coverof legal principlesand technicalformalities.
If the qualityof goals pursuedin
politics becomes immaterial,these political theoristscontend,even procedurally
correctdemocraticpolitics can only weaken the moral and civic fiberof nations.
Democraciestodayare ceasingto be "civicrepublics";theyarebecoming"procedural
republics"(Sandel 1996; Taylor1998).
Lest it shouldbe believedthatsuchlamentis confinedonlyto theinsulatedivory
towersof universities,
in the press.
considersome of the populardiscourse,reflected
"How low can theygo?," moanedNorthAmerica'sleadingbusinessnewspaperin its
editorial,reportingon campaignsin the U.S. forthe November1998 electionsand
thecorruptelectoralpracticesstillfollowedin somepartsofthecountry:
highlighting
thelegitimacy
(V)oterfraudis slowlyundermining
ofmoreandmoreelections....
Sincealmostall statesdon'trequirea photoID, it is fairly
easytovotein thename
ofdeadpeople,voteifyouarean illegalalien,falsify
an absentee
ballotorvotemore
thanonce.
... Twoyears
ago,groupsusingfederal
funds
hundreds
ofnon-citizens
registered
in OrangeCounty,
California.
. . . cameup with
The HouseOversight
Committee
thenameof1499voterswhoshouldbe removed
fromtherolls,butelection
officials
theLosAngeles
claimit is toolateto purgethemfortoday'selection.
Thismonth,
identified
submitted
Country
registrar
16,000phonyregistrations
by twogroups
alignedwiththeDemocratic
Party.
(The Wall StreetJournal,
3 November
1998)
A decline
Unvirtuouspolitics,in otherwords,is notspecificto Indiandemocracy.
in moralityand a debasementofpoliticalpracticesand languageareindeedsignificant
problemsfor any society,as they have been for India. But unless they entirely
invalidatecitizen preferences,
they do not amount to a negation of democracy.
the latteris not the conclusionofIndia's English-languagepress.It is a
Fortunately,
whichwe mayall share,not an argumentthatdemocracyin India
call forcorrection,
has becomemeaningless.
Democratic Authoritarianism?
A second challenge to the view that India's democracyis becoming more
is rathermoreradicalin conceptionand thrust.Simplyput,itsprincipal
participatory
claim is thatIndia's democracyis a sham.In Jalal(1995), we have themostdetailed
statementof this view, thoughsofterversionscan also be foundin Bonner(1994),
Brass(1990), Lele (1990), Shah (1990), and Vanaik (1990).
Accordingto thisview,changesat the level ofelectionsand electedinstitutions
are oflittleconsequenceso long as thesocialand economicinequalitiesofcivilsociety
14
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
remainunaltered,and the non-electedstate institutions,
especiallythe bureaucracy
and police,continueto act in an authoritarian
mannervis-a-visthecitizens,muchas
theyused to whenthe Britishruled.For democracyto functionin a real,notformal,
sense,therehas to be greaterpriorequalityamong its citizens.A deeply unequal
societycannotchecktheauthoritarian
functioning
ofthestatestructures
and therefore
cannothavea politythatis "really"democratic.
"Democraticauthoritarianism,"
Jalal argues,is the best way to describeIndia's
polity, and there are no fundamentaldifferences
between India, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh, except at the level of political superstructure.
All have profound
socioeconomicinequalitiesand all haveinheritedinsensitive,
colonialstatestructures
in whichthe nonelectedinstitutions
easilytrumpthe electedpowers-that-be:
Thesimpledichotomy
between
democracy
in Indiaandmilitary
authoritarianism
in
Pakistan
andBangladesh
collapses
as soonas onedelvesbelowthesurface
phenomena
ofpoliticalprocesses.
. . . (P)ost-colonial
IndiaandPakistanexhibitalternate
forms
ofauthoritarianism.
Thenurturing
oftheparliamentary
form
ofgovernment
through
themeticulous
observance
oftheritualofelectionsin Indiaenableda partnership
between
thepoliticalleadership
andthenon-elected
institutions
ofthestatetopreside
overa democratic
authoritarianism.
(Jalal1995,249-50)
Thus,evenwhenmeticulously
observed,electionsarebasicallya "ritual."At best,
theycombine"formaldemocracyand covertauthoritarianism"
(99). If societiesare
unequal,thepoorwill inevitablybe manipulatedby thepoliticalelite:
Unless capable of extendingtheirvotingrightsbeyondthe confinesof the
institutionalized
electoral
arenastoan effective
struggle
againstsocialandeconomic
exploitation,
legalcitizensare morelikelyto be handmaids
ofpowerful
political
thanautonomous
manipulators
agentsderiving
concrete
rewards
fromdemocratic
processes.
(48)
In its theoreticalanchorage,we should note,this kind of reasoningis not new.
Commonlyassociatedwith Marx,Lenin,Gramsci,Mosca, and Pareto,it has a long
lineage lastingovera century.The argumentsof Gramsciand Mosca are the most
elaborate.12
Gramsci(1971) reasonedthatso long as the economicallypowerfulhad
controloverthe culturalmeansofa society-its newspapers,
its education,its artstheycould establisha hegemonyoverthe subalternclassesand essentiallyobfuscate
thesubalternabouttheirowninterests.
And Mosca (1939) arguedthatin democracies,
giventheirmanyinequalities,dominationof a small elite was inevitable.
For our discussionabout casteand democracy,thereare two levelsat whichthe
claim about the emptinessof Indian democracycompelsattention:theoreticaland
empirical.The keytheoreticalissue is: Should we considersocioeconomicequalitya
fordemocracy?
And sincea changein thesocialbaseofparties-to reflect
precondition
a closer correspondence
betweenpartypolitics and India's caste structure-and a
changein the compositionof stateinstitutionsthoughaffirmative
action-to make
the staterespondbetterto the needsof the deprived-are the two principalaims of
lowercastepoliticians,thekeyempiricalquestionsare:Is theriseoflower-caste
parties
actionillusory?
onlyformal,not real?And is affirmative
'2Fora detailedtreatment,
see Dahl 1989, ch. 19
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
15
Is SocioeconomicEquality a Precondition
forDemocracy?
A theoretically
defensiblenotion of democracyis not possible based on the
exampleofSouthAsia, a regionin whichonlytwo countries-India and SriLankahave had the institutionsof democracy,formalor real,in place forany substantial
lengthof time. Any reasonablesense of theorymeans that we should cast our net
wider, especiallyif the larger universeis where most of the actually existing
democracieshavehistorically
existed.EitherSouthAsian materialscan be interpreted
in theframework
ofa larger,morehistorically
embedded,democratictheory,or their
empiricalspecificities
can be used to modifythebroaderinsightsofdemocratictheory
(Varshney1998). In and of themselves,South Asian instancesof democracycannot
make democratictheory.
In the leading textsof democratictheory(Dahl 1998, 1989, 1981, 1971), the
two basic criteriaof democracyhave been: contestationand participation.The first
principle,in effect,asks how freelydoes the politicaloppositioncontestthe rulers,
and the secondinquireshow manygroupsparticipatein politicsand determinewho
the rulersshould be. The firstprincipleis about liberalization;the second about
inclusiveness
(Dahl 1971, ch. 1).
Contestationand participationdo not requiresocioeconomicequality;theymay
affect,or be affectedby, inequality.Democratictheoristsexpectthat if sociallyor
economicallyunequal citizensare politicallyequalized and ifthedeprivedconstitute
a majorityof the electorate,theirpolitical preferences
would, sooneror later,be
reflected
in who therulersareand whatpublicpoliciestheyadopt.By givingeveryone
of priorresource-endowments,
universalfranchise
createsthe
equal vote irrespective
verticaldependence.In Europe,laborparties
potentialmechanismsforundermining
was extendedto the
pushingforworkers'interests
emergedin politics,oncefranchise
workingclass.
Anotherwell-knowntheoreticalpoint is germaneto a discussionof inequalities
and democracy.If inequality,despitedemocraticinstitutions,
comesin the way of a
freeexpressionofpoliticalpreferences,
suchinequalitymakesa politylessdemocratic,
but it does not make it undemocratic.
So long as contestationand participationare
variable (expressedas "more or less"), not a
available, democracyis a continuous
dichotomous
variable(expressedas "yes or no"). Variationsin degreeand dichotomies
shouldbe clearlydistinguished.In theclassicformulation
ofRobertDahl, theUnited
a
States was less of "polyarchy"(Dahl's preferredterm for an actually existing
beforethecivilrightsrevolutionofthemid-1960s, thoughit can in future
democracy)
be evenmoredemocraticifinequalitiesat thelevelofcivilsocietycomedownfurther
(Dahl 1971, 29). Similarly,by allowinga greatdeal of contestationbut restricting
participationaccordingto genderand class,England in the nineteenthcenturywas
less democraticthan it is today,but it was democraticnonetheless,certainlyby
and participation,
standards.Given contestation
nineteenth-century
greaterequality
makes
a politymore
butgreater
inand ofitself,
doesnotconstitute
certainly
democratic,
equality,
Thereis no democracywithoutelections.
democracy.
The claims above are empirical,not normative.They are not a defenseof
is betterthanhaving
inequalities,nordo theyimplythathavinguniversalfranchise
equality.Relativeeconomicequality,forexample,maywell be a value itself,and
we may wish to defendit as such. But we should note thateconomicequalityand
16
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
democracyaredistinctcategories.Societieswithhighlevelsofeconomicequalitymay
well be quite authoritarian:
South Korea and Taiwan until the late 1980s, China
under Mao, and Singaporetoday come to mind. And societieswith considerable
economic inequalitymay have vibrantdemocracies:India and the U.S. are both
believed to have a Gini Coefficient
of 0.4-0.45, as opposed to a more equal Gini
of 0.2-0.25 forthe pre-1985, authoritarian
Coefficient
South Korea and Taiwan."3
Preciselybecause economicequalityand democracyare analyticallydistinct,some
people mayquite legitimatelybe democratsbut not believersin economicequality;
othersmay believein democracyas well as economicequality;and still othersmay
be democratsbut indifferent
to thequestionofeconomicequality.A similarargument
can also be made about social inequalities.
In lightof the theoreticaldiscussionabove,let us now turnto India. Has Indian
democracybecome more inclusiveor not? And hasn't greaterinclusion reduced
socioeconomicinequalities?In case inequalitieshave come down as a consequenceof
thepoliticalprocess,it will, in thetheoreticaltermsproposedabove,makeIndia more
eventhoughan inabilityto reduceinequalitiesmorewill notmakeIndia's
democratic,
polityundemocratic.
Are the OBCs an Elite Category?
If "the so-calledotherbackwardcastes(OBCs) are in manyregionsthebetteroff
farmersand peasant proprietorswho benefitedfrom the Zamindari (absentee
landlordism)abolitionin the fifties"(Jalal 1995, 205), theirrisewould indeed not
constitutea significant
changein thepatternsof "social and economicexploitation."
An old set of "exploiters"would simplybe replacedby a class onlyslightlyless rich
and privileged.Are the OBCs an elite groupin the lattersenseof the term?
To call the OBCs "better offfarmersand peasant proprietors"is a serious
conceptualand empiricalerror,forit conflatesOBCs with "dominantcastes."Most
OBCs are notdominantcastes.The latterterm,as alreadystated,representsthose
have been
groupswhich in the national-levelabstractionof a varnalcastehierarchy
termedSudras,but fora whole varietyof regionalor local reasons,this termmakes
no senseforthem.Their powerand statushas farexceededanythingthat the term
Sudraimplies(Srinivas1966). The all-Indiahierarchy
forgroups
was simplyirrelevant
of substantiallandownerssuch as the Jats, Patels, Kammas, Reddys, Nairs, and
Marathas.Theyhavebeenmuchtoo powerfuland rich,eveniftheyarenotBrahmins,
orVaishyas,thecustomary
Kshatriyas,
upperthreeHindu varnas/castes.
Manyofthese
castesdid indeed benefitfromthe abolitionof Zamindari,if the Zamindarisystem
prevailedin theirareas.14
The dominantcastes and OBCs have some intersections-forexample, the
Okkaligasand Lingayatsin Karnatakacountas both-but thetwoarenotoverlapping
sets(Figure2). By and large,thecategory
ofOBCs is equaltotheSudrasminusthedominant
0 and
in a society,
incomedistribution
theGiniCoefficient
13Measuring
rangesbetween
1. The closera country
is to 1, themoreunequalit is,and thecloserto 0, themoreequal.
GivensimilarGiniCoefficients,
withhigherpercapitaincomes(USA) wouldhave
countries
thanthosewithlowerpercapitaincomes
farlesspoverty
(India).
14This,
however,
wouldnotbe trueoftheRyotwari
areas,wheretheMarathas,
Reddys,
Kammas,andPatelshavebeendominant
fora verylongtime.
IS INDIA
BECOMING
Castes\
about
6.3%
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
17
e.g.
Okkaligas,
Lingayats
Hindu OBCs
43.7%/o
Figure2.
OBCs and DominantCastes.
castes.The dominantcastesin northernand westernIndia-the Jatsand Patels,for
example-have in factopposedthe extensionof reservations
to the OBCs.
Can the argumentabout therelativeelitismoftheOBC categorybe extendedto
anyOBCs at all? The upperOBCs, suchas theYadavas,areindeedpeasantproprietors
and also beneficiaries
of Zamindariabolition.Much like the Patels in Gujaratat the
beginningof the twentiethcentury,the Yadavas have achievedsufficient
upward
mobilitysince the green revolution,and have used theirnumbersto considerable
effectin a democracy.One can indeed say that theyare fastbecominga dominant
caste,and will in all probabilitybe viewedas such in the comingdecades. But the
lowerOBCs, such as the Lodha, Pal, Mali, Teli and Maurya,are not as privileged.
This bifurcationof the OBC categoryraises an importantquestion: what
proportionof the OBCs can be called economicallydeprived?Though landholding
data forcasteshas notbeencollectedfordecadesand therefore
preciseestimatescannot
be given,simplecalculations-combiningtheseparatecasteand landholdingstatistics
in an empiricallydefensibleway-can show that a majorityof the lowerOBCs are
mostlikelyto be marginalfarmers
(owninglessthan2.5 acresofland)orsmallfarmers
(less than5 acres).
In 1993-94, about 36 percentofIndia was belowthepovertyline (Ravallionand
Datt 1996; The World Bank 1997). Therewould virtuallybe no OBCs in thisgroup
if we assumed that (a) all scheduledcastes (16 percentof India's population),all
scheduledtribes(8 percent),and all Muslims (12 percent)were below the poverty
line; and that (b) all upper caste householdswere above it. Both assumptions,we
know,are wrong.First,as Chandraand Corbridgeshowin thissymposium,boththe
scheduledcastesand tribesnow have a middleclass. Moreover,thereis a substantial
Muslim middle class in India: especiallyin southernand westernIndia fromwhere
migrationto Pakistanwas minuscule,but also in northernIndia wherea Muslim
middleclass has reappearedafterthe late 1960s.
Let us supposeforthe sake ofargumentthatof the 36 percentpopulationbelow
the povertyline, nearly30 percent(of the total) comes fromthe scheduledcastes,
18
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
tribes,Muslims and a tiny numberalso fromthe upper castes. With this more
reasonablesupposition,about 5-6 percentofthepopulationfallingbelowthepoverty
line would consistof the OBCs.
Sincethepovertyline is primarily
nutritional
in thedevelopingworld-meaning
thatbelow the line one could not even buy enoughfoodto get a basic minimumof
calories (The World Bank 1997, 3)-another 15-20 percent of the country's
population,widelybelievedto be onlyslightlyabove thepovertyline,would also be
quite poor.The OBCs thuswould constituteat least20-25 percentofthepopulation
thatis below,or just above, the povertyline. That, in turn,would make up 50-55
percentof Hindu OBCs (constituting,
as theydo, 43 percentof Indian population).
We also knowthatmarginalfarmers,
havingless than2.5 acresofland,constitute
about 50 percentofall landedhouseholdsin India (Visariaand Sanyal1977).15 Thus,
puttingthe caste and landholdingdata together,we can safelyinferthat marginal
farmersconstitutean overwhelming
proportionof OBC households.Even afterthe
in Indian agriculturehas not reachedsuch
greenrevolution,the level ofproductivity
a level thatwe can justifiablycall theselatterclasses"peasantproprietors
or better
16 In agrarianpolitical economy,the terms"peasantproprietors"
offfarmers."
and
"betterofffarmers"do not indicatedebilitatingeconomicdisadvantage,but rather
considerableadvantage.These are termsthatcannotbe appliedto marginaland small
farmers.
In short,to say that peasant proprietorsor better-off
farmersbenefitedfrom
Zamindariabolitionis correct;but to concludethatpeasantproprietors
and better-off
are by and largethe OBCs is a nonsequitur.Most lowerOBCs are not only
farmers
sociallysubalternbut also economicallyso, and onlyslightlybetterin both respects
thanthescheduledcastes.That is why,as Jaffrelot
argues,a keyquestionincreasingly
is: can the lower OBCs be incorporatedwith the scheduledcastes in a BSP-led
coalition,as opposedto partiesled by the upperOBCs?
Is Affirmative
Action Illusory?
action leads to the coTheoreticallyspeaking,it is possible that affirmative
optationof a tinylower caste and scheduledcaste elite into the existingvertical
withoutanywidelydispersedwelfare-gains
fortheircastes.Afterall, India's
structure,
affirmative
actionconcernsonlygovernment
jobs, not theprivatesector.In 1992, of
the nearly300 millionpeople in the work-force,
only20 millionwerein the public
sector.One can therefore
actionin thepublic sectorwill directly
say thataffirmative
benefitonly a small proportionof the deprived,and one can, in principle,suggest
that "access to education,governmentemploymentand state patronagebased on
theautonomyofthe
reservations
mayin facthavehamperedratherthanstrengthened
moreprivilegedand talentedmembersofthescheduledcastesand tribes"(Jalal1995,
209-10; also Gokhale 1990, and Sachchidananda1990).
Is thereevidence that this theoreticalpossibilityholds up empirically?This
actionforthe
questioncan, in turn,be brokendown into two parts:(a) affirmative
"5These
havenotsignificantly
proportions
changedin thelasttwodecades-atanyrate,
nottowards
ofthisparalargerholdings
which,iftrue,wouldhavechangedtheconclusions
graph.
'6Onlyin Punjabis it possibleto generate
a surpluson a 2-3 acrefarmtoday(Chaddha
1986).
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
19
OBCs (in additionto the scheduledcastes),which has takenthe formof quotas in
muchofSouthIndia sincethe 1920s; and (b) affirmative
actionforthescheduled
castes,
implementedall overIndia since 1950, to whichthe OBCs have been added outside
the South only after1990. Clearly,it is far too early to evaluate the impact of
affirmative
action forthe OBCs beyondsouthernIndia. For the scheduledcastes,
however,our empiricaljudgmentscan be nationalin scope.
In southernIndianstates,overand abovethescheduled
castequota,closeto 50 percent
the
have
for
of
stategovernment
jobs
been reserved OBCs in the stateof Karnataka
since the 1960s; in Tamil Nadu, the OBC quota was 25 percentto begin with,and
was increasedto over50 percentlater;in Kerala,theOBC quota has been40 percent;
and in AndhraPradesh,25 percent.What has been the impactof such large-scale
reservations?
Have the nonelectedstateinstitutions
changed?
No detailedbreakdownof statebureaucracies,
accordingto caste,is availablefor
South India, but thereis no mystery
leftabout the results.It is widelyknownthat
many Brahminssimply migratedout of South India as the OBC quotas were
instituted.Once access to governmentjobs, their traditionalstronghold,was
substantiallyreduced, some Brahmins went into the private sector, becoming
businessmenforthe firsttime,but a largenumbermigratedto Delhi, Bombay,the
UnitedKingdom,and theUnitedStates.Indeed,so largewas theflightand so capable
were the Brahminsof gettingjobs anywherethat theirmigrationto, and rise in,
Bombayled to a seriousanti-southern
movementin the late 1960s and early1970s
(Katzenstein1979). By now,bureaucracies
ofsouthernstateshavebecomeremarkably,
thoughnot entirely,non-Brahmin.17Moreover,thoughsystematicempiricalstudies
have not been undertaken,it is also widelyrecognizedthat the South is governed
actionin
betterthanNorthIndian stateslike Bihar and UP. Large-scaleaffirmative
does not appear to have underminedgovernancein the
bureaucraticrecruitment
South.
Let us now turnto the impactof reservations
forthe scheduledcastes.Kanshi
Ram, the leading scheduledcaste politicianof India todayand the leader of BSP,
actionhas "nowdone enoughforthescheduledcastes,"noting
arguesthataffirmative
thatin thestateofUP, of the 500 officers
in theeliteIndianAdministrative
Service,
137 are fromthe scheduledcastes(Mendelsohnand Vicziany1998, 224). However,
affirmative
action,Kanshi Ram adds, is "usefulfora cripplebut a positivehandicap
forsomeonewho wantsto runon his own two feet";instead,he says,the scheduled
castesshouldfocuson winningpowerthroughelections,for"the captureofpolitical
the compositionof the bureaucratic
elite" (224).
powerwill automaticallytransform
action leading to coCompared to the theoreticalpossibilityof affirmative
the claim of India's leadingscheduledcastepolitician
optation,noticehow different
is. Affirmative
action,in his judgment,is alreadyquite considerable,thoughit is at
the same time an inadequate tool for empowerment.In a new sign of political
affirmative
confidence,
action,he says,is forthe disabled,whereasit is time now to
play the game of democraticpoliticsmoreequally. Finally,his politicsare premised
upon the assumption that nonelected institutionsdo not trump the elected
will transform
thebureaucracy
and
institutions;
rather,capturingelectedinstitutions
It is the electedinstitutionsof India thatset the
police much morefundamentally.
thefaculties
ofScienceandEngineering
in manyAmerican
universities,
as wellas
17And
American
software
companies,
havea lotofSouthIndianBrahmins!
20
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
toneforthenonelectedstateinstitutions
ofbureaucracy
and police,nottheotherway
round.18
Afterall is said and done,the mosttellingevidenceof the impactofaffirmative
actionon the scheduledcastesmaywell be indirect,
not direct.Affirmative
action,as
Chandraand Corbridgeargue,has produceda new counterelite,
which has started
leading political mobilization.Chandra shows that scheduled caste government
officers,
beneficiaries
ofaffirmative
action,financedtheBSP and wereitsearlyleaders.
Rather than leading to a verticalco-optation,affirmative
action, by producinga
scheduledcasteelite,appearsindirectly
to havefacilitatedhorizontalmobilization.A
hamperingof autonomyfollowsdirectlyfromverticalclient-patron
links,not from
horizontalmobilization.
Deeper,but Unfinished'9
None of the above shouldbe construedto mean thatIndia can not be made still
moredemocratic.Thereis no doubt thatmanybattlesforsocial dignityand equality
forthe lower castes still lie ahead, even in South India (Bouton 1985); and so do
strugglesforwomen and minorities.The continuinghostilitybetweenthe upper
OBCs and scheduledcastesin severalpartsofIndia is anotherexampleofan unfinished
social transformation.
However,the papers here,as well as earlierstudies(Frankel
1990; Omvedt 1993), show that democracyhas alreadyenergizedIndia's plebeian
orders.Theyhavechallengedthe traditionalformsofclientelistic
politicsand started
fightingforgreaterpower.
Whetheror noteconomic
inequalitieshavegone down,socialinequalitiescertainly
have,evenforthescheduledcastes(Mendelsohnand Vicziany1998). This is a serious
achievement.If in South India it was not possible forEzhavas to walk on public
streets,ifit was impossibleforNadar womento covertheirbreastswhenwalkingin
frontof higher caste Hindus, if scheduled castes in much of India could not
traditionallyhave access to schools,public transport,and public wells, then the
emergenceofthenotionofbasicdignityamong,and for,thelowercastesin thepublic
eventhougheconomicinequalitiesmaynot
spheremustbe takenextremely
seriously,
have lessenedto the same degree.Thereis no uniquelyacceptablereasonto suppose
thateconomicinequalitiesmustbe givenprimacyoversocial inequalities.The battle
forsocial dignityis being increasingly
won in the public sphere.
By all accounts,India's democracyhas made such social victoriespossible. In
is higher
India,unlikemanyotherdemocraciesin theworld,theincidence
ofvoting
among
thepoorthanamongtherich,amongthelesseducated
thanamongthegraduates,
in thevillages
thanin thecities(Yadav 1996a and b, 1999). The deprivedseem to havegreaterfaith
in India's electionsthan the advantaged.Unless we assume short-sightedness,
the
subalternseem to thinkthatthe electoralmechanismsof democracycan be used to
fightsocioeconomicdisadvantages.
l8Jalal(1995) arguestheopposite.During thecolonialperiod,thenonelectedinstitutions
wereindeedmorepowerfulthantheinstitutions
based on limitedelections.The reasonsimply
was thatthe formerinstitutions
wereBritish-dominated,
whereasthe lattersaw manyelected
Indiansat thetop.Universal-franchise
democracyhasreversedthecolonialrelationship
between
the electedand the nonelectedinstitutionsin India.
19This sectionhas been inspiredby discussionsof Americandemocracyand its achievements.Indeed,it comesveryclose to the last paragraphofa greatbook on Americanpolitics:
"Criticssay thatAmericais a lie becauseits realityfallsso shortofits ideals.Theyarewrong.
Americais nota lie; it is a disappointment.
But it can be a disappointment
onlybecauseit is
also a hope" (Huntington1981, 262).
IS INDIA
BECOMING
MORE DEMOCRATIC?
21
It should also be noted that many scholarswho accept these claims have
nonethelessbeen quite criticalof some otheraspectsof Indianpolity.But we should
fromthe claim thatIndia's democracyis a
specifyhow theircriticismsare different
sham.The threemostcommoncriticismsare:
(1) That a seriouscrisisof ungovernability
has arisendue to increasingpolitical
participation
and theinabilityofthestateto respondadequatelyto therisinggroups
and demands(Kohli 1991).
(2) That India's politicalelite has focusedfartoo much on narrowidentitieson
theone handand purelyeconomicgoalson theother,but fartoo littleon usingpublic
policy to expand social opportunitiesforthe deprived(Dreze and Sen 1995). (By
"social," I might add, Dreze and Sen primarilymean educationand health,not
everydaydignityand ritualstatus,the sensein whichthe termhas been used in this
ofIndiandemocracyis undoubtedlypoorat the
essay.Though thesocialperformance
level of educationand health,its social performance
at the level of everydaydignity
and respect,as arguedhere,has been rathersubstantial.)
(3) That thereis nothingunnaturalaboutthepoliticiansmakinguse ofidentities
in democraticpolitics,but that does not explainwhy India's politicianshave paid
such inadequate attentionto issues of public policy in general,bothconcerning
educationand healthon the one hand and incomeson the other(Bhagwati 1993;
Weiner1991, 1986). Nothingin India's democracy
precludeda switchfromdirigisme
to a market-orientation,
as was demonstrated
in 1991, nordoes democracyruleout a
at universalprimaryeducationand public health,as SriLankaand some
greatereffort
Indian statesshow. Failuresof public policyhave less to do with democracyper se,
more with the ideologyand mind-setof India's political and bureaucraticelite
(Bhagwati 1993; Sachs,Varshneyand Bajpai 1999; Weiner 1986). Quite different
ideologieshave been,and can be, pursuedin a democracy.
Moreover,sensiblewelfare-enhancing
public policiesdo not alwayshave to wait
forpopularpressuresto build up; theycan emergewithan ideologicalchangefrom
above.20Though the subaltern,throughthe electoralprocess,have not so farpressed
India's decision-makers
forbetterincomes,educationand health,only foreveryday
dignityand respect,such a lack of pressureon the formerobjectivesdid not dictate
relativeinaction,or lack of boldness,on thepartof the government.
India's greatest
failureis one ofimaginationand awarenesson thepartofthepoliticaland bureaucratic
elite.
Notice theimplicationsofthethirdcritique.It acceptsthatelectionshavea real,
not simplyformaland ritualistic,value and yetit claimsthatifpopulardemands
were
orifthestateresponses
were,the resultsofIndia's democracywould be so much
different
more impressive.The admittedlyunremarkablefunctioningof the Indian state in
enhancingeconomic,educational,and healthopportunitiesforits massesis viewed
not as a negation of democracy,but a problem analyticallyseparable and one
attributable
to eliteideologies.Fora balancedrecord,suchfailuresmustbe contrasted
with the success of India's democracy,reflectedin rising participationand
inclusivenesson the one hand and victoriesat the level of social dignityand respect
on the other.By privilegingnumbersand giving freedomto organize,democracy
20The
shiftinIndia'sagricultural
policyinthemid-1960sis anexample(Varshney
1995);
so isaffirmative
actionenshrined
inIndia'sconstitution.
Bothcameintoforce
without
a popular
movement
in favor
ofeither.
22
ASHUTOSH
VARSHNEY
has become the biggestenemyof the hierarchiesand degradationsof India's caste
system.
Conclusion
Insteadof arguingthatonlyrelativeequalitycan producea democracy,a much
more empiricallygrounded claim would be that democracycan help reduce
inequalities,at least social if not economic.Understandinghow this happenedin
South India in the 1950s and 1960s is increasinglya necessityfor a deeper
of contemporary
understanding
NorthIndia. Not onlyhave socialhumiliationsgone
in the South,but thereis a consensusthatSouth India is on the
down significantly
wholeless unequal todaythantheHindi-speakingNorth(as well as bettergoverned).
It is clearthattheriseoflowercastesto powerbetweenthe 1950s and 1960s has
had a greatdeal to do with the transformation
of South India since then.Whether
the North will replicatethe South is still an open question;the proportionof the
uppercastes,forone, has alwaysbeen substantially
higherin the North,and lower
caste movementsin the South, foranother,did not have to contendwith Hindu
nationalism.However,should the northernoutcomeseven approximatesouthern
outcomesin the comingyears,as would seem likely,both votariesof the liberating
potentialof democracyand thoseof reducinginequalitieswill have much to cheer
about. India is, indeed, still far frombecoming a democracyfrombelow, but
democraticpoweris increasingly
movingdownward.Democracyis no longera gift
fromabove.
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