上海外国语大学
硕士学位论文
美国对外政策中的现实政治：
尼克松时期美国对外政策研究
院系：英语学院
学科专业：英语国家文化
姓名：顾诗婷
指导教师：王恩铭
2016 年 6 月
Shanghai International Studies University
REALPOLITIK IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE
NIXON ADMINISTRATION
A Thesis Submitted to Graduate Institute of Shanghai International
Studies University
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for
Degree of Master of Arts
By
Gu Shiting
Under Supervision of Professor Wang Enming
June 2016
学位论文原创性声明
本人郑重声明：本学位论文是在导师的指导下，本人独立进行研
究取得的成果。除文中已经加以标注和致谢的部分外，本论文不包含
任何其他个人或集体已经发表或撰写过的作品和成果，也不包含本人
为获得任何教育机构的学位或学历而使用过的材料。对本文研究做出
贡献的个人或集体，均已在文中以明确方式说明。本人对所写的内容
负责，并完全意识到本声明法律结果由本人承担。
学位论文作者签名：
签名日期：
年
月
日
学位论文使用授权声明
本人完全了解学校有关保留、使用学位论文的规定，同意上海外
国语大学保留并向有关部门或机构送交论文的书面版和电子版，允许
论文被查阅和借阅。本人授权上海外国语大学将本论文的全部或部分
内容网上公开或编入有关数据库进行检索，可以采用影印、缩印或扫
描等方式保存和汇编本论文。对于保密论文，按保密的有关规定和程
序处理。
学位论文作者签名：
签名日期：
年
导
签名日期：
年 月
师
签
名：
月
日
日
Acknowledgements
Finally, I have accomplished what is expected of me in the past three years. I
owe a debt of individuals who have contributed a lot to this dissertation of mine.
First of all, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Prof. Wang Enming, who
supported the field of research that I personally take an avid interest in and patiently
motivated me to logically present my ideas. His academic excellence, good sense of
humour and meticulous attitude towards research will always serve as an inspiration
to me and continue to have a lasting and positive impact on my academic life.
My heartfelt thanks also go to Dr. Tony McCulloch and Prof. Iwan Morgan, who
have been a constant source of support and encouragement for me during my study at
University College London. Without their invaluable advice, words of wisdom and
objective judgment, I might not have the courage to carry out the research to the end.
Besides, I wish to thank all the professors, lecturers and my classmates
at Shanghai International Studies University and University College London for
sharpening my mind and making me a better researcher.
Last but not the least, my heartfelt thanks go to my beloved parents. Whenever I
was depressed or felt thwarted by academic predicaments, my Father’s comforting
words was like a river of living water that never ceased to run. I felt so guilty that
because of the research, sometimes I could not take care of them to the best of my
ability. Now that the research is done, I hope I can spend more quality time with them
and reward all the sacrifices they have made for me.
i
摘要
1969 年，尼克松总统与其国家安全事务助理基辛格为美国的对外政策计划
了一套“伟大的设想”。当时的美国饱受内忧外患之困扰，全球霸权的地位亦备
受威胁。为了在不利的国际环境中争取更多的主动性，尼克松与基辛格二人其采
取了一种现实主义的政治手法来达成外交目的，即现实政治或政治现实主义。不
同与自威尔逊总统时期外交人士孜孜以求的理想主义对外政策，现实政治主张国
力、安全、稳定以及其他的务实因素要高于意识形态或伦理基础，并且成为了尼
克松对外政策的中心。
本篇论文旨在探索 1969 年至 1974 年尼克松掌权期间，现实政治在美国对外
政策中的作用。本文将围绕尼克松总统最重要的四个外交遗产——美苏关系缓和、
美中融冰之旅、美军撤离越南以及阿以冲突来剖析现实政治对于美国维持霸权地
位及争取冷战主动权的意义。本文的创新之处在于：不同于学界中众多关于尼克
松外交政策因由的剖析、尼克松对外政策的国内外政治环境描述、尼克松与基辛
格外交理念的比较等文献，本篇论文意在将其作为研究前提，针对尼克松外交成
就的修正主义的评价或质疑进行反思，重估 1969 年至 1974 年间现实政治从何种
程度帮助美国维持霸权地位及争取冷战主动权。修正主义不仅对尼克松饱受争议
的越南政策进行了新一轮的“攻击”，还对其及幕僚引以为傲的苏联、中国、阿
以外交遗产提出了质疑。本研究的目标是以案例分析、历史描述法作为方法论指
导，以国际关系及历史学作为基本研究范式，围绕尼克松对外政策的修正主义评
价，解析现实政治对于尼克松时期美国对外政策的意义。
关键词：现实政治；美国对外政策；美苏关系缓和；美中融冰之旅；美军越南
撤兵；阿以冲突
ii
Abstract
In 1969, Nixon, together with Henry Kissinger, devised a “grand design” for
U.S. foreign policy and employed a realist approach, known as realpolitik or political
realism, to fulfil their goals, with a view to maintaining America’s hegemonic status
in a disadvantageous global situation. At variance with idealist foreign policies
pursued since the Wilson administration, realpolitik came to the fore under Nixon and
emphasized power, security, stability and other pragmatic considerations over explicit
ideological notions or ethical premises.
This research intends to explore the role of realpolitik in U.S. foreign policy
from 1969 to 1974, by focusing on four major foreign-policy legacies of President
Nixon, namely détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with the People’s
Republic of China, military withdrawal from Vietnam and involvement in the
Arab-Israeli conflict. Literature concerning Nixon’s foreign policy is abundant but
less has been written in response to the doubts or revisionist reviews of his
achievements in foreign affairs. This dissertation aims to explore the extent to which
the theory of realpolitik helped maintain the hegemonic power of the U.S. from 1969
to 1974 by reassessing these revisionist ideas.
The goal of this research is to look into the history, draw upon the merits of
realpolitik in terms of preserving the U.S. prestige and if possible assess its value of
tackling global challenges in the contemporary times.
Keywords: realpolitik, US foreign policy, détente with the USSR, rapprochement
with the PRC, military withdrawal from Vietnam, Arab-Israeli conflict.
iii
Contents
Acknowledgements ..................................................................................................... i
摘要.............................................................................................................................. ii
Abstract ....................................................................................................................... iii
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
Chapter 1 The Emergence of “Nixinger” and the Choice of Realpolitik .............. 9
Chapter 2 Rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China ........................ 16
Chapter 3 Détente with the Soviet Union .............................................................. 23
Chapter 4 Military Withdrawal from the Vietnam War ...................................... 33
Chapter 5 Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict ............................................. 40
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 45
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 48
Introduction
“When Richard Nixon left office, an agreement to end the war in Vietnam had
been concluded, and the main lines of all subsequent policy were established:
permanent dialogue with China; readiness without illusions to ease tensions with the
Soviet Union; a peace process in the Middle East; the beginning, via the European
Security Conference, of establishing human rights as an international issue,
weakening Soviet hold on Eastern Europe.”1 Perhaps among all the commentators of
Richard M. Nixon, Henry Kissinger offers the best recapitulation of his foreign policy
achievements by the succinct while stirring eulogy he made in 1994 for the one-time
controversial President and “peace-maker” who fought for America’s leadership “with
courage, dedication and skill.”2 Ultimately, U.S. foreign policy under the Nixon
administration aimed to preserve American power and contain the Soviet Union. Its
achievements can be found in four areas of interest: the U.S.S.R, the P.R.C., Vietnam
and the Middle East. This research intends to explore the role of realpolitik in U.S.
foreign policy from 1969 to 1974, by focusing on four major foreign-policy legacies
of President Nixon, namely détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China,
military withdrawal from Vietnam and involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Throughout the grand trajectory of “the American Century” which embodied
the dominance of the United States in almost every realm—be it military capacity,
economic development, political power or cultural influence, the 1970s “stand out as
a curious anomaly.”3 Gradually losing grip on the absolute advantages it had enjoyed
since World War II, the United States underwent a relative decline of power from the
late 1960s until the 1980s. On the domestic level, the ongoing anti-war protests, the
aftermath of the civil rights movements, countercultural revolution in various forms, a
potential economic recession that was about to strike the nation in the mid-1970s and
so forth coalesced to shake the national confidence of the American people and trigger
1
Henry Kissinger, “Eulogy for Richard M. Nixon”, April 27, 1994,
<http://www.henryakissinger.com/eulogies/042794.html>
2
Ibid.
3
Fredrik Logevall et al, Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969—1977, (Oxford University,
2008), p.3
1
the excruciating process of seeking self-identity. Such apprehension about the
prospect of the nation was also shared by Hamilton Fish Armstrong, a military attaché
in Serbia during WWI and later the editor of Foreign Affairs. After all, never since the
Harding administration had “the prestige of the United States stood so low. We have
the military power and we have the economic power… to command the world. But
we do not have the moral prestige, because abroad governments and people know
what we know in our hearts ourselves, that our life forces, the forces that we felt made
us great, are dispersed and sullied.”4
On the international level, the global situation seemed even more complicated.
As is depicted by Henry Kissinger in the White House Years, “Simultaneously, we
had to end a war, manage a global rivalry with the Soviet Union in the shadow of
nuclear weapons, reinvigorate our alliance with the industrial democracies, and
integrate the new nations in a new world equilibrium that would last only if it was
compatible with the aspiration of all nations.”5 To be more specific, the challenges
facing the Nixon administration mainly stemmed from 3 sources: adversaries, allies
and the unfavourable global environment. In the first category, Vietnam was at the
heart of foreign policymakers in Washington. Irrespective of the peace talks in Paris
and the military plan of a bombing halt on the U.S. side, the prospect of reducing the
number of American troops in Vietnam was still gloomy and despondent.6 In addition,
the ascent of the Soviet power in terms of nuclear capacity as well as the Soviets’
growing assertiveness in expanding their “sphere of influence” from East-Central
Europe to the Third World had taken the United States down a peg and kept it more
alert to the intense Cold War. Also, the mysterious land in the Far East—China, still
remained mysterious, leaving no apparent sign of reconciling with the U.S. even as
the Sino-Soviet split aggrandized on a daily basis. As the second category indicates,
challenges came from America’s traditional allies as well, evidenced by France’s
4
Jeremi Suri, “Henry Kissinger and the American Grand Strategy,” in Nixon in the World: American
Foreign Relations, 1969—1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford University, 2008), p. 67
5
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 69
6
Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “Foreign Policy Overview,” in A Companion to Richard M. Nixon, ed.
Melvin Small (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2011)
2
dissatisfaction of America’s continued military existence in Vietnam, the improved
relation between Germany and the U.S.S.R. under the Social Democrat leader Willy
Brandt, the economic pressure imposed by an integrated Europe and a thriving Japan7.
Complicating the issue was a global environment teeming with crises: the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the civil wars caused by the decolonization in Africa, anti-Americanism in
Latin America as well as a volatile South Asia suffused with the antagonism between
India and Pakistan.8 Hence, Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger
were confronted with more severe foreign-policy challenges than the previous
administrations.
At this critical juncture, Nixon envisaged a “structure of peace” and in
association with Kissinger devised a “grand design” for U.S. foreign policy, which
increased, if not maximized, the chance of maintaining America’s hegemonic status in
a disadvantageous domestic and global situation. Though different in background and
personality, the two shared a dual goal of power and peace. Firstly, even though fully
recognizing the new limits their country faced, Nixon and Kissinger refused to adopt a
weaker foreign policy and aimed to impede the erosion of American power in every
means possible. To take Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam (November 3,
1969) as an illustration, the urge to preserve the hegemonic status of the United States
via the devolution of U.S. responsibilities upon its allies was the central theme of the
“silent majority speech.” Nixon proposed that “in cases involving other types of
aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in
accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly
threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its
defence.” 9 Secondly, the onus is also on the administration to erect a new
international order where peace is possible and durable. As Nixon put it in his first
inaugural speech: “The greatest honour history can bestow is the title of peacemaker.
7
Jussi M. Hanhimäki, “An Elusive Grand Design,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, pp.
29-30
8
Ibid.
9 Richard Milhous Nixon, Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam (November 3, 1969),
<http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech-3873>
3
This honour now beckons America—the chance to help lead the world at last out of
the valley of turmoil, and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of
since the dawn of civilization.”10 Nixon and his newly appointed team employed a
realist approach to achieve their grand strategy. At variance with a slew of idealist
foreign policies pursued since the Wilson administration, realpolitik, or political
realism which can be traced back to the great Greek historian Thucydides in the fifth
century BC, came to the fore under Nixon and emphasized power, security, stability
and other pragmatic considerations over explicit ideological notions or ethical
premises.11 The most radical change was their willingness to communicate with any
nation in accordance with “traditional standards of the national interest,” but not
ideology or social system which their predecessors found it almost impossible and
intolerable to ignore.12
A vast reservoir of literature concerning U.S. foreign policy in the Nixon
administration is contributed by scholars, journalists and politicians. Generally,
academics tend to approach the subject from two perspectives—IR paradigms and
history. With regard to the former, IR theorists of different schools diverge in their
views about Nixon’s grand strategy and his realist approach. Realists, for example,
hold a critical view of U.S. policy in Vietnam as well as its military withdrawal.
According to Hans Morgenthau, a classical realist, Nixon’s foreign policy in Vietnam
was initiated by absurd hypotheses and irrational estimation about the status quo and
in the end achieved almost nothing.13 If Nixon’s policies in Vietnam were assessed by
traditional standards of just war, i.e. whether the end was worth the means employed,
the President could only be given credit, ironically, for having shifted the casualties
and catastrophes from America to Vietnam.14 Surprisingly, it was influenced by two
contradictory impulses that “had moved it forward and held it back at the same
10
Nixon, First Inaugural Address, Monday, January 20, 1969
<http://bartleby.com/124/pres58.html>
11
Fredrik Logevall et al, Nixon in the World, p.6
12
Fredrik Logevall, “Bernath Lecture: A Critique of Containment,” Diplomatic History 28 (September
2004): 473-499
13
Hans J. Morgenthau, “The New Escalation in Vietnam, ” New Republic, May 20, 1971
14
Hans J. Morgenthau, “Nixon and the World,” New Republic, January 6, 1973
4
time.”15 On the one hand, the administration, based on rational thinking, realized the
danger of nuclear weapons and unlimited arms race and the urgent need to avert the
kind of “procrustean ideological constraint” or near crusading fervor that haunted his
predecessors. On the other, the government was still trapped in “conventional but
obsolete modes of thought and action” predicted on national interests, which espoused
“the quantitative and qualitative nuclear arms race” due to security considerations.16
However, Morgenthau could have furthered his argument by answering why the
“strategic paradox” came into existence. Was it because of the innate problem of the
realpolitik Nixon adopted or the imbalance between realism and idealism in U.S.
foreign policy? This dissertation intends to further discuss these questions. Liberal
internationalists, similarly, are also critical of U.S. intervention in Vietnam, paying
special attention to a lack of international support for the Nixon administration.
George C. Herring, for instance, argues that irrespective of the brilliant points of the
Nixon-Kissinger scheme, it has some fatal flaws, such as disregard for democracy,
emphasis of national interests over traditional American values and hatred for
bureaucracy.17 Starting from the social background of the duo, Herring effectively
explains how they converged in policy-making and conceiving a new international
order where American primacy was warranted. Ironically, fancying themselves
“masters of realpolitik,” they culminated in falling into, what William P. Bundy
described, a web of intrigue, deceit and reprisal woven by themselves.18 In the sphere
of New Leftism, U.S. foreign policy under Nixon is generally depicted as
imperialistic. Interestingly, economic motives are taken into consideration as one of
the driving forces of “U.S. imperialism.” Among New Leftists, Gabriel Kolko may be
the most vocal in claiming that the so-called “new Nixon diplomacy” is nothing more
than a set of impromptu and eclectic settlements to emergencies, “superficially
15
Hans J. Morgenthau, “Nixon and the World,” New Republic, January 6, 1973
Ibid.
17
George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (Oxford
University Press, Inc., 2008)
18
William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency (New York,
1998)
16
5
ingenious but ultimately even less likely to prove successful than the policies of his
predecessors in imposing the U.S.’s will on its wavering allies, Indochina, or China
and Russia.”
19
Indeed, the New Leftist has effectively demonstrated how
“superficially ingenious” the scheme was and a series of problems it would invoke.
However, he could have made himself more convincing by exploring the causes, both
in domestic and international politics, of such a scheme and its short- and long-term
effects on various countries concerned. Lastly, constructivists tend to evaluate Nixon’s
foreign policy via cultural and ideological roots enshrined in “Myth of America,”
which, according to Walter L. Hixson, “creates a structure of consent that enables the
hegemony of a militant foreign policy.”20 Immersed in the notion that America was a
“manly, racially superior, and providentially destined ‘beacon of liberty’” 21 and
deserved a special right to wield power in the world, Americans have the propensity
to resort to war on a regular basis for it reaffirms their hegemonic national identity by
forging “emotional bonds of unity, loyalty and patriotism.”22 This research will also
focus on the national identity of Americans and try to explore its influence on U.S.
foreign policy.
Throughout historiography, many scholars are inclined towards the psychology
of Nixon, the alliance between Nixon and Kissinger and crucial aspects in domestic
politics that influence the policy-making process. Dan Caldwell believes that Nixon
and Kissinger developed a grand design for American foreign policy over time. Lying
at the heart of the “design” were three elements: the acceptance of a “tri-polar
configuration of power” among the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and the P.R.C.; the
development of a moderate international environment where these three powers
coexisted; and the containment of communism “in the traditional Western sphere of
19
Kolko, Gabriel, “Vietnam Policy: Superficially Ingenious,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, April 2nd
2008
20
Walter L. Hixson, The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 10
21
Ibid, p. 1
22
Ibid, p. 14
6
influence” without triggering violent engagement with the Soviet Union. 23
Nevertheless, was the design comprised by special goals or simply a combination of
realpolitik modus operandi of force with diplomacy? Or even worse, was it just the
belated search of Nixon and Kissinger for major goals of the Cold War defined by
great power rivalry? On this point, Jeffrey Kimball seems to be more objective,
because he has taken into account views from different sides. To Kimball, Nixinger’s
grand design was improvised to cope with electoral politics, bureaucratic dispute, and
domestic and foreign crises and circumstances, with a view to creating the illusion
that “the wheel of American foreign policy” was working again under Nixon.24
Furthermore, he is very sceptical of Nixon’s moral integrity, emphasizing that on the
surface it was Nixon who managed to achieve an armistice in January 1973 by means
of “Vietnamization, the bombing of North Vietnam, the invasions of Cambodia and
Laos, and linkage and triangular diplomacy with the Soviet Union and the PRC,”25
but little has been written about his attempt to trigger greater U.S. intervention in
Vietnam prior to his inauguration. John L. Gaddis, the great historian on the Cold War,
has taken a different approach. In his great work Strategies of Containment, Gaddis
attaches more importance to the definition of power, the difference between vital and
peripheral interests, and the significance of diversity in terms of maintaining a balance
of power.26 In addition, he pays special attention to the partnership between Nixon
and Kissinger and suggests their similarity may lie in “a shared commitment to the
‘realist’ tradition in American foreign policy.”27
Literature concerning Nixon’s foreign policy is abundant but less has been
written in response to the doubts or revisionist reviews of his achievements in foreign
affairs. This dissertation aims to explore the extent to which the theory of realpolitik
23
Dan Caldwell, “The Legitimation of the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy,” Diplomatic
History 33, September, 2009, pp. 633-52
24
Jeffrey P. Kimball, Nixon’s Vietnam War (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998)
25
Jeffrey P. Kimball, “The Vietnam War,” in A Companion to Richard M. Nixon, p. 381
26
John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security
Policy during the Cold War, (Oxford University Press, Inc. 1982)
27
Ibid, p. 306
7
helped maintain the hegemonic power of the U.S. from 1969 to 1974 by reassessing
these revisionist ideas. The following questions are to be discussed fully in the
dissertation: what kind of role did Nixon’s realpolitik play in foreign affairs? In what
way did it preclude the United States from declining or declining too much? Albeit its
achievements, should realpolitik be held accountable for the fact that America was
actually in a mess when Nixon left office in August 1974? What were the short- and
long-term effects of these policies on the U.S. power? With these questions in mind,
the dissertation will be divided into seven sections: introduction, the emergence of
“Nixinger” and the choice of realpolitik, détente with the Soviet Union,
rapprochement with China, military withdrawal from Vietnam and involvement in the
Arab-Israeli conflict and conclusion. The goal of this research is to look into the
history, draw upon the merits of realpolitik in terms of preserving the U.S. prestige
and if possible assess its value of tackling global challenges in the contemporary
times.
As for the methodology of the research, a case study approach will be adopted.
Since realpolitik is per se a very theoretical concept, it is essential to elucidate its role
in U.S. foreign policy and demonstrate in details the characteristics of it via specific
cases. This dissertation will include a discussion of Nixon’s four foreign-policy
priorities, namely America’s foreign relations with the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam
and the Middle East, as strong cases to demonstrate the connection between
realpolitik and American power. A historical-descriptive methodology will also be
employed to outline how realpolitik was implemented in these various cases. The
research examines the period from 1969 to 1974, which covers the entire Nixon
administration and witnesses how realpolitik emerged and played a vital role in
foreign affairs.
8
Chapter 1: The Emergence of “Nixinger” and the Choice of Realpolitik
In order to have a better comprehension of the realpolitik advocated by Nixon
as well as Kissinger, this chapter of the dissertation will deal with several fundamental
questions: how to define realpolitik and the realpolitik espoused by “Nixinger”? What
was its role in previous U.S. administrations, especially since 1945—the onset of the
Cold War? Why did Nixon switch from his staunch “Cold Warrior” stance to a
pragmatic way of action? Did he show any signs of such change before he assumed
office? What was Kissinger’s outlook on the world before he was appointed by Nixon?
In what way did their similar comprehension of realism and geopolitics help shape
U.S. foreign policy?
Many historians have discovered the innate paradoxes in Nixon-Kissinger
foreign policy—revolutionary in methods while conservative in goals, flexible in
theory yet inconsistent in practice, realist in securing national interests but ideological
in defining national identity, strong in the mind but weak in the matter.28 All these
tensions in foreign policy resulted in success and failure in equal measure. Strikingly,
such contradictions were not the product of “Nixinger” or the Cold War era but the
embodiment of American history, a history composed by ideas and values that
sometimes run counter to each other and shape the way Americans view themselves
and respond to the outside world. In other words, such set of ideas and values were so
engrained in the mindset of Nixon and his policymakers that he inherited the
“contradictions” from his predecessors and incorporated them, consciously or
unconsciously, into the trajectory of U.S. foreign relations. Hence, it is imperative to
understand the paradox etched in the diplomatic history of America before analyzing
the contradictions in Nixon’s foreign policy. In succinct words, the inherent paradox
of U.S. foreign policy is the conflict between idealism and realism. For centuries, U.S.
leaders have struggled to keep their ideological fervour in balance with pragmatism.
On the one hand, Americans had a shared faith in the nation’s destiny.29 Positive that
they were predestined to build a “city upon a hill” that would demonstrate God’s
28
29
Logevall et al, Nixon in the World, p.7
Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn., 1987), pp. 19-45
9
special favour over them, they abhorred “Old World Ways” and had a natural
antagonism towards realpolitik and traditional diplomacy which in their eyes were
nothing more than “the pest of the peace of the world.”30 Early Americans even went
so far as to reject customary formal dress which reminded them of the degeneration of
European royalty.31 What they were looking forward to was a novus ordo seclorum, a
new world order, in which “enlightened diplomacy based on free trade would create a
beneficent system that would serve the broader interests of mankind rather than the
selfish needs of monarchs and their courts.”32 On the other hand, the afore-mentioned
ideological fervour that was deeply embedded in the way Americans’ mindset was
offset by pragmatism.33 After all, many American leaders in history were willing to
give first priority to vital national interests other than abstract national ideals under
certain circumstances, epitomized by Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt
who went further by proposing “a uniquely American brand of practical idealism,”34
i.e. pursuing national ideals in a realistic and pragmatic manner and making
adjustments or even concessions if necessary. Not only did such “balance between
realism and idealism” allow them to stay committed to the nation’s professed
principles and values but it also granted them an opportunity to pursue interests that
were significant to national security. By contrast, blind adherence to ideologies
without the thought of compromise was very likely to cause problems. Nixon’s Cold
War predecessors may be the best example. Harry S. Truman, for instance, attached
such great importance to international security, the defence of freedom and the
deterrence of dictatorships that he unconsciously fell into the illusion of analogy and
eventually decided to intervene militarily in Korea.35 By making comparison of the
Communist influence in Korea with Hitler in Austria, Mussolini in Ethiopia and
30
Felix Gilbert, The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy: To the Farewell Address (New York,
1965), p. 72
31
Herring, From Colony to Superpower, p. 3
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid, p.5
34
Ibid.
35
Neustadt et al, Thinking In Time, p. 43
10