xiv
vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
State’, Asian Survey, vol. 42, no. 5, 2002: 694–707; ‘From Patronage
to “Outcomes” and Vietnamese Communist Party Congresses Reconsidered’, Journal of Vietnamese Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007: 3–26
(both single-authored by me). Any errors of fact or judgement in the
book are, of course, mine.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
introduction
If one thinks about Vietnam today, what images does it conjure up?
It is not inappropriate to say that there is still a strong association
in many people’s minds with war and its aftermath, even if this
is not a day-to-day preoccupation within Vietnam. However, for
many people, the country also conjures up a multiplicity of other
images: a vibrant street life, amazing food, a country in transition
from plan to market, industrialization, continued Communist Party
rule, a strange mixture of seemingly free-market capitalism and yet
continued talk of socialism, an increasingly vibrant public sphere,
leading, for some, to thoughts of political pluralism, and a ruling
party which is struggling to come to terms with a changing society
and economy.
Underpinning much of the commentary on contemporary Vietnam
is also a heavy association with ‘reform’, usually understood as a set
of policy changes associated with events which gathered momentum
from the late 1970s and early 1980s. The much-celebrated Sixth
National Communist Party Congress in December 1986, widely
seen as the birthplace of doi moi (renovation), is strongly associated
with such a position. Here, the policy changes are usually depicted
in terms of increased economic openness, reflected in support for
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
vietnam
export-oriented trade and foreign direct investment, encouragement
of the private sector, and alignment or partial alignment with various
neoliberal-inspired policies. This book, however, encourages a move
away from a preoccupation with ‘reform’ as necessarily being about
change, or as somehow capturing what Vietnam is about, or the
character of its politics, suggesting instead a need to get behind
this overused label.
As a consequence of this, some of the dominant images of Vietnam
which are explored throughout the book have relatively little to do
with the sweeping away of what was there before but instead relate
to the persistence, or reworking, of existing power structures. As
will be seen, the book is not very sympathetic towards ideas of state
retreat (although it is open to state change), arguments which imply
the unmediated advance of neoliberalism or liberal democracy (even
if not now but ‘some time in the future’, as is often implied), or
positions which emphasize the very great power of external forces
in relation to something more indigenous. However, none of this
should be mistaken for a position which thinks that the Communist
Party will always rule Vietnam, not least because no political party
rules for ever.
An approach to studying politics
As well as being about Vietnam, the book also lays out an approach
to studying and conceiving of politics. So what, in outline, does this
approach to studying politics look like?
In one sense, it is correct to say that this is a book about the state
– as is captured in the book’s title. However, this is to raise some
interesting and not necessarily straightforward questions about the
relationship between politics (or power) and the state. For example,
if one is interested in the state, is this synonymous with being
interested in politics? Or, to turn it around, if one is interested in
politics, must one automatically be interested in the state? This
book advocates an approach which says that studying issues to do
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
introduction
with politics, and more pertinently power, is the means by which
we potentially shed light on the entity we call the state. In saying
this, it is not being suggested that the political realm should be seen
as being synonymous with the state (the book is open to the idea
that the state is just one part of the political and not necessarily the
most important part). However, in the approach to studying politics
which is advocated here, it is argued that if we are to stand a chance
of shedding light on the state it is important that as researchers we
do not focus directly on it. This may sound a strange thing to say,
but what are its implications in terms of method?
The problem with focusing directly on the state is that to do so
is in fact to define the object of our study in advance, which is a
common problem in political science. The widespread tendency of
scholars, including those who study Vietnam, to describe themselves
as working on ‘state–society’ relations illustrates the problem perfectly since it assumes there is something clearly identifiable called the
state to study – with clear boundaries, and so on. Instead, this book
argues that it is necessary to try and surrender any preconceptions
as to what the state is and, put simply, trust that what the state really
is will come back into view as we focus our attention elsewhere. Of
course, this is trickier than it sounds, but we must try.
It is this desire to surrender our preconceptions about the state
which lies behind the book’s focus on business – as reflected in
many of its chapters – as a particularly fruitful window onto the
political, and ultimately the nature of the state, precisely because
in the world of money-making questions of ‘public’ and ‘private’,
or state and society, seem more mixed up. Central to the method
for studying politics advocated in this book, and related to the
previous point, is also a commitment to looking at ‘actors’ – whether
formally of the ‘state’ or not, albeit operating in a distinctive,
power-laden setting – and seeing what they tell us about the political
and ultimately the state. Writing on Africa, Béatrice Hibou says
something similar, arguing that to understand the state it is necessary to ‘understand the people in power and, equally important,
vietnam
their games, their strategies and their historical practices’ (Hibou
2004: 21). It is through such a focus, she suggests that the outlines
of the state come back into view. This too is the approach taken
in this book.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
Continuity and change in politics
All the book’s chapters seek – in their different ways – to advance
us towards an answer to our key research questions, namely ‘what
is the nature of the state?’, and ‘what is the relationship of the
state to the political?’, both of which are revisited at the end of the
book. Throughout the book’s eight core chapters, which are based
on fieldwork conducted from 1996 to 2007, it is clear that events in
Vietnam are not standing still. This comes across most obviously in
respect of changes affecting state enterprises (many of which have
undergone significant organizational change in recent years), the
growth of Vietnam’s capital markets, and signs of a widening of the
political space, or a more vibrant society.
However, at another level, one of the messages of the book is that
while some of the actors and institutions may change, and while
the relative weight between different dynamics may shift somewhat,
certain things do not change very fast. This takes us to the heart
of issues to do with the nature of the political, namely the way in
which there is an underlying logic to Vietnam’s political system – and
not just Vietnam’s – which means that power continuously seeks to
re-create itself. Central here is the strong association in Vietnam
between holding public office and making money, such that when
certain institutions or money-making avenues are closed down, the
logic of the system is such that they tend to spring up elsewhere.
This can be seen most clearly in respect of public administration
reform pursued by the international donor community in Vietnam
since the 1990s, such that Vietnamese newspapers today are still full
of stories about troublesome institutions, or the time that it takes
to get things approved either as a citizen or as a business. Such
introduction
complaints were widespread in the late 1990s. The only change more
than a decade on relates to the institutions and, to some extent, the
actors involved, not to the underlying practices themselves, which
persist. While none of this necessarily makes for ‘good governance’,
or any of the other normative labels commonly hung on the state, it
does tell us something about power.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
The inappropriateness of reform as an organizational motif
We will return to many of the issues raised in this introduction in
the book’s conclusion, when we pull together what we understand
by the state and its relationship to the political in a more overtly
theoretical sense. However, since this book is also about eschewing
some of the stereotypes commonly bandied around in popular and
academic discourse on Vietnam, we will conclude this introduction
by revisiting the question of the appropriateness of ‘reform’ as a
motif for making sense of what has occurred in Vietnam over the
last fifteen to twenty years. In this book, the concept of ‘reform’ is
not seen as having much utility as a window onto Vietnam. Instead,
it is seen as preferable to refer to the more neutral ‘marketization’
or highlight a process of international economic integration. If the
term ‘reform’ is used, it is usually followed by the word ‘years’ (i.e.
‘the reform years’). In this way, the word ‘reform’ is being used to
indicate an approximate period of time (largely the 1980s onwards)
and there is an implied rejection of any of the other connotations
usually associated with the term ‘reform’. But why might the concept
of reform be seen as distorting?
There are at least four key problems with the idea that ‘reform’
offers a satisfactory window either descriptively or in explanatory
terms onto what has happened in Vietnam over the last fifteen to
twenty years. First, to talk in terms of reform is immediately to place
the emphasis on change. This, it has already been suggested, runs
the risk of downplaying important areas of continuity, whether this is
in terms of the persistence of existing power structures, elite control
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
vietnam
over the economy, or particular forms of rule. Some readers may
retort that of course we know that reform is not just about change.
However, in terms of emphasis, continuity tends to be neglected.
Indicative of this is the way in which it is quite hard to tell the
story of ‘reform’ without depicting contemporary developments in
Vietnam in terms of everything the pre-reform years were not (i.e.
not closed, not planned, not supportive of the private sector), and yet
on closer analysis of the pre-reform years such a stark characterization is difficult to sustain.
Second, the focus on reform as change tends to place the emphasis on policy change introduced by Vietnam’s elite, implying further
that policy is the key driver of change. In fact, it is questionable that
policy is a leading determinant of change in Vietnam (or elsewhere),
or that change is something which elites are necessarily in control
of. To talk in this way is to make a distinction between the formal
and the informal, or what actually happens, and this is an important
characteristic of this book. Writing on China, Barry Naughton has
referred to accounts which place a heavy premium on elite-led
policy change as the key to understanding the reform years as offering a sanitized morality tale with crucial details airbrushed out
(Naughton 1995b: 22). These details, it is argued here, often relate
to the more Machiavellian aspects of politics, which have to do with
money, patronage, strong-arm tactics, and elite self-interest. By not
mentioning or by downplaying these things, talk of reform serves a
legitimating function in terms of those in power.
Third, accounts which place the emphasis on reform as somehow
capturing what has happened in Vietnam rarely pause to consider
what policy actually is. On closer inspection, what we find is that
what people tend to call policy – a disparate collection of elite
actions and counteractions – is often much less coherent than is
thought. Moreover, policy coherence is something we (‘insiders’ and
‘outsiders’) like to impose upon the state in a bid to reinforce the
state in the image of what we think it ought to be. That we behave
like this, state theorists would suggest, reflects the way in which the
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
introduction
state as an idea exerts power over us, as well as, in many cases, our
own closeness to power (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 1991).
Finally, the inappropriateness of reform as a window onto Vietnam
extends to assumptions about what constitutes politics, which is
itself bound up with the use of the word ‘reform’. Here, the tendency
is to view politics in terms of disputes between rival factions grouped
around distinct policy positions: traditionally the ‘reformer’ and
‘conservative’ language, which, the record shows, Vietnam scholars
have found hard to jettison despite its many problems. However,
what we find is that politics is much less about disputes over rival
policy positions – elites in Vietnam hang loose to policy – than
about money, patronage and loose political groupings linked to
personalities. People often do not want to be identified too clearly
with any particular policy position as this potentially restricts their
freedom of movement, and prevents opportunism in terms of going
after resources, particularly financial resources on offer from the
international donor community.
Given the position being advocated here in respect of downplaying the significance of reform and/or policy, the question arises
whether reform and policy offer any salience at all in explaining
outcomes in Vietnam. The position taken in this book is that while
it would be a mistake to dismiss them entirely, they are just one
factor among many which determines outcomes.
Structure of the book
The rest of the book is structured as follows. Chapter 1 looks at why
the Communist Party continues to rule in Vietnam despite rapid
economic growth and social change. Chapter 2 seeks to challenge
ideas about Ho Chi Minh City’s distinctiveness vis-à-vis the rest of
the country, highlighting a common ‘reform’ political economy in
which state business interests are important. In this way, the chapter
introduces crucial details about Vietnam’s political economy which
are relevant for the rest of the book. Chapter 3 seeks to understand
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
vietnam
the phenomenon of big corruption cases, asking what they teach
us about politics and the state. Chapter 4 looks at equitization in
Vietnam, specifically trying to account for why equitization suddenly
speeded up in the very late 1990s after years of going nowhere.
Continuing with the theme of equitization, Chapter 5 shows how the
sale of shares in state companies should not necessarily be associated
with state retreat, including highlighting the use of uncertainty as an
instrument of rule in Vietnam. Chapter 6 on local politics considers the impact of globalization on the state in provincial Vietnam,
suggesting that, as with equitization, it is a mistake to associate
globalization necessarily with state retreat. Chapter 7 examines one
of the key events in Vietnam’s political calendar, namely the National
Communist Party Congress, held every five years. Adopting a revisionist tone, it argues that Congresses are less about policy issues
than an occasion when access to patronage and political protection
are circulated. Chapter 8 looks at neoliberal ideas about the state,
seeking to explain why they have been relatively uninfluential in
the direction of state change in Vietnam. The book concludes by
asking how, in light of the preceding chapters, we understand the
state and its relationship with the political.
1
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
communist part y rule
Some two decades after the collapse of Communism in Eastern
Europe in 1989 and the former Soviet Union in 1991, Vietnam is
just one of a handful of states where Communist Party rule persists
(the others being China, North Korea, Laos and Cuba). While
Vietnamese society is undoubtedly witnessing new forms of political
expression, and pressure on the state, against the backdrop of rapid
economic development, the fact of continued Communist Party rule
at this juncture – whatever the future holds – requires some explanation. This chapter considers this issue with reference to theoretical
ideas which have their origins in Barrington Moore’s now classic
text, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Moore 1966).
Moore’s writing has since been built upon by other scholars, including most notably Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992).
These writers, who emphasize the importance of changing class
relations, state power and transnational forces in explaining moves
towards greater democracy or their absence, are to be contrasted
with those who focus on such things as political leadership, culture
and political parties to explain why democratization has or has not
occurred (Potter 1992: 355–79).

vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
box 1.1 Vietnam’s formal political system at a glance
Vietnam is a one-party state headed by the Communist Party of
Vietnam (CPV). The National Party Congress is the highest body of
the CPV and meets every five years. The Party Congress elects the
Central Committee, the party organization in which political power
is formally vested and which meets in plenary sessions at least twice
a year. The Central Committee elects the Politburo and the general
secretary of the Party. Between plenums the Politburo runs party
affairs. The general secretary of the CPV, the president, the prime
minister and the chairman of the National Assembly, Vietnam’s parliament, are all members of the Politburo. Formally speaking, the CPV
sets policy direction, which the government implements, although
the reality is far more complex. The government consists of the
prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, ministers, and heads
of organizations of ministerial rank. The government is accountable
to the National Assembly and reports both to the National Assembly
and to the president. The National Assembly is the highest ranking
organization of the state and the only body with constitutional and
legislative powers. Members of the National Assembly are elected
through national elections held every five years. In terms of subnational government, People’s Councils are elected at the provincial,
district and commune levels. The People’s Council is the highest state
institution at the sub-national level, responsible to the electorate at
each level and the National Assembly at the national level. People’s
Councils elects People’s Committees to serve as the executive institution at the local level, although historically the People’s Councils
have been weak.
This chapter, which looks at political change in Vietnam over the
past twenty or more years, will do so primarily with reference to the
first body of literature. This has the advantage of helping us move
away from a heavy reliance on the so-called ‘middle classes’ as the
standard-bearer of democratization, which in recent years has tended
to become the sine qua non of whether a country democratizes
or not. While not ignoring the potential role of the middle class,
the writings of Moore and Rueschemeyer et al. situate it within a
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
communist party rule

broader context. Drawing on historical cases from the seventeenth
to the twentieth century, these writers between them single out five
classes as being important as to whether a country democratizes.
These are large landowners, the peasantry and rural workers, the
urban working class, the bourgeoisie (or capital-owning class), and
the salaried and professional middle class. The writers argue that
it is not only the changing stance of individual classes brought
about by economic development that has a bearing on whether a
country democratizes but also the relationship among classes and
their relationship with the state.
In terms of the focus of this chapter, some of the writers’ most
interesting findings concern the position of the middle class or
bourgeoisie. Drawing on the historical record, they note that while
the middle class has been a force for democratization, it has often
as not sided with authoritarianism. According to Moore, what is
important is not simply the existence of a large middle class but its
relationship with the state. That is, if it is to support democratization, it needs to be ‘vigorous and independent’ from the state. This
chapter explores what this means in relation to Vietnam, particularly
focusing on business interests that have emerged during the reform
years. Also important, according to Rueschemeyer et al., in terms
of whether the middle class will be a force for democratization, is
its relationship with the working class. In countries where there is
a large and politically active working class, the middle class has
tended to feel threatened, favouring instead the authoritarian status
quo. This issue will also be considered in relation to Vietnam. In
addition, the chapter considers the nature of state power in Vietnam
and the impact of transnational forces on the Vietnamese political
scene, because these issues are also emphasized by these writers as
having a bearing on whether a country democratizes.
The danger with the approach being proposed here is that it
can all too easily be taken to assume that all countries are travelling on the same historical road, ending with the establishment of
liberal democracy. When looking at political change in authoritarian
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
states, we, in the West, find it genuinely very difficult to conceive
of any other end point. And yet the experience in Asia to date
would seem to suggest that Western-style liberal democracy is one
of the least likely conclusions. Even Thailand and the Philippines,
often seen as Asia’s most democratic states, display many features
that suggest their democracies are more formal than substantive
(Anderson 1988a; Hutchcroft 1991; McCargo and Pathmanand 2005;
Sidel 1996). Moreover, Singapore, with its long-standing capitalist
development and substantial middle class and yet the absence of
a democratic transition, although perhaps explained by Moore’s
emphasis on the importance of middle-class independence from
the state, nevertheless seems to point to the possibility of another
kind of evolution. One only has to read interviews with Singapore’s
leadership to be aware of the very different philosophical and cultural tradition on which it draws (Rodan 1992; Heng and Devan
1992). We can, of course, dismiss the language of such politicians
as simply a cover for authoritarianism. However, in terms of trying
to gain a sense of how politics in Vietnam, or elsewhere in Asia, is
likely to evolve, it seems worth taking this differentness seriously.1
These issues will be considered further towards the end of the
chapter. In the meantime, it is important to bear in mind that the
issues discussed below have been chosen because they appear to
have been significant in the evolution away from authoritarianism in
other historical contexts. However, they are not deterministic; nor
do they provide much insight into the nature of political systems
that will emerge in place of authoritarianism.
Changing class interests under reform
The onset of reform in Vietnam is variously dated from 1979, when
the first tinkering with the central plan was carried out; from 1986,
when the Vietnamese Communist Party held its Sixth Congress;
and from 1989, when rather more substantive structural economic
changes were introduced. Whatever one prefers, Vietnam for twenty
communist party rule

years or more has been undergoing a shift from a system of central
planning to one that places greater emphasis on the market to allocate goods and services. During this period, the ruling party has
eschewed making changes to the political system along multiparty
lines, focusing instead on making one-party democracy work better.
Nevertheless, driven by growing integration into the world economy,
the past decade and a half has seen rapid economic growth in
Vietnam and rising per capita incomes.2 This has had repercussions nationwide and in all sectors of society. The chapter will now
consider the impact of the last fifteen or so years of rapid economic
growth on class formation and the relationship among the five different classes cited above.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
large landowners
The first class mentioned in the theoretical literature is large landowners. Historically, they have been against democratization. In
Vietnam’s case, it would appear to be axiomatic to argue that such a
class does not exist. Large landowners were purged in the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam during the 1950s, with the process continuing
in liberated areas of the south during the 1960s and after the Communist victory in 1975 (Porter 1993: 57–8; Dacy 1986; Beresford
1989). According to the theoretical literature, the fact of their absence
would seem to work in favour of a democratic transition.
However, is it right to see Vietnam as a country devoid of a large
landowning class? Despite continued formal restrictions on the
maximum permitted landholdings in the countryside, the reform
years have been accompanied by the growing incidence of landlessness with its obvious corollary, namely the re-emergence of large
landowners (Kerkvliet and Porter 1995; Dahm and Houben 1999;
de Mauny and Hong 1998). There is also a confluence of interest
between the government’s stated desire for foreign investment in
agroprocessing and the need for large landholdings. Foreign investment in agroprocessing has not been huge, but foreign agroprocessors have been able to secure large tracts of land when desired.

vietnam
One might also argue that while the large landowners of the
ancien régime have been toppled, in their place there has emerged a
new landlord class, namely Communist Party cadres and government
officials. After all, it is very often they, or their family members, who
dominate the rural economy (Kerkvliet and Porter 1995; Kerkvliet
2005). If this analysis is correct, the prospects for a widening of the
political space look less good.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
the peasantry and rur al work ers
The second class is that of peasantry and rural workers. According
to the theoretical literature, the peasantry have historically had an
interest in democratization but have not been much of a force for
it, largely because they have been poorly organized. The fact that
Vietnam continues to be a predominantly rural society two decades
after reform would seem to imply a relatively weak impulse for
democratization. Nevertheless, with urbanization proceeding apace
the situation is changing. Only 20 per cent of GDP is now derived
from agriculture, although some 73 per cent of the population is still
classified as rural (World Bank 2008).
Since the 1990s, rural unrest has become more common. The
causes of the unrest are multiple but they would appear very often
to be linked to land disputes involving local elites, often with allegations of elite corruption (Kerkvliet and Porter 1995; Kerkvliet 2003).
Although there is no evidence of direct foreign sponsorship of rural
unrest, dissident non-government groups based overseas and foreign
human-rights organizations have been quick to champion the cause
of aggrieved rural communities, while foreign governments, including the United States, have criticized the government’s handling of
such incidents.
Beyond individual instances of unrest, it would, however, be
misleading to speak of a rural opposition in Vietnam understood
in terms of an organization with a common institutional base and
a coherent critique of party rule. Some scholars have alluded to
the growth of autonomous farmers’ groups (Fforde 1996: 78–80).
communist party rule

However, while it is clear that some farmers groups are increasingly
outspoken, whether this amounts to clear or aspirational autonomy
from the Party is less certain.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
the urban work ing class
The third class mentioned is the urban working class. It is regarded
as having been an important force for democratization. In Vietnam,
the urban working class is still quite small, given the predominantly rural nature of the country. However, the reform era has been
accompanied by rapid urban growth, and hence a growing urban
population. This has been driven in large part by spontaneous ruralto-urban migration, as strict controls on the movement of population
have broken down and as farmers have flocked to the cities in search
of employment on construction sites and in the factories that have
sprung up in the context of marketization. By 2010, it is expected
that one-third of the population will be urban-based.
In terms of organized labour, the urban working class has yet to
flex its muscles in a way which has moved the political goalposts
significantly. Labour relations have certainly become more complex
during the reform years, with the growth of private, including foreign,
capital. Since the early 1990s, strikes have become more common,
including ‘wildcat’ strikes and the emergence of self-proclaimed but
as yet not recognized independent trade unions. Nevertheless, organized labour has been kept weak by a combination of an uncertain
legal framework governing its activities and an official trade union,
the Vietnam General Confederation of Labour, which, given political
pressures on it, cannot represent workers adequately (Chan and
Norland 1999; Clarke 2006; Hanson 2003: 45–67; Ying Zhu and
Fahey 2000: 282–99).
the bourgeoisie
The fourth class is the bourgeoisie, understood here as the capitalowning or business class. In the popular view, entrepreneurs are
often viewed as being part of the middle classes, and hence seen
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
as a force for democratization. However, in the writings of Moore,
Ruesche­meyer and others, bourgeoisies are typically viewed as
taking an ambivalent stance towards democratization. Richard
Robison, for instance, has referred to an effective ‘pact of domination’ between capital-owning classes and the authoritarian state
in Suharto’s Indonesia, based around perceived shared interests
(Robison 1988).
In Vietnam, the reform years have certainly seen the emergence
of a new business elite. However, while this elite is new in terms of
its business interests, it is in fact rather old in terms of its political
ties. That is, many of the new entrepreneurs have emerged from
within the existing system, are currently serving or former officials,
or are the children of the political elite. To succeed in business,
companies are still very reliant on the state for licences, contracts,
access to capital and land, and, very often, protection (Gainsborough 2003a). Moreover, while this may be changing in some
areas with business becoming more confident and less ‘dependent’
(Cheshier 2010; UNDP 2006), Vietnam still lacks the ‘independent
or vigorous bourgeoisie’ cited by Moore as a necessary element in
democratization.
The theoretical literature also emphasizes the importance of the
bourgeoisie’s relationship with the urban working class in terms of
whether it supports democratization or not. If the middle class feels
threatened by the working class, it is likely to be more conservative.
If not, it is likely to be bolder.
Given the small size of Vietnam’s working class, the outlook
would appear more positive in terms of the possible stance of the
bourgeoisie. However, as has been noted, although organized labour
has become more militant in recent years and although there is dis­
affection in parts of the business community, there is little evidence
yet of pressure for far-reaching political change. 3 In calls for less
red tape and a more open and transparent business environment,
which can be seen coming from parts of the business community,
one can perhaps see the early stages of a division between the
communist party rule

bourgeoisie and the state. However, these calls are relatively muted
in comparison with the vigour with which many companies, out of
necessity, go after state largesse.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
the salaried and middle classes
The fifth social group considered in the theoretical literature is
the salaried and middle classes. In Vietnam, this would include
professional state employees holding positions of responsibility in
the bureaucracy and state enterprises, although there is likely to
be some overlap with the capital-owning classes or bourgeoisie.
Another group in this category would be professional Vietnamese
employed by foreign companies or the international aid community.
A decade ago some scholars were emphasizing an emerging gulf
between groups such as these and the state, arguing that people
were increasingly organizing their lives without reference to the
party (David Marr cited in Thayer 1992b: 128). While the fact of
someone’s employment by a foreign company may be significant,
it is more appropriate to emphasize the continued close relations
between these groups and the state, in terms of their relatively
privileged background (i.e. securing the necessary education to
make them employable by a foreign company or the aid community), and a primary loyalty towards the state, including a willingness in many cases to join the party. Thus, as with the bourgeoisie,
professional Vietnamese employed by foreign companies or the
aid industry are often, although not always, still ‘very much of
the system’.
In terms of possible change in this area, middle-class Vietnamese
regularly travel abroad and hence are being exposed to different
ways of doing things, which can make them less tolerant of certain
practices in Vietnam. There is also a growing exasperation on the
part of some professional Vietnamese with official corruption, but
again professional Vietnamese are as likely to be playing the system
as railing against it (Gainsborough et al. 2009).

vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
State power
As well as analysing the position of different classes and the relationships among them, the theoretical literature under consideration in
this chapter also argues that the nature of state power has been crucial
as to whether a country democratizes. In countries where it is difficult
to identify clearly a distinct realm of authority separate from society
(some African states, for example), the prospects for democratization
are reportedly poor. However, a very powerful state – one which is
almost entirely autonomous in relation to society – is also seen as not
conducive to a shift away from authoritarianism. Thus, it is in the
middle ground between not too little and not too much state power
that a democratic breakthrough has the greatest chance of success.
Over the years, the nature of state power in Vietnam has attracted
quite contrasting characterizations. Joel Migdal, for example, has
described Vietnam as a ‘strong state’, putting it, rather surprisingly,
in a category with Israel and Japan but also alongside other state
socialist countries (Migdal 1988: 269). For Migdal, these states are
strong because they are able to deploy state institutions to perform
certain public policy functions despite the existence of other power
centres. In terms of the Vietnamese state’s alleged strength, Migdal
is joined by a number of Vietnam scholars.4 Others have disputed
the characterization of the Vietnamese state as strong, arguing
that its actual capabilities are far less than is often assumed. 5 In
this book, it is argued that the state in Vietnam is comparatively
speaking quite strong but it depends on the context, hence the conflicting interpretations. Looking at the day-to-day working of state
institutions and the bureaucracy, it is striking how particularistic
seats of power in individual institutions are the norm, and how the
ability of formally senior institutions in the hierarchy to galvanize
junior institutions to act is limited. Power is thus scattered. The
state is weak. However, looking at the role of the police in people’s
day-to-day lives – their official ability to harass, extract rents, and
generally prevent dissent, for instance – the state appears stronger.
communist party rule

Moreover, in periodic clampdowns on certain types of speculative
business activity, and in the prosecution of big corruption cases,
the state (or particular echelons of it) shows that when it feels
so moved, it can act decisively and effectively. The issue of state
strength versus state weakness will be developed further later in
the book.6
In sum, therefore, the relative autonomy of the state some fifteen
to twenty years after marketization would seem to be rather uncon­
ducive to a democratic transition. The theoretical literature particularly emphasizes how a heavy military and police presence in the
state apparatus bodes ill for a transition away from authoritarianism.
In Vietnam, the military and police have always been well represented in key leadership positions.7
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
Transnational forces
The literature also emphasizes the importance of transnational
forces in the success or failure of moves away from authoritarianism. Factors mentioned as being of potential importance include
a country’s size, its geographical location, and the nature of its
relationship with the global economy. Looking at Vietnam, one is
conscious of how there are pressures working in both directions
at the same time. The end of the Cold War might be regarded as
resulting in a climate in which Southeast Asian countries, no longer
seen as potential dominoes in an anti-communist struggle, have
come under increased pressure from the USA and European Union
(EU) states on issues of human rights and governance. The extent
to which such pressure results in substantive change in the target
country is, of course, debatable. However, what is indisputable is
that the ideological terms of the engagement between the West and
Southeast Asia have changed substantially from the days of the
Cold War (Anderson 1988b).
On the other hand, Vietnam seems less vulnerable to external
ideological and cultural inflows than some countries – neighbouring
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
Laos, for example. This would appear in part to reflect Laos’s
small size and its very heavy economic and cultural links with
more democratic Thailand (Evans 1988). However, this relative
lack of vulnerability in Vietnam’s case may also be a feature and
consequence of its heavily nationalistic independence struggle,
which has given it a degree of self-belief that Laos, historically more
dependent on Vietnamese wartime support, does not possess to the
same extent. Moreover, in terms of limiting external ideological
and cultural inflows, the state in Vietnam is still well placed to do
this, even in an era of globalization (see Chapters 5, 6 and 8 in this
volume for an examination of this point from a variety of angles).
This again is something which Laos, with its close integration with
Thailand, has appeared less able to do. That said, urban Vietnamese
are now able to access a far greater range of media sources, despite
censorship, than they were ten to fifteen years ago, so the situation
is not static.
Vietnam’s location in Southeast Asia and its membership in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 1995 offer
a certain level of insulation from US and EU pressure for political
change. After all, while there is considerable variation in the political
systems of ASEAN states, this is a grouping whose members still
display relative degrees of authoritarianism, and an organization
which has by and large maintained its principle of non-interference
in the domestic affairs of its members (Dosch 2006). Meanwhile,
Vietnam’s all-important relationship with China – much improved
in recent years but still characterized by mistrust – has also arguably
served to maintain authoritarian rule in Vietnam. Whatever differences Vietnam and China may have, they have in common a shared
mistrust of US global power and the fact that they are some of the
last remaining communist states seeking to reform their economies
along market lines without losing political control. Thus, as the
frequent party and government exchanges between the two countries
illustrate, there is much they can learn from each other (Amer 1999;
Thayer 1992a; 2008; Vuving 2006; Womack 2006).
communist party rule

In addition, the popular tendency is to emphasize how in an era
of globalization, increased integration in the world economy tends
to work to the detriment of authoritarianism, not least with the
growth of the middle class on the back of economic development.
However, what is also evident in relation to Vietnam is the way
in which foreign aid and private capital inflows work to bolster
state power, because it is state institutions and state companies
that are the principal beneficiaries (see Chapters 2, 6 and 8 in
this volume).
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
From one-party rule to what?
From the outset, this chapter has emphasized the importance of
trying to break free from a mindset that sees Vietnam as necessarily
embarked on a historical road that ends in Western-style liberal
democracy. Indeed, it has been argued that this is probably the
least likely outcome, based on the experience of other countries in
Southeast Asia. Taking this as our starting point, the key is not so
much to be alert for some kind of liberal democratic breakthrough
but rather to ask how else might a broadening of political space
occur in a country like Vietnam?
At least part of the answer would appear to lie in a re-examination
of concepts such as state and society. Instead of looking for the
emergence of a robust civil society standing as a bulwark against
state power, as much of the literature does, it is also important to
look at what is occurring within the state. A number of scholars
have argued similarly. In Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific
Asia, Daniel Bell et al. write:
The impetus for political reform arises not from the autonomous
assertion of independent interests by social classes but from
conflict within the state; political reform is about the management
of intra-elite conflict rather than about the fundamental restructuring of state–society relationships. Therefore, political liberalization

vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
[in Pacific Asia] is manifested in the changing architecture of the
state with civil society remaining both limited and circumscribed.
(Bell et al. 1995: 14)
That this is the case is testament to the very different philosophical and cultural heritage on which Asian states draw. Illustrating this with reference to Indonesia, Mark Berger notes how
Suharto’s New Order regime ‘reinstated and reconfigured organicist
(and/or integralist) ideas which view state and society as a single
organic entity and the embodiment of a harmonious village or
family’ (Berger 1997: 341). While Berger notes that this ideology is
in part a reconfiguration, and is used to deny oppositional activity,
it does highlight the different philosophical and cultural roots on
which many Asian leaders draw. Moreover, to the extent that such
thinking is influential in terms of what actually happens, it offers a
clue to likely political evolution. To illustrate the same point, one
suspects that when Lee Kuan Yew spoke in the 1990s of the need
to establish safeguards to limit the ‘way in which people use their
votes to bargain, to coerce, to push and jostle’ the government, or
referred to the need for the government to show that it ‘cannot be
blackmailed’, such rhetoric does not simply represent sheer cheek on
his part, but is actually indicative of a fundamentally different way
of understanding the relationship between state and society (Rodan
1992: 5). Similarly, when Vietnamese leaders go on record to say
that Vietnam will never have need for opposition parties, justifying
such a position on the grounds that the ruling Communist Party
knows the will of the people and only exists to serve it, this is not
just a crude defence of authoritarianism but represents heartfelt
opinion based on a very different view of state and opposition than
that of the West.8
The idea that one should look for a broadening of political space
within the state rings very true for Vietnam. For all the emphasis
in foreign journalistic and academic writing on civil society, the
emerging middle class, Buddhist and Catholic dissent, dissident
intellectuals, Internet bloggers, youth disillusionment, and rural
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
communist party rule

unrest – all of which are legitimate areas of study – the main arena
of struggle in Vietnam remains closely focused in and around the
state. Thus, if one points to some of the major political debates of
the reform era, which have to do with the relationship between the
party and the government, the role of the National Assembly, issues
of centralization and decentralization, or the best way to manage
state enterprises, it is clear that the extent of change or the widening of political space must be seen in relation to state institutions.
For example, the party may still be the ultimate authority, but it
now has to contend with more robust government institutions and
a stronger National Assembly, as, notwithstanding their common
party representation, they are alternative seats of power. Whether
this was the intended outcome of the critique of the party emerging
at the Sixth Congress in 1986 is unclear, but, as an illustration of
how change is occurring within the state, it is revealing. Equally,
many of the concerns of the business sector, rather than finding
expression through an organization external to the state, are still
channelled through the state-sanctioned institutions (Stromseth
1998). Even if one were to speculate that such organizations might
one day spawn breakaway groups or evolve into something external
to the state, it is inconceivable that they would not retain something
of the different philosophical and cultural underpinnings in terms
of how they conceive of the relationship between state and society.
Conclusion
With reference to writings by Moore and Rueschemeyer et al., this
chapter has sought to offer a robust account of the nature of political
change in Vietnam over the past fifteen to twenty years. In terms
of why the middle class has not emerged to challenge the state, the
fact of its still-close relations with the state – dependent on it, not
independent from it – seems highly significant. Moreover, for all the
popular emphasis on issues such as civil society and globalization,
the Vietnamese state remains relatively autonomous in relation to
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
where Vietnamese elites have led the way both as regulators of the
market economy and as direct players. It is not the case that elite
interests in Vietnam are now the same as those of external actors.
Nevertheless, there has been some convergence such that elite Vietnamese and donor actors are able to work together while pursuing
very different agendas (i.e. a marriage of convenience).
By highlighting the way in which elite interests both inside and
outside Vietnam converge, we are able to go some way towards
transcending some of the binaries which typically govern the way
we talk about power (inside/outside; national/international; global/
local etc.), even if in some ways the very language we use fails us.
Viewed in this way, it is possible to conceive of neoliberalism as
both weakened as a force in global politics (i.e. elites with interests
which converge but are not the same, turning a blind eye to what the
other is doing) and strengthened as the interests of elites in Vietnam
genuinely become bound up with that of global capitalism such that
there is a real convergence of interests with external elites. Seen like
this, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that Vietnamese elites
might one day genuinely internalize aspects of the regulatory state
discourse as serving a kind of a market order they could support.
In the final analysis, we are dealing with a moving target here.
The mixing of ‘external’ or ‘indigenous’ ideas and practices will
continue to occur with both buffeting and influencing the other
– as they have always done. What we can be certain of, however,
is that external forces will never completely swamp internal ones.
Instead, we will continue to see further gradual evolution of the state
in Vietnam drawing on diverse inputs.
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion
At the start of this book, a method for studying the state was
proposed which entailed – paradoxically perhaps – not focusing our
attention directly on the state, arguing that to do so risked defining
the object of our study in advance. Instead, it was suggested that
what we needed to do was to try to surrender any preconceptions
as to what the state is, trusting that a more authentic picture of the
state would eventually come back into view in light of our empirical
work. Central to this approach was a commitment to looking at
‘actors’ – whether formally of the state or not – considering what
Béatrice Hibou has referred to as their ‘games, their strategies and
their historical practices’ (Hibou 2004: 21), and seeing what this
tells us about the nature of the political, and ultimately the state.
To talk like this is really to ask how people act politically. The
conclusion to the book, therefore, offers some final thoughts on
how people act politically in Vietnam, before asking what it tells
us about the state. The conclusion also incorporates the outlining
of a new research agenda born of the empirical work presented in
this book, combined with a preliminary reading of parts of the
state theory literature.

vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
How do people act politically in Vietnam?
The question of how people act politically in Vietnam – or elsewhere
– is a deceptively complex one. However, to pose it is to ask how
people think about the environment in which they operate, how they
get things done, and how they head off potential threats. To the
outsider, the stakes appear much higher in Vietnam, compared with
the United Kingdom or the United States, for those who have aspirations to move and act politically. Of course, this could be debated,
and may be a partial perspective influenced by our own closeness
to power. However, to fall politically, or really come unstuck, in
Vietnam seems to have consequences which go beyond just losing
one’s job: it affects your family, your livelihood, your standing, and
it makes you vulnerable to a loss of opportunities or to further bad
things happening.
Against this backdrop, we can say that politics in Vietnam is
dominated by whom you know, what position you hold, and how
much you can pay. Political umbrellas, whereby people higher up in
the hierarchy look out for you and protect you, are a recognized part
of the political landscape in Vietnam. This is a form of network politics, with the word ‘network’ simply used to point to the existence of
a loose agglomeration of personalities. How do these networks form?
As has been emphasized throughout this book, it is fundamentally
about personal relationships – blood or marital ties, shared home
town, time served together, past obligations and past debts.
In Vietnam, the norm is that everyone owes their position to
someone, which puts people in a hierarchical relationship, which
in turn comes with further debts and obligations. It is important
to nurture one’s relationship with one’s patron by showing them
appropriate deference or giving them gifts. This can include passing
a portion of one’s ‘corrupt’ takings upwards to the person to whom
you owe your job, or who sits above you in the hierarchy. For
instance, ‘corporate’ actors seeking to influence ‘state’ actors will
go to great lengths to do so, including arranging overseas trips
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

for them, indulging their wives, or perhaps contributing to their
children’s education.
With the holding of office also comes a place in the system, which
offers access, opportunities to do business or to collect rents or fees,
and protection. However, because of the nature of the system with
its uniformly unclear rules, everyone is always sailing close to the
wind, or in danger of falling foul of some authority. Consequently,
people are always looking over their shoulder, trying not to attract
unwarranted attention, trying not to get caught out, or taking care
not to upset someone who is more powerful than they are.1 To do
anything in Vietnam, the ducks must line up, which in turns involves
a constant process of wooing people, getting people onside, and
neutralizing threats.
Everyone in Vietnam – from top to bottom – is involved in some
kind of network, as described above. It is just that some networks
are more heavyweight, or closer to the top, than others. No one in
Vietnam – however elevated – ever has it all sewn up. There is always
someone who may potentially stand in your way. Thus, while we see
political continuity in Vietnam, the story of the reform years is not
simply one of the persistence of old power structures, unchecked.
As Hibou says, ‘everywhere there are slip-ups’ and ‘spaces where
freedom can slip in’. And, she continues, ‘if there are none of these’ it
is always possible for ‘astute actors’ to ‘invent ways of circumventing’
(Hibou 2004: 17).
As old routes or opportunities for advancement are closed down,
new ones need to be found. People’s stars dim. Patrons grow old
and die. Certain business interests survive, perhaps by diversifying
into new areas. Others go to the wall. Of course, some people
are better operators than others, and through a combination of
luck or the fortune of their birth have more going for them. But
success is never guaranteed. In the face of interventions – what are
often referred to as ‘reforms’ – which seek to upset what people
are doing, the system constantly reinvents itself to ensure that its
underlying money-making and prestige-seeking functions are not

vietnam
upset. However, for the reasons just outlined, the system never
entirely stays the same.
For most actors, debates about ‘reform’ or ‘policy choices’, or the
consequences of World Trade Organization membership and suchlike, are not their day-to-day concern. Instead, surviving, getting
things done, using one’s connections, and paying people off, all in a
context where moneymaking and maintaining one’s standing in the
system are key, whether it be through doing business, exploiting a
regulatory position, or milking the international donor community.
This is the day-to-day stuff of politics.
With politics spoken of in these terms, the question remains,
what is, or wherein lies, ‘the state’?
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
Rethinking the state
In light of the preceding analysis, one could respond that to talk
about politics we do not need to talk about the state at all. Indeed,
to do so might be misleading. And yet such a response does not
seem entirely satisfactory either. Many of the ‘actors’ we have been
talking about in this book – though not all – hold public office.
Public office, therefore, seems important, although how exactly, and
what it tells us about the nature of entity we call the state, is less
clear. There is, for instance, a very real danger at this juncture in
the book that in trying to say something about how we understand
‘the state’ we will end up superimposing on the state the very things
we were trying to avoid through our methodology of not looking
directly at the state (i.e. things that are not actually warranted by
the data). Nevertheless, it is important to try.
Perhaps the first thing to note about the state in Vietnam is the
highly particularistic nature of the different institutions, offices and
personnel which we commonly regard as comprising ‘the state’. That
is, what comprises ‘the state’ rarely moves in the same direction,
rarely works together, and rarely sings from the same hymn sheet.
Information is not shared between offices – in fact, it is often sold
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

– as different institutions and personnel vie for influence where, as
we have seen, the right to regulate various parts of the economy
and society, extract revenue from citizens, or to run a commercial
operation affiliated to one’s institutional base are among the key
drivers of politics.
Second, what we notice about the state in Vietnam is a persistent
blurring of the relationship between public and private, reflected in
the use of public office for private gain, which is the norm, and a lack
of clarity in relation to the business activities of government offices
in terms of who benefits (principally but not exclusively financially)
from what are ostensibly state companies.
In much writing on the state, including on Vietnam, a blurring
between public and private is depicted as an aberration and not
something which occurs in ‘developed’ Western states. In places
where public and private are said to be blurred, it is also depicted
as something which can be put right (through ‘reform’). However,
this is a distortion: public and private are blurred in all states by
definition because, as state theorists tell us, the state is a conceptual
abstraction (i.e. there is not a real boundary between state and
society or between public and private). That it appears otherwise is
testament to the state’s unique character as a historically contingent
form of rule, and indeed this blurring, and the policing of the
boundary by those who inhabit the state, is central to how power is
exercised.2 This way of exercising power was evident in the book in
a number of ways, but could be seen most clearly in our discussions
of corruption.
Related to this is a third observation about the state, namely the
importance of uncertainty as an instrument of rule. Keeping people
in a state of uncertainty about what they can and cannot do is a sure
way of exercising power over them. This dovetails nicely with the
comments above about the policing of the state/society or public/
private boundary as the way in which rule occurs. Because the
boundary is portrayed as a real one – an arbitrary line one must not
cross – when in fact it only exists as a conceptual boundary, people
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
are always in danger of crossing it, and thus are always vulnerable
to being disciplined when it suits those capable of doing so.
In Vietnam, this comes across particularly vividly in relation to
the labour market where regulations governing the right to strike are
so confusing and Kafkaesque that it is said to be next to impossible
to call a strike while keeping within the rules. While most of the
time this is regarded as simply a fact of life, it provides those who
inhabit the state with the means to discipline workers if they deem
their activity is unusually threatening, or they wish to make an
example of them. From the perspective of workers, this means they
are never quite sure what the consequences of their actions will be,
which tends to act as a constraint on their behaviour (i.e. uncertainty
as an instrument of rule). As with the blurring of public and private,
the use of uncertainty as an instrument of rule is depicted in much
of the literature as the characteristic of a deviant state (Chabal and
Daloz 1999; Duffield 2008). However, it is much more likely that
the use of uncertainty is more universal, including extending into
so-called ‘developed’ states.
To sum up, what we have, then, is a state which is little more
than a disparate group of actors with a weak notion of ‘the public
good’, using uncertainty, not impartial rules, as the basis of order.
However, this is only part of the picture since the state also appears
as greater than the sum of its parts – an institution which has
‘self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses’, to quote Benedict
Anderson (1983), which takes people in and spits them out, and
which re-creates itself in a way that cannot be reducible to the wit
of any one individual. In Vietnam this comes across most clearly
in terms of the way in which when this ‘collectivity’ of institutions
and actors feel its core interests threatened, it is able to mobilize
fairly robustly in order to clamp down on people or activities
deemed to threaten the ‘whole show’. In this book, we have seen
this most vividly in respect of clampdowns on speculation in the
foreign exchange and real-estate markets, which at various times
appeared to threaten the stability of the banking system, or were
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

simply troubling because they represented a flagrant ignoring of
authority.
Understanding these ‘self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses’ expressed though the state’s living members, but which
‘cannot be reduced to their passing personal ambitions’ (Anderson
1983), is particularly important for a holistic understanding of the
state. On what basis – or for what reason – might the state harbour
‘self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses’, and how might they
not be reducible to their personal ambitions of the state’s members?
One possible response would be to draw on post-structuralist ideas
about the state, emphasizing the way in which ‘the state’ works at the
level of the mind, entering social processes, working from within,
and influencing what we see (Finlayson and Martin 2006; Mitchell
1991). Hence, we have a tendency to attribute coherence to what we
call ‘the state’ when in fact it may not merit it.
Another, rather different, way to make sense of the state as greater
than the sum of its parts might be to draw on Marxist ideas of the
state as ‘instrument’, tending (but not guaranteed) to act in the
general interests of capital (Barrow 2008; Hay et al. 2006: 59–78;
Jessop 2008; Wetherly 2008). Thus, to refer back to the example
cited above, when the state in Vietnam mobilized to clamp down
on speculation in the forex and real-estate markets – acting against
individual capitalists – it was doing so because its ‘self-preserving
and self-aggrandizing impulses’ told it that not to do so risked
the ‘whole edifice’ coming down. And here the ‘whole edifice’ is
understood in terms of the emerging capitalist economy over which
the state was presiding and in which, in the context of marketization
and international economic integration, its interests were increasingly bound up.
To assert that the state in Vietnam is tending to act in the general
interests of capital is a big claim. However, it makes sense with reference to a range of examples that we have seen throughout this book.
This includes the difficulty the state appears to have representing
organized labour, and the increased incidence of land conflicts
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112

vietnam
which pit farmers against capital, where capital backed by the state
is the frequent winner (in the name of ‘development’ or ‘progress’).
In addition, the Communist Party of Vietnam’s decision in 2006
to amend its statutes to remove the clause which said that party
members ‘could not exploit’ can also be seen as an attempt by the
party to bring itself in line with the fact that many of its members
do own and run private businesses, in turn further showing its
alignment with capital. 3
An argument which says that the state in Vietnam is today tending
to act in the general interests of capital need not be premissed on
the idea that there has necessarily been a sharp break between
the pre-reform ‘state socialist’ state and the post-reform ‘capitalist’
state in terms of its relationship to capital – although mainstream
writing on reform would tend to posit that this is what has occurred.
The scepticism shown by some writers to the notion of collective
ownership, ‘belonging to the people’, suggesting that in reality it
means ‘belonging to the party elite’, combined also with the notion
that the seeds of the reform era were laid via capital accumulation
on the part of party elites in the pre-reform era, both point to a
rather closer relationship to capital on the part of the state in the
pre-reform era than is often thought (see Long and Kendall 1981;
Cheshier 2009).
However we explain this paradoxical position of the state both
as illusion and as something substantive (i.e. ‘greater than the sum
of its parts’), it seems clear that this is where a new research agenda
should pick up. So what might this research agenda look like?
Towards a new research agenda
While this has been a book about Vietnam, it is evident that
within it lie the seeds of a research agenda which go well beyond
Vietnam. Underpinning this new research agenda is a quest for a
universal theory of the state which can make sense of all states not
just certain kinds of states. To talk in such terms is to move away
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

from the tendency in much contemporary writing on the state to
emphasize ‘difference’ between states (i.e. developed/developing;
democratic/authoritarian states) – in turn suggesting that they are
beyond comparison. This is problematic for a number of reasons,
not least because it is a political position bound up with the way in
which the West seeks to exercise power over the global South.
Two things are occurring here. First, in much contemporary
writing on the state, Western states are held up as paradigms of
virtue – i.e. how the state ought to be – which serves the purpose
of putting them beyond reproach. Second, non-Western states,
excluding to some extent those designated as ‘success stories’ pour
encourager les autres (which is also a crucial part of how rule occurs),
are depicted as deviant – that is, deviating from the Western ideal
– which in turn provides the basis on which intervention can occur.
This can take the form of outright invasion, or a seemingly ‘softer’
version of intervention via international donor aid. Either way, the
result is very similar, with the goal being the promotion of a classic
‘governance’ agenda, and the creation of ‘regulatory states’ capable
of safeguarding transnational capitalism (Jayasuriya 2001).
A number of important obeervations flow from the above
analysis. First, that much of what is presented today as offering
a robust analysis of the state is nothing of the sort, and in fact
is a selective, politically motivated characterization of the state,
serving consciously or unconsciously the political agenda mapped
out above.4 Second, that in order truly to gain a window onto
the state as a distinctive, historically contingent form of rule it is
necessary to break out of the straitjacket of states which cannot be
compared, whether they are developed/developing, industrial/postindustrial/non-industrial, developmental/fragile/failing, or liberal
democratic/illiberal/authoritarian, and ask what such states have
in common simply by virtue of being states. Such a step serves two
purposes: first, it will make for better theory (i.e. a theory of the
general rather than the particular), and second, it will help unmask
a key way in which rule occurs at the global level today.

vietnam
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
What might a universal theory of the state look like?
From the outset, a universal theory of the state needs to begin
with an awareness of one’s own class position and how this might
influence one’s theorizing. One way to address this is to be open
to the way in which the state is Janus-faced (i.e. it is experienced
differently depending on your relationship to it). Thus, a universal
theory of the state needs to be attentive to the way in which ‘my
experience of the state’ is unlikely to capture the character of the
state in its entirety. Put another way, a universal theory of the state
needs to be able to make sense of the state’s benevolent side as well
as its predatory and abusive side. Recall here the comment made
by the brother of Pol Pot that Pol Pot ‘would not hurt a chicken’,
which in certain circumstances (e.g. among family members) was
probably true. Or, in the UK, recall the comment of the former head
of MI5, Stella Rimmington, who on trying to publish her memoirs
following her retirement remarked that she had experienced for the
first time what it was like ‘to be on the wrong side of the state’ (i.e.
the same state, two different experiences).
Second, a universal theory of the state needs to get away from
pluralist notions of the state as class-neutral, exploring in whose
interests the state is acting. Here, while there is a strong sense that
the state is likely to be aligned with capital, whether it is Vietnam or
Indonesia, the USA or the UK, it cannot be guaranteed (see Jessop
2008 for a discussion). Hence there is always an empirical task to
be carried out to establish whether this is the case, and indeed the
precise relationship with which manifestation of ‘capital’.
Third, a universal theory of the state needs to get away from
neo-Weberian notions of the state as rational and bureaucratic and
accept that the normal character of the state – all states – is one
where public and private are blurred and where this, along with
the use of uncertainty, is central to how rule occurs. In this regard,
there is further work to be done to clarify what Weber actually
said about the state because there is a tendency in much writing
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

about the state to invoke Weber very selectively (see Dusza 1989;
Greenfield 2001; Hibou 2004: 19; McVey 1992; Richards 2009 for
some insights on this).
Fourth, a universal theory of the state needs to be able to make
sense of the state both as illusion (i.e. why it appears more real than
it actually is) and as an entity which has ‘material effects’, including
trying to understand what the key motivators are for the state to
unite to defend what it perceives to be its core interests. Once again,
this may lead us back to the state’s relations with capital but with a
sense that while the state tends to align with capital it may not be
reducible to it. That is to say, the state’s ‘self-preserving and selfaggrandizing impulses’ may in large part be motivated by a desire
to protect the general interests of capital. However, what motivates
the state to defend its core interests – and indeed what those core
interests are – may lie elsewhere too. In this respect, part of the
state’s core interests may lie in simply defending the public–private
boundary from attack as an end in itself – and not one which is
necessarily always shared by capital.
So, what we have here are a series of theoretical observations,
most of which point to areas for regular and ongoing empirical
investigation. The areas for empirical investigation are:
1. The (blurred) character of the public and private boundary and
how this is used as an instrument of rule.
2. The use of uncertainty as an instrument of rule.
3. How the state is experienced differently depending on your
relationship to it.
4. How a conceptual abstraction can appear to have real boundaries.
5. Where the state’s core interests lie, including its relationship to
capital, and the extent to which this is the principal motivator
behind its self-preserving and self-aggrandizing impulses, or one
of a number.
While there is much to recommend such an approach to thinking
about the state, it leaves open, as we have seen, that what has been

vietnam
said needs to be verified by regular empirical investigation. At the
same time, while this book is claiming through a discussion of
Vietnam to be highlighting something universal in relation to the
nature of the political, one should also expect to encounter variation
within this. So, what kind of variation?
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
Variation within the universal
While expecting to find exploitation of the public–private boundary,
and the use of uncertainty, both deployed as instruments of rule, and
also anticipating that the collectivity of institutions and actors we call
‘the state’ will tend to act in the general interests of capital across
a wide range of cases, we should nevertheless expect to encounter
variation on this theme such that ‘local colour’ will be important in
terms of how these mechanisms and tendencies play out.
One important area where we expect this to be the case concerns
the extent to which violence forms a part of the state’s everyday reper­
toire. Violence, or the threat of violence, is a feature of all states.
However, what we need to make sense of is why it tends to be more
pervasive in certain states than others, even while the underlying
‘universal’ features of the state described above remain in play.
Invoking the Lukesian adage that the ‘supreme exercise of power’
is to ‘get another or others to have the desires you want them to
have – that is to, to secure their compliance by controlling their
thoughts and desires’ (Lukes cited in Hindess 1996: 68), we can say
that states which invoke violence less, or where it is the exception
rather than the rule, represent a stronger form of power. A good
example is contemporary Singapore, where citizens by and large
behave how the state wishes them to behave (Barr 2003; Rodan
1992; Tremewan 1994). Certainly the state in Singapore deploys
a battery of legal and other means to undermine or wrongfoot its
critics, but it rarely kills people. That said, it would be erroneous
to suggest that uncertainty is not used as an instrument of rule in
Singapore. Nor is it the case that there is a clear separation of public
© Gainsborough, Martin, Aug 12, 2010, Vietnam : Rethinking the State
Zed Books, London, ISBN: 9781848133112
conclusion

and private in Singapore even though state discourse powerfully
seeks to suggest there is: witness the close links between the family
of Lee Kwan Yew and business in Singapore or the fact that the
older Lee’s son is prime minister as examples of a greater blurring
of public and private than is often implied (Gainsborough 2009b;
Hamilton-Hart 2000). Nevertheless, we could say that in Singapore
the state’s ideological effects are particularly strong and that it is
this – rather than any objective differences in terms of how power
is exercised – which distinguishes the state in Singapore from some
other states.5
An example of a weaker state, where the use of uncertainty and
exploitation of the public–private boundary are still key instruments
of rule – just like in Singapore – is Burma/Myanmar. Here the use
of violence is much more part of the normal fabric of the state,
and in contrast to the Lukesean view of power represents a weaker
application of power for it. An important feature of states where
violence is commonplace, and where the state’s ideological effects
are much weaker, is that state rule has to be constantly backed up
by performative practices, such as hastily convened ‘mass rallies’
where public-sector workers are wheeled out to chant their support
for the regime irrespective of what they really think (Duffield 2008:
23–4). As with the use of violence, it is not the case that performance
plays no function in states where the ideological effects are stronger
but the need to resort to such performances to reinforce a fragile,
or fading, legitimacy is perhaps less.
There may well be other areas where we are likely to encounter
(local) variation in terms of the character of the state, notwithstanding the existence of the state’s more ‘universal’ features which have
been highlighted in this book. This may, for instance, apply to
the nature of the state’s relationship to capital, particularly if one
extends the analysis to the sub-national level. Is, for example, the
relationship of the state to capital in say sub-national Indonesia
likely to be the same as metropolitan Singapore, or Washington and
Westminster for that matter? A further area where we might expect