ECPR_ed2.doc
The Profile of Recent Environmental Protest in Germany 1
by
Dieter Rucht
Several observers have stated that the German environmental movement is among the
strongest and most active in the world. Moreover, the movement is perceived as being
fairly radical when compared to its counterparts in most other countries. According to
more recent accounts, however, this picture has changed. Some analysts claim that the
movement is in decline (Opp 1996: 371), or has virtually ceased to exist. Others
maintain that the movement is still there, but has lost its zeal due to a gradual process
of institutionalisation (Brand 1993; Wörndl and Fréchet 1994; Eder 1996), in
particular, to the co-optation of the movement’s leadership. To what extent such
perceptions hold can only be judged on the basis of thorough empirical analyses.
Cross-national comparison will be a matter of a later investigation.2 At this point,
the focus is only on the changing patterns of the German environmental movement
over recent years. For this purpose the paper relies heavily, though not exclusively, on
protest event data produced within the framework of a cross-national study on the
„Transformation of Environmental Activism“ (TEA-project; see Rootes 1998). The
German data are only partially available at present, and this is the preliminary use of
these. Thus, in several respects, this paper is just a first descriptive account which will
be the subject of future expansions and revisions.
In the first section, I will provide some background information on the
development of the environmental movement in Germany. The second section of the
1
Paper presented for the Workshop on “Environmental Protest in Comparative
Perspective” at the 27th Joint Sessions of ECPR Workshops in Mannheim, 26-31
March, 1999. I am grateful to Richard Steer for his editorial assistance.
2
For available cross-national analyses of environmental movements, see Dalton 1994;
van der Heijden, Koopmans and Guigni 1992; Kriesi and Giugni 1996; Rucht 1989
and 1994; Wörndl and Fréchet 1994.
1
paper will, firstly, describe the data base and then, in its main part, present empirical
findings on the main features of recent environmental protest in Germany. At this
early stage of the analysis, the paper is not geared toward one particular aspect or
question; rather it seeks to provide an overview on protest as an important, but not the
only, dimension of a movement’s activity. Finally, some of the findings and their
implications will be discussed in the light of more general questions about
environmental movements.
1. The Development of the Environmental Movement in Germany:
A Brief Overview
As in many other countries, modern environmentalism in West Germany did not gain
momentum before the early 1970s. It would be wrong to assume that environmental
questions have been put on the public and political agenda mainly, or even only, by
the emerging new environmental groups. In these years, environmental concerns were
also expressed and promoted by governments on both the international and national
levels. In West Germany, governmental environmental action programmes were
launched in 1970 and 1971, followed by a wave of environmental legislation and the
first attempts to institutionalise environmental policy (Weidner 1995). On the state
level, the first environmental department was created in Bavaria in 1971; three years
later, the national environmental protection agency was established. (However, a
Federal State Departement on Environmental Protection did not come into existence
until 1986.)
Three concurrent developments marked the early phase of the emerging
environmental movement. First, local and independent citizen action groups
mushroomed, and in part also united in regional, statewide and national organisations
such as the Bundesverband Bürgerinitativen Umweltschutz (Federal Alliance of
Citizen Initiatives for Environmental Protection; founded in 1972). These early groups
were focussing mainly on specific issues such as air pollution, individual transport,
and nuclear energy. Second, pre-existing organisations for nature conservation
became revitalised and, to some extent, politicised. An outstanding example is the
Bavarian-based Bund Naturschutz (Alliance for Nature Conservation; founded in
1913) which renewed its programme and leadership in the early 1970s and was
2
instrumental in founding the Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz Deutschland
(BUND) in 1975. Third, loose networks of individuals and groups adhering to a more
general concept of political ecology emerged. They saw an urgent need for a radical
change of industrial societies, promoting ideas of decentralisation, „soft“ technology,
an ascetic and ecologically friendly lifestyle, and sometimes even industrial
devolution (Amery 1976). Alongside these new tendencies, some of the traditional
organisations for nature conservation, bird protection, and the protection of animals
continued to exist without, at that time, modifying their apolitical ideology and
assimilative strategy.
By and large, these different groups represented three ideological strands. The oldfashioned conservationism aiming to protect particular areas and species by nonconflictual means; the modern environmentalism that had a broader and more
dramatic perception of environmental degradation and did not shy away from political
intervention; finally, the political ecologists who wanted to save the „planet Earth“ by
radical means to reach a truly ecological society (Rucht 1991).3 Many of the leftist
groups, both Old and New Left, were initially sceptical toward what they perceived as
a naive petty-bourgeois movement. Only in the second half of the 1970s, with the
centrality of the conflict over nuclear energy, did parts of leftist groups, ranging from
Maoists to Trotzkyists to Anarchists, join the movement and play some role in the
„alternative“ and „green“ lists and the early phase of the Green Party that was
founded in 1980.
During the 1970s, the environmental movement acted mainly as a challenger to the
established institutions and the dominant policy of economic growth supported by all
major parties. These were not directly opposed to environmentalism, but felt that the
movement wanted too much too quickly, thereby threatening economic performance
and job security. They framed the issue as a matter of “jobs or environmental
protection”. During the 1980s, the picture of an outsider movement besieging the
political establishment faded away. On the one hand, the establishment gradually
became more receptive to environmental concerns and more sceptical about the
conventional idea of progress measured in productivity and GNP. It also became clear
that significant parts of the population sympathised with green ideas, as could be seen
both by the large numbers of adherents to the movement (Fuchs and Rucht 1994) and
3
Green voters (Frankland 1995). On the other hand, parts of the more radical segments
of the environmental movement became more pragmatic, focussing on alternative
technologies, the technicalities of environmental policy-making, and the
parliamentary arena where the Greens got a foothold at all levels, ranging from the
local councils to the European Parliament. Over time, the groups at the ideological
fringes – both left and right - of the environmental movement did not disappear, but
decreased in numbers and significance, and the environmentalist mainstream became
the dominant force. The conflicts between the red-green and the brown-green strands,
radicals and moderates, promoters of an extra-parliamentary and a parliamentary
strategy, and between the “fundamentalists” and “realists” within the Green party
have lost their significance.
Based on this internal clearing process and the mutual rapprochement between the
movement and industry and public administrations, the instances of communication,
negotiation and bargaining multiplied (Brand 1999). At the same time, however,
direct conflicts in particular areas such as nuclear power, animal rights, and genetic
engineering continued. Overall, it seems that the movement has become ideologically
less diverse and contradictory, but has also lost its profile and clear identity due to
various developments: its specialisation and fragmentation along different issue areas,
the strengthening of bonds with non-movement organisations, the acceptance of
funding from industry and public administrations, the engagement in joint ventures
such as conferences, campaigns, eco-sponsoring and the like (Bergstedt 1998), and
the increasing role of green parliamentary politics.
These more recent developments have been welcomed by some observers as signs
of maturity, whereas others have complained that the movement has been
compromised and sold out. Most of these observations and comments, however, are
not based on any systematic analysis of the actual changes of the movement, but on
casual impressions. Investigating the movement’s protest activities may provide us
with more solid information for assessing whether or not sweeping statements about
the decline, crisis or taming of the movement can be substantiated.
3
The same threefold typology is also applicable to the environmental movement in
4
2. The Patterns of Recent Environmental Protests in Germany
Before presenting empirical findings on various dimensions and aspects of
environmental protest in Germany, it is useful to provide some information on the
underlying methodology and sources.
2.1 Methodology and data base
As indicated in the introductory remarks, the main data base used in this paper is
drawn from the German part of the TEA project, thus conforming to the joint coding
scheme and the same period of investigation (1988 to 1997). At this point, however,
data for only six of these ten years have been collected in Germany (1988 and 1993 to
1997). The existence of a four year gap is regrettable. However, the coverage of 1988,
the first year of the period under study, provides us with some clues about changes
across the full period.
The newspaper used for data collection is the tageseitung (taz) which is located in
Berlin. All issues each week (Monday through Saturday) are covered. Besides the
general (nationwide) sections of this paper, the local section on Berlin has also been
included so that we can compare events perceived as of national vs. local interest. The
proportion of events drawn from the national (as opposed to the local) section of the
newspaper is fairly stable across the six years. On average, it is 79.2 percent.
The taz is usually characterised as an “alternative” or “left-libertarian” newspaper.
It was established in 1978 as an outgrowth of New Left and new social movement
politics (Flieger 1992). Initially, it was conceived to be a mouthpiece of the
movements, but soon it took a more independent stance and professional character.
Although the paper is still unconventional in its structure, ownership, internal
practices and content when compared to its established counterparts, the taz tends to
be a reliable source of information and is widely read among other journalists, partly
because of its innovative role and often cheeky style. So, in some sense, it serves as an
intermediate agenda setter, although its circulation is small (about 60,000 copies). The
quality of the newspaper is also illustrated by the fact that several taz-journalists have
Italy (Diani 1995).
5
been hired by the established press, including flagships such as the weeklies Der
Spiegel and Die Zeit.
From its beginnings, the taz devoted considerable attention to environmental
issues. Throughout the 1990s it carried a daily section (usually one page) headed
“Economy and the Environment”, which is currently produced by four full-timers plus
a number of free-lancers.4
A second data source used in this conference paper is a large collection of protest
event data from the Prodat-project (Rucht and Ohlemacher 1992; Rucht and Neidhardt
1997). These data are derived from two nation-wide quality newspapers (Süddeutsche
Zeitung [SZ] and Frankfurter Rundschau [FR]), spanning the period from 1950 to
1994 - at present - and including significantly more variables than the TEA-project.
Prodat encompasses all kinds of protests of which environmental protests only form a
small proportion. Unlike the German TEA-project, a sampling procedure has been
applied, incorporating all Monday issues and the remaining issues (Tuesday through
Saturday) of each fourth week. Only the nation-wide sections are included in the
Prodat study.
It is important to note that the results of the two data sets cannot be compared
directly inasmuch as these rely on different sources and a different coverage (sample
vs. full coverage). Even if we apply the Prodat sample to the TEA-data and exclude
the protests derived from the local section of the taz, a comparison of the overlapping
years (1988 and 1993-94) exhibits, for some variables, significantly different results.
These differences are not due to flaws of one or the other data set, but result from the
fact that the overlap between protests reported by the taz on the one hand, and the
Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ) and Frankfurter Rundschau (FR) on the other, is not as
great as one might expect. A more detailed analysis of all protests occuring in 1993
shows that out of the 348 protest events reported by the taz, only 74 events were also
reported by both the SZ and the FR, another 38 events only by the SZ, and another 58
events only by the FR. In other words, 51 per cent of the events reported by the taz
remained unreported by the SZ and/or the FR (Eilders 2000).
Leaving aside such details, it is important to stress the fact that protest analysis of
this kind, however thoroughly designed and implemented, has its limitations insofar
as it is not representative of the totality of environmental protests. The picture we get
4
Interview conducted by Jochen Roose with Reiner Metzger, 24 February 1999.
6
is highly selective. Unlike in many surveys of individuals, the overall population of
protest cases remains unkown. Moreover, the picture only includes a small part of the
actual events, many of which get unnoticed by the nationally-oriented newspapers.
Finally, the picture is influenced, and partly flawed, by uneven selection criteria of
newspapers which are likely to underreport a protest in its early phase when its
significance is still unclear, overreport it when it is recognised as newsworthy and
potentially growing, and underreport it again when activity simply continues but
appears more and more uninteresting to the news-greedy media. Nevertheless, the
picture provided by the data is the picture seen by the average reader of quality
newspapers. It is this selection, and not so much the body of the unreported or only
locally reported events, that has most influence on public discourse and the
perceptions of decision-makers. Moreover, the protests covered by nation-wide
newspapers are to a large degree those protests which are of particular political
relevance because they are very large or very radical. Few of these protests remain
unreported by the newspapers, and thus the selectivity problem may be less severe
than appears from a first glance. Nevertheless, it is highly advisable to complement
and control these kinds of study by other sources such as local newspapers, police
records, and/or archival data from movement actors.
2.2 Empirical findings on environmental protest in Germany
The evolution of environmental protest in the last three decades and its underlying
organisational base in Germany has been described somewhere else (Rucht and Roose
1999). Let me only recapitulate some of the major quantitative findings.
First, if we only include the primary claim articulated, environmental protests
account for a relatively small proportion of all protest mobilisation between 1970 and
1994. Anti-nuclear protests represent 6.6 per cent and (other) pro-environmental
protests 3.9 per cent of all protests. In terms of participants, the respective proportions
are 5.3 per cent and 2.9 per cent. This is a remarkable finding, because one might
have assumed that the wide range of environmental issues would outweigh the single
issue of nuclear power in terms of protest activities. When considered over time, antinuclear and pro-environmental protests gradually increased during the 1970s and
tended to remain on a high level, with some significant peaks, until 1994 (Figure 1).
7
Second, throughout the whole period from 1970 to 1994, anti-nuclear protests had a
higher share of confrontational and violent protests compared to other environmental
protests. Whereas the proportion of confrontational anti-nuclear and other proenvironmental protests increased over time, the number of violent anti-nuclear
protests in both categories was highest in the 1980s (Rucht and Roose 1999).
Third, anti-nuclear protests are predominantly carried out by informal groups (66
per cent), whereas formal associations are the main carriers of other proenvironmental protests (also 66 per cent). The four big environmental organisations
(Greenpeace, WWF, BUND, NABU) have increased in terms of membership and
staff between 1980 and 1996/97, whereas the medium-sized organisations partly grew
and partly shrunk. With the exception of the totally decentralised network of antinuclear groups, the environmental movement as a whole became more
institutionalised and professionalised. It seems that the large organisations have
increased their visibility and impact at the expense of the smaller and more informal
groups. Nevertheless, a great number of these latter kind of groups are still active.
Hence, in an overall perspective, the movement was able to maintain its heterogeneity
and its pronounced network character (Rucht 1989).
In the following, let us take a closer look at the more recent environmental protests
based on the German TEA-data available at this point. As stressed and explained in
8
the brief methodological section, these results cannot be directly compared with the
results from the Prodat-study.
2.2.1 The volume of environmental mobilisation
In the TEA-study an inclusive definition of environmental protest was applied which
also encompasses anti-nuclear protests. Moreover, it should be remembered that the
data set used here includes all environmental protests in Eastern Germany from 1993
onward. Hence the figures on 1988 refer only to West Germany and West Berlin,
whereas the more recent figures cover the unified Germany. Based on these selection
criteria, 1,391 protests on environmental issues were registered in 1988 and 1993-97.
Out of these, only 11 are anti-environmentalist. These latter protests are excluded
from the further analysis.
Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of protests, participants and average
size of environmental protests for each of the six years under investigation.
Proportionately most mobilisation occurred in 1988, both in terms of events and
participants. This is also the year in which, on average, most participants were
mobilised per event. Nevertheless, there is not a trend of continuous decline in
mobilisation as some observers have assumed. 1993 was the year with the lowest
proportion of events and 1996 the year with the lowest proportion of participants.
Compared to the period from 1970 to 1994, both environmental and anti-nuclear
protests have considerably increased their relative weight. When refering to the total
of all protests reported in the taz between 1995 and mid-1997 (N=1,856),
environmental protest (without nuclear power issues) represented only 8.7 percent and
anti-nuclear protests an amzingly high proportion of 13.1 per cent.
9
Table 1: Indicators of the volume of mobilisation
(Percentages)
Year
1988
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
Total
N
Protests
Participants Mean
Median
%
%
Abs.
Abs.
26,3
32.7
16,423
187
9,6
11.6
13,194
600
16,1
24.1
11,433
100
16,7
15.0
10,485
128
13,3
7.0
6,165
239
17,9
9.6
6,997
160
100
100 All years All years
1,380 6,837,734
11,209
150
Figures 2 and 3 break down the number of events and participants for the same six
years by quarters. Comparing the distributions of events and participants, it becomes
obvious that the latter follow a much more unsteady course because of the presence or
absence of mass protests. The relatively high number of events in the first quarter of
1997 underlines that the movement cannot be said to be in decline. In terms of
participants, by far the largest number was mobilised in the first quarter of the period
of investigation. Looking at the years from 1993 to 1997, we again find no clear
indication of shrinking protest activity when considering the number of protesters.
Figure 2: Environmental Protests in Germany, 1988
and 1993+
140
120
80
60
40
20
97
3
97
1
96
3
96
1
95
3
95
1
94
3
94
1
93
3
93
1
88
3
0
88
1
Protests
100
quarters, 1988 and 1993ff.
10
Figure 3: Participants in Environmental Protests in Germany,
1988 and 1993+
1600000
Participants
1400000
1200000
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
0
881
883
931
933 941
943
951
953 961
963
971
973
quarters, 1988 and 1993ff.
2.2.2 The issues and targets of protest
When the detailed list of 48 environmental issues is transformed into six broader issue
domains, the category of pollution/urban ecology prevails by far (Table 2). Taking the
average for all six years, this category represents 72 per cent of all protests. Nature
protection follows with 11.7 percent. The remaining four domains are surprisingly
small.
Table 2: Environmental issues by year
(Percentages)
1988 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Military
0.6
Industrial pollution/
66.9
urban ecology
Nature protection
20.1
Animal rights
1.1
Alternative production 6.3
& technology
Lifestyle/health
3.0
Other
1.9
Total
100
N
363
2.3
82.0
2.7
82.9
11.7
69.3
0.0
69.0
1988,
1993ff
0.0
2.8
68.8
72.0
6.8
0.8
3.0
3.2
2.3
4.1
5.6
1.7
6.1
13.6
3.3
7.1
14.2
7.7
7.7
11.7
2.8
5.9
0.8
4.5
100
133
2.7
2.3
100
222
3.9
1.7
100
231
5.4
1.6
100
194
1.2
0.4
100
247
2.9
1.9
100.0
1,380
Within the category of industrial pollution/urban ecology, the issue of nuclear energy
is clearly dominant (62.6 per cent). Conflicts around the transport and disposal of
nuclear waste account for 32.2 per cent of all environmental protests, and conflicts
11
about nuclear power stations represent another 11.9 per cent. In 1993 and 1996, the
nuclear issue attracted over half of all environmental protest (54.2 and 53.8 per cent,
respectively). It is unlikely that such high proportions are matched in any other
country in the 1990s. Although conflicts about nuclear waste in Germany have also
attracted protests in earlier periods, the majority of anti-nuclear protests at this time
were centered around nuclear power stations and the issue of nuclear reprocessing.
When asking for the primary targets of protest, it again appears advisable to have a
separate look at the issue of nuclear power (Table 3). Considering all environmental
protests, the largest proportion is directed against private economic organisations such
as trade companies and corporations (44.4 per cent), followed by state institutions and
representatives (together 35.8 per cent). For nuclear energy issues, in which the state
is heavily involved, we would expect it to be the main target. However, compared to
all environmental protests, on this issue the state is relatively less targeted, while
private economic organisations attract 71.2 of all nuclear power protests.
Table 3: Primary target of environmental protests and anti-nuclear protests
(Percentages)
Target
Trade associations/
companies
Government/ministers
State/public
institutions/officials
Private persons
Parties
Members of parliament
Other associations/churches
Other
Total
N
All envir.
Only
protests anti-nucl.
44.0
71.2
18.8
17.0
10.3
15.8
13.1
0.4
1.3
0.1
5.3
100
957
1.9
0.2
0.5
0.0
0.0
100
417
When considering the underlying territorial scope of environmental problems, we
might anticipate that large-scale and even transnational problems play an increasing
role. As can be seen in Table 4, there is no clear trend toward transnational problems.
By contrast, national problems clearly dominate in the last two years under
consideration. These data, admittedly only spanning a relatively short period, do not
show an effect of the widely debated globalisation processes. But even when, based
12
on Prodat data, we consider the much longer period from 1970-94, no such trend is
identifiable as far as environmental protest is concerned.5
Table 4: Territorial scope of the underlying environmental problem by year
1988 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Local
District
Regional/state
National
EU-countries
Europe, general
International
Total
N
31.3
5.3
7.6
31.6
1.5
18.4
4.4
100
342
15.9
8.7
12.7
31.0
27.8
2.4
1.6
100
126
21.2
9.3
14.6
39.7
11.9
1.3
2.0
100
151
19.5
3.5
1.3
35.4
34.1
0.4
5.8
100
226
14.4
6.6
9.4
59.7
1.1
1.1
7.7
100
181
21.5
4.9
2.4
59.8
7.7
0.8
2.8
100
246
1988,
1993+
22.2
5.9
7.1
42.6
12.3
5.7
4.2
100
1,272
Moreover, when controlling for the territorial level/location of the target of protest, no
trend toward the growing relevance of international targets can be identified. Whereas
the targets at the national level become more important over time, this is not so for
foreign and/or international targets (Table 5). EU-related targets play a surprisingly
small role (3.1 per cent for all six years), though environmental problems in EUcountries accounted for 12.3 percent (see Table 4). Overall, sub-national targets
attract more than 50 per cent of all environmental protests, and their relevance does
not seem to diminish over time.
5
When considering the Prodat data, the proportion of environmental protests
focussing on cross-national problems was 8.0 percent in the 1970s, 34.3 per cent in
the 1980s, and 21.3 percent from 1990-94.
13
Table 5: Territorial level of target by year
(Percentages)
1988 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Local
District
Regional/state
National
EU-countries
Europe, general
International
Total
N
15.8
5.4
22.5
26.1
0.5
2.7
27.0
100
222
43.2
46.5
1.3
23.2
25.8
1.9
0.0
1.3
100
155
34.6
17.3
1.2
0.0
3.7
100
81
30.2
0.6
16.7
35.2
11.7
0.6
4.9
100
162
4.0
6.5
19.4
64.5
0.8
0.0
4.8
100
124
38.3
4.3
11.7
41.0
2.1
0.0
2.7
100
188
1988,
1993+
28.8
3.3
20.1
35.0
3.1
0.8
9.0
100
932
2.2.3 The levels and forms of action
When comparing the territorial levels on which mobilisation takes place, it becomes
clear that sub-national levels, most especially the local one, play an important role
(Table 6). The separate analysis for protests only against nuclear energy shows that
these are distributed in roughly the same way across territorial levels as in the case of
all environmental protests.
Table 6: Territorial level of mobilisation by year
(Percentages)
All environmental protests
Local
District
Regional/state
National
EU-countries
Europe, general
International
Total
N
1988
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
63.0
6.8
6.8
15.8
1.4
2.7
3.4
100
146
63.2
2.6
10.5
21.1
2.6
0.0
0.0
100
76
65.0
15.0
3.3
15.0
0.0
1.7
0.0
100
60
74.5
8.5
6.6
8.5
0.0
1.9
0.0
100
106
54.2
10.2
8.5
20.3
1.7
0.0
5.1
100
59
44.4
13.0
13.0
22.2
3.7
0.0
3.7
100
54
Antinuclear
1988
1993ff
62.7
8.6
7.8
16.2
1.4
1.4
2.0
100
501
1988,
1993+
63.0
11.5
5.7
15.4
0.9
1.3
2.2
100
227
14
Six broad forms of action have been defined, derived from a more detailed list of 26
different types.6 When all environmental protest are considered, a significant
proportion of them are more or less unruly (16.9 per cent confrontational, 11.9 per
cent violent) (Table 7). If we look specifically at the subset of anti-nuclear protests,
the proportion of confrontational protests is considerably higher (24.6 per cent). The
same is true for the category of heavy violence. These results confirm a pattern that
also holds across a longer time period (Rucht and Roose 1999): Anti-nuclear protests
tend to be significantly more disruptive than all other environmental protests (with the
probable exception of issues such as animals rights and genetic engineering.
Table 7: Types of environmental and anti-nuclear action*
(Percentages)
All environmental protests
Antinuclear
1988 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1988
1988
1993ff 1993ff
Appeal
18.6
9.1
8.6 10.0 14.7 30.0
16.1
7.2
Procedural
9.4 18.2
6.3
7.4
9.2
6.5
8.9
7.7
Demonstrative
51.0 42.4 58.6 46.8 29.3 20.6
42.3
44.5
Confrontational
13.9 21.2 18.5 18.6 15.2 17.4
16.9
24.6
Light violence
0.3
5.3
0.0
2.2 12.5 17.4
5.7
2.4
Heavy violence
0.8
0.8
5.9 12.6 13.6
5.7
6.2
10.9
Other
6.1
3.0
2.3
2.6
5.4
2.4
3.8
2.6
Total
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
N
361
132
222
231
184
247 1,377
622
* only first form of action
6
The following categorisation has been applied:
Appeal: signatures/petitions/resolutions/public letters, referendum, press conference,
distributing leaflets/posters, illegal billboarding/graffiti/flyposting, cultural
performance, noncommercial positive action, indoor assembly/teach in;
Procedural: procedural complaint, litigation;
Demonstrative: non-verbal protest (e.g. vigil), public protest assembly/rally,
demonstration march, hunger strike;
Confrontational: boycot, disruption of event, blockade/sit in, strike, occcupation;
Light violence: theft/burglary, minor attack on property, aggressive bodily contact;
Heavy violence: severe attack on property/arson/bombing, personal injuries (*move to
confrontational; homicide/murder.
15
2.2.4 The social and organisational carriers of protest
For a minority of the protests (about 14 per cent), we also have some rough
information about the social characteristics of the participants. In line with findings
from various other contexts, young people are, in relative terms, the most important
distinct group to protest (22.4 per cent). To a similar degree, the participants in
protests are socially heterogeneous. Next to this category, but representing
significantly lower proportions, come students and farmers (Table 8).
Table 8: Social characteristics of protesters*, 1988 and 1993-97
(Percentages)
Social category
Youth
Socially heterogeneous
Students
Farmers
Professionals
Employees/white collar
Women
Senior citizens
Intellectuals/artists
Craft/trade
Other
Total
N
* Only first category
All
environ
mental
protests
22.4
21.4
8.9
8.3
3.1
2.1
2.1
1.0
1.0
1.0
28.6
100.0
192
Antinuclear
only
23.1
31.9
2.2
13.1
5.5
1.1
3.3
0.0
1.1
1.1
17.6
100
91
In addition to the social characteristics of the protesters, the organisational carriers of
protest have also been registered as far as information was available. Because quite
often several groups and organisations participate in the same protest, up to five
different carriers were coded. Combining the information in these five variables, we
can display the distribution of types of organisational carriers (Table 9). Again a
structural difference between all environmental protests and the subset of anti-nuclear
protests becomes apparent. Formal organisations are the largest category (40.3 per
cent) when the total of environmental protests is considered, whereas anti-nuclear
protests are mainly carried out by informal groups (53.7 per cent). This confirms our
16
view that the anti-nuclear movement is mainly based on small groups without statutes
and official membership. Also, the way in which these groups are linked tends to be
looser and more informal. No national organisation or firm alliance exists for the antinuclear movement. Instead, its most active groups meet at the so-called Spring and
Autumn Conferences to exchange experiences and discuss strategies.
Table 9: Organisational carriers of protest, 1988 and 1993-97
(Percentages)
Formal environmental
organisation
Informal environmental
group
Party
Network of groups/
organisations
Union
Business/industry
Other
Total
N
All
environ
mental
protests
40.3
Antinuclear
only
24.7
29.6
53.7
13.0
4.5
11.8
4.2
2.4
1.2
8.9
100
1051
0.8
0.3
4.5
100
380
A rough indicator of the network and alliance structure of the movement is the
number of groups and organisations per event. For all environmental protests it is 4.0
and for the subset of anti-nuclear protests it is only slightly higher (4.1). However, we
should bear in mind that reports on anti-nuclear protests, because of the more informal
basis of these activities, tend to provide less information on their organisational basis.
In consequence, the average number of anti-nuclear groups may be higher than the
available figures suggest.
A second indicator for the co-operation of environmental groups is the extent to
which individual protests are part of a larger campaign. When all environmental
protests are taken together, about one third (32.2 per cent) of them can be attributed to
a campaign. In the case of anti-nuclear protests, this proportion is 37.5 per cent –
again an indicator that collaboration tends to be more common in the anti-nuclear
movement than the rest of the environmental movement. Whereas a single national
environmental organisation may stage a large protest based mainly or even
17
exclusively on its own adherents, the relatively small anti-nuclear groups are forced to
join together in order to achieve a significant turnout.
2.2.5 Immediate consequences of protests
Data on injunctions, the use of physical force, injuries and arrests provide us with an
idea of the more concrete circumstances and consequences of protest activities.
Injunctions were brought in 10.2 per cent of all environmental protests; they were
overwhelmingly (9.6 per cent) enacted by state authorities and, in particular, police
force. The use of physical force was registered in 4.9 percent of the cases, again
largely exerted by the police (4.4 per cent). Injuries were rare (15 cases, 1.0 per cent),
whereas arrests were conducted in 4.5 per cent of the environmental protests. Again,
when looking only at anti-nuclear protests, the corresponding figures are higher,
confirming the more radical character of anti-nuclear protest: use of injunction 17.0
percent, use of physical force 7.7 per cent, injuries 1.6 per cent, and arrests 8.2 per
cent.
3. Discussion and Summary
At present, this preliminary analysis based on still incomplete data is purely
descriptive. The aim was to shed some light on the profile and patterns of
environmental protest. Neither explanations for its occurrence and patterns, nor an
analysis of its impacts, was sought. In this final section, some of the major findings
will be summarised and briefly discussed.
First, the data show that the environmental movement in Germany cannot be said
to be in decline, let alone dead. This is true not only in terms of its protest activity but
also its organisational infrastructure. Other data not presented here suggest that the
large national organisations continue to grow, though not at the relatively high rates
seen in earlier periods. The medium-sized organisations have had more mixed
fortunes in terms of membership growth and other resources. As for the plethora of
autonomous groups active at the local and regional levels, no recent data are available.
Scattered information suggests that their number and size is fairly stable (Rucht,
Blattert and Rink 1997). One explanation for the overly pessimistic view of the
18
environmental movement could be that the movement of today is no longer as new
and exciting as it was in earlier periods. It no longer makes headlines, it is no longer a
threat to the established system, its rapid growth rates are over, and therefore its actual
activity and size tend to be underestimated. Looking at the internal discourse of the
movement, it also appears that some observers dramatise the state of the movement to
raise levels of awareness and activity. Similar diagnoses of crisis and decline have
also been promoted with regard to the women’s movement (whose infrastructure,
however, tends to be quite solid - particularly when considering the local level).
A second important finding is the continuing endurance and vitality of anti-nuclear
activism (Ehmke 1998; Kolb 1997). Although no nuclear reactors went into operation
from the late 1980s, and no concrete plans for the construction of new reactors are
underway (though the industry is developing new prototypes), the movement did not
fade away as in most other countries. During the 1990s, anti-nuclear protest accounts
for half or even more of all environmental protest. The analysis has also shown that
nuclear protests differ in several respects from other environmental protests. Above
all, they tend to be more radical and are based on a much more decentralised and
informal infrastructure which resembles the SPIN-structure (segmented,
polycephalous, integrated networks) as described in another context by Gerlach and
Hine (1970). A closer look at these protests reveals that the issues of the anti-nuclear
struggle have changed. Whereas activism in the 1970s and 1980s was geared to
preventing the construction of nuclear facilities (mainly nuclear power stations and a
reprocessing plant), the overriding nuclear issue in the 1990s is the transport and
temporary storage of nuclear waste. On various occasions, this led to massive and
partly radical protest, including clashes with police which were mobilised to an
unprecedented scale to protect nuclear transports across the country. Why nuclear
transport, which is also conducted in many other countries, is particularly conflictual
in Germany, would require a separate comparative analysis. In part, this seems to be a
result of a deliberate strategic choice of the German environmental movement which,
as early as the late 1970s, had defined the issue of nuclear waste as the Achilles’ heel
of the nuclear power programme as a whole. Since the phasing out of nuclear power
decided upon in 1986 by the Social Democratic Party seems to be taking much longer
than expected, and the nuclear industry pushes to keep nuclear power in place, the
stopping of nuclear transports and intermediate storage of nuclear waste would
represent the final blow for nuclear power in Germany. In other countries, by contrast,
19
the situation is largely different. Either nuclear power is still largely unquestioned by
the established forces (e.g., France, Belgium, Great Britain) and the anti-nuclear
movement is far too weak to make any change, or nuclear power is no longer, or
remains only for a limited period, an option (e.g., Austria, Italy, Sweden).
A third finding of this paper is the absence of remarkable changes to environmental
protests over time. Although only six out of ten years are currently covered, the
inclusion of the first year (1988) and its comparison with the five last years (1993-97)
should enable us to identify any major changes. While we do see significant changes
form year to year when it comes to the number of events or participants, as well as the
forms, targets, levels and other aspects of environmental protest, these changes do not
form a clearly identifiable trend over time. In particular, they do not lend support to
assumptions of a de-radicalisation or transnationalisation of the movement. A time
span of ten years is probably too short to identify clear-cut trends, but there is still a
striking discrepancy between the widespread and often strong opinions about
allegedly “obvious” developments and the empirical evidence as provided by protest
event analysis.
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