Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2009, pp. 307-340
LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Fahlman et al.
Does a lack of life meaning
cause boredom? Results from
psychometric, longitudinal,
and experimental analyses
Shelley A. Fahlman, Kimberley B. Mercer, Peter Gaskovski,
Adrienne E. Eastwood, and John D. Eastwood
Existential theory and previous qualitative research have suggested that a lack of
life meaning and purpose causes boredom, as well as other types of negative affect such as depression or anxiety. Although these variables have been shown to
be correlated at one point in time, the relationships among these constructs have
not been investigated using a controlled, quantitative research design. In Study
1a (N = 131), boredom was shown to be related to, yet psychometrically distinct
from, life meaning, depression, and anxiety. In Study 1b (N = 88), life meaning
significantly predicted changes in boredom across time while depression and
anxiety did not. In addition, boredom was a significant predictor of changes in life
meaning across time, while depression and anxiety were not. Finally, in Study 2 (N
= 102), manipulating perceptions of life meaning significantly changed boredom,
while a manipulation of mood did not. The nature of the relationship between life
meaning and boredom, as well as some clinical implications, are discussed.
Boredom is a common yet insidious human experience. Although
boredom makes “no grand gestures, nor great cries” (Baudelaire,
1993, p. 7) and, on first glance, appears deceptively simple, a closer
examination reveals an intractable and complex malady. The term
boredom is used to refer to a wide range of experience, from trivial
and transient dissatisfaction, to extreme, chronic suffering. In terms
of its defining elements, however, boredom involves dissatisfaction
with and disengagement from one’s environment and/or current acPortions of this research (Study 2) are based on the Master’s thesis of the first author.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Dr. John Eastwood,
Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M3J 1P3. E-mail: [email protected].
307
308LACK OF LIFE MEANING
tivity (e.g., Fenichel, 1951; Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993). Although
a bored individual wishes to be engaged in satisfying activity, the
individual may feel that there is “nothing to do,” that they cannot
identify an activity that would satisfy their desire, or that they must
do things they do not want to do (Fahlman, Mercer, Flora, & Eastwood, 2008). The English word “boredom” has a relatively specific
and recent historical origin (Spacks, 1995), but the psychological
state to which it refers has been explored by observers of the human
condition since antiquity (Kuhn, 1976). Among modern thinkers,
Schopenhauer (1995) describes ennui as a “lifeless yearning without
a definite object, a deadening languor” (p. 85). Byron calls boredom
“that awful yawn which sleep cannot abate” (Steffan & Pratt, 1971,
p. 405). Finally, Fromm (1955) claims that “among the evils of life,
there are few which are as painful as boredom, and consequently
every attempt is made to avoid it” (p. 202).
In contrast to its treatment in literary and philosophical work,
boredom has received relatively little attention in the psychological
literature. In fact, Smith (1981) noted that between 1926 and 1980
an average of less than one paper per year was published on the
topic. In more recent years, however, this trend has been shifting,
and a growing body of literature has demonstrated that boredom
is associated with significant psychological, behavioral, and social
difficulties (e.g., Blaszczynski, McConaghy, & Frankova, 1990; Harris, 2000; Sommers & Vodanovich, 2000). Most consistently, studies
have shown that boredom is correlated with various types of negative affect, including depression, anxiety, apathy, hopelessness, and
lacking a sense of meaning or purpose in life (Ahmed, 1990; Bargdill,
2000; Blaszczynski et al., 1990; Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; MacDonald & Holland, 2002; Passik, Inman, Kirsh, Theobald, & Dickerson,
2003; Sommers & Vodanovich, 2000; Vodanovich & Verner, 1991;
Weinstein, Xie, & Cleanthous, 1995). With such relations to different
forms of negative affect, boredom is surely not simply a transient
form of suffering. In fact, several authors have documented cases
of individuals experiencing chronic boredom (e.g., Bargdill, 2000;
Drob & Bernard, 1987)—one even describing a man who was “almost bored to death” (Maltsberger, 2000).
Although the associations between boredom and various types
of negative affect have been reliably demonstrated, there have been
few efforts to fully understand or interpret these findings within
a theoretical framework. However, one such framework—the ex-
FAHLMAN ET AL.
309
istential tradition—provides a clear frame for understanding the
relationship between boredom, negative affect, and life meaning.
Although diverse in their thinking, many existential theorists posit
that lacking a sense of life meaning is at the forefront of human
suffering, and that experiences of boredom and negative affect
are central components of this lack of purpose or meaning. Frankl
(1959/1962/1984), for example, emphasizes the fundamental importance of having of a sense of meaning in one’s life. Indeed, for
him, the quest to find and fulfill a sense of meaning is the essence of
human motivation, a basic striving that he calls the “will to meaning” (Frankl, 1978). According to Frankl (1959/1962/1984, 1978),
the conditions of modern society have left many individuals with
a feeling of meaninglessness—an affliction he refers to as an existential vacuum. When this condition remains unresolved, individuals are said to “lack the awareness of a meaning worth living for.
They are haunted by the experience of their inner emptiness, a void
within themselves” (Frankl, 1959/1962/1984, p. 128). Frankl further
contends that “the existential vacuum manifests itself mainly in a
state of boredom” (p. 129). Yet, he also notes that the existential vacuum is associated with negative affective states, such as dysphoria,
as well as resulting maladaptive behaviors, such as aggression or
suicide.
A similar but distinct conceptualization of boredom and negative affect is offered by Maddi, in which he too underlines the importance of the search for meaning (Maddi, 1967, 1970). For Maddi
(1970), both boredom and negative affect arise from a psychopathology of meaning—what he refers to as existential sickness or existential neurosis, which he defines as “a settled, continuous state of
meaninglessness, apathy, and aimlessness” (p. 140). The affective
component of this existential sickness involves a “general absence
of emotions, pleasant or unpleasant, with the exception of boredom”
(p. 140, emphasis added). Although boredom is the primary affective symptom, existential sickness can also manifest in intermittent
periods of depression. Yet, according to Maddi, if the condition is
prolonged, depression recedes and the individual is overcome by
“apathy and boredom, and more apathy and boredom, in a humdrum cycle of indifference” (p. 140).
At least two empirical studies have examined the relationship between life meaning and boredom using qualitative methods. First,
310LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Drob and Bernard (1987), on the basis of clinical case studies, challenged the classic psychoanalytic assumption that chronic boredom
is a consequence of defensive operations (i.e., that boredom develops after instinctual aims are blocked from awareness, resulting
in impoverished desire, fantasy and emotion, e.g., Wangh, 1975).
Instead, Drob and Bernard concluded that the chronically bored individual is devoid of purpose: he or she has failed to achieve a fundamental life project that gives meaning to his or her life. Although
this lack of direction may, in part, result from defensive factors, it
is the lack of purpose or meaning which is the critical causal factor in the development of chronic boredom. Accordingly, Drob and
Bernard suggest that it is only when the individual has adopted a
meaningful life project or theme that boredom can be overcome.
More recently, Bargdill (2000) has adopted a similar view of boredom. In conducting interviews with individuals who were bored
with their lives, Bargdill found that emotional ambivalence is a key
element of life boredom—ambivalence which developed after these
individuals had compromised their personal life projects, goals, or
dreams. After replacing their desires with less desired projects, they
became emotionally torn. On the one hand, they felt anger and blame
toward the world and others, particularly toward those whom they
felt had “forced” them to compromise their personal projects; on the
other hand, they felt shame and self-blame, realizing they had sold
short their own dreams to pursue those of others. Moreover, the
boredom they felt toward their modified projects spread to other aspects of their lives. This chronic boredom was accompanied by feelings of emptiness, and eventually individuals became passive and
avoidant toward their lives. Bargdill thus concluded that losing or
turning away from personally meaningful life goals leads to feeling
“stuck” in a chronic state of boredom. In short, the work of Bargdill
(2000), like that of Drob and Bernard (1987), suggests that the loss
of or failure to develop meaningful life goals causes the experience
of chronic boredom.
Existential theory and these two qualitative studies suggest that
boredom arises from a lack of life meaning. Although previous research has shown that these variables are significantly related when
measured at one point in time (e.g., MacDonald & Holland, 2002;
Weinstein, Xie, & Cleanthous, 1995), cause cannot be inferred from
correlations alone. In order to remedy this gap in existing research,
the present research evaluated the relationships among these vari-
FAHLMAN ET AL.
311
ables using a quantitative, controlled research design. Specifically,
the existential hypothesis that a lack of meaning causes boredom
was tested. In addition, because existential theory implies that boredom’s relationship to negative affect can be accounted for by life
meaning, a related sub-goal of the present research was to examine
this possibility.
In order to demonstrate that changes in life meaning cause changes in boredom, it first must be shown that these constructs can be
reliably and distinctly measured. Then, the temporal precedence
of life meaning must be demonstrated by examining its effect on
boredom across time (in addition to its impact on depression and
anxiety). Finally, the presumed “cause” must be shown to correlate
with its presumed effect when other relevant variables are held constant—that is, the causal variable must be selectively manipulated
via a controlled experimental design. This was the approach taken
in the present investigation. Specifically, boredom, life meaning, and
negative affect (i.e., depression and anxiety) were first examined for
psychometric distinctiveness (Study 1a). Next, the variables were
examined across time in order to evaluate their predictive value
(Study 1b). Finally, an experimental approach was used to examine
whether temporarily manipulating perceptions of life meaning and
purpose would have the expected impact on boredom, as opposed
to manipulating negative affect alone (Study 2).
Study 1a
The purpose of Study 1a was to determine whether boredom, life
meaning, depression and anxiety are correlated, yet psychometrically distinct, constructs. To achieve this purpose, structural equation modeling analyses were used to determine whether these variables could be best described as four separate constructs.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 138 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory psychology courses. They were 77% female (n = 106) with a
mean age of 19.4 (SD = 2.5, range 17 to 36). Participants received
312LACK OF LIFE MEANING
course credit for participating. Questionnaire packages containing
self-report measures of boredom, meaning, anxiety, and depression
were included in four different orders.
Measures
Boredom Proneness Scale. The Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS;
Farmer & Sundberg, 1986) is a trait scale with 28 items measuring
“one’s proneness toward experiencing boredom” (p. 5). The internal
consistency of the 7-point Likert version has been reported to range
from .79 to .83 (Farmer & Sundberg, 1986; Vodanovich & Kass, 1990).
The test-retest reliability was reported to be .79 over a one-week interval (Polly, Vodanovich, Watt, & Blanchard, 1993). Higher scores
indicate greater proneness toward experiencing boredom.
Boredom Coping Scale. The Boredom Coping Scale (BCS; Hamilton,
Haier, & Buchsbaum, 1984) consists of 10 forced-choice items intended “to reflect one’s disposition to restructure one’s perceptions
and participation in potentially boring activities so as to decrease
boredom” (p. 183). In other words, it assesses the ability to avoid the
experience of boredom (e.g., “I easily find ways to entertain myself
even if others are bored”). The internal consistency is reported to
be .67, and the test-retest reliability based on a one- to three-week
interval is .64 (Hamilton et al., 1984). Higher scores indicate less
frequent boredom.
Purpose in Life Test. The Purpose in Life Test (PIL; Crumbaugh,
1968; Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964) was developed as a means
of operationalizing Viktor Frankl’s concept of life meaning. It is
intended to measure “the degree to which the individual [experiences] ‘purpose in life’ “ (p. 201), which is defined as “the ontological significance of life from the point of view of the experiencing
individual” (p. 201). The internal consistency of the PIL has been
reported to range from .90 to .92 (Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964; Reker, 1977), and the split-half reliability from .87 to .92 (Crumbaugh,
1968; Reker & Cousins, 1979). Reported test-retest coefficients are
.83 over a one-week interval (Meier & Edwards, 1974), and .68 over
a three-month interval (Reker, 1977). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of purpose in life.
Life Regard Index. The Life Regard Index (LRI; Battista & Almond,
1973) is a 28-item measure of “positive life regard” (i.e., life mean-
FAHLMAN ET AL.
313
ing). All items are measured on a 5-point scale. It has an internal
consistency of .86 (Debats, 1990), and test-retest reliability ranging
from .80 to .94 (Battista & Almond, 1973; Debats, van der Lubbe,
& Wezeman, 1993). Higher scores indicate a greater degree of life
meaning.
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. The Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD; Radloff, 1977) is a
20-item scale that measures current level of depressive symptomatology in the general public. According to Radloff (1977), the internal consistency is .85 and the test re-test reliability ranges from .45
to .70. Higher scores indicate greater depressive symptomatology.
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. The Hospital Anxiety and
Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) has two major
subscales, one measuring anxiety (HADS-A) and one measuring depression (HADS-D). It contains 14 items (7 depression items, 7 anxiety items), each measured on a 4-point scale. The internal consistency ranges from .68 to .93 for HADS-A, and .67 to .90 for HADS-D
(Bjelland, Dahl, Haug, & Neckelmann, 2002). Higher scores indicate
greater depressive or anxious symptomatology.
Self-Rating Depression Scale. The Self-Rating Depression Scale
(SDS; Zung, 1965) measures both physiological and psychological
symptoms of depression. It contains 20 items, each measured on a
4-point Likert scale. According to a review by Thurber, Snow, and
Honts (2002), the internal consistency has ranged from .79 to .88.
Higher scores indicate greater depressive symptomatology.
State-Trait Personality Inventory, Form Y—Trait Anxiety Scale. The
State-Trait Personality Inventory (STPI; Spielberger, 1995; Spielberger & Reheiser, 2004) measures both state and trait forms of curiousity, anxiety, depression, and anger. The total scale contains 80
items, with 10 items for each subscale. All items are measured on a
4-point scale. The Trait Anxiety scale (ANX)—used in the present
study—measures the general tendency to respond with elevated
anxiety to threatening situations. Higher scores indicate a greater
tendency toward elevated anxiety.
Latent Factors
Four latent factors specified were Depression, Boredom, Meaning/Purpose in Life, and Anxiety. Indicators of Depression included: (a) Cen-
314LACK OF LIFE MEANING
ter for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD), (b) Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—Depression scale (HADS-D),
and (c) the Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS). Indicators of Boredom included: (a) the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS), and (b) the
Boredom Coping Scale (BCS). Indicators of Meaning/Purpose in Life
included: (a) the Purpose in Life Test (PIL), and (b) the Life Regard
Index (LRI). Finally, indicators of Anxiety included: (a) the Hospital
Anxiety and Depression Scale—Anxiety scale (HADS-A), and (b)
the State-Trait Personality Inventory—Trait Anxiety scale (ANX).
Measurement Models. It was predicted that boredom, life meaning,
depression, and anxiety would be correlated, yet psychometrically
distinct, constructs. Support for this prediction would be indicated
by a four-factor model that provided a better fit to the data than
four possible three-factor models. The Chi-square difference test
was used to compare nested models to the four factor model. In
each of the three-factor models, two of the latent factors were specified to measure the same underlying construct as follows: model
3-factorA = depression/anxiety, boredom, and meaning; model
3-factorB = depression, anxiety, and boredom/meaning; model
3-factorC = boredom/depression, meaning, and anxiety; and model 3-factorD = boredom/anxiety, depression, and meaning. All covariances were constrained to a value of one.
Results and Discussion
Two participants had missing data on the SDS, and one participant
had missing data on the Trait Anxiety scale. In addition, two outliers (i.e., greater than three standard deviations above or below the
mean) were detected on the HADS-D scale, one on the CESD scale,
and one on the HADS-A scale. These seven participants were excluded from the present analysis, resulting in a sample size of 131.
All variables were normally distributed. Table 1 presents the correlation matrix and standard deviations.
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate the fit of the
obtained covariance matrix for the measurement models. Several fit
indices were chosen to evaluate model fit. Chi-square (χ2), with its
associated p value, indicates that the specified paths in the tested
model provide a good fit to the data when p is nonsignificant (p >
FAHLMAN ET AL.
315
TABLE 1. Study 1a Correlation Matrix, Means, and Standard Deviations (N = 131)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Depression
1. CESD
2. HADS Depression
.640
3. SDS
.754
.625
.466
.445
.578
-.200
-.266
-.294
-.595
6. Purpose in Life
-.654
-.550
-.659
-.574
.327
7. Life Regard Index
-.541
-.455
-.571
-.572
.375
Boredom
4. Boredom Proneness
5. Boredom Coping
Meaning/Purpose
.806
Anxiety
8. HADS Anxiety
.556
.524
.527
.235
-.181
-.399
-.258
9. STPI Trait Anxiety
.618
.474
.566
.387
-.171
-.501
-.454
15.06
3.45
38.38
96.18
6.30
104.63
102.43
7.50
21.15
7.32
2.37
6.62
17.79
2.04
15.13
14.41
3.10
3.57
Means
Standard deviations
.488
Note. All correlations p < .05. CESD = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; SDS = SelfRating Depression Scale.
.05). In addition, when values of the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and
the comparative fit index (CFI) exceed .90, the tested model fits the
data better than the null model. Finally, the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) and 90% confidence intervals were
included, for which excellent fit is indicated by values of .05 or less,
adequate fit is indicated by values of .08 or less, and poor fit is indicated by values of .10 or greater (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
Results indicated that the four-factor solution, with a constrained
error variance,1 provided an excellent fit to the data (Table 2). In
contrast, the alternative three-factor models resulted in poorer
fit indices relative to the four-factor model, with the exception of
1. The BPS factor loading initially exceeded one (i.e., 1.08), which is known as a
Heywood case. In such a scenario, Dillon, Kumar, and Mulani (1987) recommend that
the problematic error variance be constrained to zero if ‘‘the model provides a reasonable
fit, the respective confidence interval for the offending estimate covers zero, and the
magnitude of the corresponding estimated standard error is roughly the same as the
other estimated standard errors” (p. 134). Our data met these conditions, and therefore
the BPS error variance was constrained to zero, resulting in a factor loading of one.
316LACK OF LIFE MEANING
three-factor model A, which combined anxiety and depression into
a single factor; this model was equivalent to, but not better than, the
four-factor model.2 Correlations between all four latent factors were
statistically significant (p < .01) and strong (see Figure 1).
In sum, these findings demonstrate that boredom is related to, yet
psychometrically distinct from, life meaning, as well as other negative affects (i.e., depression and anxiety).
Study 1b
A further step in examining the relationships between these constructs entails measuring them at more than one point in time in
order to determine whether they predict changes in one another.
Thus, the purpose of Study 1b was to explore the relationships between life meaning, boredom, depression, and anxiety across time.
Based on existential theory, it was predicted that life meaning would
better predict boredom across time (controlling for boredom at time
one) than anxiety or depression. In addition, it was predicted that
anxiety, depression, and boredom would not predict meaning across
time (controlling for meaning at time one), given that meaning is
believed to be the causal variable. Thus, two hierarchical regression
analyses were conducted, the first with boredom and the second
with meaning as the dependent variable.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Participants were drawn from the same sample as Study 1a; however, 88 of these individuals returned at time two, and their data
was analyzed for Study 1b. The returning participants were 77%
female (n = 68) with a mean age of 19.5 (SD = 2.9, range 17 to 36).
2. Although they are validated measures of life meaning, some items on the PIL
(items 1, 2, 19) and LRI (items 5, 10, 12, 16, 20, 24) seem to also measure boredom;
thus, in order to rule out any concern with item conflation, we ran the same analyses
excluding these items. Even with this strict test, results were nearly identical: the fourfactor model provided an excellent fit, χ2(22) = 31.56, TLI = .99, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .058,
and was better than all other three-factor models, again, with the exception of threefactor model A (depression and anxiety combined).
FAHLMAN ET AL.
317
FIGURE 1. Four-factor measurement model.
They were not significantly different from the Study 1a sample on
demographic variables (i.e., age or gender) or any of the dependent
variables (i.e., anxiety, depression, boredom, or life meaning). For
each participant, questionnaires were completed approximately
three to eight weeks from the time they completed the questionnaires at time one.
318LACK OF LIFE MEANING
TABLE 2. Study 1a Fit Indices for Four-Factor Model and Nested Models (N = 131)
Model
4-factor
3-factorA
3-factorB
3-factorC
3-factorD
χ2 (df)
28.02 (22)
32.61 (25)
150.48 (25)
307.37 (25)
134.10 (25)
.175
.141
.000
.000
.000
p value
TLI
.99
.99
.82
.72
.87
CFI
.99
.99
.88
.81
.91
RMSEA
RMSEA 90% CI
.046
.048
.196
.295
.183
.000-.091
.000-.090
.170-.230
.270-.320
.150-.210
4.59 (3)
122.46 (3)
279.35 (3)
106.08 (3)
.204
.000
.000
.000
χ2 difference (df)
p value
Note. Model 3-factorA = depression/anxiety, boredom and meaning; 3-factorB = depression, anxiety,
boredom/meaning; 3-factorC = boredom/depression, meaning, and anxiety; and 3-factorD = boredom/anxiety, depression, and meaning. TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; CFI = Comparative Fit Index; RMSEA
= Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
Measures
At time two, participants completed the same questionnaire package utilized in Study 1a; however, for the regression analyses, one
measure of each construct was utilized: boredom was measured by
the Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS); depression was measured by
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD); life
meaning was measured by the Purpose in Life Test (PIL); and anxiety was measured by the State-Trait Personality Inventory—Trait
Anxiety scale (ANX). See Study 1a for a description of these measures.
Results and Discussion
All variables were normally distributed. Four variables had missing
data from one participant each. In addition, two outliers (i.e., greater than three standard deviations above or below the mean) were
detected: one on CESD1 and one on BPS2. These total scores were
deleted. For each hierarchical regression analysis, plots of standardized residuals were examined to assess for linearity and homoscedasticity, and participants with standardized residuals greater than
three were excluded from each analysis. In addition, the presence of
multicollinearity was assessed by examining the variance inflation
factors, none of which exceeded 5 for any variable in the following analyses (range 1.46 to 2.28), indicating the absence of multicol-
.553
12. SDS2
-.214
14. BCS2
.681
.610
-.548
-.626
-.160*
.489
.686
.646
-.605
-.681
-.212
.558
.385
.359
-.583
-.679
-.469
.794
.538
.813
.683
.349
.562
.642
.499
4
.613
3
.660
2
-.258
-.210
.454
-.628
-.482
.765
.842
.307
.811
.466
-.633
-.654
-.484
-.552
6
-.645
-.318
-.228
-.269
5
-.592
-.475
.643
.702
-.481
-.408
.761
-.200*
.411
.432
-.495
.441
8
.885
.278
-.617
-.630
-.477
-.487
7
.529
.599
.589
-.541
-.585
-.193*
.505
.648
.684
10
.733
-.504
-.510
-.171*
.419
.521
.543
.540
9
.650
.657
-.535
-.544
-.279
.385
.710
11
.705
.599
-.681
-.696
-.327
.588
12
.518
.372
-.713
-.686
-.588
13
-.220
-.152*
.371
.381
14
-.652
-.515
.790
15
-.705
-.520
16
.725
17
Note. All correlations p < .05 unless otherwise noted. For correlations between time one variables, see Table 1. Bolded correlations represent stability of scales across time.
1 = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—Depression scale (HADS-D), Time one; 2 = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD), Time one; 3 = Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS), Time one; 4 = Boredom Proneness Scale (BPS), Time one; 5 = Boredom Coping Scale (BCS), Time one, 6 = Purpose in Life Test (PIL), Time one;
7 = Life Regard Index (LRI), Time one; 8 = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—Anxiety Scale (HADS-A), Time one; 9 = State-Trait Personality Inventory—Trait Anxiety
scale (ANX), Time one; HADD2 = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—Depression scale, Time two; CESD2 = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale, Time
two; SDS2 = Self-Rating Depression Scale, Time two; BPS2 = Boredom Proneness Scale, Time two; BCS2 = Boredom Coping Scale, Time two; PIL2 = Purpose in Life Test,
Time two; LRI2 = Life Regard Index, Time two; HADA2 = Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale—Anxiety scale, Time two; ANX2 = State-Trait Personality Inventory—Trait
Anxiety scale, Time two. *p > .05.
.514
.589
17. HADA2
18. ANX2
Anxiety
-.540
-.469
15. PIL2
16. LRI2
Meaning
.447
13. BPS2
Boredom
.747
.497
10. HADD2
1
11. CESD2
Depression
TABLE 3. Correlations Between Depression, Boredom, Life Meaning, and Anxiety at Time One and Time Two (n = 88; Study 1b)
FAHLMAN ET AL.
319
320LACK OF LIFE MEANING
linearity. Correlations between all time one and time two variables
are presented in Table 3.
Predicting Boredom Across Time
The first analysis predicted boredom at time two (Table 4). Boredom
at time one was entered first, and meaning, anxiety, and depression
(all at time one) were entered second. Both the step one, F(1,83) =
145.17, p < .001, and step two, F(4,80) = 40.24, p < .001, omnibus models were statistically significant. Boredom at time one accounted for
64% (R2 = .64) of the variance in boredom at time two. The addition
of the three variables in step two accounted for an additional 3% of
the variance in boredom at time two (∆R2 = .03), which approached
statistical significance, F(3,80) = 2.55, p = .061. Importantly, an examination of the individual predictors revealed that both boredom
(β = .656, p < .001) and meaning (β = –.196, p = .044) were statistically
significant predictors of boredom at time two, while anxiety (β =
–.023, p = .798) and depression (β = .063, p = .521) were not.3
Predicting Meaning Across Time
The second analysis predicted life meaning at time two (Table 5).
Meaning at time one was entered first, and boredom, anxiety, and
depression (all at time one) were entered second. Both the step one,
F(1,84) = 206.60, p < .001, and step two, F(4,81) = 63.82, p < .001,
omnibus models were statistically significant. Meaning at time one
accounted for 71% (R2 = .71) of the variance in meaning at time two.
The addition of the three variables in step two accounted for an
additional 5% of the variance in meaning at time two (∆R2 = .05),
which was a statistically significant change in R-squared, F(3,81) =
5.40, p = .002. Anxiety (β = .041, p = .596) and depression (β = –.130,
p = .118) were not statistically significant predictors of meaning at
3. Similar to the approach taken in Study 1a, we ran a more stringent analysis (here,
using hierarchical regression) without the problematic PIL items. Results were very
similar: ∆R2 = .03, p = .087. Boredom (β = .674, p < .001) at time one was a statistically
significant predictor of boredom at time two, while anxiety (β = -.028, p = .762) and
depression (β = .073, p = .452) were not. The only difference was that the standardized
beta coefficient and associated p value for the PIL decreased slightly (β = –.172, p = .070).
4. Again, results were nearly identical with the problematic PIL items removed: ∆R2
= .04, p = .006. Meaning (β = .722, p < .001) and boredom (β = –.213, p = .002) at time one
were both statistically significant predictors of meaning at time two, while anxiety (β =
.085, p = .247) and depression (β = –.104, p = .182) were not.
FAHLMAN ET AL.
321
TABLE 4. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Boredom at Time Two (BPS2) from
Boredom, Meaning, Anxiety, and Depression at Time One (Study 1b)
b
SE b
β
t
p
R2
∆R2
F(∆R2)(df)
p
BPS1
.833
.069
.798
12.05
.000*
.636
—
—
—
BPS1
.686
.087
.656
7.86
.000*
PIL1
-.237
.116
-.196
-2.05
.044*
ANX1
-.112
.437
-.023
-0.26
.798
CESD1
.136
.211
.063
0.64
.521
.668
.032
2.55(3,80)
.061
Step 1
Step 2
Note. BPS1 = Boredom Proneness Scale, Time one; PIL1 = Purpose in Life Test, Time one; ANX1 =
State-Trait Personality Inventory—Trait Anxiety scale, Time one; CESD1 = Center for Epidemiologic
Studies Depression Scale, Time one. *p < .05.
time two, while unexpectedly, boredom (β = –.246, p = .001) was a
significant predictor.4
In sum, life meaning was a significant predictor of boredom across
time, whereas anxiety and depression were not. These results are
consistent with existential theory. Unexpectedly, boredom was a
significant predictor of meaning across time. These results suggest
that a bidirectional causal relationship may exist between life meaning and boredom. Finally, boredom appears to have a more unique
relationship with life meaning than it does with negative affective
states such as depression or anxiety. That is, although boredom, depression, and anxiety are significantly related at one point in time
(e.g., Study 1a; also see Table 3), Study 1b suggested that this relationship is minimal when the variance associated with life meaning
is partialled out. This is consistent with existential theory, which
implies that boredom is related to negative affect because both are
brought about by changes in life meaning.
Study 2
The findings of Study 1b suggest that life meaning can predict
changes in boredom across time, which is consistent with theoretical claims and previous qualitative research (Bargdill, 2000; Drob
& Bernard, 1987; Maddi, 1967, 1970; Frankl, 1959/1962/1984). The
purpose of Study 2 was to provide a direct test of this hypothesis
by investigating the impact of manipulating life meaning on self-
322LACK OF LIFE MEANING
TABLE 5. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Meaning at Time Two (PIL2) from
Meaning, Boredom, Anxiety, and Depression at Time One (Study 1b)
b
SE b
β
t
p
R2
∆R2
F(∆R2)(df)
p
PIL1
1.01
.070
.843
14.37
.000*
.711
—
—
—
PIL1
.750
.097
.629
7.76
.000*
BPS1
-.250
.072
-.246
-3.47
.001*
ANX1
.194
.365
.041
0.53
.596
CESD1
-.250
.176
-.130
-1.58
.118
.759
.048
5.40(3,81)
.002*
Step 1
Step 2
Note. BPS1 = Boredom Proneness Scale, Time one; PIL1 = Purpose in Life Test, Time one; ANX1 = StateTrait Personality Inventory—Trait Anxiety scale, Time one; CESD1 = Center for Epidemiologic Studies
Depression Scale, Time one. *p < .05.
reported ratings of boredom. As a control, mood alone was manipulated, and its impact on boredom ratings was also examined. That is,
because manipulating meaning was expected to also change mood,
a manipulation of mood alone was included as a control.
In total, four experimental conditions were created: a meaning
manipulation with two levels of meaning (high/low) and a mood
control condition with two levels of mood (happy/sad). The notion that an individual’s perceived sense of life meaning influences
levels of boredom whereas mood does not was translated into two
specific hypotheses: (1) participants in the low meaning condition
would score significantly higher on the measure of boredom than
those in the high meaning condition; and (2) participants in the
happy mood and sad mood conditions would not be significantly
different on the measure of boredom.
Participants and Procedure
Participants were 106 introductory psychology students who received course credit for their participation. Data from four individuals was removed due to failure to follow instructions, resulting
in a final sample size of 102. Participants were 73% female (n = 74)
with a mean age of 20.1 (SD = 3.3, range 18 to 41).
FAHLMAN ET AL.
323
Participants signed up anonymously for data collection sessions
and were unknown to each other. Data collection sessions were conducted in small groups of two to six participants for approximately
50 to 60 minutes. Random assignment was completed at the group
level to one of the four experimental conditions. The meaning manipulation elicited participants’ autobiographical memories in order to induce a temporary change in their perceived level of life
meaning. This particular manipulation was chosen over two other
possible approaches after it was shown to have a greater effect on
perceived levels of meaning in a pilot experiment (Fahlman, 2005).
Participants first read a sheet of paper with the following description of meaning (adapted from Battista and Almond, 1973):
When we talk about someone having a sense of “meaning” in life,
it means they believe life has a certain significance to it, so they act
according to those beliefs. What a person believes to be meaningful
can vary though. For example, some people might believe that life is
about helping others so they try to do things that make a difference in
the world. Someone else might believe that life is about trying to be
satisfied, so they then try to be happy or to enjoy themselves. Others
might feel life is about achievement and success, so they try to make
money. Others might believe that the purpose of life is to serve God,
Allah, Gaia, or some kind of Higher Power or deity. There are many
ways people’s lives can be meaningful. Having a sense of “meaning in
life” means that a person determines their goals and behaviour based
on the beliefs that they have about their life meaning and purpose. A
person who says their life is really meaningful is someone who spends
their time doing things that fit with those beliefs.
The researcher went through the definition with participants, and
answered their questions. Participants in the high meaning condition recalled a memory of a time in their life that was particularly
meaningful to them; participants in the low meaning condition recalled a memory of a time in their life that was meaningless (i.e.,
implying a negative valence, not a neutral one). Next, participants
spent several minutes in a guided visualization task in which they
were prompted to recall what they saw, how they felt, what they
were thinking, and who they were interacting with during the recalled incident. They were told: “Take a few minutes to imagine
324LACK OF LIFE MEANING
as vividly as possible that you are in this scenario again.” Three
minutes were allowed for this task. Finally, participants were told:
“Take ten minutes or so to describe the situation in writing, and
include as many details as you can.” Those in the mood conditions
followed an identical procedure, but recalled either a happy or a
sad memory. Dependent measures were administered immediately
after the manipulation in all conditions.5
Measures
Before the manipulation, participants completed measures of depression, self-esteem, and life meaning, in order to verify that randomization was successful and that the groups were not different
on key variables. Following the manipulation, participants in all
conditions responded to a series of questions used as manipulation checks (meaning- and mood-related items, as well as items assessing memory characteristics), as well as the dependent measure,
state boredom. Finally, participants responded to several “questions
about the experiment” which were used to determine whether the
conditions (meaning vs. mood) were more difficult to engage in, required more effort, or were more challenging or interesting (thereby
reducing boredom).
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSE;
Rosenberg, 1965) consists of ten items measured on a 4-point scale.
The internal consistency has been reported to be .92, and the testretest reliability over two weeks .85 (Rosenberg, 1965; Wylie, 1974).
Self-esteem was chosen as an individual difference variable because
it has been found to be strongly related to meaning (Battista & Almond, 1973; Reker, 1977). Battista and Almond consider self-esteem
to be a necessary but insufficient condition for the development of
positive life regard (i.e., life meaning). Therefore, because individuals who have pre-existing differences on level of self-esteem may
differentially react to the meaning manipulations, RSE was included as an individual difference measure.
5. After completing the experiment, participants in the low meaning condition
participated in the high meaning induction in order to counteract any negative effects
produced by the manipulation; similarly, participants in the sad mood condition
participated in the happy mood manipulation.
FAHLMAN ET AL.
325
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale. The Center for
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CESD; Radloff, 1977) has
been described in Study 1a. A measure of depression was included
because previous research has indicated that depression is strongly
related to meaning, and because depression may impact the ability
to recall specific autobiographical memories (e.g., Moore, Watts, &
Williams, 1988; Williams & Dritschel, 1988).
Sense of Coherence Scale. Pre-manipulation levels of life meaning
were measured by the Sense of Coherence Scale (SOC; Antonovsky,
1987). According to Antonovsky (1987), ‘sense of coherence’ is the
extent to which individuals perceive life to be meaningful, manageable, and comprehensible. The scale consists of 13 items, each measured on a 7-point scale. The internal consistency has been reported
to range from .74 to .91 (Antonovsky, 1993; Hood, Beaudet, & Catlin, 1996). A test-retest reliability coefficient of .77 has been found
after six months, and .76 to .78 after a one-year period (Antonovsky,
1993). This measure was included because participants’ susceptibility to having state-like perceptions of meaning altered may be
influenced by their pre-existing sense of life meaning.
Meaning Manipulation Check. The manipulation check for state
meaning included two questions—(1) Right now, how strongly do
you feel that your life is meaningful? (7-point scale); and (2) Right
now how strongly do you feel that your life is meaningless? (7-point
scale)—which were mixed among other filler questions not included in the present analyses. After reverse scoring the second of these
two items, responses were added together to create a total state
meaning score (possible range 2 to 14).
Mood Manipulation Check. The manipulation check for mood was
based on responses to the item: “Please rate your current mood.”
Responses were indicated on a 7-point scale where 1 = extremely
positive, 2 = positive, 3 = somewhat positive, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat negative, 6 = negative, and 7 = extremely negative.
Multidimensional State Boredom Scale. The Multidimensional State
Boredom Scale (MSBS) is measure of state boredom containing 24
items rated on a 7-point Likert scale (Fahlman, Mercer, Flora, &
Eastwood, 2008). Developed from phenomenological descriptions
of the experience of boredom, the MSBS has demonstrated good
construct validity, a strong factor structure, and state sensitivity. It
326LACK OF LIFE MEANING
contains five subscales: Disengagement, Agitated Affect, Dysphoric
Affect, Inattention, and Time Perception, with alpha coefficients of
.87, .85, .86, .80, and .88, respectively; for the full scale, an alpha coefficient of .94 has been reported. Fahlman et al. demonstrated that
the MSBS was significantly correlated with the Boredom Proneness
Scale, and with key constructs such as depression, anxiety, anger,
impulsivity, and attention problems. Strong support for its 5-factor structure was found using structural equation modeling analyses; furthermore, second-order factor analyses confirmed that the
five subscales are significantly related to a second-order “General
Boredom” factor, implying that MSBS total scores are meaningful.
Finally, the MSBS successfully distinguished between participants
who were induced into a state of boredom and those who were not,
demonstrating its state sensitivity. In the present study, only MSBS
total scores were utilized, for which the alpha coefficient was .93.
Memory Characteristics Questionnaire. The Memory Characteristics
Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) is a
self-report scale used to examine the phenomenal characteristics
of autobiographical memories recalled by participants in cognitive
psychology experiments (e.g., Arbuthnott, Geelen, & Kealy, 2002;
Johnson, 1988; Johnson et al., 1988; Suengas & Johnson, 1988). The
original version has 39 items rated on 7-point scale, which ask participants to rate recalled memories on several dimensions, such as
sensory detail or intensity of feelings. However, subscales can be
modified depending on the purposes of the research. In the present study, the MCQ was included as a manipulation check. Specific
subscales included were Clarity, Sensory Characteristics, Affective
Tone, Intensity, and Frequency of Recollection (similar to Arbuthnott et al., 2002).
Questions About the Experimental Tasks. Four questions about the
experimental tasks themselves were created to determine whether
participants found the tasks easier to engage in due to the content
(i.e., meaning- versus mood-related memories). The first question
asks explicitly about the potential engaging quality of the task itself,
apart from the valence of the condition: “Although the memory/
paragraph activities might have made you feel a certain way based
on the particular memory you recalled, when you think of the activities themselves did you find them engaging (i.e., held your attention)
or boring?” (1 = extremely engaging, 4 = neutral; neither engaging
FAHLMAN ET AL.
327
TABLE 6. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics for Individual Difference Measures, by Condition
(N = 102)
Condition
High Meaning
Low Meaning
Mean
Mean
(SD)
(SD)
High Mood
Mean
(SD)
Low Mood
Mean
(SD)
F
p
CESD
14.08
(6.24)
15.92
(6.76)
17.54
(8.40)
16.40
(8.63)
0.94
.43
RSE
18.85
(3.88)
19.36
(4.94)
18.81
(4.96)
18.92
(5.20)
0.07
.98
SOC
42.92
(7.40)
40.28
(8.82)
38.80
(9.53)
42.40
(9.26)
1.20
.31
Note. CESD = Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale;
SOC = Sense of Coherence Scale.
nor boring; 7 = extremely boring). The three additional questions
asked: (1) “How fully were you able to participate in the exercise
in this experiment?” (1 = not at all; 7 = totally able); (2) “Overall,
how boring were the activities in this experiment?” (1 = extremely
interesting, 2 = interesting, 3 = somewhat interesting, 4 = neutral,
5 = somewhat boring, 6 = boring, 7 = extremely boring); and (3)
“Overall, how interesting were the activities in this experiment?”
(1 = extremely interesting, 2 = interesting, 3 = somewhat interesting, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat uninteresting, 6 = uninteresting, 7 =
extremely uninteresting).
Results and Discussion
Individual Difference Measures
The groups were not significantly different on the measures of selfesteem, depression, or life meaning (Table 6), suggesting that the
randomization of groups was successful.
Manipulation Checks
Participants successfully recalled either a meaningful, meaningless,
happy, or sad memory, depending upon experimental condition. In
terms of content, those in the happy memory condition described,
for example, vacation activities or positive moments with family
328LACK OF LIFE MEANING
and friends. In contrast, those in the sad memory condition typically described the loss of a friend, family member, or pet. In the
meaning conditions, the memory content was diverse. In the high
meaning condition, participants described achieving meaningful
goals or dreams (e.g., winning sports/dance competitions, graduation from high school, acceptance to university), or events related to
established sources of meaning, such as religious experiences or intimate relationships (e.g., sharing a deep emotional connection with
a lover). In the low meaning condition, participants described difficult events involving value conflicts or a loss of coherence (e.g., betraying one’s culture by rejecting an arranged marriage), or events
that were confusing, emotionally overwhelming, and difficult to
understand their meaning (e.g., experiences of violence, abuse, or
sudden illness).
With respect to the quantitative measures, the high meaning (M =
12.04, SD = 1.68) and low meaning (M = 10.96, SD = 2.65) conditions
were significantly different on the measure of state meaning, t(49) =
1.74, p = .09, one-tailed test, while the happy mood (M = 11.28, SD =
2.25) and sad mood (M = 11.00, SD = 2.33) conditions were not, t(48)
= 0.43, p = .67. On this measure, medium effect sizes were found
in the meaning condition (Cohen’s d = .49, η2 = .06), in contrast to
negligible effect sizes in the mood condition (Cohen’s d = .12, η2 =
.004).
On the item assessing current mood, those in the high meaning
condition (M = 2.32, SD = 0.90) reported a significantly more positive mood than those in the low meaning condition, M = 3.68, SD
= 1.70; t(48) = –3.53, p = .001. Similarly, those in the happy mood
condition (M = 2.48, SD = 0.96) reported a more positive mood than
those in the sad mood condition, M = 3.54, SD = 1.44; t(47) = -3.04, p
= .004. This represents a large effect in both the meaning (Cohen’s d
= 1.00, η2 = .19) and mood conditions (Cohen’s d = .87, η2 = .16).
In sum, the meaning manipulation appeared to successfully
change perceptions of life meaning, while the mood manipulation
did not have such an effect; in addition, both the meaning and mood
manipulations appeared to impact mood, as expected.
Influence of Memory Characteristics. In order to determine whether
or not the qualities of the memories were inadvertently different in
other respects besides meaning or mood, an analysis was conducted
on subscales of the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ).
FAHLMAN ET AL.
329
The four conditions did not differ on the MCQ subscales Clarity,
Sensory Characteristics, Intensity, or Frequency of Recollection.
As expected, however, the groups differed on the Affective Tone
subscale, which measures the affective tone of the recalled memory
(i.e., positive or negative). There was a significant main effect for
condition, F(3, 98) = 223.40, p < .001. Using pair-wise comparisons
adjusted with a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons,
both of the “high” conditions (High meaning: M = 12.39, SD = 2.23;
Happy mood: M = 13.15, SD = 1.35) were significantly higher on
Affective Tone than both of the low conditions respectively (Low
meaning: M = 3.40, SD = 1.47; Sad mood: M = 3.88, SD =1.94) and
vice versa (p < .001 for all comparisons). However, as would be expected, neither of the high conditions differed from one another (p
= .741) and neither of the low conditions differed from one another
(p = 1.00). Furthermore, Affective Tone was not significantly correlated with any of the other MCQ subscales. Taken together, these
results indicate that the content of the memories did not change
the memory characteristics—for example, if happy memories had
been clearer, with more sensory characteristics, or had been recalled
more frequently than meaningless memories, these qualities may
have unintentionally altered the experimental manipulations. According to these results, however, this was not the case.
Questions About the Experimental Tasks. In response to the first
question “Although the memory/paragraph activities might have
made you feel a certain way based on the particular memory you
recalled, when you think of the activities themselves did you find
them engaging (i.e., held your attention) or boring?”, the groups
were not significantly different, F(3, 98) = 0.31, p = .82. In addition,
the groups did not differ on the question about how fully they were
able to participate in the task, F(3, 98) = 1.23, p = .30, how boring
they perceived the tasks to be, F(3, 98) = 0.79, p = .50), or how interesting they perceived the tasks to be, F(3, 98) = 0.28, p = .84. These
results indicate that no condition was significantly more challenging, engaging, or interesting than the others, despite the type of
memory recalled.
330LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Impact on Boredom
Both hypotheses regarding boredom were substantiated. Participants in the low meaning condition (M = 273.00, SD = 58.79) reported significantly higher levels of state boredom than those in the
high meaning condition, M = 237.69, SD = 63.80; t(49) = –2.05, p
= .045), whereas participants in the happy mood (M = 269.15, SD
= 56.88) and sad mood (M = 281.84, SD = 68.82) conditions were
not significantly different on the measure of state boredom, t(49) =
–0.72, p = .48). This represents a medium-sized effect in the meaning
condition (Cohen’s d = .60; η2 = .08) and a small effect on boredom
in the mood condition (Cohen’s d = .20; η2 = .01).
Thus, boredom was influenced by meaning as theoretically expected, but was minimally influenced by the mood manipulation
alone. This finding is consistent with existential theory and the results of Study 1b. With respect to causation, these findings suggest
that meaning is causally related to boredom more so than mood
or negative affect, since manipulating the level of meaning affected
participants’ level of boredom, in contrast to manipulating the level
of mood, which did not significantly affect boredom ratings.
General Discussion
The present investigation sought to clarify the relationship between
boredom and life meaning, and the role that depression and anxiety
play in this relationship. The findings of Study 1a suggested that
boredom is related to, yet psychometrically distinct from, life meaning and negative affect. Study 1b used hierarchical regression analyses to investigate longitudinal relationships between boredom, life
meaning, depression, and anxiety. In particular, it was shown that
life meaning predicted the level of boredom three to eight weeks later, even when initial boredom levels were controlled. The converse
relationship was also demonstrated—namely, that the level of boredom predicted later levels of life meaning, even when initial levels
of life meaning were controlled. The latter finding suggests that life
meaning and boredom may share a bidirectional causal relationship. Further, in Study 1b, neither depression nor anxiety significantly predicted meaning or boredom across time, over and above
FAHLMAN ET AL.
331
initial levels of life meaning or boredom. This finding suggests that
boredom and life meaning share a closer relationship with each other than they do with depression or anxiety. In other words, although
depression and anxiety were both significantly related to boredom
when measured at one point in time, these relationships are no longer significant when life meaning is taken into account. Study 2
involved an experimental manipulation which demonstrated that
changing perceptions of life meaning caused predicted changes in
boredom, while a manipulation of mood (toward happy or sad) had
a small, nonsignificant impact on boredom levels. Collectively, the
findings of the three studies support the hypothesis that boredom
and life meaning are distinct yet correlated constructs. These findings also support the hypothesis that changes in life meaning lead
to changes in boredom.
Limitations of Present Research
Several limitations of the present research should be noted. First,
in Study 1b, the amount of time between re-testing was relatively
short and also variable across participants (i.e., three to eight weeks),
making it difficult to determine the strength of the effect of boredom and life meaning on one another across time. Related to this
issue, participants were tested over a time period spanning several
typical “peaks and valleys” in the life of a student (e.g., exam periods, changes in semester). Certainly, levels of anxiety, depression,
etc., may have been impacted by such changes, and the time of year
was not controlled for in Study 1b. Third, while Study 2 tested how
manipulating perceptions of life meaning impacted boredom, it did
not examine how manipulating boredom would impact perceptions
of life meaning. In order to conclude that boredom and life meaning share a unidirectional causal relationship (i.e., lack of meaning
causes boredom and not vice versa), this additional step must be
taken. Until then, the two can be understood to have a bidirectional
relationship. Finally, the generalizability of the findings may be limited due to the restricted age range of participants, and the use of
an undergraduate sample. Future research examining these issues
with older participants or other samples (e.g., clinical populations)
would be valuable.
332LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Clinical and Applied Issues
While depression and anxiety are both recognized as important
clinical issues, boredom is not currently recognized as such. Further, because boredom can accompany depression and anxiety, it
may be overlooked in clinical situations, even though it is an important concern. As described earlier, Drob and Bernard (1987) and
Bargdill (2000) presented case studies of individuals suffering from
chronic boredom. In another salient example, Maltsberger (2000)
has described a patient who was almost “bored to death”—that is,
his experience of boredom was so insidious and pathological that he
attempted suicide twice, once in 1987 and once in 1997. He did not
consider himself depressed, and his psychiatrist reported that although the man appeared dysphoric, depression would have been
a somewhat “forced” diagnosis. As described by the patient:
I feel like I’m not alive in this moment in time, as if I am a spectator to
life and to myself. I feel detached from others around me. I feel I lack a
sense of purpose, and completeness. Most of all, I feel extremely bored.
Bored of everything—work, friends, hobbies, relationships, music,
reading, movies, bored all the time. . . . No matter what the activity
is it leaves me feeling unfulfilled. I’m bored of thinking, of talking, of
feeling bored with being bored. (Maltsberger, 2000, p. 84)
The distinction between boredom and depression has been discussed
in other clinical contexts as well. For example, boredom has been described as a source of distress which detracts from the quality of life
of cancer patients (Inman, Kirsh, and Passik, 2003; Passik et al., 2003).
These researchers demonstrated that boredom and spirituality (i.e.,
life meaning) had a unique impact on quality of life, over and above
levels of depression (Inman, Kirsh, & Passik, 2003). Furthermore,
Theobald , Kirsh, Holtsclaw, Donaghy, & Passik (2003) discovered
that treating cancer patients with antidepressant medication rapidly improved levels of depression, but did not significantly improve
levels of “overt boredom.” The authors noted that “the problem of
boredom as a health care issue has been subsumed under research on
other complaints such as depression, apathy, or fatigue. While there
are many common elements. . . boredom appears to have enough
unique qualities to warrant a separate consideration” (Inman et al.,
2003, p. 144).
FAHLMAN ET AL.
333
In fact, boredom has been shown to be related to clinical issues
such as binge eating (e.g., Stickney & Miltenberger, 1999), problem
gambling (e.g., Blaszczynski et al., 1990), alcohol and drug abuse
(e.g., Paulson, Coombs, & Richardson, 1990; Iso-Ahola & Crowley,
1991), and alexithymia (Eastwood, Cavaliere, Fahlman, & Eastwood, 2007). Moreover, it has been described as a relevant issue
for clinical populations, such as individuals with attention-deficit
disorder (e.g., Diamond, 2005), those suffering from serious mental illness—in particular schizophrenia (e.g., Laudet, Magura, Vogel, & Knight, 2004; McCormick, Funderburk, Lee, & Hale-Fought,
2005; Todman, 2003)—and individuals with traumatic brain injury
(e.g., Seel & Kreutzer, 2003). In terms of applied scenarios, boredom
has been described as an issue related to work avoidance in students (e.g., Jarvis & Seifert, 2002), psychosocial development in college students (Watt & Vodanovich, 1999), attention problems (e.g.,
Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006), job performance and satisfaction
in adults (e.g., Kass, Vodanovich, & Callender, 2001), satisfaction in
marital relationships (e.g., Reissman, Aron, & Bergen, 1993), and life
satisfaction in general (e.g., Farmer & Sundberg, 1986). Boredom can
also be an issue for other populations such as gifted children (e.g.,
Kanevsky & Keighley, 2003) or juvenile delinquents (e.g., Newberry
& Duncan, 2001). Clearly, boredom is a relevant issue distinct from
depression, with relevance in a broad range of clinical and applied
scenarios.
Finally, in all of the scenarios cited, life meaning may be an important contributing factor to the experience of boredom. If a lack of life
meaning can indeed lead to feelings of boredom, then life meaning
is an important issue to be explored by individuals dealing with
clinical or nonclinical types of boredom. However, because there are
certainly other causes of boredom which may be relevant, future research should examine how issues of life meaning may or may not
contribute to the boredom-related problems reviewed.
Theoretical Issues
The claim that life meaning and boredom are causally related has
been suggested by qualitative studies (Bargdill, 2000; Drob & Bernard, 1987) and existential theorists (Frankl, 1959/1962/1984; Maddi, 1967, 1970). The current findings represent the first quantitative,
334LACK OF LIFE MEANING
experimentally-controlled demonstration of the theoretically-expected relationship between one’s sense of life meaning and level of
boredom. Although the findings are consistent with previous work
in suggesting that changes in life meaning can lead to changes in
boredom, Study 1b unexpectedly also suggested the converse relationship, namely that changes in boredom may lead to changes in
life meaning. This finding indicates that further empirical work and
theoretical refinement is necessary to fully understand or conceptualize the relationship between life meaning and boredom.
Based on the present findings, then, can it be concluded that
lacking meaning causes boredom? The longitudinal observation in
Study 1b that boredom predicts life meaning and, conversely, that
life meaning predicts boredom raises the possibility that boredom
and life meaning might share a relationship of identity, in which one
construct is simply a way of describing the other from a different
perspective, like two sides of the same coin. However, taken as a
whole, the present results are inconsistent with the idea that these
two variables share a relationship of identity. First, the measurement model in Study 1a demonstrated that the best fit to the data
was a model in which boredom and life meaning were distinct but
correlated constructs. Second, the longitudinal results of Study 1b
demonstrated that life meaning at time one predicted changes in
boredom at time two, and vice versa. If life meaning at time one
and boredom at time one were essentially two measures of the same
construct, the results of Study 1b would be impossible—that is, controlling for boredom at time one would have eliminated any variability in meaning at time one. It would be highly informative for
future studies to evaluate the impact of manipulating boredom on
an individuals’ sense of life meaning. A future study of this kind
mirroring the approach taken in Study 2 would be useful in both
replicating and extending the current findings. If changing boredom did not impact meaning, it would suggest that there is a unidirectional, causal relationship between life meaning and boredom.
On the other hand, if manipulating boredom did change levels of
life meaning, it would suggest a model of reciprocal causation (i.e.,
similar to a positive feedback loop).
Another way to conceptualize the relationship between life meaning and boredom that is consistent with the present findings is
through a dialectical-constructivist perspective (e.g., Greenberg &
Pascual-Leone, 2001). Within such a framework, meaning is con-
FAHLMAN ET AL.
335
ceptualized as a higher-order, reflexive, meta-narrative process,
whereas affective or emotional states are conceptualized as more
basic, tacit schematic, even biological phenomena. Researchers in
this area have been explicitly concerned with the relation between
basic emotion processes and higher-order narrative processes (e.g.,
Angus, Lewin, Bouffard, & Rotondi-Trevisan, 2004; Greenberg
& Angus, 2004; Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 2001). In their view,
reflexive self-narratives emerge from a continual process of symbolizing and synthesizing information in awareness—information
including emotional experience and reactions (Greenberg, Rice, &
Elliot, 1993). Perhaps it could be said that a meta-narrative of reduced life meaning manifests in the affective experience of boredom. In other words, in that life meaning involves cognitive and
motivational elements, it can be said to be a kind of self-reflexive
narrative regarding one’s life, as opposed to being simply an emotion or feeling (i.e., boredom). In this sense, then, life meaning and
boredom are not of the “same kind,” and it would be somewhat inaccurate to think of them in terms of billiard-ball-type causation. Still,
what remains unmistakable, based on the current research, is the
highly contingent relationship between life meaning and boredom.
Although it is unclear whether the notion of “causation” is the most
appropriate way to conceptualize the relationship, it is clear that
a lack of life meaning is at least one major source or trigger of the
experience of boredom.
Conclusions
On the whole, boredom has not been thoroughly or adequately addressed by researchers or practitioners of psychology. One potential
reason is an attitude of indifference toward the subject—“boredom”
sounds trivial, inconsequential, or simply uninteresting, and is not
studied or taken seriously as a result. However, boredom is associated with serious psychological and physical health difficulties,
and should not be taken lightly or dismissed. The present research
highlights the importance of studying boredom in its own right as
well as in relation to life meaning and purpose.
Those who are in the role of parent, educator, mentor, therapist or
other type of caregiver ought to take seriously any concerns regarding boredom voiced by a child, student, or client. In practice, the re-
336LACK OF LIFE MEANING
sponsibility for alleviating boredom is often laid solely at the feet of
the suffering individual—an attitude which would be unthinkable
with respect to other experiences such as depression or anxiety. To
assist individuals who are experiencing boredom—either in clinical
or nonclinical contexts—it may be important to target their sense
of life meaning, as it is clearly one important factor in producing
feelings of boredom. Through further examination and clarification
of the relationship between boredom and life meaning, psychologists will be better equipped to prevent and to relieve this type of
distress.
References
Ahmed, S.M.S. (1990). Psychometric properties of the boredom proneness scale. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 71, 963–966.
Angus, L. E., Lewin, J., Bouffard, B., & Rotondi-Trevisan, D. (2004). “What’s the
story?” Working with narrative in experiential psychotherapy. In L. E. Angus
& J. McLeod (Eds.), The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy: Practice, theory,
and research (pp. 87–101). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Antonovsky, A. (1993). The structure and properties of the sense of coherence scale.
Social Science & Medicine, 36(6), 725–733.
Antonovsky, A. (1987). Unraveling the mystery of health: How people manage stress and
stay well. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Arbuthnott, K. D., Geelen, C. G., & Kealy, K. K. (2002). Phenomenal characteristics
of guided imagery, natural imagery, and autobiographical memories. Memory
& Cognition, 30(4), 519–528.
Bargdill, R. W. (2000). The study of life boredom. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology, 31(2), 188–219.
Battista, J., & Almond, R. (1973). The development of meaning in life. Psychiatry, 36,
409–427.
Bjelland, I., Dahl, A. A., Haug, T. T., & Neckelmann, D. (2002). The validity of the
hospital anxiety and depression scale: An updated literature review. Journal
of Psychosomatic Research, 52(2), 69–77.
Blaszczynski, A., McConaghy, N., & Frankova, A. (1990). Boredom proneness in
pathological gambling. Psychological Reports, 67, 35–42.
Baudelaire, C. (1993). The flowers of evil. (J. McGowan, Trans.). New York: Oxford.
Cheyne, J. A., Carriere, J.S.A., & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of
conscious awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(3), 578–592.
Crumbaugh, J. C. (1968). Cross-validation of Purpose-in-Life Test based on Frankl’s
concepts. Journal of Individual Psychology, 24(1), 74–81.
Crumbaugh, J. C., & Maholick, L. T. (1964). An experimental study in existentialism:
The psychometric approach to Frankl’s concept of noogenic neurosis. Journal
of Clinical Psychology, 20, 200–207.
Debats, D. L. (1990). The life regard index: Reliability and validity. Psychological Reports, 67, 27–34.
FAHLMAN ET AL.
337
Debats, D. L., van der Lubbe, P. M., & Wezeman, F.R.A. (1993). On the psychometric
properties of the Life Regard Index (LRI): A measure of meaningful life. Personality and Individual Differences, 14(2), 337–345.
Diamond, A. (2005). Attention-deficit disorder (attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder without hyperactivity): A neurobiologically and behaviorally distinct
disorder from attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (with hyperactivity).
Development and Psychopathology, 17, 807–825.
Dillon, W. R., Kumar, A., & Mulani, N. (1987). Offending estimates in covariance
structure analysis: Comments on the causes of and solutions to Heywood
cases. Psychological Bulletin, 101(1), 126–135.
Drob, S. L, & Bernard, H. S. (1987). The bored patient: A developmental/existential
perspective. Psychotherapy Patient, 3, 63–73.
Eastwood, J. D., Cavaliere, C., Fahlman, S. A., & Eastwood, A. E. (2007). A desire
for desires: Boredom and its relation to alexithymia. Personality and Individual
Differences, 42(6), 1035–1045.
Fahlman, S. A. (2005). The relationship between life meaning and boredom: A conceptual
analysis and empirical investigation. Unpublished master’s thesis, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada.
Fahlman, S. A., Mercer, K. B., Flora, D. B., & Eastwood, J. D. (2008). Development
and validation of the Multidimensional State Boredom Scale (MSBS). Manuscript submitted for publication.
Farmer, R., & Sundberg, N. D. (1986). Boredom proneness: The development and
correlates of a new scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 50(1), 4–17.
Fenichel, O. (1951). On the psychology of boredom. In D. Rapaport (Ed.), Organization and pathology of thought: Selected sources (pp. 349–361). New York: Columbia University Press.
Frankl, V. E. (1959/1962/1984). Man’s search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy. New York: Pocket Books.
Frankl, V. E. (1978). The unheard cry for meaning. New York: Simon & Schuster.
Fromm, E. (1955). The sane society. New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston.
Greenberg, L. S., & Angus, L. E. (2004). The contributions of emotion processes to
narrative change in psychotherapy: A dialectical constructivist approach. In
L. E. Angus & J. McLeod (Eds.), The handbook of narrative and psychotherapy:
Practice, theory, and research (pp. 331–349). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Greenberg, L. S., & Pascual-Leone, J. (2001). A dialectical constructivist view of
the creation of personal meaning. Journal of Constructivist Psychology, 14,
165–186.
Greenberg, L. S., Rice, L. N., & Elliott, R. (1993). Facilitating emotional change: The
moment-by-moment process. New York: Guilford Press.
Hamilton, J. A., Haier, R.J., & Buchsbaum, M.S. (1984). Intrinsic enjoyment and
boredom coping scales: Validation with personality, evoked potential, and
attention measures. Personality and Individual Differences, 5, 183–193.
Harris, M. B. (2000). Correlates and characteristics of boredom proneness and boredom. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(3), 576–598.
Hood, S. C., Beaudet, M. P., & Catlin, G. (1996). A healthy outlook (Statistics Canada
No. 82-003). Health Reports, 7(4), 25–32.
338LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation
Modeling, 6, 1–55.
Inman, A., Kirsh, K. L., & Passik, S. D. (2003). A pilot study to examine the relationship between boredom and spirituality in cancer patients. Palliative and Supportive Care, 1, 143–151.
Iso-Ahola, S. E., & Crowley, E. D. (1991). Adolescent substance abuse and leisure
boredom. Journal of Leisure Research, 23(3), 260–271.
Jarvis, S., & Seifert, T. (2002). Work avoidance as a manifestation of hostility, helplessness, and boredom. Alberta Journal of Educational Research, 48(2), 174–187.
Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenological approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(4), 390–394.
Johnson, M. K., Foley, M., Suengas, A. G., & Raye, C. L. (1988). Phenomenal characteristics of memories for perceived and imagined autobiographical events.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117, 371–376.
Kanevsky, L., & Keighley, T. (2003). To produce or not to produce? Understanding
boredom and the honor in underachievement. Roeper Review, 26(1), 20–28.
Kass, S. J., Vodanovich, S. J., & Callender, A. (2001). State-trait boredom: Relationship to absenteeism, tenure, and job satisfaction. Journal of Business and Psychology, 16, 317–327.
Kuhn, R. Cl. (1976). The demon of noontide: ennui in western literature. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Laudet, A. B., Magura, S., Vogel, H. S., & Knight, E. L. (2004). Perceived reasons for
substance misuse among persons with a psychiatric disorder. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 74(3), 365–375.
MacDonald, D.A., & Holland, D. (2002). Spirituality and boredom proneness. Personality and Individual Differences, 32, 1113–1119.
Maddi, S. (1967). The existential neurosis. Journal of Abnornal Psychology, 72,
311–325.
Maddi, S. R. (1970). The search for meaning. In W. J. Arnold & M. M. Page (Eds.),
The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (pp. 134–183). Lincoln, NE: University
of Nebraska Press.
Maltsberger, J. T. (2000). Case consultation: Mansur Zaskar: A man almost bored to
death. Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior, 30(1), 83–90.
McCormick, B. P., Funderburk, J. A., Lee, Y., & Hale-Fought, M. (2005). Activity
characteristics and emotional experience: Predicting boredom and anxiety in
the daily life of community mental health clients. Journal of Leisure Research,
37(2), 236–253.
Meier, A., & Edwards, H. (1974). Purpose-in-Life Test: Age and sex differences. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 384–386.
Mikulas, W. L., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1993). The essence of boredom. Psychological
Record, 43(1), 3–12.
Moore, R., Watts, F., & Williams, J.M.G. (1988). The specificity of personal memories
in depression. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 27, 275–276.
Newberry A. L., & Duncan, R. D. (2001). Roles of boredom and life goals in juvenile
delinquency. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 31(3), 527–541.
Paulson, M. J., Coombs, R. H., & Richardson, M. A. (1990). School performance,
academic aspirations, and drug use among children and adolescents. Journal
of Drug Education, 20(4), 289–303.
FAHLMAN ET AL.
339
Passik, S. D., Inman, A., Kirsh, K., Theobald, D., & Dickerson, P. (2003). Initial validation of a scale to measure purposelessness, understimulation, and boredom
in cancer patients: Toward a redefinition of depression in advanced disease.
Palliative and Supportive Care, 1, 41–50.
Polly, L. M., Vodanovich, S. J., Watt, J. D., & Blanchard, M. J. (1993). The effects of
attributional processes on boredom proneness. Journal of Social Behavior and
Personality, 8(1), 123–132.
Radloff, L, S. (1977). The CES-D Scale: A self-report depression scale for research in
the general population. Applied Psychological Measurement, 13, 385–401.
Reissman, C., Aron, A., & Bergen, M. R. (1993). Shared activities and marital satisfaction: Causal direction and self-expansion versus boredom. Journal of Social
and Personal Relationships, 10(2), 243–254.
Reker, G. T. (1977). The Purpose-in-Life Test in an inmate population: An empirical
investigation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 33(3), 688–693.
Reker, G. T., & Cousins, J. B. (1979). Factor structure, construct validity and reliability of the seeking of noetic goals (SONG) and purpose in life (PIL) tests.
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 35(1), 85–91.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Schopenhauer, A. (1995). The world as will and idea. (D. Berman, Ed. & J. Berman,
Trans.). London, England: Orion Publishing Group. (Original work published 1818).
Seel, R. T., & Kreutzer, J. S. (2003). Depression assessment after traumatic brain injury: An empirically based classification method. Archives of Physical Medicine
and Rehabilitation, 84, 1621–1628.
Smith, R. P. (1981). Boredom: A review. Human Factors, 23(3), 329–340.
Sommers, J., & Vodanovich, S. J. (2000). Boredom proneness: Its relationship to
psychological- and physical-health symptoms. Journal of Clinical Psychology,
56(1), 149–155.
Spacks, P. M. (1995). The literary history of a state of mind. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Spielberger, C.D. (1995). Manual for the revised state-trait personality inventory (STPI).
Palo Alto, CA: Mind Garden.
Spielberger, C. D., & Reheiser, E. C. (2004). Measuring anxiety, anger, depression,
and curiosity as emotional states and personality traits with the STAI, STAXI,
and STPI. In M. L. Hilsenroth & D. L. Segal (Eds.), Comprehensive handbook of
psychological assessment (Vol. 2) (pp. 70–86). Hobokon, NJ: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc.
Steffan, T. G., & Pratt, W. W. (Eds.). (1971). Don Juan: A variorum edition: Cantos VI –
XVII (2nd ed., Vol. 3). Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press.
Stickney, M., & Miltenberger, R. G. (1999). Evaluating direct and indirect measures
for the functional assessment of binge eating. International Journal of Eating
Disorders, 26, 195–204.
Suengas, A. G., & Johnson, M. K. (1988). Qualitative effects of rehearsal on memories for perceived and imagined complex events. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(4), 377–389.
Todman, M. (2003). Boredom and psychotic disorders: Cognitive and motivational
issues. Psychiatry, 66(2), 146–167.
340LACK OF LIFE MEANING
Theobald, D. E., Kirsh, K. L., Holtsclaw, E., Donaghy, K., & Passik, S. D. (2003). An
open label pilot study of citalopram for depression and boredom in ambulatory cancer patients. Palliative and Supportive Care, 1, 71–77.
Thurber, S., Snow, M., & Honts, C. R. (2002). The Zung self-rating depression
scale: Convergent validity and diagnostic discrimination. Assessment, 9(4),
401–405.
Vodanovich, S. J., & Kass, S. J. (1990). A factor analytic study of the boredom proneness scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 55, 115–123.
Vodanovich, S. J., & Verner, K. M. (1991). Boredom proneness: Its relationship to
positive and negative affect. Psychological Reports, 69, 1139–1146.
Wangh, M. (1975). Boredom in psychoanalytic perspective. Sociological Research, 42,
538–550.
Watt, J. D., & Vodanovich, S. J. (1999). Boredom proneness and psychosocial development. The Journal of Psychology, 133(3), 303–314.
Weinstein, L., Xie, X., & Cleanthous, C. C. (1995). Purpose in life, boredom, and volunteerism in a group of retirees. Psychological Reports, 76, 482.
Williams, J.M.G., & Dritschel, B. H. (1988). Emotional disturbance and the specificity of autobiographical memory. Cognition and Emotion, 2, 221–234.
Wylie, R. C. (1974). The self-concept. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.
Zigmond, A. S., & Snaith, R. P. (1983). The hospital anxiety and depression scale.
Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica, 67(6), 361–370.
Zung, W. W. (1965). A self-rating depression scale. Archives of General Psychiatry,
12(1), 63–70.