Christopher Clark. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000. xvi + 271pp.p
Notes + bibliography and index. $13.95 (paper), ISBN 978-0-582-24559-4.
Reviewed by Thomas E. Nutter
Published on H-Soz-u-Kult (August, 2001)
C. Clark: Kaiser Wilhelm II.
between Wilhelm’s father, Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm, and his grandfather, Kaiser Wilhelm I (“a figure of almost mythical reputation with the gravitas and
whiskers of a biblical patriarch”) as the single most influential fact of Wilhelm’s early life. He illustrates the
pernicious effect upon Wilhelm’s development created
by his grandfather’s ability and willingness to interfere
in the child’s education, among other things. This regrettable state of affairs was exacerbated by the political tensions that had riven the Hohenzollern court
since the early 1850’s, namely the struggle between the
western-oriented progressives and the more reactionary
pro-Russian faction. The resolution of this controversy
by the ascendancy of Otto von Bismarck in 1862 affected
the Crown Prince and his family profoundly. The animus
of the Prussian minister-president for Friedrich Wilhelm
and Crown Princess Victoria isolated them and their children politically and socially, with the result that Wilhelm’s education and general upbringing became a bone
of contention between his parents, on the one hand, and
his grandfather and Bismarck, on the other. Considering Wilhelm’s later irresolution in circumstances where
stouter resolve might have better served both him and
Germany, Clark reasonably asks whether it might not
have been better for one or the other of these competing factions to have prevailed unequivocally.
The Last Kaiser Reconsidered.
The Kaiserreich, and particularly the reign of Wilhelm II, continues to provoke strong interest among historians of Germany. This has been manifested in the
last decade by the publication of a number of impressive works on the subject by John C.G. Rohl, Lamar Cecil,
Roderick R. McLean, Volker Berghahn, James Retallack
and others. Lest we think, however, that this wealth of
scholarship has provided conclusive answers to all of the
issues presented by this complex period of German history, we have Christopher Clark’s fine Kaiser Wilhelm II
to remind us that difficult questions still remain.
Clark’s work, part of the Profiles in Power series, is
a testament to the value that such series may represent
for both professional and student alike. As Clark notes,
the guidelines of this particular series required him to focus upon “the character and extent of the Kaiser’s power,
his political goals and his success in achieving them, and
the mechanisms by which he projected authority and exercised influence.” Clark avoids the issue of “personal
rule” and makes no pretense of having made new discoveries in the primary sources, admitting that his is a
work of synthesis and interpretation. His purpose, given
these parameters, is to ask (and suggest an answer to) the
question as to whether and to what extent it made a difference that Wilhelm II occupied the German throne beEventually Wilhelm learned to adapt to and extween 1888 and 1918. Clark achieves his goal admirably. ploit for his own purposes the atmosphere of conIn a work whose subject is power, Clark begins with flict that surrounded him. As he matured, he elected
an examination of the power relationships in Wilhelm’s increasingly to side with his grandfather’s apparently
unique family. Clark characterizes the division of power stronger faction, much to the chagrin of his parents. He
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widened the rift so created by marrying Augusta Victoria of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderberg-Augustenburg,
a woman whose politics proved to epitomize those of
Friedrich Wilhelm’s most ardent opponents; and by
adopting as his most trusted confidant General Count Alfred von Waldersee, quartermaster-general of the Prussian army and deputy chief of the general staff, and a man
who “was the personification of everything Wilhelm’s
parents most detested.” In the end, Wilhelm seemed to
have backed the right horse, since Bismarck and the conservatives remained the premier force in German politics, surviving intact and in power following the deaths of
both Wilhelm I and Friedrich Wilhelm (Kaiser Friedrich
III). Clark suggests, however, that Wilhelm’s success in
this regard was illusory; while he had learned well how
to successfully play the power game, he knew not what
to do with the power once it became his.
many, the more staid politics of the former era giving
way to a far more factional model in which both the right
and left became more vocal and contentious. Clark argues that Wilhelm responded to this situation by seeking to enlarge the middle ground in German politics and
place the throne within it. For the Kaiser, the political
center comprised patriotic Germans accepting of technology and opposed to socialism. Wilhelm’s efforts to
galvanize this group involved mediation of conflicts, persuading conservatives and moderates to take common
cause against “agreed enemies of the social order”, and
aligning the monarchy in support of important national
projects. But the Kaiser’s initiatives came to naught,
Clark contends, because of weakness of character. He
was unable to use his power effectively in part because
his apparently innate rudeness, indiscretion and lack of
objectivity alienated friend and foe alike. Moreover, he
lacked discipline and was emotionally erratic. Unable to
govern with his ministers, he now came into conflict with
both the provincial and imperial legislatures. His unsuccessful efforts to sponsor unpopular legislation in these
venues had the additional deleterious effect of inciting
public opinion against him.
One of Clark’s most significant contributions in this
work is his explication of the imperial constitution and
Wilhelm II’s relationship to it. The author refers to the
“extreme federalism” of the constitution of 1871, observing that it reduced the Kaiser to the status of one prince
among others, without a claim to dominion over the territory of the Reich. There was, in addition, the curious dualism of parallel imperial and Prussian state governments, in which the imperial chancellor was also the
Prussian prime minister, responsible to both the imperial
Reichstag and the Prussian Landtag. With responsibility also came a substantial quantity of political control in
both the Reich and Prussia, and between 1871 and 1890
that control was in the hands of the formidable Otto von
Bismarck. As Clark observes, Bismarck’s power and control had its source not merely in his political offices, but
also in the status and reputation acquired from his role
in unification, domestic and foreign policy, and relationship with the Kaiser. That relationship, of course, was
a difficult one, characterized by conflict over issues such
as labor policy, imperial administration, and Wilhelm’s
reliance upon personal advisors other than the chancellor. This conflict led to Bismarck’s forced resignation in
March 1890. In the roughly two years since ascending
the throne, Wilhelm had changed that office from a passive to an active source of power, and in so doing had
removed one of the principal obstacles to the exercise
of power from the throne. Clark argues that Wilhelm
achieved this by emulating, as much as he was able, the
political acumen and ruthlessness of the first chancellor.
The Kaiser’s imperial career wanted guidance, and
found it in the person of Bernhard von Buelow, Wilhelm’s imperial state secretary for foreign affairs from
1897 and chancellor from 1900 until 1909. Clark qualifies
the view that the advent of von Buelow brought about a
system of “institutionalized personal rule” in which the
key departments of the Reich government were dominated by Wilhelm’s hand-picked functionaries, thereby
avoiding more clumsy interference in governmental affairs by the Kaiser. It is the author’s view that even before
he became a government minister, and indeed throughout his tenure, von Buelow intended to and did manipulate Wilhelm. He did this chiefly by controlling the Prussian and Reich ministries, thereby depriving the Kaiser
of the opportunity to scheme against him in conjunction
with other ministers. Moreover, until 1903 von Buelow
managed to convince Wilhelm that the latter, rather than
his chief minister, was in control and responsible for the
monarchy’s record of success both at home and abroad.
In 1905-6, however, the relationship between the two
men began to unravel. The first clash between them occurred over the so-called “Treaty of Bjorko”, one of mutual defense negotiated by Wilhelm with his cousin Tsar
Nicholas II of Russia. Von Buelow refused to execute the
agreement; his threat to resign over the incident forced
After Bismarck’s departure, Wilhelm had the unen- Wilhelm to renounce it. In the ensuing months the Kaiser
viable task of governing without him. The 1890’s were
began to purposefully reassert his authority over the apmarked by the advent of a new political paradigm in Ger2
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pointment of ministers, and to actively undermine the
course of conciliation that von Buelow had adopted toward the Catholic Centre Party. In Clark’s view, Wilhelm’s uprising against von Buelow during these years
demonstrates that, far from being a merely symbolic ruler
with little means to exercise political power, the Kaiser
possessed the ability to create mischief, if nothing else,
by virtue of his ability to make imperial administrative
appointments. Nevertheless, Clark maintains, Wilhelm
undercut his own influence by his failure to articulate a
consistent national political program.
deed, Clark maintains that Wilhelm damaged his reputation much more by what he said than by what he did. This
was due to his inherent inability to express himself in the
“sober, measured diction” expected of him. The manifestations of this unfortunate trait were both numerous
and egregious. His Bremerhaven speech in 1900 on the
embarkation of the German contingent for China during
the Boxer rebellion identified Germans with the Hun despoilers of the Roman Empire. The publication in 1908 by
the London Daily Telegraph of an interview given by him
that was perceived as discrediting both the Kaiser and the
German nation led to public outrage and open, virulent
criticism of him in the Reichstag. In spite of these gaffes,
however, or perhaps because of them, Clark points out
that Wilhelm continued to enjoy widespread popularity
among the humbler orders of German society, a situation
changed only by the events of the First World War.
With the coming of Theobald von BethmannHollweg to the chancellorship in July 1909, the monarchy began to take on a different political aspect. Wilhelm
knew Bethmann well and respected him, and saw in him
something of a political ally against the imperial legislature. In point of fact, Clark contends, these facts did not
particularly favor the Kaiser and certainly did not facilitate his “personal rule” in the Reich. Like his predecessor, Bethmann asserted his position as president of the
Prussian state ministry to remove ministers with whom
he differed or in whom he lacked confidence and replace
them with men to whom he was more sympathetically inclined. In all of this, Wilhelm took little meaningful role.
As a result, Bethmann was able to effectively undercut
one of the Kaiser’s last remaining levers of power, namely
his capacity to select imperial administrators of his own
choosing. Clark makes the point that this “marginalization” of Wilhelm from domestic politics had the effect of
enhancing the importance of the Kaiser’s Kommandogewalt, his extra-parliamentary power to command his military subordinates, the most significant remaining facet
of his sovereignty. This was reflected in Wilhelm’s handling of the Zabern affair, the effect of which was to place
him squarely against the tide of liberal feeling in the Reich. In any case, the first fourteen years of the new century saw the advent of aggressive political blocs that rendered more and more ineffectual the power and influence
of the monarchy in the legislatures.
Wilhelm is perhaps most well known as an actor
on the international stage, both before and during the
Great War. The author presents the question whether the
Kaiser succeeded in placing himself in charge of German
foreign policy, an aspiration of his since long before his
accession. Clark’s answer is equivocal. While Wilhelm’s
profile in foreign relations was a high one, his real significance was marginal, as demonstrated by, for example, his
inability to secure the renewal of the Reinsurance Treaty
after Bismarck’s departure, notwithstanding his strong
personal bias in favor of renewal. Clark identifies Wilhelm’s principal deficiency as his total lack of a coherent
policy position in the area of foreign affairs. As a result
his chief ministers were able to manipulate Wilhelm for
their own purposes. The one area in which Wilhelm was
able to exert substantial influence was in the decision to
expand and modernize the German Navy, and embark
upon a naval race with Great Britain. In this connection, the author presents a somewhat unique view of Wilhelm’s role in the affair of the “Kruger telegram”, pointing out that he was not alone in favoring German military intervention in the Transvaal, and that the sending
of the telegram was the result of a true consensus, rather
Clark spends an entire chapter on the subject of Wil- than an attempt to control a Kaiser out of touch with rehelm and popular opinion, and it is time well spent. The ality. Clark’s significant contribution in this regard is to
author rejects the traditional view that Wilhelm’s often suggest that, while the telegram offended Queen Victoria
unfortunate attempts to court the public stemmed from a
and outraged the British government and press, “there is
narcissistic personality disorder. He sees it, instead, as an
no reason why this response should be the touchstone
eminently reasonable approach for the Kaiser to take in for our own judgments.” He goes on to remark upon the
view of his own regard for the power of the press, made “perplexing tendency” of the literature on the subject to
evident, as he saw it, by its often irreverent tone since “accept implicitly the notion that British colonial expanthe end of the Bismarckian era. While Wilhelm may have sion and British perceptions of British rights constituted
acted rationally, this does not mean he did so reasonably,
a ’natural order’, in the light of which German objections
and Clark assigns to him the responsibility for this. In3
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appeared to be wanton provocations.” This bespeaks an
openness of mind that would be pleasant to see reflected
in the work of other scholars of German history. Perhaps
equally controversial is Clark’s view on the Kaiser’s role
in Germany’s pre-war isolation. While he concedes that
Wilhelm’s attempts at intervention may have made the
lives of his foreign ministers difficult, he attributes Germany’s encirclement to the confusion and irresolution of
the German foreign policy establishment, whose origins
lay not with Wilhelm, but with Bismarck.
Kaiser portrayed here is one who consistently urged caution as the key to German policy, abjured the idea of a
preventive war, and generally warned all who would listen against war. Clark’s point here is that, while historians and others have often characterized Wilhelm’s pacific utterances as hypocritical “camouflage for a fundamentally belligerent diplomacy”, in fact his private remarks to all and sundry, German or otherwise, were consistent with a conciliatory posture. With regard to the
July crisis of 1914, Clark contrasts the “Blank Cheque”
episode with Wilhelm’s attempts, on July 28, to defuse
What of Wilhelm’s role in the coming of the Great tensions based on the Serbian response to the Austrian
War? On this question, Clark emphasizes the critical neultimatum of two days earlier. The Kaiser told his seccessity of considering the Kaiser’s speech and action in
retary of state for foreign affairs, Gottlieb von Jagow,
context. On this basis, he rejects the view that Wilhelm’s that Serbia’s response amounted to a “capitulation of the
commitment to Austria in particular, and his power as most humiliating kind”, and ordered him to inform the
sovereign in general, were fatal for Germany. Instead, Austrians that there was no longer any cause for war
Clark argues that the record supports the conclusion that and that Wilhelm would mediate for peace. These inWilhelm’s commitment to Austria was not uncritical, and
structions, however, were not followed, providing furthat in fact his willingness to proffer German support dether evidence of the Kaiser’s isolation from the center of
pended upon his assessment of the rectitude of Austria’s power. When war itself came, Wilhelm continued to be
cause and his understanding of the risks involved. In- marginalized, although not without significant influence.
deed, the evidence he marshals in support of this argu- Clark argues effectively that things would not have been
ment, for example with regard to Wilhelm’s words and the same without him; his power of appointment kept
deeds in connection with the Bosnian crisis of 1908 and
Falkenhayn in office, and Wilhelm delayed the advent of
the First Balkan War of 1912, amply support his thesis,
unlimited submarine warfare because of his support for
showing as they do a Kaiser wary of international con- Bethmann’s policy of restraint.
flict. So also with Wilhelm’s actions in the prewar crisis.
The record presented by Clark runs decidedly counter to
Christopher Clark’s Kaiser Wilhelm II is well written,
the notion that Wilhelm was in the camp of those who carefully reasoned and provocative. It occupies a valusaw in Austria’s confrontation with Serbia an opportu- able place in the recent literature on this important penity to initiate war and thereby gain an advantage. The riod in German history.
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Citation: Thomas E. Nutter. Review of Clark, Christopher, Kaiser Wilhelm II. H-Soz-u-Kult, H-Net Reviews. August,
2001.
URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=18408
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