Religion &
Society
RSEW 9–10 / 2016
Vol. 44
in
East
and
West
Illiberal and Authoritarian Tendencies
in Eastern Europe
Hungary’s Illiberal State:
Model or Pariah?
18
The Authoritarian Turn in Turkey
33
Moldova’s Democratic Decay
36
2
EDITORIAL
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
CONTENTS
3PREFACE
ILLIBERAL TENDENCIES
4
Vedran Džihić, Nicolas Hayoz
Questioning Democracy and Liberalism
in the Eastern Part of Europe
Anton Shekhovtsov
The No Longer Silent Counter-Revolution
Vlastimil Havlík
Populism and Political Entrepreneurs
in the Czech Republic
Magdalena Solska
Ambivalent “Good Change” in Poland
Grigorij Mesežnikov
The Extreme Right Challenge
to Slovak Democracy
Zoltán Kiszelly
Hungary’s Illiberal State: Model or Pariah?
Senada Šelo Šabić
Croatia’s Experience
with Liberal Democracy
Jasmin Mujanović
Fractured Authoritarianism
in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Jovana Marović
The Thin Line Between the Party
and the State in Montenegro
Marko Vujačić
Serbia: The State Besieged,
Society in Distress
Arben Hajrullahu
Kosovo between Unsolved Problems
and Ideas of Liberalism
Dane Taleski u. a.
Maintaining a Hybrid Regime:
The Case of Macedonia
Cengiz Günay
The Authoritarian Turn in Turkey and the
Weakness of the Authoritarian System
Natalia Timuş
Moldova’s Democratic Decay
Olexij Haran, Mariia Zolkina
After Euromaidan: Democratic Elections vs.
Personalised Parties and Informal Practices
Giga Zedania
Democracy and Liberalism in Georgia:
Uneasy Ties
Natasha Wunsch
Democratic Backsliding: The End
of EU Transformative Power?
9
11
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
29
31
33
36
38
41
43
Dear Reader,
In his speech on the state of the European Union on 14 September,
President of the EU Commission Jean-Claude Juncker spoke of an “existential crisis” with regard to the refugee crisis, mass unemployment in
South-eastern Europe, the terrorist threat and the Brexit vote. Three
days later, at an informal special summit in Bratislava, the 27 EU heads of
government (excluding Great Britain) passed a reform agenda in which
they agreed on the smallest common denominators regarding issues of
security and border protection.
A more comprehensive approach to dealing with the crisis had already
been formulated by Hungary’s premier Viktor Orbán and the chairman
of the Polish governing party Jarosław Kaczyński in early September.
They consider the cause of the “crisis of the European conscious” to lie
primarily in the dissolution of national and religious identities, which
they regard as being compounded by the refugee crisis. The model of
dealing with the refugees with “flexible solidarity” presented by Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic at the special summit in
Bratislava must thus be seen in the context of Kaczyński’s und Orbán’s
idea of a “cultural counter-revolution”.
Is a spectre haunting Europe once more? National-conservative politicians’ demand that Europe refuse to relinquish its cultural wealth and
national differences would appear quite legitimate if it did not go hand
in hand with the dismantling of democratic principles and increasingly authoritarian tendencies. These developments (not only) in Central
and Eastern Europe require a differentiating approach however. Hence
political and sociological analysis must give consideration to the sociocultural situation specific to individual countries in order to meet the
challenges in each of the newest EU member states, the current candidates for accession and the other neighbouring countries in Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe – flexibly and with solidarity – and in order to
be able to adapt existing strategies of transformation and integration.
This task is taken up by the participants of an international workshop
organised by the “Academic Swiss Caucasus Net” (ASCN) on the subject
of “Illiberal and Authoritarian Tendencies in Central, South-Eastern and
Eastern Europe” from 13–15 October in Munich. In the present issue,
authors from the countries concerned present their findings and theses
so far. Here we would like to express our thanks to the coordinators of
LITERATURE
the ASCN for their smooth cooperation and generous financial support
45
and to translator and proofreader John Heath for his assistance in pre-
Sabine Witt
Nationalistische Intellektuelle
in der Slowakei 1918–1945
Paul W. Werth
The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths
PROJECT REPORT
46
Regula Spalinger u. a.
Helping People to Help Themselves:
Social Centres in the Urals
paring the present English edition.
Regula Zwahlen
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
P R E FAC E
PREFACE
“Populists on the rise” is how the 2016 Bertelsmann Trans-
suspension of democratic rights in Turkey after the failed
formation Index (BTI) labels the status and development of
military coup in July 2016 is further proof of autocratic ten-
democracy in the countries of East-Central and Southeast
dencies recently re-emerging.
Europe. The authors explain the situation there as follows:
“Overshadowed by the EU crisis and faced with a lack of
It goes without saying that any analysis of the situation in
accession prospects, consensus on the objectives of democ-
the region of East-Central, Southeast and Eastern Europe
racy and market economies is crumbling in East-Central and
has to be related to current European trends: the crisis of
Southeast Europe. Instead, populists and extremists are
the European Union, with the friction caused by the so-
gaining traction”.
called refugee crisis, the Greek crisis, Brexit and the threat
of terrorism. The rise of populist and nationalist forces, also
From the (transition) partner countries of the Southeast
in the core countries of the EU, is generally a matter of
Europe Association (SOG), the BTI 2016 categorizes only
deep concern.
five as “democracies in consolidation”, namely Slovenia, Slovakia, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania. All others (Albania, The Southeast Europe Association, in the framework of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Mol-
numerous conferences, workshops and analyses, has in the
dova, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey), find themselves in
past few years placed special focus on questions of demo-
the category of “defective democracies” with more or less
cratic conduct in countries of transition, be it on the rule of
rigid deficiencies in democratic conduct.
law, media freedoms, minority rights, transitional justice or
specific issues such as the rights of the Roma populations.
As a matter of great fact the indices of most countries in
We are therefore extremely happy to host and co-organize
East-Central and Southeast Europe show a declining trend
the International Workshop on “Illiberal and authoritarian
in democratic performance, very prominently represented
tendencies in Central, Southeastern and Eastern Europe”
by Hungary – with an index declining by a record-breaking
on 13–15 October in Munich, the seat of our Association.
-1.80 between 2006 and 2016. Hungary also provides evi- The comparative perspective of this workshop, gathering
dence that even after a country has gone through the hard-
eminent scholars and experts on the topic, will certainly
ships of EU accession negotiations and meeting the Copen-
provide deeper insights into the state of affairs of democ-
hagen Criteria, the process of democratic consolidation is
racy in the region. The event is also an opportunity to con-
anything but irreversible. Indeed, it is probably misleading
tinue a long and fruitful partnership and cooperation with
to describe the Hungarian political system as an illiberal
Nicolas Hayoz in his capacity as director of the Regional
democracy, as Prime Minister Orbán himself has done. In
Research Promotion Program for the Western Balkans and
this sense, in a recent article Jan-Werner Müller has criticized
the Academic Swiss Caucasus Net, both associated with the
the use of the analytical concept of illiberal democracy. His
University of Fribourg.
argument: whoever talks of “illiberal democracy” leaves it
to governments like those of Kaczynski and Orbán to stipu- The compilation of the contributions to this workshop in
late that their countries are still democracies. Instead, Mül-
this special issue of Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West
ler argues, analysts should have no doubt that in countries
is an excellent and most valuable project. My special thanks
like Poland and Hungary democracy itself is in great danger.
go to the editorial board for its extensive editing and pub-
Macedonia is another prominent example of a democracy
lishing work.
in deep and constant crisis. There the “wiretapping scandal”
provides an insight into the tool-box of autocratic conduct
Hansjörg Brey, Executive Director, Southeast
in the disguise of a formally democratic system. The massive
Europe Association, Munich.
3
4
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Vedran Džihić, Nicolas Hayoz
Questioning Democracy and Liberalism in the Eastern Part of Europe
In South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, new forms of government are developing a grey zone between
democracy and authoritarianism. This is due inter alia to a general crisis of democracy and the (neo-)
liberal transformation strategy and EU enlargement fatigue. It is only recently that social protest has
formed in opposition to these illiberal tendencies. – R. Z.
It is almost a truism to say that liberal democracy is no longer triumphing in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. For the post-Soviet
space it was always naïve to assume that these countries would gently follow the path of the transition model. But at least most of the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe belonging to the EU were
engaged on a political and economic reform path and determined
to establish liberal democracy.
Europe’s multiple crises in the last decade seem to have slowed
down or convinced the governments of certain countries (Poland
being the latest example, Hungary the most prominent and most
resilient) that (neo-)liberal reform is no longer an option. Building
an “illiberal state” – whatever this may mean – is not only part of an
ideological narrative placing the nation at the centre of politics, but
is being translated – in the worst case – into policies turned against
basic European values such as the rule of law, freedom of the media
or checks and balances. In this regard, policies in countries that are
members of the EU or that are pretending to be moving towards
EU membership not only reveal deficits in their understanding of
a modern liberal democracy, but also show that democracy is not
the only game in town.
Temporary crisis or democratic decline?
This may still be an exaggeration – but there are certainly tendencies
among political leaders in this part of Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe to flout democratic norms and a growing tendency among
parts of the population to accept illiberal policies.
On the other hand, most of the post-Soviet countries are autocracies without any prospect or will to move to the shores of liberal
democracy. And in Russia’s neighbourhood one can see a series of
countries which are involved in a difficult transformation process
and confronted with the question of whether they want to belong
to the West and join the European Union or be integrated into a
Russian “hemisphere”. As a matter of fact, they are part of geopolitical zones of conflict, which after Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine could be presented, as Alina Mungiu-Pippidi rightly put
it, as a new European border on the Dniester, a border marking
two different conceptions of political order, modernisation and
geopolitical influence. 4
Analyzing all these trends, the recent Bertelsmann Transformation Index for 2016 referred to this new illiberal European belt
as a “ring of fire” emerging in Europe and stretching from Russia
down to Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and further towards
Turkey and beyond to Azerbaijan. 5 The new “ring of fire” alludes
to an ongoing process of challenging the underlying assumption of
the “transition to democracy” paradigm, which at the beginning
of the 1990s, caught by the euphoria following the end of the Cold
War, included a notion of linear progress towards the normative
“end” of transitional processes – Western-style liberal democracy.
What we face today rather resembles a regression in democratic
development than democratization, encompassing various aspects
of authoritarian rule more strongly than liberal values.
If democracy, accompanied by liberal values and stable institutions, has not (entirely) materialized in an expected and assumed
manner, the question is what has contributed to said stagnation of
and weaknesses in democratic development? Here the answers are
as manifold as the countries we focus on in this special issue. Yet
certain family resemblances and patterns of new illiberal or authoritarian governmentality have emerged and warrant close scrutiny.
The political elites in Hungary, Serbia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, until
recently in Romania and now also in Poland seem to have developed particular skills and energies in implementing illiberal policies,
calling into question the checks and balances of the liberal state or
even transforming the original democratic project into an unfair
game to be controlled by the incumbents of political power. In
some cases observers have described the national leaders as “Putin
wannabes”. This may be an exaggeration, since none of the Eastern or South-Eastern European political regimes come close to the
type of autocracy realized by Putin and his followers. Still, there
is an illiberal and even authoritarian “temptation”, which may be
temporary, an expression of crisis, of frustration directed against
certain policies of the EU. It might also be the case that we are facing
the beginning of a historic decline in democracy and the rise of a
new authoritarianism. The Guardian has recently told the same
worrying story: “A long malaise in continental liberal democracy Common denominators among illiberal regimes
is beginning to feel more like decline”.1 And Michael Ignatieff even In order to analyze family resemblances and patterns of new illiberrecognizes it on the higher global level when portraying mainly al or authoritarian governmentality, one of the obstacles identified
Russia and Turkey but also China: “A new political competitor to by scholars is the dichotomy between democracy and authoritariliberal democracy began to take shape: authoritarian in political anism. The pattern in the debates is still dominated by dichotomies:
form, capitalist in economics, and nationalists in ideology.” 2
liberal democracies on one side (such as the USA) and authoritarian
In any case, the European Union has yet to find adequate bad guys on the other. The reality of these newly emerging regimes
answers. For some scholars, like Anton Shekhovtsov for example, is much more complicated than a simple dichotomy would be able
the transition in Central Europe seems to be reversible, not to men- to explain.
What we are facing is the emergence of a new type of governmention countries of the Western Balkans that seem to be stuck on
their way to the EU, or the countries of the post-Soviet space, the tality where liberal order is openly attacked. In times of economic
majority of which has not embarked on the path to the EU at all.3 and social crisis or any other major crisis as well as in times of a
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
broadly felt crisis of democracy, new forms of authoritarian rule
have proven to be perceived as attractive, flexible, adaptable, and
more functional alternatives. What is emerging before our eyes, at
least in some countries we are interested in, is new forms of regimes
that reconcile competitive elections, multi-party systems, parliaments, constitutions and other elements usually associated with
liberal democracies with the functional logic of authoritarianism
and the mechanisms and techniques usually applied by authoritarian regimes (including strong party control of all processes in
society and open or subtle repression). Those regimes adhere to the
formal notion of democracy while creating a façade of formal democratic elements and even rule of law. They seek to underline their
democratic character by a strong declarative and rhetorical commitment to democracy. Elections are regularly held and bitterly fought.
The elections themselves are usually free of fraud. Furthermore,
increasing limitations on fundamental rights such as the freedom
of information, freedom of the press and the right to demonstrate
can be observed. The governments have often justified restrictions
and strong tendencies to equip the executive branch of the government with almost unlimited powers by pointing to the necessity
of confronting internal and external threats. Ethnic or national
issues, as well as religious questions or questions of territory and
national sovereignty are often used by the regimes as a means to
mobilizing voters or diverting attention from particular interests
and non-democratic and non-transparent practices. 6
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Party (AKP) in Turkey or the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in
Serbia the image of modernizing reformers.
Populist leaders throughout Europe can mobilize disadvantaged
social strata with their discourses against globalization, immigration and – last but not least – the EU itself. When additional crisis
narratives (as seen recently in the case of the so-called refugee crisis or in the debates about terrorism) emerge, social mobilization
is coupled with popular sentiments and fears and provides a very
substantial foundation for populism and even extremism reaching
deep into the realm of illiberalism. This new illiberalism goes hand
in hand with closing borders, protecting the nation and celebrating
the nation’s glory.
One final remark on liberalism in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe: liberalism is about providing equal access to rights and
freedoms but it was never about equal distribution of goods and
social equality. Such an understanding of liberalism provided the
foundation for the idea of the modern welfare state, an idea that
has never really been rebuilt in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
Instead, a profound socio-economic decline in some parts of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and quite prominently in the Balkans has undermined the legitimacy of democracy and Europe and
opened up new spaces for the “return to the nation” and illiberalism.
The “social basis for national populisms” (Fukuyama) will unfortunately continue to haunt Europe and its periphery.
Creating legitimacy – how?
The longevity and stability of some authoritarian regimes proves
A core assumption about Western liberal democracies being a the assumption that democracies are generally more legitimate
normative role model for countries in Eastern and South-Eastern than hybrid regimes or autocracies wrong. Schlumberger claims
Europe has lost a lot of its original credibility. The latest debates that authoritarian regimes may even enjoy some structural advanabout post-democracy and crises of democracy (see authors like tages over democracies when it comes to generating support as they
Crouch, Fukuyama, Rosanvalon, etc.) underline the fact that the usually have more opportunities to control media and civil society
crisis of democracy in the West (and particularly within the EU) and to monopolize the political discourse. 8 In short, they have an
has changed the perception of democracy on its the periphery. The advantage when it comes to framing the political narratives.
argument that free and fairly conducted elections are a necessary
However, as Weber holds, the kind of legitimacy claimed by the
but not sufficient condition of liberal democracies is yet another authority influences “the type of obedience, the kind of administraimportant assumption that is challenged here. The reduction of the tive staff developed to guarantee it” as well as the modes in which
concept of democracy to a pure electoralism has certainly led to authority is exercised.9 Weber’s notion of legitimacy as a reciprocal
significant problems. By placing a strong focus on the importance of relationship between the rulers and the ruled provides an important
elections, the importance of other important elements of democracy tool that enables us to look beyond the façade of political reforms
such as the active participation of citizens, the functioning of the and decode the essence of authoritarianism inherent to the regions
state, or the redistributive ability of the welfare state have largely we examine.
been underestimated.
Gerschewski is among the few authors to have addressed the
We argue that the weakening of realistic prospects of EU acces- question of legitimacy in the context of the debate on new authorsion within a reasonable timeframe supported the proliferation of itarian regimes. What he highlights is that all authoritarian sysgrey zone regimes in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. The tems do indeed seek and manage to generate legitimation by the
attraction of liberal democracy has diminished as a consequence population. Gerschewski distinguishes between “specific support”
of enlargement fatigue and the EU’s fading interest in bringing the and “diffuse support” that regimes deploy in order to obtain legitEastern and South-Eastern countries closer to the community, but imation. “Specific support” refers to the regimes’ delivery of goods
also with the tangible effects of the global economic crisis.
(security, welfare and so on), whereas “diffuse support” refers to
The (neo-)liberal model in Eastern Europe was always based on what the regime “actually is or represents” (ideology, forms of
the idea that the wild and liberal capitalism of the transition period religio-nationalistic claims, the charisma of leaders, and (real or
would produce more winners than losers.7 Today it is obvious that imagined) external threats).10
this is no longer the case, not even in Poland, which has always
Taking Gerschewski’s concept of legitimation and “specific and
been presented as the one success story of neo-liberalism in Eastern diffuse support” as a point for further research and thinking, the
Europe. The global financial crisis and the subsequent debates about assumption is that narrative and ethno-religious discourses (as part
rising global inequality have become a truism in Central Europe, of the “diffuse support”) as well as continuous reference to internal
the Balkans and in the post-Soviet space. Taking an even closer look and external threats constitute important elements of legitimacy
at the countries that were lined up in the EU accession process or in our three regions. On the other hand we argue that maintaining
are still part of the EU enlargement package (Turkey and the West- the stability and legitimacy of a regime in a long-term perspective
ern Balkans), one can argue that in several cases the EU accession also requires a sufficient level of serving and satisfying people’s (or
process and structural reforms in line with neoliberal conceptions popular) demands, which is why we examine the “specific support”
provided a source for legitimizing the replacement of established by scrutinizing the clientelistic networks and alliances established
power centers. Moreover, taking up a pro-EU line and the adapta- and maintained by the respective ruling parties. In that regard, the
tion to neo-liberalism gave parties like the Justice and Development party apparatuses of ruling parties not only play a crucial role for
The weakness of the European liberal role model
5
6
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
but not necessarily democratic and effective leader is privileged.
Here we will probably find an interesting relationship between
leaders and followers which might add an additional explanatory
puzzle to understanding why so many “toxic leaders” could and
can stay in power for long periods of time. Interesting explanatory
concepts in this context are Ludger Helms’ recent studies on bad
leadership in liberal democracies. Helms (2014: 51) underlines the
growing importance of leadership in the political decision-making
processes in democracies and concludes that the study of bad leadership “offers important clues as to how to avoid at least some of the
mistakes that tend to undermine the prospect of good democratic
leadership”. The problem here is that such advice is not a great help,
particularly in “grey zone” regimes or in authoritarian regimes,
as no institutional “learning mechanism” would be so powerful
as to force bad leaders to withdraw. Institutions, mechanisms of
institutional checks and balances as well as free media and civil
The premiers of Slovakia, Ukraine, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic – society in grey-zone regimes are generally too weak to stop bad
Robert Fico, Volodymyr Groysman, Beata Szydło, Viktor Orbán and Bohuslav
leaders doing harm to their societies. We do know, as Helms puts it,
Sobotka – at the 26th Eastern and Central European Economic Forum in the
that “smart institutions and a firm commitment to good democratic
Southern Polish town of Krynica on 6 September 2016.
Photo: Keystone
leadership among both citizens and leaders have to come together”
in order to have democratic and good governance in place.14 But
the mobilization of the electorate on both the national and local what if the citizens like or do not resist the “bad leader”? What if
levels, but are also central elements for maintaining and stabilizing the tools and mechanisms for manipulating the “published opinpower in the long run. In many ways these parties in the grey zone ion” and presenting that figure as a successful “crisis manager” are
between democracy and authoritarianism combine charismatic effective and create popular support for such leaders? This is the
leadership with machine politics.
reality in many countries of Eastern Europe, in the Balkans as well
In almost all countries discussed in this special issue, machine as in the post-Soviet space. Obviously, here we observe important
politics have been combined with a leadership cult, ethno-religious differences between liberal democracies and non-democracies or
discourses and the promise of revanchism and re-distribution illiberal regimes in terms of the quality of leadership: whereas a
replacing ideology. As Scott holds, an important element of such liberal regime is about containing leaders and the power of the state,
machine politics is precisely the aforementioned populisms and the an illiberal regime would always first ask how to contain followers,
image of working for the little man created by political elites. The the people, and expand the rule of the state, the Leviathan, as much
boss, as we can imagine here either Putin or Erdogan, Vucic or as necessary for the elites to stay in power.
Orbán, “conveys the image of working constantly for the interests
Taking a closer look at the relationship between governance and
of the poor and his attention is focused on their concrete needs and leadership, and here first and foremost between bad governance
deprivations. Hints of municipal corruption are winked at, even and bad leadership, we must take into account three important
applauded, by the machine clientele as the social banditry of an layers of the correlation. The first is the correlation between the
urban Robin Hood […].”11
institutional setup of the country on the one hand and the form of
In many cases in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and in the governance and leadership on the other. The second is seeking to
post-Soviet space this kind of machine politics has been made pos- provide answers about the cultural preconditions of bad leadership,
sible by economic (neo-)liberalization, which has always entailed the aspect of morality of leadership and the effects of bad leadership
the replacement of enforceable citizen rights by the “social contract on societies. And the third layer would take into account the relaof informality”.12 The erosion of formal institutions and the under- tionship between bad leadership and informal politics and strucmining of civic rights have created a blurred space, dominated by tures, which seem to be particularly resilient in illiberal regimes or
uncertainty, in which informal, intangible relations have gained non-democracies.
prominence. Informality has also been a deliberate “technique
of governing.” All “more-or-less soft variants of authoritarian Causes and effects of bad leadership
regimes”13 have relied on informality as a governance practice. Par- Looking at the first layer, we can assume that effects of bad leadticularly in light of weak or failing ideological movements, personal ership in countries with weak and inefficient institutions are much
allegiance, based on material dependency, primordial ties such as larger than in functioning democracies. Bad policies executed by
family, clan affiliation, ethnic origins or religion have represented bad leaders lead directly to poor governance. Normally we have
the basis of clientelistic mechanisms of maintaining dependency good reasons to expect, at least in a liberal rule-of-law-based conand securing control.
text, that the system of checks and balances should function and
that political opposition, the media or a critical civil society can be
mobilized against an inefficient or even corrupt power, to demand
Authoritarian governmentality and bad leadership
We see from a variety of cases that bad leadership and dysfunc- accountability or to recall or dismiss those in power. In functional
tional governance are no longer the exception but are threatening democracies, institutions are strong enough to constrain or dissuade
to become a rule in the region, which is backsliding in terms of bad leaders, even though the negative effects on the governance of a
democratic governance due to a variety of reasons, one of the most country can also be found in liberal democracies. Here the case of
harmful and disastrous being bad and unaccountable leadership. Berlusconi can serve as a cautionary tale: in Berlusconi’s case we saw
Here the obvious question is whether there are particular reasons an extreme abuse of power that resembles bad leadership and govin this part of Europe that might explain the many examples of bad ernance syndrome in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with all
leadership. The weak institutional setup is obviously one. But also the related problems such as corruption, clientelism and a constant
the still predominantly traditional, nationalistic and patriarchal attempt to undermine the institutions of a liberal democracy. But
political culture creates a societal framework in which the strong normally, bad leaders should not be able to undermine institutions
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
and ruin the economy of a country. The same goes for informal
politics, which can also be expected in liberal democracies, but does
not directly endanger the democratic character of the country. In
grey-zone countries and regimes that can be defined as illiberal, bad
leadership compounds existing patterns of policy making through
informal politics, clientelism and patronage.
Returning to the notion of bad leadership per se and the embeddedness of leadership in a specific political culture, we argue that
the “bad” in bad leadership is not easily and clearly defined, nor is
how to distinguish it from good leadership. “Bad” is not necessarily “bad” everywhere, which shows that bad leadership is always
also a result of an observation, of attribution and of expectations.
Expectations with regard to good leadership vary from country to
country and even increase, but in which direction? Sometimes it is
in a more conservative authoritarian direction and in liberal democracies it appears as a demand for greater transparency or efficiency.
“Post-heroic leadership” is probably what democracies most want
and seek today. But in many countries in Eastern and South-Eastern
Europe, particularly in Russia, as a very centralized country, people
are on the lookout for strong (male) heroic leaders associated with
power, personal strength, determination, performance, the capacity
to mobilize followers etc. Looking at Russia under Putin, we see
that political institutions always reflect the norms and the political
culture of the society in which they are established. This is also true
for other aspects of political life such as tolerance of bad governance,
corruption or specific forms of informal politics.
This brings us to reflect on the relationship between bad leadership, bad governance and regime types. This involves thinking
about forms of bad leadership and their occurrence in specific
political contexts. Maybe certain forms of bad leadership can be
expected more often in a non-democratic context with only weak
institutional checks and balances. Here an interesting dimension
of the correlation between morally bad governance and ineffective
leadership seems to be important.15 In a nutshell – you can be a
bad leader without being a liar, a thief or an opportunist politician
obsessed with political power. Not every leader is as unscrupulous
as Berlusconi and not many leaders have the freedom of action or
can build up a neopatrimonial empire of wealth and influence like
Vladimir Putin in Russia. If we are just speaking about inefficient
and ineffective leaders, their poor performance, then we have a lot
of bad leadership even in countries like Switzerland, Austria or
Germany.
Now we can see particularly in transitional regimes in Eastern
and South-Eastern Europe and even more so in countries such as
Russia “mixed” forms of bad leadership combining bad and inefficient governance, morally bad leadership and a certain amount of
“toxic leadership”, both in isolation and more pronounced when
occurring in a combination, with devastating effects on governance.
By introducing the concept of “toxic leadership”, a new dimension
can be added to the protracted relationship between leadership and
governance. As Jean Lipman-Blumen shows by referring to the
example of George W. Bush, toxic leadership can harm even the
most stable democracies, not to mention countries with weak institutions and huge informal sectors.16 In describing the case of Bush
as a toxic leader, Lipman-Blumen introduces major elements of the
concept. She writes of a “combination of incompetence, arrogance,
and stubbornness” as characteristics of Bush and any toxic leader.
Many of the features introduced by Lipman-Blumen are easily
found in cases of leadership in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe,
where arrogance and stubbornness are paired with patriarchal, traditional and hierarchically structured societies. On the other side
stands the violation of liberal values and basic human rights mentioned by Lipman-Blumen, which points to the illiberal character
of such forms of leadership. Putting the two dimensions together
draws the contours of what can be described as bad governance. In
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
such a context it can be easily seen to what extent bad leadership
and bad governance form a symbiotic relationship.
With regard to bad governance Helms has introduced two basic
aspects: bad governance as bad policies and bad governance as violations of norms of liberal democracy.17 Good but weak leadership
may yield ineffective policies. The same is also true for the strong,
effective but “toxic” leader obsessed by his power ambitions who
turns against democratic principles. Such a leader, for example Putin
or Gruevski in Macedonia, produces bad governance in the form of
widespread corruption and neo-patrimonial power networks. We
should add here a third type of leader: the populist, nationalist type,
which can be combined with the other two: the inefficient leader
and the amoral leader violating norms.
Obviously bad leadership – and this would be the third layer – is
particularly important in grey-zone regimes, always also an informal and highly personalized kind of leadership. “Toxic leaders” do
everything they need and are able do in order to keep their followers
or clientele in a kind of “symbiotic” dependence on their networks
by providing advantages such as clientelism and patronage, which
are in fact the “archetypes” of negative informal structures, practices
or institutions.18 In the context of bad leadership coupled with bad
governance and weak institutions, the question of whether informal institutions strengthen or undermine democracy is fundamental
and of enormous relevance today. A considerable number of rather
(quasi-)authoritarian political regimes, particularly in the countries
of the former Soviet Union, are based on personalized, informal networks of power.19 Strong, but ethically bad leaders use their personal
power, networks and resources in order to stay in power. And they
sell their “strong leadership” as “legitimate power”.
Looking at the concept of bad and toxic leadership from a
normative standpoint, certainly the question of values once again
comes to the fore. Since we define bad or toxic leadership as a critical feature of grey-zone regimes or illiberal democracies, and since
in these regimes control of the media, and thus also control over
values of liberal democracies including good governance, is seen as
a central tool of exercising illiberal governance, we should provide a
few examples regarding the freedom of media and speech. Here the
countries in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus
have recently seen a sharp decline in media freedom (cf. RGOW
10/2015). The most indicative developments illustrating the deterioration of media freedom are related to the massive pressure placed
on the media by political elites and power circles, which amounts
to the aforementioned violation of basic human rights, one of the
key features of toxic leadership.
Is there a “cure” for new authoritarian temptation?
Jan Werner-Müller, following a rather pessimistic survey of worrying trends in Eastern Europe in a recent article in Foreign Affairs,
goes on to search for possible alternatives to growing illiberal trends.
And he finds the “cure” in the “people”, which – as he puts it – “may
prove better than their political establishments”. And finally: “The
people of the region must safeguard the legacy of their revolutions by
once more showing such resolve – and blocking attempts by Orbánstyle populists to now steal them.” 20
“People”, usually framed collectively as civil society, play a key
role as a democratic corrective force in all societies, all the more
so in those that embarked on a transitional path from an authoritarian regime to a liberal democracy in the early 1990s. The idea
is basically that civil society fundamentally helps to develop and
sustainably embed a democratic political culture, thus preventing
countries from lapsing back into authoritarian rule. Against this
background, it is easier to understand why so much – and generally
too much – is expected of civil society as a cure-all, especially in
times of illiberal challenges. In order to form a realistic picture
of civil society and citizens’ movements, its role and potential
7
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
as well as its limitations, it is first of all essential to move away
from over-simplified images of civil society and hopes of salvation.
Civil society is not always or automatically a cure for illiberalism
and a guarantee of sustainable democratic development. But in
times of new clashes within societies, in times where the front
lines between those defending values of liberalism and democracy
and those negating and fighting them are increasingly visible and
surrounded by conflicts, the “people” – be it assembled in the
form of civil society or protest movements – once again becomes
an agent of change or liberal resistance. This goes both for Eastern
and South-Eastern European countries but also for all Western
countries facing crises of democracy, extremist movements and
ideologies, etc.
One of the major moments of challenges to illiberalism, as seen
in Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia, Turkey or Ukraine,
are social and protest movements (cf. RGOW 4–5/2015). In the
past few years we have seen a new dimension and a new quality.
Social protests, most of which we have witnessed recently, are the
most important development of democratic politics in the regimes
“in-between” in the past two decades. The political establishment,
however, is fighting back against these new social movements with
all its might. There are plenty of role models for authoritarian rulers,
such as Putin or Erdogan, who only know the force of repression,
the police and the deeply symbolic water cannons.
Fukuyama, in his recently published Political Order and Political Decay argues that “Democracies exist and survive only because
people want and are willing to fight for them; leadership, organizational ability, and oftentimes sheer good luck are needed for them to
prevail.” 21 But in any case, social and protest movements, citizens’
action taken against “untouchable” political elites, against injustice,
corruption, the malfunctioning of the state and the economy, and
generally against illiberal trends spreading across the region under
the guise of formal democracy, are creating a momentum of resistance against illiberalism and a new coalition assembled around the
values of open societies.
3)https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/
publications/is-transiting-reversible-the-case-of-central-europe-january-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=8.
4) Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina: The Quest for Good Governance. How
Societies Develop Control of Corruption. Cambridge 2015.
5)http://www.bti-project.org/en/home/.
6) Bohle, Dorothee; Greskovits, Bela: Varieties of Capitalism and
Capitalism “tout court”. In: European Journal of Sociology 3
(2009), 355–386 (362).
7) Fukuyama, Francis: American Political Decay or Renewal. In:
Foreign Affairs 4 (2016), 58–68.
8) Schlumberger, Oliver: Opening Old Bottles in Search of New
Wine: On Nondemocratic Legitimacy in the Middle East. In:
Middle East Critique 19, 3 (2010), 233–250 (236).
9) Weber, Max: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization
(with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons), NewYork 1966, 325.
10)Gerschewski, Johannes: The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-optation in Autocratic Regimes.
In: Democratization 20, 1 (2013), 13–38 (20).
11) Scott, James C.: Machine Politics, and Political Change. In: The
American Political Science Review 63, 4 (1969), 1142–1158 (1144).
12)Harders, Cilja: Revolution I und II – Ägypten zwischen Transformation und Restauration. In: Jünemann, Annette; Zorob,
Anja (eds.): Arabellions. Zur Vielfalt von Protest und Revolte
im Nahen Osten und Nordafrika. Heidelberg 2011, 19–42 (24).
13)Giordano, Christian; Hayoz, Nicolas: Informality in Eastern
Europe. Structures, Political Cultures, and Social Practices,
Bern 2013, 11–12.
14)Helms, Ludger: When Leaders are not good: Exploring bad
leadership in liberal democracies across time and space. In:
Kane, John; Patapan, Haig (eds.): Good Democratic Leadership. Oxford 2014, 51–69 (54, 64).
15)This is in fact a basic distinction introduced by Kellermann,
Barbara: Bad Leadership. What it is, How it Happens, Why it
Matters. Boston 2004.
16)Lipman-Blumen, Jean: The Allure of Toxic Leaders. Oxford
2004.
A few remarks on the aims and the variety of papers in this
17)Helms, Ludger (ed.): Poor leadership and bad governance.
special issue
Reassessing presidents and prime ministers in North America,
This special issue serves multiple purposes. First of all, we wish
Europe and Japan. Cheltenham 2012.
to take a closer look beyond the frequently and easily used terms
“illiberalism” or “authoritarianism” by focusing on ongoing devel- 18)See Ledeneva, A. V.: Informality and informal politics. In:
Handbook of Russian Politics and Society London 2012; Helmopments in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and
the post-Soviet space. The authors assembled in this journal provide
ke, G. and Levitsky, S. Informal institutions and comparative
deeper insights into the dynamics of regimes in Ukraine, Georgia,
politics: a research agenda. In: Perspectives on Politics 2, 4
Moldova, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bosnia
(2004), 725–740.
and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Croa- 19)Levitsky, S. and Way, L. A.: Competitive Authoritarianism.
Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge 2010.
tia and Turkey. Obviously, not all of them can be described as illiberal or authoritarian; there are many shades of grey and variations 20)Müller, Jan Werner: Eastern Europe goes South. In: Foreign
Affairs 3/4 (2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
in the countries’ historical and recent developments and in the ways
eastern-europe-caucasus/2014-02-12/eastern-europe-goesthese regimes exercise power. In any case, on the basis of sound
south.
analysis of selected countries accompanied by rather general and
comparative thoughts we aim to go beyond mere regionalism and 21)Fukuyama, Francis: American Political Decay or Renewal. In:
Foreign Affairs 4 (2016), 58–68.
towards a broader conceptual understanding of new illiberalism
and authoritarianism. Trying to find and describe family resemblances and patterns of new illiberal or authoritarian governmentality on the European periphery is a task that we cannot entirely
Vedran Džihić, PhD, Senior Researcher at the
fulfil in this journal, but a first step towards a broader discussion
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (oiip),
has hopefully been taken.
Vienna.
Nicolas Hayoz, Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Fribourg, Director of
Notes
the Interfaculty Institute for Central and Eastern
1) Behr, Rafael: As Le Pen rises Europe’s liberal dream is disapEurope, Director of the Research Programme Acapearing in front of our eyes. In: The Guardian, 9.12.2015.
demic Swiss Caucasus Net (ASCN) and Regional
2) Ignatieff, Michael: New World Disorder. In: New York
Research Promotion Program (RRPP) Western
Review of Books 25 (2014), http://www.nybooks.com/artiBalkans.
cles/2014/09/25/new-world-disorder/.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Anton Shekhovtsov
The No Longer Silent
Counter-Revolution
The rise of the new right must be seen as a reaction to the growth of post-material and
cosmopolitan attitudes since the Second World War. The washed up catch-all parties and postmodernism have left an ideological vacuum that has been infiltrated by right-wing extremist
parties. Yet it is not they that primarily profit from the present crisis of the EU but national
conservative politicians such as Orbán or Kacýnski. – S. K.
In 1977, Ronald Inglehart published his widely acclaimed The
The first phenomenon, “catch-all” political parties, is rooted in
Silent Revolution, in which he argued that a “silent revolution” the period of extraordinary peace for the Western capitalist world
had been occurring in the West as well as fundamentally chang- during the Cold War. The post-war European integration project
ing it.1 The unprecedented prosperity experienced by Western aimed specifically at preventing violent conflicts between Euronations during the Cold War and the absence of total war, Ingle- pean states that were not part of the socialist bloc, and – partly
hart maintained, contributed to the process of gradual transfor- due to the fact that the majority of the capitalist European states
mation of individual values from materialist to post-materialist: were also members of NATO – they indeed succeeded in avoiding
once needs related to physical survival are met, people move to military clashes. The feeling of security and perception of peace
fulfil the needs for love, belonging and esteem, and then “intellec- as routine contributed to the rise of post-materialists, but also to
tual and aesthetic satisfaction take on central importance” – the the emergence of “catch-all” political parties. In 1966, Otto Kirchlatter he termed “post-materialist values”. In the political sphere heimer described them as essentially mass-based election-oriented
of the Western nations, the “silent revolution” was underpinned organisations that appealed not to particular groups within a sociby two major trends: (1) “a shift from overwhelming emphasis ety, but to the society in general. 5 Due to the liberal-democraton material consumption and security toward greater concern ic consensus in the larger part of the capitalist West, “catch-all”
with the quality of life”, and (2) “an increase in the political skills parties differed little in ideological sense and produced fewer and
of Western publics that enables them to play a more active role fewer big ideas, and as early as 1970s social movements “accused
in making important political decisions”. 2 Naturally, post-mate- the political parties, left and right, of operating without vision”. 6
rialists were only a minority among Western societies, but they
Simultaneously, the extended peacetime of the Cold War era
were arguably best educated and most active in politics. Post-ma- allowed for the rise of yet another phenomenon: postmodern polterialists were also the main drivers of European integration and itics. The latter renounced ideological master discourses, most
the fostering of cosmopolitan identity.
importantly liberalism and Marxism, and claimed that no politBut there was also a “silent counter-revolution”, as Piero ical truth existed – only individual standpoints to interpret mulIgnazi termed it. 3 He argued that during the 1980s, against the tiple “realities”. Grand visions and big ideas were not necessarily
background of “a growing dissatisfaction vis-a-vis the political vital instruments of electoral mobilisation for “catch-all” parties,
system and a corresponding decline in confidence in its effica- but for political postmodernists they were anathema.
cy”, 4 a new movement emerged in Europe that was simultaneBoth “catch-all” parties and political postmodernists, to a cerously a result of, and a backlash against, the silent revolution tain degree, provided fertile ground for the rise of the far right
of the post-materialists; this movement was associated with the in the 1990s and, especially, in the 2000s. The former contributrise of a new type of far-right parties that were different from ed to the growing perception of liberal democracy as a project
fascist organisations of the interwar period and the neo-fascist of the select few who allegedly lost touch with common people.
parties of the post-war era. In contrast to the “post-materialist For many in Europe, liberal democracy was no longer simply an
optimism” and cosmopolitanism of the presumably progressive ideology or a form of government; rather, it increasingly came to
silent revolution, silent counter-revolutionaries demanded law be perceived as a symbol, or even an embodiment of the causes,
and order enforcement and stricter immigration control. New of inequality.
radical right-wing parties rejected multiculturalism and insisted
Political post-modernists, on the other hand, contributed to
on the active protection of what they considered to be national or the weakening of the post-war liberal-democratic consensus in
European traditional values. But despite their sometimes signifi- the West by deconstructive attacks on the foundations of libercant electoral successes during the 1990s, the far right remained al thought. Political post-modernism also became a prominent
largely in the opposition. Since then, however, many things have element of what has become known as the “return of Realpolichanged, and counter-revolutionaries opposing the liberal-dem- tik” in the 2000s. Since liberal democracy was just one of many
ocratic consensus no longer appear to be silent.
other forms of governance, relations between Western states and
between the Western world and non-Western nations could be
governed not by moral values but by moral relativism, not by libReasons for the rise of right-wing extremism
In order to understand these changes, it seems important to brief- eral principles of justice, human rights and freedom, but by pragly discuss two relatively recent political phenomena that both matic considerations and individual national interests. In other
reflect the inability or even unwillingness of modern mainstream words, international relations within the discourse of postmodliberal-democratic forces to articulate grand visions of a political ern Realpolitik should be governed by momentary assessments
future of the West and the world.
of fluid, contextual and circumstantial “realities”. This principle
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
became toxic for the internal developments in the West, and its Austria, Hungary’s Jobbik, the French National Front or the Italimplementation resulted in the erosion of solidarity among West- ian Northern League, the “mainstream” counter-revolutionaries
such as Orbán or Trump can draw on resources inaccessible to the
ern states and the growth of isolationism.
traditional radical right-wing populists, as well as implementing
policies that would not differ much from those that could potenThe new and the old right
When the liberal progressivist “end of history” ended with tially be implemented by the National Front or Jobbik were they
Al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on the United States in September to come to power.16
2001, 7 the collective West – despite being militarily and economThe radical right-wing parties led the silent counter-revoically superior to any other bloc – appeared weak in terms of lution against liberal democracy in the 1980 and 1990s, but in
philosophical and ideological opposition to the challenges posed the new century it is largely mainstream national-conservative
by the enemies of liberal democracy. Proceeding from bad to politicians who take the opportunities enabled by the philosophworse, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, the resulting Great ically sterile political space created by the ideologically exhausted
Recession (the worst since the Second World War) and austerity “catch-all” parties and cynical political post-modernists, and are
policies undermined the economic superiority of the West. More able not only to dramatically weaken the Western post-war liberrecently, Islamist terrorist attacks and fear of them, migration al-democratic consensus, but also to undermine the international
and refugee crises, austerity policies, the Eurozone crisis and a security architecture.
perceived lack of effective leadership has produced an environment that fosters isolationist thinking even further. With liberal Notes
progressivism in retreat and few global visions articulated, many 1) Inglehart, Ronald: The Silent Revolution: Changing Values
citizens of Western nations started seeking existential refuge in
and Political Styles among Western Publics. Princeton 1977.
local, regional, national and religious identities.
2) Ibid., p. 363.
The far right embraced the opportunities offered by the 3) Ignazi, Piero: The Silent Counter-revolution: Hypotheses on
spread of political, economic, cultural and existential anxieties
the Emergence of Extreme Right-wing Parties in Europe. In:
in the West. In contrast to the intellectually exhausted mainEuropean Journal of Political Research 22, 1 (1992), 3–34.
stream liberal democrats, the far right do possess an ability to 4) Ibid., p. 25.
offer global alternative visions for the world order. And unlike 5) Kirchheimer, Otto: The Transformation of Western Europepolitical post-modernists, the far right reject the idea of multiple
an Party Systems. In: LaPalombara, Joseph; Weiner, Myron
“realities”: only one reality exists and they are prepared to stand
(eds.): Political Parties and Political Development. Princeton
their ground.
1966, 177–200.
But while the far right has obviously gained momentum in 6) Aronowitz, Stanley: Postmodernism and Politics. In: Social
the last decade, this was not the radical right-wing parties that
Text 18 (1987/88), 99–115 (101).
became the embodiment of the no longer silent counter-revo- 7) Kagan, Robert: The Return of History and the End of Dreams.
New York 2008.
lution. Rather, it is Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán’s
promise to build “an illiberal state” in Hungary; 8 it is the harsh 8) Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádanti-immigrant rhetoric of the Czech president Miloš Zeman,9
fürdő) of 26 July 2014, The Budapest Beacon, 29 July 2014,
the Slovak prime minister Robert Fico10 and the leader of the
http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/full-text-of-vikPolish ruling party Law and Justice Jarosław Kaczyński;11 it is the
tor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-juBrexit referendum that “has taken the shame out of racism”12 and
ly-2014/10592.
led to a surge of hate crimes in the UK after the majority of voters 9)https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/14/milosdecided to withdraw from the EU; it is the high-level appeasement
zeman-czech-leader-refugees.
of Russia’s president Vladimir Putin’s right-wing authoritarian 10)http://w w w.express.co.uk /news/world/610923/Slovaregime after the Russian invasion of Ukraine;13 it is the popularity
kia-Robert-Fico-Refugee-Crisis-European-Union-Quoof the racist US presidential candidate Donald Trump.
ta-Member-states.
Meeting with Jarosław Kaczyński in September 2016, Vik- 11)http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/polandrefuses-to-take-a-single-refugee-because-of-securitytor Orbán declared that Brexit was “a fantastic opportunity”, “a
fears-a7020076.html.
historic cultural movement” that allowed for “a cultural counter-revolution”.14 Kaczyński replied that they needed to “take the 12)http://www.irr.org.uk/email/brexit-and-xeno-racism-helpus-to-build-the-national-picture/.
initiative” and change the EU. While their idea of a counter-revolution may simply be interpreted as the EU’s decentralisation 13)https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/tighten-eusanctions-on-russia-by-guy-verhofstadt-2016-06.
and devolving more power to national parliaments, it cannot be
ignored that both Orbán and Kaczyński see European nations 14)www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e825f7f4-74a3-11e6-bf48-b372cdb1043a.
html.
as ethnically and religiously homogeneous entities. Their parties
skilfully exploited ethnic and religious nationalism to mobilise 15)Mudde, Cas: Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Camthe voters, and after they came to power, they took steps to secure
bridge 2007, pp. 22–23.
full control over their states by transforming and degrading their 16)The Budapest-based Political Capital Institute noted that by,
institutions, especially constitutional courts and public media.
spring 2015, Fidesz had “implemented several measures that
If radical right-wing parties – despite the ongoing de-radwere originally part of Jobbik’s program”. See “Jobbik’s Policy
Proposals Realized by Fidesz: A Summary in 10 Points”, Politicalisation process – still struggle to present themselves as a
legitimate and respectable part of the political process, neither
ical Capital Institute, May 15 (2015), http://www.riskandforeOrbán, nor Kaczyński, nor Zeman, nor Trump, nor the leaders
cast.com/post/flash-report/jobbik-s-policyproposals-realof the “Leave the EU” campaign in the UK need to prove the
ized-by-fidesz-a-summary-in-10-points_818.html.
political eligibility of their ideas that combine ultra-nationalism
and populism – ideological elements that are considered major
Anton Shekhovtsov, PhD, political scientist, curelements of radical right-wing ideology.15 Moreover, in contrast
rently a Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute
for Human Studies in Vienna.
to the traditional far-right parties such as the Freedom Party of
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Vlastimil Havlík
Populism and Political
Entrepreneurs
in the Czech Republic
The Czech Republic is considered an exemplary case of effective post-communist transformation
and democratisation. But the populist rhetoric and politics of the current president and the
rise of entrepreneurial parties represent a threat to this model of success. President Zenan
uses a rhetoric of friends and enemies and his idea of majoritarian democracy offers very
little protection to minorities. An unprecedented amount of political and economic power is
concentrated in the hands of political entrepreneurs. – S. K.
such as Tomáš Masaryk, Edvard Beneš and more recently
Václav Havel or Václav Klaus. In short, the Czech president,
although he does not have any great powers, is not a normal
politician, but an institution of great authority. The introduction of direct election to the presidency in 2012 by runoff (the two most successful candidates compete against each
other in a second round) contributed to one of the most polarised election campaigns in the country’s history post-1989
and led to the election of Miloš Zeman, premier of a left-ofcentre government from 1998 to 2002. Shortly after he was
elected president in January 2013, Zeman began to pursue a
policy that poses a threat to the tried and tested structures
of Czech parliamentary democracy. Firstly, it strengthens
the position of the head of state without regard for the parliamentary principle of the form of government. Secondly,
Zeman supports the model of majoritarian democracy and
to this end uses populist images.
Shortly after his election, the Czech Republic was gripped
by a political crisis brought about by accusations of corruption levelled at premier Petr Nečas which ultimately led to
his resignation and the collapse of the entire right-of-centre
government. Despite the avowedly slight majority enjoyed
by the right-of-centre parties in the parliament, Zeman
decided not to appoint the coalition’s candidate the new
premier, but instead chose his party-less friend Jiří Rusnok.
Rusnok’s expert government did not receive a majority in the
parliament however. Since Zeman was not prepared to create
a normal party government, the parliament was dissolved
and new elections were brought forward to the October of
2013. Along with his – ultimately unsuccessful – efforts to
transform the political system into a semi-presidential sysIlliberal political culture in Prague Castle
tem of government, Zeman’s populist action in appointing
Political culture, as a collection of historically rooted and Rusnok reveals his perception of democracy: the president
generally shared beliefs, feelings and values related to the refused to appoint a new right-of-centre party after the
essence of political systems, is an important factor in poli- political crisis of 2013 because “that is not what the majority
tics. It shapes our expectations of politics and our political of the population wants”. 4 Although Zeman explained that
behaviour. Political culture contains a set of norms com- this presumed majority was not formed by his voters during
prised of various sources – and politicians play a prominent the presidential elections, he pursued an illiberal populist
role in its composition. 3 The president plays an especial- vision of a majoritarian democracy in which constructed a
ly important role in the Czech Republic, since his seat of moral divide between the common people (which in fact coroffice is Prague Castle (the old seat of the Bohemian princes) responded to his voters and comprised less educated, older
and the position has been held by important personalities people with respect for authority and left-wing leanings)
Most attention regarding the illiberal turn in East Central
and Eastern Europe has recently been directed towards
Hungary and Poland.1 This is hardly surprising, given
Kaczyński’s project of a Fourth Republic (IV Rzeczpospolita) and Orbán’s national conservative vision for Hungary.
In both cases attempts are being made (to an extent successfully) to push through political reforms that undermine the
distribution of power between various control mechanisms
and institutions, including the constitutional courts, thus
shifting the systems of government towards the model of
illiberal democracies.
Historically, the Czech Republic has never been at the
centre of such debates. This is hardly surprising, for country
at the heart of Central Europe (together with Slovenia) has
been considered a model of successful political and economic transition, since it can point to a relatively stable set of
liberal political institutions, a calm party system and rather
sustainable economic growth free of any great disruptions. 2
Political developments in recent years call this success story
into question however. This article is concerned with the
“populist turn” in Czech politics embodied by the policies
of the newly elected president Miloš Zeman and the rise of
new political entrepreneurs in the parliamentary elections
of 2010 and 2013. In my opinion, the most recent rise of
various populist actors whose pragmatic approach to politics goes hand in hand with a preference for the model of
majoritarian democracy and a lack of respect for conventional mechanisms of democratic checks and balances represents
a challenge for the principles of a liberal-democratic form of
government and the political culture of the Czech Republic.
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characterised by economic pragmatism (good relations with China),
Euroscepticism and a pro-Russian
attitude (that is, denying Russian
occupation of Crimea or ridiculing opposition to Putin – Zeman
described Pussy Riot as “half-prostitutes”10) . Or, in other terms:
Zeman has skilfully constructed an
essentially illiberal divide between
the majority of society and various minority groups, including
political and intellectual elites and
migrants from Muslim countries.
In the president’s strategy, these
minorities, who are portrayed as
inferior to him (and the common
people), have become a target for
ridicule in order to completely
deny their legitimacy. In his opinThe Czech president Miloš Zeman visiting Russian president Vladimir Putin in May 2015.
Photo: kremlin.ru
ion, they do not deserve any of the
and the others. The definition of these others depends on special protection typical of liberal-democratic forms of
the context in question, but as a general simplification they government – or at least not without reservation. The term
can be described as liberal, urban intellectuals (including “tyranny of the majority” was coined to describe this idea
everyone who criticises Zeman) whom the president and his of democracy.
As well as potentially impacting on the growing polarisaspokesman commonly refer to only as the “Prague café”.
And finally, the Muslim immigrants have also become tion within society, Zeman’s attitudes and his actions – parpart of the president’s radicalised populist discourse: he usu- ticularly given the special role and perception of the instially uses right-wing extremist topoi in directly associating tution of the president in the Czech context – have a strong
Islam and Muslims with terrorism and cultural and econom- influence on the country’s political culture. In other words:
ic threats. As a result, xenophobia has become more prevalent Zeman (or indeed whoever is the Czech president) plays an
because of Zeman’s public speeches. On 17 November 2015, extraordinarily strong role in determining the rules of the
the 26th anniversary of the Velvet Revolution, Zeman even game. Under Zeman’s presidency, people can observe that
gave a speech side by side with representatives of the right- ridicule, impolite behaviour, demagogy or lies and – even
more importantly – an illiberal understanding of democracy
wing movement “Bloc against Islam”. 5
are an everyday aspect of politics. Of course, Zeman is not
the only politician to use these methods, but his prominent
Populist ideas of friends and enemies
Political disputes are part of politics, but it is also a question position makes him special case in this regard.
of how they are conducted. The division between the people
and the others constructed by Zeman is above all not based Anti-party populism
on the usual ideological differences between the right and the A further illiberal development in recent years is the unprecleft or between conservatism and liberalism, but in essence edented concentration of political and economic power. For
aims to completely disqualify opponents through insults instance, the party Věci veřejné (Public Issues), which gained
and ridicule. This includes the aforementioned expression 10.9 percent of the vote in the parliamentary elections of 2010,
“Prague café” (implying people sitting around in cafés doing promised to fight corruption and introduce as many direct
nothing, in contrast to the hard-working common people). democratic and participatory measures as possible, but the
Demonstrators who had criticised the president during the party was two-headed: its hidden face was merely a business
previous year at a rally marking the anniversary of the Velvet plan of its de facto leader and patron designed to enable his
Revolution, were described as a “bellowing fascist herd”. 6 A security company to access state funds for public services.
popular singer who had pointed to Zeman’s pro-Chinese The party ran like an entrepreneurial party lacking internal
attitude was ridiculed as a “poor little girl” “who is not able democracy, not attempting to develop sustained ties with
to speak three sentences without reading them”.7 And liberal a part of society but serving the economic interests of its
intellectuals were compared with the elites of the authori- owner and pursuing a very murky ideological programme.
tarian Second Czechoslovak Republic (1938–1939). Reacting The discovery of this plan (and the corrupt behaviour of its
to criticism by the Czech PEN club, Zeman’s spokesman members of parliament) soon led to internal division and
declared that “the gulf between the so-called elite and the marginalisation of the party however.11
Czech citizens has not only become deeper, but has become
In November 2011 Andrej Babiš, the owner of the Czech
a deep chasm”. 8 On another occasion he announced via Republics’s largest agrochemical holding (Agrofert), foundtwitter that “according to the constitution, the people is the ed the party ANO 2011, which expressed its dissatisfaction
only source of political power in the country, there’s not with corruption allegedly widespread in the Czech Republic.
mention of the elites”.9 Anti-intellectualism has become an Shortly before the 2013 parliamentary elections, Babiš decidessential component of Zeman’s (and his spokesman’s) polit- ed to buy the publishing group MAFRA, which publishes the
country’s two most widely read daily newspapers and news
ical discourse.
Another defining feature of the president’s anti-lib- portals. Following the elections, in which the party received
eral attraction is his views on foreign policy, which are 19 percent of the vote, ANO 2011 formed a coalition with the
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Social Democrats (ČSSD) and the Christian and Democratic
Union-Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL), and Babiš
became finance minister. Similarly to Věci veřejné – but now
openly – the party is run in centralist fashion with its leader
and his cronies from Agrofert in prominent positions.
Business not as usual
The threat to the foundations of a liberal democracy are
clear: one of the most important characteristics of a liberal-democratic form of government is the separation of powers between the legislation, the executive and the judiciary,
but also between the political, economic and media spheres.
The fact that the leader of the most popular party acts as
the finance minister, owns companies whose economic gain
is closely connected to public subventions determined by
the government, and owns important media represents an
unprecedented concentration of power and the potential for
using political functions for private interests. Some authors
speak of oligarchic power structures when describing Babiš’s
position in Czech politics. Although it is rather difficult to
find direct evidence of the finance minister’s abuse of political power for financial gain, his companies’ profits have risen
sharply on the basis of public tenders. Some studies also
point to the media bias towards Babiš’s party, since they
either criticise only his opponents or hardly ever report on
the owners of Agrofert.
Babiš’s career under the communist regime as a economic
representative abroad, his alleged collaboration with the communist secret police (although a court in Slovakia concluded that his file did not constitute evidence of collaboration)
and his very reputation since the 1990s as a very pragmatic
entrepreneur (sometimes teetering on the edge of legality)
do little to suggest the Slovak billionaire has much sympathy
for liberal-democratic politics. It is thus hardly surprising
that he has repeatedly questioned the role of parliament as a
forum for discussion (terming it a “big den of nonsense”12)
and has expressed his desire for limited institutional rights
for the opposition in order that he might have more time for
work.13 That does not mean that ANO 2011 is attempting to
transform Czech democracy into a kind of authoritarian or
even totalitarian regime, but the manager-like, expert-based
ways of populist politics leave little room for democratic
negotiation and protection for minorities.
***
In conclusion, it can be said that in recent years the liberal
face of post-1989 Czech democracy has been under unprecedented attack. This article has presented two significant
causes: firstly the populist communication strategy of the
president who (to an extent blindly) undermines some of the
basic principles of liberal democracy, including protection for
minority rights, and promotes the development of an illiberal political culture. An important aspect of the “presidential
threat” is his orientation regarding foreign policy and his
Euroscepticism, which are rooted either in his political pragmatism (a significant part of Czech society has Eurosceptic
and pro-Russian leanings) or in personal economic advantages (Russian firms are alleged to have financed Zeman’s
2013 election campaign). Secondly, we can observe the rise of
political entrepreneurs in whose hands unprecedented power
is concentrated and who have only the slightest respect for
the principles of liberal democracy. Both threats must not
only be associated with certain actors, but must also be seen
in the broader context of the growth of an illiberal political
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
culture throughout the Czech Republic which could open
the door to genuine non-democratic alternatives.
Notes
1) Krasztev, Peter; Van Til, Jon (eds.): The Hungarian
Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy.
Budapest 2015; Stanley, Ben: Confrontation by Default
and Confrontation by Design: Strategic and Institutional
Responses to Poland’s Populist Coalition Government.
In: Democratization 23, 2 (2016), 263–282.
2) Merkel, Wolfgang: Plausible Theory, Unexpected Results:
The Rapid Democratic Consolidation in Central and
Eastern Europe. In: Bakke, Elisabeth; Peters, Ingo (eds.):
Twenty Years since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-up and Democratic Politics in Central
Europe and Germany. Berlin 2011, 57–76.
3) Vgl. Pye, Lucian W.; Verba, Sidney (eds.): Political Culture and Political Development. Princeton 2015.
4) Vládu sestaví Rusnok, rozhodl Zeman. Postavil se proti
stranám; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/zeman-predstavilnoveho-premiera-bude-jim-rusnok-fby-/domaci.aspx?c=A130625_145418_domaci_kop.
5) Zeman zpíval s Konvičkou hymnu. Národ není xenofobní, nenechme sebou manipulovat, pronesl prezident;
http://video.aktualne.cz/dvtv/zeman-zpival-s-konvickou-hymnu-narod-neni-xenofobni-nenechme/r~4f4e7dac8d5511e594520025900fea04/.
6) In his speech Zeman characterised the participants of a
demonstration against him in the previous year as follows: “Bellowing is an instrument used by the fascists,
bellowing is an instrument of the herd that gathered here
last year.”
7) Chudinka holčička, řekl Zeman o Dusilové, podle níž
nemá podlézat Číně; http://zpravy.idnes.cz/chudinka-holcicka-rekl-zeman-o-dusilove-podle-niz-nemapodlezat-cine-117-/domaci.aspx?c=A160417_120405_
domaci_kop.
8)Spisovatelé píší Zemanovi: Pane prezidente, šíříte
nenávist; http://svobodneforum.cz/spisovatele-pisi-zemanovi-pane-prezidente-sirite-nenavist/.
9) h t t p s : / / t w i t t e r . c o m / p r e z i d e n t m l u v c i / s t a tus/668764143055425537.
10)Zeman opět provokuje: Bakala je zloděj, Pussy Riot
poloviční prostitutky; http://www.lidovky.cz/bakala-je-zlodej-a-podvodnik-pussy-riot-polovicni-prostitutky-p7y-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A160225_191303_ln_
domov_ELE.
11)Havlík, Vlastimil; Hloušek, Vít: Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde:
The Story of the Populist Public Affairs Party in the
Czech Republic. In: Perspectives on European Politics
and Society 15, 4 (2014), 552–570.
12)Ministr financí Andrej Babiš v Interview ČT24, http://
www.mfcr.cz/cs/aktualne/v-mediich/2014/ministr-financi-andrej-babis-v-interview-18.
13)Lidovcům dochází trpělivost s arogantním Babišem.
ANO už se mělo rozkoukat, řekl Bělobrádek, http://
zprav y.akt ua lne.cz/domaci /politika / babis-v yhovel-lidovcum-pokud-elektronicka-evidence-trzeb-neb/
r~6528fc44701111e594170025900fea04/.
Vlastimil Havlík is an Assistant Professor at the
Department of Political Science, Faculty of Societal Studies at the Masaryk University of Brno. His
research focuses on, inter alia, populism, Czech
politics and Euroscepticism.
13
14
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Magdalena Solska
Ambivalent “Good Change”
in Poland
Following its victory in the recent elections, the party Law and Justice (PiS) has quickly passed a number
of controversial laws concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, the administration and the media. Despite its
claim to represent the will of the people, the PiS does not have an electoral mandate to radically restructure
the state. The party’s long-term success depends on whether it can keep its social promises. – R. Z.
The year 2015 marked the end of two terms in power for the
centre-right Civic Platform (PO) and its coalition partner, the
Polish People’s Party (PSL). The conservative Law and Justice
(PiS) party unexpectedly won the presidential elections in May
and five months later obtained 38 % of the vote and thus an absolute majority of seats in the Sejm (Polish Parliament). For the first
time in the Polish semi-presidential system of power, one party
controls the double executive and the legislative. Furthermore,
two populist anti-establishment parties, Kukiz’15 and KORWiN,
managed to win 14 % of the vote and attract around one third of
voters under 30, mostly high school and university students (see
RGOW 12/2015, 9–12).1
The victory of the PiS can be attributed to its rather skillful
campaign addressing moral issues as well as traditional Polish
values, and presenting new, dynamic candidates for the most
relevant posts. The PO, in contrast, was visibly weakened by
the “wiretapping scandal” of 2014, whereby relevant PO public
officials including the foreign minister, the head of the National
Bank and the head of the secret service were recorded in several
exclusive Warsaw restaurants. Furthermore, the PiS responded
to the anti-immigrant sentiments of many Poles and refused to
accept migrants’ quotas imposed by the European Union and
agreed upon by the previous government. Another decisive factor
was a successful appeal to young people, pensioners, and inhabitants of rural and suburban areas, whose economic situation has
been precarious. 3 It is they who felt neglected by the previous
government, associated mainly with reductions in public spending, which was, however, a necessary measure to counteract the
financial crisis affecting e. g. Hungary.
As a result, Poles granted the PiS the right to govern on its
own and to launch the promised “good change”, involving social
assistance for families4 and a reduction of the age of pension eligibility. At the same time, it conducted several institutional reforms
concerning the Constitutional Tribunal, the civil service, public
media and making the Minister of Justice the general prosecutor
(cf. RGOW 3/2016, 9–10). All the new acts were introduced rapidly, without proper public consultations and entailing several
provisions that could undermine the autonomy of these institutions. Critical voices have been heard at home and abroad ranging
from “authoritarianism à la Putin”, “constitutional coup d’état”,
“a war against liberal democracy” to “infantile autocracy”. Has
Poland turned from a master pupil to the lame duck of the EU?
Is Polish democracy really in danger?
Conflict surrounding the Constitutional Tribunal
one of the determinants of the new political order in the country. Finally, when the new constitution was introduced in 1997,
the Tribunal became a “referee” of public politics conducted by
different parliamentary majorities. 5 Most importantly, it declared
the new law on lustration, prepared earlier in 2006 by the PiS and
supported by the PO, as partially unconstitutional. Since then
lustration in Poland has not moved forward. This is why the PiS
has always regarded the CT as a strongly politicized institution.
Earlier in 2015, the previous PO-PSL coalition introduced an
amendment to the new Law on the Constitutional Court, which
enabled it to propose candidates for the CT judges, whose terms
in office were to expire after the new parliamentary elections.
In the beginning of the October, the old parliament elected five
new judges out of the total fifteen. The first three were elected to
replace those whose term in office expired on 6 November, before
the constitution of the new Sejm. The latter two judges were chosen to replace those whose term in office ended in December – at
a time when the new parliament would undoubtedly already be
in place. The governing coalition argued that it was necessary
to secure the continuity of the CT’s full composition. On the
contrary, the PiS stated that it was rather “a politically-driven
attempt to prevent the new majority from electing the judges.”6
Accordingly, President Andrzej Duda refused to swear in all
five judges elected by the old parliament. On 2 December the
PiS majority elected five new CT judges, who were immediately
sworn in by the president. On the same day, however, the CT
ruled that the early election of the two “December judges” was
unconstitutional and the president was obliged to swear in three
remaining judges appointed by the old Sejm. The government
delayed the publication of this decision, which was necessary to
grant it a binding force, whereas the president has not complied
with that CT ruling so far.
Furthermore, the PiS introduced a new bill on 24 December,
which, according to domestic and foreign experts as well as the
Venice Commission, could paralyze the work of the CT in the
future.7 This bill did not undergo any public consultations and
was immediately signed into law by the president. All in all, the
conflict has been initiated by the PO-PSL coalition’s hasty nominations, but the PiS has demonstrated no will to resolve it on
the basis of a compromise, nor has it abided by the ruling of the
Constitutional Tribunal. It clearly discredits the party fostering
the “good change” and may undermine the authority of the CT
in the long run.
National or party media?
The Constitutional Tribunal (CT) in Poland was introduced in Also in December the party changed the media law and replaced
1985 to cover the legitimacy crisis of the totalitarian system under all the executive boards and CEOs of public media companies.
General Wojciech Jaruzelski. After 1989, in the context of the tran- While such practice is not new, the most controversial aspect consitory “small constitution”, the Constitutional Tribunal became cerned the temporary decision that the Director General of public
Photo: Keystone
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
legal means of limiting and controlling the exercise of power”.13
Such liberalism, or in Sartori’s terms, “freedom from tyranny”,
shall be guaranteed by the Constitutional Judges, who, as a matter
of fact, do not have a democratic mandate. And this, in turn, the
PiS is reluctant to accept. The vice minister of justice once stated
that the “old” CT (before the appointment of five new CT judges
by the PiS) would block reforms such as the “Family 500+” programme – reforms resulting from the will of the people.14
The PiS has correctly identified the problems of Polish society
and its call for social justice. Perhaps it is using this social programme to distract attention from the policies subordinating state
institutions. The institutional changes, however, even the weak
position of the Constitutional Tribunal, do not have to mean the
end of a democratic order. It all depends on the elite’s behavior
in the long run, whether they play by the rules inherent to these
institutions and whether political and social pluralism is not curMarch by PiS supporters with signs declaring “It was an attack”, in reference
to the Polish government plane crash on 10 April 2010, and “Poland – let us
tailed. It is therefore too early to categorise the changes carried
follow the path of Lech Kaczyński”.
out by the current PiS government. They undoubtedly display a
tendency to control state institutions, to use these institutions to
television was to be appointed by the Minister of the Treasury. 8 discredit the past ruling elites, to strengthen and shape national
Eventually, the new law on national media introduced in July feelings and to construct recent history. It is thus necessary to
2016 altered the legal status of the public media, which were to closely observe the party’s next steps. At the moment, popular
become “national institutions” subordinate to a new National support for the PiS is as high as that for all four oppositional
Media Council and financed by an audiovisual tax. The “nation- parties combined. However, if its social promises turn out to be
al media” should promote national history and culture, respect pure demagogy, at the next elections the Poles may surprise again.
for Christian values and ethical principles. They should serve to
promote civic activism, presenting diverse opinions and stances, Notes
shaping the content and form of their messages according to the 1)http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/wybory-parlamprinciples of editorial independence.9 Under the new director of
entarne-2015-wyniki-glosowania-grup-zawodowych,589085.
state television, Jacek Kurski, the former head of the presidential
html; http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2016-07-25-marczecampaign of the late President Lech Kaczyński, channel 1 (TVP
wski-en.html.
1) has become very one-sided. For instance, when it reported on 2)http://whogoverns.eu/another-shift-in-polish-politics/.
the speech of Barack Obama at the NATO Summit in Warsaw, 3)http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-z-kraju,3/wybory-parlamthe sentence “I expressed to President Duda our concerns over
entarne-2015-wyniki-glosowania-grup-zawodowych,589085.
certain actions and the impasse around Poland’s constitutional
html.
tribunal […]”10 was simply omitted. Moreover, the national media 4) The programme “Family 500+” entails 500 zloty (ca. 120 euros)
for every second and further child.
extensively cover the monthly commemorations of the plane
crash in Smolensk in 2010 (cf. RGOW 9/2011, 19–21), organized 5)http://fakt y.interia.pl /rapor t y/rapor t-spor-wokol-tk /
komentarze/news-rewolucja-w-tr ybunale-konstytucy
by the PiS in front of the Presidential Palace. Additionally, a new
jnym,nId,1940562.
parliamentary commission on Smolensk has been established to
once again investigate the causes of the plane crash and demon- 6)https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2016 _
Poland_0.pdf.
strate the negligence of the former ruling elite. At the same time,
President Duda has become the honorary patron of the newly 7)http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/kraj/1667754,1,
prezydent-podpisal-nowa-ustawe-o-trybunale-konstytucy
released propaganda film Smolensk, whose plot revolves around
jnym-oto-11-jej-najwazniejszych-zalozen.read.
the planned attack on the Polish head of state, Lech Kaczyński.
Special film presentations are organized for schools across the 8) Bader, Katarina; Zapart, Tomasz: Polarisiert, politisiert und
vielfältig. In: Osteuropa 66, 1–2 (2016), 131–148.
country. Whereas the state media have become clearly pro-government, it is noteworthy that the private media landscape 9)http://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Druki8ka.nsf/Projekty/8-020-1772016/$file/8-020-177-2016.pdf.
remains diverse and, for now, not in danger, however deeply it is
10)https://www.rt.com/news/350621-polish-censors-obamasplit into pro- and anti-PiS camps.11
democracy/.
11)Bader, Zapart: Polarisiert, politisiert und vielfältig (comLiberalism or the “will of the people”?
The last parliamentary elections with a turnout of 51 % showed
ment 8), p. 141.
that the most frequent choice in Poland is electoral abstention. As 12)Interview with Prof. Radoslaw Markowski: Kaczyński po
a result, the PiS could achieve an absolute majority with only 19 %
wsze czasy. In: Gazeta Wyborcza 16–17 April (2016), p. 3.
of votes of the eligible electorate.12 This would appear far from 13)Sartori, Giovanni: How Far Can Free Government Travel? In:
Journal of Democracy 3, 6 (1995), 101–110.
sufficient for a party to speak and act on behalf of the whole nation.
Nonetheless, the party presents itself as the only true representa- 14)http://wpolityce.pl/polityka/275463-patryk-jaki-trybutive and protector of the common good. In its dominant narrative,
nal-konstytucyjny-blokowalby-nasze-reformy-szanuje-opinthe PiS creates an artificial division between “liberal post-comie-sadu-najwyzszego-ale-sie-z-nia-nie-zgadzam.
munism” and a “truly free Poland of solidarity with the poorest”
while reducing the term “liberalism” to radical economic reforms
Magdalena Solska, PhD, is a postdoctoral researchand individual freedom. However, contrasting liberalism with
er and lecturer in political science at the Intersocial solidarity is misleading, because democratic order needs
faculty Institute for Central and Eastern Europe
both. Political liberalism is concerned with the “structural and
(IICEE), University of Fribourg.
15
16
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Grigorij Mesežnikov
The Extreme Right Challenge
to Slovak Democracy
Since the parliamentary elections in March 2016, a right-wing party has been represented
in the Slovak parliament for the first time. The People’s Party– Our Slovakia is a radical antisystem organization seeking to abolish liberal democracy. The other parties represented in
the parliament refuse to work with the right-wing extremists, but they remain a challenge to
democracy in Slovakia. – S. K.
In March 2016 the right-wing extremist People’s Party–Our
The first group of factors includes issues related to the
Slovakia (L’S-NS) was elected into Slovakia’s parliament, overall development of Slovak society in recent decades, the
receiving 8.04 % of the vote (14 seats in the assembly). The public perception of the socio-economic impact of reforms, the
party ran in the 2010 and 2012 elections but only gained 1.33 % effectiveness of the exercise of power and the mainstream elites’
and 1.58 % of the vote and failed to qualify. Now, for the first addressing of societal challenges, and the persisting patterns of
time in the history of post-communist Slovakia, the anti-sys- value orientations and types of political culture within the poptemic political force whose activities and overall profile stand in ulation (authoritarianism, paternalism, xenophobia). Another
contradiction to the fundamental principles of liberal democ- obvious aspect is the impact of such factors as the mobilizing
racy is represented in the legislative body. The party’s ideo- power of ethnic nationalism and anti-Roma racism, the ideological background and the political preferences of many of its logical legacy of the collaborationist war-time fascist Slovak
members, including its leader Marian Kotleba, are marked by state that is still attractive to certain part of the population, the
an evident inclination to fascism. The party rejects the current susceptibility of certain groups of the population to the isolaforeign policy orientation of the Slovak Republic based on alli- tionist ideas in the perception of Slovakia’s foreign policy and
ance with the states of the democratic West and deep political, the country’s position in Europe and in the world, anti-Amereconomic, security and defense integration into Euro-Atlantic icanism, EU-phobia, anti-Western sentiment etc.
structures. On the contrary, its leaders express sympathy for
The second group includes diverse factors that are neverthe foreign policy of the Russian Federation, the state whose theless related in their complexity and co-shaping of the whole
policies constitute one of the biggest security threats for the picture: reactions of the population to the migration wave to
European Union and NATO today.
Europe from countries with different ethnic and religious characteristics to the population (even though this wave completely
bypassed Slovakia), the use of a specific segment of social media
Reasons behind the rise of the L’S-NS
The rise of populist and extremist forces is an evident recent and networks for communication and receiving information,
trend in many European states. Xenophobia has become a pow- the penetration of “alternative” political and historical narerful mobilizing tool with an impact on policies, particularly ratives, including classic conspiracy theories, and ideological
in Central Europe. In Slovakia, the national-populist parties infiltration from the outside supporting the formation of views
have been the constituent parts of the political landscape since rejecting the values of liberal democracy.
the fall of the communist regime and the introduction of parliaAn important situational factor was the weakened ability of
mentary democracy. These parties operated in the Slovak par- the “standard” parties to effectively reach out to voters, which
liament in all legislative cycles since 1990, in some cycles even led to a decline in their electoral support and helped the extremas ruling parties. Despite their populist nature and authori- ist party to take over a considerable part of their electorate.
tarian tendencies in the exercise of political power, however, A phenomenon that manifested itself in Slovakia in the 2016
they were not anti-systemic extremist formations marked by elections to a greater extent than in elections in previous years
totalitarian ideologies. The L’S-NS undoubtedly uses populist was the activation of those parts of the population that normally
anti-establishment rhetoric and used populist methods when belong to the category of non-voters. A substantial part of these
appealing to voters, but its main characteristic is not that it voters in 2016 opted for the “alternative” (newly created) parties,
is a populist and anti-establishment organisation, but that it while many of them supported just the right-wing extremist
is an extremist and anti-systemic one. Its goal is to replace L’S-NS. The overall success of the party was also due to the
the existent socio-political system with another in which the stronger inclination of first-time voters. According to exit polls
basic features of the liberal-democratic political system, a free carried out on election day, of all competing parties the L’S-NS
market economy and an open, culturally diverse society would received the highest number of votes in this category.
disappear.
The lack of efficiency and the often poorly qualified perWhy has this party become a relevant part of Slovakia’s party formance of the state institutions (bodies with executive and
system? It is the result of the interaction of multiple factors. judicial powers) in securing the strict legal framework for politSome of them can be described as long-term, associated with the ical and other public activities of members of the right-wing
deeper trends in society’s development, while others are rather extremist scene also contributed to the success of right-wing
situational, associated with the recent events and tendencies in extremists in 2016. This resulted in the creation of an atmodevelopments within the country and around the world.
sphere of tolerance for the open spreading of racist ideas and
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
messages containing propaganda promoting inequality and
violence. This atmosphere provided comfortable conditions for
the activities of right-wing extremist groups, for their communication with sympathizers, allowing them to poison the public
discourse with views that were in irreconcilable conflict with
the principles and values of liberal democracy.
Factors associated with the formation of the historical consciousness of the population, especially the young generation,
also played a role. The activation of representatives of a revisionist trend among historians, supported by part of political
establishment (including government and academic institutions) and the apparent neglect of certain topics in the school
curriculum (for example, the history of the Second World War,
the crimes committed by the genocidal regime of the fascist
Slovak state in 1939–1945, the nature of totalitarian regimes
and ideologies, the values of freedom, democracy and human
rights, the danger of nationalism and racism, the importance
of solidarity and religious tolerance) led to relativizing interpretations of many historical events and to blunting the critical
perception of the most problematic ones.
An eloquent testimony about the right-wing extremist L’SNS is offered by the personal profiles of its leading representatives, functionaries, members and people placed on its party
list in the parliamentary elections. Alongside the long-known
activists of radical-nationalist orientation there were persons
who have had problems with the law, individuals who have
committed acts of violence with racist motives, participated in
physical clashes with the police, spread racial hatred, condoned
the acts of violence against Roma, Jews and migrants, glorified
Nazism and Hitler or approved the Holocaust. Among those
who have got into parliament on an L’S-NS ticket at least three
persons charged and tried or investigated for criminal offenses
(including violence) motivated by extremism or racism.
Reactions following the elections
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
as to where there was room for its activities, and where there
are boundaries for interactions between it and the rest of the
political class and civil society.
The definition of the L’S-NS as a “fascist” party was accompanied by a policy of isolating it from the political “mainstream”. By labelling Kotleba “fascist” and refusing to meet
with him in the presidential palace after the elections, President
Kiska set boundaries that will be difficult to cross. During his
visit to Krupina, the region where the L’S-NS achieved the best
results in the elections, Kiska said of the leader of the party:
“Apart from the fact that he is marching in uniform with torches
and declaring that the [anti-fascist] Slovak National Uprising
[of 1944] was the saddest event in our history, he says referring to nearly 60 thousand Jews who were deported during the
Slovak State and did not return, having been killed, that it is
not a problem of our people, because we are not the Jewish but
Slovak people […] Kotleba is simply fascist”.1 Later President
Kiska stated: “We must understand the reasons for open support of neo-Nazism, fascism, racism, that the hate speeches are
spreading in a more open manner. But that does not mean we
must compromise with their adherents or avert our eyes from
them apologetically”. 2
The programmatic arsenal of the L’S-NS, the personal composition of its leadership, the level of expertise and professionalism of its structures, its post-election activities, including the
first experience in its performance as a parliamentary party,
confirm the obvious fact that this political entity is not an
organization that complies with the standard process of preparing and providing the policy solutions, but is a force aimed
at eliminating the existing system. Proposals presented by this
party in its documents and statements of its prominent representatives are not based on reliable expertise. In the current
system they are not practically implementable. It is simply not
possible to integrate the L’S-NS into the existent democratic
system as its standard constituent. With its current program
and declared priorities, the L’S-NS is sentenced to existence
as a fringe political organization. Therefore, the most likely
future scenario is that it will continue to present the inherently
anti-systemic proposals, will continue to criticize the existent
system and established “mainstream” political actors and will
carry out various activities outside of parliament in an effort
to retain or to increase its electoral support.
Although the right-wing extremist party L’S-NS is currently not in a strong enough position to be able to remove the
liberal-democratic model, its presence in parliament constitutes a serious challenge to liberal democracy in Slovakia, to
its norms and principles. Spreading their malignant messages,
the right-wing extremists are trying to create an atmosphere
of uncertainty and mistrust in the institutions of a democratic
state, in the rule of law and the principles of equality of citizens.
This is a test of the ability of democratic politicians to defend
democracy.
During the first five months after the elections, as a parliamentary party with a 14-member caucus the L’S-NS behaved passively; its participation in the legislative process was minimal.
Its members submitted only one legislative proposal (during
the period in question 100 legislative proposals were submitted to the assembly for deliberation). The core performance of
the party after it entered the parliament included continuation
of activities outside of the parliament and promotion of its
traditional agenda through public events. The L’S-NS initiated the petition for the referendum on Slovakia’s withdrawal
from the EU and NATO, organized the demonstration against
Gay Pride in Bratislava entitled “The protest march against
the perverts”, announced that it would send its own “public
order patrols” onto trains for the protection of “decent people”
who supposedly receive no protection from the state from the
“Gypsy extremists”.
Regarding the ideological nature of the L’S-NS, a particularly important aspect was the general consensus spontaneously formed after the elections in 2016 that it is a fascist Notes
party. The party was described thus by leaders of the vast 1) Prezident: Kotlebu Kiska označil za fašistu [President
majority of parliamentary parties, by president Andrej Kiska
Kiska said Kotleba is fascist], SITA, April 7th, 2016.
and representatives of numerous NGOs. After the elections, 2) Andrej Kiska’s speech on memorial day of the Slovak
the Slovak media published a high number of analyses written
National Uprising in Banská Bystrica. August 29th, 2016,
by experts (historians, political scientists, sociologists, psyhttps://dennikn.sk/minuta/547171/?ref=mpm.
chologists) and journalists in which the L’S-NS was defined
as a “fascist”, “neo-fascist” or “neo-Nazi” party. Irrespective
Grigorij Mesežnikov is a political scientist and
of the terminological nuances of using such definitions, espepresident of the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)
in Bratislava. He was a key author of the reports
cially differentiating between particular streams, in the current
on Slovakia in Nations in Transit published by
socio-political context of Slovakia it was an important sign:
Freedom House from 1998–2014.
the right-wing extremist organization received a clear message
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Zoltán Kiszelly
Hungary’s Illiberal State:
Model or Pariah?
The international community has criticised Hungary in recent years for introducing political
reforms aimed at an authoritarian restructuring of the state. The author discusses this model
of an “illiberal state” against the background of the historical experiences of the East Central
European countries. The proclaimed goal of the governing party Fidesz is greater political
sovereignty within the EU. – S. K.
are the mere blinking of an eye. Hence the national elites seek
to preserve and reinforce the nation state as a framework for
modernisation at any price.
Moreover, after a long period of peace in Central Europe,
Hungarians currently see themselves on the threshold of new,
larger conflicts (buzzwords abound such as the “new Cold
War” and the “modern Migration Period”). In such situations, the realistic school of international relations advises
consolidation of resources and sovereignty to gain room for
manoeuvre when faced with distant centres of power with
their “selfish” interests. “Die for Poland?”, “Die for Hungary” – the West answered with a resounding “No” in 1939 and
1956. There were (are) always “more important and higher”
considerations.
Of course, the twenty-first century cannot be compared
like for like with the twentieth; humanity has (hopefully)
learnt from history. What have remained however are the historical reflexes which in CEE tend towards mistrust and pessimism. And the Western power centres are currently doing
as little as possible to assuage this mistrust (“silent treatment”
and majority decisions in the EU). In Hungary and CEE
attempts are being made to improve the health of the nation
The historical context
As is well known, everything is different east of the River state and to prepare for the anticipated time “after this EU”.
Elbe. There people feel separated from the western part of the The Visegrád states continue where the British left off followcontinent and try to make up for lost time. The prospects of ing Brexit. Under the banner of “liberal democracy”, Hungaliberal development in politics and the economy following the ry fell from the region’s frontrunner in 1989/90 to bringing up
revolutions of 1989/90 depended on market forces that had to the (economic) rear in 2010. Hence the conservative national
develop as freely and as close to the Western model as possi- elites, in consensus with the majority of voters, came to the
ble. To achieve this, people were prepared to give up national conclusion that the liberal path was not leading the country
sovereignty for integration into supranational organisations. in the right direction and that Fidesz should be given a chance.
In Hungary in 2010, this project was brought to an end by a This widespread trust in Fidesz prevails – partly because there
are no appealing alternatives.
landslide victory for Fidesz.
Hungary and the many small and medium-sized states in
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) created by the Treaty of Definition
Versailles (1920) historically found themselves on the periph- The term “illiberal democracy” was coined by Fareed Zakaria
ery of power in each of these supranational integrations and and in Western discussions is considered somewhat loaded.
empires, all of which sought to establish large uniform eco- Not least for this very reason, in Hungary people speak pronomic spaces with uniform regulations, administration and grammatically of an “illiberal state” in order to avoid queslanguage wherever possible. Perceiving themselves to have tioning the democratic character of the political order. Viktor
been the losers, people had only had bad experiences with Orbán’s government can be democratically voted out at the
oversized integration projects and saw themselves as a mere elections in 2018.
marketplace for Western goods and as a reservoir of cheap
We know from Winston Churchill that democracy is not
labour. This has barely changed to this day.
the best form of rule, but the best to have been devised thus
For 150 years, Hungary was part of the Ottoman Empire, far. But democracy has many manifestations – one need only
the Habsburg ruled over it for 400 years, and the Soviets for think of the different systems of government in the USA,
45. The only constant has been the nation state. In historical France, Germany or Switzerland. It would be foolish to take
perspective, the twelve years of EU membership since 2004 any of these as a compulsory model for all other countries.
In his speech at the summer academy in Băile Tuşnad/Tusnádfürdő (Transylvania, Romania) in July 2014, Viktor Orbán
spoke of the necessity of transforming Hungary into an illiberal state. This necessity, he said, resulted from the obvious
long-term crisis of liberal democracy (of the “West), which
was becoming clear in the transformed global geopolitical situation, the persistent leadership crisis besetting the EU and
in particular the stagnation of the Eurozone.
Is Hungary, a member of the supranational organisations
of liberal democracies, on the road to becoming an illiberal
state? This is a completely new phenomenon and hence this
experiment is being followed closely in both the East and
the West. In the final years of communism, Hungary was
considered (along with Poland) to be the experimental site
for reforms that played a significant role in the collapse of the
Eastern Bloc. It remains to be seen whether the most recent
Hungarian (and Polish) experiment will be imitated or prove
to lead to a dead end; in the following I seek to provide a
sketch of some of the key features of this illiberal model that
might serve as the basis for future discussion.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
are won in this centre (by the votes of moderate swing voters); hence the governing party attempts to keep its political
rivals away from this centre. It is not least for this reason that
an economic redistribution is taking place in favour of the
opinion-leading (upper) middle class.
Prior to 2010, the Socialists (MSZP) and the Liberals
(SZDSZ) were able to appeal to this political centre, but the
disappointing results of their time in government (austerity
measures between 2002 and 2010 and their dogmatic adherence to a neoliberal economic policy) and continuity in their
party leadership pushed these parties to the margins of the
left-wing. Also, since 2010 these parties have splintered into
many small and medium-sized parties fighting for the same
voters (ca. 15–20 % in surveys).
To the right of Fidesz stands the right-wing extremist party
Jobbik (ca. 10–15 % in surveys), which has become less militant and less anti-Semitic in reason years but still appeals to
more or less the same voters as Fidesz. Jobbik differentiates
itself from the governing party by stressing that it is not corrupt, but today Fidesz has a meta-issue, like it had with the
reduction of overheads during the last elections in 2014: the
refugee question, which is far better suited than the issue of
Walking hand in hand: the goal of Polish premier Beata Szydło and
Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán is to strengthen the power of the executive
corruption to appealing to and retaining voters far beyond the
in their respective countries.
boundaries
of its own party base ahead of the next elections
Foto: Chancellery of the Prime Minister of Poland
in 2018. Moreover, the two margins of the party spectrum are
not capable of forming a coalition, highlighting the governing
For a long time during the nineteenth and the early twen- party’s strategy of divide and rule.
In a mass democracy, politicians and parties “must” be
tieth century, Hungary itself imitated the British model of
parliamentarianism, before opting for the German chancellor populist (“governing by opinion polls”) in order to gain
model in 1990. But the new basic law passed by Fidesz in majorities, and hence populism cannot be considered a spe2011 swings back towards parliamentarianism, which many cific feature of this model of an “illiberal state”.
see evidenced by the removal of the constructive motion of
no confidence. A system of government can be defined as an Prospects
“illiberal state” if it devises liberal (democratic) structures The CEE states are in a reciprocal relationship with one
in such a way that the executive gains in power over other another. This is particularly true of Hungary and Poland,
authorities, whereby care is taken not to break (constitu- both renowned as pioneers of reforms in their respective
tional) and international laws and treaties while expanding integration systems. Today these states are attempting to
the executive’s room for manoeuvre through targeted (and prepare their nation states for the twenty-first century in a
cardinal) domestic law-making and balancing “hard” polit- “New Medieval” period and the age of globalisation. They
ical and economic borders abroad. A political weapon to this are carrying on where the British left off after their exit. The
end is the permanent and manifest mobilisation of voters United Kingdom wants to leave the EU in order to increase
using symbolic conflicts and issues (such as the “struggle its state’s economic liberalism and political sovereignty.
As a less economically developed country, Hungary is
for liberation from Brussels”) in order to consolidate political power. The political mandate obtained in this fashion is striving to modernise via greater political sovereignty withintended to tame the unleashed economic forces (as advocat- in the EU and a reduction of neoliberal economic policies
ed by Franklin D. Roosevelt or John Maynard Keynes after domestically. The “illiberal state” was invented as a politithe Great Depression) and put them at the service of “forced cal vehicle to this end, with the intention of modernising the
modernisation”.
country in the interests of national conservative (not liberal,
Political power – for instance in the form of special taxes libertarian transnational) elites.
So far, the illiberal system has worked rather well for the
and restructuring of the market – is also used for (economic) strengthening and primitive accumulation of capital by governing party, since a divided opposition has not posed
national big business. In individual strategic spheres such as any real threat. Nor is there external pressure on Hungabanking, the media, energy and trade, uniform national (but ry to transform itself that cannot be absorbed by political
not necessarily state) property is strived for in order to keep means. Viktor Orbán’s government must rather demonstrate
as much of the added value created by these spheres inside the economic capacity of its system before the parliamentary
the country. (Foreign) manufacturing companies and direct elections of 2018. Should Donald Trump become the next
investors on the other hand are supported in the interests of American president, our examples of illiberal democracy will
a “patriotic” economic policy and reindustrialisation rather most likely have to be expanded to include the USA.
than hindered.
The central political force field
Since 2010, Fidesz has established a multi-party system with
a dominant people’s party (30–35 % in surveys) and a divided
opposition, whereby the moderate right (Fidesz) occupies the
political centre. Experience shows that elections in Hungary
Zoltán Kiszelly is a political scientist at the János
Kodolányi University of Applied Sciences and a
political advisor in Budapest. He studied at the
ELTE University in Budapest and was a fellow of
the DAAD and the German Bundestag.
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Senada Šelo Šabić
Croatia’s Experience
with Liberal Democracy
In Croatia the political elite suppressed controversial debates in the lead up to the country’s
accession to the EU so as not to endanger the process. This is now coming back to haunt them, since
the lack of profound societal and political change is becoming obvious. The marriage referendum
of 2013 thus demonstrates not only conservative attitudes in large parts of society, but also voters’
frustration with the political elite. – N. Z.
The referendum on amending the Croatian constitution with a it formally fulfilled EU requirements for membership that
definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman espouse liberalism, in essence the nature of society changed
took place on 1 December 2013, exactly five months after the little.
country joined the European Union. Roughly 38 % of the total
It is all too easy to dismiss Croatian people as backward,
electorate took to the polls, with 66 % voting in favour and 34 % nationalist, anti-democratic, etc. But they have been the same
against. As a consequence, the Croatian constitution has been all along, the difference is that the modus operandi of politics
amended to refer to marriage as a heterosexual contract (see changed. The framework of the public debate was determined
RGOW 8/2016, 23–25).
by the priority of the EU accession, which also meant that the
The referendum has been taken as a sign of the derogation of content of the debate was filtered. 3 In order to steer the course
minority rights in the country and a U-turn in the process of of accession to the EU, Croatian politicians obscured and surthe consolidation of liberal democracy and European values.1 passed any serious debate in society on serious issues reflecting
Critics of the referendum, liberal civil society, vocally protested the conditions of an EU candidate post-war transition country.
with a whole list of arguments: there was no objective need to Ethnic relations, reconciliation, the position of Church in sociseek another precise definition of marriage as a union between ety, relations with neighbours – these and other similar topics
two opposite sexes – because an existing law already regulated were downplayed for the sake of not compromising Croatia’s
this matter; the referendum was costly – 47 million HRK could accession progress.
have been spent, for example, on childcare centres or schools;
Undoubtedly, there was domestic consensus that Croatia’s
it violated adopted values of full equality for all minorities, future lies in the EU (and NATO). Yet, this support was not
including sexual minorities. The European Union could only universal and some conditions were more difficult to meet than
express its concern to a member state. A mechanism of moni- others. Highly sensitive issues related to the legacy of the war
toring a candidate’s alignment with liberal democratic values in the 1990s, regional cooperation, minority protection were
controversial for many in society but not publicly discussed.
was lifted upon Croatia’s entry into the EU.
Croatian politicians feared that allowing in the public space
discussion which would reveal the conservative nature of the
Neglected conservative civil society
To many who have followed the Croatian accession process, society would put brakes on the accession process. They had
the quick change of public sentiment came as an unwelcome little trust in citizens and, in return, citizens demonstrated little
surprise. After all, wasn’t Croatia the country that had to go trust in their politicians.
To shift focus from thorny issues (and propel enthusiasm)
through an eight-year, most demanding accession process which
included inventions like opening and closing benchmarks, a successive governments advocated EU membership on two
series of checks to ensure that laws are not just adopted but main arguments – the return to the European family of nations
actually implemented? Wasn’t Croatia the country for which a and prospect of wealth. Identity and economy were engines of
completely new chapter, number 23, was introduced, designed accession. The notion of re-joining the core Europe rested on
especially to tackle issues of justice and fundamental rights? notions of romantic longing, respect for enlightenment, hope
After all, if Croatia, with relatively developed institutions and of progression and on a sense of historical justice for it was
an ethnically homogenous society did not make it, what can be Croats who bled at the European borders, defending Europe
expected from less developed Western Balkan countries with from Ottomans and other intruders. An image of Antemurale
unfinished state building processes, weak institutions and Christianitatis became vivid again. The promise of better life
rested on the promise that Croatia’s economy would grow once
greater ethnic diversity?
The example of Croatia adds to the already growing list of it joined the exclusive, the richest and the most developed marcases of unravelling democracy across Europe. 2 Entrenching ket in the world.
and sustaining democracy remains a challenge for democratic
Yet, this vision, in reality, was based on two main beliefs –
veterans, much more for fresh starters. However, this obser- as a member of the EU Croatia would no longer be Balkan
vation rests on an assumption that Croatia is regressing from and as a member it would have accession to EU funds. There
a level of relatively high democratic standards and is compro- has been very little, almost no discussion about what Croatia
mising already embraced liberal values. Yet, this assumption would contribute to the EU, what dowry it brings into the marmay be flawed. It is more likely that Croatia never achieved the riage? The realization of these goals, however, proved difficult.
status of a country with entrenched liberal norms. Although EU demanded cooperation with neighbours and Croatia very
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Croatia’s accession to the EU was advocated with two key arguments:
a return to the European family of nations and the prospect of prosperity.
Photo: Keystone
reluctantly agreed to this formal necessity. Implementation of
critical structural reforms was delayed in hope that once in,
Croatia would use EU funds to finance its development and
thus mitigate effects of eventual reforms.
The third referendum in Croatian history
The referendum on marriage was the third in the Croatian history. The first was on independence 1991 and the second was
on joining the EU in 2012. There is some irony to sequence.
Fearing a low turnout at the EU accession referendum, the government changed the existing regulations4 so that a majority of
voters who turn up at the poll would decide on the outcome of
a referendum.
Referendum had polarizing effect on the society. The Catholic Church, as a bastion of traditional values, supported and
assisted mobilization of conservative forces. Yet, the debate
did not oscillate only between conservative-liberal world
views. Many expressed a notion that now, finally, citizens
had a chance to express their opinion on an issue that bothers
them. Not everybody who joined the debate on referendum
was interested in the question at stake – if a homosexual union
can also be called marriage – but they supported referendum
on grounds that political elites, who systematically silenced
all uncomfortable voices for the sake of higher goal of EU
accession, by their own miscalculation (changing the referendum rules) eased conditions for the use of direct democracy
instrument. It could be costly, but its worth is beyond doubt
concluded one author5).
The error of liberal and pro-EU elites was that they were
basically passive. They relied on the authority of Brussels and
the pull factor of promised prosperity to trade for hardship the
society had to undergo before it would enter the promised land
of membership. This was unreal and the backlash was imminent.
Instead of initiating debate on all aspects of the accession and
the responsibility of future membership, pro-accession elites
repeated the same phrases of pending benefits, circumventing
painful reforms for the sake of popularity.
Vox populi
Disagreement and polarization in the society over identity issues is sharp. However, moralizing arguments or panic
reaction on the part of liberal intellectuals on the derogation
of democratic values in the society may not be constructive,
even just. In Kulenović’s 6 interpretation of Rawls, the value
of liberal democracy lies exactly in its capacity to allow for
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
safe expression of different opinions and maintenance of public
space made up of chaotic, perhaps uneasy reality of contested
world views.
Perhaps we are making our conclusions too soon. This is
not to say that it is acceptable to circumscribe any minority
rights in a society. But instead of trying to prove the other side
wrong, perhaps a more useful approach would be to focus on
new solutions. Instead of flirting with populism, genuine liberal democratic politicians would do better to offer progressive
ideas and new social contract based on principles and values
they stand for. In the case of Croatia, the collapse of a government after its eight months in office were spent on pushing a
conservative agenda opens a possibility for change. September
2016 may reproduce a stalemate 7), but a path of entrenching
liberal democracy never promised to be straight and fast; the
long-term goals require today’s investment. Those 34 % who
in the referendum on marriage voted against the definition of
marriage as solely a union between a female and a male human
being are a (relatively large) pool of citizens a committed liberal
democratic politician can start from.
Notes
1) Veselica, Lajla: Croatia Votes on Anti-Gay Marriage Referendum. In: The Huffington Post, 1 December 2013,http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/01/croatia-gay-marriage-referendum-_n_4366465.html; Croatians vote against
gay marriage. 5 December 2013,http://www.economist.
com/blogs/easternapproaches/2013/12/croatia.
2) Kauffmann, Sylvie: Europe’s Iliberal Democracies. In:
The New York Times, 9 March 2016,http://www.nytimes.
com/2016/03/10/opinion/europes-illiberal-democracies.
html?_r=0; Horvat, Srećko: Croatia’s vote forbidding gay
marriage: a sign of the rotten heart of Europe. In: The
Guardian, 4 December 2013, https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2013/dec/04/croatia-gay-marriage-vote-europe-rotten-heart.
3) Dejan Jović, a professor of political science at the University of Zagreb, spoke early about officially compelled public
silence on sensitive political issues in Croatia.
4) Earlier regulation stipulated that the referendum outcome
would be decided by 50 % +1 votes out of total eligible voters.
5) Šikić, Roko: About referendum which apparently costs 47
milion kunas (in Croatian). In: Politika Plus, 2013, http://
www.politikaplus.com/mobile/novost/90617/Roko-Sikic-O-referendumu-koji-navodno-kosta-47-milijuna-kuna.
6) Kulenović, Enes: Brak i Kulturkampf. In: Političke analize
16, December 2013, 14–18.
7) Raos, Višeslav: The Curious Case of Croatia. In: Green
European Journal, 26 August 2016, http://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/the-curious-case-of-croatia/.
Senada Šelo Šabić works as a scientific associate
in the Institute for Development and International Relations in Zagreb. Her research interests
include Croatian foreign policy, Southeast Europe,
EU enlargement, development cooperation and
migration. She holds a Ph. D. in political science
from the European University Institute in Florence
(2003) and has earned two Masters degrees – in
international relations from the University of
Zagreb (1999) and in peace studies from the University of Notre Dame, USA (1996). Senada Šelo
Šabić is editor-in-chief of the Croatian International Relations Review and is a teacher at the
University of Zagreb.
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Jasmin Mujanović
Fractured Authoritarianism
in Bosnia-Herzegovina
The Dayton Peace Agreement of early 1996 introduced a successful process of state-building to
Bosnia-Herzegovina which has come to a standstill during the last decade however. Necessary
reforms to the constitution and the political system are foiled by a corrupt political elite and
an ethnic quota system created by the Dayton Peace Agreement itself. At the same time, social
dissatisfaction is on the rise. – R. Z.
Between 1996 and 2006, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was
the poster child for successful post-war political and economic
reconstruction. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA)
had administratively fractured the country, with the support of the U. S. and EU, BiH took dramatic strides towards
definitive Euro-Atlantic integration: the adoption of a single
monetary regime; the creation of a unified armed forces and
special police force; and the overall normalization of relations between the country’s once warring communities. BiH
appeared definitively on the path, as many remarked, “from
Dayton to Brussels.”1
But in the decade since, the wheels have fallen off the Bosnian state-building project. Repeated EU and NATO brokered
agreements and deadlines have fallen by the wayside, decisions
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) remain
unimplemented, while the country’s leaders consistently flirt
with the rhetoric of renewed conflict – amid growing social
discontent that spectacularly came to the fore in 2014 (see
RGOW 4–5/2015, 29–33; RGOW 7/2014, 18–20). And even the
recent EU candidacy application has already stalled, with crucial measures “adopted” repeatedly but never implemented. 2
What has happened in BiH since 2006 to have so dramatically
altered the country’s development, and what does it mean for
the international community’s policy in the country in turn?
Bosnia, in theory
The complicated constitutional arrangements incorporated
into the DPA by the international community in the winter of 1995 were intended to balance the competing claims of
each of the warring factions in the Bosnian War (1992–1995).
Accordingly, the DPA and subsequent rounds of arbitration
established a state with one nominally “central government” –
albeit with three presidents, two chambers of parliament, and
one council of ministers – two entities, one special district, and
ten cantons. Each of these units and sub-units was designed as
an autonomous ethnic enclave, with only a handful of examples of multi-ethnic units in a country where this had once
been the norm.
This complex arrangement was for a country with a population of less than four million people – and half the size
of Iceland. Subsequent moves by the international community, however especially the establishment of the Office of the
High Representative (OHR) – made clear that the DPA was
intended to be the beginning, not the conclusion of the peace
and democratization process in BiH.
With the involvement of the international community, and
chiefly the strong backing of the U. S. and Germany, BiH made
remarkably rapid progress within the first post-war decade.
Arguably, the high-water mark of this period was the string of
attempted constitutional amendments between 2005 and 2009.
Of these, the so-called “April Package” (2005–2006) was the
most significant, as it came within two votes of adoption in
the BiH parliamentary assembly. 3
But owing to both the shifting geopolitical priorities in
Washington and Brussels, and popular but disingenuous critiques of the U. S. and EU’s involvement in the country as
“colonial” (by vocal minorities within the international policy community) 4 Western backing for this progress dissipated.
The logic going forward was a combination of the belief that
BiH had come far enough in the previous ten years that reversals of its political and economic transformation were virtually
impossible, and that the country’s future progress needed to
be the product of “local ownership” and will.
While conveniently optimistic, this logic was founded on
a gross mischaracterization of the past decade’s events, and
the nature of the BiH political establishment and system as
a whole.
Bosnia, in practice
Consider the following: since 1996, despite two decades of
direct international involvement and state building efforts,
BiH has been consistently rated as an only “partly free” state
by the global monitoring organization Freedom House. By
comparison, in 2009 Tunisia was rated as “not free”, yet by
2016 the country was “free” only five years after the toppling
of the Ben Ali regime in Tunis that had ruled the country
since 1987. 5
The question arises then as to what has prevented the
genuine democratic transformation of BiH. In a sense, the
dirty little secret of the contemporary Western Balkans is that
while the old state dissolved, the old regime never did. In this
respect, one does not need to distinguish much between the
late Yugoslav communist establishment and the subsequent
nationalist cliques, as in most cases the former simply mutated
into the latter. In their most recent evolution, the remnants of
both have become “Europeanists” of various sorts and degrees.
Even the most vocal nationalists today, like the president of
BiH’s Republika Srpska entity (RS) Milorad Dodik, speak of
their desire to join the EU.
But this supposed desire for EU (and, in most cases,
NATO) membership has not been accompanied by a genuine
embrace of the core liberal-democratic values and norms that
are the foundation of the entire Euro-Atlantic political and
security architecture. Moreover, in contrast to countries like
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Tunisia, where the adoption of democratic practices and norms
was necessarily preceded by a popular revolution, as it was in
most of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, such civic
insurrections have yet to occur in BiH, or indeed in most of
the Western Balkans.
Instead, despite the supposedly grand ideological transformations of the region’s elites, the nature of their rule has
changed little. Notwithstanding the adoption of technically
“free and fair” elections, contemporary BiH is best thought
of as a fragmented authoritarian state, wherein the respective entity, cantonal, and even municipal boundaries serve to
delineate the various pockets of control by one of the country’s
leading six (or occasionally seven) parties. 6 And each of these
parties controls each of these pockets, in turn, as their own
private fiefdom.
The DPA’s byzantine ethnic quota system ensures that
democratic accountability is so difficult to achieve as to be
all but impossible. The HDZ BiH, for example, has blocked
government operations on both the state and FBiH level with
only 7 % of the vote, as in the period between 2010 and 2014.
Indeed, so rigid are the provisions for ethnic quotas and vetoes
in the current constitution that non-ethnic parties are either
prevented from governing (despite winning as much as a quarter of the popular vote) or forced to migrate to the nationalist
“center”.
Moreover, the country’s so-called “asymmetric federalism” means that political reforms in one canton or entity
often have little if any bearing on their neighbours. As such,
the state of civil liberties, media freedoms, and the general
political climate for democratic dissent and opposition, for
instance, is dramatically worse in the RS than it is in the FBiH.
While Goražde, the seat of the tiny Bosnian-Podrinje canton, is often cited as the country’s leading economic success
story, Mostar, the seat of Herzegovina-Neretva canton, and
the fourth largest city in the country, has failed to organize
municipal elections since a 2004 OHR decision created a unified city statute.
All of this has led the political scientist Asim Mujkić to
argue that under the provisions of the Dayton constitution
“[under] the cover of the legitimacy conferred by free and fair
elections, citizens as individuals are stripped of any political
power.”7 Given than we are now half a decade removed from
the (still unimplemented) Sejdić-Finci decision by the ECHR
that found the Dayton constitution patently discriminatory
in the manner in which it reserved power exclusively for ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, it is difficult to argue with
Mujkić’s assessment. In his words, BiH is not a polis; instead
it is an “ethnopolis.”
But even this characterization is somewhat beside the mark.
After all, as the ideological mutations of BiH’s elites indicate,
their commitments to nationalism are no more genuine than
their one time commitments to Marxism, or their purported
desire for EU membership. The Sejdić-Finci decision is only
one of a host of unimplemented international and local judicial
decisions. Even the rulings of BiH’s own Constitutional Court
are routinely flouted, and not merely by the Dodik government in Banja Luka, but also by the SDA and HDZ BiH. In
truth, BiH’s political establishment so brazenly and routinely
ignores and defies the country’s laws and constitution as to
have placed the whole polity in a permanent “state of exception.”8 Corruption, cronyism, and criminality are the norm,
whereas lawful implementation and behaviour are the exception. And while conditions differ, sometimes from town to
town, on the whole the country’s politics cannot be described
as democratic in any meaningful sense of the term.
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Constituting democracy
All of this is to say that as a peace accord, the DPA has held
up remarkably well. Unfortunately, as a foundation for BiH’s
democratic development it has failed, merely preserving a
peculiar, internally fractured authoritarian regime.
Contrary to the apparent consensus within the policy community, there is little chance that the impetus for reform will
come from within this regime. Instead, as in other authoritarian states, change will have to come from the outside in, and
from the bottom up.
That revolutionary impulses exist in BiH was proven by
the events of February and March 2014.9 That similar episodes of social insurrection will occur again is inevitable, given
the country’s catastrophic political and economic climate. It
remains only to work out the manner in which these pressures can be definitively released, and harnessed. The former
can only be a local enterprise, while the latter will necessarily
involve the engagement of the international community as has
been the case in Tunisia.
The sooner policymakers in Brussels and Washington realize this, and begin to prepare for the coming upheaval, the
sooner we can dispel our illusions about BiH as it actually
exists, and prepare for how the country might yet be.
Notes
1) Hays, Don; Crosby, Jason: From Dayton to Brussels: Constitutional Preparations for Bosnia’s EU Accession. In:
United States Institute of Peace Special Report, October
2006: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SRoct06_2.
pdf.
2) Mujanović, Jasmin: Bosnia-Herzegovina’s EU Candidacy:
Symbolic or Substantive? In: European Council on Foreign
Relations, February 23, 2016: http://www.ecfr.eu/article/
commentary_bosnia_herzegovinas_eu_candidacy_symbolic_or_substantive_6011.
3) Perry, Valery: Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Does the Road to Confederation go through the
EU? In: International Peacekeeping 22, 5 (2015), 490–510.
4) Knaus, Gerald; Martin, Felix: Lessons from Bosnia and
Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj. In: Journal of
Democracy 14, 3 (2003), 60–74 (pp. 61–63).
5) Puddington, Arch; Roylance, Tyler: Freedom in the
World 2016 – Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies:
Global Freedom Under Pressure. In: Freedom House:
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016.
6) These being the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ BiH), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and
the Alliance for a Better Future (SBB).
7) Mujkić, Asim: We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis. In: Constellations 14 (2007), 112–128 (p. 113).
8) Agamben, Giorgio: State of Exception, Chicago and London 2005.
9) Arsenijević, Damir (ed.): Unbribable Bosnia and Herzegovina: The Fight for the Commons. Baden-Baden 2014.
Jasmin Mujanović, PhD, political scientist and policy analyst, whose research focuses on contemporary southeastern European affairs and the
politics of post-authoritarian and post-conflict
democratization more broadly, http://www.jasminmujanovic.com.
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Jovana Marović
The Thin Line Between the Party
and the State in Montenegro
In Montenegro, the governing party, the DPS, has been able to remain in power for two and
a half decades. This permanent rule has led to the close entwinement of party and state on
all administrative levels; the party uses state resources to mobilize voters, turns a blind eye
to corrupt local authorities and protects officials from being held accountable. Yet electoral
support for the DPS remains high. – N. Z.
Montenegro is the only Western Balkan country that has not
experienced a democratic change of government, changed by
elections. Continuity of the same ruling elite, which has been
untouchable for more than a quarter of a century, has affected the
line separating the leading Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS)
from the public administration. In such circumstances, the abuse
of power, use of public resources for party purposes and excessive employment within the public administration are common.
Although the legislation is constantly improving, in practice,
under the influence of political leadership, norms and standards
are adapted and interpreted differently while accountability (for
misdemeanours, both criminal and political) is lacking.
The decades of state control by the DPS have caused a lack
of democracy in at least three respects:1 adopted standards and
norms2 do not achieve the desired achievements and progress in
practice, as they are not implemented consistently; free expression of one’s will at elections is questionable due to the fact
that all the previous elections have been followed by scandals,
irregularities and misuse of state resources for party purposes;
institutions and procedures, although reformed, still function
in a frozen political context and remain under strong political
influence, not functioning according to the standards required
by contemporary advanced democracies.
There are many examples of such abuses but three are particularly illustrative and have gained the greatest attention both
at home and abroad.
persons involved has been deemed politically accountable. The
prosecution failed to react promptly and ex officio. Under the
European Commission’s pressure and demand for measurable
results, the State Prosecutor’s office started an investigation but
did not consider anything about the above-mentioned activities
to constitute an offense and concluded that there were no legal
grounds for pursuing criminal charges. However, as a method
of political action, numerous offenses were indeed committed
in this affair: violation of equality and especially equality in
employment, abuse of official positions and power.
The DPS is using the state structure and the public administration for the purpose of obtaining voters. Hence, the state is the
main employer and the public administration is cumbersome, 3
with a large number of redundant employees, while at the same
time the unemployment rate in the country is high at 17.32 %. 4
This is the main reason why the public administration reform is
not taking place as envisaged. The document on the internal reorganization and rationalization of the public sector prepared three
years ago has remained “dead”, since the number of employees
was not reduced. Data shows that in the period from 2013 to 2015
the number of employees at the local level even increased. Last
year the Ministry of Finance classified a confidential document
on the state of local finances, which also contains information
on the number of employees at local level. In Montenegro, therefore, information on the number of employees is protected and
is not public.
The Audio Recordings Affair
Budva: Metropolis of Montenegrin Tourism
Although the government of Montenegro is elected by dem- Budva municipality is an example of a failure to uphold regulaocratic procedure, no election has been held without doubts tions, corruption and illegal construction damaging the municconcerning its regularity and abuse of state resources for party ipal budget and property. Although the matter was long the
purposes. Concrete evidence of such manipulations is provided
by the “audio recordings affair” that was documented by the
European Commission’s progress report and the GRECO’s
(Group of states against corruption) annual assessment, but had
no proper epilogue.
Transcripts of leaked audiotapes from the meeting of the leading Democratic Party of Socialist’s Council were published by
the independent daily newspaper DAN in 2012 and made clear
to the public some of the electoral manipulations. The transcripts
suggest the strategy of “buying” voters with a variety of benefits, but primarily with jobs in the public administration. The
transcripts also revealed alleged efforts by the party leaders to
mobilize voters in the state-owned enterprises and public bodies
to vote for the DPS, even criticizing the leniency of certain directors towards opposition. Parliamentary inquiry was initiated but View of Budva on the Adriatic coast, the site of several corruption scandals
only resulted in the adoption of a technical report. None of the in recent years.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons / Bratislav Tabaš
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Longstanding head of the government Milo Đukanović at a meeting of
NATO foreign ministers in Brussels on the occasion of Montengro’s joining
the defence alliance on 19 May 2016.
Photo: U. S. Department of State
topic of speculation, the prosecution first took action in 2011.
This coincided with the call from the European Commission to
demonstrate measurable results in combating corruption in order
to start negotiations for full membership of the EU. However,
while the construction of certain facilities was presented from
the very outset as abuse of office, four years later and shortly
after taking office, the Special State Prosecutor classified it as the
action of an organized criminal group which had used the municipality for personal gain. He continued on-going trials and filed
several criminal charges against several persons including two
former mayors, secretaries of the Secretariat, and other employees in the local administration and public enterprises, the total
number of crimes and cases running to over 30. In two cases
(TQ Plaza and Jaz beach), the damage is estimated to be over €10
million. The Special Prosecutor identified the former DPS vice
president and political director of the ruling party as the head
of the criminal group, although he did not hold any positions in
Budva. The prosecution accepted plea bargains from most of the
defendants but such practices have opened up new controversy
on whether certain fines and prison sentences are sufficient in
relation to the harm it has caused the budget.
Budva is an illustrative case study which reflects well the longterm violation of the laws and procedures and abuse of power. All
the crimes in Budva took place in the context of silent approval
on the part of the DPS for a number of years.
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Director of Public Procurement Administration, but all maintained their initial positions that there was no concrete evidence
as to whether any illegal actions had taken place and thus political responsibility could not be established. It was only after great
public pressure that the Special Public Prosecutor initiated the
investigations – in February 2016. However, the Special Public
Prosecutor’s Office has, reportedly, determined that the former
chief of police did not misuse his position and, therefore, did not
cause damage to the state budget and property. It is unknown
whether the other proceedings have been launched.
The case highlights constant and usual practices: the frequent
violations of the Public Procurement Law;6 the denial and transfer of responsibility between state authorities; the lack of impact
of the parliamentary control mechanisms.7 The State Audit Institution’s reports are not sufficient evidence for the inspection or
the State Prosecution. 8 The Special Prosecutor’s reaction was late
as usual and did not determine personal accountability.9
***
Support for the DPS is still substantial and prior to the October
elections stands at around 40 %. Opposition lists still cannot
achieve significant support, which leads us to the conclusion that
citizens believe in the “democracy forms” by the DPS. Alternatively, citizens are still deciding to vote for the DPS under
pressure or because of certain benefits. In both cases, the ruling
party has huge room for maneuver.
Notes
1) There are also other forms, such as pressures on free media
and censorship, but will not be covered by this text.
2) Primarily adopted norms of the acquis since as a candidate
country for EU membership Montenegro is obliged to fully
harmonize legislation with it.
3) Almost every third citizen of Montenegro works for a public
authority or company.
4) Montenegro Unemployment Rate 2002–2016, Trading Economics, accessed 15 September 2016, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/montenegro/unemployment-rate.
5)The Ministry of the Interior’s reaction, http://www.
gov.me/naslovna/vijesti-iz-ministarstava/156849/Utvrdiva nje-odgovornosti-za-slucaj-Limen ka-je-za konska-ali-i-moralna-obaveza-prema-gradanima.html.
6) In this case the law was broken, since there was no public
The “Limenka” Case
tender for work worth several millions.
The “Limenka” case concerns the Security Centre building in
Podgorica, which cost 15 million euros and was built without 7) The Parliament’s Oversight of the Executive in 2014, Institute Alternative, April 2015, http://media.institut-alternatiprior public tender. Under the contract agreed with the conva.org/2015/09/ia_the-parliaments-oversight-of-the-execustruction company, the police were committed to transfer part of
tive-in-2014.pdf
the land as compensation for work performed. Such a provision
was disputed by the Supreme State Prosecutor’s Office on the 8) Audit finding: Evidence and Indication”, Institute Alternative,
April 2016, http://media.institut-alternativa.org/2016/05/
grounds that state property couldn’t be used for compensation.
ia-cooperation-bet ween-the-sai-and-prosecutors-ofThe land was sold later on through public competition to the
fice-in-montenegro.pdf.
Montenegrin prime minister’s brother for 3 million euros. However, the police administration has failed to fulfill contractual 9) Even though it is clear that the budget has been damaged by
the police’s failure to fulfill the contractual obligations.
obligations and didn’t move officers out of the building until
2010. Djukanovic sued the state in 2012 and won. Under the
High Court’s decision, confirmed by the Supreme Court, the
state is required to pay 10.5 million euros from the budget and
Jovana Marović, PhD, has been an Associate Felthe taxpayers’ money. The reactions of the state authorities that
low at Institute Alternative, a Podgorica-based
followed were not well coordinated and were frivolous. The Minthink tank, since 2010. Since March 2012 she has
istry of Finance declared its insistence on determining responbeen a member of the working group for Chapter
sibility. Via an official statement, the Ministry of the Interior
23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights, in prepa“encouraged” the authorities to do the same. 5 The parliamentary
ration for Montenegro’s EU accession. Jovana is
also a member of the Balkans in Europe Policy
anti-corruption committee conducted a control hearing of the
Advisory Group (BiEPAG).
Minister of the Interior, the Supreme State Prosecutor and the
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Marko Vujačić
Serbia: The State Besieged,
Society in Distress
While Serbia has a multi-party system, in reality it is dominated by one party. The parties do not
offer political programs and plunder state resources, thereby creating clientelistic networks. In 2016
many citizens protested in Belgrade against alleged illegal practices on the part of the municipal
authorities. This engagement by civil society gives cause for hope, but how the protest movement
will pan out is uncertain. – N .Z.
In the last decade of the 20th century, political Europe experienced a triumph of representative democracy. It was widely
seen as a regime preferable to all other known forms of governance, “the end of history” as Francis Fukuyama argued
in 1989, claiming that the Western type of liberal democracy
had proved throughout history to be a “fundamentally better system (ethically, politically, economically) than any of
the alternatives”.1 In this decade, the EU finalized its single
market, the borders fell between its member states, the newborn European citizen was able to travel and cross borders
unchecked, to trade, seek employment, provide services and
invest throughout the EU, and the Euro was launched by the
end of the century. The promise of a life of democracy and
prosperity was also offered to all Europeans, including those
who had lived behind the Iron Curtain for many decades,
provided that their countries fulfill a fairly demanding and
comprehensive set of criteria related to democracy, the rule
of law and economic relations, and thus qualify for full EU
membership.
Theories of democratic transition and consolidation flooded academia. For example, the famous Linz and Stepan structural theorem outlines five arenas of consolidated democracy.2
In essence, the argument goes, a consolidated democracy exists
in a functioning state in which the following five arenas are
in interplay: (1) free and fair elections with political parties
competing for representation of public interest; (2) economic relations that secure fair distribution of public goods and
market allocation of resources with accompanying rules and
regulations; (3) rule of law and the hierarchy of norms providing guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms, legal
certainty through the predictability of norms, and fair and
efficient administration of justice; (4) a rational and accountable bureaucracy that administers and implements laws and
regulations; and (5) autonomous civil society which provides
ideas and inputs demands concerning political society, thus
covering the middle level of politics and ensuring societal
cohesion.
Although a multiparty system was introduced in 1990, in
the wake of revolutionary changes in Central and Eastern
Europe, Serbia was a latecomer to the process of democratic
transition. It was not until 2000 that Serbia got rid of Slobodan
Milošević caesarist regime and embarked on a journey towards
democracy and the promised European future. Sixteen years
on, in my opinion, Serbia’s democracy is far from consolidated
and EU membership is nowhere in sight. In fact, I will argue
in this article that Serbia is presently experiencing a major
setback in its democratic development. In order to do so, I
will in part utilize the Linz/Stepan consolidated democracy
theorem outlined above as a theoretical toolkit for crafting
my argument.
Parties without programs
For most of the 26 years since the reintroduction of the multiparty system, the Serbian electorate has repeatedly returned
to a “winner takes all” party model whereby one party dominates the political scene and occupies all the most important public offices and sinecures. This was the case with the
Socialist Party of Serbia (1990–2001), the Democratic Party
(2007–2012), and the Serbian Progressive Party (from 2012
onward). The dominant party often keeps smaller parties tied
to it, providing an impression of a coalition government, when
in fact these smaller parties remain insignificant, as most of
them would not be able to independently pass the electoral
threshold. At the same time, the dominant political parties are
tightly controlled at all times by a strong leader who is the face
of the party and the regime.
This situation breaks one of the basic trade-offs in democracy: that political parties constitutionally enjoy privileges in
exchange for serving public interest. Political parties in Serbia
do not perform even their basic functions: (a) notwithstanding
a few exceptions, they virtually have no social base or a particular group they consistently represent, e. g. workers, farmers,
entrepreneurs, etc. The names of political parties (socialist,
democrat, liberal) or the ideological divisions remain largely
irrelevant, as all combinations of post or pre-electoral coalitions are possible. For example, today the parliamentary
majority is composed of conservatives and social democrats,
one self-proclaimed revolutionary socialist leftist party and
one right-wing populist party, two national minority parties,
and both monarchist and republican parties, as well as proEU and pro-Russian parties. Instead of having one governing
party that has obtained an overwhelming majority of seats
and could legitimately govern on its own, Serbia has a chimera
of a quasi-coalition government; (b) the function of political
parties in democracies where they offer competing policies
and programs as their main product is almost absent. Even if
the parties form some programs and policies in the election
cycle, they never look back at it after the elections; (c) parties do not come to power by competitive elections. Nor do
elections determine who will be in power and who will form
the opposition. Firstly, small and insignificant parties form
pre-election coalitions with bigger ones, thus surviving by
entering the parliament. Secondly, the election process itself is
deeply corrupt. In order to obtain votes, parties literally offer
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Rule of law and civil society
Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party currently
dominate the political scene in Serbia. Photo: Wikimedia Commons
material goods in exchange, thus buying off entire groups of
citizens, mainly those who live in poorer city quarters and
districts, e. g. the Roma population, who often live in areas
with extremely harsh conditions. 3 In sum, elections are barely
competitive. The dominant party almost exclusively controls
and utilizes public resources for its electoral gains. One of
the key achievements of post-Milošević Serbia, the relatively
free and fair election process, with political parties competing for representation of public interest, has been severely
endangered.
Clientelist networks
As per the second Linz/Stepan arena on economic relations,
it is safe to say that the economy in Serbia, while undergoing a volatile recovery, does not work for most of the people,
but only for a select handful. The middle class has never fully
recovered from the international economic embargo from the
1990s, which was accompanied by the economic transformation. The economy is still dominated by the public sector, and
the state subsidizes both public and private businesses in a
non-transparent manner. 4 The beneficiaries of such a system
can primarily be found among the ranks of the party, occupying most important public sector managerial posts, e. g. in
the postal, railway, electricity, energy and transport industries.
Furthermore, hiring in these companies based on job vacancy
announcements, open calls or merit is still an exception to the
rule. The party-appointed managers rather select loyal party
members for positions on all levels: while receiving a salary,
the appointee is expected to work for the party – e. g. to be on
the campaign trail when needed, or to post comments praising the party leader on news portals. At the same time, in the
private sector struggling businesses base their productivity
on tax evasion and in large part operate at the expense of their
workers, who often work in harsh conditions. Reports of maltreatment and abuses of basic workers’ rights are widespread. 5
That is why most of the people still prefer public administration and public sector jobs, and the pathway for those is party
membership. In sum, public goods are distributed unevenly,
while the market economy is both distorted by state intervention and poorly regulated. As a result, the middle class, which
in theory should represent the backbone of any consolidated
democracy, has almost vanished.
The rule of law, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms,
legal certainty and efficient administration of justice all
remain a challenge, all stressed repeatedly in yearly EU Progress Reports for Serbia. 6 In the absence of a functioning state
in this sense, an elected government simply lacks the power
to deliver on any electoral program it may have put before the
people. Serbia is systematically incapable of ensuring that its
legislation is enforced in practice.
For example, in the election night of 24th April 2016, without any official court warrant, a squad of masked unidentified
people, allegedly a part of a private security firm, took control over a part of Belgrade’s Savamala quarter, and demolished mostly illegally constructed buildings. People caught
on the spot were tied down, their cell phones were taken away,
they were threatened not to call the police, and instructed to
look down and not in the direction of the demolition work.
Attempts to reach the police were futile, as both the city’s
communal police and the republic’s police refused to intervene,
which suggested they had been instructed in advance.
Vesna Rakić Vodinelić argues in her analysis that the demolitions were undertaken in violation of all laws, bylaws and
ordinances that regulate the matter. Citing articles 262 and
263 of the Law on General Administrative Procedure, she
claims that “even if all the demolished objects were illegally
built, no demolition should take place without a warrant for
demolition, a directive on compulsory execution of the demolition, without a notice to the owner or user of the building
to remove all belongings and people; demolishment should
not be performed under masks and at night.”7 The citizens and
civil society reacted angrily with a series of protests against
such illegal practices, demanding the resignations of the head
of the Belgrade police force, the minister of the interior and
the mayor of Belgrade. A special report on the matter was
issued by the ombudsman, outlining key facts and demanding the authorities be held accountable. 8 Only a month and
a half after the occurrence, Prime Minister Vučić hesitantly
admitted, without naming names, that the top local officials
were responsible for the demolitions. However, no criminal
proceedings against the perpetrators have been launched to
date. This example is only one of many testifying to the lack
of a functioning public administration in Serbia, law enforcement, legal certainty, and fair and efficient administration of
justice. Serbia lacks the basic capacity to enforce its laws and
administer policies throughout the territory.
Furthermore, public control or influence over the government is meaningless when the government itself lacks
sufficient capacity to implement its laws and policies. Save in
few control mechanisms of the national parliament, such as
public hearings or parliamentary committee sessions, where
citizens may be able to participate and ask questions of elected
or appointed public officials, there are not many instances in
which the public can hold public officials accountable. Access
to these mechanisms remains fairly limited, as the MPs have
the sole power to decide whether such mechanisms are to be
used and utilized. In a situation in which the dominant party
controls the national parliament, and individual MPs lack the
autonomy to act against the will of a party leader, there is
almost no possibility for the general public to utilize these
existing control mechanisms.
Civil society and citizens who wish to express dissatisfaction are left to stand alone. Domestic and international funds
for the support of civil society have been steadily shrinking
over the years. Individual citizens belonging to an army of
a vanishing middle class, disillusioned about politics and
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
political parties, and preoccupied with daily
life problems, can hardly be motivated to act. In
circumstances in which most of the media are
also controlled by the government, a series of
peaceful protests triggered by illegal demolitions
in Belgrade’s Savamala quarter, with turnouts of
more than 10,000 citizens on all four occasions,
demonstrated a surprising level of citizens’ vigilance and defiance towards the regime.
In a short space of time, Filip Ejdus argues,
the citizens’ protest has created a new space not
just for the critique of endangered democratic
achievements, but also for the articulation of
the most diverse political voices: “For the first
time since the beginning of democratic transition, a local citizens’ initiative with little money
and a lot of good ideas has managed to unify
the political imagination of many citizens of
Belgrade.”9 However, he claims, the protest is
facing a dilemma: either to continue as a citizen’s
movement which serves as a corrective for the Buildings destroyed in Belgrade’s Savamala Quarter during the night of 24–25 April 2016.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons /Mickey Mystique
government, or to actively engage in politics as a political party. In both situations the initiative
faces challenges: the awakened citizen’s energy will drift away democracy is besieged by these tendencies, and Serbian sociin the face of the protests’ lack of clear results and success; ety is deeply in distress.
on the other hand, turning the initiative into a political party
would alienate those who protest against the established polit- Notes
ical parties and who have simply lost trust in politics. Civil 1) Fukuyama, Francis: The end of history?. In The National
society, although it has demonstrated signs of life, is thus
Interest (Summer 1989), http://www.ou.edu/uschina/gries/
systemically incapable of acting autonomously and covering
articles/IntPol/Fukuyama%20End%20of%20History.pdf.
mid-level politics.
2) Linz, Juan J.; Stepan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South
America, and Postcommunist Europe. Baltimore 1996.
***
3)ht t p: //w w w.bl ic . r s/ve s t i /p ol it i k a / k r iv ic n a- pr ijava-zbog-kupovine-glasova-biraca/n3kb46t; http://www.
In this article I have utilized the Linz/Stepan structural theob92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2010&mm=04&drem on five arenas of consolidated democracy to describe the
state of democracy in Serbia. My analysis demonstrates that if
d=22&nav_id=426278; http://www.blic.rs/vesti/politione chooses to observe political process, or economic relations,
ka/nova-stranka-naprednjaci-kupuju-glasove-besplatthe rule of law or public administration, or the state of civil
nim-lekarskim-pregledima/0zhwpp7; http://www.blic.rs/
society, one will inevitably detect a process that testifies to
vesti/politika/priznali-da-su-kupovali-glasove-za-bokana/
the structural crisis and decay of representative democracy in
hme67d5.
Serbia, with a rather gloomy outlook. There is no true demo- 4) In his recent book Machine for Wasting Money (2016),
political scientist Dušan Pavlović describes in detail his
cratic representation of citizens, nor specific social categories
and groups and interests. There is no control over the govexperience as a counselor to the Minister of the Economy
during 2013/14, claiming that the system of public subsidies
ernment and no viable opposition, which means the effective
to public and private companies is deeply prone to corrupabsence of accountability. Thus, Serbia is a besieged state, a
facade of democracy in which a political clique, and the party
tion, clientelism, cronyism and the creation of a pork barrel
leadership in particular, tightly controls the entire process of
economy.
governance (via public institutions, including independent 5)http://www.kurir.rs/pelene-ili-otkaz-zaposleni-ne-smejuagencies, chambers of commerce, public companies, public
u-wc-na-poslu-clanak-942693; http://www.rtv.rs/sr_lat/
media broadcasters, etc.) and where elections and democratic
ekonomija/aktuelno/u-kakvim-uslovima-rade-zaposleinstitutions, ideologies, programs and policies are all a mere
ni-u-juri_713941.html.
formality.
6) Serbia 2015 Report: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/key_documents/2015/20151110_report_serbia.pdf,
Under President Boris Tadić’s administration (2004–2012)
pp. 11–17.
all these tendencies were already in place and Serbia was slowly sliding back towards an invisible authoritarian regime. 7)http://pescanik.net/bauk-kruzi-sava-malom-bauk-lazi/.
Today, under Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić’s administra- 8)http://www.ombudsman.rs/attachments/article/4723/
savamala.pdf.
tion (2012 onwards) the process is in full swing. This regime
is personalized; it is named after the person who holds most 9)http://pescanik.net/patkica-na-raskrsnici/.
of the power, regardless of his constitutional role). Citizens
or civil society have little or no say whatsoever. Public service is captured in the jaws of party feuds, ineffective, slow,
Marko Vujačić, PhD candidate at the Karl Franzens
unprofessional, and deeply corrupt. It runs without control or
University of Graz in the area of diversity manageaccountability, and without the incentive to work to improve
ment and governance; senior researcher at the
the situation and act against systemic corruption. Serbian
European Research Academy Belgrade (EURAK).
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Arben Hajrullahu
Kosovo between Unsolved
Problems and Ideas of Liberalism
Despite the efforts of the international community, democracy in Kosovo remains weak and
corruption and organised crime are widespread. The main obstacle on the path to greater rule of law
remains the unsolved Kosovar–Serb relations, on which the conditions of EU membership for both
countries have regrettably failed to have any impact. – N. Z.
1) Kosovo’s political elite fails to establish a relationship based
on reciprocity with Serbia;
2) Serbia is not yet fully convinced that it actually should recognize Kosovo, since none of the big powers has demanded
with any levity that recognize Kosovo as an independent and
sovereign state;
3) a part of the international community offers Serbia a kind of
preferential treatment. Following the NATO bombings in
1999, Serbia has often been considered the main belligerent
party in the wars and aggression against other former Yugoslav federal entities, but primarily as a victim of the dissolution process of the former Yugoslavia.
My argument here is that the prospect of European integration does remain key to promoting reforms and untying this
Gordian knot. All parties involved in Serb–Kosovar relations,
however, continue to be guided by short-term interests without
any clear vision on how to achieve a genuine lasting solution
in the disputes. In addition to the general perception that “EU
institutions are often unwilling to take stands against illiberal
trends”4 and that the EU is facing serious internal problems, one
key additional problem is that the EU has no common position
on Kosovo’s sovereignty and is somewhat exhausted from previous enlargements as well as from the continuing instability in
the Western Balkans in general. Some Western commentators
The crux of the problem: non-recognition
Despite the lack of progress, low scores in the democracy devel- even express the opinion that the EU deceived the democracy in
opment index and severe criticism, local and international stake- Kosovo itself. 5 Thus it is impossible to use the real prospect of
holders continue to declare Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration EU integration process as a sustainable strategy to foster more
process as the leverage for a liberal consolidated society and rule inclusive societies based on liberal values in the region.
of law. Nonetheless, the crux of the issue is in fact Kosovo’s
Kosovo and Serbia were never able to reach an agreement on
non-recognition by Serbia and five EU member states. This the status of Kosovo. On the one hand, governments in Kosovo
problem impacts not only on the Serb–Kosovar relations, but prefer to remain intransparent about the concessions made and
also has wider implications for the Euro-Atlantic perspective obligations taken against the international community and do not,
of the country and the Western Balkan region in general.3 Since as a result, really tackle the more immediate problems facing the
the unresolved issues between Serbia and Kosovo are the main country, such as high unemployment rates, a weak economy and
obstacle on the path to creating a more integrated and more liber- high levels of organized crime. On the other hand, successive goval society, a very basic question should be asked: what in fact has ernments in Serbia have sworn that Kosovo’s independence and
(not) been achieved in overcoming the lasting conflict between sovereignty will never be accepted and are simultaneously trying
Serbia and Kosovo since 1999 onwards?
to squeeze concessions for their own geo-strategic interests from
On the one hand Kosovo needs recognition by Serbia. For the Russian Federation, the EU, and the US at the very same time.
instance, without Serbia’s recognition, Russia and China are not
expected to ever accept Kosovo’s membership of the UN. On The role of the international community
the other hand, Serbia needs it too; as long as Serbia has a de Certainly, some steps have been taken towards improving
facto and de jure open dispute over the territory of Kosovo, it Serb–Kosovar relations. For example, in 2010 the UN General
can hardly be considered a functioning democratic state with a Assembly adopted Resolution 64/298 by which it welcomes the
defined territory, a condition of the EU membership to which readiness of the EU to facilitate the dialogue between Kosovo
Serbia aspires. Since both parties need more or less the same and Serbia. 6 As a result, in March 2011 the EU launched a process
thing to make their future EU membership a reality, why is this of “technical dialogue” between the parties, meaning in essence
not happening? The reasons are many. To summarize, however, between the governments of Serbia and of Kosovo, but named
the following three factors should be taken into consideration:
publicly only as dialogue between Prishtina and Belgrade.
After the fall of the communist regimes in Central,
South-Eastern and Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, the Serbian state revoked Kosovo’s autonomy and implemented a “policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of Kosovo and
creating an apartheid-like society”.1 Only military intervention
by NATO in 1999 would eventually create the conditions that
offered the perspective and hopes for a liberal inclusive society and state institutions based on the rule of law. However,
even after foreign intervention and decades after the fall of the
communist regimes, a lack of accountability and illiberal and
authoritarian tendencies remain prevalent in the Western Balkan
region. According to democracy indicators compiled by Freedom House’s Nations in Transit 2015 report, there are presently
no consolidated democratic regimes in the Western Balkans.
Serbia is ranked as a semi-consolidated democracy; Macedonia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro have worse democracy scores than they did five years ago, while Kosovo is ranked
as a semi-consolidated authoritarian regime on a similar level to
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia. This means that the country’s ruling
parties attempt to mask authoritarianism or rely on informal
power structures with limited respect for the institutions and
practices of democracy. 2
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
The bridge over the Ibar links the two parts of the ethnically divided city of
Mitrovica, the symbol of the split in Kosovar society.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
Nonetheless, the content of the agreements reached so far
appears to actually challenge and hinder efforts to create an
inclusive society, foster liberal values and achieve Kosovar statehood more generally. For example, based on the “First Agreement on principles governing the normalization of relations”,
reached on 19 April 2013, strong elements of ethnic-based segregation in Kosovo are to be legalised. Furthermore, as a result of
this agreement, Serbia’s role in Kosovo has been upgraded to that
of a co-decision party dealing with pure Kosovo domestic issues.
Meanwhile, Serbia’s government has sought to advance its
aspirations to EU membership, but has continued to not recognize Kosovo’s independence and sovereignty. Moreover, Kosovar
expectations from the EU are to facilitate and assist a comprehensive solution to a wide spectrum of issues between Serbia and
Kosovo, such as that of missing persons, the return of pension
funds to citizens of Kosovo, border demarcation, energy, transportation and so on. For all involved parties in the Serb–Kosovar
issues, however, one question remains unanswered: how can a
lasting normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia
occur in the absence of mutual recognition and the divided EU
policy on the same issue? Mutual recognition as equal partners,
states, between Kosovo and Serbia would help Kosovo and the
whole region to identify and pursue a country-centered agenda
of sustainable development, functioning market economy and
rule of law as the key elements and preconditions of functional
democratic liberal values and social cohesion and inclusion.
Kosovo and the Western Balkan region in general, however,
have to face another reality. In Kosovo, first the UNMIK administration and then EULEX, together with Kosovar institutions,
failed to guarantee effective rule of law and legal security. Despite
statements by local institutions and international organizations
operating in Kosovo that they are committed to establishing
and strengthening rule of law, high-level organized crime and
corruption remain widespread. For instance, the stated purpose
of the EULEX mission was to assist the Kosovo authorities in
further developing and strengthening an independent judiciary,
police and customs service in line with European best practices.
The reality, sadly, is that even the EULEX Mission is suspected
of involvement in corrupt practices. 7 In addition, the European
Court of Auditors finds that overall EU assistance to Kosovo has
not been effective. Furthermore, the report notes that although
aid to the judicial sector has been “helpful”, the judiciary continues to suffer from political interference, inefficiency and a
lack of transparency. 8 Thus EULEX has failed in many respects
to help Kosovo institutions create a judicial system based on
independence, accountability, efficiency and effectiveness. The
emergence of the need to create a special court outside of Kosovo for the purpose of judging alleged crimes in Kosovo in 1998
and the years after 1999 illustrates the combined failure of local
and international institutions to create a locally driven, impartial
system of justice and rule of law.
In fact, the real perspective of using the EU integration process as a tool for more inclusive societies and for overcoming
conflict between Serbia and Kosovo appears to be more of an
imaginary vision than a tangible reality. Each government in
Belgrade before and after 1999 states that the recognition of an
independent and sovereign state of Kosovo will not happen. This
results, on the one hand, in the mobilization of ethnic Serbian
nationalism for internal politics in Serbia. On the other hand,
this policy of non-recognition of Kosovo by Serbia is (mis-) used
to blackmail the Western world and to undermine all efforts to
build a functioning state based on inclusion and rule of law in
Kosovo. In this struggle, the question of how to reach long-term
and stable relations between Kosovo and Serbia in the absence of
mutual recognition remains something of a mystery.
To conclude, the normative framework created over the years,
as well as the societal level of economic and political development, do not offer room for optimism for more liberal and more
integrated and inclusive societies in the region. Kosovo is not
a member of key regional and international organisations,and
it has limited and often internationally disputed sovereignty.
UNMIK is still active, although significantly reduced. In addition, Kosovo’s citizens remain the most isolated and the poorest
people in the entire European continent. For the younger generations in Kosovo, the period prior to June 1999 is not a point of
reference. For them, the reference point is the living standards of
their peers in the region and beyond, in the Western world. A lack
of prospects, isolation and poverty in a highly turbulent regional
and the global political context have a larger impact on young
people, and thus the future of the country, including ideas of a
society based on liberal values and on effective rule of law and
social ‘justice’. And, last but not least, the image of a European
future for Serbia and Kosovo, as equal partners in a wider community of states, continues to remain a desiderium of all those
who embody liberal views and reject any type of segregation,
exclusion, authoritarianism and violence per se.
Notes
1) Independent International Commission on Kosovo, at: http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/F62789D9FCC56FB3C1256C1700303E3B-thekosovoreport.htm.
2)ht t p s : //f r e e dom h ou s e . or g /r e p or t /n a t ion s - t r a n s it /
nations-transit-2015#.VvHOCFlKZog.
3) Kosovo and Serbia after the ICG Opinion, ICG Europe
Report N°206, 26 August 2010.
4) Anton Shekhovtsov: Is Transition Reversible? The Case
of Central Europe. Legatum Institute, January 2016, p. 24:
https://lif.blob.core.windows.net/lif/docs/default-source/
publications/is-transiting-reversible-the-case-of-central-europe-january-2016.pdf?sfvrsn=8.
5)http://www.sueddeutsche.de/wirtschaft/augsteins-welt-geschmiertes-kosovo-1.3117301.
6)http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/64/298&referer=http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/resolutions.shtml&Lang=E.
7)https://euobserver.com/justice/126319.
8)http://www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR12_18/
SR12_18_EN.PDF.
Arben Hajrullahu, PhD., Associate Professor of
Politics at the University of Prishtina, founder
and director of the Centre for Political Courage
in Prishtina.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Dane Taleski, Dragan Tevdovski, Trajche Panov and Viktor Dimovski
Maintaining a Hybrid Regime:
The Case of Macedonia
Macedonia represents an exceptional case in analyses of hybrid regimes. Although the population
suffers from a high level of inequality and a low level of democracy, it rarely mobilizes for
widespread protests; only occasionally are demands made for more democracy and redistribution of
wealth. A well-developed system of clientelism ensures the regime’s survival. – N. Z.
“Hybrid regimes” is a term used by scholars to denote political
systems which are neither democratic nor authoritarian.1 These
are political systems characterized by democratic elements such
as contested elections and existence of political opposition, but
in which democratic rights and freedoms are diminished to a
level that strongly favors the ruling political structure. There
are several different concepts that have been used to define and
explain these systems, such as delegative democracy, semi-democracy, illiberal democracy, disctablanda and democradura,
competitive authoritarianism, semi-authoritarianism, defective
democracies and electoral authoritarianism. 2
It has been argued that, inter alia, economic prosperity and
stable economic growth lead toward democratization. 3 It has
also long been argued that economic development promotes
democracy, 4 and it has been shown that democracy correlates
positively with GPD per capita and GDP growth. 5 However,
the inferences between democracy and income per capita are not
that clear. 6 On the other hand, extensive state control over the
economy, natural resources and redistributive politics allows
an authoritarian government to exercise control over elites and
voters. 7
A conventional view is that economic crisis, negative growth
or contraction of the economy open up opportunities for
democratization. Historically, there has been a close correspondence between lowering inequality and increasing franchise.
Therefore it is claimed that “only with a sufficient high level
of inequality does democratization become a necessity”. 8 One
would expect that if there were high social inequality, then there
would be strong public demands to democratize in the forms of
social disorder or revolution.
However, the inferences between inequality and democracy
are not that straightforward. Three clusters appeared when we
plotted the countries. The results are displayed in graph 1 below.
The first cluster of countries shows greater inequality and a
high quality of democracy. These are mainly the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In these countries,
neo-liberal market reforms have increased income inequalities.
However, the quality of democracy improved and there is sufficient freedoms to absorb the social pressures. In the second
cluster, the countries have lower inequality and lower quality
democracy. These are egalitarian authoritarian countries. Some
are resource-rich, such as Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, others,
like Belarus, are not. Coercion and the costs of protest are very
high. In addition, they all make significant efforts, despite the
high level of corruption, to redistribute wealth to maintain
social peace. The third set comprises countries that have higher
inequality and a lower quality of democracy. The expectation
of revolution and public demands to democratize are highest
among these countries. For example, Georgia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina, which are in this cluster and have seen a range of
protests in recent years, confirm this expectation. On the other
hand, Macedonia has the highest income inequality among all
countries and democracy there has been steadily deteriorating
since 2008. However, there have been no significant protests
demanding more democracy and/or more redistribution.
Macedonia as an outlier
The Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE),
the right-wing conservative-nationalist party, came to power
in 2006. They introduced different measures increasing income
inequality. For example, they introduced a flat 10 % tax and cut
Democracy and inequality
To see the inference between income inequality and democracy down on social welfare. Cheap labor was an important element
we created a data base of 28 newly democratizing countries from in their strategy to attract FDI. As a consequence, about 30 %
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Central and of the population lives in poverty, even including families of
Southeastern Europe. To measure income inequality we took people who have a guaranteed minimum income.
Since 2008, democracy has downgraded in parallel to the
the Gini indices from the Standardized World Income Inequality Database.9 As a measure of democracy, we took data from rising income inequality and the government has become more
Freedom House’s Nations in Transit reports.10 Freedom House authoritarian. The government’s critics have been attacked
measures democracy on a scale from one to seven, higher scores in the media and have suffered discrimination and persondenoting lower quality of democracy. We gathered all available al harassment. The VMRO-DPMNE has captured the state,
data between 2003 and 2015, which yielded 378 observations. A public employment having become available only for the parPearsons’ correlation shows that there is a positive relationship ty’s clientele. The judiciary has been placed under control and
between improving democracy and lowering inequality. The the parliamentary majority fall in in blind obedience. There
correlation coefficient is 0.317 and it is significant at a level has been a clamp-down on critical media and the others were
of 0.01. This shows that democracy has better redistribution bought off. Opposition leaders have been arrested and have
mechanisms than authoritarian regimes, and that it is a prefer- faced selective legal proceedings. However, the rise of inequalable regime from an individual point of view.
ity and the degradation of democracy, which in theory are
31
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Budget size and selected spending in Macedonia, in Euros,
necessary conditions for a revolution, were not sufficient for
percents mark annual increase (2005–2014)
large scale protests in Macedonia.
This is because technocratic policy making provided tarYear
Budget
Salaries
Subven­
Social
Contracts /
geted and narrow spending to benefit specific social groups.
increase
tions
transfers
Services
For example, students received vouchers to buy computers at
affordable prices. Pensions and salaries in the public admin- 2005
1.6 Bn
363 Mil
49 Mil
67 Mil
52 Mil
22 %
3 %
4 %
3 %
istration were increased. Farmers received state subventions.
2006
5 %
22 %
5 %
3 %
17 %
None of these measures were strong enough to change the social
10 %
20 %
8 %
3 %
16 %
picture in the country. However, all were intended to margin- 2007
2008
17 %
14 %
6 %
2 %
17 %
ally improve the situation of as many individuals as possible
2009
0 %
16 %
6 %
3 %
16 %
within the group. Access to the benefits was closely linked with
2010
3 %
15 %
6 %
3 %
15 %
support for the ruling party. Party officials employed in the
2011
5 %
15 %
6 %
3 %
15 %
public administration administered the implementation of these
2012
5 %
14 %
6 %
3 %
15 %
measures and made lists of people who received the benefits. If
someone from the lists showed dissent, she would be reminded
2013
3 %
14 %
6 %
3 %
15 %
that the benefits could be revoked, and if she did not comply – 2014
2.7 Bn
375 Mil
201 Mil
103 Mil
407 Mil
6 %
13 %
7 %
3 %
14 %
the benefit would be revoked. The lists were also used to ensure
“secure” voter support. VMRO-DPMNE activists would visit Source: Ministry of Finance. Final reports of the budget of the Republic
individuals who got benefits from the state to remind them of Macedonia (2005–2014)
that they were obliged to vote for the party or they would lose
the benefit.
The spending measures required the state budget to be
33–58; Schedler, Andreas: Electoral Authoritarianism: The
increased mainly by borrowing and increasing the public debt.
Dynamics of Unfree Competition. Boulder 2006.
The data for the budget size and selected spending (i. e. salaries, 3) Przeworski, Adam et al.: Democracy and Development:
subventions, social transfers and contracts/services) are shown
Political Institutions and Well-being in the World. Camin table 1 and demonstrates that the state budget increased by
bridge 2000. Boix, Carles; Stokes, Susan C.: Endogenous
60 % between 2005 and 2014. For example, the sum for social
democratization. In: World Politics 55, 4 (2003), 517–549.
transfers almost doubled, the sum for subventions quadrupled 4) Lipset, Seymor M.: Some social requisites of democracy:
and the sum for contracts/services, ranging from public tenders
economic development and political legitimacy. In: Amerito temporary employments, increased eightfold.
can Political Science Review, 53, 1 (1959), 69–105.
5) Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.: Economic Origins
of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge 2006.
Conclusion
There is a theoretical expectation that a rise in inequality cre- 6) For example Acemoglu, Daron et al.: Income and democracy.
In: American Economic Review 98, 3 (2008), 808–842, find
ates demand for more democracy. Most of the post-communist
no relationship; while Che, Yi, et al: The impact of income
democracies support this theory. However, there are different
on democracy revisited. In: Journal of Comparative Ecopathways. On the one hand, there are neo-liberal democracies
in CEE that have higher inequality and quality democracy that
nomics 41 (2013), 159–169; Moral-Benito, Enrique; Bartoprovides freedom to absorb social pressures. On the other side,
lucci, Christian: Income and democracy: Revisiting the evithere are egalitarian authoritarian regimes, mainly in the CIS,
dence. In: Economic Letters 117 (2012), 844–847; Benhabib,
that do not provide freedoms, but ensure that income inequalJess, et al: Income and democracy: Evidence from nonlinear
estimations. In: Economic Letters 118 (2013), 489–492, claim
ity remains low. The potential for revolt is highest in hybrid
otherwise.
regimes in which inequality is high and quality of democracy
is low. However, the regime in Macedonia has defied these odds. 7) Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al.: The Logic of Political SurIt has managed to maintain itself by creating elaborate distribuvival. Cambridge 2003. Ross, Michael L.: Does Oil Hinder
Democracy?. In: World Politics 53 (2001), 325–361.
tive policies for specific target groups. The aim has not been not
to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the citizens, but to 8) Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.: Economic Origins
of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge 2006, p. 69.
build patronage networks and to create serfdom.
9) Solt, Frederick: The Standardized World Income Inequality
Database. In: Social Science Quarterly 97 (2016).
Notes
1) Diamond, Larry: Thinking About Hybrid Regimes. In: 10)Freedom House, Nations in Transit https://freedomhouse.
org/report-types/nations-transit.
Journal of Democracy 13, 2 (2002), 21–35.
2) O’Donnel, Guilermo: Delegative Democracy. In: Journal
of Democracy 5, 1 (1994), 34–51; Diamond, Larry; Linz,
Juan; Lipset, Seymour M. (eds.): Politics in Developing
Dane Taleski, PhD, is a Fellow at Centre for
Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. BoulAdvanced Studies in Southeast Europe, University of Rijeka, and Visiting Fellow at the Centre for
der 1995; Zakaria, Fared: The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.
Southeast European Studies, University of Graz.
In: Foreign Affairs, November/December 1997; O’DonDragan Tevdovski, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at
nel, Guilermo; Schmitter, Philippe; Whitehead, Laurence
the Faculty of Economics, Ss. Cyril and Methodius
(eds.): Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Prospects for
University in Skopje.
Democracy. 4 vols. Washington DC 1986; Levitsky, Steven;
Trajche Panov is a Doctoral Candidate at the EuroWay, Lucan: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. In:
pean University Institute in Florence, and a lecturJournal of Democracy 13, 2 (2002), 51–66; Ottaway, Marina:
er at the James Madison University.
Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism.
Viktor Dimovski, PhD, is an independent researchWashington DC 2003; Merkel, Wolfgang: Embedded and
er based in Skopje.
Defective Democracies. In: Democratization 11, 5 (2004),
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Cengiz Günay
The Authoritarian Turn in Turkey
and the Weakness of the
Authoritarian System
Following the attempted coup on 15 July 2016, Turkey is experiencing an authoritarian turn.
But its underlying causes go back much further. When the governing party AKP came into
power in 2002, it allowed itself, in an alliance with Kurds and liberal forces, to be led by
a pro-EU orientation. But in recent years, with accession to the EU looking unlikely, it has
sought a monopoly on power. This strategy is helped by the blurred boundaries between the
governing party and state functions, the marginalisation of opposition voices and a network
of patronage for its own supporters. – S. K.
Turkey is a prime example of the dramatic decline in the
quality of democracy and the rise of illiberal authoritarian tendencies. Various factors, including the end of realistic
prospects of joining the EU, have contributed to this authoritarian turn. The country has been continuously sliding
towards becoming a competitive authoritarian system since
2011 at the very the latest, following the outbreak of unrest
in the Arab world.1 In the case of Turkey, this development is
characterised by a stark monopolising of power, an increasing
blurring of the boundaries between state functions and the
governing party, the governing party’s unchecked access to
state resources, increasing control of the media, restrictions
to the freedom of the press and the extensive limitation of
democratic protest at elections. In recent years state funds
have been used to create a media and economic bloc close
to the government. This in turn guarantees the governing
party’s hegemony over the public discourse and its monopoly
on economic redistribution.
Parallel to these developments, the governing Adalet ve
Kalkınma Partisi (Party for Justice and Development, AKP)
has increasingly lost ideological substance. Its most prominent representatives from its early years are now no longer
in the parliamentary club or its institutions and have largely become isolated. They were replaced by people who have
shown absolute loyalty to president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
That is, the monopoly on state power has gone hand in hand
with Erdoğan’s monopoly on power within the party.
While the Gezi protests in 2013 (see RGWO 7–8/2013,
13–15) introduced a new phase marked by the delegitimisation of public protest and stricter security laws (in response
to the protests a new security law was passed granting the
police far-reaching rights), following the failed coup of 15
July 2016 there have been extensive “purges” and a changing
of the guard in public and even in the private sector. This article primarily examines the structural framework and those
factors contributing to the monopolising of power in Turkey.
The EU accession process causes a reform bottleneck
Awarding Turkey the status of an official candidate country in
1999 had the effect of boosting democratisation. Many of the
political obstacles to liberalising the system were overcome
and a pro-EU coalition was formed from a broad spectrum
of interests, from Islamists and Kurds to Kemalists. While
oppressed groups such as Islamists and Kurds hoped for greater freedoms, many Kemalists saw the prospects of joining
the EU as preserving secularism and the Kemalist character
of the state. For a long time the Kemalist establishment, led
by the army, had delayed the democratic opening up of the
country out of concerns it might strengthen Islamic forces
and encourage Kurdish separatism.
The parliamentary elections of 2002 took place in the shadow of the severe financial crisis that had rocked the country since the previous year and had the effect of a political
earthquake. None of the established centre parties managed
to get back into parliament. The AKP suddenly achieved an
absolute majority. Only a year earlier it had been born of
the schism in the Islamist camp brought about by reformists
around Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The party was founded as
a result of the realistic assessment that ideological Islamic
politics had next to no chance of success in Turkey. The party
programme reflects the de-ideologisation and adaptation to
global discourses and concepts. Taking up a pro-EU line and
continuing the economic reforms introduced in consultation
with the IMF (International Monetary Fund) following the
financial crisis are two prime examples of the pragmatism
shaping AKP policy from the very outset.
Supported by entrepreneurs, by liberal and to an extent
even Kemalist elements, the AKP wasted no time in pushing
through extensive legal reforms, for instance new penal and
civil codes and far-reaching changes to the constitution. The
institutional reforms enabling adaptation to European norms
and procedures reduced the predominance of the military and
Keralist bureaucracy.
The constitution passed in 1982 under the aegis of the
army following the military coup of 1980 introduced many
controlling bodies intended to limit and check the power of
elected governments. Such controlling bodies include the
university council, the highest radio and television authority and the powerful National Security Council. All of these
bodies contained military men along with representatives of
the Kemalist bureaucracy. The National Security Council
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
new forces better disposed towards the AKP
or indeed created by the
party. At this time, an
important role was also
played by the Gülen movement, named after the
preacher, which was mainly active in the education
sector and whose supporters had been increasingly forcing their way into
state institutions since
the 1980s. The movement
provided the religious and
well-educated cadres that
the governing party lacked
at the time.
Several court cases in
which leading Kemalist
and ultra-nationalist circles were accused of conThe Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the mass demonstration against the failed military putsch
spiring against the elected
(“democracy and martyr assembly”) in Istanbul on 7 August.
Photo: Keystone
AKP government led to
a massive restructuring
within the ranks of mil(MGK – Milli Güvenlik Konseyi), was dominated by the gen- itary officers, which mainly benefited officers close to the
erals. The reforms related to EU accession led to restructuring Gülen movement, as became clear after the attempted coup
and new personnel within these bodies. The military men of 15 July.
were replaced by civilians appointed by either the government
or the parliament. This squeezing out of the military was not
accompanied by fundamental structural reform however. The The disappearance of EU prospects and its consequences
centralist and authoritarian character of the Kemalist state A second important factor weakening the already weak and
remained untouched.
moreover non-democratic balance of power and checks and
Although the reforms introduced with an eye on EU acces- balances was the loss of realistic prospects of accession to
sion were in line with basic liberal values, the process did not the EU. While for many secular people in Turkey hope of
usher in the development of a liberal democracy, but laid the joining the EU, albeit in the distant future, had guaranteed
the democratic and above all the Western orientation of the
foundations for reinforcing authoritarian tendencies.
country, these hopes were dashed by the negative signals coming from individual European capitals. In response, Turkey
was gripped by a wave of anti-European and anti-imperialist
The system becomes unbalanced
Reducing the influence of the military was an important nationalism. The ruling AKP could mobilise this atmosphere
step towards democratising the political system, but it was for its own ends by alluding to the Ottoman past and pronot accompanied by an extensive restructuring of the state moting a popular culture characterised by films, TV series,
or decentralisation. The military had always played a spe- music, architecture and cuisine full of Ottoman references.
cial role in the tradition of Turkish statehood: it was the only In this context one can also observe that Tayyip Erdoğan
institution to enjoy complete autonomy from the government. acted with greater certainty and contrariness, particularly in
It had its own budget and its own jurisdiction free from civil dealing with Western partners.
The third significant factor paving the way for the AKP’s
control. In this sense, the ousting of the military amounted to the dissolution of the separation of powers, albeit an monopoly on power on all levels of the state was the end of its
cohabitation with Kemalism. State president Necdet Sezer’s
undemocratic one. 2
Since the founding of the Republic in 1923, the army had term in office came to an end in 2007. The former president
considered itself the guardian of secularism and the country’s of the constitutional court was considered to be a dyed-inWestern orientation. Following the transition to a multi-party the-wool Kemalist. Since all laws had to be ratified by the
system in 1946, it had often intervened against elected govern- president and the president also had the power of veto over
ments. Together with the Kemalist bureaucracy, which con- appointments to government positions, many critics of the
trolled the powerful state machinery, the military regarded AKP considered Sezer to be a safeguard for Kemalist-type
themselves as a counterweight to the elected governments, secularism. Especially due to his power of veto over appointwhich in their opinion were all too often populist and driven ments in the public sector, Sezer balanced out the absolute
by their own interests. The generals and officers perceived political power of the AKP government.
themselves as serving as a corrective force on behalf of the
The nomination of Adbullah Güls, one of Erdoğan’s old
state’s positivist orientation, putting Western orientation and cronies, as Sezer’s successor led to the ultimate splintering of
secularism before democracy.
the fragile pro-EU coalition formed by liberals, secularists,
The reduction of military and Kemalist influence in the conservatives and Islamists who had supported the reform
state and the economy went hand in hand with the rise of process.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
The consolidation of power
The disappearance of structural obstacles was followed by a
phase of consolidating power that continues to this day, principally characterised by a party-political personnel policy in
public institutions and companies close to the state and by the
marginalisation of oppositional and critical voices. Increasingly authoritarian actions are legitimised by scenarios of
external and internal threats. Alternatingly, representatives of
the Kemalist establishment, the Gezi protest movement, the
Gülen movement and the Kurdish movement are labelled enemies of the democratic system, as extreme, foreign elements
in a nation portrayed as homogenous. In this context, the
failed coup provided fresh “ammunition” for a new “enemy”.
In a discourse led by the rhetoric of friends and enemies,
the AKP is portrayed as the only legitimate democratic force,
on the basis of its strong electoral support. The party’s battle
against its opponents (real and imagined) is dressed up as a
battle for democracy. This discourse can also be observed in
public institutions and the judiciary due to the blurring of the
boundaries between the state and the governing party.
The redistribution of state resources to entrepreneurs close
to the AKP via privatisation and awarding licenses, contacts
etc. has created a corporate sector close to the government.
The involvement of the governing party and its leaders in the
economy has further reinforced their hegemony. Many people
have begun to feel that nothing can be achieved without the
AKP. Even among the less well-off, patronage networks have
created relationships of financial dependency. Many people
fear that the end of AKP rule would mean the end of their jobs,
their status and their prosperity. Their associating their own
well-being with the continuation of AKP rule is a significant
factor contributing to the party’s grip on power.
The attempted coup and its consequences
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
nationalist orientation and not least due to the alliance with
the ruling party. Gülenists often replaced Kemalist forces, whom the AKP long considered the greater threat. The
background to the break between Gülen and Tayyip Erdoğan
is not clear, but the Gülen movement’s increasing claims to
power played a role in it. In 2012 at the latest, the government
began to squeeze out the Gülen movement. However, from
the current perspective it turns out that this was done only
half-heartedly and it is often not easy to determine where the
AKP ends and where the Gülen movement begins.
The attempted coup provided the government with the
opportunity to declare a state of emergency and to take rigorous action against the movement. The government’s response
confirms the suspicion however that it is reacting without
any plan. In this regard, the mass dismissals, the arrests and
the restrictions placed on critical journalists are not a sign of
strength, but must be considered a sign of weakness. Whether
the AKP is forced to embark on a more inclusive path once
more or whether it will become even more authoritarian
remains to be seen.
Notes
1) Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucian: The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. In: Journal of Democracy 13, 2
(2002), 51–65. Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan: Competitive
Authoritarianism.
Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.
Cambridge 2010.
2) Ülgen, Sinan: From Inspiration to Aspiration. Turkey in
the New Middle East. In: The Carnegie Papers. Dezember
2011; http://carnegieendowment.org/files/turkey_mid_
east.pdf.
3) Baskan-Canyas, Filiz; Canyas, Orkunt F.: The Interplay
between Formal and Informal Institutions in Turkey: the
Case of the Fethullah Gülen Community. In: Middle Eastern Studies 52, 2 (2016), 280–294.
The events of 15 July 2016 highlight above all the weaknesses
of AKP rule. Ironically, the challenge to the party’s predominance came not from Kemalist forces, but from members
of the military widely considered to have been close to the
Cengiz Günay, PhD, Senior Researcher at the
Gülen movement. The nationalist-religious movement that
Austria Institute for International Affairs (oiip)
has risen around the preacher Gülen was strongly represented
in Vienna.
principally in the judiciary,
the security forces and the
education sector. Several
universities and above all
preparatory courses for
university entrance exams
were connected to it and
were considered important
places for the recruitment
of cadres. The placing of
these cadres in the public
sector or in companies and
media groups close to this
movement is an expression
of the reciprocal relationship between formal and
informal structures that
has always existed but that
has gained in significance
due to the polarisation in
society. 3 The Gülen supporters were considered to
be loyal allies of the AKP
The Turkish government reacted to the Gezi protests in 2013 with stricter security laws.
due to their faith, their
Photo: Wikimedia Commons (VikiPicture)
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Natalia Timuş
Moldova’s Democratic Decay
Once the poster child for the EU’s Eastern Partnership, the Republic of Moldova is in crisis. A massive
corruption scandal and an unstable party system whose actors tend to pursue their own interests have
endangered the country’s hitherto successful democratization and its European integration process. – R. Z.
The concentration of power and authoritarianism represent major
challenges to the democratic consolidation within the post-Soviet
space. Some ex-USSR republics, such as Belarus or Central Asian
countries, have moved away from democracy into consolidated
authoritarian regimes. Others, like Georgia and Ukraine, have
successfully reinstalled the democratic rules of the game through
electoral (or colour) revolutions.
A prime example of European democracy promotion?
But the Republic of Moldova represents an exception. Since its
independence, it has avoided radical political transformations such
as authoritarianism or revolution.
Until recently, Moldova has been regarded as the most democratic post-Soviet state (apart from the Baltic countries) and a
success story of European democracy promotion beyond the EU
borders. The pro-European reformation of the Communist Party
(PCRM) during its governing period, the signing of the Political
Partnership between the PCRM and the opposition parties with
respect to European integration (2005) and the strong pro-EU
public opinion1 illustrate the successful democratic reforms and
political stability of the Moldovan state. Moreover, even during
the tumultuous years of 2009–2011, when Moldova was shaken by
recurring political crises, the pro-democratic and pro-European
societal and political actors managed to join forces to resist the
authoritarian tendencies of the governing PCRM. Moldova fell
short of a revolution in April 2009 and underwent a democratic
transition of power from the PCRM to the Alliance for European
integration. 2
In the context of political instability in Georgia and Ukraine,
which have experienced illiberal tendencies and the reversal of the
democratic gains of electoral revolutions, Moldova has emerged
as a regional example of democratic continuity and as a successful
model of EU external leverage. The country has advanced significantly on its path towards democratic consolidation and European
integration from 2009–2015. Visa liberalization and later visa-free
agreements, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
(DCFTA), as well as the EU Association Agreement (AA) have
been gradually granted by the EU as part of its ‘more for more’
neighbourhood approach. These incentives represented rewards
for Moldova’s voluntary commitment and compliance with the
European liberal-democratic requirements.
decisive role in reversing the democratic achievements and triggering instability.
In order to understand the current political situation, it is crucial to examine the post-Soviet political developments and the role
of the main socio-political actors, as well as the external influence
on domestic transformations.
Despite the overall continuity of democratic practices and
structures, the Moldovan political system has been shaped by
post-Soviet challenges similar to those that have facilitated the
illiberal developments in the ex-USSR. The party system has
remained weak, experiencing regular fluctuations in the degree
of fragmentation and fluidity (i. e. the emergence and death of
parties). By 2005, the Moldovan party system had achieved a certain level of consolidation in party identity and party age. But
the predominance of individual political entrepreneurs and their
strategic behavior resulted in recurring party fissions and fusions.
Political entrepreneurialism and Russian influence
This largely explains how the small Democratic Party, owned
by Moldova’s biggest oligarch, Vladimir Plahotniuc, managed
to become a key political player by attracting various prominent
leaders (from the left and right of the political spectrum). For
example, the PDM increased its votes from 3 % to 12.5 % between
April and July 2009 in early parliamentary elections, after the split
of a group of PCRM members, led by the party’s number two,
Marian Lupu. Following the strategy of positive incentives (offices, financial rewards) but also blackmail, the PDM has regularly
enlarged itself by attracting political players from its opponents.
But the political instability and party system fragmentation
were also caused by external factors. The increase in the degree
of party system fragmentation during the 2014 elections, specifically among the left-wing parties, was largely the result of the
increased Russian influence. Similarly to its policy concerning
other East European countries, Russia’s primary aim is to prevent
Moldova’s deeper integration into the EU and to keep it within the
Russian sphere of influence. The reformed Socialist Party (PSRM),
backed by Russia, emerged as the winner of the 2014 elections
(20.51 % of the vote). It promised to annul the EU Association
Distribution of parliamentary seats (101 seats) 2009–20143
April
2009
July
2009
Nov.
2010
Nov.
2014
Party of Communists of the Republic
of Moldova (PCRM)
60
48
42
21
Liberal Democratic Party (PLDM)
15
18
32
23
Liberal Party (PL)
15
15
12
13
13
15
19
Legacies within the post-Soviet space
However, recently the country has fallen into democratic decay,
becoming yet another regional victim of illiberal and authoritarian tendencies. The vicious circle of political crises and high-level
corruption scandals put Moldova in the international spotlight as
a country that has failed its stern democratic and European test.
What are the factors behind the recent democratic failure? This
study argues that the country’s democratic regression is linked
to common legacies within the post-Soviet space. The fragility of
the Moldovan democratic system, as well as the growing Russian
influence in its ‘shared neighborhood’ with the EU have played a
Democratic Party (PDM)
Our Moldova Alliance (AMN)
Party of Socialists of the Republic of
Moldova (PSRM)
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Agreement and to join Putin’s regional projects (the Custom’s
Union and the Eurasian Union). ‘Patria’ was another pro-Russian newcomer, led by a controversial Russian-based businessman
lacking knowledge of the state language and political experience. 4
Overall, Russian-backed parties have been successful in achieving
their broader goal – distancing Moldova from the European integration objective. By promoting a nationwide divide in domestic
and foreign policy alternatives, based on EU and Russian-backed
political models and regional projects, these parties have deepened the political crisis and encouraged socio-political instability
through staged public protests and votes of no confidence aimed
at triggering early elections.
The prevalence of strategic over principled-oriented behavior on the part of political actors represents another key factor
behind Moldova’s democratic decay. More than two decades after
the collapse of the USSR, Moldovan parties still lack well-defined
ideological profiles, being less constrained in altering their policy Demonstration against the corrupt government elites with anti-oligarch
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
positions. Until recently, the European integration objective rep- banners in Chișinău in September 2015.
resented a unifying and consolidating factor among the pro-democratic parties and even for a government–opposition partner- boiling point for the public, which took the streets to express its disship. But the recurring political deadlocks since 2009 reveal that content with the corrupt ruling elites and the interplay of business
cost-benefit calculations are the driving force for Moldovan parties. and politics (see RGOW 12/2015, p. 3). The 2014 elections had the
The cycle of political crises is largely determined by the failures of lowest turnout since Moldova’s independence (57.28 %). This result
‘pro-European’ coalition governments. Although the pro-Europe- reflects voters’ disillusionment with the political actors, specifically
an parties share similar political principles, based on democratic with the center-right parties that had betrayed their pro-democratic
reforms and compliance to EU requirements, they remain primari- and pro-European principles. Brussels was aware that Moldova was
ly political competitors seeking to increase their political gains. As a fragile success story. But in the context of regional illiberal and
a consequence, the coalition parties have used the negotiations over authoritarian developments, the country was vital for legitimizing
the indirect election of the president (elected through a two-thirds the EU’s role of external democracy promotion.
parliamentary majority) to bargain over governmental portfolios
To conclude, Moldova’s recent democratic regression has to be
or key offices. The repeated failures to reach consensus concerning assessed via analysis of both domestic and external factors. This
an acceptable presidential candidate or prime minister revealed the study has shown that the illiberal tendencies have been present in
prevalence of political entrepreneurialism over principle-oriented the Moldovan political system since the collapse of the USSR. But
behavior. The European stance appears to be an electoral shield these tendencies have become more evident since 2014, when the
for parties, which however have failed to prove in practice their vicious circle of political crises, coupled with high-scale corrupcommitment to the European liberal-democratic model.
tion scandals and increased Russian influence, resulted in democratic decay. The Moldovan political elites have failed the stern
democratic and European test, demonstrating the prevalence of
Lack of long-term structural reforms
Last, but not least, the fragility of Moldova’s democratic system political entrepreneurship and the lack of democratic maturity.
derives from the lack of long-term, structural democratic reforms.
Despite the successful democratic changes, particularly since 2009, Notes
the governing elites have prioritized quick changes and short- 1) 77 % in 2004 and 72 % in 2009, Public Opinion Barometer, IPP,
term reforms. For example, they have focused on implementing
Soros Foundation Moldova.
reforms to qualify for visa-free travel and the DCFTA with the 2) A governing coalition established in August 2009, comprising
EU. These achievements have been sold to the public and to the EU
the Liberal-Democratic Party (PLDM), the Democratic Party
and international actors as proof of the political elite’s pro-dem(PDM), the Liberal Party (PL), and Our Moldova Alliance
(AMN).
ocratic and pro-European commitment. 5 But little advancement
has been gained in implementing the EU Association Agreement. 3)http://www.e-democracy.md/elections/parliamentary/.
The pro-European coalition forces have claimed that compliance 4) Timuş, Natalia: A democratic and European stern test for
Moldovan political elite, blogpost, 23 March 2015, availto European requirements is at the top of their political agenda.
But one year after the signing of the AA, Moldova was lagging
able at http://whogoverns.eu/a-democratic-and-europebehind with 40 % of its implementation. By early 2016 less than
an-stern-test-for-moldovan-political-elite/.
50 % of the agreement had been implemented. This outcome is 5) Popescu, Nicu: Moldova’s Fragile Pluralism. In: Russian Polmerely the result of the political struggle between major parties for
itics and Law 50, 4 (2012), 37–50.
ministerial portfolios and official functions. This reality confirms 6) Timuş, Natalia: The Impact of European Democracy Promothat EU democratic leverage with its East European neighbors
tion on Party Financing in the East European Neighbourhood.
primarily depends on the degree of discretion of the ruling elites
In: European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 12 August 2010;
in adapting to EU requirements. 6
Timuş, Natalia: Democracy for Export: the European­isation
of Electoral Laws in the East European Neighbourhood. In:
The failure of long-term democratic reforms is not only due to
East European Politics 29, 3 (2013), 289–304.
the strategic behaviour of domestic elites. The EU is also accountable for this outcome. Brussels has been closing its eyes to the lack
of progressive reforms and the prevalence of incremental problems
Natalia Timuş, PhD, researcher at Maastricht Gradsuch as high-level corruption. The theft of $1 billion from three
uate School of Governance and UNU-MERIT and
major domestic banks in November 2014, representing nearly oneadjunct professor at the Middle East and Mediterfifth of Moldova’s annual gross domestic product, has represented a
ranean Campus, SciencesPo, Paris.
37
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I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Olexiy Haran, Mariia Zolkina
After Euromaidan: Democratic
Elections vs. Personalised Parties
and Informal Practices
One of the Euromaidan’s central demands was that elections be brought forward and
fundamental changes be made to electoral procedure. While new elections did take place on
all levels and were recognized by the international community as free and fair, the parliament
only passed the law on local elections. The existing system of parliamentary elections however
remains the same as under the former president Yanukovych. New alternative parties on the
other hand remain at a disadvantage. – N. Z.
During the 2012 parliamentary elections, Ukrainian President in the context of Ukraine’s mixed electoral system would have
Viktor Yanukovych decided to abandon the proportional system meant that many MPs in the existing “old” parliament ran the
and replace it with a mixed electoral system: half of the MPs were risk of not being re-elected. Therefore, it was very unlikely that
elected on party slates, while the second half of the MPs was most MPs would vote for a new electoral system. Moreover, demelected in single-mandate majoritarian districts. Majoritarian ocratic factions needed to ensure the loyalty of the majoritarian
districts enabled the authorities to manipulate the result. First, half of the parliament to pass urgently needed measures. The best
such an electoral system made possible the election of latent example was the ratification of the Association Agreement with
supporters of the ruling party, as “self-nominated” candidates. the EU in September 2014. To pass the agreement, the democrats
Second, it provided additional opportunities for falsifications needed the votes of former members of the Party of Regions.
and violations in majoritarian districts, especially remote rural At the same time, the involvement of Russian regular troops in
districts, where it was much more difficult for electoral observ- the Donbas in August 2014 meant that unity in the parliament
ers to control the process. As a result, in 2012 three opposition would be essential if urgent and immediate decisions needed
forces won on party slates and collected more than 50 % of the to be adopted, including the prospect of introducing a state of
vote, while Yanukovych’s Party of Regions obtained 30 %, and emergency.
However, maintaining the previous electoral law, which
the Communists managed to garner 13 %. But a parliamentarian
majority was formed by the Party of Regions and the Commu- included a mixed electoral system, a 5 % electoral threshold,
and a ban on blocs, was unfavorable for the new parties that had
nists combined, based on the majoritarian MPs.
emerged during the Maidan. As a result, ‘new’ faces in politics
(civic activists, journalists, experts) decided not to unite under
New parliament, old electoral system1
Bringing forward parliamentary elections was one of the main the banner of a new political party that would have represented
demands of the Euromaidan in the winter of 2013/14. The Euro- the new potential “Maidan Party”, as they were not certain to
maidan also demanded changes in the electoral law, specifically exceed the 5 % threshold. Instead, they ran on the party slates of
the establishment of a proportional electoral system with open more powerful political forces, including the presidential party
party lists. Therefore, changing the electoral system and hold- Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the prime minister’s People’s Front.
ing early parliamentary elections were among the demands of
Euromaidan and the main promises of Petro Poroshenko and 2014: The parties’ personalization
other democratic presidential candidates in the early presidential Pre-term elections were scheduled for October 26, 2014. The
elections in May 2014. However, this promise was not fulfilled electoral campaign in the fall of 2014 was reduced to 45 days.
and the old mixed electoral system was kept in place. Why?
Therefore the chances of “new faces” running in single-mandate
President Poroshenko wanted to gain the largest faction in the districts being elected decreased. For the political parties, a short
parliament. The most reliable mechanism via which to achieve electoral campaign meant competition, not so much of ideas and
this goal was to preserve the majority component of the electoral programs, but the use of political technologies for the effective
system, as the self-nominated majoritarian candidates connected mobilization of voters, which included the name of leader in the
to the business sector would naturally join the winner in the party’s title (Petro Poroshenko Bloc or Radical Party of Oleh
parliament. In addition, voters were often swayed to choose a Lyashko).
certain party list because of the personality or charisma of the
According to all forecasts, pro-European forces won the
party leader. Therefore, the president, who enjoyed a high level overwhelming victory, gaining in total almost 70 % of the
of popularity, 2 expected that his party would benefit from a high vote. For the first time in independent Ukraine, the Commudegree of support, in both the proportional and majoritarian nist Party did not exceed the threshold (neither did the far right).
systems.
This party served as the silent “junior partner” of the Party of
There was also another justification, absolutely acceptable to Regions and was viewed by Ukrainian society as Russia’s “fifth
the expert community: removing the majoritarian component column”.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Election campaign rally with Petro Poroshenko in Lviv on 22 May 2014.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
This clear and concise, if not overly simplified, message proved
to be very effective during the short electoral campaign.
However, despite a considerable decline in ratings, the Petro
Poroshenko Bloc formed the largest faction in the parliament, as
majoritarian MPs joined this group. Thus, there were two winners of the parliamentary elections: the two “parties of power”.
It was a positive sign that in a time of war and economic crisis,
Ukrainian voters did not follow populist slogans and trusted
those who were in power. It also meant that the monopolization of power by one political force was unlikely; the president
and prime minister had to work together.
Another surprise came with the success of a new political
reformist force, Samopomich (Self-Reliance). This political
movement managed, similarly to the People’s Front, to mobilize the voters during a rather short period of time. Before the
end of October, Samopomich did not obtain more than the 5 %
threshold in the electoral polls but in the end obtained 11 %!
Ukrainian society’s demand for “new faces in politics” and a
“new quality of policy” materialized through electoral support
for Samopomich, which was evenly distributed throughout
Ukraine. Samopomich was able to overcome the threshold in
all the regions of Ukraine, including the Donbas.
Under the current political configuration, President Poroshenko, who possessed the largest faction in the parliament,
tried to extend his latent powers, providing tough competition
to Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and his party. However, economic and wartime conditions were forcing the two main parties of
the coalition to work together. Their mutual cooperation was
a pre-requisite for Western support and aid from international financial institutions. Therefore, even after the resignation
of Yatsenyuk in April 2016, the coalition of two main parties
remained (see RGOW 6–7/2016, p. 15–17).
The local elections of 2015: More competition
At the same time, former members of the Party of Regions, but old practices
known now as the Opposition Bloc, 3 passed the threshold. It While the law on parliamentary elections was not changed, in
was surely politically suicidal for any other parliamentarian July 2015 the main political forces in the new parliament adoptparty to have a coalition with the Opposition Bloc. But the ed a new law on local elections. However, this law introduced
very fact that these politicians survived and again became MPs a complicated and unfair system. The voter votes for a party
testified that political lustration in post-Maidan Ukraine is candidate in a certain district. The total number seats gained
somewhat limited.
by the party should correspond to the number of votes gained
by the party candidates in total. But the place in the party slate
Results of the 2014 parliamentary elections
is then measured by the number of votes (as a percentage) each
(only shows parties over the five-percent threshold)
candidate received in his own district: that is, the winner in
one district may lose the seat to his fellow party member who
Party
Votes in millions
(%)
gets more votes in another district. Moreover, because of this
People’s Front
3.48
(22.14)
system of counting, it cannot be ruled out that in some cases
Petro Poroshenko Bloc
3.43
(21.82)
an electoral district may not receive a seat in the local council
Self-Reliance
1.72
(10.97)
at all. Certainly, this is not a system with open party slates as
legislators claimed. Most experts hope that this system is a
Opposition Bloc
1.48
(9.43)
transitional one and that it will be changed for the next local
Radical Party of Oleh Lyashko
1.17
(7.44)
elections.
Fatherland
0.89
(5.68)
The results of this system were mixed. In the previous 2010
Source: Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine: http://www.cvk.gov.
local elections, the Party of Regions used administrative presua/pls/vnd2014/wp300?PT001F01=910
sure to the full extent. Even in those local councils where the
opposition won on party slates, the majoritarian component
As for the performance of ‘post-Maidan parties’, the main sur- shifted the balance in favor of the authorities. Therefore, the
prise was the success of the new People’s Front led by prime new system in which the final result depends only on the party
minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, which took first place in the votes prevented such monopolization, as it is difficult for one
party slates, receiving 22.14 % of the vote, even slightly ahead party to attain 50 %. 4 This was especially true for the Donof the Petro Poroshenko Bloc (21.82 %), although the Poros- bas, which was the traditional base for Yanukovych’s Party
henko Bloc was the undisputed front-runner of the race during of Regions. Local elections on October 25, 2015, were the first
the entire electoral campaign. The People’s Front articulated competitive elections for almost 20 years in the Donbas. The
a very straightforward message to their potential voters: “Do Opposition Bloc – which is based on the remnants of the Party
you want to see Yatsenyuk as prime minister? Vote for “PF”!” of Regions – did well, as it retained influence in the Donbas.
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country democratic forces suffered from the traditional democratic illness: disunity.
What next?
The results of electoral changes after the Euromaidan are mixed. Three rounds of elections
(presidential, parliamentary, and local) were recognised by the international community as free
and fair. Ukraine’s Freedom House ranking for
electoral process improved from 4.0 in 2013 to 3.5
in 2016. 6 However,the paradox is that under the
new, democratic rules of the game the parliamentary electoral system remained the same as it had
been when introduced by the authoritarian-inclined former president Yanukovych.
There is a strong debate among politicians and
in society about whether to have new pre-term
elections. However, a new electoral campaign will
most likely result in confrontation between key
Personalised election campaign in 2014: election posters of the People’s Front with the
slogan “Vote for Arseniy Yatsenyuk for prime minister! Vote People’s Front!”
political forces, an increase in fervent populism,
Photo: Keystone
disruption of existing reformist efforts and destabilization, thus playing into the hands of Putin.
However, its results were lower than in 2010 and it lost its According to different polls, the new Rada will be still fragmonopoly on power in the region.
mented and the formation of a new coalition will be difficult.
Mostly, this was due to the “new political project, which President Poroshenko and the two ruling parties will try to
included the newly founded parties Vidrodzhennia (Renais- avoid it (especially the People’s Front, for whom the results of
sance) and Nash Kraj (Our Land), based to a great extent on snap elections will be fatal).
In the debate on the new pre-term elections, one of the key
defectors from the Party of Regions. These defectors represented the more “moderate” part of the Party of Regions and issues is whether the electoral system will be changed. Both
it could be interpreted as a split in the former Yanukovych the authorities and the oligarchic opposition would like to
party. In general, the Party of Regions was built as a typical keep the old system or use the complicated and unfair system
conformist ‘party of power’ with no programmatic, ideological introduced for local elections. Under the present conditions, a
base. Not surprisingly, as soon as Yanukovych was ousted, a monopolization of power does not seem to be likely. Rather, it
lot of MPs defected. As a result, Vidrodzhenniaand Nash Kraj is a chaotic situation which presents opportunities for manipmanaged to seize part of the traditional electorate of the Party ulation in different spheres, including the electoral system.
of Regions. In this sense, they were used by the new authorities Instead, young democratic forces and civil society activists
to reduce the results of the Opposition Bloc. The fact that there would like to change it and to move to open party slates.
is no united party in the east and south which opposes Kyiv
is a positive sign. However, people connected to Yanukovych Notes
returned to politics on other partys’ electoral tickets.
1) Haran, Olexiy; Zolkina, Maria: A Year After Euromaidan:
There was another compromise between the ruling authorPro-European Forces Wins the New Parliament. In: Insight
Turkey 16, 4 (2014), 33–44.
ities and former ‘regionals’ regarding the 30-kilometer zone
close to the frontline in the Donbas. For security reasons it 2) Elections were widely recognized by the international comwas decided to postpone local elections in this area. However,
munity as free and fair. Poroshenko won in the first round
in the strategic city of Mariupol, situated 15 kilometers from
with 55 %, the next democratic candidate, YuliaTymoshenthe frontline, elections were held. The city is economically
ko, gained 13 %, while the candidate from the former Party
controlled by the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, who was close to
of Regions, SerhiyTyhypko, received only 5 %.
Yanukovych. As a result, candidates close to Akhmetov won 3) This title of the formally ‘new’ party was one more example
in Mariupol. As in many other places, electors voted not for
of political manipulation from former supporters of Yanuideology or party programs but for strongmen who had access
kovych’s regime.
to resources, who could invest in the solution of local needs 4)http://nv.ua/opinion/haran/pobeda-senkevicha-i-draand who were present in local media.
ma-vilkul-filatov-pervye-itogi-vyborov-80445.html.
This revealed another contradiction. The Euromaidan and 5)http://www.dif.org.ua/en/publications/press-relizy/pressPutin’s subsequent aggression led to dramatic shifts which
ress2015.htm.
resulted in consolidation of Ukrainian society. For example, 6)Sushko, Oleksandr; Prystayko, Olena: Ukraine. In:
according to a poll conducted in October 2015 by respectable
Nations in Transit 2016, https://freedomhouse.org/report/
Democratic Initiatives Foundation in the Ukraine-controlled
nations-transit/2016/ukraine.
Donbas, Ukrainian all-national identity took first place for
the first time. Only 4 % of respondents were in favor of sepaOlexiy Haran, PhD, Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy; Academration from Ukraine of the so-called “people’s republics” creic Director, Democratic Initiatives Foundation in
ated by Putin. 5 But these changes were not transformed into
Kyiv.
support for democratic political forces. Nevertheless, in some
Mariia Zolkina, PhD candidate, University of Kyiv
places democratic forces succeeded. For example, in MariuMohyla Academy; Political Analyst, Democratic
pol, the new democratic party People’s Force obtained 8 % and
Initiatives Foundation.
appeared in the second place. Unfortunately, throughout the
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Giga Zedania
Democracy and Liberalism
in Georgia: Uneasy Ties
Georgia’s political system is characterised by charismatic leaders and their networks. So far, all
of its governments have struggled to come to terms with changes in power or to deal fairly
with the opposition. While after 2003 the government leant towards a rather authoritarian
liberalisation, in the current climate – and under the influence of Russia – an illiberal concept of
democracy is once again on the rise. – R. Z.
means, for the opposition to gain power (constant features of
these attempts being suppression of free media, the creation of
false opposition parties as a substitute for genuine opposition,
and exacerbated conflict with NGOs). Each of these dominant
parties was centered around a charismatic leader with more
power than a democracy should have allowed; each was weakly
institutionalized, being more of a network around the leader
than a modern-day organization or “machine”.
This difficulty with ‘splitting the apex’ – which is a difficulty
of democracy – is intimately linked with the difficulty of the
rule of law too. The genesis of the rule of law does not stem from
an enlightened elite that wants to establish reasonable rules,
but is born of necessity. Its origin lies in the fact of an essential split within society and politics between at least two major
parties and the awareness that this split cannot be overcome
Problematic changes of power
Could it be that the aim was not as clear as it seemed? Or was by the destruction of one of the sides. This necessity leads to
the country led astray? When it comes to definitions of democ- the introduction of the third authority – the law, guaranteeing
racy, the one suggested by Niklas Luhmann – “the splitting that each party shall not be subject to unlimited suppression
of the apex of the political system” – seems to be one of the by the other.3 It is exactly this desire for unlimited suppression
most elegant. 2 The idea behind this definition is that the most on the part of the ruling parties that at different times hindered
important trait of the democratic political system consists in the process of establishing the rule of law in Georgia, slowing
the possibility of changing the power-holder. There is always down its democratic development too. This is the difficulty
competition between the government and the opposition and with liberal democracy in Georgia on the structural level. But
this possibility is essential to the functioning of the system. there are other, semantic or ideological difficulties.
Thus it is a significant observation that, after gaining independence, Georgia has been experiencing troubles exactly at this Undemocratic liberalism or illiberal democracy?
point of ‘splitting’. As its 25-year history shows, it has always Discussions of liberal democracy in Georgia have often been
been a problem of ceding or receiving power: the first change in characterized by twin temptations to imagine liberalism withpower came about through the civil war (or coup d’état, or how- out democracy or democracy without liberalism. It was the
ever one defines it: the 1992 toppling of Zviad Gamsakhurdia), link with which the country had a problem. Liberalism without
the second through a peaceful revolution (the Rose Revolution democracy as such was never openly articulated, but was more
of 2003, ousting Eduard Shevardnadze) and only at the third or less implied in the dream of authoritarian modernization
attempt did it come about through elections (the 2012 defeat which appeared soon after the Rose Revolution of 2003. The
of Mikheil Saakashvili – although even in this case the revo- idea behind this dream was to have a stable party in power as
lutionary aura defined the election process and right after the long as the economic transition was completed, Euro-Atlantic
victory, the new coalition in power, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, integration was achieved and the political system was stabilized
was prone to acting like it was a post-revolutionary govern- and immunized to the threats emanating from Russia or from
ment). As the country awaits the next parliamentary elections the forces that would play into Russia’s hands. Not that this
on 8 October 2016, it is time to think about the reasons for dream was ever clearly put on the agenda, but it was hovering
in the atmosphere, suggesting Singapore as one possible model
these difficulties.
What is most interesting in this history of power changes is of development. The problem with this dream was that it was
how much the system constituted after each of them; although liberalism which suffered most in this combination – the major
at its apex at different times it united groups with vastly dif- tenet of the criticism of the otherwise rather impressive record
ferent social and cultural backgrounds, values and skills at of the revolutionary (or, from a chronological point of view,
different times resembled each other. Each time a dominant post-revolutionary) government, which efficiently built basic
party system was established, its main mission was to render institutions of the modern state, was its poor performance with
it impossible, via all legal and extralegal, formal and informal regards to maintaining the rule of law, protecting human rights
During and immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union,
it seemed that the future of the fifteen newly constituted states
was clear – there had to be a double transition to liberal democracy and a market economy from state socialism and the totalitarian/authoritarian political system. After more than a quarter
of a century, this simple path looks more than problematic.1
To take the Georgian example, charismatic leaders – with their
loose networks of friends and allies presented as political parties – came to the foreground of the political system. This, in
turn, gave rise to the intimate linkage of political interests with
economic activities. Despite important transformations, the
goal of stable liberal democracy with a free market has remained
distant.
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
pro-Russian political parties have had a realistic chance of entering the Georgian parliament, albeit with little chance of gaining a
significant number of seats there.
If we conclude from the Georgian experience that there is no way you can have the
dream of democracy without liberalism and
liberalism without democracy and that in
the setting of a modern political system the
two should go hand in hand, there are several
positive things to be said about recent developments in the country: first, neither the idea
of liberalism without democracy nor the idea
of democracy without liberalism was clearly
articulated and put forward as government
agendas. They have been functioning in the
shadows, operating in the background. There
have been policies and practices linked with
both of these in different periods of recent
Georgian history, but to date the outward
consensus has remained that liberal democThe parliamentary elections of 2012, here in front of a polling station in Poti, saw the first
democratic change of power in Georgia.
Photo: Wikimedia Commons (Bertramz)
racy is unavoidable as the only model of
development.
Second, the prospect of European and Euro-Atlantic inteand upholding property rights – in other words, everything the
gration plays an important role in maintaining the consensus on
word “liberal” stands for.
Democracy without liberalism has been far more popular the subject of liberal democracy as a desirable goal for the counan idea since this revolutionary government was replaced by a try. There is even a certitude that if the prospects of integration
more conservative one. The idea consists in the claim that the had been stronger, the progress in political, legal and economic
sovereignty of the people should not be limited by the values spheres also would have been greater. But this ‘conditionality’
and rules which are not of ‘peoples’ own making’. In reality it (which is significantly weaker in regards to Georgia than it has
is about majority rule, which would like to disregard any kind been in the cases of Eastern European countries) and socializing
of minority group, political, ethnic, religious or sexual. While the Georgian political and societal elite into European values and
accepting the primacy of the people’s will, it will not accept the practices has played an important role in acting as a counterballimitation of this will by the basic principles of human rights or ance to the authoritarian and illiberal tendencies in the Georgian
a constitution. But if we apply the formula developed by Fareed political system – a function which the indigenous civil society
Zakaria, who talked of “illiberal democracy”,4 we should say that with its weak grassroots basis could not fulfill alone.
Third, notwithstanding the fact that the political systems
this model lacks not only liberalism, but is in want of democracy
as well. As one might expect, at the time when these ideological constituted after each change in power tend to have essential
representations and fantasies were actualized, the critics were identical features, there is an important difference in the way
accusing the government of supporting the rule of an informal power changes hands. From civil war to revolution to elections –
and unlimited charismatic leader in possession of unrivaled there seems to be a normalization process taking place which
political and economic resources and subverting the very prin- could make the idea of government and opposition exchanging
places a trivial and frequent experience in Georgia. As the Hunciple of democracy.
This idea of democracy without liberalism is not necessarily tington test tells us, a consolidated democracy is one in which
indigenous in its making. It is heavily influenced by the Russian the peaceful turnover of power through elections between at
developments of recent decades. Russia is the country where least two groups has happened at least twice. 5 So far, Georgia has
the concept of “sovereign democracy” was coined, the function experienced this constitutional change through elections only
of which to a large degree was no less than the rejection of the once. We will have to wait.
legitimacy of liberal values and the actors associated with these
values. This is an important element of Russian soft power, since Notes
there is hard power behind it. The Russian influence is a strong 1) Carothers, Thomas: The End of the Transition Paradigm. In:
temptation for the powerful and the uninformed in the post-SoJournal of Democracy 13, 1 (2002), 5–21.
viet space. To the powerful it promises the alliance with a state 2) Luhmann, Niklas: Die Zukunft der Demokratie. In: ibid.:
Soziologische Aufklärung 4. Beiträge zur funktionalen Difwhich does not require to conform to any standard of accountferenzierung der Gesellschaft. Opladen 1987, pp. 126–132.
ability to the people and protection of the individual. And for
the uninformed, Russia is a symbol of the lost security which 3) Maravall, Jose Maria; Przeworski, Adam (eds.): Democracy
and the Rule of Law. Cambridge 2003.
existed in the Soviet Union, with its minimal but all-inclusive
social safety net, as well as the major actor defending ‘traditional 4) Zakaria, Fareed: The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy
Home and Abroad. New York 2003.
values’ against the advent of globalization. This type of influence, the aim of which is to combat ‘pernicious westernization’ 5) Huntington, Samuel: Third Wave: Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century. Oklahoma 1991.
and liberal values as the core of this process, has been on the rise
in recent years in Georgia (as well as in many other countries in
the region), channeled through numerous media outlets financed
and supported by the Russian state. It is not without palpable
Giga Zedania, Full Professor and Rector of the Ilia
effects – this is the first time since more than a decade that openly
State University, Tbilisi, Georgia.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
I L L I B E R A L T E N D E N C I ES
Natasha Wunsch
Democratic Backsliding: The End
of EU Transformative Power?
EU enlargement strategy is facing a stern test. If Europeanisation and democratisation have gone
hand in hand, increasingly authoritarian tendencies and democratic backsliding in the new member
states threaten to cause a domino effect in the candidate countries that could spell danger for the EU
as a political project. – R. Z.
Democratic backsliding has emerged as a major challenge to the
presumed transformative power of the European Union (EU).
The notion of ‘transformative power’ was originally developed
in the context of the 2004 enlargement towards Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE).1 It sustains the political, economic and
social change the EU has been able to foster in third countries
by the mere virtue of providing them with prospects of membership and backing this up with explicit conditionality and a
close monitoring of reform progress on the ground. Despite the
unequal progress made by the candidates of the CEE region
towards EU membership, the eventual accession of eight CEE
countries in 2004, joined by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007,
appeared to confirm the effectiveness of incentive-based transformation, earning enlargement policy a reputation as the EU’s
most successful foreign policy tool.
A decade later, the picture is much less clear. While the new
member states’ compliance with the EU acquis is surprisingly
high, their performance regarding the political criteria for membership is less uniformly impressive. Instead, one can observe
stagnation and even a partial reversal of democratic consolidation in a growing number of Eastern European member states. 2
Similarly, worrying tendencies are emerging in several of the
current accession candidates, most prominently in the areas of
elections and media freedom. The 2014 Nations in Transit report
issued by Freedom House downgrades six out of ten of the new
EU entrants, whereas democracy scores for the Balkans have on
average returned to the levels achieved back in 2004. 3
These developments are occurring in the context of a global decline of democracy following the end of the ‘third wave’
of democratisation. 4 Still, the spread and degree of democratic backsliding among both recent EU entrants and candidate
countries seem to call into question the EU’s ability to foster
sustainable political transformation and highlight the limits of
the EU’s model of democracy promotion through enlargement.
In the long run, failure to adequately respond to and redress
democratic rollback in a growing number of Central and Southeast European countries risks deepening the rift between ‘new’
and ‘old’ member states and further undermining the EU’s
credibility both among its citizens and in third countries.
The domino effect of unguarded backsliding
The first signs of democratic backsliding within the EU began to
emerge in Hungary in 2010, when Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party
secured a two-thirds majority in the parliamentary elections,
enabling it to embark upon a process of what has been qualified
as constitutional capture. This process was characterized by the
passing of sweeping constitutional amendments severely curtailing media freedom and the quality of the electoral process,
Orban openly embracing the concept of ‘illiberal democracy’.
The following parliamentary elections of 2014, evaluated by the
OSCE as “free, but not fair” in light of the overwhelming dominance of the government party, confirmed Fidesz’ two-thirds
majority. One year on, Hungary became the first country ever
to be downgraded in a Freedom House report from the status of
“consolidated democracy” to that of “semi-consolidated democracy”. However, in the tense climate produced by the ongoing
refugee crisis and Hungary’s refusal to shoulder the burden
of migrants arriving into the country via the Western Balkan
route, official reactions from Brussels have remained subdued
(cf. RGOW 1/2016, 21–24).
In late 2015, Poland followed in Hungary’s footsteps, with
the newly elected Law and Justice Party (PiS) government
blocking the Constitutional Court as an important guarantor
of checks and balances and introducing a controversial new
media law (cf. RGOW 3/2016, 9–10). The EU Commission
reacted more forcefully in this case, but has so far failed to
achieve any improvement of the situation. Instead, a number
of prominent PiS figures have lashed out strongly against any
suggestion of wrongdoing from Brussels. Moreover, Hungary’s
Orban and Poland’s Kaczynski have reportedly assured each
other that they would block any attempt to trigger the EU’s
article 7 procedure. Since the complex procedure, which can
eventually lead to the suspension of a country’s voting rights,
requires the unanimous approval of all member states other
than the one in question, this mutual reassurance effectively
undermines the EU’s institutional safeguards against democratic backsliding.
The obvious risk in the case of an insufficient response on
the part of the EU to the rise of illiberal tendencies among its
member states is that these may trigger a domino effect across
the region. Where it appears that efforts by governing parties
to cement their position of power through the questionable
use of legal and constitutional means will go unpunished, the
temptation is great for other young democracies with incompletely internalised democratic norms to follow suit. The previous government in Croatia, ousted by a vote of no-confidence
following an internal dispute within the coalition, is a case in
point: despite undertaking steps to undermine media freedom
and the operation of independent cultural bodies, its conservative authoritarian agenda failed to trigger any reaction from
Brussels. Parliamentary elections in mid-September confirmed
the main coalition party as the strongest political force, making
it the likely leader of the new government.
On the whole, the spread of democratic backsliding in CEE
undermines the earlier confidence in the EU’s ability to successfully transform and integrate countries with a recent history of
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No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
in their assessment that the EU will turn a blind eye to internal backsliding of democratic standards as long as they uphold
their rhetorical commitment to EU integration and continue to
simulate compliance with the EU’s political criteria for membership. More importantly, it signals to the citizens of the region
that even EU membership is no longer a safeguard against the
abuse of power by political elites. The resulting disenchantment with EU membership as a solution to domestic problems
and the ensuing broader disaffection of the population with the
political process seriously weakens the prospects of successful
democratic consolidation in the Balkans.
Decoupling of democratisation and Europeanisation
It is precisely the frequent conflation of Europeanisation and
democratisation that has left the EU unprepared for the growHeads of state and government discussed ways out of the crisis at the EU
special summit in Bratislava. From left to right: Donald Tusk, president of
ing appeal of authoritarianism among its Eastern members and
the European Council, Viktor Orbán, Hungarian premier, Robert Fico, Slovak
candidate states. Both processes were initially thought to go
premier, and Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission.
hand in hand, culminating in EU accession as the formal con
Photo: EU2016 SK
firmation of a country’s successful political transformation. 5
political transition. It also flags up the limits of a mainly incen- In direct opposition to this presumption, the simultaneous
tive-based enlargement policy that relies upon the prospect of occurrence of democratic backsliding in both the pre- and the
EU accession to tilt the cost-benefit calculations of political post-accession contexts suggests instead a progressive decouleaders in candidate countries in favour of reform. Once EU pling of democratisation and Europeanisation. The dissolution
leverage subsides following a country’s admission to the club, of this nexus calls into question the very essence of European
alternative considerations, and most prominently the desire to integration, namely the idea of peaceful cooperation between a
remain in power, can return to the forefront. That democratic group of countries committed to the same principles and values.
backsliding has occurred precisely in those countries that were The EU’s failure to develop a consistent approach to counter
considered to be the frontrunners in the negotiations leading the degradation in the democratic performance of its current
up to the 2004 round of enlargement serves as stark confirma- and aspiring members is symptomatic of a weakened Union
tion that processes of democratisation are not linear, much less that is marred by internal disputes and a growing wariness of
irreversible. At the same time, partial reversals in democratic its members with regards to the added value of supranational
consolidation risk accentuating the division into ‘old’ and ‘new’ cooperation.
In this sense, the current democratic disenchantment in
member states and adding grist to the mill of those voices that
Europe’s East goes beyond a mere questioning of the EU’s
considered the Eastern enlargement to be premature.
transformative power in its neighbourhood. Instead, it is the
legitimacy and viability of the EU as a political project itself that
Undermining the credibility of accession conditionality
The unexpected embrace of illiberal tendencies in CEE is prob- is being challenged by the rise of illiberal tendencies in its midst.
lematic not only with regards to its internal implications for It is therefore urgent that the EU devise and apply targeted and
the cohesion and credibility of the EU. It is perhaps even more effective mechanisms to counter democratic backsliding both
problematic when it comes to the signal sent out to the current within and beyond the circle of its members. Poland’s eventual
group of candidate states. Enlargement policy has already taken response to the more hard-line approach initiated by the Euroa blow due to the lack of political will among the member states pean Commission represents a crucial test of whether the EU
to integrate further countries in the near future. The absence of can rise to the challenge.
a clear prospect of EU entry even in the medium term undermines the perceived benefits of pursuing reforms to consolidate Notes
the rule of law and ensure the respect of fundamental rights. 1) Grabbe, Heather: The EU’s Transformative Power. EuroAdd to this the rise of authoritarian leaders in existing EU mempeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern
Europe. Basingstoke 2006.
ber states, and the credibility of the EU’s accession conditionality as a crucial driver of change is severely diminished. Why 2) Greskovits, Béla: The Hollowing and Backsliding of Democbother pursuing an ambitious democratisation agenda when
racy in East Central Europe’. In: Global Policy 6, 1 (2015),
member states themselves fail to comply with basic principles
28–37.
of the rule of law?
3) Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2014: Eurasia’s Rupture
Mirroring the developments in CEE, the Balkan region has
with Democracy (2014); https://freedomhouse.org/report/
seen a rise of authoritarian leaders in recent years. Macedonia,
nations-transit/nations-transit-2014.
Montenegro and Serbia are all ruled by strongmen that face no 4) Diamond, Larry J.; Plattner, Marc F.: Democracy in Decline?
serious political opposition and have been able to cement their
Baltimore 2015.
grip on power by cutting down on media freedom and sabo- 5) Schimmelfennig, Frank; Sedelmeier, Ulrich: The Politics of
EU Enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives.
taging the work of independent political bodies. Prioritising
In: ibid. (eds.): The Politics of European Union Enlargement.
stability over democracy at times when the EU is faced with
London 2004, 3.
a multitude of internal and external crises, leaders in Brussels
have been all too willing to overlook these tendencies to avoid
creating a further source of unrest in the EU’s neighbourhood.
However, ignoring the rollback of democratic standards in
Natasha Wunsch, PhD, Ernst Mach Postdoctoral
accession countries means accepting further erosion of the EU’s
Fellow at the Centre for Southeast European Studcredibility. For one, it confirms political leaders in the region
ies, University of Graz.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
L I T E R AT U R E
Nationalistische Intellektuelle in der Slowakei 1918–1945
Sabine Witt
Nationalistische Intellektuelle in der Slowakei
1918–1945
Kulturelle Praxis zwischen Sakralisierung
und Säkularisierung
(= Ordnungssysteme. Studien zur Geschichte
der Neuzeit, vol. 44)
Berlin: De Gruyter 2014, 412 p.
ISBN 978-3-11-035930-5. € 59.95; CHF 74.90.
In this doctoral thesis submitted at the
University of Berne, Sabine Witt examines Slovak nationalist thought and it
forms of expression in the art, culture
and political literature of the interwar
period – the epoch, then, in which Slovakia first attained statehood (albeit
shared) in the context of the Czechoslovak Republic and which was brought
to a close by the authoritarian-fascist topoi of martyrdom, the Crucifixion
Slovak state during the Second World and resurrection etc. dominated and
War (1939–1945), in which several of discourse on the nation was thus made
the intellectuals examined by Witt ‘sacred’. Witt covers several important
occupied positions of political influ- aspects in her work – such as the debaence. The author investigates these te on the codification of the Slovak
processes of nation-building within language, treatment of multi-ethnicia young binational state by focusing ty and the double function of Czechoon the example of cultural institutions, slovak cultural institutions, which on
the press and literature – three fields the one hand reinforced (cultural)
in which the same protagonists were Czechoslovakism, but on the other
often closely connected. Witt identi- hand sought to promote the culture
fies as the central pillars of socialisa- of the smaller and more rural Slovak
tion and networks the manifold insti- part of the country.
The number of aspects touched on
tutions of the Catholic Church and the
Slovak cultural associations, some of and the patchwork structure of the
which were close to the Church them- study often make it difficult howselves, where the young generation of ever to avoid losing the thread. The
Slovak intellectuals, largely from rural book lacks an index, without which it
environments, came into contact with is virtually impossible to maintain an
the first pioneers of national or nati- overview of the activities of the intelonalist thought and developed their lectuals that keep popping up in the
own, more radical visions of the Slovak various chapters, and references are
nation and its ‘rebirth’.
often used sparingly, which unforThe core of the book, chapters 6 to tunately is an obstacle to further stu8, analyse the political-essayistic and dies on what is without doubt a fasciliterary production of this group. The nating area.
chapter on the literature of this milieu
in particular makes clear how Christian
Eva Maurer, Bern
The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths
Paul W. Werth
The Tsar’s Foreign Faiths
Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in
Imperial Russia
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, 288 p.
ISBN 978-0-19-959177-0. £ 68,–.
This study examines the “multiconfessional establishment” of the multiethnic Russian state that formed following
the reign of Catherine II in the late
eighteenth century. It provides an overview of the development of imperial
religious policy and confessional institutions, which not only served as conduits between the authorities and the
religious communities, but belonged
moreover to the most important institutions via which the Russian population
with its great diversity was controlled
and ruled over long before it is possible to speak of nationalities policy per
se (p. 7). Several case studies based on
extensive archival research, impressive
in its geographical range, focus on the
integration of the so-called religious
tolerance of the early modern period
into the bureaucratic and legal imperial structures of the nineteenth century.
The increased regulation often stood in
contradiction to the idea of freedom
of faith and conscience which became
prevalent in public discourse and was
mentioned in the Tsar’s October Manifesto of 1905 without ever being implemented however.
The first part of the book consists of
five chapters analysing the construction
and functioning of Russia’s multiconfessional establishment in the context
of state legal practice regarding conversions, separatist movements within
established religious communities and
mixed marriages, and also discusses the
failed attempts at reform of the 1860s.
The second part focuses on the intensification of the dilemma that increasingly
eroded the established system: which
measure provides greater political stability, privileging the Russian Orthodox
state church or extensive freedom of
religion and conscience (pp. 255–56)?
Here Werth examines the politicisation
and nationalisation of “religion”, the
passionate discussions on implementing
freedom of conscience in the State Duma
and the abrupt departure from a policy of integrating “foreign confessions”
from 1910 onwards.
This most revealing book is recommended reading for anyone interested
in current Russian religious policy, since
it demonstrates that multiconfessional
tensions and a utilitarian and ambivalent attitude towards religion are just as
much a part of the country’s “historical
heritage” as the “special role of Orthodoxy in Russian history” (p. 266).
Regula Zwahlen
45
46
P R OJ EC T R E P O R T
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
Regula Spalinger in discussion with Lyudmila Len, Valentina Fesechko and Vera Butyrskaya
Helping People to Help Themselves:
Social Centres in the Urals
The two social centres of the “Island of Good Hope” association support the elderly and people
in need in the Ural region. In a region lacking infrastructure they are often the only port of
call for people suffering social hardship. Regula Spalinger, project leader at G2W, spoke to the
directors of “Island of Good Hope”, Lyudmila Len and Valentina Fesechko, and their colleague
Vera Butyrskaya about the challenges facing the social centres. – S. K.
G2W: Why are the social centres in Revda and Pervouralsk
such an important point of contact for the elderly?
Vera Butyrskaya: At our social centre in Revda too groups
meet regularly to find out about healthcare. Doctors, mostly retired themselves, take people’s blood pressure and give
Lyudmila Len: Here in the Ural region elderly people seldom medical advice in private sessions. We have weekly or monthly
have the opportunity to talk to other people. Their relatives talks by medics, usually attended by 20 or more people. Since
usually have to work to support their families, or they have medicine is mostly very expensive, there is a lot of interest in
migrated to other regions in Russia in search of work. The natural remedies such as traditional, medically effective herbs,
doctors here, and I have experienced this myself, can spare wraps and teas. We also offer physiotherapy and gentle sports
no longer than 15 minutes per patient due to the high demand activities such as hiking or cross-country skiing so that our
and the regulations concerning patient documentation. But visitors can maintain their fitness into old age. They often
the elderly need half an hour or more to describe their prob- get to meet children, since our choirs and musicians play in
lems, recall associations and ask questions. Here at the social all sorts of places, for instance in kindergartens or children’s
centre in Pervouralsk we thus have an expert specifically for homes.
healthcare who can deal with elderly people’s problems without being pressed for time. She listens to the visitors and gives Your centres don’t just offer help to elderly people. Which
them advice on looking after their health or on how to take other sections of the population turn to the social centres?
certain medication. We are particularly lucky to have in Father
Vassili (Zudilov) a warm-hearted priest and an excellent psy- Vera Butyrskaya: We are often visited by families with lots
chologist who regularly calls by the centre. The visitors to of children or single mothers. In individual cases, assistance
the “Island of Good Hope” always look forward to talking can also consist of groceries, medicines or hygiene products.
and celebrating with him. Recently Lidia Titova, 100 years Particularly in the remote villages there are many impoverold, asked before her birthday if Father Vassili could come ished families and invalids whom we support in conjunction
round and bless her flat. Her eyesight is not what it was, so with the local experts (local leaders, etc.). This year we were
it has become difficult for her to leave home, especially when able to offer an interim solution to a family whose house had
it is dark. Father Vassili agreed at once. It is never too far for burned down. But we also receive visits from people released
him to visit someone who is ill.
from prisons, whom we assist with applications for new docOur service is rounded off with social and cultural occa- uments such as domestic passports. On release, former prisonsions that welcome senior citizens – there are regular meetings ers receive only 800 roubles, but a passport costs 5,000 roubles
at our handcraft studio “Skilled Hands”. We currently have a (75 CHF). This passport is required for every job application
wonderful exhibition of self-made dolls created by an elderly and by various bureaucratic channels.
visitor. Every Friday there are discussion evenings with the
staff of the city library on the renowned writer of Ural fairy Valentina Fesechko: On some days up to 15 people turn to
tales and legends, Pavel Bashov, on Pushkin and on other well- us for some sort of advice, for example in connection with
known personalities of Russian culture. Sometimes local poets their children going to school or their pension. Often they
also tell us about their work.
turn to us first because they remain anonymous here, we
Group photo after a gymnastics class in Revda’s town
park. The social centre offers regular sports courses.
Photos: ODN
One of the volunteer doctors in the Revda social centre,
which provides health advice for the elderly.
Photos a and b: Regula Spalinger
Many older people in the Ural region are entirely on
their own because their relations have left.
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
don’t keep documentation of discussions and they can thus
discuss their problems freely. The people know that we pay
attention to what they say. And they are glad that because of
our knowledge of urban and non-state institutions we can
point them in the right direction. Disabled people especially
require support.
What are the specific problems facing disabled people?
Valentina Fesechko: Disabled people in wheelchairs often
have difficulties accessing buildings, since a lot of places
don’t have ramps. At the entrance to our organisation we
have an extra bell that disabled people can use. We then come
and help them enter. The municipal government has also
assisted us in building a new metal door that automatically
opens for wheelchair users. Many organisations in our city
and throughout the entire region lack disabled access. Fortunately however improvements have recently been made in
this regard. Another obstacle particularly for people who
have difficulty walking was the long queues at the city’s clinics: people without a PC and an internet connection had to
queue just to make an appointment. Since this year it has also
been possible to make an appointment by phone, with the
effect that the queues have disappeared from the hospitals.
Another challenge for disabled people is finding employment. We employ three people with physical disabilities at
our organisation.
Could you give us a specific example of the assistance you
offer to disabled people?
Vera Butyrskaya: Together with a company from the town of
Revda we were able to purchase a lighter wheelchair that is
easier to steer by hand and has thus given back 32-year-old
Andrei Khramov his mobility. A bad motorcycle accident
rendered Andrei paraplegic. He can no longer work in his
old job as an electrical fitter, but since 2008 he has been a
successful web designer. He has regained his enjoyment of life
through a lot of rehab and work on himself. Andrei Khramov was presented with his wheelchair in the presence of Juri
Myakhin, a member of parliament from our town, and Valentina Fesechko, the director of our centre in Revda. Andrei’s
grandmother had asked Juri Myakhin for support, who in
turn got us involved, since of the local NGOs we have the
broadest experience with emergency help.
How has the economic and social situation changed over
the past year?
Vera Butyrskaya: Fortunately there have been no drastic
changes to the local industries’ contracts, so there have been
no mass redundancies. On the other hand, the prices for
imported goods have risen sharply, as is the case throughout
The social centres’ choirs are renowned throughout the
region and often sing in children’s and old-age homes.
P R OJ EC T R E P O R T
Russia. Since our region has a larger number of poorer people,
we are always confronted with many families and individuals
in need. In the summer the requests we receive decrease slightly, as people grow fruit and vegetables at their dachas and can
collect berries and mushrooms in the forest. But as soon as
school starts in the autumn, many families are glad to have
basic support with things such as stationary, second-hand
clothes and shoes for the children.
Lyudmila Len: We have long-standing ties with the society
for the blind in our city. Every year we put together 15 sets
of stationary for blind children starting school. On the first
day of school, 1 September, the society for the blind hosts a
small party and presents these practical gifts to the children
on our behalf.
In the first half of the year the social centre in Pervouralsk
was informed that its tenancy agreement at its current site
could not be extended. What is the current situation?
Lyudmila Len: Fortunately we were eventually able to
extend the agreement. Two months ago I spoke to the new
mayor of Pervouralsk, a most capable man who cares about
social issues. Also, the unannounced audit by the Ministry
of Justice for the Sverdlovsk region in May registered no
complaints. Due to the positive outcome the newly elected
municipal government was satisfied that we are doing solid
work that is very important for the city. The local media have
also been only positive in their reports on our work. Perhaps
the municipal government was wary of us initially, since our
financial support comes from abroad. The extension of our
tenancy is extremely good news and we once again have a
“roof over our heads”. Now we can also take on the urgent
renovation of our sanitary system.
It is impressive that many sprightly senior citizens work in
your social centres.
Lyudmila Len: The people who work for us do not arrive
here by chance. Both our employees and volunteer helpers are
repeatedly put to the test by difficult situations. For instance,
when we had to prepare masses of documents within 24 hours
in early May in order to present them to the Justice authorities,
nobody complained. Because you can take us at our word.
Because we do not allow any irregularities in our organisation and always work conscientiously, we could approach the
situation with courage and without any worries.
You can support the work of the association “Island of Good
Hope” with a donation to the account of the G2W institute
G2W (IBAN CH22 0900 0000 8001 51780). Please list the
transaction as “Sozialzentren Ural”.
Andrei Khramov with his grandmother, Yuri Myakhin
and Valentina Fesechko, director of the centre in Revda.
Social events such as dances offer senior citizens the
chance to overcome their isolation.
47
No. 9/10 2016 RSEW
New Publication
Hornidge, Anna-Katharina;
Shtaltovna, Anastasiya;
Schetter, Conrad (eds.)
Agricultural Knowledge
and Knowledge Systems
in Post-Soviet Societies
Series: Interdisciplinary Studies on Central
and Eastern Europe – Vol. 15
Bern, Berlin, Bruxelles, Frankfurt am Main,
New York, Oxford, Wien, 2016. 396 p.
ISBN 978-3-0343-2006-1. € 88.30; CHF 99.–.
This volume addresses the crucial role of knowledge and innovation in coping with and adapting to socioeconomic and political transformation processes in post-Soviet societies. Unique are the bottom up or
micro-sociological and ethnographic perspectives offered by the book on the processes of post-Soviet
transformations in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Three thematic fields form the structuring frame:
cultures of knowledge production and sharing in agriculture; local governance arrangements and knowledge
production; and finally, the present situation of agricultural advisory services development.
I M P R ESSU M
Verein G2W – Ökumenisches Forum für Glauben, Religion
Herausgeber Institut G2W. Ökumenisches Forum für Glauben,
und Gesellschaft in Ost und West
Religion und Gesellschaft in Ost und West
Präsident Prof. Dr. Georg Rich, Aarau Aktuarin Eva Gysel, Wilchingen
Birmensdorferstrasse 52, Postfach 9329, CH-8036 Zürich
Redaktionsverantwortliche Dr. phil. Rahel Černá-Willi
Tel.: 0041 (0)44 342 18 19, Fax 0041 (0)44 240 06 10
Jahresbeiträge, Mitgliedschaften: Kollektiv-A CHF 400.–, einschließlich 3
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CHF 50.– In den meisten Kantonen können freie Zuwendungen an G2W bis
Dr. phil. Regula Zwahlen Guth, Natalija Zenger, lic. phil.
zu 70 % in Abzug gebracht werden (bei zweckgebundenen Spenden für die
[email protected]
Projektarbeit zu 100 %)
Projektverantwortliche Regula Spalinger, lic. phil.
Die Meinung der namentlich zeichnenden Verfasser braucht nicht mit der
Meinung der Redaktion übereinzustimmen.
G2W – Ökumenisches Forum für Glauben, Religion und Gesellschaft in
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