Associations between Dark Triad-, Callous-Unemotional Traits, Moral Reasoning
and Immoral Behavior in Adolescents
Masterthesis Forensic Psychology
Department Psychology and Mental Health
Tilburg University
Name:
Fieke Naaijkens
ANR:
106392
Supervisor:
Dr. Maaike Cima
Date:
17-08-2014
0
Samenvatting
In dit onderzoek zijn de associaties onderzocht tussen de anti-sociale Dark Triad
persoonlijkheden (Machiavellianisme, Narcisme en Psychopathie), ongevoelig-emotieloze
trekken (Calllous Unemotional traits), moreel redeneren en immoreel gedrag bij zowel binnen
JeugdZorgPLUS geïnstitutionaliseerde adolescenten (n = 26) als bij plaatselijke middelbare
scholieren (n = 83). Onze eerste hypothese is dat adolescenten die hoog scoren op de Dark Triad
– en Callous Unemotional (CU) trekken, meer gebruik maken van cognitieve vertekeningen en
dat ze meer immoreel gedrag vertonen. We hebben tevens de hypothese opgesteld dat cognitieve
vertekeningen direct van invloed zijn op immoreel gedrag. Onze eerste hypothese wordt over het
algemeen bevestigd: met uitzondering van Narcisme, passen alle adolescenten die hoog scoren
op Dark Triad- of CU trekken, alle cognitieve vertekeningen toe. Deze adolescenten vertonen
tevens meer immoreel gedrag. Hiernaast blijkt de combinatie van hoge mate van psychopathietrekken- en het verblijf in een JeugdZorgPLUS instelling het meest samen te hangen met immoreel
gedrag. Onze tweede hypothese is verworpen: resultaten tonen aan dat cognitieve vertekeningen
niet direct van invloed zijn op immoreel gedrag. Er is echter wel sprake van indirecte invloed: ze
mediëren de relatie tussen het verblijf in een JeugdZorg PLUS instelling en immoreel gedrag.
Aangeraden wordt om bij behandelingen van cliënten met anti-sociale persoonlijkheden hen
ervan bewust te maken dat ze cognitieve vertekeningen toepassen, zodat ze veranderingen
kunnen aanbrengen in hun denkpatroon. Meer onderzoek is nodig om de associaties tussen
cognitieve vertekeningen en immoreel gedrag te verduidelijken.
1
Abstract
We have studied the associations between the anti-social personality Dark Triad traits
(Machiavellianism, Narcissism, Psychopathy), Callous-Unemotional traits, moral reasoning and
immoral behavior in as well institutionalized adolescents (n = 26) as in local high school students
(n = 83). We have hypothesized that adolescents scoring high on CU- and Dark Triad traits apply
more cognitive distortions and show more immoral behaviors. We have also hypothesized that
cognitive distortions directly influence immoral behaviors. Our first hypothesis has generally
been confirmed: except for Narcissism, high scores on the Dark Triad or CU traits relate to all
types of cognitive distortions. Adolescents scoring high on Dark Triad- or CU-traits show more
immoral behavior as well. Interestingly, the combination of psychopathy and being
institutionalized relates mostly to immoral behavior. Our second hypothesis has been rejected:
results show that immoral behavior is not directly predicted by cognitive distortions. Cognitive
distortions do however mediate the relationship between being institutionalized and showing
immoral behavior. Regarding treatment, we suggest to make clients with anti-social personalities
realize they apply cognitive distortions, so that they can change their thought processes. More
research is needed to clarify the associations between cognitive distortions and immoral
behaviors.
Introduction
Every society has rules to regulate the conduct of its members. It is important that children learn
these rules that focus on differences between right and wrong (Castiglia, 1991), since they
contribute to children’s moral development (Crawford, 2001). One important goal in studying
moral development is understanding and being able to predict moral behavior (Tavecchio, Stams,
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Brugman, & Thomeer-Bouwens, 1999). Previous research has namely shown that moral
immaturity relates to delinquency (Lickona, 1983; Stams et al., 2006). Central to moral
development is moral judgment, which is driven by moral reasoning (Greene & Haidt, 2002).
This research will therefore focus on associations between moral reasoning, anti-social
personality traits, of which some proved to be predicting delinquent behavior (Chabrol, van
Leeuwen, Rodgers, & Séjourné, 2009), and immoral behavior.
Morality is defined as a multidimensional concept that expresses itself in at least two
important manners: cognitive morality and affective morality (Feilhauer, Cima, Benjamins, &
Muris, 2013). Affective morality refers to how individuals feel about moral issues. Cognitive
morality on the other hand, is also referred to as moral reasoning, and renders the way
individuals think about rules of ethical conduct. Cognitive morality also includes cognitive
perspective taking, which is the ability to identify another person’s emotional state without
actually experiencing these feelings yourself. Generally, results have shown that deficits in
cognitive morality judgments are linked to anti-social behavior in children and adolescents
(Barriga, Sullivan-Cosetti, & Gibbs, 2009; Blair, 1997; Nas, Brugman, & Koops, 2008; Stams et
al., 2006).
The anti-social traits measured in this research, concern characteristics of the concept
called Dark Triad, together with Callous Unemotional (CU) traits. The Dark Triad contains the
three most socially aversive personalities, namely Machiavellianism, Narcissism and
Psychopathy (Muris, Meesters, & Timmermans, 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These three
personalities are all characterized by an underlying deficit in empathy (Wai & Tiliopoulus,
2012), and are connected by a core of dishonesty and disagreeableness (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006;
Jonason & McCain, 2012; Lee & Ashton, 2005). Individuals with high levels of Dark Triad traits
3
more often use self-defeating and aggressive humor and more frequently exhibit bullying
behaviors. They also show higher levels of racism and prejudice, and apply more vigorous and
aggressive tactics at work (Muris et al., 2013). Machiavellianism is characterized by the
exploitation and manipulation of others, a focus on self-interest and a cynical despise of morality
(Muris et al., 2013). High Machiavellians are not moved by emotional involvement with others
and are unaffected towards their own behaviors or beliefs. Machiavellians believe it is better to
manipulate others than to be manipulated themselves: they identify and exploit weaknesses in
other people, while hiding their own (Wai & Tiliopoulus, 2012). Narcissists are arrogant and
self-centered, and possess excessive views of grandiosity (Muris et al., 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulus,
2012), entitlement and superiority (Raskin & Hall, 1979). In interpersonal relationships they are
exploitive and use other people to achieve their needs for reinforcement of their self-views and
admiration. Psychopaths are mainly typified by callousness and a lack of remorse and personal
affect (Muris et al., 2013), while they apply destructive patterns of dysfunctional interpersonal
behavior. To achieve personal gain, they use manipulative techniques and charm, regardless of
what harm this could do to others. Contrary to the other Dark Triad traits, psychopaths are also
defined by high impulsivity. They have a predisposition for inappropriate, indecent, reckless or
even violent behavior (Wai & Tiliopoulus, 2012). Research showed that psychopathic traits are
independent predictors of severe conduct and delinquent behaviors, and of higher levels of overt
and relational aggression (Chabrol et al., 2009; Edens, Campbell, & Weir, 2006; Frick, Stickle,
Dandreaux, Farrel, & Kimonis, 2005; Marsee, Silverthorn, & Frick, 2005; Salekin & Frick,
2005).
Generally it is assumed that psychopathy is a developmental disorder (Essi, 2004). The
combination of conduct problems with CU traits appears to be correlated with a specific high
4
risk of developing psychopathy when growing up (Frick & White, 2008). CU traits refer to
features such as lack of empathy, lack of guilt and remorse, superficial or defective affect and
lack of concern about one’s performance. Research shows that CU traits are closely related to a
thorough underlying emotional dysfunction (Feilhauer, Cima, & Arntz, 2012). Considering this
has been described as the core characteristic of psychopathy, these traits can best be seen as the
childhood precursor of psychopathy (Feilhauer et al., 2012; Muris et al., 2013). Children with
CU traits exhibit more delinquency and severe aggressive behavior (Frick, Cornell, Barry, Bodin,
& Dane, 2003; Kruh, Frick, & Clements, 2005). Youths scoring high on these traits are also less
sensitive to punishment (Barry et al., 2000) and respond less to stimuli showing distress in other
people (Frick, Kimonis, Dandreaux, & Farell, 2003; Loney, Butler, Limja, Counts, & Eckel,
2006).
Relations among cognitive- and affective morality, and anti-social traits have been
studied before. In general, results indicate that youth with CU traits show deficits in affective
perspective taking, whereas their cognitive perspective taking skills seem to be adequate
(Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008; Feilhauer et al., 2013; Jones, Happe, Gilbert,
Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Schwenck et al.,2012). It seems that they know the difference between
right and wrong, but just don’t care about it (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010). Same results were
found for individuals scoring high on psychopathic traits. They seem to have affective morality
deficits (Meier, Sellbom, & Sygant, 2007), whereas they appear to be perfectly rational
(Maibom, 2005; Brouns et al., 2013). The aim of this study is to examine one possible
explanation for the fact that individuals with CU- and psychopathic traits show immoral
behavior, even though they seem to know it’s wrong. This could be explained by them using
deviant cognitions, in order to justify their wrongful behavior. Research namely showed that the
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destructive patterns of dysfunctional interpersonal behavior, applied by psychopaths, are
increased by deviant cognitions (Wai & Tilopoulus, 2012). A form of deviant cognitions are
cognitive distortions, which are biased or inaccurate ways of conferring meaning upon
experiences (Barriga, Gibbs, Potter, & Liau, 2001). For example, the experience of mistakenly
stumbling over someone’s parked bike, can be distorted as the idea that one can’t do anything
right, or instead, that one has been the victim of an intentional provocation. The interpretations of
this experience might have emotional and behavioral consequences, for instance becoming
aggressive by misattributing threat to the actions of someone else. Cognitive distortions of
externalizing individuals have been described mainly as unreasonably attributing hostile
intentions to others (Dodge, 1993; Kendall, 1991). This could be the case with individuals
scoring high on psychopathic and CU traits, since these cognitive distortions are associated with
behavioral problems (Barriga, Landau, Stinson, Liau, & Gibbs, 2000); at high levels of
prevalence, self-serving cognitive distortions could moderate anti-social behavior such as
aggression (Barriga et al., 2001). For example, if one interprets the way someone looks at him as
provocative or threatening, he might feel justified to hit that person, since he assumes that
otherwise, he’ll get hit first.
This study will therefore investigate associations between anti-social personality traits,
cognitive distortions, and immoral behavior. We hypothesize that individuals scoring high on CU
and Dark Triad traits will apply more cognitive distortions, and show more immoral behaviors
than individuals lacking these traits. Since cognitive distortions are associated with behavioral
problems (Barriga et al., 2000), we test the assumption of Barriga et al. (2001) and hypothesize
that the use of cognitive distortions directly predicts immoral behaviors.
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Method
Participants
The clinical sample consisted of institutionalized boys and girls (n = 26, ♀ = 11) aged 14-18
(M = 16.15; SD = 1.05) from Bijzonder Jeugdwerk Brabant (BJB) at Deurne, the Netherlands.
The control group consisted of local high school HAVO (higher general continued education)
students (n = 83, ♀ = 42), aged 12-18 (M = 15.57; SD = 1.51).
Procedure
After the study was approved by the Ethical Committee of Psychology (Department of Clinical
Psychological Science of Maastricht University, the Netherlands), we contacted a youth
institution in Deurne as well as local high schools in Tilburg, to ask whether they were willing to
cooperate in the current study.
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. Testing took approximately sixty
minutes. Questionnaires were counterbalanced to avoid an order effect. Only four (pen and
pencil) questionnaires of the total of six tasks will be reported in this thesis. All questionnaires
were translated into Dutch. First, to measure the Dark Triad characteristics, the Dirty Dozen
(DD; Jonason & Luévano, 2013) was filled out by the participants. Secondly, to measure CUtraits, the Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (ICU; Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, 2006) was
administered. In order to see if participants apply cognitive distortions, they filled out the How I
Think questionnaire (HIT; Barriga et al., 2001). To measure immoral behavior, an observation
list was developed by the main researcher, called the Development of Conscience Interview
(DOCI). This observation list needs to be filled out by two social workers involved in the
participant’s treatment.
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Measurements
Dirty Dozen (DD; Jonason & Luévano, 2013)
Characteristics of the Dark Triad were measured by using the DD, which consists of 12 items to
identify the personality traits Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy. These traits were
measured by items such as ‘I have used deceit or lied to get my way’ (Machiavellianism), ‘I tend
to want others to pay attention to me’ (Narcissism), and ‘I tend to lack remorse’ (Psychopathy).
Each item has to be scored on a 9-point scale (ranging from 1 = never true to 5 = (almost) always
true). Prior research indicated that the DD is a valid and reliable measurement (Jonason &
Webster, 2010; Jonason & Luévano, 2013). Internal consistency in the current sample was
adequate (Cronbach’s Alpha = .80).
Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (ICU; Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick, 2006)
Callous-Unemotional Traits were measured by the ICU, which consists of 24 items that are
scored on a 4-point scale (ranging from 0 = not at all true to 3 = definitely true). The ICU
consists of three subscales: Uncaring, Callousness and Unemotional (Roose, Bijttebier, Decoene,
Claes, & Frick, 2010). The basis of the scale is formed by the four items (of which three need to
be reversely coded) on the CU scale that consistently loaded on anti-social personality disorder
(‘Is concerned about how well he/she does at school or work’; ‘Feels bad or guilty when he/she
does something wrong’; ‘Is concerned about the feelings of others’; ‘Does not show feelings or
emotions’; Frick, Bodin & Barry, 2000). Previous research has shown that using the total score
as an indication of CU traits is generally confirmed to be most valid (Essau, Sasagawa, & Frick,
2006; Kimonis et al., 2008; Feilhauer, Cima, & Arntz, 2012). Hence, in this study, the original
8
single factor model of the ICU was used as a general index of CU traits. In the current study
Cronbach’s Alpha was .75.
How I Think (HIT; Barriga et al., 2001)
Cognitive distortions were measured by the HIT, which consists of 54 items that are scored on a
6-point scale (ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree), of which some of the
items need to be reversely coded. The questionnaire taps on four categories of distortions: SelfCentered, Blaming Others, Minimizing/Mislabeling and Assuming the Worst, which are also the
subscales of the HIT.
By using Self-Centered distortions, people barely consider views, expectations,
needs, and/or immediate feelings of others, since they see their own views as most important
(Gibbs et al., 1995). Items concerning this subscale are, among others, ‘If I see something I like,
I take it with me’ and ‘Rules are generally meant for others’. The subscale Blaming Others
concerns misattributing blame to outside sources such as another group, a momentary aberrance,
or another person (Gibbs et al., 1995). These distortions also concern misattributing blame for
their misfortune to innocent others, such as: ‘I make mistakes because I hang out with the wrong
people’ and ‘If someone does not lock his car, he asks for it to get stolen’. By Minimizing or
Mislabeling immoral behavior, the behavior is described as not causing real harm, or as being
acceptable or even admirable. For example ‘It’s not bad to lie, everyone does it’. The behavior
can also be justified by referring to others in a disregarding way, such as ‘Some people ask for it
to get beaten up’. The subscale Assuming the Worst concerns unreasonably attributing hostile
intentions to others (such as ‘You might as well steal, someone else would steal from you as well
if they get the chance’), assuming that worst-case scenarios are inevitable in social situations,
9
and assuming that there’s no improvement possible regarding one’s own or others’ behavior (for
instance ‘I might as well lie. If I’d tell the truth, no one would believe me anyway’). Research
indicated that the validity and reliablity of the HIT are satisfactory (Barriga et al., 2001; Nas,
Brugman, & Koops, 2008). Current internal consistency was good (Cronbach’s Alpha = .92).
Development of Conscience Instrument (DOCI; Cima & van Pol, in preparation)
To measure immoral behavior, the DOCI was used. The DOCI consists of 33 items scored on a
3-point scale (0 = not, 1 = sometimes, 2 = often/frequently), in which some of the items have to
be reversely coded. Example items are ‘The adolescent shows malicious behavior’, ‘The
adolescent bullies others’, and ‘The adolescent has reciprocal friendships’. To get a full
impression of the juvenile’s behavior, emotions and cognitions, the list needs to be scored
individually by two independent involved social workers. In case the juvenile is not admitted, the
DOCI can be filled in by the parents or teacher. Subsequently, during a semi-structured
interview, the rater is asked to clarify the confirmed items. Since this instrument is newly
developed, there are no reliability and validity data available yet. Current internal consistency
was adequate (Cronbach’s Alpha = .92).
Analyses
To identify differences between the control group and the clinical sample regarding gender; age;
and scores on Dark Triad-; CU traits; cognitive distortions and immoral behavior, Independent
Samples T-tests were performed. Regarding the relationship between the anti-social personality
traits, cognitive distortions and immoral behavior, a correlational analysis was performed.
Because numerous significant associations were found, a multivariate regression analysis was
10
performed to examine which variables predict immoral behavior. In the regression analyses,
centered variables were used (created by using the sample mean). Immoral behavior was the
dependent variable, whereas group (whether the adolescent was institutionalized or not), the antisocial personality traits (Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and Narcissism and CU traits) and
subscales of cognitive distortions (Self-Centered, Blaming Others, Minimizing/Mislabeling and
Assuming the Worst) were predictors in this model.
In the first step, main effects for group, Dark Triad- and CU traits were entered as
predictors. Next, in the second model, the interaction variables group*machiavellianism,
group*psychopathy, group*narcissism and group*cutraits were entered into the model as well.
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS version 19. Last, a Sobel test (Sobel, 1992)
was performed to examine whether the relationship between group and immoral behavior was
mediated by cognitive distortions and/or the Dirty Dozen personality traits.
Results
A Skewness and Kurtosis check showed that de data was distributed normally, with values
between -1 and +1. To check the interrater reliability of each couple of social workers that
completed scoring one participant’s immoral behavior, the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient was
determined (n = 23). Since both subjects and raters were chosen randomly, a two-way random
effects model was used. Results showed moderate to adequate interrater reliability for the DOCI
(ICC = .65; p = .003).
There were no significant gender and age differences between the groups (sequentially
t(107)= -.733; p = .465; t(107) = 1.850; p = .067). Therefore gender and age are not controlled
for in further analysis. The clinical sample showed significantly higher scores regarding
11
Machiavellianism (t(106) = 2.075; p = .040), Psychopathy (t(106) = 2.216; p = .029), CU traits
(t(104) = 3.124; p = .004), three out of the four HIT subscales (Self-Centered: t(107) = 2.558; p =
.015; Blaming Others: t(107) = 3.523; p = .001; Assuming the Worst: t(107) = 5.012; p < .001)
and immoral behavior (t(104) = 6.531; p < .001) compared to the control group. Regarding
Narcissism, the control group showed significant higher scores than the clinical sample (t(106) =
-2.272; p = .025). An overview of these results is shown in table 1.
Table 1. An overview of the means, standard deviations, number of participants, and level of
differences of the clinical- and control group regarding gender, age, personality traits, cognitive
distortions and immoral behavior.
Variable
BJ
Control
Brabant
group
M
SD
M
SD
N
p
Gender
♀=11
-
♀=42
-
109
.465
Age
16,154
1,047
15,566
1,508
109
.067
Machiavellianism
14,385
7,145
11,342
6,311
108
.040
Psychopathy
13,577
6,376
10,598
5,845
108
.029
Narcissism
12,5000
7,469
16,512
7,957
108
.025
CU traits
29,000
10,342
21,915
7,502
106
.004
Self-Centered
2,697
1,020
2,147
0,712
109
.015
Blaming Others
2,499
0,818
1,946
0,657
109
.001
Minimizing/Mislabeling 2,602
1,089
2,180
0,752
109
.075
2,801
0,821
2,045
0,618
109
.000
Assuming the Worst
12
25,558
Immoral behavior
8,800
11,975
9,340
106
.000
Regarding the relationship between the anti-social personality traits, cognitive distortions and
immoral behavior, all variables seemed to correlate significantly, except for Narcissism. Results
are shown in table 2.
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between personality traits Machiavellianism (Mach.),
Psychopathy (Psych.), Narcissism (Narc.) and CU traits (CU), cognitive distortions (SC = SelfCentered, BO = Blaming Others, MM = Minimizing/Mislabeling and AW = Assuming the Worst)
and immoral behavior (IB, N = 109).
Mach.
Psych.
Narc.
CU
SC
BO
MM
AW
Psych.
.538**
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Narc.
.416**
.148
-
-
-
-
-
-
CU
.424**
.645**
-.084
-
-
-
-
-
SC
.383**
.510**
.217*
.576**
-
-
-
-
BO
.394**
.542**
.154
.551**
.799**
-
-
-
MM
.317**
.470**
.203*
.565**
.836**
.798**
-
-
AW
.392**
.542**
.082
.612**
.839**
.820**
.836**
-
IB
.358**
.263*
-.162
.367**
.298*
.381**
.294*
.410**
* = significant at the two-tailed 0.05 level.
** = significant at the two-tailed 0.001 level.
Results showed that the first multivariate regression model was significant (F(9,93) = 7,13; p <
13
.001). According to this model shown in table 3, the only significant predictors for immoral
behavior were group, Machiavellianism, and Narcissism. All together, these variables explained
41% of the variance of immoral behavior.
The second model (table 3), in which the interaction effects (group*machiavellianism,
group*psychopathy, group*narcissism and group*cutraits) are shown, showed to be significant
as well (F(13,89) = 5.91; p < .001). The interaction variable group*psychopathy turned out to be
a borderline significant (p = .07) predictor for immoral behavior (figure 1). All together, the
variables in this model explained 46% of the variance of immoral behavior.
Table 3. Results multivariate regression analysis, predictors of immoral behavior.
MODEL 1
B
Std. Error
Beta
t
p.
(Constant)
25.348
6.608
-
3.836
<.001
Group
-8.547
2.471
-0.336
3.459
.001
Machiavellianism
0.634
0.194
0.366
3.277
.001
Psychopathy
-0.160
0.210
-0.090
-0.761
.449
Narcissism
-0.359
0.143
-0.261
-2.509
.014
CU traits
0.029
0.156
0.024
0.188
.851
SC
-1.725
2.413
-0.129
-0.715
.476
BO
3.350
2.333
0.226
1.436
.154
MM
0.950
2.355
0.075
0.403
.688
AW
-0.040
2.855
-0.003
-0.014
.989
25.977
7.243
-
3.586
.001
MODEL 2
(Constant)
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Group
-8.298
7.659
-0.326
-1.083
.282
Machiavellianism
0.143
0.686
0.082
0.208
.836
Psychopathy
1.143
0.773
0.642
1.478
.143
Narcissism
0.484
0.661
0.352
0.732
.466
CU traits
0.017
0.487
0.014
0.035
.972
SC
-2.578
2.410
-0.194
-1.070
.288
BO
4.105
2.311
0.277
1.777
.079
MM
0.714
2.362
0.056
0.302
.763
AW
0.251
2.791
0.017
0.090
.929
Group*machiavellianism 0.347
0.406
0.347
0.854
.395
Group*psychopathy
-0.792
0.435
-0.779
-1.820
.072
Group*narcissism
-0.504
0.354
-0.665
-1.424
.158
Group*cutraits
-0.016
0.287
-0.023
-0.057
.954
Figure 1. Interaction effect group*psychopathy.
35
30
25
20
Control sample
15
Clinical sample
10
5
0
High Psychopathic traits
Low Psychopathic traits
15
To examine whether the relationship between group and immoral behavior was mediated by
cognitive distortions and/or the Dirty Dozen personality traits, a Sobel test was performed by
using the HIT total scores as a measurement of cognitive distortions. None of the Dirty Dozen
personality traits mediated the relationship between group and immoral behavior (all Sobel tests
<1.70; all p’s >.05). However, cognitive distortions was a significant mediator in
this relationship (Sobel test = 2.05; p <.05).
Discussion
This research investigated the associations between anti-social personality traits, cognitive
distortions and immoral behaviors among institutionalized and non-institutionalized adolescents.
The results confirmed our first hypothesis: adolescents scoring high on Dark Triad - and Callous
Unemotional traits, apply more cognitive distortions than individuals scoring low on these antisocial personality traits, and adolescents scoring high on the anti-social personality traits
Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and CU traits, apply more immoral behaviors than their peers
who score low on these traits. The combination of being institutionalized and scoring high on
psychopathic traits turned out to be a borderline significant predictor for immoral behavior.
The results rejected our second hypothesis: cognitive distortions did not directly influence
immoral behavior. They did, however, mediate the relationship between being institutionalized
and immoral behavior (which didn’t account for anti-social personality traits as measured by the
Dirty Dozen).
Whereas adolescents scoring high on Narcissism score also high on Self-Centered and
Minimizing/Mislabeling distortions, the remaining anti-social personality traits related to all
types of cognitive distortions (Self-Centered, Minimizing/Mislabeling, Assuming the Worst and
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Blaming Others). Some of these results are somewhat unexpected, namely the finding that the
cognitive distortion Assuming the Worst is applied by adolescents scoring high on psychopathic
and CU traits. Research namely showed that deficits and biases regarding interpretations were in
general positively correlated with reactive aggression (Cima, Vancleef, Lobbestael, Meesters,
and Korebrits, 2014; Dodge & Coie, 1987). However, in the first study of Cima et al., (2014) CU
traits also related to a negative interpretation bias. Furthermore, in the second study an
aggressive interpretation bias also related to proactive aggression (Cima et al., 2014). Therefore
the finding that Psychopathy and CU traits relate to the cognitive distortion Assuming the Worst,
is actually in line with this type of research. However, to determine the exact association
between these traits and cognitive distortions, more research is needed.
The findings that adolescents scoring high on Machiavellianism, Psychopathy and
Callous Unemotional traits, apply more immoral behaviors than their peers scoring low on these
anti-social personality traits seem logical, since these traits are, among others, defined by antisocial behavior (Wai & Tiliopoulus, 2012; Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006; Jonason & McCain, 2012;
Lee & Ashton, 2005; Muris et al., 2013), which can be described as immoral behavior.
According to our results however, the only significant positive predictors of immoral behaviors
among the included variables, was the variable group (whether the adolescent is institutionalized
or not) and the personality trait Machiavellianism. The finding that the clinical group showed
more immoral behavior than the control group is far from surprising, since their behavior is
generally the reason for the institutionalization. Results showing that high levels of
Machiavellianism are predictive for immoral behavior, are in accordance with previous research
which shows that Machiavellians are convincing liars (Geis & Moon, 1981) who use deceptive
tactics within social relations (Dussault, Hojjat, & Boone, 2013). This could increase the chance
17
that a parent, teacher or social worker would mistakenly believe the adolescent, so that he or she
gets more opportunities to exhibit immoral behavior. Since research on the associations between
Machiavellianism and immoral behavior is scarce or outdated, more research is needed to further
clarify this relationship.
Results of the present study furthermore demonstrated that Narcissism is a significant
negative predictor of immoral behaviors, which indicates that the more narcissistic a person is,
the less he or she will exhibit immoral behavior. This could be explained by the fact that
narcissistic adolescents might be less influenceable than their peers regarding delinquent
associations, because of their self-centeredness. Research namely showed that delinquent peer
relations can influence adolescent delinquency (Piquero, Gover, MacDonald, & Piquero, 2005),
mainly when adolescents attempt to preserve their social circle and impress their friends (Payne
& Cornwell, 2007). Narcissists might feel less need to do so, due to their excessive views of
grandiosity (Muris et al., 2013; Wai & Tiliopoulus, 2012), entitlement and superiority (Raskin &
Hall, 1979). Another explanation for the finding that Narcissism seems to be a negative predictor
of immoral behavior could be the fact that, within this research, the non-institutionalized
adolescents score significantly higher on Narcissism, while they’re showing significantly less
immoral behavior than their institutionalized peers.
The fact that Psychopathic- (and CU) traits do not directly seem to be predictors of
immoral behaviors, is not in consensus with previous mentioned research which states that
psychopathic traits are independent predictors of aggression, severe conduct, and delinquent
behaviors (Chabrol et al., 2009; Edens, Campbell, & Weir, 2006; Frick et al., 2005; Marsee,
Silverthorn, & Frick, 2005; Salekin & Frick, 2005). However, Psychopathy seems to be a
borderline significant predictor (only) when the adolescent is institutionalized (figure 1). One
18
(out of many) possible explanation(s) for this effect is the combination of psychopathic traits
with its callousness and lack of remorse and personal affect (Muris et al., 2013), in an
environment with a foundation of rules, rewards and punishment, and stimulation of empathic
capability. The system of rewards and punishment could be less effective among psychopathic
adolescents, since they don’t feel remorse after being punished and might therefore rather use
their manipulative techniques and charm to get what they want through another way, instead of
restraining themselves from immoral behavior. This is in consensus with information purchased
through the semi-structured interviews that were conducted after the social workers filled out the
DOCI (of which the content is not mentioned in this thesis). These interviews revealed that social
workers seemed most frustrated and desperate about institutionalized adolescents scoring high on
psychopathic traits, since the techniques of most social workers are based on the connection they
have with their clients. Regarding the psychopathic adolescents it namely seemed impossible to
build a trustworthy relation: they used the social workers to achieve personal gain, regardless of
the effect this had on them, which is in accordance with research of Wai and Tiliopoulus (2012).
Outside the institutionalized setting, there generally are less restrictions regarding rules and
commitments with people so that psychopathic adolescents could continue their destructive
patterns of dysfunctional interpersonal behavior with less consequences. This might also be an
explanation for the fact that Psychopathy or CU traits are no individual direct predictors for
immoral behavior.
Our second hypothesis was rejected: results showed that cognitive distortions did not
directly predict immoral behavior, which is not in line with research indicating that antisocial
cognitions are predictors of adult criminal recidivism (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996).
Cognitive distortions do however mediate the relationship between being institutionalized and
19
showing immoral behavior, which means that the extent to which institutionalized adolescents
show immoral behavior is influenced by whether they apply cognitive distortions. This is in
consensus with previously mentioned research (Barriga et al., 2001; Wai & Tiliopaulus, 2012),
as well as with findings that showed that antisocial attitudes appear to be related to misbehavior
inside institutions (Barriga et al., 2001; Gendreau, Goggin, & Law, 1997) and are associated with
diminished levels of treatment motivation and – engagement (Best, Day, Campbell, Flynn, &
Simpson, 2009). These results are in line with empirical findings that offenders of sexual and
domestic violence apply cognitive distortions regarding their actions (Gilchrist, 2007; Langton,
2007; McCrady et al., 2008; Ward, Hudson, & Keenan, 2001). Adolescents with these anti-social
personalities seem to use these distortions to ease their conscience: they seem to know they’ve
done something wrong, and therefore try to reduce the cognitive dissonance between the norms
and their own behavior (Barriga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001; Gibbs, 2003).
Various factors could explain why cognitive distortions do not directly predict immoral
behavior, for example the coping style one applies. Perhaps adolescents that generally show
moral behavior, act different on the applied cognitive distortions, because they own healthier
coping styles than their immoral peers. Research namely showed that coping styles affect
behavioral problems (Windle & Windle, 1996) and that delinquents differ in coping styles from
the non-delinquent population (Ruchkin, Eiseman, & Hägglöf, 1999). Numerous other factors
could however contribute to an explanation for the above mentioned findings. Therefore more
research is necessary to clarify the relationship between as well anti-social personality traits and
immoral behavior, as well as the one between cognitive distortions and immoral behavior.
20
Limitations
De most important limitation of this research is the fact that most of the data was collected
through self-reports, which could have caused a social desirability bias. We tried to nullify this
by explicitly telling the adolescents that the participation was anonymous, and by asking parents,
teachers and social workers to rate the adolescents’ behavior as well, by using the DOCI.
Another limitation is the fact that the reliability and validity data concerning this newly
developed instrument, are not available yet.
Besides these limitations, there is a possibility that research regarding this domain has
been done before, but that these studies have not been published (yet), for instance because no
significant results were found (file drawer bias).
Recommendations
It seems that adolescents with anti-social personalities know the differences between right and
wrong (Anastassiou-Hadjicharalambous & Warden, 2008; Feilhauer et al., 2013; Jones, Happe,
Gilbert, Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012), but that they fail to apply these norms
regarding their own behavior. This is in consensus with the assertion that delinquents are
characterized by a big gap between what should be done and what they actually do (Gibbs,
2003). Within treatment it could be helpful to make these clients realize which cognitive
distortions they apply with regard to their own – and others’- behavior. This way they could
learn to recognize their own cognitive patterns, in order to change them into functional ways to
deal with difficult situations.
Current research has resulted in new findings, which raised new questions as well. More
research is recommended, especially regarding the relationship between cognitive distortions and
21
immoral behavior. If a clear relationship between these two factors could be found, this could for
example lead to innovations regarding cognitive behavioral therapy, focused on changing
cognitive patterns.
22
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