PROFILE OF INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT :
UGANDA
Compilation of the information available in the Global IDP
Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council
(as of 18 December, 2003)
Also available at http://www.idpproject.org
Users of this document are welcome to credit the Global IDP Database for the collection of information.
The opinions expressed here are those of the sources and are not necessarily shared by the Global IDP
Project or NRC
Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project
Chemin Moïse Duboule, 59
1209 Geneva - Switzerland
Tel: + 41 22 799 07 00
Fax: + 41 22 799 07 01
E-mail : [email protected]
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
1
PROFILE SUMMARY
8
SUMMARY
UGANDA: MASS DISPLACEMENT TO UNPROTECTED CAMPS
8
8
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
13
ACCESS TO MONTHLY "HUMANITARIAN UPDATE"
13
HUMANITARIAN UPDATE BY THE UN OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN
AFFAIRS (JANUARY 2001 - SEPTEMBER 2003)
13
BACKGROUND
13
ONE OUTLINE OF THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT IN ACHOLILAND
13
MANY ACHOLI BELIEVE THAT THE INCUMBENT (1986-PRESENT) GOVERNMENT OF YOWERI
MUSEVENI HAS WRITTEN THE ACHOLI OFF
16
THE NATIONAL RESISTANCE ARMY’S ARMED INSURGENCY (1981-1986)
17
THE HOLY SPIRIT MOVEMENT FRONT [HSMF]AND ALICE AUMA 'LAKWENA (1986-1987)
18
THE LEADER OF LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY BROKE AWAY WITH ALLIES IN OBOTE II
ARMY(1988)
18
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY CONSISTS OF 2,000-3,000 WELL ARMED AND TRAINED
19
FIGHTERS(2002)
BACKGROUND OF THE ALLIANCE FOR DEMOCRATIC FORCES (1996-1999)
19
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN THE WEST NILE AND THE WNBF (1971-2002)
20
BACKGROUND OF THE CONFLICT IN THE KARAMAJONG DOMINATED NORTH-EAST (1970S-2003)
23
CAUSES OF DISPLACEMENT
25
DISPLACEMENTS IN ACHOLI DOMINATED AREA
25
BRUTAL KILLING OF OVER 60 CIVILIANS CAUSED DISPLACEMENTS IN LIRA (NOVEMBER 2003) 25
GOVERNMENT ALLEGEDLY MOVED REFUGEES BY FORCE (AUGUST 2003)
26
ARMY DISPLACED 300,000 PEOPLE (JULY 2003)
26
SYSTEMATIC ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE IN THE NORTH (2003)
27
PEOPLE REGARD CAMPS AS TRAPS (JULY 2003)
28
SUDANESE REFUGEES IN UGANDA TARGETED BY THE LRA ( JULY 2003)
30
LRA REBELS ATTACKING GOVERNMENT CREATED 'PROTECTED IDP VILLAGES (2002-2003) 30
MILITARY SOLUTION A FAILURE (2002)
33
CIVILIANS GIVEN THE OPTION OF DISPLACING THEMSELVES OR REMAINING IN THEIR HOMES AND
BEING MISTAKEN FOR LRA (1996)
34
DISPLACEMENT IN KARAMAJONG DOMINATED AREA
34
CATTLE RAIDS, DROUGHT AND FOOD INSECURITY IN THE KARAMAJONG DOMINATED NORTHEAST (2000-2003)
34
INTER AND EXTRA COMMUNAL VIOLENCE IN KARAMAJONG
37
DISPLACEMENTS IN THE WEST
37
THE THREAT FROM ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) REDUCED (2003)
37
LANDOWNERS IN THE RWENZORI REGION CHARGING IDPS FOR LAND TO ESTABLISH SHELTERS
(2002)
39
DISPLACEMENTS RELATED TO THE ALLIED DEMOCRATIC FORCES (ADF) IN THE WEST AND
40
SOUTHWEST (1998-2003)
PEACE EFFORTS
41
LEADERS OF A PEACE INITIATIVE HAVE REJECTED CALLS TO OFFER MONEY TO THE REBEL LORD'S
RESISTANCE ARMY (LRA)(OCTOBER 2003)
41
UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO BRING A PEACEFUL END TO THE WAR (SEPTEMBER 2003)
42
WHY THERE HAVE NEVER BEEN ANY REAL "PEACE TALKS" ( JULY 2003)
42
SEVERAL LOCAL NGOS UNDERTAKING PEACE BUILDING ACTIVITIES AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL
(2000)
45
ENDEMIC MISTRUST ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CONFLICT IN ACHOLI DOMINATED NORTH
46
PREMATURE PEACE HOPES
50
PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION TO THE CONFLICT APPEARED TO RECEDE(2002)
51
PEACE TALKS ENDED WHEN PRESIDENT MUSEVENI GAVE THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY SEVEN
52
DAYS TO LAY DOWN WEAPONS (1994)
KACOKE MADIT (KM) - AN ORGANISATION OF THE ACHOLI COMMUNITY IN EXILE WORKING FOR
52
PEACE (1996-2000)
UGANDA-SUDAN RELATIONS
53
LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY ASSISTED BY SUDAN IN RETALIATION FOR UGANDAN SUPPORT TO
SPLM/A (JULY 2003)
54
UGANDA WITHDREW ITS OBSERVERS FROM SUDAN (AUGUST 2003)
54
SUDAN AND UGANDA HAVE AGREED TO RENEW A BILATERAL MILITARY AGREEMENT
(SEPTEMBER 2003)
56
UGANDA FOR THE FIRST TIME OPENLY ACCUSED SUDAN OF RESUMING SUPPORT FOR NORTHERN
REBELS (SEPTEMBER 2003)
57
SUDAN WOULD WORK TO IMPROVE TIES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES(SEPTEMBER 2003)
58
UGANDA-SUDAN RELATIONS (1999-2003)
59
UGANDA-SUDANESE AGREEMENT AUTHORISES THE UGANDA PEOPLE'S DEFENCE FORCES TO
61
PURSUE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY WHITHIN SUDAN (MARCH 2002)
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
62
GLOBAL FIGURES
MORE THAN 1,400,000 IDPS ACCORDING TO THE GOVERNMENT (OCTOBER 2003)
MORE THAN 20,000 CHILDREN ABDUCTED BETWEEN 1986 AND 2003
INCREASED NUMBER OF DISPLACED SINCE 2002 RESURGENCE OF LRA ATTACKS DURING 2002
(SEPTEMBER 2002)
APROXIMATELY 552,000 PEOPLE WERE INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY END JANUARY 2002
560,000 PEOPLE WERE INTERNALLY DISPLACED BY END- 2001
NUMBER OF IDPS INCREASED FROM 560,000 END 1999 TO MORE THAN 700,000 BY MID-2000
400,000 IDPS REPORTED TO RECEIVE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY DECEMBER 1998
62
62
65
65
68
69
70
71
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
73
2
GENERAL
73
PATTERN DISPLACEMENT IN SOTORI (SEPTEMBER 2003)
73
RECOGNIZABLE CHANGE IN THE SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES OF ABDUCTION AND ABDUCTEES
(2003)
73
VILLAGER FORCED TO SLEEP SEVERAL HUNDRED METRES FROM HOME (SEPTEMBER 2003)
74
DIFFICULT TO KNOW EXACTLY WHERE DISPLACED HAVE SETTLED (SEPTEMBER 2003)
74
THOUSANDS OF FLEEING CHILDREN STRANDED IN KARAMOJA (SEPTEMBER 2003)
75
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT IN THE RWENZORI REGION (2002)
75
IDPS MADE TO MOVE BACK AND FORTH THEIR ORIGINAL HOMES
76
FLUID MOVEMENT PATTERNS REFLECT HIGHLY UNPREDICTABLE SECURITY SITUATIONS (19982002)
78
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
81
PHYSICAL SECURITY
81
ARMY DENIES LIRA DEATH TOLL (DECEMBER 2003)
81
THE POPULATION IN THE NORTH CONTINUES TO BE TARGETED BY THE REBELS (NOVEMBER 2003)
81
GULU DISTRICT, THE EPICENTRE OF THE REBELLION, IS NOW FAIRLY CALM (NOVEMBER 2003) 82
THE CAMPS HAVE BECOME JUST AS MUCH OF A TARGET AS THE VILLAGES ONCE WERE
(SEPTEMBER 2003)
83
LRA TARGETS CAMPS TO PUNISH PEOPLE (JULY 2003)
84
CONCERTED MILITARY OFFENSIVE BY THE NATIONAL ARMY TO FIGHT REBELS (MARCH 20022003)
85
INSUFFICIENT PHYSICAL PROTECTION OFFERED BY THE "PROTECTED VILLAGES" IN NORTHERN
UGANDA (1996-2003)
87
SECURITY CONCERNS IN KARAMOJA NEED TO BE ADDRESSED IF RETURN IS TO BE FACILITATED
(JUNE 2002)
88
WOMEN AND GIRLS CONTINUED TO BE TARGETS OF ABUSE AND RAPE IN IDP CAMPS AND
89
REFUGEE SETTLEMENTS (2000-2002)
IDP CAMPS IN NORTHERN UGANDA UNDER DIRECT LRA ATTACK (2002)
91
LRA ABDUCTED CHILDREN USED AS HUMAN SHIELDS INSTEAD OF BEEING PROTECTED (19972002)
94
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
98
FOOD
98
DISTRIBUTION IN SOROTI MUNICIPALITY ENDS ON 06 DECEMBER AND WILL RESUME AFTER A REVERIFICATION EXERCISE (DECEMBER 2003)
98
HUNGER GAP IS CENTERED IN THE MONTHS OF MAY, JUNE, AND JULY (NOVEMBER 2003)
98
WFP FACES A PIPELINE BREAK OF 35,079 TONS OF FOOD COMMODITIES FROM SEPTEMBER 2003
THROUGH MARCH 2004 (OCTOBER 2003)
99
HUNGER GAP IS INCREASING IN GULU CAMPS (OCTOBER 2003)
99
DRAUGHT AND HUNGER IN KARAMAJONG DOMINATED NORTH-EAST
100
RAPIDLY DETERIORATING FOOD SECURITY SITUATION (NOVEMBER 2002)
102
HEALTH
103
HEALTH CARE FOR IDPS CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE (NOVEMBER 2003)
103
HEALTH SITUATION IN SOROTI (OCTOBER 2003)
104
HEALTH SITUATION HAS REACHED CRISIS PROPORTIONS ( SEPTEMBER 2003)
104
3
RAPE, SEXUAL ABUSE, AND EXPLOITATION BY UPDF SOLDIERS CONTRIBUTE TO THE
105
TRANSMISSION OF HIV (JULY 2003)
CONGESTION, POOR HYGIENE AND CHANGED SEXUAL BEHAVIORAL PRACTICES HAVE WORSENED
THE HEALTH SITUATION IN RWENZORI IDP CAMPS (2002)
106
POOR HEALTH SERVICES AVAILABLE FOR THE DISPLACED POPULATION (2001)
106
POOR HEALTH CONDITIONS REPORTED IN KATAKWI IDP CAMPS (2002)
107
HEALTH SERVICE DELIVERY SUFFERED ANOTHER SERIOUS SET BACK AS A RESULT OF LRA
ATROCITIES (NOVEMBER 2002)
108
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAUMA SUFFERED BY ABDUCTED CHILDREN MAKES THEIR
REINTEGRATION DIFFICULT (2001)
109
CHRONIC MALNUTRITION RATE WAS HIGH AMONG IDPS IN BUNDIBUGYO (NOVEMBER 2001) 110
WATER AND SANITATION
111
WATER AND SANITATION IN SOROTI DISTRICT (OCTOBER 2003)
111
WATER SOURCES ARE INSUFFICIENT FOR THE POPULATION (JULY 2003)
111
WATER AND SANITATION SITUATION REMAINS POOR IN CONFLICT AREAS (2002)
112
MOST DRAMATIC SUCCESSES AND BROADEST CONSTRAINTS IN WATER AND SANITATION SECTORS
113
SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS
114
NO OFFICIAL ASSISTANCE IS PROVIDED TO THE CHILDREN KNOWN AS ‘NIGHT COMMUTERS’ (JULY
2003)
115
LRA ATTACKS IN NORTHERN UGANDA LEFT HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS IDPS WITHOUT SHELTER
(2002)
116
ACCESS TO EDUCATION
117
GENERAL
117
SCHOOLS HAVE NO CAPACITY TO PROVIDE SHELTER, TEACHERS, AND SCHOLASTIC MATERIALS
(NOVEMBER 2003)
117
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE NORTH SEVERELY DISRUPTED ( JULY 2003)
117
DESTRUCTED SCHOOLS STRUCTURES IN SOROTI DISTRICT (OCTOBER 2003)
118
LOW ATTENDANCE IN KATAKWI SCHOOLD DUE TO HUNGER (JUNE 2002)
118
OVER 200,000 SCHOOL CHILDREN DISPLACED IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2002)
119
POSITIVE ASSESSMENTS ABOUT ACCESS TO PRIMARY EDUCATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA
119
DESPITE HIGH DROP OUT RATES OF GIRLS (2002)
EDUCATION SYSTEM DOES NOT ADDRESS THE NEEDS OF TRAUMATISED DISPLACED CHILDREN
121
AND ADOLESCENTS (1998-2002)
CHILDREN PREVENTED FROM ATTENDING SCHOOL IN LIRA (FEBRUARY 2003)
121
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
123
SELF-RELIANCE
123
LACK OF INITIATIVE TO DEVELOP COPYING MECHANISMS (OCTOBER 2003)
123
THE LOWEST LEVEL HOUSEHOLD WOULD BE LIVING OFF OF 5 US CENTS PER PERSON PER DAY
(OCTOBER 2003)
123
SERIOUS CONCERN THAT OVER HALF A MILLION ACHOLI WILL DEPEND ON HUMANITARIAN
124
ASSISTANCE UNTIL AUGUST 2003 (AUGUST 2002)
COLLAPSE OF SOCIAL FABRIC AND PASTORAL ECONOMY IN THE NORTH
126
RWENZORI REPORT SHOWS THAT DISPLACEMENT HAS CHANGED TRADITIONAL LIVELIHOOD
127
PATTERNS
4
WORST CROP FAILURE EVER SEEN IN THE LAST 20 YEARS HITS KARAMOJA (2002)
128
DRAMATIC DIMINISHING OF CATTLE HERDS DUE TO CATTLE RAIDS AND INCREASED DEMAND FOR
129
MEAT BY ARMY (1985-1997)
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
131
FEMALE HEADED HOUSHOLDS LIMITED CAPACITY TO ENSURE ASSISTANCE
131
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
133
GENERAL
133
APATHY AND DESPAIR (OCTOBER 2003)
133
MANY ABDUCTED WOMEN AND GIRLS FIND IT HARD TO ADJUST TO THE LIFE BACK HOME(JULY
2003)
133
CONFLICT AFFECTED AREAS IN NORTHERN UGANDA SUFFER SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
134
BREAKDOWN
CONTRADICTING PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER ROLES (2002)
136
FEMALE-HEADED HOUSEHOLDS DISADVANTAGED DURING RESETTLEMENT (2002)
136
PROPERTY ISSUES
139
GENERAL
139
THE THREAT TO ACHOLI LANDS HAS BECOME A MAJOR POINT OF CONTENTION IN THE ON-GOING
139
WAR IN ACHOLILAND(OCTOBER 2003)
THE GOVERNMENT PLANS LARGE SCALE MECHANIZED FARMING (AUGUST 2003)
139
93 PERCENT OF WOMEN BEING LOCKED OUT OF OWNERSHIP TO LAND (2003)
140
ELDERS ENSURED THAT INDIVIDUAL MEN DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO SELL LAND
140
"THE LAND ACT OF 1998 CHANGED THE MEANING OF THE WORD ‘OWNERSHIP’ TO MEAN
‘INDIVIDUAL OWNERSHIP (2000)
142
PEOPLE NOT GIVEN SUFFICIENT TIME TO COLLECT THEIR BELONGINGS WHEN FORCED TO MOVE
142
TO "PROTECTED VILLAGES" (1997)
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
144
GENERAL
144
IMPROVED SECURITY IN RWENZORI INDUCED RETURN
144
POSITIVE SIGNALS OF IMPROVED OPPORTUNITIES FOR RETURN IN MOST AREAS DURING FIRST
147
HALF OF 2002
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN ORDER TO FACILITATE RETURN IN THE NORTH BEFORE SECURITY
149
DEGRADATION (FEBRUARY 2002
DISPLACEMENT AND ONGOING CONFLICT HAVE ERODED RESOURCES NEEDED FOR SUCCESSFUL
151
RETURN (2001)
RETURN
152
RETURN OF ABDUCTEES
152
WHAT PROSPECTS DO THE IDPS THEMSELVES HAVE FOR RETURN?
153
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
155
GENERAL
155
5
THE REBELS SHOULD BE INFLUENCED TO NOT ATTACK THOSE WHO HELP THEIR OWN
PEOPLE(NOVEMBER 2003)
CAPTURED DRIVERS ARE KILLED VEHICLES BURNED (SEPTEMBER 2003)
NGOS THAT ACCESS SOME OF THE CAMPS WITHOUT ESCORT PLACE THEMSELVES AT
CONSIDERABLE RISK (AUGUST 2003)
KARAMAJOA INSECURITY PREVAILS (AUGUST 2003)
HUMANITARIAN RELIEF CONVOYS ATTACKED (JULY 2003)
CONSTANT VOLATILE SECURITY SITUATION FOR HUMANITARIAN WORKERS (MAY 2003)
OVERVIEW OF THE ACCESS SITUATION AT SEPTEMBER 2002
156
156
157
158
159
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
161
155
155
DONOR RESPONSE
161
€2 MILLION IN HUMANITARIAN AID TO THE VICTIMS OF THE DEPLORABLE HUMANITARIAN
161
SITUATION IN NORTHERN, CENTRAL AND EASTERN UGANDA (DECEMBER 2003)
SERIOUS SHORTFALL IN FUNDING
161
81,5 % OF REQUIREMENTS FOR CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL FOR 2003 MET
(NOVEMBER 2003)
163
INTERNATIONAL DONORS ARE CONCERNED (JANUARY 2003)
163
REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
164
KNOWN REFERENCES TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (AS OF AUGUST
2003)
164
ANALYSING THE "PROTECTED VILLAGES" IN REFERENCE TO THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (MARCH 2002)
165
"GUIDING PRINCIPLES" TAILORED FOR THE UGANDAN OPERATIONAL CONTEXT RATIONALISE
167
PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN 2001
NATIONAL RESPONSE
168
LOCAL AUTHORITIES POORLY CAPACITATED (AUGUST 2003)
168
THE GOVERNMENT OF UGANDA DEVELOPPING A NATIONAL POLICY ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
(2002)
169
'DECONGESTION' PLANS ON GOVERNMENT AGENDA (2001-2002)
171
LACK OF COMMITMENT FROM UGANDAN GOVERNMENT TO ASSIST RETURNING IDPS IN THE
RWENZORI REGION (MAY 2002)
173
MINISTRY OF HEALTH PLANNING AN EMERGENCY ONE-YEAR HEALTH PROGRAMME FOR IDPS IN
KATAKWI (SEPTEMBER 2001)
174
OPERATION TO DISARM THE KARAMOJONG INITIATED BY END-2001
174
MINISTRY FOR DISASTER PREPAREDNESS AND REFUGEES MAIN COORDINATING BODY FOR IDP
ASSISTANCE SINCE 1998
177
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE
179
OCHA DIRECTOR DENOUNCES THE WORLD'S BIGGEST, NEGLECTED, IGNORED HUMANITARIAN
179
CRISIS (NOVEMBER 2003)
UNITED NATIONS TO SCALE UP ASSISTANCE TO NORTHERN UGANDA (NOVEMBER 2003)
180
THE UN COUNTRY TEAM IN UGANDA IS FOCUSED ON LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT AND HAS DONE
LITTLE TO RESPOND TO THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS (OCTOBER 2003)
180
CALL FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFLICT (OCTOBER 2003)
182
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON IDPS ON OFFICIAL VISIT TO UGANDA
(AUGUST 2003)
182
US CONTRIBUTES $3MILLION TO UGANDA'S DEFENCE BUDGET(JANUARY 2003)
183
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE RESURGENT CRISIS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2002)
183
IDP RELATED FOOD AID DURING 2002
185
6
CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY APPEAL FOR UGANDA 2003: MID-YEAR REVIEW
188
CONSTRAINTS ENCOUNTERED AND PROGRESS MADE BY THE HUMANITARIAN COMMUNITY (2002)
192
UN COORDINATION MECHANISM
194
INTERVIEW WITH UN RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION OF IDP ACTIVITIES(NOVEMBER 2003)
194
HIGH LEVEL UN MISSION HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH DISTRICT OFFICIALS, NGOS AND CIVIL
SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS (NOVEMBER 2003)
196
SECTORAL COORDINATION IS NOT WHAT IT SHOULD BE (SEPTEMBER 2003)
197
RECOMMENDATIONS FOLLOWING UN MISSION TO IDP CAMPS (AUGUST 2003)
197
WFP TO STRENGTHEN PARTNERSHIPS WITH NGOS (2002)
198
REGISTRATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEM FOR ABDUCTIONS SET UP BY THE GOU AND UNICEF
198
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE UN CAPACITY FOR COORDINATION (2000-2001)
200
NGO RESPONSE
202
NGO ACTIVITIES IN GULU CAMPS (OCTOBER 2003)
202
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE IN SOROTI DISTRICT (OCTOBER 2003)
202
WORLD VISION ACTIVITIES IN THE NORTH (SEPTEMBER 2003)
202
UGANDAN RED CROSS SOCIETY (URCS) RELIEF EFFORTS IN THE NORTH (SEPTEMBER 2003) 204
IDP RELATED NGO ACTIVITIES INCLUDED IN THE 2002 UN CONSOLIDATED INTER-AGENCY
APPEAL FOR UGANDA
204
NGO RESPONSES TO RE-EMERGING CRISIS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2002)
206
SELECTED UN ACTIVITIES
207
UNICEF PROVIDES SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS TO 15,000 IDPS (DECEMBER 2003)
207
UN PLANS TO SHIFT AWAY FROM EMERGENCY INTERVENTIONS TOWARDS RECOVERY AND
208
RESETTLEMENT SHATTERED BY RECENT HAVOC IN NORTHERN UGANDA (2002)
OCHA INTER-AGENCY ASSESSMENT OF IDPS IN KATAKWI JUNE 2002
208
OCHA APPEALS FOR THE CREATION OF AN EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND (2000)
209
UNICEF IDP-TARGETED ACTIVITIES (2002)
210
POLICY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
212
THIRD PARTY MEDIATION NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVE A LASTING PEACE (AUGUST 2003)
212
IDP CAMPS: "PROTECTED VILLAGES" OR "PROTECTED BARRACKS"?
214
"PROTECTED VILLAGES" AND LACK OF CLEAR GOU POLICY ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT
(SEPTEMBER 2002)
215
NGO INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE IDP RIGHTS (2002)
218
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
220
LIST OF SOURCES USED
221
7
PROFILE SUMMARY
Summary
Uganda: Mass displacement to unprotected camps
Described by a senior UN official as the “world’s biggest neglected humanitarian crisis”, the conflict in
northern Uganda has now dragged on for more than 17 years. The number of internally displaced people
(IDPs) has more than doubled from about 650,000 in July 2002 to 1.4 million as of December 2003. The
escalation of the conflict since June 2003 meant hundreds of thousands of people have poured into camps
after fleeing direct attacks by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army and regular fighting between the warring
parties.
There is little evident will on either side to end the conflict peacefully. The government appears to be
encouraged in its strategy to pursue a military solution by considerable assistance from the United States,
provided in exchange for Ugandese support for the fight against international terrorism. It is widely
believed that the government army is unable or – worse – unwilling to protect the IDP camps, which are
frequently attacked by the LRA. Because of the insecurity, few humanitarian actors assist the heavily
congested camps where conditions are appalling with a widespread breakdown of schools, health care, and
water and sanitation facilities.
In order to bring an end to this humanitarian catastrophe and the suffering of the victims of this bloody
conflict, the country’s major donors should use their influence to urge the Ugandan government to
effectively protect IDP camps against rebel attacks. Also, existing regional mechanisms under the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD) should be used to encourage the government to fulfil its obligation to protect its citizens.
Background and main causes of displacements
The majority of the reported 1.4 million displaced people are concentrated in about 180 sites throughout
nine northern and eastern districts (OPM, 11 November 2003; UN OCHA, 30 November 2003). The
largest camps are located in Gulu. Camp populations generally range from more than 50,000 to less than
2,000 in the smallest sites, which include churches, public buildings, and hospitals. The average camp
population is 12,000. An unspecified number of displaced is hosted by relatives.
It is widely recognised that the violence perpetrated by the rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
is the main trigger for displacements in northern Uganda. The LRA is headed by members of the previous
national army that was defeated by the Museveni-led National Resistance Army in 1988. The majority of
these troops were Acholi people who live in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader. There is a
long history of antagonism, dating back to colonial rule, between the Acholis and the southern-based elites
who dominated the country before independence in 1962, and again since President Museveni’s accession
to power in 1986 (LIU, 30 October 2003, p 33).
Although the LRA’s wider political agenda is unclear, its immediate objectives seem to be the overthrow of
the current government and the dismantling of the IDP camps. The LRA appears to view the people in
these camps as tacitly supporting the current government. Moreover, the camps make it more difficult for
them to successfully hide from government forces in a deserted countryside. Therefore, by forcing people
out of the camps and back to their homesteads, the rebels would find themselves better protected and have
easier access to logistical support.
8
The LRA reportedly consists of more than 80 per cent abducted children, many of whom have been
converted in the most brutal ways to become extremely violent fighters. The rebels force abducted children
to kill and watch beatings, rape and the slaughtering of friends and relatives. Disobedience is likely to result
in the children falling victim to the same fate. Since the beginning of the conflict in 1986, a total of more
than 20,000 children have been abducted. Some 4,500 were reportedly fighting for the LRA as of July 2003
(HRW, 15 July 2003, p 21).
The conflict escalated in the mid-1990s when the LRA started to receive support from the Sudanese
government in retaliation for the Ugandan government’s support to the Sudanese rebel group, Sudan’s
People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The rebels forced about three-quarters of the population to flee
their homes in the Gulu and Kitgum/Pader districts of the north. A relative calm in the area during 1999 and
part of 2000 allowed for some return movements, but escalated LRA attacks since the beginning of 2000
have forced an increasing number of people to seek refuge in IDP camps, or in the towns of Gulu and
Kitgum. After a period of some stability, the LRA intensified its raids during the first months of 2002.
In March 2002, with the consent of the Sudanese government, the Ugandan army launched a large-scale
military offensive called “Operation Iron Fist” against the LRA’s rear bases in southern Sudan (IRIN, 5
April 2002). This huge military operation aggravated an already complex conflict. The deployment of a
large part of army troops in pursuit of the LRA in Sudan left the Acholi displaced population without
adequate protection against the rebels. This lack of physical protection is directly reflected in the number of
recently abducted children who reached more than 8,000 only between June 2002 and July 2003 (HRW, 15
July 2003). To avoid direct confrontation with the army, the LRA returned to northern Uganda from their
rear bases in southern Sudan, split into smaller groups and initiated some of the worst atrocities in the
history of the war. The suffering inflicted by the rebels is further exacerbated by it being committed by the
victims’ own ethnic group and, in many cases, the their own relatives.
In spite of various half-hearted attempts, mostly under international pressure, to open dialogue with the
LRA for a negotiated peace, the Ugandan government has chosen to confront the problem in the north by
military means. Any attempt at a peace process is further complicated by an apparent lack of will on the
part of the rebels to engage in serious talks, as well as mutual mistrust on both sides (HURIPEC, 30
October 2003, p. 121; IRIN, 22 April 2003). Following the repeated failures to settle the conflict locally,
domestic non-governmental organisations have called for urgent international mediation (HURIPEC, 30
October 2003, pp 144-145).
Background and main causes of displacements in the west
The other main area of displacement in Uganda has been the Rwenzori mountains in the Bundibugyo
District on Uganda’s western border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This region has
suffered violent attacks by the rebel group Allied Democratic Front (ADF) since November 1996. The ADF
violence intensified between 1998 and 2000 and included the abduction of school children as well as
attacks on IDP camps. After early 2001, the situation improved as a result of a weakening of the ADF by
the Ugandan Army that led to the return of most IDPs. In May 2002 an international team of experts
declared the western area safe and free from rebel infiltrators. Government figures make no reference to
IDPs in this area anymore (OPM, 11 November 2003).
However, according to some local observers a considerable number of the IDPs in the Bundibugyo District
sold their land in desperation at unreasonable low prices during their displacement and are now unable to
reintegrate. Without access to land in their places of origin or job opportunities in the urban centres they
fled to, many of the 87,000 people displaced during the conflict have become impoverished urban squatters.
Thus, even though officially there are no recognised IDPs in the District, a considerable number of those
who were recognised as such will most likely have to face the consequences of the displacements the rest of
their lives unless compensation schemes are initiated.
Background and main causes of displacements in the east
9
In eastern Uganda, internal displacement has been triggered by the violent raiding of villages by
Karamojong pastoralists and warriors. There has been a significant increase in violent raids following the
beginning in 2000 of a multi-year draught. During the raids, the perpetrators maim, loot, rape, kill and burn
down huts.
As a result of the intensified violence in the area, which has been aggravated by an incursion of LRA rebels
in June 2003, the number IDPs in the east rose from about 50,000 in May 2003 to almost 500,000 in
October 2003. The conditions in the camps have deteriorated considerably with poor water and sanitation,
spread of measles, malaria, diarrhoea and pneumonia, education facilities destroyed and malnutrition. The
camps are largely out of bounds to humanitarian actors (ACT, 30 October 2003).
The Karamojong who have been the main perpetrators of violence in the district, have suffered from a
history of colonial and post-colonial repressive policies, which has fuelled their distrust of formal
government initiatives. The creation of the Kidepo National Park by the Obote government in the 1960s,
for example, destroyed their access to grazing and watering points during the dry seasons (Minority Rights
Group International, 12 March 2001, pp. 6, 14, 19). Moreover, the proliferation of small automatic arms
has contributed to the disintegration of traditional clan structures in which elders are able to exercise
control over the younger generation. The introduction of automatic weapons has created new dynamics of
violence, which evidently goes beyond the search for water and pasture during the dry season. Automatic
weapons have given younger men the means and incentive to establish a reputation as brave warriors and
build their own herds through mounting raids on other pastoral groups and neighbouring populations (UN
OCHA, 30 November 2003).
Continued large-scale
displacement to unprotected camps
The intensified violence has triggered massive displacements to largely unprotected camps, which are in
fact regular targets for LRA attacks. The camp leaders in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader who attended an NRC
workshop on the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement in November 2003 said the soldiers usually
tried to avoid confrontations with the rebels when the camps come under attack. According to the camp
leaders this non-interventionist ‘policy’ is because of their fear of being outnumbered and suffering losses
rather than a military strategy, as the soldiers reportedly claim.
The combination of poor physical protection and the rebels’ tactic of deliberately attacking the camps have
caused the security situation within the IDP camps to deteriorate dramatically. The insecurity in Gulu, for
example, was on the rise in early December 2003 following a relative lull earlier in the autumn. This
increase in violence was followed by a considerable rise in rebel activities in other northern and eastern
districts as well, which included reports of massacres in villages outside Lira town and thousands of
displacements into Lira town itself (UN OCHA 30 November 2003). Despite public statements by the
government and the army that they are firmly committed to fight the LRA, the rebels’ violence against the
displaced people is relentless with killings, abductions, looting and road ambushes occurring almost on a
daily basis.
Thousands of children, the so-called night commuters, regularly move from insecure areas into safer town
centres to spend the night on verandas and the streets. There are reports of 15,000 night commuters coming
to Kitgum, and unspecified numbers to Soroti and Lira. In Gulu, the children were relocated to nearby
school buildings (UN OCHA, 30 November 2003, 5 November 2003, 13-14 October). An additional source
of concern is the number of unrecognized camps which in Gulu amount to more than 13 in addition to the
33 recognised. Unrecognised camps do not receive WFP rations or other officially endorsed assistance.
Appalling humanitarian conditions
The displacements and volatile security situation have severely impeded the majority of the IDPs’ access to
farmland and hence reduced significantly the general food security situation. This further exacerbates the
appalling humanitarian conditions in the camps.
10
Nutrition surveys indicate that malnutrition is more prevalent among displaced children than among the
underage population at large. Malnutrition rates increase significantly when WFP reduces rations to the
camps because of shortages of food deliveries (ACT, October 2003, WFP, 12 November 2003).
A large number of public health units have been closed down, health workers have moved to safer areas,
and expectant mothers are not attended to adequately. Diseases like malaria and acute respiratory infections
proliferate (AAH, 30 October 2003, p 6).
In the congested camps in Gulu, each person receives an average of three litres of safe water as opposed to
the recommended 20 litres. The congestion in the camps in combination with an acute shortage in latrines there is one latrine for every 145 people in some camps - increases the possibility of faecal contamination
of ground water.
Difficulties in introducing free primary education in Uganda under the Universal Primary Education policy
(UPE) have been compounded by the problems of displacement. Firstly, few, if any, of the school
infrastructures were designed to cope with the influx of displaced pupils. Secondly, because of the
displacements of teachers, students and schools, funds allocated under the UPE scheme do not reach
approved destinations. The result is a recurrent lack of school materials, an acute shortage of teachers, and
an increase in pupil-to-classroom ratio of 112:1 to 234:1 in some schools (OPM 11 November: UN OCHA
19 November 2003).
The poor health among the displaced population has been aggravated by the congested camps and a
breakdown of social structures (Oxfam, 8 February 2002). On the whole, conflict and displacement in
Uganda have undermined community support systems, and there has been an increase in crime, and alcohol
and drug abuse since the 1990s.
Humanitarian access
The intensified rebel activity has hampered the provision of humanitarian assistance to most of the camps
in northern and eastern Uganda, with the exception of WFP monthly food deliveries and occasional visits
by some NGOs. Although WFP offers non-governmental organisations places in their heavily escorted
convoys, these are often not accepted. Some organisations refuse the offer as a matter of principle; others
argue that they would not be able to carry out their activities in the midst of hectic food distributions.
Return opportunities
The hopes for return movements in the Acholi districts in the north have been dashed following the launch
of the Ugandan army’s Operation Iron Fist in March 2002 and the intensified rebel activity since June
2003. The frequent attacks, lootings, killings, rapes and abductions make any return movements in the near
future highly unlikely. Nevertheless, in Soroti, a district recently affected by rebel activity, IDPs have
reportedly tended gardens and farmland during the day whenever the security has allowed and returned to
town at night (UN OCHA, 30 November 2003).
The poor prospects for return, especially in Kitgum, Pader and Gulu where the conflict has lasted the
longest, should not prevent return preparations. One element of these preparations could be to investigate
the impact of the Land Act of 1998, which opened up the way for the privatisation of land. If large-scale
sale of land takes place during displacement, this might constitute a significant obstacle to return and
reintegration.
International humanitarian response faces dilemma
Since June 2003 the escalation of the conflict beyond the Acholi districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader has
added hundreds of thousands of beneficiaries to WFP’s lists of recipients. In Kitgum, WFP has commenced
food distributions to ten new camps in the east of the district. In Pader, food rations cover around 50 per
cent of the nutritional requirements. In the eastern districts of Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido and Kumi,
WFP distributes food to more than 400,000 IDPs (WFP, 8 December 2003).
11
Nevertheless, following emergency food needs assessments conducted in September and October 2003,
WFP has reduced the general rations in Gulu and to the old camps in Kitgum from 86 % to 65 % of the
daily minimum nutritional requirement (WFP, 3 December 2003). The reduction is mainly because of
increased access to farmland for IDPs during the months of August and September in 2003 following
improved security in these months, reliable rainfall, and subsequently a better harvest (WFP 8 December
2003).
However, the international humanitarian response to the displaced in northern Uganda might be hampered
because of the government’s strategy to pursue a military solution to the conflict. This strategy is backed up
by the United States, which provides considerable military assistance in exchange for Ugandese support for
the fight against international terrorism. The government’s decision to increase the defence budget at the
expense of other sectors has angered several donors, which in response have threatened to cut humanitarian
assistance to the country (LIU, 1 February 2003).
The recent visits of the UN Representative on Internally Displaced People, Dr. Francis Deng in August and
the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland in November 2003 succeeded in drawing much-needed
international attention to the conflicts in Uganda.
The visit of Dr. Deng in August 2003 highlighted the need to adopt and implement the draft national policy
on internal displacement, which was developed by the government on the basis of the UN Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement and in consultation with the UN Unit on Internal Displacement. The
policy will reportedly not imply any financial commitments on the part of the government. Even though
return plans, which make up an important part of the policy, are currently obsolete in the face of the ongoing crisis, a national policy on internal displacement is still needed to coordinate protection and
assistance to the affected population.
Mr. Egeland’s well-publicised visit contributed to raise awareness of the humanitarian emergencies in
northern Uganda. Moreover, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs started opening
offices in Kitgum, Lira and Soroti. This initiative is expected to strengthen the UN coordination efforts,
which have been strongly criticised.
(Updated December 2003)
12
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF DISPLACEMENT
Access to monthly "Humanitarian Update"
Humanitarian Update by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(January 2001 - September 2003)
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) based in Kampala
publishes a monthly update that provides the latest information about protection issues and subsistence
needs of the internally displaced in Uganda, as well as updated figures on IDP populations. This
information is being incorporated in the Global IDP Database when the Uganda profile is updated –
normally every 3-4 months. The Monthly Update may thus contain more recent information than this
country profile. If you want to access the complete reports, you may download these in PDF format below.
On request we can also make available Updates for 1999 and 2000.
Background
One outline of the causes of the conflict in Acholiland
•
Contemporary violent conflicts in the country are directly related to the profound crisis of
legitimacy of the state, its institutions and their political incumbents
•
This crisis reflects the way the state was constructed through European expansionist violence,
manipulation of pre-existing differences, administrative policies of divide and rule and economic
policies that further fractured the colonial entity
•
Conflicts in the colonial state were exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic
zones
•
The post-colonial regime inherited a fractured state
•
In April 1979, the exiled rebels, who were overwhelmingly from Acholi and Langi, assisted by
the Tanzanian army and Yoweri Museveni’s Front for National Salvation (FRONASA),
overthrew the Amin regime
•
The new administration organized general elections in December 1980, which were won by
Milton Obote and his Uganda People’s Congress
•
The main challenger, the Democratic Party (DP), rejected Obote's victory. Museveni also rejected
the results
•
The war in Acholi has become an extension of regional and international power struggles
"The roots of the current war between the government of Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
in Acholiland are entwined with the history of conflicts in Uganda and the rise to power of the National
Resistance Movement/National Resistance Army (NRM/A). The conflict has persisted because of
fragmented and divisive national politics, strategies and tactics adopted by the armed protagonists, and
regional and international interests. The harrowing war has claimed many innocent civilian lives, forcefully
displaced over 400,000 people and destroyed schools and health centres. In addition, the war has been
13
characterized by widespread and systematic violations of human rights, including rapes, abductions of men,
women and children, torture, increased economic decay, and national and regional insecurity.
Uganda: land and people
Uganda lies along the Equator, between the great East African Rift Valleys. It is a landlocked country,
bordered by Sudan in the north, Kenya in the east, Tanzania in the south, Rwanda in the southwest and the
Democratic Republic of Congo in the west. With a landmass of 241,139 square kilometres, its population is
about 20 million. Its territory includes Lake Victoria, Lake Albert, Lake Edward and Lake Kyoga. These
lakes, together with several elaborate networks of river drainage, constitute the headwaters of the River
Nile. The country’s economy is primarily agrarian, comprised mostly of smallholdings though pastoralism
is dominant in Karamoja and Ankole.
Lake Kyoga forms both a physical and linguistic marker. South of Kyoga is the so-called Bantu region,
with the centralized pre-colonial states of Buganda, Toro, Ankole (Nkore) and Bunyoro the dominant
territories. North and east of Kyoga are the non-Bantu territories of the Acholi, Alur, Langi, Iteso and
Karamojong. The Acholi inhabit present-day northern Uganda and southern Sudan, where, in the precolonial era, they constructed decentralized states. In the 1970s, the Acholi district of northern Uganda was
divided into Gulu and Kitgum districts. In 2001, Kitgum was subdivided to create a third district of Pader.
The three districts constitute an area commonly referred to as Acholiland.
Conflicts and fragmentation in colonial Uganda
Contemporary violent conflicts in the country are directly related to the profound crisis of legitimacy of the
state, its institutions and their political incumbents. This crisis, in part, reflects the way the state was
constructed through European expansionist violence, manipulation of pre-existing differences,
administrative policies of divide and rule and economic policies that further fractured the colonial entity.
These policies did not only undermine the faltering legitimacy of the state, but also impeded the emergence
of a Ugandan nationalism and generated ethnic, religious and regional divisions that were to contribute in
later years to instability and political violence.
One significant divide was along the lines of religious affiliation, which can be traced back to the arrival of
Islam, Protestantism and Catholicism in Buganda. These religious groups engaged in a ferocious conflict
for dominance, and the Protestant faction emerged victorious after the Imperial British East Africa
Company intervened in their favour. Anglicans were to late dominate the top positions in the civil service,
and this structural inequality was maintained after the colonial era. Consequently, religious beliefs and
political party affiliations were to become entangled.
Conflicts in the colonial state were exacerbated by the partition of the country into economic zones. For
example, while a large portion of the territory south of Lake Kyoga was designated as cash crop growing
and industrial zones, the territory north of Lake Kyoga was designated as a labour reserve. This partition,
which was not dictated by development potentials, led to economic disparities between the south and the
north. The fragmentation of the society was compounded by the economic-cum-administrative policy that
left the civil service largely in the hands of Baganda and the army largely in the hands of the Acholi and
other northern ethnic groups. These policies also widened the gulf between the socio-political south and the
socio-political north. This was further sustained by the administrative policy that relied on the Baganda as
colonial agents in other parts of the country. The policy of divide and rule, which rested on so-called
‘indirect rule’, led to widespread anti-Buganda sentiment.
Conflicts and fragmentation in post-independent Uganda
The post-colonial regime inherited a fractured state. Milton Obote responded to this crisis of legitimacy by
forming an alliance between his political party, the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) and the Buganda
monarchy party (Kabaka Yekka). With this marriage of convenience, Obote became the Executive Prime
14
Minister and Kabaka Mutesa II became the President and Head of State. However, the alliance collapsed
over a conflict over land (the ‘lost counties’) between Bunyoro and Buganda. The ‘divorce’ led to
widespread violence in Buganda. Obote responded by detaining five government ministers from the Bantu
region, dismissing the President and Vice President and forcing President Mutesa into exile and suspending
the 1962 constitution. The government also imposed a state of emergency in Buganda, occupied Buganda’s
palace, following the flight of the Kabaka to England, and introduced a republican constitution. Some
Bantu-speaking groups perceived this struggle for legitimacy and power as a conflict between the Bantu
south and the non-Bantu (Nilotic) north.
These difficulties overlapped with the instability generated in the region by the superpowers’ quest for
hegemony during the Cold War. These crises were compounded by a conflict between Obote and his army
commander, General Idi Amin. In 1971, Amin seized power. Immediately after he came to power, Amin
ordered Acholi and Langi soldiers, who constituted the backbone of the army, to surrender their arms. The
overwhelming majority of them did so. However, many were subsequently killed. The government
extended its conflict with the Acholi and Langi by arresting, detaining and killing highly educated and
influential members of the ethnic groups. Over time, Amin began to target people he perceived as disloyal
from other parts of the county. To protect the regime which lacked political legitimacy in the country,
Amin recruited new soldiers into the national army from West Nile. In addition, he appointed prominent
Bantu to important positions in his government. The regime however largely maintained the dominance of
southerners in the civil service and commerce, while the northerners largely controlled the government and
army.
In April 1979, the exiled rebels, who were overwhelmingly from Acholi and Langi, assisted by the
Tanzanian army and Yoweri Museveni’s Front for National Salvation (FRONASA), overthrew the Amin
regime. Yusuf Lule assumed power. However, ideological and ethnic conflicts within the Uganda National
Liberation Front (UNLF) and the national army led to the collapse of the Lule administration within
months. Godfrey Binaisa took over, but was himself deposed in May 1980 by Paulo Muwanga and his
deputy Yoweri Museveni.
The new administration organized general elections in December 1980, which were won by Milton Obote
and his Uganda People’s Congress. But widespread irregularities and political violence undermined the
legitimacy of the elections. The main challenger, the Democratic Party (DP), rejected Obote's victory.
Museveni also rejected the results. Thereafter, a number of armed groups, including Lule’s Uganda
Freedom Fighters, Museveni’s Popular Resistance Army (later they were to merge to form the National
Resistance Movement/Army (NRM/A), and Dr Andrew Kayira's Uganda Freedom Movement/Army
(UFM/A), declared war against the Obote government. In West Nile, Brigadier Moses Ali’s Uganda
National Rescue Front (UNRF) and General Lumago's Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) also
engaged the army and the UPC in bitter armed opposition.
Fighting was particularly intense in the Luwero triangle, where the mostly Baganda population was
targeted for their perceived support of rebel groups. Many innocent civilians were tortured and murdered by
the UNLA. Although the UNLA was a national and multi-ethnic army, the NRM/A held the Acholi
exclusively responsible for the atrocities committed, and this disputed perception was to shape subsequent
attitudes toward the conflict.
In July 1985, conflict between some Langi and Acholi soldiers led to the overthrow of the Obote regime.
The coup, which brought General Tito Okello to power, shattered the military alliance between the Acholi
and Langi and escalated ethnic violence. The Okello regime invited all fighting groups and political parties
to join the military government. Every armed group and political party, with the exception of the NRA,
joined the administration. The NRA, however, engaged the regime in protracted peace negotiations held in
Nairobi. In December 1985, the Nairobi Agreement was signed under the chairmanship of President Moi of
Kenya. However, the Agreement was never implemented and Museveni seized power on the 25th January
1986.
15
The NRA’s seizure of power effectively meant that for the first time, socio-economic, political and military
powers were all concentrated in the south. The new administration, which absorbed political and military
groups from the south and Moses Ali's UNRF group, engaged in intensive anti-northern propaganda. The
administration also discriminated against groups from eastern Uganda and West Nile. This severe
alienation and marginalization led to armed conflicts in Teso and West Nile. After much destruction and
displacement of the population in Teso, the government negotiated an end to the conflict in the east.
Emergence of the conflict in Acholiland
By April 1986, the Acholi had largely come to terms with the NRA victory. The majority of former UNLA
soldiers also heeded the appeal made by the government to hand over their arms and demobilize. The
response by the Acholi ended the armed engagement in the territory. However, after months of relative
calm, anxieties escalated when the NRA began to commit human rights abuses in the name of crushing a
nascent rebellion. Over time NRA soldiers plundered the area and committed atrocities, including rape,
abductions, confiscation of livestock, killing of unarmed civilians, and the destruction of granaries, schools,
hospitals and bore holes escalated. These atrocities in Acholiland were justified by some as revenge for the
‘skulls of Luwero’.
Against this background of mistrust and violence, in May 1986 the government ordered all former UNLA
soldiers to report to barracks. The order was met with deep suspicion, in part, because it was reminiscent of
Amin's edict that led to the 1971 massacre of Acholi soldiers. Some ex-UNLA soldiers went into hiding;
others fled to Sudan and some decided to take up arms. Soon, these ex-soldiers were joined by a stream of
youths fleeing from NRA operations. During this period, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA),
which was perceived by Acholi refugees as an ally of the Museveni government, attacked a refugee camp
in southern Sudan. On August 20, 1986, some Acholi refugee combatants, led by Brigadier Odong Latek,
attacked the NRA. This armed group, known as the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA), was later
joined by the Holy Spirit Mobile Forces / Movement (HSMF/HSM), Severino Lukoya's Lord's Army,
ultimately to be followed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
Why the war has persisted
The war has lasted for nearly sixteen years because of a number of interrelated factors. To begin with, the
war in Acholi has become an extension of regional and international power struggles. On the regional front,
Uganda provided military hardware and sanctuary to the SPLA. In retaliation, the Sudan government
provided sanctuary and military hardware to the LRA. On the international front, both the Uganda
government and the SPLA received military and political support from the US, in part to curtail the
influence of the Islamic government in Khartoum. Another factor perpetuating the conflict has been that the
war has become a lucrative source and cover for clandestine income for high-ranking military and
government officials and other profiteers. In addition, the unwillingness of the government and the LRA to
genuinely pursue a negotiated settlement has sustained the war. Lastly, atrocities committed by the LRA
against unarmed civilians and the unwillingness of the rebel group to accept alternative political views on
the conflict have prolonged the war." (Accord, 31 December 2002)
Many Acholi believe that the incumbent (1986-present) government of Yoweri
Museveni has written the Acholi off
•
· Higher rates of military service by northern populations in the volunteer army after
independence
•
· No ethnic group is in the majority in Uganda's 24.6 million population
16
•
· The Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), drew heavily from the impoverished northern
Ugandan Acholi population
•
· The NRA took up positions and bases in the area known as the Luwero triangle to the north of
the capital, Kampala
•
· Yoweri Museveni created the National Resistance Army (NRA) and Movement in 1980 that
took up arms to overthrow the government
•
· In an effort to crush local support of the NRA, the UNLA (including its Acholi soldiers)
committed gross human rights violations, in the Luwero triangle
“The current conflict in northern Uganda has its immediate roots in the troubled times after Ugandan
independence in 1962, when military groups of different ethnic and ideological composition aspired to and
often succeeded in overthrowing a succession of Ugandan governments. Colonial preference to
development of the southern regions and neglect of the north led to an economic imbalance and hence to
higher rates of military service by northern populations in the volunteer army. No ethnic group is in the
majority in Uganda's 24.6 million population; they inhabit an area of 242,554 square kilometers, a dense
population for an African country with an agricultural economy. The first prime minister, Milton Obote,
was ousted by his army commander, Colonel Idi Amin, in 1971. Within Amin's army, his kinsmen from the
West Nile (northwest) region began killing Langi and Acholi soldiers. Amin was overthrown by rebel
Ugandan soldiers and the invading army of Tanzania in 1979. Contested national elections were held and
Milton Obote returned to power in 1980. As was the case under the first rule of Obote, the national army,
then known as the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), drew heavily from the impoverished
northern Ugandan Acholi population.
In part because of the election fraud that brought Obote back to power, Yoweri Museveni created the
National Resistance Army (NRA) and Movement in 1980 that took up arms to overthrow the government.
The NRA took up positions and bases in the area known as the Luwero triangle to the north of the capital,
Kampala. In an effort to crush local support of the NRA, the UNLA (including its Acholi soldiers)
committed gross human rights violations, in this area, including the mass killing of thousands of civilians,
the looting of property and goods, and the destruction of government buildings and homes; the UNLA
sustained heavy casualties itself. Many Acholi believe that, dating from these events, the incumbent (1986present) government of Yoweri Museveni has written the Acholi and their northern region off, which the
government denies.” (HRW, 15 July 2003)
The National Resistance Army’s armed insurgency (1981-1986)
•
The NRA was comprised primarily of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda combatants from
southern and central Uganda
•
UNLA forces in Luwero were often referred to as “the Acholis” and were blamed for the deaths of
100,000 civilians
•
Fearing revenge, the ex-UNLA Acholi forces fled to Sudan where they organised themselves into
an armed insurgency against the NRA
"In 1981, the National Resistance Army (NRA) under Yoweri Museveni began an armed insurgency. The
NRA was comprised primarily of Banyankole, Baganda and Banyarwanda combatants from southern and
central Uganda, including Luwero District where in 1984, Obote forces carried out extensive reprisals
against unarmed Baganda civilians. UNLA forces in Luwero were often referred to as “the Acholis” and
were and blamed for the deaths of 100,000 civilians.
In 1985, Acholi elements in the UNLA overthrew the Obote government, expelled other ethnic groups from
the military, and put a predominately Acholi government in power under General Tito Okello Lutwa. This
17
was followed by authoritative and well documented reports of looting throughout the country by primarily
Acholi officers and enlisted men. Following a short-lived power-sharing treaty between the UNLA and
NRA, the NRA overthrew the government and took power. Fearing revenge, the ex-UNLA Acholi forces
fled to Sudan where they organised themselves into an armed insurgency against the NRA." (UN
November 2001, p.13)
"As the Acholi UNLA forces crossed Acholiland, they warned Acholi civilians that the NRA would exact
revenge - and in fact kill many of them - when it arrived in Gulu and Kitgum. They urged civilians to
follow them across the border to Sudan, and many did. The rest remained at home and held their breath,
awaiting developments." (Gersony, Section 1, 1997,"Advent of the NRA")
"Most of the former Acholi UNLA soldiers who retreated from Kampala (fighting the NRA as they
withdrew) continued north during March 1986 and finally crossed the international border into Sudan.
Sudan provided refuge and a base from which to re-reorganize but, according to most reports, did not
provide military assistance. Several Acholi asserted that, in fact, Sudanese authorities confiscated their
weapons when they entered Sudan and returned them when they crossed back into Uganda." (Gersony
1997, Section 1,"Phase I UPDA")
The Holy Spirit Movement Front [HSMF]and Alice Auma 'Lakwena (1986-1987)
•
The Holy Spirit Movement Front closest to succeeding in overthrowing the NRM [National
Resistance Movement]of any movement
•
The movement’s leader, Lakwena, rather than the UPDA, [Uganda People's Democratic Army]
provided the greatest inspiration for Joseph Kony
•
The HSMF promised redemption to a people who felt they were being punished for atrocities
committed by Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and Lutwa
"In late 1986, a temporary but significant figure emerged on this conflict scene in the form of Alice Auma
'Lakwena.' Lakwena is significant for several reasons: her movement, the Holy Spirit Movement Front
(HSMF), came the closest to succeeding in overthrowing the NRM of any movement to date; Lakwena,
through the HSMF, was the only early resistance to the NRA/M to claim moral and religious grounds to
attempt to influence the conflict; and it seems that Lakwena, rather than the UPDA, provided the greatest
inspiration for Joseph Kony, though he fought with the UPDA. Auma claimed to be possessed by the spirit
of a dead Italian soldier named Lakwena. To a people who felt they were being punished for atrocities
committed by Acholi soldiers fighting the NRA under Obote II and Lutwa, the HSMF promised
redemption. In order to join HSMF, one had to undergo ritual purification to cleanse themselves of past
sins. According to HSMF doctrine, only an impure soldier could die in battle. There can be little doubt that
the success of the HSMF was due, in part, to the beliefs in magic and spirit powers that are a part of the
Acholi culture and, in part, due to the early successes of the HSMF.
In October of 1987, a mere 80 km from Kampala, the NRA finally and resolutely defeated the HSMF.
Lakwena is said to have escaped to Nairobi, but she has not made an overt gesture toward overthrowing the
NRM since. (Westbrook June 2000, sects. III, VI)
The leader of Lord’s Resistance Army broke away with allies in Obote II Army(1988)
•
Ugandan People’s Democratic Army signed a peace accord with the NRM [National Resistance
Army
•
Those with the most to gain by coming back into the country mainstream and, thus, the most to
lose by staying in the bush were the people who accepted the peace accord
18
•
Those who had little education, stood little chance of significant gain, and had already committed
atrocities remained in the bush
" In 1988, however, the UPDA[Ugandan People’s Democratic Army] signed a peace accord with the NRM
[National Resistance Army] Many of those in the UPDA leadership were given positions in the
government. It is said by some that those with the most to gain by coming back into the country mainstream
and, thus, the most to lose by staying in the bush were the people who accepted the peace accord. Those
who had little education, stood little chance of significant gain, and had already committed atrocities
remained in the bush. According to Charles Alai, a founding member of the UPDA, who was, in 1996,
Uganda's Minister of State for Public Services, '...by 1988 when we negotiated with the NRM government,
Kony had already broken away from UPDA. When we came out, we had already disagreed with Kony and
he took the most deadly and primitive officers with him.' Thus, at the conclusion of the 1988 peace accords,
a rather large contingent of the disenfranchised stayed in the bush.
Though Kony adopted many of the methods of his supposed cousin Lakwena he never gleaned the popular
support she had. His movement, known in 1988 as the Uganda Peoples Democratic Christian Army
(UPDCA) and later as the LRA, has had something more of a schizophrenic or disjointed nature about it.
Kony has vacillated from near full adoption of Lakwena's beliefs, including the Christian components
denouncing witch doctors and diviners, to denying any links with Christian doctrine to incorporating many
Muslim rituals and beliefs." (Westbrook June 2000, sects. III, VI).
Lord’s Resistance Army consists of 2,000-3,000 well armed and trained fighters(2002)
"Ugandan and foreign military and diplomatic sources were broadly consistent in their assessment that the
LRA main force, in the Sudan, consists a well-armed and trained body of perhaps 2,000–3,000 fighters,
located in an encampment that is also crowded with those fighters’ wives and consorts, and with their
children as well as young children who have been recently abducted from Acholiland and are undergoing
training as fighters – the total population of the main encampment is perhaps 5,000 people. According to
international military observers, this encampment is over 100 km. from the border (others in the military
place it closer in, at 65 km. from the border), in territory nominally under Sudanese government control,
and it is shifted periodically for security reasons." (Weeks March 2002, p.8)
Background of the Alliance for Democratic Forces (1996-1999)
•
The ADF emerged in western Uganda late 1996
•
ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with
strong Islamic ties
•
Because of the war in DRC borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured thus depriving the
ADF of its supplies (November 1999)
"A new rebel insurgency emerged in western Uganda in late 1996. The Alliance for Democratic Forces
(ADF), using bases in Zaire, attacked in November and abducted 300 civilians. Tens of thousands of
persons - some suffering severe wounds - fled heavy fighting between the rebels and Ugandan troops. They
sought refuge on church properties, in school buildings, and in private residences of friends. (USCR 1997,
p. 102)
"A 'rebellion without a cause'. This is the description most often attributed to rebels of the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) who have been sowing terror and destruction in western Uganda for the last
three years.
[…]
19
The ADF, which decided to adopt Islam as its ideology, was born from a core group of puritanical Moslems
from the Tabliq sect whose members portray themselves as "Moslem evangelists". In Uganda, the Tabliqs
claimed Moslems were being marginalised by the government.
Together with the obscure and largely defunct National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), the
Tabliqs moved to western Uganda to start the rebellion under the ADF umbrella. They set up rear bases in
neighbouring Congo where they began recruiting and training fighters with the promise of money and
education. It was easier to recruit in Congo where the people were not hostile to the ADF.
The ADF has few links with western Uganda - its leaders come from areas in central Uganda with strong
Islamic ties such as Iganga, Masaka and Kampala itself. A former Catholic, Jamil Mukulu, is said to be the
driving force of the ADF. The group also includes some ex-commanders of former president Idi Amin's
army.
Military sources told IRIN there were three main reasons why the rebels adopted western Uganda as their
theatre of operations: the mountainous terrain, the proximity to Congo and the ability to exploit an existing
ethnic conflict in the area. They coerced some local people to help them, especially the Bakonjo people
with their extensive knowledge of the mountains.
Using leaflets and a mobile radio in Congo (now dismantled), they tried to turn the population against the
government by propaganda attacks against its policies. One such statement in 1998, signed by the ADF
"chairman" Frank Kithasamba, warned that the group would "crack down" on those responsible for the
deaths of its members and urged local people "to be on the lookout for politicians who kill and intimidate
opponents and voters for their own interests".
There is little evidence of the ADF's Islamic claims. 'They attack indiscriminately, just to kill,' said David
Magado Katesigwa, the assistant Resident District Commissioner (RDC) for Bundibugyo district. 'They hit
soft targets, such as the IDPs [internally displaced people]'.
Government workers and humanitarian officials alike are unable to explain the ADF's continued senseless
killing, other than that the rebels are now on the run with nowhere to go. 'They carry out revenge attacks
because the local people refuse to support them,' Katesigwa told IRIN.
The ADF problem exploded in 1997. Prior to that there had been sporadic attacks which did not appear to
concern the government too much. President Yoweri Museveni, in his book 'Sowing the Mustard Seed'
published in 1996, makes no mention of the insurgency in the west. But in 1997, the ADF launched a
surprise attack on Ugandan soldiers at Mpondwe on the border with Congo in Kasese district. Attacks and
atrocities escalated the following year with the army apparently unable to contain them, one of its problems
being the lack of an adequate alpine force.
[…]
Sources say that due to the war in DRC and Uganda's collaboration with Congolese rebel groups in
northwest and northeast DRC, the borders with Sudan and DRC have been secured, thus depriving the ADF
of its supplies. Other measures, such as posting soldiers at intervals along the Fort Portal-Bundibugyo road,
have also been taken and there is a noticeable military presence in the whole area." (IRIN 8 December
1999)
For information about displacement caused by ADF see:
Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west and southwest (1998-2000)
Background of the conflict in the West Nile and the WNBF (1971-2002)
•
Conflict in the West Nile distinct from the war in Gulu/Kitgum
20
•
West Nilers in the Idi Amin Army are believed to have participated in massacres of Acholi and
Langi officers
•
West Nile pacified by Tanzanian army forces mid-1979
•
The Museveni force NRA reached the West Nile in March 1986 and relative peace followed
•
Disruption of nine years of peace by the emergence of the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) in 1995
•
WNBF's military strength diminished during 1997 following demobilization of the rebels
•
Most displaced people from the north-west returned to their homes during 1999
"The conflict in the West Nile has been strikingly distinct from the war in Gulu/Kitgum in most essential
respects. These include its duration, the level of motivation of rebel combatants, its intensity and degree of
brutality, the magnitude of casualties and civilian displacement, and its economic impact.
[…]
Unlike the ethnically homogeneous area of Gulu and Kitgum, the West Nile is home to a number of distinct
groups, including the Kakwa and the Aringa (mainly Lugbara-speaking Muslim) people of northern Arua's
Koboko and Aringa counties. The overwhelming majority of Moyo District residents - except in its western
Obongi County - are of the predominantly Christian Madi group, which has participated in neither the West
Nile conflict nor in the war in Acholi, with which it also shares a border.
[…]
Like the Acholi people but in reduced proportion, West Nilers were prominently represented in the Obote I
army. Muslims in northern Arua were considered to be strong supporters of President Obote's Uganda
People's Congress (UPC) party. When Army Commander Idi Amin - an ethnic Kakwa (who was also a
Muslim) and who claimed Koboko County as his birthplace - overthrew the Obote Government in January
1971, the prominence of West Nilers in the Ugandan army increased. It is believed that West Nile soldiers
participated in the large-scale massacres of Acholi and Langi officers […]." (Gersony 1997, Section 2,
"Background" & "The Amin regime")
"Tanzanian army forces were responsible for pacification of the West Nile, which they achieved in mid1979. According to all accounts, their conduct towards West Nile civilians was restrained and correct. In
this environment, West Nilers began to trickle back from southern Sudan. Once the invading coalition had
consolidated its control of Uganda, the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) was reconstituted, with
prominent participation of Acholi and Lango elements.
When during 1980 the UNLA replaced Tanzanian occupying forces in the West Nile, it engaged in brutal
reprisals against the local civilian population. In late 1980, ex-Amin forces invaded from southern Sudan
and forced some UNLA units out of the West Nile region. They were organized into two main groups:
?
the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF), based principally among the Aringa people of
northeast Arua; and
?
the Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) forces, based mainly among the Kakwa people of
northwest Arua.
After it regained control of the area from the ex-Amin forces, the UNLA engaged in further reprisals and
large-scale destruction of property in both Arua and Moyo. One UNLA massacre on 19 June 1981 gained
international prominence: hundreds of displaced civilians had taken refuge in the Comboni (Verona)
Fathers Catholic Mission, over which the flag of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was
flying. UNLA soldiers entered the mission, located at Ombachi just outside Arua town, searching for exAmin guerrillas and in the process killed more than fifty of the civilians, many of them children. As a result
of such incidents, as many as 500,000 West Nile civilians fled to Sudan for refuge." (Gersony 1997,
Section 2 "Amin overthrown - 1979")
Period of relative calm between 1986 and 1994 interrupted in 1995 by the emergence of the West Nile
Bank Front (WNBF):
21
"In late-March 1986, the NRA [Museveni's National Resistance Army] reached the West Nile, meeting no
resistance within the region. The conduct of NRA forces was generally reported as positive. President
Museveni visited Arua during the following month and consulted with the elders on his plans. The UNRF
forces, led by Brigadier Moses Ali, joined the Museveni government. For almost a decade thereafter, the
West Nile enjoyed relative peace. " (Gersony, Section 2, 1997, "Advent of NRA")
"A turning point in the West Nile occurred in 1994, when Sudanese Government forces recaptured from the
SPLA the strategic town of Kajo Keji in southern Sudan, and consolidated their control of the
Sudan/Uganda border west of the Nile. [This was the same year in which Sudan's assistance to Joseph
Kony's LRA began.] With Sudan's assistance, former Amin Foreign Minister, Juma Oris, a Muslim and, at
that time, resident of Juba, organized what became known as the West Nile Bank Front. Interviews in the
West Nile suggest that WNBF officials offered the equivalent of a US$300 recruitment bonus to former
soldiers and young men to join the rebel organization. Recruiters reportedly predicted a rapid defeat of the
Museveni government and attractive employment in a future government in which the WNBF would be a
powerful force. It appears that some recruiters appealed to the Muslim religious background common to the
WNBF's Sudanese sponsors and residents of northern Arua.
WNBF activities began to affect the West Nile in 1995 and intensified in 1996. In 1995, the WNBF (and
Kony's LRA) began to use land mines apparently provided by Sudan. In September 1996, Moyo town was
bombed by aircraft, which appeared to originate in Sudan. WNBF activities were based along the
Uganda/Sudan border as well as in the towns of Aru and Mahagi in northeastern Zaire, from which it
pursued its insurgency.
However, in comparison with the eleven years of Acholi insurgency, WNBF attacks were intermittent,
uneven and less effective. Although their activities ranged from time to time throughout Arua and western
Moyo - and even marginally in eastern Nebbi - to an outside observer, it appeared that the motivation of
WNBF forces was lower than their LRA counterparts, even in some respects half-hearted.
During 1997, the WNBF's strategic capabilities were critically diminished. Banyamulenge operations in
northeastern Zaire deprived the WNBF of its refuge along the Zaire/Uganda border. Military operations led
by the SPLA recaptured control of most of the Sudan/Uganda border. Both military offensives were
reportedly supported directly by UPDF forces. Significant numbers of WNBF leaders and combatants were
captured and returned to Uganda. WNBF activity diminished considerably." (Gersony, Section 2,1997 , "
The Sudan factor")
"The defeat and demobilization of the West-Nile Bank Front (WNBF) rebels in 1997 have brought
increased security to Nebbi and parts of Arua. However, there are now concerns that some of the
demobilized WNBF soldiers are returning to their arms after their hopes for a better life remains unfulfilled
– this, despite distributions of seeds and tools by UNHCR and FAO aimed specifically at ensuring their
successful reintegration." (UN December 1998, p.8)
"WNBF attacks resumed during the year [1998] in northwestern region bordering Sudan and the
Democratic Republic of Congo, and more than 100 abductions in Arua district. The majority of those taken
in subsequent raids over a week-long period later escaped and returned to their homes. In November
WNBF rebels killed and decapitated a Muslim religious leader in Arua, reportedly in retaliation for his
son's defection from the WNBF ranks. The Uganda Salvation Front/Army carried out an attack on a police
station and prison facility near Tororo in the east in August in which it abducted 110 prisoners. Members
of the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF--II) also carried out a number of abductions and killings in
the northwest. The UNRF-- II attacked a WFP vehicle in Moyo and killed a WFP driver in September."
(US DOS March 1999, sect.1g)
"The plight of Ugandans living in the West Nile region improved in 1999 as a result of peace negotiations
between the government and the UNRF II. Most displaced people from the north-west were able to return
to their homes and take steps towards resuming a normal life." (ICRC 31 August 2000)
22
Ceasefire agreement reached between UNRF-II and GoU:
"The government of Uganda and the rebel Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF-II) signed a formal
ceasefire agreement in Kuru sub-county, Yumbe District, northwestern Uganda on Saturday, with the aim
of paving the way for political dialogue in the West Nile region.
[…]
The UNRF-II rebels had taken the chance to return when they realised that the UPDF was serious in its
campaign against the LRA in southern Sudan (an operation it is undertaking with the blessing of the
Sudanese government) and would hardly be likely to leave another rebel force operating in Sudan,
according to Ugandan military sources.
[…]
The challenge now, according to humanitarian workers, will be to set up rehabilitation centres in the north
and west to help resettle those rebels who return, and to ensure at least some measure of social and
economic development for these marginalised areas." (IRIN 19 June 2002)
Background of the conflict in the Karamajong dominated North-East (1970s-2003)
•
Introduction of modern weapons removed relevance of elders as a stabilizing element within the
Karamajong communities
•
The “so-called “Karamajong problem” arose mainly because the colonial government adopted a
policy to maintain Karamajong’s natural heritage for tourism
purposes
•
In line with this colonial policy, the Obote I government Created Kidepo National Park thus
destroying the Karamajong’s access to grazing and watering points
•
Endemic mistrust further to extreme repressive policies including heavy artillery and tanks.
•
Collapse of pastoral economy and lucrative arms trade has created vicious circle of violence.
•
The Sahara desert has continued to move southwards
•
The Museveni government allowed the Karamojong to retain their arms
A Century of Deterioration of Social Order
“In the area of social and political pressures, this century has seen an ever-increasing level of violence.
Forces from the outside have invaded the relative stability of Karamoja, and generally failed to understand
the civil order that was already present. As conformity to foreign ways was forced on the Karamojong, they
put up with it for periods of time but occasionally rebelled against it when their very way of life seemed
threatened.
The introduction of modern weapons made rebellion against these external forces more and more effective,
but these weapons themselves had an effect of changing the internal dynamics of Karamojong life. As the
younger warrior class of Karamojong became increasingly the de facto "law" in Karamoja, the
elder/wisdom class of Karamojong became less of a stabilizing and effective influence. Eventually, respect
for the elders and their traditions has slipped away into a state of near irrelevance.
In the end, all of these pressures taken together produced a bitter fruit of turmoil, enmity, and abandonment
of the traditional order, causing a headlong rush into cattle-raiding, general lawlessness and violence, and a
prevailing low regard for human life.” (http://www.karamoja.org/karmjong/needs.htm)
“The so-called Karamoja problem arose because the colonial government adopted a policy to maintain
Karamajo’s natural heritage for tourism purposes, a policy that never took of due to a break-down of law an
order after Uganda gained independence. Successive post-independence have dealt with the ‘Karamajo
problem’ as a problem of refusal to change and integrate, i.e. as a ‘social deviance’ problem. Government
policies, as reflected in the wording of relevant laws and decrees, for example the Pacification of Karamoja
Decree, deny the Karamajong any meaningful participation in their own social-cultural reforms. Extremes
23
of post-independence policy came under in the mid-1970s. The government sought to ‘civilise’ the
Karamajong using heavy artillery, including tanks, to stop Karamajong cattle raids in neighbouring areas.
This lead to a very heavy death toll that Amin billed as a ‘final solution to the Karamajong problem’.
However, after the fall of Amin, the Karamajong renewed their resistence to government pressure to
abandon their pastoral lifestyle.
During the 1960s, the Turkana from the West and the Toposa from the North with modern firearms and
especially high-powered rifles-began frequent incursions into Karamoja, raiding for cattle and whatever
else they could take. The armed police of the Ugandan government who were statitioned in Karamoja were
ineffectual in responding to these raids. This predicament continued until the coup by Amin in 1971
brought a different armed force into the district. While Amin’s Army was more brutally efficient in
stopping the raiders, the recovered lifestock was stolen by the soldiers and sold to local cattle traders. This
caused the Karamajong to distrust all formal government intitiatives and to increasingly resort to self-help,
creating a vigilant culture in addition to traditional cattle raiding.
[...]
Competition for scarce resources, particularly water and pasture, and the high value placed on cattle have
produced a culture of raiding and warfare within which men are noted for their bravery and their wealth.
This practice leads to a vicious circle in which the Matheniko raid the Bokora, Jie and labwor; and the
Bokora and the Jie raid the Matheniko. The Dodoth and Matheniko seem to have a permanent peace treaty,
but the Dodoth raid the Jie and Turkana of Kneya. The Bokora, Dodoth, Jie and Matheniko all raid Labwor.
This complicated cycle is underlain by the fact that men need cattle to marry. Young men have a powerful
incentive to establish their reputation and build their own heirds through mounting raids on other pastoral
groups. [...]
Since colonial times, the Ugandan government has pursued legislative and taxation policies which, in
practice, have led to only wild animals being allowed to live inside the national parks and reserves. The
establishement of given areas as game parks and reserves has, since its inception in colonal times, caused
affected minority groups to be totally uprooted and dispossessed. … One enduring example is the British
colonial government-originated ‘conservation of Karamoja for tourist purposes’ project.
[...]
This ‘human reserve’-type scheme harmed and stigmatized the Karamajong, and reinforced false and
offensive images of their being ‘primitive’or ‘backward’. In the 1960s, the Obote I government followed
this policy and created Kidepo national Park. The creation of this park destroyed the Karamajong’s access
to grazing and watering points during the dry seasons. This has resulted in conflict between the
Karamajong (in search of water and pasture) and their neighbours during the dry seasons. The fact that the
Sahara desert has continued to move south and has therefore prolonged the droughts-sometimes lasting for
a year at a time-has also prolonged the Karamajong’s search for water. This has led to an intensification of
conflict, mainly with their southern neighbours, the Itesot. Most governments have failed to understand this
process.: instead they have often sanctioned fighting the army to attack and kill the Karamajong, frequently
in large numbers, or have sanctioned fighting between rival groups.” (Minority Rights Group International
12 March 2001, pp. 6, 14, 19 )
24
Karamajong: A thorn in the side of all governments
"The issue of the Karamojong warriors has been a thorn in the side of all Ugandan governments since
independence. The current government of President Yoweri Museveni allowed the Karamojong to retain
their arms in order to protect themselves from external raids by the Turkana and Pokot in neighbouring
Kenya.
[...]
The Karamojong have maintained their armouries by buying guns cheaply from the SPLA [Sudan People's
Liberation Army], and other sources in Somalia and northwestern Kenya, Wairagala Wakabi, a journalist
with 'The EastAfrican' who specialises in the movement of small arms in the region told IRIN. "They have
the option of barter trade where they exchange animals for guns." (IRIN 22 March 2000)
"The north-east of the country is inhabited by the Karamojong pastoralists, a marginalised minority of
about 100,000 people. Since the Karamojong acquired automatic weapons the region has become a virtual
no-go area. The area is suffering from environmental degradation and is periodically struck by famine. The
military has been involved in regular punishment expeditions in the fight again cattle-raiding. Vigilantes
have taken the law into their own hands, resulting in a breakdown of law and order. Guns are plentiful and
gangs have terrorised the local population. An estimated 30,000 illegal weapons are in circulation which
are used to rustle cattle and ambush and raid vehicles. These raids extend across the borders into Kenya and
Sudan and on numerous occasions have provoked serious incidents with neighbouring countries." (EPCPT
December 2000)
Causes of displacement
Displacements in Acholi dominated area
Brutal killing of over 60 civilians caused displacements in Lira (November 2003)
"Thousands of civilians have fled into Lira town in northern Uganda, following the Lord's Resistance Army
(LRA)'s latest brutal killing of over 60 civilians between 06 and 07 November. The District Disaster
Management Committee has registered over 10,000 new IDPs, since the new spate of attacks. Lira district
is now host to over 48,000 IDPs. Over the last two weeks, WFP has provided 270 tons of food to 29,983
persons displaced in Lira Municipality through the Christian Children's Fund (CCF)." (WFP, 14 November
2003)
25
Government allegedly moved Refugees by force (August 2003)
"Former Acholi Pii refugees relocated to West Nile
On 1st September, the Government of Uganda began the relocation of 16,000 Sudanese refugees from
Kiryandongo Refugee Settlement in Masindi district, southwestern Uganda to refugee settlements in
Yumbe and Arua districts in northwestern Uganda. The exercise, which ended on 8th September, went on
amid controversial reports of use of force by Government. Consequently there were allegations of refugees
being wounded, arrested and killed (deaths have not been confirmed and Government has categorically
refuted them).
UNHCR was initially denied access to Kiryandongo settlement, but were later given access to monitor the
ongoing relocation exercise. UNHCR was fully involved in receiving the refugees in the West Nile
settlements. However, there are still varied views on the adequacy of existing infrastructure in Madi
Okollo and Ikafe settlements. Currently. DED and LWF are managing the settlements and DED has started
allocating plots for both agricultural and residential purposes. Distribution of food and NFIs is also
ongoing."(UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
Army displaced 300,000 people (July 2003)
•
Displacement or capture of civilians solely to deny a social base to the enemy has nothing to do
with the security of the civilians
•
It would be prohibited to move a population in order to exercise more effective control over a
dissident ethnic group
•
Forty-eight hours after the order was issued, the UPDF began shelling, bombing, and using
helicopter gun ships to attack the areas around the camps
•
It is unclear why the government is unable to provide for the security of the civilians in any way
other than such forced displacement
"The oral army order of October 2, 2002, displacing some 300,000 people, together with those 500,000
previously displaced, resulted in approximately 800,000 displaced and needy persons originating in the
three northern districts, according to the WFP-a total of 70 percent of their population-an astoundingly high
percentage. Most of adults in this population are capable of economic self-sufficiency through small
farming for themselves and their families-but now they are dependent on international relief to survive.
Article 17 (1) of Protocol II states in part: ‘1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be
ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military
reasons so demand.’
The term ‘imperative military reasons’ usually refers to evacuation because of imminent military
operations. The provisional measure of evacuation is appropriate for example if an area is in danger as a
result of military operations or is liable to be subjected to intense bombing or other military action. It may
also be permitted when the presence of protected persons in an area hampers military operations. The
prompt return of the evacuees to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area have ceased is implied in the
article.
Displacement or capture of civilians solely to deny a social base to the enemy has nothing to do with the
security of the civilians. Nor is it justified by ‘imperative military reasons," which require ‘the most
meticulous assessment of the circumstances’ because such reasons are so capable of abuse. One authority
has stated:
Clearly, imperative military reasons cannot be justified by political motives. For example, it would be
prohibited to move a population in order to exercise more effective control over a dissident ethnic group.
The U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement state that, ‘prior to any decision requiring the
displacement of persons, the authorities concerned shall ensure that all feasible alternatives are explored in
26
order to avoid displacement altogether.’ The principles state that states are under ‘a particular obligation to
protect against the displacement of . . . peasants, pastoralists, and other groups with a special dependency
on and attachment to their lands.’
The commander of the Fourth Division, Brig. Aronda Nyakairima, handing down the oral army evacuation
order to the people of northern Uganda of October 2, 2002, stated:
‘This announcement goes to all law-abiding citizens in the abandoned villages of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum
districts to vacate with immediate effect. . . .This is because we have discovered that the LRA terrorists
when pursued by the UPDF hide in huts located in these villages. . . . Get out of these villages in order not
to get caught in cross fire.’
This order suggests both ‘imperative military reasons’ and the security of the population.
Forty-eight hours after this order was issued, the UPDF began shelling, bombing, and using helicopter gun
ships to attack the areas around the camps. The government, interpreting the order broadly, reasoned that
after the forty-eight hour ultimatum, everyone found outside the ‘protected villages’ or IDP camps would
be a rebel or a rebel collaborator----therefore converting almost the entire northern Uganda into a military
operational zone in which civilian movement is sharply limited. This order, together with the LRA military
campaign, has further crippled the rural economy of northern Uganda.
Whether the security of the civilians or ‘imperative military reasons’ justify such massive disruption of life
and the economy is a hotly contested issue. It remains to be established what the imperative military
reasons are that would warrant forced displacement of 70 percent of the population for such a long periodsome have been displaced since 1996. Nor is it clear why the government is unable to provide for the
security of the civilians in any way other than such forced displacement, which is so drastic for the affected
population that it should be the last resort. Because these facts are exclusively within government
knowledge, the burden is upon the government to establish that its actions comply with international legal
standards and its own policy on displacement.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, pp 61-62)
Systematic escalation of violence in the North (2003)
•
More killings and abductions taking place on a daily basis (March 2003)
•
Rebels operating in smaller groups.
•
Peace mediators attacked by rebels.
Chronology for March 2003 as recorded by Acholi Religious Leaders’ Initiative (ARPLI)
"1. Joseph Kony proposes ceasefire.
- LRA in Pader District beheaded 6 UPDF soldiers.
- LRA rebels ambushed a vehicle between Patongo and Lira Paluo at Odoko-mit. Some people were killed
and others were wounded.
2. Presidential Peace Team member Gen. Salim Saleh announced on Radio Mega FM that the Government
welcomed Kony's announcement and that soon arrangements would be done to formalise the ceasefire.
3. LRA ambushed a vehicle between Atiak and Bibiya where seven UPDF soldiers including a driver were
killed and three people including a woman escape with serious injuries.
4.Three UPDF soldiers were shot dead by firing squad in Kitgum District after pleading guilty for the
murder of three civilians.
5. UPDF soldiers who went to collect palm timbers in Lalweny Punena parish, exchange fire with LRA
soldiers.
6. LRA rebels killed a motorcyclist at Abera forest.
7. LRA attacked Acet center where they looted foodstuff and abducted an unknown number of people to
carry the loots.
8. 4 LRA attacked Acet camp again where they killed one woman and abducted 52 people.
9. LRA held rally at Paibona Primary School with over 40 civilians in the evening. They collected food
stuff from the people.
10. A large group of about 60 rebels crossed into Patiko.
27
11. Large group of rebels was reported in Pawel Owor area. UPDF soldiers encountered them in the
afternoon hours.
12. LRA attacked Ginnery in Kitgum Town. They abducted an unknown number of people.
13. 9 people were rescued at Adak parish and 5 rebels were killed during the battle between the UPDF
soldiers and LRA.
14. President Museveni declared a five-day ceasefire in the areas of KoyoLalogi and WiPolo in Lapul subcounty to help continue peace contacts. 15. An estimated 200 rebels led by Vincent Ottii entered from
Sudan with new supplies of ammunition. During the following days, new ambushes and attacks on
civilians.
16. Suspected rebels entered in Pabbo camp in zone E where they looted foodstuff.
17. Unknown gunmen ambushed a bus between Cwero and Aswa. Nobody was injured.
18. The LRA rebels that crossed from Kilak hill eastwards released 23 people in Apyeta Palaro Division.
19. Presidential Peace Team held peace rally in Pajule and returned to Gulu.
20. ARLPI launched the report 'War of Words', about media coverage of military operations in the North
since January 2002 up to date.
21. Unknown gunmen ambushed a Lorry, which carried cotton from Mucwini to Kitgum town. 22. Four people suspected to be rebel raided Ajulu camp. One of them was killed and identified to be
former home guard.
23. Thugs well armed with guns suspected to come from Kabedo-opong robbed people from Laliya. The
UPDF intercepted them and drove them off.
24. President Museveni extended ceasefire in Lapul up to 20th March.
25. Rebels ambushed a vehicle in Pamolo (Kitgum) and killed eight people.
26. Three rebels were killed in Acet during an attacked on the camp. Some civilians were wounded.
27. Four LRA rebels blocked Patiko road at Patalira -Tenyaa and later they crossed to eastern direction.
28. Military intelligence cautioned Rwot Oywak, Fr. Tarcisio and Fr. Carlos that Kony had ordered their
execution should they go back to meet with LRA.
29. Museveni extended ceasefire for ten more days.
30. Presidential Peace Team broadcast message on Radio Mega appreciating the fact that "over 80 per cent
of LRA were now in the designated ceasefire areas".
31. UPDF Capt. Okech Kuru was killed by rebels in Lapul after being sent with some messages by the
Presidential Peace Team.
32. A home guard from Bar Dege Detach was arrested for robbery and rape.
33. LRA ambushed a vehicle at Ato Parish Lapul Sub County where one person died and others were
wounded.
34. A number of people were abducted from Parabongo when digging in their gardens.
35. Two people died and others were wounded when their vehicle entered into an ambush of LRA along
Gulu Kitgum road.
36. Human Rights Watch published report 'Stolen Children: Abductions and child recruitment in Northern
Uganda'.
37. Archbishop Odama and Rwot Acana delivered LRA written declaration of ceasefire to Presidential
Peace Team in front of journalists in Gulu. Presidential Peace Team wrote letter of reply.
38. Two representatives of the Community of St. Egidio visited Gulu.
39. About 200 huts were burnt in Pabbo camp late in the evening. Further updates are expected shortly.”
(ARPLI April 2003)
People regard camps as traps (July 2003)
•
Almost every day not less than thirty children are abducted and forced into the rebel ranks
•
People in Cwa county have refused to live in displaced camps
•
Rebels have routinely attacked settlements at Palabek and Padibe
•
When the LRA comes to a village they ask immediately for the youth
28
•
All abductees who are between ten and eighteen years of age are almost sure to remain with the
LRA
•
The UPDF soldiers usually arrive at the scene of rebel atrocities long after they are gone
•
Whenever the Karamajong have a skirmish either with the LRA or with the Army, people know
that they will come to take revenge on them.
"All over rural areas of Kitgum district, people are being terrorised. Almost every day not less than thirty
children are abducted and forced into the rebel ranks. People in Cwa county have refused to live in
displaced camps -which they regard as traps- and they try to cope with a combination of sleeping in the
bush, staying at times at the nearby trading centres (Pajimo, Mucwini, Kitgum Matidi, Namokora...) with
some relatives or sending the children to Kitgum town (many of whom are swelling the ranks of the street
kids). For those in Lamwo county where "protected villages" have been in existence since 1997 there isn't
much protection either: in recent months rebels have routinely attacked settlements at Palabek and Padibe,
abducting thirty or fourty children at a time and burning scores of huts.
When the LRA comes to a village they ask immediately for the youth. "The Government is doing
recruitment and so are we", they are quoted as saying. Most of the children are gone, either to town or to
the nearest trading centre, so when rebels do not find them they search the huts until they find textbooks,
then parents are beaten cruelly. On the 30th March a man whose son escaped from the LRA and is at the
World Vision trauma centre in Gulu was beaten to death in front of his wife. Before they left they warned
her: "We shall come back and if you don't bring your son we shall do the same to you". On the 18th March,
in the same village, a boy who had a shaved head was accused by the rebels of being a recent Army recruit
and was also beaten to death.
Victims of rebel terror tell endless tales of suffering: an old man compelled to carry a motorcycle on his
shoulders for miles, an eighteen-year old girl who had her legs burnt because she tried to escape, men
compelled to gather honey for the rebels without being allowed to use fire, children burnt with battery acid
while in captivity "so that they would not escape". Adults found sleeping in the bush are beaten and told
that "they have to pay the lodge", which means that they will be abducted unless they pay ten thousand
shillings. All abductees who are between ten and eighteen years of age are almost sure to remain with the
LRA. Adults are usually released after some few days, often after going through more humiliating
experiences: "They forced us to box while they watched and told us that the one who wins will be
released".
People clearly feel that they are being targeted, and not only by the LRA. They point at the UPDF soldiers
usually arriving at the scene of rebel atrocities long after they are gone. "They also beat us because they say
that we are the ones feeding the rebels". To add to the suffering, armed Karimojong have been causing
havoc in the eastern areas of Kitgum and Pader districts for most of the dry season. Whenever they have a
skirmish either with the LRA or with the Army, people know that they will come to take revenge on them.
The 2nd of April was a particularly tragic day in Kitgum: armed Karimojong shot three men dead in Lagot
(a place that has suffered greatly at the hands of the rebels), a boy and a girl who were travelling by
motorcycle were killed in the morning at Pederyam, on the Kitgum-Namokora road. A Caritas vehicle was
ambushed near Kalongo and the two staff travelling in it were wounded. In the evening, the LRA ambushed
a pick-up truck near Acholibur, killing seven people and injuring at least fifteen. On of the dead was
Captain Oyet Waliki, a former prominent rebel who in 1994 joined the Government forces. He was very
popular since he was known for having being involved in peace negotiations together with some local
leaders as well as for his friendly approach to the population. When the vehicle, with plenty of people
bleeding and crying, arrived in Kitgum hospital that evening the whole town was thrown into confusion.
In the meantime, massive recruitment for the Local Defence Units (LDUs) or "home guards" has been
going on in the district. Recently the local Lwo newspaper "Rupiny" quoted the RDC Okot Lapolo
expressing his satisfaction at the fact that so far 7,000 had joined in. For many youth, having no
perspectives in life and plenty of grudges, there is little choice. For the rest, neither the on-going "Iron Fist
Operation" nor the recent local recruitment seems to have improved security for ordinary people. Also,
despite announcements by the LRA leadership that they were declaring a ceasefire and the on-going efforts
by religious and cultural leaders to initiate peace talks, there is little sign that the brutality is decreasing. [...]
29
Following a well-known pattern in the Northern Uganda conflict, in recent months the Government has
promised that by the end of the dry season the rebels would be crushed. The end of the dry season has
come, but so far, everything seems to indicate that the ones who are indeed showing signs of having been
crushed, broken and thrown into desperation are just the ordinary civilians.”(ARLPI, 1 July 2003)
Sudanese refugees in Uganda targeted by the LRA ( July 2003)
•
Three major attacks in 2002
•
More than 24,000 Sudanese refugees there dispersed into the bush
•
The LRA has subjected the refugees to many of the same abuses to which Ugandans are subjected
•
16,000 Sudanese refugees were relocated from Achol-pii to the Kiryandongo refugee camp
“Sudanese refugees in Uganda continue to be targeted by the LRA, with three major attacks in 2002. Many
of these United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps for Sudanese are in the
Adjumani district, west of Acholiland and near the Sudanese border.
The worst LRA attack of 2002 on refugee camps was the brutal onslaught on Achol-pii refugee camp in
Pader district on August 5, 2002, where the LRA killed more than sixty people, and the more than 24,000
Sudanese refugees there dispersed into the bush and elsewhere, in fear. The LRA took hostage four aid
workers from the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a humanitarian NGO, during the attack, although
they were later released.
In other attacks upon returning to northern Uganda, the LRA killed five Sudanese refugees and burned 126
houses in Maaji refugee camp in Adjumani on July 8, 2002, then returned for a second attack on the same
camp three months later, on October 3, 2002, when LRA fighters killed several UPDF soldiers and burned
another sixty-five homes.
According to the March 2003 report on Sudan prepared by the Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict,
the situation for Sudanese refugees in Uganda is problematic: the majority of Sudanese refugees in Uganda
live in twenty-five designated settlements. The LRA has subjected them to many of the same abuses to
which Ugandans are subjected:
The LRA and other rebels regularly attack [Sudanese] refugee sites. During raids the LRA injures, abducts
and kills children and adolescents. . . . Attacks have increased dramatically in 2002, since the LRA
scattered in northern Uganda as a result of Uganda's Operation Iron Fist.
A large number of Sudanese refugees who fled the attack on Achol-pii refugee camp were relocated to
Kiryandongo refugee camp in Masindi district in central Uganda, far from the Sudan border. The
Kiryandongo refugee camp was established in 1996 for 13,000 Sudanese refugees fleeing Achol-pii camp
after a 1996 raid by the LRA, in which one hundred refugees were killed, according to a Sudanese refugee
leader interviewed by the press.
Following the next large LRA raid on Achol-pii, in 2002, some 16,000 Sudanese refugees from that camp
were relocated to the Kiryandongo refugee camp. This produced extreme overcrowding and deterioration of
sanitary conditions. The Ugandan government, through its minister for disaster preparedness Moses Ali of
the West Nile region, identified two locations in West Nile region to which it wanted the Achol-pii refugees
moved.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, p 39)
LRA rebels attacking government created 'protected IDP villages (2002-2003)
•
Displacement in the North caused mainly by the Acholy dominated Rebel group Lord’s
Resistance Army abducting, killing, mutilating, raping and destroying property of the Acholi’s in
Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts.
•
Violence escalates (June 2002-2003)
30
•
LRA extending its attacks to the districts of Kitodo, Moyo, Lira and Apac causing new
displacements (October 2002)
•
LRA pursued an even more violent tactic towards civilians during 2000.
•
In 1996, governmental forces embarked on a strategy of displacing the local population into
'protected villages'.
•
First round of major LRA attacks during 1996 forced approximately 110,000 Acholi people to
seek refuge in trading centres in Gulu district
•
Escalated LRA violence against civilians started in 1995
Terrorising the community
"From the beginning, the LRA’s principal tactic has been to target the civilian population of Acholiland,
terrorizing the community and creating paralyzing despondency. In its attacks, it characteristically kills,
maims, rapes, loots, burns homes, destroys crops, and – most traumatically – abducts civilians, especially
children. Kony is said to believe (or to have been told by his spirits) that the Acholi are to be punished for
their lack of support to his cause." (Weeks March 2002, p.9)
From Mid-June 2002 and onwards
"Kony’s Lords Resistance Army (LRA) attacks in northern Uganda have been unrelenting since they
resumed in mid-June 2002. The continued resurgence has worsened security, looting, abductions, killings
and destruction of houses and other property and increased displacement in Acholi region of Gulu, Kitgum
and Pader Districts. Since the entry of between 2000-3000 LRA forces into Uganda from Southern Sudan,
there is no doubt the Northern Uganda has degenerated into an emergency humanitarian situation.
Unfortunately though, due to the insecurity, humanitarian agencies have been forced to scale down their
activities to the towns and are thus unable to access most of the affected population, even as their needs
increase. This has worsened an already fragile situation in IDP camps and villages.” (OCHA, July/August
2002)
"LRA attacks in northern Uganda continue in Gulu and surrounding areas. Significantly, the LRA have
attacked Kotido and Moyo, areas they have not been to previously." (OCHA 2 Ocober 2002)
"Since the official peace talks with rebels seem not to materialize and the government is still trying to
pursue the military option, the security situation remains uncertain as the LRA continue to terrorise the subregion and extending to neighbouring districts including Apac, Lira, Kotido and Adjumani." (NRC 9
October 2002)
Displacement as military strategy
"[I]t was from 1995 onwards that the scale of violence, displacement and child abductions by the LRA
increased dramatically.
[...]
A common theme throughout this devastating period of Acholi history has been the strategic use of
civilians by both sides, including the calculated enforcement of displacement. In February 1996 the LRA
issued an edict banning settlement within four kilometres of roads and prohibiting the use of bicycles. Their
intention was the tight control of a population inaccessible to government troops which would provide
cover and supplies for the rebels. To enforce the edict, hundreds of people were killed, villages and food
stocks were burned and thousands drifted towards the relative safety of Gulu town. By September 1996 the
Gulu District Council announced that 100,000 people in the district were now displaced.
Meanwhile, the government’s Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) shelled villages they suspected of
containing LRA units, discouraged the return of IDPs from the towns and conducted a number of
‘clearances’, particularly from Aswa and Kilak counties in northern Gulu District. By November 1996, the
Gulu District Council estimated that IDP figures had doubled to 200,000. Three months later, the figure
was again upwardly revised to 270,000 as the policy of creating camps (introduced in October 1996)
31
intensified. Tens of thousands of people had swelled the towns (particularly Gulu), trading centres and
areas around army barracks. By mid-1998 the majority of IDPs were in 20 official camps." (WFP
September 1999, pp.6-7)
Voluntary displacement according to OCHA
"Under the Geneva Convention, the GoU has the right to move or contain people if, for reasons of
insecurity, such relocation is in the people’s best interest. In the majority of cases, it would appear as if
displaced Ugandans have been able to exercise their right to residence and movement and that their choice
of location/abode has generally been voluntary." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")
"Although fighting between government forces and the LRA continued, there were no reports during the
year that government forces used threats to compel citizens to leave their homes because of the conflict."
(US DOS February 2001, sect.1f)
Government induced displacement
"As a counter measure to the insurgency, IDPs have been moved into military protected camps and it was
estimated [by WFP] that 75 % of both Kitgum and Gulu was resident in camps in January considerably
with people being able to get back to normal activities with access to gardens and less fear of insecurity"
(RNIS April 2001, p.41).
Government created camps and removed people (1996)
"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the
creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army
was unable to prevent LRA activity. The decision to create camps was taken at the highest level. On 27
September 1996 President Yoweri Museveni informed members of the Parliamentary Committee on the
Offices of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs that the authorities were going to establish
"protected villages". However, from interviews with villagers and others, it appears to Amnesty
International that some UPDF units were already moving people out of their homes a number of weeks
before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to the Parliamentary Committee. " (AI 17
March 1999, para.2.1)
Both spontaneous and militarly supervised displacements
"Initially, in 1997, there were about 50 settlements where IDPs were grouped either spontaneously or under
army supervision. The district authorities could not manage such a widely dispersed group of people.
Following a needs assessment undertaken by WFP, the camps in Gulu District were merged into 23
officially designated sites where 270,000 people would be provided with continuing assistance. In October
1998, three of these camps were found to have sufficient access to land for cultivation (though they were
still served through food-for-work (FFW) projects by WFP). This effectively brought the camp total in
Gulu to 20 where humanitarian assistance was (and still is) given. In Kitgum the IDP population was about
80,000 in five official camps." (WFP September 1999, p.8)
"Many people have moved to camps "spontaneously", fleeing from the LRA. Others feel that the
authorities gave them no choice about leaving their farms and livelihoods. Yet others were physically
forced by government soldiers. Few people are happy to be in camps, which appear to have become semipermanent, regarding them as punitive. However, the extreme violence of the LRA poses a real dilemma.
Returning to the countryside may provide more opportunities (for example, for education) but may increase
the risk of being killed, either by the LRA or by patrolling government soldiers." (AI 17 March 1999,
"Introduction")
Open resistance to government’s intent to displace the local population in Kitgum
"If we compare Gulu and Kitgum (which includes Pader), the circumstances which explain the origin of
displaced camps in Acholi are slightly different. This is why we shall deal with both parts separately.
[…]
32
Camps in Kitgum came into existence at three different points in time: in January 1997 (Lukung, Padibe,
Palabek Gem and Palabek Kal), in October-November 1997 (Pajule, Lacekocot, Acholibur) and in March
1999 (Potika and Agoro). The circumstances which gave origin to these camps were different from the ones
in Gulu, and the percentages of the population which is displaced is also different: 80 % in Gulu and 20 %
in Kitgum (which also includes Pader district). On at least two different occasions the Government has
attempted to create more displacement in Kitgum: in September 1997 and in September 2000 (in Pajule),
although in both cases the population and some of their leaders openly resisted the move.
Between the nights of 7th January and 12th January 1997, LRA rebels systematically swept through
villages of the Lamwo sub-counties of Lukung and Palabek, in northwest Kitgum. These units methodically
hacked and clubbed to death a total of 412 men, women and children. Thousands of homes were looted and
burned. The remaining population fled in sheer terror. This was the largest single massacre of the war in
Acholi.
[…]
Potika and Agoro camps are the most recently created ones, having started in March 1999. At that time
rebels had come down over the mountain of Lamwaka, heading for Madi-Opei. The UPDF pushed them
back and forced people to leave those areas." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, pp. 5, 8)
People in Gulu forced to move into "protected villages" while displacement in Kitgum was more
spontaneous:
"In Gulu district, the establishment of the villages followed a decision by the military authorities in 1996;
most of the villages appear to have been established between August and October of that year. The
population was ordered into the villages on short notice; those who remained outside them were subject to
army attack. In Kitgum/Pader, the villages were more often established as a result of the flight by rural
residents following LRA attacks in 1995-97; these villages evolved more spontaneously, with people
moving near trading centres and military cantonments in search of security; there has been more movement
back and forth from people’s original homes than is the case in Gulu." (Weeks March 2002, p.2)
Military solution a failure (2002)
•
Civilian population has been left without adequate protection while the Ugandan army is
concentrated on the pursuit of the LRA in Sudan
•
The security situation in northern Uganda has worsened
"After four months, 'Operation Iron Fist,' the military operation underway to root out the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), has yielded few results and destroyed the security of civilians in both Sudan and Uganda.
Consequently, the civilian population has been left without adequate protection while the Ugandan army is
concentrated on the pursuit of the LRA in Sudan. The current crisis shows the high cost of the collective
failure to protect the civilian population (including IDPs) and the urgency for international action without
further delay." (NRC, August 2002)
"The security situation in northern Uganda has worsened, with continued attacks by LRA rebels. These
continue to be characterized by killings, abductions, looting and the destruction of property. One of the
most serious incidences reported is the massacre of an estimated 57 civilians, hacked to death with
machetes and knives on 25th July in a village near the norhtern town of Kitgum. Vehicles hace been
ambushed on the road, including a military lorry a few kilometers from Gulu town in which 25 soldiers
were injured. The wave of violence has resulted in increased displacement, although it is difficult to guage
the extent of this while access remains extremely limited. There are an estimated 550,000 displaced in the
north. " (OCHA 31 July 2002)
33
"Rebels crossing into the country from neighbouring southern Sudan since mid-June have attacked 16 of th
existing 35 IDP camps in th edistricts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, as well as a refugee settltment in
Adjumani district." (IFRC 4 September 2002)
Civilians given the option of displacing themselves or remaining in their homes and
being mistaken for LRA (1996)
•
Officers began encouraging and persuading the Acholi to seek the refuge of 'protected villages
•
By end 1997, a total of 400,000 Acholi had been displaced - some by force, some by persuasion
and some voluntarily
"Initial attacks February – September 1996, resulted in approximately 110,000 Acholi people fleeing
voluntarily to trading centres in Gulu district where UPDF detachments offered a degree of protection. In
late October, UPDF tactics changed. Officers began encouraging and persuading the Acholi to seek the
refuge of 'protected villages.' In some cases, the Acholi were given the option of displacing themselves or
remaining in their homes and being mistaken for LRA. In January 1997, neighbouring Kitgum district was
attacked, with 81,000 Acholi fleeing to protected villages, reportedly in a voluntarily manner. Those who
had been hesitant to move to the protected villages in Gulu, were now given further encouragement. By end
1997, a total of 400,000 Acholi had been displaced - some by force, some by persuasion and some
voluntarily – although the exact proportion has never been ascertained." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Historical
Backdrop")
Displacement in Karamajong dominated area
Cattle raids, drought and food insecurity in the Karamajong dominated North-East
(2000-2003)
•
Karamajong raids perpetuate displacement in Katakwi ( January-March 2003)
•
During 2002 Karimojong attacks were reduced to thefts resulting in slight decrease of
displacements and improved access to gardens.
•
Food distribution, availability of some pasture, limited disarmament, and increased dialogue on
peace and reconciliation between the various groups possible peace-contributing factors (2001)
•
Reports of over 55 recorded violent attacks by Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers on neighbouring
Katakwi District – causing new displacement (2001)
•
Cattle raids and violence specially frequent during the dry season
Intensified attacks in 2003
“At least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader district) by Karimojong armed
herdsmen during the months of February and March. The tragic figure is part of an incidence report written
by the peace committee of Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative (ARLPI) of Kalongo. Two cultural
leaders and some elders signed the report, which due to continuous insecurity on the roads reached Gulu
with delay.
The report also indicates that 68,000 people are displaced in Kalongo township due to continuous acts of
violence perpetrated by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels, Karimojong warriors and indisciplined
soldiers of the Ugandan Army (UPDF). It also lists a total of 150 huts and hundreds of granaries burnt
34
down by the UPDF, who have often forced people to live in displaced camps by staging arson attacks on
houses and food stores.
Kalongo is part of Pader district, which has a population of 287,000. Most of them live in squalid camps
lacking basic amenities. Up to know only Caritas has delivered food aid. Two of their staff were wounded
in a rebel ambush last Wednesday, April 2nd .” ( ARLPI, 1 July 2003)
"After a year of relative peace in Katakwi district of the Teso sub-region, armed Karimojong warriors
began raiding and stealing cattle in the district in late 2002. These attacks intensified in January and
February 2003, leading to new displacement and, in some cases, re-displacement of people.” (OCHA
March 2003)
“The Joint Communication Centre must be strengthened to allow more efficient information exchange
between UPDF and district authorities on security issues
A report by the Kalongo peace committee of Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), released
early April, indicates that at least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader
district) by Karimojong armed herdsmen during the months of February and March.
The report also indicated that 68,000 people have been displaced in Kalongo Township due to continuous
acts of violence perpetrated by LRA rebels, Karimojong warriors and undisciplined UPDF soldiers. It also
listed a total of 150 huts and hundreds of granaries allegedly burnt down in UPDF arson attacks aimed at
forcing people into IDP camps." (OCHA April 2003)
“According to a UPDF spokesman, an estimated 30 people died in northeastern Karamoja Region in midJanuary following clashes between two rival clans of the Karamojong tribe, the Pian and the Bokora. The
dry season has led to clans moving with their livestock in search of pasture and water, prompting conflicts
over limited resources. In an unrelated event, a group of suspected Kenyan cattle rustlers attacked two
villages in Karamoja at the beginning of January, resulting in ten deaths and more than 700 cattle taken.”
(USAID 4 Feb 2003)
"However, The New Vision Ugandan government-owned newspaper reported on Wednesday that suspected
Karamojong warriors had attacked a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Okoboi, Katakwi
District, killing two people and leaving four critically wounded. In the incident, on Monday afternoon,
about 80 warriors attacked the camp, which was being guarded by 13 members of the Local Defence Unit,
and stole 140 head of cattle, according to the paper. People in the camp had expressed fears of the
possibility of another attack, it added." (IRIN 15 August 2002)
Period of relative calm (2002)
"Though Karimojong attacks in Katakwi in 2002 have greatly reduced and are more of thefts than raids,
Katakwi still has 77,000 IDPs still in camps. This is 10 percent less than the 88,500 displaced by the 2000
violent raids. The most affected areas remain the two counties of Usuk and Kapelebyong and specifically,
sub-counties immediately bordering Moroto District, namely Magoro, Ngariam, Usuk, Kapelebyong,
Obalanga and Acowa. Due to improved security, the displaced have more access to their gardens." (OCHA
June 2002)
"The security situation in Katakwi remains calm, despite the influx of Karamojong into the district to find
pasture and water for their cattle. According to the RDC of Katakwi, the last raid was on 6th January 2002,
and there have been a couple of cattle thefts in some areas. He reports that the Karamojong who have
entered Katakwi, with an estimated 30,000-40,000 heads of cattle, are peaceful and not provocative.
However, it has not yet been established whether they are carrying arms or not. Fear is high among the
Katakwi residents, for past experience has shown them that peace as the Karamojong graze their animals
does not guarantee security when they head back home with the onset of the rains. Hence those still in
camps are staying in camps and those who had returned home are reported to have returned to the camps."
(OCHA February 2002)
35
Period of attacks and displacement (2001)
"[S]ecurity continues to elude Karamoja as inter-group clashes and ambushes continue. Even more
worrying is the export of this violence into neighbouring districts, particularly Katakwi, where there were
over 55 recorded violent attacks by Karamojong in 2001, resulting in the displacement of a third of the
population (88,500 people). Government responded with renewed commitment towards disarming the
Karamojong, alongside various proposed development projects in Karamoja, resettlement of the Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs), and security enhancements to prevent migrations into Katakwi, east Kitgum,
Kumi, Soroti and Lira.
[...]
Improved security will be the key to recovery. In 2001, traditional Karamojong raids became more violent
than in the past and included death, rape and malicious destruction of property such as uprooting of crops.
Katakwi’s 320 km border with Moroto makes it difficult to maintain a 24-hour security net and the
Karamojong warriors continue their relentless attacks through numerous entry points. The result has been a
displacement of 88,500 people (30% of the Katakwi population)." (UN November 2001, pp.5, 17)
Worst hit area was Katakwi District bordering Moroto, Ngariam, Magoro and Usuk
"[Reported in April 2001 that] Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers have launched a series of attacks on
neighbouring Katakwi District, just as the rainy season gets underway - a time when the Karamojong are
going back home if they migrated to neighbouring districts. The attacks, which began in early April [2001],
are reported to have displaced yet unknown numbers of people. Katakwi residents have also lost cattle,
goats, chicken and crops like cassava from gardens to the rustlers. The worst hit areas are those subcounties bordering with Moroto, including Ngariam, Magoro and Usuk in Usuk County and sub-counties in
Kapelebyong County. The numbers in the remnant IDP camps from last year’s violent raids in March-April
are now swelling as more families return. The attacks are reportedly not by large groups but most likely by
small groups of cattle thieves from Karamoja. The LDUs recruited last year to guard Katakwi residents
from Karamojong raiders have allegedly been absorbed into the barracks, hence leaving gaps for the cattle
rustlers.
[...]
The security situation in Karamoja is still very fluid, with a significant increase in the number of ambushes
and armed robberies on the road especially between Kotido-Moroto and Moroto-Namalu, over the last four
weeks or so. On the other hand, inter-tribal clashes have somewhat subdued and some attribute this to the
increased presence of UPDF officers deployed to facilitate the disarmament programme." (OCHA April
2001)
"The annual migration of Karamojong in search of pasture took place in mid-January, with approximately
200 herders, mainly Jie from Kotido district, crossing into East Kitgum and Pader districts. However,
significant migration into neighbouring Teso districts, the site of serious clashes over resources in 2000,
was not apparent. A number of factors appear to have contributed to the maintenance of relative calm
during 2001, albeit with some clashes during return migrations from mid-April. Such factors include food
distribution within Karamoja itself by international aid agencies, the availability of some pasture within
Moroto and Kotido districts, some limited disarmament of herders crossing district borders and increased
dialogue on peace and reconciliation between the various groups. While emergency interventions appear to
have eased immediate tensions, only long-term development to improve not only the access to water but
also to basic social amenities can address their underlying causes. The considerable reduction in the total
number of IDPs for Uganda is due primarily to the return of the Karamajong to Karamoja, which has
allowed the majority of displaced in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern Kitgum to return home." (OCHA 30
April 2001, pp.30-31)
“The northeastern Karamoja area bordering the Sudan and Kenya has been a traditional theatre of raids by
cattle rustling tribes (Karamajong, Turkana, Pokot). It is not unusual that Karamajong carry their raids
westwards into the centre of the country, particularly during dry times when pasture in Karamoja becomes
scarce and cross border movements from Kenya are frequent. With the arrival of the rainy season, the
situation usually improves. The year 2000 saw particularly violent raids leading to the temporary
36
displacement of some 140’000 persons. The raiding has taken on the character of military confrontations,
with destabilising effects beyond the border districts and the displacement of increasing numbers of
persons." (OCHA 7 October 2000)
Inter and extra communal violence in Karamajong
•
At least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader district) by
Karimojong armed herdsmen (February 2003)
•
Karamojong raids perpetuate displacement in Kalongo township (April 2003)
•
The Karamojong tribes Pian and Bokora clashed (February 2003)
•
Kenyan cattle rustlers attacked two villages in Karamoja killing ten stealing 700 cattle
(February 2003)
•
Okobi IDP camp attacked by 80 Karamojong who stole 140 heads of cattle
“The Joint Communication Centre must be strengthened to allow more efficient information exchange
between UPDF and district authorities on security issues
A report by the Kalongo peace committee of Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI), released
early April, indicates that at least 65 people have been killed in sub-counties of Agago county (Pader
district) by Karimojong armed herdsmen during the months of February and March.2003
The report also indicated that 68,000 people have been displaced in Kalongo Township due to continuous
acts of violence perpetrated by LRA rebels, Karimojong warriors and undisciplined UPDF soldiers. It also
listed a total of 150 huts and hundreds of granaries allegedly burnt down in UPDF arson attacks aimed at
forcing people into IDP camps.(OCHA April 2003)
“According to a UPDF spokesman, an estimated 30 people died in northeastern Karamoja Region in midJanuary following clashes between two rival clans of the Karamojong tribe, the Pian and the Bokora. The
dry season has led to clans moving with their livestock in search of pasture and water, prompting conflicts
over limited resources. In an unrelated event, a group of suspected Kenyan cattle rustlers attacked two
villages in Karamoja at the beginning of January, resulting in ten deaths and more than 700 cattle taken.”
(USAID 4 Feb 2003)
"However, The New Vision Ugandan government-owned newspaper reported on Wednesday that suspected
Karamojong warriors had attacked a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Okoboi, Katakwi
District, killing two people and leaving four critically wounded. In the incident, on Monday afternoon,
about 80 warriors attacked the camp, which was being guarded by 13 members of the Local Defence Unit,
and stole 140 head of cattle, according to the paper. People in the camp had expressed fears of the
possibility of another attack, it added." (IRIN 15 August 2002)
Displacements in the west
The threat from Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) reduced (2003)
•
Relative calm in southwestern and west Nile region (2002-03)
•
A team of defence attaches declared Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe
from rebel infiltrators(April 2002)
•
Numbers of IDP decreasing steadily(2002-03)
37
•
Improved security further to “decisive action”. (2001)
•
Atrocities commited in 1998 and 1999
“Developments in the situation in southwestern Uganda are more positive. The threat from the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) appears to have reduced significantly and the Amnesty Commission and Mission
d’Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) are currently approaching donors in Uganda for the
repatriation and rehabilitation of the ADF as stipulated by the Amnesty Act (2000). As a result, the
situation in the Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo District, is much calmer. As a direct result, an
increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to smaller settlements
near their places of origin. While there has been no recent verification of the numbers in IDP camps in
Bundibugyo (last established in February 2002 at 87,000), there are indications that up to 40,000 people
have since left the camps. Similar returns has taken place in Kasese and Kabarole, where all IDPs have
either returned home or integrated in the community.
[...]
Other areas previously affected by conflict (southwestern Uganda and most of West Nile region) continue
to experience relative calm. In these areas, transition and rehabilitation efforts, the second focus of the
2003 CAP, can be pursued."(UN November 2002, p.6) )
"Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks beginning in1996 up to mid-2001 caused displacement of local
populations, limited access to land, insecurity, collapse in purchasing power, family income/assets and
morals. Bundibugyo District bore the brunt of the ADF attacks and had the largest number of IDPs in the
region, which peaked at 120,000 in the year 2000. To date Bundibugyo is reported as the only district with
IDPs in Southwestern or Rwenzori region. Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken,
most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated into the community."
(OCHA July/August 2002)
"A team of defence attaches from America, UK, France, Kenya and South Africa have declared the
Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe from rebel infiltrators. The team, led by
Richard Orth, the American defence attaché and dean to all defence attaches in Uganda, was on a factfinding mission in the region during the week beginning 6th May 2002. This comes in the wake of over
twelve months of calm in the Rwenzori region, which has seen several IDPs voluntarily return nearer to
their homes. Further, UPDF second division commander, Col. Poteli Kivuna, reportedly said the displaced
were free to go back to their homes." (OCHA April/May 2002)
But signs of a safer situation by end-2001
"ADF attacks have decreased in number and magnitude since the year began. Save for the March 17th
attack on Kasese, where unknown terrorists were involved, calm has reigned in the region, with very few
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks reported. With hope that this quiet is more than a lull in the storm,
IDPs in Bundibugyo now have access to more garden areas during the day while still seeking the safety of
camps at night. Approximately 20% have boldly resettled in four new camps nearer to their homes with the
aim of increasing their food production. Consequently, the district is providing security to the new camps
and humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of aiding IDPs resettlement in both Bundibugyo and
Kabarole." (UN November 2001, p.6)
Rebel activities continues unabated (first half of 2001)
"In the Southwest, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity continues unabated. Although the Kasese
attack on 17 March was not linked to the ADF, on March 28 heavily armed ADF rebels attacked
Hamukungu fishing village – about 30km southwest of Kasese town – reportedly killing three and
abducting four. In early April, the UPDF claimed, however, to have reduced the force to ‘less than 100’ and
to have overrun a local commander’s headquarters. President Museveni has also declared a departure from
the ‘softer approach’ implied in the initial amnesty offer and decreed decisive action to bring the terrorist
threat to an end through strengthened UPDF measures against them. IDPs in the Southwest remain hesitant
38
about returning to the homes, due to continuing fear of attack by remnant rebels, although Kasese district is
advocating for their resettlement." (OCHA 30 April 2001, p.31)
Further escalation of ADF activities occurred during the second half of 1999:
"The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) substantially increased attacks in mid-December 1999 and these
attacks have continued without abatement for the past two months in Bundibugyo and Kabarole Districts.
President Museveni is currently in the Rwenzori Region leading operations against the rebels. Even with
the President in the area, the ADF continues to attack IDP camps. There have been daily attacks, gun
battles and/or ambushes occurring in parts of the District during the day and at night. Since the start of the
year, there have been 28 separate ADF attacks and ambushes reported in the Monitor and New Vision
newspapers. These attacks have left several dozen civilians dead. During his visit, the President is reported
to have encouraged people to return to their homes and leave the IDP camps." (UNHCU 18 February 2000)
One report gives the following outline of the ADF atrocities in 1998:
"In the west and southwest, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces significantly heightened their activities [in
1998], which included repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in
hundreds of deaths and abductions. The ADF continued to plant land mines extensively and increased its
attacks on both rural and urban civilian targets, police outposts, and UPDF encampments. In February 30
students were abducted by ADF rebels from Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In April
rebels attacked a woman in Bundibugyo district and cut off her ears and nose. The ADF forces hacked two
civilian women to death in Kasese district in May. The ADF's deadliest attack of the year occurred on June
8, when rebels killed 80 students of Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district by setting locked
dormitories on fire. An additional 80 students were abducted in the raid. Also in June, ADF rebels
abducted over 100 school children from a school in Hoima district. ADF conducted dozens of small-scale
raids that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. An ADF-affiliated group, the National Army for the
Liberation of Uganda claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August that killed 30 persons."
(US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c)
Landowners in
(2002)
•
the Rwenzori region charging IDPs for land to establish shelters
Comercialisation of land causes displacement
"Associated with economic problems is the difficulty to access their original land. Land emerged among the
perceived main problems faced by IDPs (43%). Both displaced persons and landowners on whose land
camps were established face this problem. Landowners where camps were established have had their crops
destroyed by people putting up temporary shelter.
Land in camps
The demand for land has increased in areas where camps were established, making it more marketable.
Many landowners, where camps were established have sold parts of their land either to the displaced people
or other interested persons. This has led to constant displacement of some IDPs from one place or camp to
another. Some landowners chased displaced persons from their land, while others are charging IDPs a fee
for establishing a shelter or constructing a latrine. This was mainly observed in camps near trading centers
e.g., Nyahuka, Union IDP camps in Bundibugyo district.
In Kasese district, Ibanda Primary IDP camp, displaced people were reportedly chased from the land and
only 6 households remained after pleading to the owner. In Nyahuka IDP camp, Bundibugyo district,
respondents reported being charged between 10,000 Ush and 50,000 Ush. per year for constructing a shelter
and 5,000 Ush - 10,000 Ush. per year for a latrine." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.8)
39
Displacements related to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the west and
southwest (1998-2003)
•
•
•
Relative calm in southwestern and west Nile region (2002-03)
Numbers of IDP decreasing steadily(2002-03)
Improved security further to “decisive military action” (2001)
“Developments in the situation in southwestern Uganda are more positive. The threat from the Allied
Democratic Forces (ADF) appears to have reduced significantly and the Amnesty Commission and Mission
d’Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) are currently approaching donors in Uganda for the
repatriation and rehabilitation of the ADF as stipulated by the Amnesty Act (2000). As a result, the
situation in the Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo District, is much calmer. As a direct result, an
increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to smaller settlements
near their places of origin. While there has been no recent verification of the numbers in IDP camps in
Bundibugyo (last established in February 2002 at 87,000), there are indications that up to 40,000 people
have since left the camps. Similar returns has taken place in Kasese and Kabarole, where all IDPs have
either returned home or integrated in the community.
..other areas previously affected by conflict (southwestern Uganda and most of West Nile region) continue
to experience relative calm. In these areas, transition and rehabilitation efforts, the second focus of the
2003 CAP, can be pursued.(UN November 2002 p.6) )
"Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks beginning in1996 up to mid-2001 caused displacement of local
populations, limited access to land, insecurity, collapse in purchasing power, family income/assets and
morals. Bundibugyo District bore the brunt of the ADF attacks and had the largest number of IDPs in the
region, which peaked at 120,000 in the year 2000. To date Bundibugyo is reported as the only district with
IDPs in Southwestern or Rwenzori region. Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken,
most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated into the community."
(OCHA July/August 2002)
"A team of defence attaches from America, UK, France, Kenya and South Africa have declared the
Rwenzori Districts of Kabarole, Kasese and Bundibugyo safe from rebel infiltrators. The team, led by
Richard Orth, the American defence attaché and dean to all defence attaches in Uganda, was on a factfinding mission in the region during the week beginning 6th May 2002. This comes in the wake of over
twelve months of calm in the Rwenzori region, which has seen several IDPs voluntarily return nearer to
their homes. Further, UPDF second division commander, Col. Poteli Kivuna, reportedly said the displaced
were free to go back to their homes." (OCHA April/May 2002)
But signs of a safer situation by end-2001
"ADF attacks have decreased in number and magnitude since the year began. Save for the March 17th
attack on Kasese, where unknown terrorists were involved, calm has reigned in the region, with very few
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks reported. With hope that this quiet is more than a lull in the storm,
IDPs in Bundibugyo now have access to more garden areas during the day while still seeking the safety of
camps at night. Approximately 20% have boldly resettled in four new camps nearer to their homes with the
aim of increasing their food production. Consequently, the district is providing security to the new camps
and humanitarian agencies are exploring ways of aiding IDPs resettlement in both Bundibugyo and
Kabarole." (UN November 2001, p.6)
Rebel activities continues unabated (first half of 2001)
"In the Southwest, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) activity continues unabated. Although the Kasese
attack on 17 March was not linked to the ADF, on March 28 heavily armed ADF rebels attacked
Hamukungu fishing village – about 30km southwest of Kasese town – reportedly killing three and
40
abducting four. In early April, the UPDF claimed, however, to have reduced the force to ‘less than 100’ and
to have overrun a local commander’s headquarters. President Museveni has also declared a departure from
the ‘softer approach’ implied in the initial amnesty offer and decreed decisive action to bring the terrorist
threat to an end through strengthened UPDF measures against them. IDPs in the Southwest remain hesitant
about returning to the homes, due to continuing fear of attack by remnant rebels, although Kasese district is
advocating for their resettlement." (OCHA 30 April 2001, p.31)
One report gives the following outline of the ADF atrocities in 1998:
"In the west and southwest, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces significantly heightened their activities [in
1998], which included repeated attacks on civilian targets, trading centers, and private homes, resulting in
hundreds of deaths and abductions. The ADF continued to plant land mines extensively and increased its
attacks on both rural and urban civilian targets, police outposts, and UPDF encampments. In February 30
students were abducted by ADF rebels from Mitandi Seventh Day Adventist College in Kasese. In April
rebels attacked a woman in Bundibugyo district and cut off her ears and nose. The ADF forces hacked two
civilian women to death in Kasese district in May. The ADF's deadliest attack of the year occurred on June
8, when rebels killed 80 students of Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole district by setting locked
dormitories on fire. An additional 80 students were abducted in the raid. Also in June, ADF rebels
abducted over 100 school children from a school in Hoima district. ADF conducted dozens of small-scale
raids that resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths. An ADF-affiliated group, the National Army for the
Liberation of Uganda claimed responsibility for three bus bomb attacks in August that killed 30 persons.
(US DOS March 1999, sect. 1c)
Peace efforts
Leaders of a peace initiative have rejected calls to offer money to the rebel Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA)(October 2003)
•
The Uganda Human Rights Commission suggested borrowing money to buy the rebels off
•
The commander of the Reserve Forces, Lt-Gen Salim Saleh, is upset with government failure to
fully fund his 4bn-shilling (US$2m) project aimed at ending the LRA war
•
The proposal was issued in May and the government has only released about US$ 7,000 dollars
"The Ugandan army and leaders of a peace initiative have rejected calls to offer money to the rebel Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) in a bid to stop its devastating insurrection. The Uganda Human Rights
Commission suggested borrowing money to buy the rebels off in a desperate last attempt to end the 17-year
armed rebellion.
In a similar vein, the commander of the Reserve Forces, Lt-Gen Salim Saleh, is upset with government
failure to fully fund his 4bn-shilling (US$2m) project aimed at ending the LRA war. In his Security and
Production Programme (SPP) proposal, Saleh asked government for 4.7bn shillings, about US$ 2.35m
dollars to use on specific projects aimed at ending the 17-year long insurgency that has ravaged much of
northern Uganda, and recently parts of Teso. The SPP project also aims at reducing dependence on food aid
for about one million people living in camps for the internally displaced in the Acholi sub-region. The
proposal was issued in May and the government has only released 14m shillings about US$ 7,000 dollars.
Meanwhile, the LRA have rejected government's offer of amnesty to end the rebellion in northern Uganda.
However, the Amnesty Commission says that the Joseph Kony-led LRA rebels are still the biggest single
group to have taken advantage of the three year-old amnesty. LRA commander, Brig Parliament passed the
41
Amnesty Act in 2000, pardoning rebels who give up fighting and report to the Amnesty Commission." (UN
OCHA, 8 October 2003)
Unsuccessful attempts to bring a peaceful end to the war (September 2003)
•
Widely held view in the north that the Ugandan government is primarily interested in wiping out
the LRA by force
•
Civil society groups have tried to fill the vacuum left by the failure of government-led peace
initiatives
"Apart from the Ugandan army's troubled campaign against Kony, there have been some, so far
unsuccessful, attempts to bring a peaceful end to the war. These peace initiatives have included a
presidential peace team, which was established by Museveni with a view to starting serious negotiations.
However, the initiative has floundered after a ceasefire agreement was dishonoured, and it is now a widely
held view in the north that the Ugandan government is primarily interested in wiping out the LRA by force,
rather than reaching a settlement through dialogue.
Some civil society groups, most notably the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARPLI), have tried
to fill the vacuum left by the failure of government-led initiatives. However, members of this team have
also been frustrated by an apparent unwillingness on the part of the rebels to come out of the bush to
negotiate, and by the difficulties in talking peace while war is still being waged.
Fr. Carlos Rodriguez, a high-profile member of the ARPLI, says the time has come for international
mediation to resolve the conflict, and that the LRA would also respond positively to such engagement.
This is a sentiment shared by Baker Ochola, the retired Bishop of Kitgum. 'Those being targeted are the
children, women and the elderly. This is why we feel there is a need for the international community to put
pressure on the Ugandan government and Sudan in order to give a break to the people,' he told IRIN." (UN
OCHA, 15 September 2003)
Why there have never been any real "peace talks" ( July 2003)
•
At the beginning of the war, in 1986, and later on there is no doubt that the first groups of rebels
enjoyed much popular support
•
The generous support that the LRA has been receiving from the Khartoum regime has been a
major factor in keeping the war going
•
If a group of well-armed rebels come to your village and ask for food you really have no choice
•
On one hand parents want the war to end, on the other hand they want their children to come back
home alive, not to be killed.
•
Prominent NRM public figures expressed in the past their total opposition to any kind of peace
talks with the LRA
42
•
It does not seem that the LRA enjoy any significant financial or logistical support from Acholi
communities abroad
•
Some few individuals are definitely making quite a lot of "blood money"
"Have a quick look at the phrases in bold below. We have all have heard or read these or similar
statements, whether we live in Northern Uganda or elsewhere. In conflicts all over the world people have
and express "perceptions", that is, assumptions or stereotypes about the parties in conflicts and the elements
that sustain the violence. Such ideas are often distorted and barely correspond to reality, but if repeated
again and again they can fan the flames of conflict, increasing hatred and further division in the
community. There is reason for concern when statements of this kind are expressed in public by somebody
who may stand as, for instance, an RDC (Regional District Commissioner), a Presidential Advisor or an
Army representative.
The long duration of this conflict puzzles everyone and has given rise to a good number of such
stereotypes. I am just putting across some of the more common perceptions about the war that has ravaged
Acholiland and other parts of Northern Uganda for the last seventeen years, and giving my comments as
somebody who has lived events in Acholi from within for most of the time. I do not believe that any of the
following statements are true, and I am trying to explain why.
"The war does not end because the Acholi people support the rebels"
Advocates of this statement should be able to answer a crucial question: If that is the case why is Kony
killing so many Acholi civilians, accusing them of supporting the Government?
At the beginning of the war, in 1986, and later on there is no doubt that the first groups of rebels enjoyed
much popular support. However, such popularity increasingly faded away and it turned to open lack of
support to the rebels from the average person in Acholiland. This explains why the LRA, since the early
nineties, resorted to large-scale child abduction to beef up their forces since they could hardly do any
voluntary recruitment.
Different civil society groups (elders, rwodi, religious groups, peace committees, women groups, local
NGOs...) have consistently, for more than a decade, advocated for peace. Many outstanding Acholi leaders
have brought a good number of rebels out of the bush, undergoing great risks, but unfortunately these
positive events have not always attracted much public attention. Our religious leaders' peace group has been
organising peace rallies at the end of every year in Gulu and Kitgum.
Those who raise a pointed finger at the Acholi population are fond of establishing comparisons on how
rebellions ended in places like Teso, Lango or West Nile. They seem to forget, however, that Acholi unlike those other regions- has a long border with Sudan and that the generous support that the LRA has
been receiving from the Khartoum regime has been a major factor in keeping the war going.
"The war does not end because the Acholis do not support the UPDF"
Even the most pacifist of all people would acknowledge that the Armed forces have a necessary role to play
in protecting the population. It is because of this need for self-defence that many Acholis responded
positively to the call to join the Local Defence Units, although a good number of them ended up being
taken to Congo or elsewhere to fight other kinds of war. This particular factor eroded trust between the
population and the Army.
Unfortunately, a common scenario during these years goes like this: A man goes to a UPDF detachment
and reports the presence of rebels in a certain location. The local commander sends the man away without
43
taking any action, or alternatively compels him to guide the UPDF to that place, putting him and his whole
family at tremendous risk. That man is more than likely to keep quiet the next time!
We should not forget two other obvious facts: first, that if a group of well-armed rebels come to your
village and ask for food you really have no choice (I myself did give them everything they wanted once that
they entered in the Mission where I was. Had I refused I probably would be writing this article now in St.
Peter's office!). Secondly, people who have had their children abducted have a difficult dilemma to face: on
one hand they want the war to end, on the other hand they want their children to come back home alive, not
to be killed. What would any normal person in such situation do?
"The war does not end because the Government is not interested in peace"
Let us be fair. The Government, much as it has pursued the military option, has always shown signs of
good will as far as peaceful means to end the war are concerned: After the collapse of the 1993-94 peace
talks spearheaded by Betty Bigombe, it still tried to get in touch with the LRA and at the end of 1997 a
Government delegation met twice with one of their representatives in Rome (who later on was arrested by
Kony and narrowly escaped death). In 1999 the Government of Uganda reached a peace agreement with the
Sudanese government and passed the Amnesty Law, which has enabled many rebels to come back home
without being taken to court or victimised in any way.
Although some prominent NRM public figures expressed in the past their total opposition to any kind of
peace talks with the LRA, in August last year President Museveni appointed a Presidential Peace Team
(PPT) and expressed his willingness to engage in direct negotiations and declare a ceasefire provided
certain conditions were met. The Government has later on become increasingly flexible and accepted even
the possibility of going abroad for talks. The Presidential Peace Team, as well as some other figures in
authority, has at least been able to talk to the rebels on phone. By the way, the PPT is still relevant and
needed and it would be most helpful if they could again find ways of being more present on the ground.
"The war does not end because of the support that the LRA get from many Acholis living abroad"
It is true that in the past some prominent Acholis in the diaspora tried to organise some fund-raising for the
LRA and some of them used to be regular visitors of the rebels in their camps in Sudan. These links,
however, seem to have been greatly weakened, partly because of the disappointment of some of these rebel
sympathisers, and also because Kony has made himself more and more isolated and does not seem to
accept any influence from outside. At the moment it does not seem that the LRA enjoy any significant
financial or logistical support from Acholi communities abroad.
One of the common stereotypes of this war is the one that suggests that Acholi from the diaspora are
necessarily supporters of the LRA. It is true that some Acholi diaspora, who have both been away from
home for a long time and lack objective information, certainly do sympathise with the rebels. However, we
cannot forget that many others have been active in peacebuilding initiatives, particularly through the
"Kacoke Madit" secretariat in London, who are partners to different peace groups in Acholi, including
ARLPI.
"The war does not end because of so many people in the North making economic profit of it".
One cannot deny that there are some few individuals who are definitely making quite a lot of "blood
money" and investing it into their businesses, but this is far from being a widespread practice. Nevertheless,
these persons who obtain economic gain may have a great negative influence on the LRA and discourage
them from engaging into negotiations or accepting the Amnesty. There is no doubt that this problem must
be addressed. However, it is important to avoid a scenario in which almost everyone who is building a new
house or opening a new shop is automatically assumed to be a rebel collaborator.
44
"The war does not end because during the period of those useless peace talks the rebels were able to reorganise themselves".
Is this really the case? Well, to begin with there have never been any real "peace talks" as such, since the
LRA and the Government of Uganda representatives have never met face to face. For the last year there
have been some contacts (about twenty of them) between religious and cultural leaders and some LRA
commanders in the bush. On the 10th March this year, when the prospect of a first meeting were very much
at hand President Museveni agreed to declare a limited ceasefire in Lapul sub-county (Pader district). This
ceasefire was initially given for five days and eventually extended several times until it reached a period of
about five weeks. During that time military operations continued elsewhere and, interestingly enough, the
LRA rebels were not very much present in the ceasefire zone for much of the five weeks, so it is difficult to
understand how they could get such a boost from something so limited. By the way, the Lapul Presidential
ceasefire was not a waste of time: it gave the signal to everyone, including the LRA, that the Government
was serious about peace talks, and it allowed a number of rebel officers to come out of the bush safely."
(ARLPI, 1 July 2003)
Several local NGOs undertaking peace building activities at the community level
(2000)
•
Peace mediators thought to be opposed to the government difficulties in obtaining their
registration
"The Church of Uganda conducts a Peace and Human Rights Programme, which started in the north and
north-east but has been extended to west-Uganda. Several peace and human rights training sessions to raise
the consciousness of civil society have been conducted. The Planning, Development and Rehabilitation
Department of the CoU is associated with Responding To Conflict, based in Birmingham, UK, and works
closely with Action by Churches Together (ACT) in Geneva.
A community peace-building programme in the Gulu district in northern Uganda is run by the NGO
People’s Voice for Peace. Here, trainers in conflict resolution help victims to cope with conflict and to
build peace. Support for income-generating activities is part of the programme. The coordination of the
community peace-building activities is being done through its Peace and Oral Research and Testimony
Documentation Centre. Networking and collaboration with other peace actors within the civil society (local
groups, churches, social movements, and traditional institutions) is seen by PVP as essential. Presently the
Gulu-based organisation is expanding its activities to neighbouring districts, due to the high demand
especially in the area of support to women victims of war.
[…]
The Centre for Conflict Prevention is an Uganda-based NGO seeking alternative and creative means of
preventing, managing and resolving conflicts. The Centre trains key figures and professionals in conflict
prevention and resolution skills, besides other skills like community development, office management and
decision-making. The trainees are encouraged to transmit the same skills to people in the community and
workplace in turn. Many of the trainers are women who held influential positions in society. The Centre
also provides counselling services to traumatised children and young people
ACORD Uganda has been running extensive programs in the north for at least a decade. In March 1997 it
organised a two-day conference in Kampala on conflict resolution in the north, with a host of national and
regional invitees.
45
Uganda has a wide variety of NGOs operating in the country. They are obliged to register with the
Nongovernmental Organisations Board. NGOs thought to be opposed to the government have sometimes
had difficulties in obtaining their registration." (EPCPT December 2000)
Endemic mistrust on both sides of the conflict in Acholi dominated North
•
Ceasefire terminated (April 2003)
•
Head of the Presidential Peace Team has said that the peace talks have achieved nothing so far
•
Peace talks in the way of a decisive military victory
•
Endemic mistrust on both sides
•
Hopes for dialogue in August 2002 shattered by military priorities of both LRA and GoU
•
Both sides determined to continue pursuing a military agenda until they reach "mutual
destruction", according to local peace mediator
Presidential peace talks( April 2003)
“Despite reports from Gulu that, on 29th March, Archbishop Odama and Rwot Acana delivered a written
LRA declaration of ceasefire to the Presidential Peace Team (PPT) in front of journalists, and to which the
PPT replied, the peace process in northern Uganda has remained elusive. On 18th April, President Yoweri
Museveni officially terminated the limited ceasefire declaration that was offered to the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) insurgents starting from10th March 2003. After an emergency meeting in Gulu, with senior
army commanders and the Presidential Peace Team (PPT) members on Friday, 18th April 2003, The
President ordered a full-scale resumption of UPDF operations against the LRA in Lapul sub-county, Pader
district, where the limited ceasefire was originally effective. The termination came after reports in the local
media, that on 18th April 2003 President Museveni had suspended the mobilization and activities of the
peace initiatives because intelligence had discovered a plot to kill some of the PPT members, including
Salim Saleh, and to abduct the rest. (OCHA April 2003)
LRA's peace talks ( December 2002-March 2003)
"I want genuine peace talks with government. I initiated a ceasefire, but it is government which seems to
work against peace," the BBC quoted Kony as saying on Saturday in a phone-in to Mega FM, a radio
station based in the northern town of Gulu. (IRIN 30 December 2002)
“Uganda's rebel leader, Joseph Kony, has declared a ceasefire in northern Uganda to pave the way for talks
to end the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency in the region, but his gesture has been greeted with a
mixture of hope and scepticism.
Kony's right-hand man, Charles Tabuley, reportedly told a team of religious leaders who met him at the
weekend that Kony had declared the ceasefire with immediate effect, as part of his willingness to begin
peace talks with the government. The recorded message was reportedly broadcast on Ugandan radio.
The religious leaders said they spoke for over an hour via satellite phone with Kony during the meeting, the
BBC reported. In the recorded message, which was reportedly broadcast on Ugandan radio, the LRA leader
also promised to stop abducting civilians, ambushing vehicles and attacking government troops, according
to the BBC.
Lam Cosmas, the coordinator of the Acholi Religious Leaders' Peace Initiative, which has been playing a
mediating role in the conflict, told IRIN on Monday that the body was happy with the LRA's gesture, and
was monitoring the ceasefire. "We are happy about this. The fact that he [Kony] asked for a meeting is very
important for us," he said. 'Now we implore them [the LRA], we exhort them to implement the ceasefire.
The process of peace must be nurtured,' he added.
However, he did not rule out renewed confrontation between the army and the rebels during the ceasefire
period. 'The commanders are all aware of the ceasefire. But we know there are problems of coordination
and communication. So there could be isolated incidences,' he added.
46
Salim Saleh, President Yoweri Museveni's brother and a member of the government's peace team appointed
last year to negotiate with the rebel group, welcomed the ceasefire and said arrangements were currently
being made 'to organise face-to-face discussions" and that he would "personally' take part in those talks,
according to BBC.
A representative of the Ugandan military has, however, stressed that the army would only accept Kony's
ceasefire if the LRA leader abided by conditions set earlier by the government before talks can begin. The
conditions included stopping attacks on civilians.
The Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) spokesman in Gulu, Paddy Ankunda, told Radio Uganda that
the UPDF had "no choice" but to continue hunting for the LRA rebels for so long as they failed to abide by
the conditions.” (IRIN 3 March 2003)
Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI).
“Northern Uganda’s peace process looks to be on its last legs. Talks have all but collapsed between
Uganda’s government and the troublesome rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), as both sides take to the
bush to resume full hostilities. But have they really blown their last chance for peace?
It is eight months since the Ugandan government and LRA first decided to talk to each other. For 16 years,
all they had ever exchanged was gunfire. Then on 14 July 2002, the rebels held a landmark seven-hour
meeting with representatives of the local Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI).
They said they wanted to open negotiations with the government – negotiations which could finally end
Uganda’s longest, bloodiest civil conflict to date. Present were Vincent Otti, Sam Kolo and Caesar
Acellam, three of the LRA’s most senior members.
“We had another meeting on the 21st [July],” explains Father Carlos Rodriguez, a chief negotiator who has
been in contact with the LRA almost since the insurgency began.
'We went back, we told the president that we have already met them, that they have these demands, and so
on,' he told IRIN. 'And he said we should try and meet them again. This was a real breakthrough. It was the
first time in my memory that the government had shown a willingness to talk.'
Breakdown
Eight months down the line, progress has been slow. The LRA is still pursuing relentless attacks on villages
in troubled northern districts, with regular killings, lootings and child abductions (60 from Lira in one
evening last week).
And now the government, in frustration with what it sees as a lack of sincerity on the part of the LRA, has
formally ended a ceasefire in Lapul subcountry, Pader district, declared last month so that the rebels could
meet the Presidential Peace Team. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) now have orders to attack
the LRA wherever they find them.
According to government sources, this is because the LRA are using the ceasefire as a safe haven in which
to regroup for further attacks. First Deputy Prime Minister Salim Saleh, who heads the Presidential Peace
Team told IRIN the LRA were 'not genuine' about peace talks.
'Until four days ago, I was hoping against hope, but not any more,' he said. 'They are just buying time to
reorganise themselves. Recently they’ve been under a lot of pressure. They’ve been dislodged from Sudan,
so they’ve got no base.'
'My current conclusion is that this is just a charade to give them time to relax before the next offensive,' he
added.
Mistrust
47
The issue of trust is one that has been repeatedly raised by mediators. According to them, it is endemic on
both sides. Because of their mistrust, the government thinks the LRA is just using the peace talks as a
breathing space.
Meanwhile, the LRA are reported to be terrified that the peace talks are just a cover for military operations
against them. And not without reason. Too often peace meetings in agreed spots have coincided with a
sudden UPDF attack.
'Some of our efforts have definitely been spoilt by the army,' says Father Carlos.The most recent of such
incidents was at the beginning of March, after the LRA declared a unilateral ceasefire. Father Carlos
recounts the event:
'After the LRA declared a ceasefire we got a call from one of their commanders on the radio. They said
come on the 4th [March] and bring government officials. One even wanted his mother. The meeting was in
the bush near Padula, Pader District. But when we got to Acholi Pii [north Pader] the 5th division
commander refused to stop operations, saying he didn’t have orders to stop. They then proceeded to bomb
the area relentlessly for four days.'
'It cannot be proved that what happened was a deliberate trap, but the temptation will always be there to use
peace talks to contain the rebels and then pound them,' he noted.
But Salim Saleh defends the army on this, pointing out that a ceasefire had not yet been agreed. 'The 5th
division commander was right. The president had given no orders to stop operations. [LRA leader Joseph]
Kony declared it on the 1st, but it takes more than that to cement a ceasefire. The president had barely
received the news.'
He also points out that the rebels themselves did not honour their own ceasefire. 'On that very day they
launched an attack and killed some of our soldiers,' he said.
Nevertheless, incidents like the above have led the LRA to treat every interaction with the government,
mediated or not, with deep suspicion. Acholiland senior cultural leader David Achana says: 'The LRA told
me last week they now feel that the meetings are just a trap.'
Control
Another question is whether the rebel commanders meeting for talks are really the ones in control. Or, for
that matter, whether anyone is, says Father Carlos.
'Is it a group with a serious central command or has it splintered into a loose collection of warlords, no-one
in control?,' he asks. 'Sometimes it seems that way. I get the impression that if the power of the LRA was
really in the hands of the people we have been meeting, we would have solved this by now.'
Government officials disagree, saying there is no question that the LRA is anything other than an organised
group. 'The LRA is tightly controlled,' says Salim Saleh. 'If Kony wanted to, he could stop tomorrow.'
No-one really knows what Kony wants. 'It is the biggest puzzle of this war', says Lam Kosmos, coordinator
of the ARLPI. 'We cannot determine Kony’s seriousness about peace talks because no-one has met him.
We just get reports from his second in command that ‘we are working on it’.'
Business
Other suggested reasons for the failure of talks are still open to debate. A common accusation is that the
war is a lucrative business, which both sides are perpetuating, although Kosmos dismisses this.
'That is just a stereotype,' he says. 'It is impossible to verify that anyone is deliberately prolonging the war,
for money or any other reason.'
48
But if not greed, then there might just be one other deadly sin holding back negotiations - pride.
'The collapse in talks has just allowed the hardliners to harden further,' Salim Saleh told IRIN.
'This is not about personal gain, but pride, with both the LRA and the UPDF. There are elements in both
that will only be happy with a decisive victory.'" (IRIN 22 April 2003)
Peace talks in the way of the decisive military victory?
“Local initiatives by groups such as the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative have made major
inroads in attempting to negotiate between the parties and convince individual LRA commanders to come
in from the bush and release their captives. Some representatives report that the Ugandan military is
hindering this work, at times detaining and dangerously threatening individuals who attempt to cross lines
to create dialog, thereby undermining peace activities.” (Women’s Commission, 12 February 2003)
New peace committee in Gulu:
“Stakeholders in northern Uganda’s troubled districts have joined a number of international relief agencies
to draft a new resolution which it is hoped will restart peace talks between the government and Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) rebels.
Oduru Kuc – which in the northern Acholi language translates as 'peace call' – is a new body comprising
religious leaders, international agencies, MPs, local councillors, elders, women representatives and
influential Acholis from the diaspora. It was officially inaugurated on Friday, at the conclusion of the twoday 'peace workshop' in Gulu town after behind-the-scenes talks.
The committee is supposed to be a response to the criticism that previous efforts at peace talks failed
because would-be mediators sent mixed messages to the rebels’ senior commanders. Its aim is to bring
together all the various parties under a single committee so that they can talk with one
voice.
Gulu Catholic Archbishop Martin Odama, who is to chair the committee said he thought this was the one
important outcome of the peace workshop.” (IRIN 12 May 2003 )
Museveni has put in place politcal structures which have tended to muzzle opposition, according to
Peace Mediators at Makerere University
[…]
According to Sam Tindifa who heads the Human Rights and Peace Centre at Uganda's state Makerere
University, the inability of the government and LRA to agree on conditions for talks, is an indication that
both sides are determined to continue pursuing a military agenda until they reach 'mutual destruction'.
'I don't know whether either party can be taken seriously. Each party is offering conditions that are
unacceptable to the other,' he told IRIN.
Tindifa argues that lasting peace for northern Uganda lies in a political, rather than military, solution. The
northern rebellion, he said, was rooted in the 'military history' of Museveni's government which, upon
seizing power in 1986, put in place political structures which have 'tended to muzzle opposition'. One such
structure is the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) system, which restricts the activities of
political parties, he said.
'I think the problem in the first place is political rather than military. Without solving the political problems,
there can be no military solution,' Tindifa said. 'The north is fundamentally opposed to the Movement. It is
therefore easy for an armed rebellion to take root in such an environment.'[…]
49
Furthermore, recent claims in the local media linking Kiiza Besigye - Museveni's main rival in the 2001
presidential elections who now lives in exile - to the LRA have serious implications in the northern
Ugandan conflict, according to Tindifa.
He argues that the possibility of Besigye's involvement with the LRA could lead to the transformation of
the northern insurgency into a much more complex conflict." (IRIN 27 August 2002)
Civil society organisations create a Coalition for Peace in Northern Uganda:
"Twenty-five civil society organisations in Uganda have announced the formation of a new coalition aimed
at ending insecurity in northern Uganda.
The Coalition of Civil Society Organisations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU), as it is known, was
formed on Tuesday, after members met to express growing concern over the escalating 'cycle of violence'
in the north.
[…]
'Citing the terrible suffering over the past few years of up to 500,000 internally displaced persons, and the
lack of a coherent government policy to bring peace to the sub-region, the CSOs [civil society
organisations] see the roots of the conflict partly in the ethnic, regional and religious differences within
Uganda,' the statement said." (IRIN 3 July 2002)
Premature peace hopes
•
Hopes for peace and return in March 2003
•
Hopes for return February 2002
•
Hopes for gradual return November 2001
“Following recent peace moves by the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army( LRA),
there is hope that finally an end may be in sight to the bloody insurrection in the north of the country”
(IRIN 12 March 2003)
“The government is estimating that peace will have returned to the north of the country by February 2003
and resettlement of displaced populations to have taken place in March. However it has not put forward any
timetable for peace talks with rebels.” (OCHA 2 October 2002)
Government hoped that IDPs would be able to return to their homes by early April 2002
"As Kony’s position is weakened and the UPDF estimates LRA numbers in Uganda at only 100 with a
further 300 in southern Sudan, Museveni appears confident that there will be a direct, and positive, impact
on the situation for IDPs in the north and he has expressed a hope that IDPs will be able to return to their
homes by early April. While there continue to be a small number of attacks and ambushes on roads, these
are often attributable to banditry and incidences of abduction have decreased. In response, IDPs have
begun to venture out of the camps to work in their gardens and travel to their villages, a trend that had
already been noticed in Kitgum over the last six months, and is now apparent in Gulu where 25% of the
IDP population are estimated to be accessing their gardens. " (OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.31-33)
Hopes for gradual return of the civilian population to their homesteads or villages of origin(2002)
“The North (Gulu, Pader, Kitgum): Most Likely Scenario: it is assumed that the Amnesty Act (Section 1.2),
with its option for active combatants to report for their Amnesty Certificate and return to normal life, will
weaken the strength of the LRA and its impact on the civilian population. Additional efforts will be made
by Khartoum and Kampala to bring an end to the meaningless attacks on the civilian populations. LRA
rebel activity will consequently decline, including looting, abductions and sporadic attacks, as was
50
experienced during 2001. This will result in a gradual return of the civilian population to their homesteads
or villages of origin.”(UN Uganda 30 November 2001)
Increasing isolation of LRA facilitated return(First half of 2002-before military offensive)
"Improvements in security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA in recent months had facilitated
the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas, humanitarian sources told IRIN on
Thursday, 10 January 2002.
'It is happening in a fairly ad hoc manner. It is pretty slow but it is going in the right direction,' they said.
The population of one of the largest camps at Pabbo, Gulu District, had fallen by around 5,000 and was
now estimated at 41,000 people, sources added. (IRIN 11 January 2002)
The president assuring IDP that they would be able to return during 2002
"Although the Ugandan government has no clear policy on tackling internal displacement, Museveni said in
his end of year address that the security status of the northern and western Uganda would improve enough
to allow the IDP camps to be dismantled.
"I would like to assure those Ugandans that are still in those camps that they will be able to go back to their
homes this year," he said on Radio Uganda on 31 December." (IRIN 11 January 2002)
Political changes may result in the resolution of the long-running LRA rebellion. (2001)
“Events that have contributed to the comparative quiet include:
The ongoing Amnesty;
A number of community based peace initiatives such as the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative
(ARLPI);
Government’s efforts to dialogue with the LRA rebels, spearheaded by the Gulu LCV Chairperson’s
meeting with several LRA Commanders on June 4th; and
Improved relations between the governments of Sudan and Uganda, which led to Sudan Government’s
formal decision to cut support to the LRA on August 20th.
Further, as part of the peace overtures to restore diplomatic relations (broken in 1995), Sudan reopened its
embassy in Kampala August 2001, with Uganda doing the same in Khartoum a month later. These political
changes may result in the resolution of the long-running LRA rebellion. Gulu district officials are already
reviewing the possibility of resettling IDPs in camps nearer to their homes." (UN November 2001, p.6)
Prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict appeared to recede(2002)
•
The Ugandan government publicly demanded a military solution to the LRA problem
•
The Lord’s Resistance Army declared a terrorist group by US State Department (2002)
"After the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the US State Department declared the LRA, among
others, a terrorist group. With the global scene largely dominated by the anti-terrorist campaign in the last
months of 2001, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict appeared to recede. The Ugandan
government publicly demanded a military solution to the LRA problem. Museveni visited Sudan in January
2002 for the IGAD meeting, and at a pre-summit meeting with Bashir both presidents pledged support for
the war on terrorism. This visit, like the earlier visits of President Bashir to Kampala in 2001, signal a
marked improvement in bi-lateral relations. Towards the end of January 2002 there were reports of a
significant UPDF military build-up in northern Uganda and speculation grew that a move to attack the LRA
inside Sudan was imminent." (ACCORD 2002, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement")
51
Peace talks ended when President Museveni gave the Lord’s Resistance Army seven
days to lay down weapons (1994)
•
In 1994 LRA soldiers were staying freely in the trading centers
•
Peace talks ended when President Museveni suddenly announced that he was giving the LRA
seven days to put down their weapons and turn themselves over to the government
•
LRA buttressed by alleged arms and logistical from Khartoum, escalated its attacks against Acholi
communities in 1996
“By 1994, things had once again reached a state where the government felt it needed to attempt to bring
peace to the north. Thus, in 1994, peace talks were held between Kony and the NRM. These talks were
facilitated by Betty Bigombe. Bigombe, herself an Acholi, was then the Minister for Pacification of the
North. Bigombe's efforts very nearly came to fruition. It is said that, at the time, LRA soldiers were staying
freely in the trading centers and that a cease-fire existed. These talks ended badly when President Museveni
suddenly announced that he was giving the LRA seven days to put down their weapons and turn themselves
over to the government. Within three days of this announcement, the LRA had once again begun attacking.
After the breakdown of the 1994 talks, any support that the LRA had enjoyed from the Acholi people dried
up. Thus, the mass abduction of children began in early 1995.
[...]
Clearly, the people of Acholi-land have little stomach for a movement that has inflicted so much harm and
contributed so greatly to the destruction of their culture and people. Whatever support the LRA has enjoyed
in the past in Acholi-land has long since dissipated." (Westbrook June 2000, sects. III, VI)
"The Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) deployed in all main trading centres throughout Gulu,
Kitgum and Padar Districts and continued to engage in low-intensity battles with the LRA until February
1996, when the later, buttressed by alleged arms and logistical from Khartoum, escalated its attacks against
Acholi communities. By July 1996, the LRA had attacked numerous locations throughout Gulu in what
appeared to be a campaign to breed fear amongst the population and to force the UPDF to respond in a
more forceful and imprecise manner. There followed numerous incidents of Acholi citizens being caught
up in “friendly fire” or of being brutally interrogated and accused of being LRA collaborators. (OCHA 23
May 2001, "Historical Backdrop")
Kacoke Madit (KM) - an organisation of the Acholi community in exile working for
peace (1996-2000)
•
KM was established in 1996 by Acholi people living in the 'Diaspora'
•
Peace initiative dedicated to the restoration of peace to Northern Uganda by peaceful means
"Kacoke Madit (KM) was established in 1996 by Acholi people living in the 'Diaspora' in response to the
escalation of the N. Uganda conflict. It is a peace initiative dedicated to the restoration of peace to Northern
Uganda by peaceful means. It has now grown into a world-wide network of community groups,
organisations and peace initiatives working together to end the conflict and to promote reconciliation. The
initiative has helped to establish and to build the consensus among Acholi people, other Ugandans and the
international community at large, for the conflict to be resolved by peaceful means.
In addition to its peace-making role, KM provides a forum for the development of post war plans and
strategies to meet the socioeconomic and development needs of the war-ravaged districts and the
rehabilitation of education, health care, communication and other infrastructure.
52
'Kacoke Madit' is an Acholi phrase, which means "Big Meeting or Big Conference". The name was
originally coigned in reference to the first conference organised by KM in 1997.
The Origin of KM
In 1995, Acholi community in North America unsuccessfully lobbied the Uganda North America
Association (UNAA) to include the conflict in Northern Uganda on the agenda of their 1995 Convention in
Chicago. They therefore held a separate meeting during the Convention at which they agreed to call a
meeting involving all members of the Acholi community of North America to discuss the conflict between
LRA and the Uganda Government.
The meeting took place the following year during the UNAA convention in Toronto Canada, (August 30 September 2 1996), under the chairmanship of Dr. Ben Ochora Latigo. It was attended by Dr. Martin
Aliker, who was then the Uganda Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (Regional Cooperation). The
meeting produced a 9-point resolution, which was delivered to President Yoweri Museveni by Dr. Aliker.
President Museveni did not respond to this initiative, and attempts to get a response were unsuccessful.
It was also proposed in Toronto that an all-Acholi Meeting should be organised in London, United
Kingdom. In late 1996, following circulation of the proposal, and widespread consultation, a team of
volunteers from the Acholi community in the United Kingdom formed the London Organising Committee.
They elected Dr Patrick Oguru Otto as Coordinator, and embarked on the task of organising the first
Kacoke Madit (KM).
The first Kacoke Madit (KM97)
The first Kacoke Madit took place in London, United Kingdom on the 5th and 6th April 1997. It was
attended by more than 300 delegates from Uganda, the USA, Canada, the UK, Sweden, Germany, Denmark
and Kenya. The main objectives of the conference were to raise awareness of the conflict in N. Uganda, to
exchange views on the causes and consequences of the conflict and to determine the most viable and
practical means of bringing the conflict in Northern Uganda to a speedy end. The Uganda government was
represented by the Ministers for State for Foreign Affairs, Dr Martin Aliker and for Northern Uganda, Mr
Alphonse Owiny Dollo, while the LRA sent their Secretary for External Affairs and Mobilisation, Dr James
Obita and 2 other members of the LRA/M High Command.
The conference produced an eleven-point resolution, which principally called on the Government and the
LRA to cease hostilities and to embark upon a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
The Second Kacoke Madit (KM98)
KM98 built on the achievements of KM97. It was held between the 17th and 19th July 1998 in London,
UK again. In view of the setbacks experienced in implementing the 1997 resolutions, and unsuccessful
attempt by the government and the LRA to establish a viable negotiation process in 1997 and 1998, the
theme, 'Removing the Obstacles to Peace' was adopted for the conference. The conference was attended by
more than 300 delegates from all sectors of the Acholi communities, as well as many non-Ugandan
individuals and representatives of Governments and international non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
KM98 identified the main obstacles to peace and proposals to overcome them, which were encapsulated in
the 11-point conference resolution. The conference also re-affirmed the delegates' commitment to pursuing
a peaceful resolution as stipulated at KM97." (KM 2000)
Uganda-Sudan relations
53
Lord’s Resistance Army assisted by Sudan in retaliation for Ugandan support to
SPLM/A (July 2003)
•
· President Museveni claims that the Sudanese rebels receive political support only , but this is not
accurate
•
· In 1997 the SPLM/A received the assistance of the UPDF, including troops
•
· LRA seemed to have better arms, communications equipment, and newer uniforms than the
UPDF
•
· LRA boasted that it had stockpiled enough arms to last for five years
•
· Airdrops by low-flying planes, possibly by the Sudanese armed forces, in northern Uganda in
2003
“The LRA has been assisted by the Sudanese government since about 1994, in retaliation for the support
that President Museveni gives to the Sudanese rebels, the SPLM/A. President Museveni claims that the
Sudanese rebels receive political support only, but this is not accurate. In 1997, for example, the SPLM/A
received the assistance of the UPDF, including troops, in its sweep from the Ugandan border north through
Equatoria and Bahr El Ghazal. With the help of the UPDF and others, the SPLM/A captured many
Sudanese army garrisons from Yei to Tonj towns, and took thousands of prisoners of war. Among the
prisoners of war were at least one thousand members of the West Bank Nile Front, a Ugandan rebel group
also supported by the Sudanese government. The West Bank Nile Front was effectively disbanded.” (HRW,
p. 10, 15 July 2003)
“It is unclear from where the new supplies for the LRA might have come-if not from Sudan, its long-term
supplier. The LRA claimed that it was supplied through capture of goods from the UPDF (or corruption),
which was probably only partly true, as the LRA seemed to eyewitnesses to have better arms,
communications equipment, and newer uniforms than did the UPDF.
Undoubtedly the LRA was in and out of Sudan even after it returned in force to northern Uganda in June
2002; former child abductees reported to UNICEF that in late 2002 the LRA took at least 500 children to
Sudan.In early March 2003, LRA second-in-command Vincent Otti reportedly crossed from northern
Uganda into southern Sudan with some 300 LRA fighters and civilian abductees.A social worker who
counsels LRA abducted and escaped child soldiers said that many children reported that the stronger boys
were forced to march into Sudan in 2003 and porter back a large cache of arms. Other children reportedly
said that the LRA boasted that it had stockpiled enough arms to last for five years.
Agencies based in northern Uganda and others reported airdrops by low-flying planes, possibly by the
Sudanese armed forces, in northern Uganda in 2003. The planes were Antonovs, a make frequently used by
the Sudanese government, and the planes came from the direction of Juba, Sudan and returned back after
dropping, without landing. Further evidence of continuing Sudanese army involvement with the LRA came
in the form of detailed interviews conducted in Luo, the Acholi language, with LRA senior returnee
officers, according to the ARLPI. The Sudanese government denied all accusations.” (HRW, p 13, 15 July
2003)
Uganda withdrew its observers from Sudan (August 2003)
•
Uganda admitted that it had withdrawn its observers that were based in Sudan (August 2003)
•
Sudan decided to remove Ugandan military observers from Juba and instead take them to
Khartoum
•
Each government has accused the other of violating the common frontier and supporting the
other’s insurgents
54
•
A central question was why the two presidents decided in 1999 to request help to resolve their
differences
•
Uganda’s interest in re-establishing relations with Sudan was less clear
•
The Sudanese government wanted to improve relations with the US
“Uganda [...]admitted that it had withdrawn its observers that were based in Sudan, and accused Khartoum
of not being serious to undertake its obligations.
‘It is true we have withdrawn our liaison officers, but this was prompted by Sudan, which decided not to
allow them do their job in Juba,’ army spokesman Major Shaban Bantariza said.
‘The liaison officers were supposed to do their job from Juba, but unfortunately Sudan decided to remove
them from there and instead take them to Khartoum,’ he explained in reacting to reports suggesting
differences between the two countries that had just mended relations.
Bantariza said that even those Sudanese officers deployed in Uganda to observe the border had refused to
go to Gulu and had remained in Kampala.
‘We told them that their work was in Gulu, not in Kampala, and if they could not go to northern Uganda,
they should leave, so they decided to leave,’ he said, adding: ‘If they are to report about our support of the
rebel Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), what quality of evidence will they have when they remain
in Kampala?’
Sudanese Foreign minister Mustafa Ismail on Sunday confirmed that there were differences over liaison
officers the two countries deployed to monitor common border positions.
The two officers from each country, according to Bantariza, were supposed to monitor activities in
operation areas of either country, as a confidence building mechanism.
‘Our officers were supposed to monitor activities in former LRA (Lord's Resistance Army) camps in
Jabulain, Lubang Tek and Bin Rwot, not to be in Khartoum, while theirs were supposed to be in Gulu to
monitor areas of operation in Kitgum, Arua and Nimule," he added.”( AFP, 18 August 2003)
“Efforts to end the war in northern Uganda have been entwined with the wider dynamics of hostility
between the governments of Uganda and Sudan and war in south Sudan. Each government has accused the
other of violating the common frontier and supporting the other’s insurgents. Diplomatic relations between
the two states were severed in 1995, allegedly because of Sudan's support for the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) in retaliation for the government of Uganda’s participation in the Sudanese government’s war
against the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). In early 1999, the governments of
Sudan and Uganda asked former US President Jimmy Carter to help normalise relations.
Decision to negotiate
A central question was why the two presidents decided at that point to request help to resolve their
differences, and why they approached Carter. The two countries were not at war, nor were they suffering a
‘hurting stalemate’ that might encourage them to seek a negotiated settlement. Their motives appear to have
been less direct.
Sudan was on a ‘charm offensive’ to improve relations with its neighbours. Although the Sudanese
government used the LRA to fight the SPLA, The Carter Center believed this was not decisive in the
balance of military power, and the government might have judged that it could afford to cease supporting
the LRA so as to improve its international standing. Sudan also had reasons to involve a former US
president. The Clinton administration had declared Sudan a terrorist state for its alleged role in the
assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and for hosting Osama bin Laden, accused of
masterminding the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. In August 1998, the US
fired missiles into a suburb of Khartoum to destroy an alleged chemical weapons factory. By late 1998, the
Sudanese government wanted to improve relations with the US and knew that Carter had been a friend to
Sudan in the past. They believed Carter had access to Clinton and could influence US policy on Sudan.
55
Uganda’s interest in re-establishing relations with Sudan was less clear. Uganda enjoyed privileged status
with the US government, and US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had characterised President Yoweri
Museveni as one of the ‘new generation of African leaders’. Museveni may have been motivated to reduce
military spending to conform to World Bank requirements on debt repayments. In addition, the Ugandan
People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) were fighting on three fronts: in the north against the LRA; in the west
against the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the northwest against the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF)
and the Uganda National Rescue Front II (UNRF II); and, most notably, in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) where Ugandan troops were fighting armies from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and even
their erstwhile ally Rwanda. Museveni may have wanted to withdraw troops from the north and west to
send to the DRC. Uganda's continued presence in the DRC was not popular with some donor 'allies' in the
West.” (Accord, 11 January 2002)
Sudan and Uganda have agreed to renew a bilateral military agreement (September
2003)
•
Bilateral agreement that gives the Ugandan army access to southern Sudan to carry out limited
operations against the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
•
We [The Ugandese]have information that rebels have set up new camps in southern Sudan
•
Some 15,000 foot soldiers backed by tanks, artillery and two fully adapted attack helicopters have
been deployed in southern Sudan
•
The military operation has indirectly caused the worst humanitarian situation the region has ever
seen
"Sudan and Uganda have agreed to renew a bilateral agreement that gives the Ugandan army access to
southern Sudan to carry out limited operations against the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). The
agreement was extended by three months on Friday despite allegations that the Sudanese army was
supporting the Ugandan rebels in southern Sudan.
"The agreement has gone ahead as planned. The fact that we are saying Sudan has reneged on it does not
affect the signing of the protocol itself," army spokesman Maj Shaban Bantariza told IRIN.
The protocol allows the Ugandan army access to southern Sudan within the framework of "Operation Iron
Fist", a campaign it began in early 2002 with the aim of crushing the rebel group. This is the eight time it
has been renewed. The renewal comes at a time when the two countries are involved in increasingly bitter
exchanges over whether some members of the Sudanese armed forces are supplying the Ugandan rebels
with food, weapons and ammunition.
At the official signing in Uganda's military headquarters in Bombo, outside Kampala, Chief of Military
Intelligence Col Noble Mayombo said Khartoum must make greater efforts to stop LRA fighters and
officers from establishing safe havens in the region. He also said Sudan was failing to share vital
intelligence with Uganda concerning the LRA. "We have information that rebels have set up new camps in
southern Sudan and this intelligence we did not get from them [the Sudanese], which is a violation of the
protocol," he said.
On Thursday Sudan's ambassador to Uganda, Sirajuddin Hamid Yousif, told the BBC's Focus on Africa
that Khartoum was disappointed that the Ugandan government and media were willing to readily believe
the testimony of former LRA fighters - the main basis for the accusations.
56
But Uganda's army has countered that the reports from former rebels show remarkable consistency. "These
reports are all independently saying the same thing," Bantariza told IRIN. "So, on the contrary, they [the
Sudanese] need to give us a reason why we should not believe it."
Ugandan and Sudanese government officials have agreed to meet in October to discuss the allegations. "A
delegation is being sent to Khartoum next month to discuss all these things," Bantariza told IRIN. "Until
then, we will simply continue to catalogue our evidence."
Some 15,000 foot soldiers backed by tanks, artillery and two fully adapted attack helicopters have been
deployed in southern Sudan under Operation Iron Fist. However, the campaign has failed to end the LRA
insurgency in spite of several deadlines set by the Ugandan government, and has indirectly caused the
worst humanitarian situation the region has ever seen. It has led to large numbers of the LRA returning to
northern Uganda, where they have stepped up their attacks against civilians. Many people have been killed
in the attacks, in which villages have been looted and an increasing number of children kidnapped.
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced. " (UN OCHA, 15 September 2003)
Uganda for the first time openly accused Sudan of resuming support for northern
rebels (September 2003)
•
Our information is that the rebels have set up new camps near and beyond Sudan army lines
•
In March 2002 Uganda and Sudan signed a protocol allowing Ugandan troops to hunt LRA
fighters in southern Sudan
•
LRA leaders had moved their headquarters to southern Sudan from northern Uganda and had been
receiving arms and supplies from the Khartoum government
•
The protocol might be re-negotiated in Khartoum
"Uganda for the first time openly accused Sudan on Friday of resuming support for northern rebels in
violation of a border cooperation pact, but said it would talk to Khartoum next month to resolve the matter.
'Our information is that the rebels have set up new camps near and beyond Sudan army lines,' Uganda's
military intelligence chief Colonel Noble Mayombo told reporters, referring to the Lords Resistance Army
(LRA) rebels.
'This intelligence we did not get from them (Sudanese authorities). If the intelligence exchange had been
there, the LRA may have been defeated by now.'
One of Africa's strangest rebel movements, the LRA has fought a 17-year insurgency against the
government of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and is feared for its habit of abducting children for use
as child soldiers and sex slaves.
In March last year Uganda and Sudan signed a protocol allowing Ugandan troops to hunt LRA fighters in
southern Sudan, marking an end to Khartoum's support for the rebels which included permission for the
rebels to have bases in Sudan.
But earlier this week former child soldiers who gave themselves up to the army told members of parliament
that LRA leaders had moved their headquarters to southern Sudan from northern Uganda and had been
receiving arms and supplies from the Khartoum government in recent months.
57
MPs also quoted Museveni as saying in a closed-door speech to parliament that Sudan had resumed the
support and he would teach Khartoum a "lesson" if it persisted.
The Sudanese embassy in the Ugandan capital Kampala denied the accusations, which they said were based
on hearsay.
Uganda's state defence minister Ruth Nankabirwa told a news conference officials of the two countries
would discuss the matter at a meeting in Khartoum in October.
'In Khartoum we will renew the protocol and present evidence of the new links between the Sudan army
and the LRA,' she said.
She was speaking at a ceremony with Sudanese ambassador Mohammed Surjudin where they signed a onemonth extension of the protocol to the end of September at army headquarters outside Kampala. The
protocol ran out at the end of August.
Nankabirwa's comments suggested the terms of the protocol might be re-negotiated in Khartoum. At the
ceremony, Surjudin repeated his government's denial that they were aiding the LRA.
More than 14,000 Ugandan troops backed by tanks, artillery and helicopter gunships were deployed in the
north last year to fight the rebels but have so far failed to defeat them.
LRA leader Joseph Kony, who locals say talks to "angels", has previously said he wants to overthrow the
Kampala government but he has never given detailed reasons for his rebellion. Northern residents said the
rebel leader has no clear agenda." (Reuters, 12 September 2003)
Sudan would work to improve ties between the two countries(September 2003)
•
Ugandan Defence Minister arrived in Khartoum to negotiate means to fight activities by the rebel
Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in South Sudan
•
Museveni had warned Khartoum that ties between the two countries were at risk and would
change fundamentally if LRA rebels would receive arms from within Uganda again
•
In early September, the United States requested Khartoum to mediate between the Ugandan
government and the LRA rebels
"Sudanese president Omar Hassan al-Bashir told the Ugandan government on Sunday that Sudan would
work to improve ties between the two countries.
He was responding to a message from Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni, which was conveyed by
Ugandan Defence Minister Amama Mbabazi in Khartoum.
Mbabazi arrived in Khartoum to negotiate means to fight activities by the rebel Ugandan Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) in South Sudan, on the basis of the countries' renewed military protocol of March 2002,
which allows Ugandan troops to crackdown on rebels bases in Sudan.
The minister said Uganda was looking forward to sudan's cooperation in the fight against the LRA.
58
After first talks with presidential aide Mubarak al-Fadhil he said he hoped Sudan would cooperate with
Uganda to bring about stability and peace in the region.
Al-Bashir made clear Sudan was keen to maintain good relations with Uganda, according to the agreements
signed between the two countries and within the framework of regional and international charters on good
neighbourliness.
He also promised to press ahead with talks started by the two presidents in the Mozambican capital of
Maputo last August.
Last month, Museveni had warned Khartoum that ties between the two countries were at risk and would
change fundamentally if LRA rebels would receive arms from within Uganda again. Al-Bashir had rejected
the Museveni's allegation.
In early September, the United States requested Khartoum to mediate between the Ugandan government
and the LRA rebels in a bid to end the 15-year civil war in Northern Uganda.
Relations between Sudan and Uganda have improved generally despite the recent Ugandan accusations that
the Sudanese army had resumed their support for the rebels.
The LRA has been conducting insurgencies against Museveni's government since 1988." (Sudan Net, 21
September 2003)
Uganda-Sudan relations (1999-2003)
•
Sudanese support to the LRA has been provided in direct retaliation for Ugandan support to the
SPLA
•
December 1999 agreement obliges both Sudan and Uganda to disarm and disband ''terrorist''
groups operating on their soil
•
Agreement reiterated in September 2000.
•
International concern by July 2000 about slow implementation of agreement
"It is widely acknowledged that the war in Sudan between the National Islamic Front (NIF) government,
and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) rebel group has played a role in the continuation of the
war in northern Uganda. In the first place, the NIF supports the LRA. This seems to have begun sometime
in 1993 and 1994. According to Father Carlos Rodriguez of the Catholic Mission in Kitgum, there are two
reasons for this support: "the LRA provides cannon fodder in the form of Acholi children to fight the
SPLA"; and they support the goal of destabilizing the NRM government due to its support of the SPLA.
The LRA managed to fight the NRM for years without the help of Sudan, but the conflict has taken on a
much more deadly nature since the entrance of the Sudanese." (Westport June 2000, sect. V)
"Among Acholi at all levels with whom the consultant spoke, it was accepted as an article of faith that
Sudanese support to the LRA has been provided in direct retaliation for Ugandan support to the SPLA.
Over and over, villagers, politicians and civil-society leaders expressed dismay at this state of affairs and
expressed the feeling that there could only be an end to the LRA threat if the Ugandan side cut off
assistance to the SPLA. It is generally accepted that the Sudanese authorities have used the LRA as antiSPLA proxies within the Sudan itself, as well as in Northern Uganda. The LRA and SPLA are understood
59
to have clashed frequently, and LRA returnees interviewed by the consultant spoke vividly of major
engagements in which the LRA was able to seize substantial weaponry." (Weeks March 2002, p.13)
"The establishment of diplomatic relations between Sudan and Uganda, the release of prisoners of war, the
exchange of envoys by Kampala and Khartoum, the cessation of support by Sudan for the LRA and an
expressed willingness to use military action against them, as well as increased control of the Sudan-Uganda
border, have all impacted on and curtailed rebel activity and movement. The improvement of in SudanUganda relations was further developed during the January 2002 Inter-Governmental Authority on
Development (IGAD) summit in Khartoum, where, in a meeting between the two leaders, both pledged to
cease support for rebel groups. Sudan’s President Bashir had already announced his Government’s
withdrawal of support to the LRA in August 2001, and President Museveni, in his first visit to Sudan since
1995, countered this with an announcement of Uganda’s suspension of assistance to the SPLM/A in
southern Sudan, claiming this had initially been in self-defence against the Sudan-supported Kony rebels,
and had taken the form of ‘moral support’ and humanitarian assistance in the past rather than military aid.
With the approach of the traditional season for SPLM/A attacks approaching, it remains to be seen whether
the positive trend in Uganda-Sudan relations will continue." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.31)
New context for Sudan-Uganda relations after 11 September terrorist attacks in the USA
"After the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001, the US State Department declared the LRA, among
others, a terrorist group. With the global scene largely dominated by the anti-terrorist campaign in the last
months of 2001, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict appeared to recede. The Ugandan
government publicly demanded a military solution to the LRA problem. Museveni visited Sudan in January
2002 for the IGAD meeting, and at a pre-summit meeting with Bashir both presidents pledged support for
the war on terrorism." (ACCORD 2002, "Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement")
"Khartoum's support for violent opposition groups in neighboring countries has been most overt in Uganda.
The Sudanese military has trained members of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group
that espouses its own form of alternative Christianity. Sudanese soldiers have joined Ugandan LRA rebels
in attacks on villages in northern Uganda, including an attack in early 1995 that left 250 Ugandan villagers
dead. Following that attack, the Ugandan government also broke diplomatic relations with the Sudan. By
mid-1996, the LRA had fundamentally changed. With support from the government of the Sudan, it was
openly able to attack major targets, presenting a serious threat to the Ugandan People's Defense Forces. In
July 1996 the LRA massacred Sudanese refugees in northern Uganda" (Ruiz 1998, p.160)
Uganda and Sudan again agreed during a meeting in September 2000 to disarm the rebels:
"Uganda and its neighbor Sudan resolved last week to normalise bilateral relations, 'The New Vision'
newspaper reported. The two countries agreed in principle to disarm and relocate the rebels of the Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) at least 1,000 km deep into Sudan from the border. The talks, attended by the
foreign ministers of Uganda, Libya, Egypt and Sudan, agreed that Egyptian and Libyan observers would be
placed on the Sudan-Uganda border to focus on removing the security threat caused by the LRA to Uganda.
They also agreed that to exchange foreign service officials to look into the affairs of each other's country.
Two Ugandan diplomats will reportedly be stationed at the Kenyan embassy in Khartoum and two
Sudanese diplomats in the Libyan embassy in Kampala." (IRIN 6 October 2000)
Concerns were expressed in July 2000 that the agreement had not led to any improvements:
"whereas a Peace Accord between Uganda and Sudan was signed in Nairobi on 8 December 1999 which
included a commitment by the Sudanese Government to stop its support for the LRA and guarantee the safe
return of the abducted Ugandan children held in rebel camps in Sudan,
[...] whereas the political will to implement the Peace Accord has been lacking on both sides, both countries
have continued to support each other's armed rebels, and very few abducted children have been returned by
Sudan," (European Parliament 6 July 2000, paras. H-I)
Uganda and Sudan agreed in December 1999 to cease support for rebel groups:
60
"Uganda and Sudan moved closer to normalising their relations when they pledged to undertake to stop
supporting each other's rebel groups in an agreement signed on December 8. In the accord reached during
talks in Nairobi, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and Sudanese President Omar el-Beshir agreed to
take steps to re-establish diplomatic relations and to promote peace in the region. Points of the agreement
included pledges 'to renounce use of force to resolve their differences, to stop support for each other's rebel
groups, to disband and disarm the terrorist groups and to respect each country's territorial integrity.' The
Carter Center, which oversaw the talks, issued a statement saying: 'This agreement complements the InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process in Sudan, chaired by Kenyan President
Daniel arap Moi.' The 11-point agreement also includes clauses on the return of prisoners of war (POWs),
locating and returning abductees to their families and an amnesty for returnees who renounce use of force.
The accord called for the formation of a joint ministerial committee and technical teams to establish a
timetable of specific steps for implementation. [...]." (UN EUE 31 January 2000, "Uganda")
Uganda-Sudanese agreement authorises the Uganda People's Defence Forces to
pursue Lord’s Resistance Army whithin Sudan (March 2002)
•
UPDF overran five LRA base camps in (Eastern Equatoria) southern Sudan
•
Sudanese military could have warned the LRA of the impending Ugandan offensive
"A recent agreement signed by the Ugandan and Sudanese governments has given the Uganda People's
Defence Forces (UPDF) authorisation to sweep through broad swathes of Sudanese territory in pursuit of
the LRA.
[...]
'Either way we are happy,' he said. 'In case LRA runs to other areas, we will go there and get them. The
protocol permits that. They [the Sudanese government] gave us no objections to going into areas they
control.
[...]
During the operation, which began on 28 March, the UPDF overran five LRA base camps in (Eastern
Equatoria) southern Sudan, and by 29 March had captured a cache of arms worth just over US $2 million,
according to Bantariza. He said there had been no casualties reported since the operation began.
[...]
According to, a private international organisation promoting peace and human rights in Africa, the process
leading to improved relations evolved at the regional level under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development (IGAD) but was also boosted by the US-led war on terror launched after the 11
September events - in which it has secured Khartoum's assistance against terrorism and listed the LRA as a
terrorist organisation.
[...]
[T]he London-based organisation [Justice Africa] also suggested that the Sudanese military could have
warned the LRA of the impending Ugandan offensive, enabling it to evacuate its bases before the arrival of
the UPDF.
According to Justice Africa, the LRA's main military bases were within the security perimeter of the
Sudanese army's southern command in Juba - its major garrison in southern Sudan, from where it could
easily have dealt with the LRA itself." (IRIN 5 April 2002)
61
POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES
Global figures
More than 1,400,000 IDPs according to the Government (October 2003)
•
Geographical distribution of IDPs from October 1998 to end September 2003:
Adjumani
Bundibugyo
Gulu
Kibaale
Kabarole Kyenjojo
Kapchorwa
Karamoja
Kasese
Katakwi
Kitgum
Lira
Masindi
TOTAL
Bundibug
yo
Gulu
Kabarole
Kaberamaido
Kasese
Katakwi
Kitgum
Kotido
Kumi
Lira
Pader
Soroti
TOTAL
Oct. 1998
11,000 (a)
261,206
67,000 (b)
122,121 (c)
13,000 (d)
474,327
Jan.
2001
120,00
0
370,000
Dec. 1999
10,000
101,000
237,710
12,000
20,000
5,000
35,000
93,000
46,958
560,668
Dec.
Jan.
2001
2002
63,000 63,000
June 2000
10,000
120,000
370,000
12,000
20,000
5,000
35,000
15,000
90,000
47,000
724,000
April
2002
85,600
Nov. 2000
2,000
105,000
370,000
14,595
16,000
15,000
82,645
5,000
610,240
June
2002
87,396
July
2002
87,000
368,417
368,417 395,000
416,452 419,258
20,000
292,16 315,882 423,795
0
15,416 960
960
960
100
**
33,815
16,000
15,000
82,645
18,000 1,600
88,500 88,500
82,645 82,645
1,600
77,000
125,000
623,64
5
559,72 552,587 683,100
1
1,600
88,500
82,645
660,373
May
2003
8000
0
Sept
2003
Novembe
r 2003
0
0
97,561
200
785
0
77,000 45,774
157,000 104,254
125,000 99,228
233,283 281,372
4600
3,000
**
21,113 59,207
47,333
65,904 79,097
241,000 229,115 229,115
80,000 136,112
657,717 841,720 1,239,6 1,405,97
82
6
62
Sources: GoU, 11 November 2003, OCHA September, March, April 2003, OCHA April/May, June,
July/August 2002, January/February 2002, February 2001, UN Humanitarian Coordination Unit
(UNHCU) 24 January 2002, 14 July 2000, 20 December 2000, OCHA 23 October 1998.
"Since mid-June 2003, the population in Teso sub-region, particularly Soroti, Katakwi and to some extent,
Kaberamaido have borne the consequences of frequent brutal attacks, abductions, killings, looting and
destruction of property. The displaced population in the Teso region is currently in excess of 300,000
people and is mainly in Soroti, Katakwi, Kaberamaido and Kumi towns.
The district officials and organisations on the ground report that the security during September was calmer
than in the previous two months in most parts of Soroti district. Katakwi district reports a higher presence
and activity of LRA during the month, particularly in the western part of the district. Amuria and
Kapelebyong counties recorded regular LRA attacks and clashes between UPDF/Arrow militia group and
LRA and are still very difficult to access without armoured escort. The road Soroti to Katakwi was closed
for half of September and access to Katakwi District headquarters was possible only across Lake Bisina
through Kumi. It is still quite risky travelling on Soroti-Lira road due to continued ambushes and rebel
sightings.
In Soroti, most of the displaced moved from the outskirts to the town centre/municipality. The phenomenon
of “night commuters” is also evidenced here: throngs of people trek to the town in the evening to seek
safety for the night and commute back home in the morning. The number of settlement sites within Soroti
municipality has more than doubled to reach 27. These settlement sites are based in schools, churches,
empty unfinished private and Government buildings (under construction) and administrative units. Many
people are also staying and sleeping in Verandas. In the early morning, IDPs vacate the schools where they
stay at night, to let the students attend the classes during the day and return to the schools at the end of the
day. In rural areas almost all IDPs live with relatives or within the communities. Most settlement sites are
overcrowded and living conditions are very poor rendering IDPs very vulnerable." (UN OCHA, 1 October
2003)
"According to UN OCHA in early December, more than 840,000 Ugandans have been displaced by
fighting in Northern Uganda and reside in 60 camps. UN OCHA estimates that 385,000 IDPs reside in 32
camps in Gulu District, 271,000 people in 20 camps in Pader District, 140,000 people in 8 camps in Kitgum
District, and 47,000 in the main town of Lira District. The number of IDPs has increased from
approximately 522,000 in July 2002. In 1995, in order to isolate civilians and the LRA, the GOU conceived
the creation of "protected camps"or centers where many of the Acholi displaced reside. The GOU's order
for all residents to move into the camps has resulted in overcrowding and a lack of basic supplies, including
adequate water and sanitation facilities, which has led to health and problems among resident populations.
In addition to residing in the camps created in wake of the most recent violence, IDPs have sought shelter
in urban centers, public buildings, and in formal and spontaneous sites created prior to June 2002."(USAID
4 February 2003)
"Due to the fluid insecurity, there is constant movement of people and the above are figures and may thus
fluctuate from month to month because no comprehensive registration of current displacement figures has
been undertaken in the north since the LRA resurgence in June 2002. (OCHA March 2003)
"The three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader [The former district of Kitgum was divided by
administrative reform in January 2001 into two districts, Kitgum and Pader] are home to most of the Acholi
people of Uganda. Recent, accurate figures are not available, but by general consensus the combined
63
population of these districts in 2000 was on the order of 700,000-750,000. Of this population, at least
450,000 have been living for varying periods in a state of chronic internal displacement, clustered in what
are known as “protected villages” [...]
In Gulu district, the most populous of the three, the pro-tected-village population exceeds 320,000 out of a
total of some 420,000; most of the remaining population of the district lives in Gulu town, where many
families have settled after fleeing the insecurity of the countryside and should also be counted among the
displaced.
Kitgum and Pader districts are less populated in absolute terms and in terms of overall density. Of a
combined population of approximately 265,000, at least 135,500 (90,200 in Kitgum and 45,300 in Pader)
live in protected villages for at least part of the year. " (Weeks March 2002, p.1)
"It is anticipated that the year 2002 will see some tendencies for the displaced to return back home to their
homesteads and villages. The southwest (Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kasese) and northeast (Katakwi) are
the two locations from which we could see a gradual return of IDPs to their homes during 2001.
The possibilities for return will be more difficult in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, where
continued displacement of IDPs is foreseen. The situation in Sudan is likely to remain unchanged resulting
in occasional influxes of refugees. Western DRC is unstable and while most of the affected remain IDPs,
Uganda will need to prepare for a possible influx of refugees from its neighbours. (UN November 2001, p.
19)
"[In the west ]Bundibugyo District has the biggest problem of internal displacement where a large
proportion of its total population (174,800 people) in the district are estimated to be staying in camps, most
of the displaced people (52%) having been in camps for more than three years.
About 14,116 people were displaced by insecurity in Kasese, but about 1,616 were staying in camps and
the remaining 12,500 were staying with host families. Camps in Kasese are getting smaller, currently only
960 IDPs are estimated to be staying in camps as many people have either returned home or are staying
with host communities. In Kabarole district, at the height of the insurgency, more than 22,000 persons were
reportedly staying in camps but towards the end of 2001 the number had reduced to 15,416 IDPs. Several
camps such as Bukiika, Bukuku, Bwanika, Kigote and Iruhura have closed down as people returned to their
homes.
Although Kamwenge and Kyenjojo districts suffered the effects of the insurgency, there are no existing
IDP camps.
[...]
Availability of accurate data is vital if the process for resettlement is to be well planned and later
implemented. However the current available data on internally displaced persons is insufficient in the
region. The exact number of displaced people in each of the districts still remains an approximation. The
principle causes for the inaccuracy of this data include continuous movement of displaced persons from one
camp to another, inflation of numbers of people displaced in anticipation of receiving more quantities of
relief and lack of adequate resources for district/agencies to conduct thorough registration of IDPs. Several
NGOs have attempted collect information regarding IDPs, however on review of data from different
agencies, the assessment team realized a discrepancy of the statistics from each agency. This is as a result
of different interests and reasons of collecting this data as well as different approaches and definitions. For
instance, some agencies only consider adults in their data collection while others consider only those who
are in camps and not in host families or do not consider those in trading centers where camps were
established although they were also affected by displacement. Due to influx of displaced people occupying
land of host communities, they themselves therefore become displaced, as their economic base has been
reduced or inaccessible. Some data regarding the magnitude and categories of affected people due to
insurgency are either not recorded or missing in the region." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp.v -22)
64
More than 20,000 children abducted between 1986 and 2003
•
An estimated 8,400 children have been abducted in the year of June 2002-May 2003
•
Less than one hundred children abducted in 2001
•
Children account for approximately three of every four abductions
•
3,927 children between ages five and seventeen were registered as abducted in Pader alone in the
year 2002
“Conservative estimates place the total number of children abducted by the LRA since the beginning of the
conflict in 1986 at more than 20,000.The abducted children who survive deliberate killing and disease are
brutalized, are forced to serve the LRA army as conscripts and sex slaves, and are forced to commit crimes
themselves.
After the LRA's retreat to Sudan (and absence from northern Uganda) following the Ebola outbreak in Gulu
in late 2000, abductions sharply decreased, but this was only temporary. The abductions increased
dramatically when the LRA returned to Uganda in mid-2002 and since then have been at the highest rate
ever.
An estimated 8,400 children have been abducted in the year of June 2002-May 2003- more than any
previous year of the conflict and a sharp increase from the less than one hundred children abducted in 2001.
For the entire period of 1990-2001, UNICEF says that 12,000 children were registered as abducted, making
more than 20,000 child abductees. Based on reports from local volunteers, the ARLPI reports that in the
period starting in 2002, children account for approximately three of every four abductions.
UNICEF states that in the year 2002, 3,927 children between ages five and seventeen were registered as
abducted in Pader alone, one of the three districts in northern Uganda. Children are most vulnerable to
abduction at night, when the LRA carries out raids on villages and camps, looting, burning, and abducting.”
(HRW, 15 July 2003, p17)
Increased number of displaced since 2002 resurgence of LRA attacks during 2002
(September 2002)
•
There is a 6% increase in IDP numbers since the resurgence of serious civil insecurity in Northern
Uganda
•
In Southwestern Uganda, IDP population peaked at 120,000 in 2000 and is now down to
aproximately 50,000-65,000 in Bundibugyo
•
There are less than 200 IDPs in Kasese and less than 100 in Kabarole
•
Aproximately 50,000 new IDPs in the north due to LRA recent attacks, although registrations
could not be undertaken due to insecurity
•
520,000 displaced is WFP working figure for the northern region only
"According to the district authorities and humanitarian organizations, the re-insurgency has increased total
numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), now estimated at 522,000 (Table 1) with 372,000 of these
located in Gulu District — approximately 74 percent of the projected 2002 population — and 150,000 in
Kitgum and Pader Districts or 28 percent of predicted 2002 population. This is a 6 percent increase in the
number of IDPs in northern Uganda, estimated at 492,000 at the end of 2001. The intensified attacks
follow a reported influx of LRA rebel forces from Southern Sudan, where they are facing a large-scale
offensive by Ugandan and Sudanese Government forces." (FEWS 8 August 2002)
IDPs in the tree war-affected district July 2002
District
Affected Population Catregory
Estimated Population
65
Kitgum
Pader
Gulu
IDPs in 7 camps
103,000
IN-transit IDPs in Kitgum town
30,000
IDPs in camps
17,000
IDPs in 24 camps
325,000
In.transit IDPs in Gulu town
TOTAL
47,000
522,000
Source: WFP/Uganda Office, July 2002 in FEWS 7 August 2002
"Each district has the following nmber of camps – 32 camps in Gulu, 7 in Kitgum and 1 in Pader." (OCHA
7 August 2002)
"Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) attacks beginning in1996 up to mid-2001 caused displacement of local
populations, limited access to land, insecurity, collapse in purchasing power, family income/assets and
morals. Bundibugyo District bore the brunt of the ADF attacks and had the largest number of IDPs in the
region, which peaked at 120,000 in the year 2000. To date Bundibugyo is reported as the only district with
IDPs in Southwestern or Rwenzori region. Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken,
most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated into the community. Kasese
reports less than 200 IDPs remain and are in the process of integrating into the local population. Kabarole
reports less than 100 IDPs remain and are expected to return permanently upon repairing their homes and
community infrastructure.
[…]
Current IDP figures in Bundibugyo district are difficult to ascertain, however some estimates put the IDP
population between 50,000 to 65,000." (OCHA July/August 2002)
Katakwi
"Though Karimojong attacks in Katakwi in 2002 have greatly reduced and are more of thefts than raids,
Katakwi still has 77,000 IDPs still in camps. This is 10 percent less than the 88,500 displaced by the 2000
violent raids." (OCHA June 2002)
"After the 2000 violent raids the number of displaced in Katakwi was placed at 88,500 in 58 camps. In
2001 the raids were isolated and rarely violent, but though their frequency and violence was greatly
diminished, the threat of attack kept the IDPs in camps in 2001 and up to date. District authorities estimate
that about 10 percent of 88,500 have returned home, which places the number of IDPs currently in camps at
77,000. Some IDPs have moved out of one camp to another which they deem is closer to their home, so
while numbers in one camp may have decreased, numbers in another increase. There is a need for a proper
recount and registration of IDPs, which the district plans to undertake." (OCHA 10-12 June 2002)
IDP estimates in Katakwi camps in June 2002
Camps
IDPs estimates
Magoro
3000
Adacar/Okocho/Omukuru
3716
Old Ngariam Corner
1235
Acowa sub-county headquarters
3,275
Kapelebyong sub-county
3,347
Airabet
725
TOTAL
12,298
Source: OCHA 10-12 June 2002
Northern Uganda
66
"Due to the insecurity, there is constant movement of people (new displacement and redisplacement and
WFP has a working figure of 520,000 IDPs in northern Uganda) however, no registration of current
displacement figures has been undertaken in the north and figures above reflect the pre-insurgence data."
(OCHA July/August 2002)
"The on-going rebel activities in northern Uganda and parts of west Nile region remain a grave matter of
concern to the humanitarian community and other stakeholders in general. As a result of the LRA recently
having crossed into Uganda from Sudan, it is estimated that over 50,000 have been displaced in the
northern Districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and Adjumani." (OCHA July 2002)
Geographical distribution of IDPs from October 1998 to end July 2002:
Oct. 1998
Dec. 1999
June 2000
Nov. 2000
Adjumani
-
10,000
10,000
2,000
Bundibugyo
11,000 (a)
101,000
120,000
105,000
Gulu
261,206
237,710
370,000
370,000
Kibaale
-
12,000
12,000
-
Kabarole Kyenjojo
-
20,000
20,000
14,595
Kapchorwa
-
5,000
5,000
-
Karamoja
67,000 (b)
-
-
-
Kasese
-
35,000
35,000
16,000
Katakwi
-
-
15,000
15,000
Kitgum
122,121 (c)
93,000
90,000
82,645
Lira
13,000 (d)
-
-
-
Masindi
-
46,958
47,000
5,000
TOTAL
474,327
560,668
724,000
610,240
End
End
End
Jan.
Dec.
Jan. 2002
End April 2002
End June 2002
End July 2002
2001
2001
Bundibugyo
120,000
63,000
63,000
85,600
87,396
87,000
Gulu
370,000
292,160
315,882
423,795
368,417
368,417
Kabarole Kyenjojo
20,000
15,416
960
960
960
100
Kasese
16,000
18,000
1,600
1,600
1,600
200
Katakwi
15,000
88,500
88,500
88,500
77,000
77,000
Kitgum
82,645
82,645
82,645
82,645
125,000
125,000
TOTAL
623,645
559,721
552,587
683,100
660,373
657,717
Sources: OCHA April/May, June, July/August 2002, January/February 2002, February 2001, UN
Humanitarian Coordination Unit (UNHCU) 24 January 2002, 14 July 2000, 20 December 2000, OCHA
23 October 1998.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Estimated number of people assisted by WFP
Estimated drought affected population being assisted by WFP in Kotido and Moroto districts
Estimated 59,000 drought affected population being assisted by WFP in Kitgum district
Displaced population by flooding receiving monthly food ration from WFP
24,000 Sudanese refugees also displaced from camp Achol-Pii by LRA attacks
"The LRA on 5 August attacked and destroyed the Acholi-Pii refugee camp in Pader District, killing about
60 people and dispersing all the 24,000 Sudanese refugees residing there. Most of the refugees who fled the
67
camp were scattered within Pader and Lira districts, from where the UNHCR collected them and took them
to Kiryondongo, an existing refugee site about 100 km southwest of Lira town." (IRIN 15 August 2002)
Aproximately 552,000 people were internally displaced by end January 2002
•
UN positive about return during 2002
•
Camps in Kasese getting smaller as many people have either returned home or are staying with
host communities
•
Exact number IDPs in each of the districts remains an approximation as there is continuous
movement of displaced persons from one camp to another
"The three districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader [The former district of Kitgum was divided by
administrative reform in January 2001 into two districts, Kitgum and Pader] are home to most of the Acholi
people of Uganda. Recent, accurate figures are not available, but by general consensus the combined
population of these districts in 2000 was on the order of 700,000-750,000. Of this population, at least
450,000 have been living for varying periods in a state of chronic internal displacement, clustered in what
are known as “protected villages”
[...]
In Gulu district, the most populous of the three, the pro-tected-village population exceeds 320,000 out of a
total of some 420,000; most of the remaining population of the district lives in Gulu town, where many
families have settled after fleeing the insecurity of the countryside and should also be counted among the
displaced.
Kitgum and Pader districts are less populated in absolute terms and in terms of overall density. Of a
combined population of approximately 265,000, at least 135,500 (90,200 in Kitgum and 45,300 in Pader)
live in protected villages for at least part of the year. " (Weeks March 2002, p.1)
"It is anticipated that the year 2002 will see some tendencies for the displaced to return back home to their
homesteads and villages. The southwest (Bundibugyo, Kabarole and Kasese) and northeast (Katakwi) are
the two locations from which we could see a gradual return of IDPs to their homes during 2001.
The possibilities for return will be more difficult in the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, where
continued displacement of IDPs is foreseen. The situation in Sudan is likely to remain unchanged resulting
in occasional influxes of refugees. Western DRC is unstable and while most of the affected remain IDPs,
Uganda will need to prepare for a possible influx of refugees from its neighbours. (UN November 2001, p.
19)
"[In the west ]Bundibugyo District has the biggest problem of internal displacement where a large
proportion of its total population (174,800 people) in the district are estimated to be staying in camps, most
of the displaced people (52%) having been in camps for more than three years.
About 14,116 people were displaced by insecurity in Kasese, but about 1,616 were staying in camps and
the remaining 12,500 were staying with host families. Camps in Kasese are getting smaller, currently only
960 IDPs are estimated to be staying in camps as many people have either returned home or are staying
with host communities. In Kabarole district, at the height of the insurgency, more than 22,000 persons were
reportedly staying in camps but towards the end of 2001 the number had reduced to 15,416 IDPs. Several
camps such as Bukiika, Bukuku, Bwanika, Kigote and Iruhura have closed down as people returned to their
homes.
Although Kamwenge and Kyenjojo districts suffered the effects of the insurgency, there are no existing
IDP camps.
68
[...]
Availability of accurate data is vital if the process for resettlement is to be well planned and later
implemented. However the current available data on internally displaced persons is insufficient in the
region. The exact number of displaced people in each of the districts still remains an approximation. The
principle causes for the inaccuracy of this data include continuous movement of displaced persons from one
camp to another, inflation of numbers of people displaced in anticipation of receiving more quantities of
relief and lack of adequate resources for district/agencies to conduct thorough registration of IDPs. Several
NGOs have attempted collect information regarding IDPs, however on review of data from different
agencies, the assessment team realized a discrepancy of the statistics from each agency. This is as a result
of different interests and reasons of collecting this data as well as different approaches and definitions. For
instance, some agencies only consider adults in their data collection while others consider only those who
are in camps and not in host families or do not consider those in trading centers where camps were
established although they were also affected by displacement. Due to influx of displaced people occupying
land of host communities, they themselves therefore become displaced, as their economic base has been
reduced or inaccessible. Some data regarding the magnitude and categories of affected people due to
insurgency are either not recorded or missing in the region." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp.v -22)
560,000 people were internally displaced by end- 2001
•
Verification of IDP populations in Gulu camps revealed irregularities in registration
•
Reduced number of IDPs since mid-2000 among others related to return of people displaced by
the Karamajong in early 2000
•
Reported in April that Karamojong raids in the Katakwi District had caused increased
displacement
"The verification exercise [by WFP of Gulu IDP camps] took off well in March 2001. During the month 8
out of the 33 IDP camps were verified. To date the exercise has continued well except a few instances
where transport constraint causes some shortfalls. The purpose was to ascertain an accurate number of
displaced persons living in camps that require support. Against this background the exercise has registered
several findings: –
?
‘ghosts’ names registered (including people who are long-dead)
?
local leaders registering more than two households for themselves;
?
students, who are studying out of the camp, were also registered."
(OCHA April 2001)
Major changes during the year:
"The Ugandan military applied increased pressure on both the LRA and Alliance of Democratic Forces
(ADF) as external support for both rebel groups dwindled [during 2000]. The majority of displaced still
fear the rebels, preferring to remain in protected villages by night." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Present
Situation")
"In an unusual pattern, Karamojong cattle raiders/rustlers have launched a series of attacks on neighbouring
Katakwi District, just as the rainy season gets underway - a time when the Karamojong are going back
home if they migrated to neighbouring districts. The attacks, which began in early April, are reported to
have displaced yet unknown numbers of people. [...] The numbers in the remnant IDP camps from last
year’s violent raids in March-April are now swelling as more families return. The attacks are reportedly not
by large groups but most likely by small groups of cattle thieves from Karamoja. The LDUs recruited last
year to guard Katakwi residents from Karamojong raiders have allegedly been absorbed into the barracks,
hence leaving gaps for the cattle rustlers." (OCHA April 2001)
69
"The considerable reduction in the total number of IDPs for Uganda is due primarily to the return of the
Karamajong to Karamoja, which has allowed the majority of displaced in Katakwi, Soroti, Lira and Eastern
Kitgum to return home." (OCHA 30 April 2001, pp.30-31)
Number of IDPs increased from 560,000 end 1999 to more than 700,000 by mid-2000
•
•
Nearly the entire rural population of Gulu is now in IDP camps or in Gulu Town (2000)
ADF violence induced 163,000 displaced in Rwenzori (August 2000)
Gulu/Kitgum areas
"Hundreds of thousands of displaced persons that had only just recently ventured away from the IDP camps
to reclaim their homes, have now [January 2000] returned to the IDP camps in both Districts [Gulu and
Kitgum]. Actual verification of numbers by relief agencies is impossible due to insecurity. Thousands of
area residents are also spending each night in Gulu and Kitgum Towns in hospital grounds, bus parks,
schools etc. The numbers fluctuate depending on the daily security situation." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)
"Security remains [by July 2000] very poor in large parts of Gulu and Kitgum. The LRA continues to
regularly attack camps and trading centres, ambush vehicles and engage in battles with the UPDF.
[...]
Nearly the entire rural population of Gulu is now in IDP camps or in Gulu Town -- estimated displaced
population is now 370,000. In Kitgum there are 82,000 IDPs in the official camps but perhaps another 1020,000 in transient or unofficial camps. IDPs have little access to their homes or to land for cultivation."
(UNHCU 14 July 2000)
Rwenzori areas:
"The ADF continues to make its presence felt through several attacks in Bundibugyo, Kasese, Kibaale and
Hoima over the past month. The attacks thus far have not resulted in serious displacement except in the
Rwenzori region where over 80 percent of the population of Bundibugyo District are displaced - 120,000
displaced in 51 camps - and in Kabarole and Kasese where some 43,000 persons remain displaced."
(UNHCU 18 August 2000)
"In Kasese, security is reported to have improved tremendously though some IDPs still fear returning to
their homes in the hills, as ADF activities have not ceased entirely. These IDPs, totaling 16,000 - in camps
or living with relatives still need assistance in health, food, water and sanitation, etc. One particular case is
that of 16 families camping in Rugendabara Y.M.C.A. whose children of secondary school-going age are
not attending school because parents cannot pay fees. They also lack plastic sheeting for shelter as the
recent storms destroyed those they had." (UNHCU 30 October 2000)
"The issue of inflated IDP numbers remains unresolved with plans to tackle the problem early 2001.
Humanitarian agencies (ACF/USA, MSF/F, ICRC, Oxfam, WFP, UNICEF, CRS, ActionAid and local
organisations like Church of Uganda) nevertheless continue humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable in the
area, based upon population figures that have been reduced arbitrarily." (UNHCU 20 December 2000)
Karamoja area:
"Currently [April 2000], as the drought in Karamoja begins to bite, the Karimojong are violently raiding
neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi and causing a lot of displacement.
[...]
As in the past, the Karimojong moved into neighbouring districts for water and pasture. As they were
retreating back, the old pattern of looting with violence surfaced. This year, however, the looting was
reportedly combined with raping, killings and violent beatings of a previously unknown dimension. Pickups and lorries are also reported to have ferried food and household items of ransacked villages. Frequent
mention of disarmament of the Karimojong may have triggered this year's extreme violence in the raids
70
according to some district leaders and displaced people during the fact finding mission. " (UNHCU 12
April 2000)
Major changes during 1999:
"Recent [February 1999] heightened activity by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) has forced the
displacement of several thousands of Bundibugyo residents. District and NGO estimates place the number
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) currently at about 40,000 living in 24 IDP camps and settlements.
The majority of IDPs appear to have been in their current displaced camp since mid 1997 when the war
started. However, new displacement continues daily both of IDPs and of residents. IDPs are moving from
more scattered IDP camps into Bundibugyo Town, and more generally from one IDP camp to another in
search of a more secure location. Thus far Nyahuka Town has not witnessed an increase in displacement.
No district plans have yet been drawn up for possible influxes of additional IDPs into the two urban areas
[…]
In early February, an estimated 6,038 persons were displaced by the UPDF in Agoro Sub-County in the
mountain range of Lomwaka in northern Kitgum. The displacement was ordered due to security reasons.
Local authorities put the number at 6,038 people. The displaced have been directed to Paluga and Patika in
Agoro, northern Kitgum. WFP has provided food rations to the 6,038 persons. No shelter nor water and
sanitation facilities have yet been provided." (UN HCU 16 March 1999, pp. 1 & 6)
" A new emergency appears [by April 1999] to be developing in the western district of Bundibugyo where
large numbers of Ugandans are again becoming displaced due to rebel activities. Local authorities and aid
agencies operating in the area estimate that between 50-70,000 persons are now displaced in the district.
WFP is sending an initial food shipment of 200 tons of food and will closely monitor the situation.
Insecurity is a major constraint and the last WFP food convoy had to turn back just before reaching
Bundibugyo." (WFP 9 April 1999)
"Following a spate of rebel attacks on their homes and communities in September and October [1999],
approximately 9,000 residents of Purongo Sub-county in Gulu have moved to five camps close to army
detaches for protection. The area is west of Gulu town in Nwoya County. Sources speculate that attacks
are being carried out by a few LRA rebels who have remained in Gulu throughout the year." (UNHCU 19
November 1999)
400,000 IDPs reported to receive humanitarian assistance by December 1998
•
Peak of displacement in the Gulu District in June 1998 with 320 000 IDPs
•
New displacements during 1998 offset by return of IDPs to their former homes
Major changes during the year
"New internal displacement continues [in 1998] throughout conflicted areas in the northern and western
parts of Uganda, especially in Kitgum, Gulu, Kasese, Bundibugyo, and Kabarole; entire communities
continue to be affected by ongoing insecurity in these areas as well as in Arua, Adjumani, Moyo, Lira and
Apac and to a lesser extent a few other districts. The new displacement is offset by the return of IDPs to
their former homes or the absorption of these IDPs into homes of relatives or movement to other locations.
There are approximately 400 000 IDPs receiving assistance from the UN and other International
Organisations (IOs) and NGOs. "(UN December 1998, p. 9)
"Displacement in Uganda has traditionally related to refugees, both in terms of exodus and influx. In recent
years, however, internal displacement has grown enormously, and IDPs are currently double the number of
refugees in the country. The latest available figure for internally displaced people was estimated at 400,000
in March 1998. Recent events indicate that the number of IDPs in Uganda may continue to rise as
hostilities escalate." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p. 73)
71
"One of the most contentious issues in northern Uganda is that of forced displacement. From the
perspective of local people, being displaced from their homes is one of the most important facts in their
current struggle for survival. Since 1996 the number of displaced persons has quadrupled. According to
the World Food Program, at the most recent peak of displacement, in June 1998, over 320,000 persons
were displaced in Gulu District, the majority in 20 official camps, one containing over 30,000 people.
There are at least seven other camps in Kitgum District, where by June 1998 nearly 80,000 people had fled
their homes. Displaced people have also sought refuge in Gulu and Kitgum towns and in other parts of
Uganda. (AI March 17 March 1999, "Introduction")
72
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT
General
Pattern displacement in Sotori (September 2003)
•
Most of the displaced moved from the outskirts to the town centre/municipality
•
Throngs of people trek to the town in the evening to seek safety for the night and commute back
home in the morning
•
Settlement sites are based in schools, churches, empty unfinished private and Government
buildings and administrative units
"In Soroti, most of the displaced moved from the outskirts to the town centre/municipality. The
phenomenon of “night commuters” is also evidenced here: throngs of people trek to the town in the evening
to seek safety for the night and commute back home in the morning. The number of settlement sites within
Soroti municipality has more than doubled to reach 27. These settlement sites are based in schools,
churches, empty unfinished private and Government buildings (under construction) and administrative
units. Many people are also staying and sleeping in Verandas. In the early morning, IDPs vacate the schools
where they stay at night, to let the students attend the classes during the day and return to the schools at the
end of the day. In rural areas almost all IDPs live with relatives or within the communities. Most settlement
sites are overcrowded and living conditions are very poor rendering IDPs very vulnerable." (UN OCHA, 1
October 2003)
Recognizable change in the system and consequences of abduction and abductees
(2003)
•
Number of people abducted to carry loot is increasing
•
More children manage to escape than before due to the forced mobility of the rebels
•
Abductions have a terrible impact even on those who are not abducted
•
Children travel into the towns, Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, nightly from surrounding areas
“There is a recognizable change in the system and consequences of abduction and abductees since the
return of the LRA to Uganda in June 2002. The number of people abducted to carry loot is increasing, yet
the majority of the adult abductees-some 2,000 from June 2002 to early 2003-are used as porters and
released by the rebels.
More children manage to escape than before, due to the forced mobility of the rebels-a result of encounters
with the UPDF. Frequent movements also meant that the new recruits received less military training. Most
captives were not taken to now-abandoned camps in Sudan (where they were trained before), but were kept
with LRA units in Uganda-and the familiar surroundings made it easier for abductees to escape. UNICEF
estimated, based on interviews with escaped children, that some 500 abductees were taken to Sudan in
2002-a far smaller proportion of the abductees than previously [...]
“These abductions have a terrible impact even on those who are not abducted. Thousands of children still
live at home, but fearing LRA abduction, travel into the towns, Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader, nightly from
surrounding areas to sleep on verandas, in the bus park, on church grounds, and in local factories before
73
returning home the next morning. These children are known locally as "night commuters." In early
February 2003, more than 1,000 children were sleeping each night in Gulu town, and about 3,000 people,
the vast majority unaccompanied children, sought safety at Lacor hospital outside of Gulu. By May 2003,
the number had tripled, to 13,400 children staying in six buildings in and around Gulu, according to the
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Gulu.
Adults usually stayed in their homes to protect their property during LRA raids. Adults abducted by the
LRA are generally kept for short periods to help carry the looted goods, and then released. For children
who are abducted, captivity can last for years.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, p 18)
Villager forced to sleep several hundred metres from home (September 2003)
•
Knew rebels would attack
•
The rebels were kind to us because they thought our region would join them
•
Had to sleep amongst tall shrubs and mosquito infested grassland
"When rebels came to attack Roseland Ibuga's village, 10 km north of Soroti town, she was ready. Rosalind
already knew they would attack - they had told her so themselves.
'I first met the rebels the night they came to attack Soroti town,' she recalls. 'They came to our village and
told us to hide. They were kind to us then because they thought the Iteso would join them. But they said
they would come back soon and if we hadn't risen up against the NRM [ruling National Resistance
Movement], we would be killed. But the Iteso will never join them.'
Thanks to the fortunate warning she was able to hide. Every night for seven nights she slept out in the bush
- hidden amongst tall shrubs and mosquito infested grassland, a several hundred metres from her home.
When they finally came, she was nowhere in sight.
'Since that night, I slept in the bush every night, fearing to return home until morning," she told IRIN."(UN
OCHA, 30 September 2003)
Difficult to know exactly where displaced have settled (September 2003)
"The World Food Programme (WFP) has said that delays in the distribution of urgently needed food in
eastern Uganda's Teso region were caused by difficulties in assessing the numbers of displaced people.
'Our food distribution programmes have definitely been delayed by a lack of accurate figures on the
numbers of displaced and the difficulty of tracking exactly where they have settled,' WFP national
programme officer Ernest Mutanga told IRIN.
Since the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel group made its unprecedented incursion into eastern Uganda
on 15 June, some 240,000 people are estimated to have been displaced in Teso region, including 150,000 in
Katakwi district. WFP is to mobilise about 2,700 mt of food for the displaced next week. The food is to be
distributed by local and international NGOs." (UN OCHA, 18 September 2003)
74
Thousands of fleeing children stranded in Karamoja (September 2003)
•
Estimated 4,000 children are scattered throughout Kotido district [northern Karamoja]
•
Some of them had expressed the desire to go home but were too frightened to move
"Thousands of children fleeing Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) attacks in northern Uganda's troubled Pader
district are now stranded in neighbouring Karamoja, unable to rejoin their families, according to
government officials.
'They are scattered throughout Kotido district [northern Karamoja]," Minister of State for Karamoja Peter
Lokeris told IRIN. "The number isn't clear, but we estimate it at around 4,000. Most of them are staying in
various schools around the area.'
Many of the children, who fled from their villages during or because of rebel attacks, have also been
enrolled in the local schools.
Lokeris said that they had been trickling into the district since the beginning of the year. He said that some
of them had recently expressed the desire to go home but were too frightened to move. 'It is a dire
situation," he said. 'They can't go back and see their families and their parents have not visited them.'
Lokeris said the children were quite well looked after, in spite of the fact that Kotido is under-resourced.
'The World Food Programme is giving them food and they are being educated and given clothes. All things
considered, they are quite healthy,' he told IRIN." (UN OCHA, 11 September 2003)
Patterns of displacement in the Rwenzori Region (2002)
•
Nearly 90 percent of IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts had returned to their homes by May
2002
•
People either return or move from one IDP camp to another to get closer to their homes
•
60% of IDPs in camps in Kasese district are staying more than 10 Km away from their original
homes
“In western Uganda, efforts to stamp out the rebel insurgency have been more successful, and relative calm
has prevailed over most of the region since 2000, when the Ugandan military began its campaign to drive
the ADF out of the Rwenzoris. The authorities now hope to close down more than 80 protected camps, and
have strongly encouraged IDPs to return to their home villages.
When IRIN visited the Rwenzori region in May 2002, nearly 90 percent of IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole
districts had returned to their homes, and most camps had been dismantled.(IRIN May 2002)
"Several displaced people from Bundibugyo ran to neighboring districts such as Kasese and Kabarole
District, while others were reported to have crossed to the districts of Kibaale and Mubende. The number of
people staying in camps in Bundibugyo District is growing as many people are returning from neighboring
districts to settle in camps nearer to their homesteads. Apparently there are no people from Kabarole or
Kasese districts staying in camps in Bundibugyo, although there are Congolese refugees staying in IDPs
75
camps in the district. For example Butogo camp has about 530 refugees of Congolese origin, residing in
defined parts within the camp.
[...]
About 14,116 people were displaced by insecurity in Kasese at the height of the ADF insurgency. Camps in
Kasese are getting smaller, currently only 960 IDPs are estimated to be staying in camps as many people
have either returned home or are staying with host communities. Some of the displaced persons found in
Kasese camps came from the neighboring districts like Kabarole and Bundibugyo. Household data revealed
that IDPs (60%) in camps in Kasese district are staying more than 10 Km away from their original homes.
Many of them come from Bundibugyo District (7 hours walk over mountainous terrain) and Kabarole
District (4 hours walk).
[...]
At the height of the insurgency, more than 22,000 persons were reportedly staying in camps [in the
Kabarole district] but towards the end of 2001 the number had reduced to 15,416 [...]. Several camps such
as Bukiika, Bukuku, Bwanika, Kigote and Iruhura have closed down as people returned to their homes.
Although other camps still exist, the population is getting smaller each day as people return home. For
example, in Kyamukube camp 63% of the displaced have returned, 83% from Kibota camp have returned
and 53% from Mitandi camp have gone back" (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 4-5)
"Large population movements have been reported as rebel attacks force residents of the three districts
[Bundibugyo, Kitgum and Gulu] to seek security and protection in camps and towns. In Bundibugyo, the
displaced are reportedly moving to different camps and seeking protection in the two main towns of
Bundibugyo and Nyahuka. Some Bundibugyo residents are leaving the District for Kabarole and Kasese
although the numbers do not appear significant at this time. In Gulu, the IDP camps are now full once
again as most of the population moved back to the IDP camps with the encouragement of the District
officials. In Kitgum, the affected population is sleeping in the IDP camps and in certain locations around
Kitgum town but people are still moving outside of town and the camps during the day attempting to bring
in the last of the harvest and bring their food stores to a more secure location." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)
IDPs made to move back and forth their original homes
•
Rebels burning settlements to discourage IDPs staying in the camps
•
LRA attacks on IDP camps causes displacement of displaced persons
•
IDPs spending nights in the bush rather than risk night attacks in their homes
•
UPDF ordered civilians to leave their homes within 48 hours
•
Talk of resettlement drastically reduced, due to insecurity (March 2002)
•
Parents sending their children to neighbouring district
"There seems to be a sense of fear that the pattern of rebels approach and attacks have changed. Unlike in
the past, where they would loot and abduct civilians for carrying looted properties, they seem to kill more
of people abducted. It’s also believed that the rebels have resorted to burning IDP settlements and even
killing quite a number, in a bid to discourage them staying in the camps. As a result, IDPs have been made
to move back and forth their original homes (for those who have ventured back) and the camp." (UNHCU
25 September 2000)
"It is estimated that until the recent LRA rebel incursion a month ago, over 500,000 people were living in
Internally Displaced Peoples' Camps. But with the rebels burning down camps, the region is now
experiencing the displacement of already displaced people. The entire Alero camp, which was home for
17,403 persons was burnt down. Part of Purongo, Pabbo, Pagak, and Olwal camps were also burnt leaving
23,660 people homeless." (World Vision 8 August 2002)
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"The ongoing conflict has expanded into neighbouring districts, particularly Lira and Apac. Reports as of
September 2002 indicate that LRA had displaced 183,066 persons (32,370 families) in Lira and 87,329
people (14,554 families) in Apac. Many of the displaced are camped out in the open in the town centres and
larger trading centres of the two districts, while others are reported to be spending nights in the bush rather
than risk night attacks in their homes. (UN November 2002, p.11)
"Civilians in the north of the country have been ordered by the army to leave their homes and move closer
to camps protected by the military.
Army spokesman Shaban Bantariza told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme that up to 100,000 people
in three districts were affected.
[…]
Major Bantariza said that rebels hid in villagers' huts when they were pursued by the army, and civilians
should therefore move closer to areas the rebels could not reach.
Civilians in the districts of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum have been given 48 hours to move into towns under the
army's control, or camps set up for the hundreds of thousands of people already displaced by the fighting,
AP news agency reported." (BBC, 3 October 2002)
"Insecurity meant aid agencies had been forced to scale down many of their activities, worsening the
already fragile situation in displaced people's camps and villages, it added.
The few urban and rural centres still considered safe were becoming congested with people seeking safety,
stretching local capacities to the limit and posing serious health and safety risks to hundreds of thousands of
people without shelter or access to basic services, it stated.
The main towns in the region - Kitgum, Gulu and Pader - had become overcrowded with displaced people
seeking refuge in hospital grounds, schools, churches and shop verandas, the report added.
For example, Lacor hospital in Gulu District, was hosting an estimated 40,000 people every night during
July, although this number had reduced significantly by the end of August." (IRIN 9 September 2002)
"With the incidents having taken place to the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest of Gulu town
there can no longer be talk about safe areas where people are likely to start moving out of the camps in the
near future. Residents of Pagak camp in Lamogi Sub-County for example, said they have now changed
their mind about planning for return following the latest developments and the attacks in Amuru. As a
consequence of Joseph Kony’s LRA renewed activities, talk of resettlement has drastically reduced and
many NGOs are restricting field activities to a minimum." (OCHA March 2002)
“In Pader, parents have been sending their children to neighbouring Kotido District in the hope they would
be looked after, “This illustrates the kind of desperation here. Parents sending their children off to another
district where they have no relatives. We have never seen this before,” Mads Oyen, the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) child protection officer in Uganda, told IRIN.( IRIN 6 May 2003)
"The insecurity in northern Uganda has affected the neighbouring districts as well. In Kotido for example,
IDPs, mainly children of school going age and mothers, started filtering into the district. By August 11th,
there were 255 registered children in Jie County, mainly in Kotido town, 300 children in Dodoth County in
the border towns with Kitgum/Pader and 87 children were identified so far in boarding schools in Labwor.
Their main needs were identified as food, shelter, blankets and soap. Most of the children stay in boarding
schools or good smaritan families, while others sleep on verandas in Kotido town. With the failing rains,
the IDPs and existing population are struggling to survive on the meagre food left. An extra mouth to feed
exacerbates the problem." (OCHA July/August 2002)
77
Fluid movement patterns reflect highly unpredictable security situations (1998-2002)
•
Displacement of displacement in Karamajong (2003)
•
In March 2002 violent incidents were already curtailing resettlement and return opportunities
forseen in early 2002
•
End 2001 IDPs travelled outside so-called protected villages both to farm their land as well as to
assess security in view of return
•
The majority of the present IDP camps in Katakwi District were
•
established as far back as 1979/80.
•
IDPs seek protection in camps and towns as security situation deteriorates
•
Some people farm by day but seek refuge during the night in camps, churches, caves, in the bush
or in local trading centres
•
Movement patterns are determined by complex sets of factors including information, political
interest, material needs as well as seasonal considerations
“After a year of relative peace in Katakwi district of the Teso sub-region, armed Karimojong warriors
began raiding and stealing cattle in the district in late 2002. These attacks intensified in January and
February 2003, leading to new displacement and, in some cases, re-displacement of people. (OCHA 31
March 2003)
"With the incidents having taken place to the Northeast, Northwest, Southeast and Southwest of Gulu town
there can no longer be talk about safe areas where people are likely to start moving out of the camps in the
near future. Residents of Pagak camp in Lamogi Sub-County for example, said they have now changed
their mind about planning for return following the latest developments and the attacks in Amuru. As a
consequence of Joseph Kony’s LRA renewed activities, talk of resettlement has drastically reduced and
many NGOs are restricting field activities to a minimum." (OCHA March 2002)
"Organized transfers to new decongestion sites did not occur during 2002. As security gradually imporved
late in the year, however, some displaced persons began to farm and travel ouside protected villages,
making short trips to their original homes to assess conditions for their eventual return" (USCR June 2002)
“In Pader, parents have been sending their children to neighbouring Kotido District in the hope they would
be looked after, “This illustrates the kind of desperation here. Parents sending their children off to another
district where they have no relatives. We have never seen this before,” Mads Oyen, the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) child protection officer in Uganda, told IRIN.( NAIROBI, 6 May 2003 (IRIN)
[…]
"The largest relief operation is for IDPs in the north. There are 33 IDP camps in Gulu district and 8 in
Kitgum/Pader districts. The general trend is towards more people accessing their land; their spending time
in their original homes; and their leaving children, the disabled and the elderly in the camps. These people
return to the camps to receive their food rations and/or for safety, when the security situation is
unfavourable."(WFP 27 December 2001, p. 13)
“Katakwi district in Northeastern Uganda has suffered from constant
sporadic attacks by Karimajong warriors for over two decades, with the
year 2000 recorded as the worst raid in history including killings, rape,
abductions and destroying of crops and property. The cattle rustling has
caused over 88,500 people (38 percent of the district population) to be
internally displaced and they are currently settled in 58 IDP camps. The
most affected areas are Kapelebyong and Usuk counties, which border with
Moroto District.
78
The majority of the present Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps were
established as far back as 1979/80 when the Karimajong carried out one of
the big raids and caused a lot of displacement. Thus over the years, with
subsequent Karamajong raids, the displaced people run back to the camps
from where they access their gardens during the planting and harvesting
period and then return to the safety of the camps at night. Since the
major attack in 2000, the displaced have not been able to go back to their
homes especially the sub counties bordering with Moroto district. This is
due to the ever-present threat of attacks by the Karimojong, who have
since carried out intermittent attacks not only in the villages but also
on these camps. Since the beginning of this year (2001) there have been
over 54 attacks. In the most recent attack during the month of September,
the Karimojong attacked again one IDP camp at the border of Moroto and
Katakwi districts killing 17 people, mostly women and children and
injuring several others including a three day old baby who survived with
pathetic wounds. Revenge killings which resulted in the death of nine
people (Karimojongs and two Iteso) has led to increased tension in the
area and closure of the road (Katakwi - Moroto road). The displaced have
remained in the camps since they moved there in 2000, trying to survive on
the little they have, for most lost cows and property and access to their
gardens.(ACT October 2001)
"Large population movements have been reported as rebel attacks force residents of the three districts
[Bundibugyo, Kitgum and Gulu] to seek security and protection in camps and towns. In Bundibugyo, the
displaced are reportedly moving to different camps and seeking protection in the two main towns of
Bundibugyo and Nyahuka. Some Bundibugyo residents are leaving the District for Kabarole and Kasese
although the numbers do not appear significant at this time. In Gulu, the IDP camps are now full once
again as most of the population moved back to the IDP camps with the encouragement of the District
officials. In Kitgum, the affected population is sleeping in the IDP camps and in certain locations around
Kitgum town but people are still moving outside of town and the camps during the day attempting to bring
in the last of the harvest and bring their food stores to a more secure location." (UNHCU 24 January 2000)
"There is no single or simple pattern to internal displacement in the north. In some areas during the 1997
and 1998 planting and cultivation seasons, many villagers returned to their fields. Some were ‘night
commuters’, usually men who returned to the safety of towns or camps at night. Others stayed away longer,
creating divided families where women and children remained in camps. By mid-1999 an intensified
counter-insurgency campaign by the government had created much improved security conditions and a
further IDP category emerged - those who followed the army back to the bush, but preferred to build
temporary shelters around army camps while tending their fields during the day. These ‘half-way houses’
often sheltered whole families.
The year 1999 marked a potential turning point in the cycle of displacement. The LRA had not been active
since August of the previous year. An amnesty was declared for all rebels and peace efforts on several
fronts were underway, including discussions with the Government of Sudan which, if successful, would cut
the rear bases and supply lines of the LRA. Despite the optimism of the government, however, most IDPs
remained in camps for several reasons:
Most people were ignorant of the security situation in their home areas.
They received no clear indication that lasting protection would be offered by the army. Although army
contingents accompanied some returnees, this was ad hoc, with no firm commitment to stay near the
villages.
In the absence of any central government directives, IDPs were receiving contradictory advice from the
army and civil authorities, aid organizations and camp leaders.
79
Some politicians were anxious not to lose the political advantages of population concentrations in the
camps. Semi-urban and urban settings potentially provided better security, employment, transport,
schooling and medical assistance promised by the government.
Vulnerable groups - particularly widows, the old and infirm - did not have support for reconstructing
houses in their home areas.
In some areas, IDPs were offered land for resettlement near the camps.
The return of IDPs to their homes depended on the seasonal supply of harvested food and shelter materials
(especially grasses for houses)." (WFP September 1999, p.7)
80
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
Physical security
Army denies Lira death toll (December 2003)
•
Up to 70 bodies from Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks have reportedly been recovered
•
The bodies were found over a wide area near the scene of the latest attack
•
Lira district has been an LRA target since last month, after a number of LRA splinter groups
started raiding villages close to Lira town
•
The LRA is according to UPDF trapped in Lira and taking out its frustrations on the civilian
population.
"The Ugandan army has denied reports from local leaders in the country’s troubled northern Lira district
that up to 70 bodies from Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) attacks have been recovered in the last week.
'This figure is simply false,' Lira-based army spokesman Lt Chris Magezi told IRIN. 'We know the rebels
killed four over this last weekend in a place near Okude, but our investigations in this area revealed nothing
further. There is no way that there could be a killing on that scale and we fail to know.'
Lira district chief Franco Ojur was quoted over the weekend as saying 70 bodies of people hacked to death
by the LRA had been found in the bushes.
Magezi said the LRA in Lira "doesn’t have the resources to orchestrate such a massacre'.
Father Sebhat Ayele of Lira Catholic mission claimed the figure was correct, saying many of the bodies
were decomposed and had probably been there for weeks.
'They were found over a wide area near the scene of the latest attack and some were possibly up to three
weeks old,' Ayele told IRIN.
Lira district has been an LRA target since last month, after a number of LRA splinter groups started raiding
villages close to Lira town for the first time in the 17 years since the insurgency began.
The army says this is because they were forced out of Teso in east and Kitgum and Pader in the north by
'intense pressure' from government forces. It says the LRA is trapped in Lira and taking out its frustrations
on the civilian population." (IRIN, 8 December 2003)
The population in the north continues to be targeted by the rebels (November 2003)
•
In Kitgum in northern Uganda, 20 people were abducted and two vehicles set ablaze in three
separate attacks
81
•
LRA rebels for the first time launched an attack in Apala village in Lira district where at least 18
people were killed
•
In Soroti, rebels killed 14 people in an attack on an IDP camp
"The killing of civilians together with LRA rebels and UPDF forces continues in the north. On 29th
October, UPDF reportedly killed the deputy to Jospeh Kony, Brigadier Charles Tabuley. The battles took
place in Teso region in northeastern Uganda. Many other LRA rebels were as well killed. [...]
Five days after one of the LRA leader, Brigadier Tabukey was killed, the army reportedly killed 19 LRA
rebels in Kalai in northern Uganda. The army also reported to have rescued 15 rebel captives in Kalaki in a
separate battle.
In another incident, heavily armed Karamajong warriors of the Dodoth ethnic group on 30th October
attacked and killed about 50 Local Defence Units (LDUs) and UPDF soldiers in a fierce fight at Kaloto,
about 15 kilometers west of Kabong, Kotido district in northeastern Uganda. Following the attack, about 20
soldiers had returned but without their guns or any injuries. The army is therefore investigating whether
some of the LDUs connived with their fellow Karamajong to kill the soldiers. The soldiers killed are said to
be part of a group of 74 LDUs and soldiers who had been dispatched to Kaloto to arrest 20 others who had
deserted the army with guns.
The population in the north continues to be targeted by the rebels. In Kitgum in northern Uganda, 20 people
were abducted and two vehicles set ablaze in three separate attacks by suspected rebels of the LRA. The
abductions took place in Westwad Kitgum town council, Adye village, Layamo subcounty and Chua
county, 38 kilometers east of Kitgum town.
On 31st October, LRA rebels for the first time launched an attack in Apala village in Lira district where at
least 18 people were killed and many more abducted. An army unit has since been deployed to the scene to
investigate the actual number of deaths. And in Soroti, rebels killed 14 people in an attack on an IDP camp.
The attack took place in Anyara subcounty in Kabermaido district. In another incident, three people
including a UPDF soldier were killed when a landmine hit their pick-up truck in Kuju Sub County in
Katakwi district. UPDF 3rd division spokesman said the rebels who planted the landmine were part of the
group terrorizing residents in Katakwi and Kabermaido district." (UN OCHA, 5 November 2003)
Gulu district, the epicentre of the rebellion, is now fairly calm (November 2003)
•
The rebels have moved eastwards into Lira, Kitgum and Soroti districts
•
The rural population lives in fear of bloody attacks
•
Some northerners also suspect that vanquishing the LRA is not at the top of the government's
priorities.
"Gulu district, the epicentre of the rebellion, is now fairly calm, even though much of the rural population
has spent the past several years interned in displaced people's camps.
82
But the rebels have moved eastwards into Lira, Kitgum and Soroti districts, where although the main towns
are secure, the rural population lives in fear of bloody attacks.
The LRA's favoured tactics of sending groups of a dozen men to arbitrarily kill, burn and loot in remote
settlements are particularly difficult to counter, the army has conceded.
Army spokesman Lieutenant Paddy Ankunda maintains that had it not been for Sudan's support to the
LRA, the army would have crushed them long ago.
"Now that Sudan has committed itself to stopping that support, the army is getting the upper hand,"
Ankunda said, pointing out that "before, until June, we were fighting Sudan and the LRA. Now it's just the
LRA."
Escaped LRA combatants have testified that Sudan was still supporting the LRA as recently as last
October.
But while observers are unanimous in condemning the LRA, many are also critical of the army's handling
of the war, with some saying morale is low in the military.
"They fought in the (Democratic Republic of) Congo and in Sudan. Now they're again fighting here.
They're tired and the wounded are happy not to be fighting anymore," said Lira Hospital doctor, Terence
Okello.
Some northerners also suspect that vanquishing the LRA is not at the top of the government's priorities.
The point out that the army dealt pretty quickly with Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels when they
threatened Uganda's southwestern border with the DRC.
"Why is it taking them so long to deal with the LRA?" wondered Remijo Odongo, 64, a peasant farmer
unimpressed, even after Museveni gave him 150 dollars as compensation for his brother being killed by the
LRA the previous week in Ngetta, near Lira town.
Observers are also sceptical of the government's regular declarations that it will crush the rebels and kill its
chief Joseph Kony". (AFP, 29 November 2003)
The camps have become just as much of a target as the villages once were
(September 2003)
•
LRA [Lord's resistance Army]military strategy seemed to be to force IDPs out of the camps
•
The rebels have tended to view the camp populations as their enemies
•
The rebels have left written demands that the IDPs must vacate the camps or face death
•
LRA did not hesitate to kill IDPs as a warning of what would happen to those who did not
follow instructions
83
"Although the camps were initially created to protect civilians from rebel attacks, they have now become
just as much of a target for these attacks as the villages once were. As the Acholi people have been forced
to crowd together in the camp, so the LRA, in their search for food and slaves, have followed them.
The Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS) said recently that a major aspect of the LRA military strategy
seemed to be to force IDPs out of the camps protected by the UPDF. 'According to some rumours
circulating, the LRA has intention to [sic] dismantle the camps by force,' URCS said in its June situation
report.
While the UPDF has attempted to protect the camps by stationing small detachments in their midst, they
have found protecting such a massive displaced population spread over such a large area to be extremely
difficult.
Delivering humanitarian assistance to the widely dispersed camps has also become a treacherous business.
Aid convoys themselves have come under regular attack, and a number of aid workers have lost their lives
in rebel ambushes. At present, only WFP has been able to establish regular aid deliveries, and it relies on a
heavy UPDF military escort to provide security.
In addition, the rebels have tended to view the camp populations as their enemies, and as supporters of the
government. As a result, they have, during raids, left behind written demands that the IDPs must vacate the
camps or face death. As IDPs know, however, they are just as likely to face death outside the camps as
inside them.
In a recent report on the crisis in the north, the US-based Human Rights Watch (HRW) quoted a former
abductee as saying the LRA did not hesitate to kill IDPs as a warning of what would happen to those who
did not follow instructions.
'At one time, we went to a displaced persons camp and immediately killed three people. This was done to
warn people not to stay in the camps but to move back to their villages. I don't know why these three were
selected. We later abducted many children from that camp,' HRW quoted the former abductee as saying in
the report, entitled: 'Abducted and Abused: Renewed Conflict in Northern Uganda'." ( UN OCHA, 15
September 2003)
LRA targets camps to punish people (July 2003)
•
LRA did not hesitate to kill people as a warning of what would happen to those who did not obey
the LRA
•
LRA warned people not to stay in the IDP camps, but ironically continues to kill people who have
stayed in the villages as well
“ The LRA suspected those who moved to internally displaced camps, or "protected villages," of being
against the LRA and for the government. It has at various times demanded they leave and has targeted these
camps to punish people who remain. [...]
The LRA communicated these threats to the camp population through letters left after attacks on the camps.
In one communication of January 2003 to IDPs in Kora camp the LRA stated, "We know now that the
people of Acholi want to stay in the [IDP] camps. We will come [to the camps] and kill you."
84
During an attack on Purongo IDP camp in Anaka sub county, Gulu district on June 29, 2002, the LRA
killed seven civilians and abducted an unknown number of persons. LRA Commander Matata left a letter
addressed to the sub county chief, to the local commissioner, and to the camp population, stating:
(1) Don't stay in the camp. Museveni has put you in the camps to finish you and take over the land in
Acholi.
(2) We will kill everybody in the camp
(3) There will be nobody left to bury the death (Golgatha) [sic].
(4) Cdr. Matata is coming to pick [up] 15.000.000 Ush [fifteen million Ugandan shillings or U.S. $ 9,000]
from Olunya. Olunya is in hiding but we will collect the money.
(5) We want peace talks. Traditional leaders (Rwot Moo), religious leaders of local council V, and other
elders should be present.
A former abductee told Human Rights Watch that the LRA did not hesitate to kill people as a warning of
what would happen to those who did not obey the LRA. Christopher W., age fifteen, said,
At one time, we went to a displaced persons camp and immediately killed three people. This was done to
warn people not to stay in the camps but to move back to their villages. I don't know why these three were
selected. We later abducted many children from that camp.
Although the LRA warned people not to stay in the IDP camps, it ironically continues to kill people who
have stayed in the villages as well. And it has spread fear and forced people to abstain from any movement
by conducting ambushes on commercial and civilian vehicles. It has also ordered people not to use bicycles
and not to travel along main roads, especially on Fridays and Sundays. One result of these attacks is the
crippling of the northern Ugandan economy.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, p 36)
Concerted military offensive by the National Army to fight rebels (March 2002-2003)
•
Agreement signed between the Sudanese and the Ugandan government allows the Ugandan Army
to chase the rebels on Sudanese territory (March 2002)
•
UPDF Operational Commander says: "All peace loving people should be certain that victory is
for sure.”
•
NGOs claim the military operation to sustain the worst violence experienced in the history of
the war.
•
•
Military offensive named: “Operation Iron Fist”
“In March 2002, in a bid to end the LRA threat once and for all and building on the growing
rapprochement between their two countries Uganda and Sudan agreed on 27 April 2002 to re-establish full
diplomatic relations, upgrading their representation to the level of Ambassadors. Uganda’s decision to vote
in favour of a UN resolution expressing concern over the human rights situation in Sudan does not appear
to have significantly damaged the new relationship, although there was some initial concern that it would
do so., Uganda and Sudan entered into an agreement allowing the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF)
access to southern Sudan in a campaign against the LRA. The exercise, code named “Operation Iron Fist”
was originally planned as a short operation to destroy the LRA bases in southern Sudan, capture the fighters
and release thousands of abducted children and adults. When the campaign was launched, the humanitarian
community in Uganda prepared contingency plans for the potential flight of families, reporters and
abducted children held by the LRA. However, Operation Iron Fist has produced a number of unexpected
results. Although a number of LRA bases were overrun, the LRA dispersed before the advance of the
UPDF forces and there seems to have been little direct engagement between the two forces. Furthermore,
LRA forces regrouped in the Imatong Mountains and launched a series of attacks on both the Sudanese
civilians in southern Sudan and on the population in northern Uganda. LRA attacks have also occurred
outside Acholi-land in the neighbouring districts of Lira, Apac, Adjumani and Kotido, which are receiving
trickles of fleeing civilians. At the same time, the Operation has not resulted in the release of the bulk of
85
LRA captives. Indeed the operation has faced criticism from various stakeholders, who are concerned
about the deteriorating humanitarian situation in northern Uganda. The initial deadline for the end of the
Operation Iron Fist has been extended several times and the UPDF has declared that it will continue until
LRA leader, Joseph Kony, and his fighters are defeated. More recently, direct contact with LRA
negotiators began under the good office of the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiatives.” ( UN
November 2002, p 5)
The Ugandan Army’s account of Operation Iron Fist
“In November 2002, Kony ordered all his commanders to fight for their personal survival since capture of
power was no longer viable.
On the 2nd December 2002, he instructed his commander, Odiambo, to cross into Gulu and massacre the
Acholi people, on the biggest scale ever, for their support of Operation Iron Fist. But thanks to the vigilant
and heroic UPDF, Kony’s intentions came to naught. The people of Gulu had a generally peaceful
Christmas as well as New Year holidays.
What were Kony’s intentions? To ambush, rob and loot civilian property as well as turn the Christmas
season into mayhem.
Odiambo led other task commanders like Abdema, Lapaicho, Makasi and Kwoyelo-the LRA training
officer, to fulfil these intentions.
On the night of 10 December 2002, Lapaicho attempted to attack our forces at Barugali in Gulu only to lose
9 (nine) of his fighters, including Lt. Oling Nkufa. Lapaicho himself sustained serious injuries and has
never engaged in any fight since then.
Odiambo then crossed with his forces into Kochgoma and committed the most hienous act of savagery,
when he killed three civilians he found in their gardens and forced their wives to have sex with the corpses.
It was this act that brought the full wrath of UPDF on them.
[...]
‘All peace loving people should be certain that victory is for sure,’ says Operational Commander Brig
Aronda Nyakairima
(UPDF 8 January 2003)
NGOs account of Operation iron Fist
“The continuation of "Operation Iron Fist" has undermined peace efforts, contributing to a humanitarian
crisis and exacerbating the rate of abductions and other atrocities against civilians.” (Human Rights Watch,
27 February 2003)
“The operation code named, Operation Iron Fist (OIF) failed to achieve its objectives and LRA re-entered
Northern Uganda from their bases in Sudan and went on a rampage of destruction. Over 3,000 houses were
burnt in 13 IDP camps causing a further displacement of over 40,000 people from the district of Gulu
alone” (Action by Churches Together 30 January 2003)
“In March of 2002, the Ugandan government launched a military operation known as Operation Iron Fist.
Its name smacks little of “rescue” for abducted children or “peaceful negotiation.” The operation has led to
a humanitarian disaster the likes of which the region had not yet seen.” …
(Women’s Commission, February 12, 2003)
"After four months, "Operation Iron Fist," the military operation underway to root out the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), has yielded few results and destroyed the security of civilians in both Sudan and Uganda.
Consequently, the civilian population has been left without adequate protection while the Ugandan army is
concentrated on the pursuit of the LRA in Sudan. The current crisis shows the high cost of the collective
failure to protect the civilian population (including IDPs) and the urgency for international action without
further delay." (NRC August 2002)
86
Insufficient physical protection offered by the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda
(1996-2003)
•
LRA rebels moved from threats to atrocities (November 2002)
•
UPDF intervened in only thirty-three out of 456 LRA attacks between June and December 2002
•
Reports of Ugandan soldiers raping, harassing and torturing people suspected of collaborating
with rebels
•
Religious peace mediators ambushed by UPDF
•
The strategic positionning of UPDF soldiers'encampments at the center of the camps rather than
around, turns the IDP residents into army shields in the event of LRA attacks
“The LRA rebels have heightened their activities and moved from threats to committing atrocities. They
have attacked IDP camps, burnt down hundred of homes, killed IDPs and abducted others in the process.
They have immobilised road travel by ambushing vehicles on most of the main routes leading to the subregion. Attacks on IDP camps have forced the people to flee for safety to larger camps and towns leading to
IDP numbers soaring in some camps. (UN November 2002, p31)
“Many people in the north fault the UPDF for not offering the civilian population adequate protection from
LRA attacks, including abduction. The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative reports that between June
and December 2002, the LRA carried out at least 456 attacks in Kitgum and Pader districts, but that the
UPDF intervened in only thirty-three of these instances” ( Human Rights Watch March 2003)
”But many observers note that these camps - which are improvised and have no perimeter fences - are
regularly attacked or infiltrated by the LRA. In its latest report on Uganda, the New York-based Human
Rights Watch said "the camps provide little or no protection from the LRA, and residents are vulnerable to
abuse by the UPDF and individual soldiers".
Many blame the army for failing to adequately protect them. "The thousands of government troops recently
placed in the north and in southern Sudan have been largely ineffective at protecting and rescuing
children," Lowicki told the US congressmen.
Norbert Mao said the failure was primarily due to a lack of manpower, and widespread corruption. "The
rank and file see their senior officers advancing materially, while they do not have basic necessities, and
they are de-motivated," he said. .(IRIN April 2003)
“Several IDPs said that when the LRA attack, the soldiers run”
“One woman said, ‘The UPDF are trying, but they are getting defeated. They are afraid of the rebels—just
like we are.”
(Refugee International 22 October 2002)
“Residents consistently complain that when they are under attack, the military detach-ments in the adjacent
barracks fail to respond effectively or in a timely manner, and that these units (many of which are in fact
under-paid and under-trained Local Defence Units, not regular UPDF troops) are in fact themselves often
the source of violence and criminality.
Rape is a particular concern in this respect – residents in a number of villages stated categorically that
women are regularly raped by members of the military detachments and that complaints have gone
unheeded. Other complaints involve looting or assaults that occur in the open fields, in which village
residents are set upon for being outside their village “without authorization”. " (Weeks March 2002, pp.2,
21)
Harrassment by UPDF
87
“People clearly feel that they are being targeted, and not only by the LRA. They point at the UPDF soldiers
usually arriving at the scene of rebel atrocities long after they are gone. "They also beat us because they say
that we are the ones feeding the rebels". (Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative 3 April 2003) “
Peace mediators ambushed by UPDF
“Villagers reported to Refugee International that they do not trust the Ugandan military to protect them and
some northeners reported that Ugandan soldiers rape, harass, and torture people suspected of collaborating
with rebels. In addition, the government has stated that anyone outside of the camps will be considered to
be a rebel or a rebel collaborator.” …
On one occasion, when religious leaders tried to meet with the LRA, they were ambushed by the Ugandan
military and accused of being rebel collaborators. The Ugandan government, while publicly stating that it
will negotiate, has shown little real commitment to a peaceful solution and critics have gone to far as to
accuse it of sabotaging peace efforts. (Refugee International 11 January 2002)
" … They also questioned the military effectiveness of the strategy and whether civilians were better
protected in them. A few, including some who had not visited any such places, asserted that they were all
similar to the site at Pabo (i.e., they were all co-located with the military detachments), which was
inaccurate. Referring to cases like Pabo, they characterized all the centers as "protected villages" or
"protected barracks," alleging that the civilians were used as a first-line of alert against rebel attacks against
the military. Advocates of the "protected villages" argued that the UPDF was in the process of an
aggressive operation against the LRA. To the degree that the LRA could replenish its losses by abducting
more youngsters - which in the highly dispersed rural areas the army could not effectively prevent - its
effort and sacrifice seemed futile. By eliminating the LRA's ability to loot food and abduct youngsters frequent complaints of the rural population - rebel forces would be weakened. Able to concentrate its
stationary units in a limited number of locations, the remainder of the army would be freer to pursue the
rebels. The Geneva Convention, it was argued, permits the Government to displace populations for their
protection [although it also requires that adequate arrangements for their material well-being be provided].
As long as the LRA continues its attacks and executions on undefended civilians, advocates argue, it is
impossible for the UPDF to protect so many potential targets in such a vast area. The army is criticized for
not effectively protecting the civilian population from LRA assaults, yet it is also criticized for attempting
to concentrate the population so that is can address the problem more effectively. " (Gersony ,Section 1,
1997, "The Protected Villages debate")
Security concerns in Karamoja need to be addressed if return is to be facilitated (June
2002)
•
Okobi IDP camp attacked by 80 Karamojong who stole 140 heads of cattle ( August 2002)
•
Once Karimojong are disarmed rehabilitation and reintegration projects should be invested to
decrease cattle thefts in the area
•
Only 10% IDPs have gone home following disarmament exercice
•
Protection in IDP camps has seriously scaled down, leaving the displaced in prey to raids
•
The Joint Communication Centre must be strenghtened to alow more efficient information
exchange between UPDF and district authorities on security issues
"However, The New Vision Ugandan government-owned newspaper reported on Wednesday that suspected
Karamojong warriors had attacked a camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Okoboi, Katakwi
District, killing two people and leaving four critically wounded. In the incident, on Monday afternoon,
about 80 warriors attacked the camp, which was being guarded by 13 members of the Local Defence Unit,
and stole 140 head of cattle, according to the paper. People in the camp had expressed fears of the
possibility of another attack, it added." (IRIN 15 August 2002)
88
•
"The issue of security is still top priority and it cannot be overemphasized. Without security, the
IDP camps in Katakwi will always be a refuge for people fleeing from Karimojong attacks.
•
While disarmament is ongoing in Karamoja, the LDUs in Katakwi need to be beefed up, because
reports show Karimojong still enter the district and even steal cows. Due to the isolated incidents since
2002, people fear Karimojong attacks and this has kept them in the camps. [...]
•
Cross border peace initiatives are important and should be encouraged and strengthened and
coordinated on both sides where they exist. This is to restore the amicable relationship between the Teso
and the Karimojong
[…]
•
Due to the improved general security situation – mainly from the disarmament exercise in
Karamoja and the tightened border security along Moroto and Katakwi - an estimated 10 percent of the
88,500 IDPs have returned to their homes.
•
About 90 percent of the IDPs are able to access their gardens. However, how much is cultivated
depends on the distance the IDPs have to walk to tend their gardens - this varies from 2-7km. Those who
walk long distances can only cultivate limited acreage and they will consequently be more vulnerable to
food insecurity.
•
LDUs that were guarding the various camps in the whole district have been greatly reduced,
leaving some of the camps open to any Karimojong raid. The LDUs, previously numbering 988, have been
taken to Moroto to assist the UPDF during the disarmament exercise. Other LDUs, numbering 360 were
brought in from Sebei, Lango, Acholi and Bugisu.
First the LDU’s are inadequate in terms of numbers. Secondly, they are unfamiliar with the Katakwi terrain
and do not know the language, hence cannot pursue the Karimojong fast enough to recover the stolen cattle.
•
The camps closer to the border area with Moroto tend to be more prone to the sporadic raids or
theft of cattle than camps in the inner regions of the counties.
•
The incidents in 2002 have tended to be more of thefts of cattle than the traditional or violent
raids. In most of the reported incidents, the Karimojong sneak in under the cover of night and steal the
cattle. (See annex of incidents in 2002).
•
Many of the women returned home to maintain their homes (huts) in the village. Periods they
stayed in the villages averaged two weeks.
•
There were a lot of livestock around – cows, goats, pigs. And also chicken. It appears as though
during the last visit these had been taken for safe custody further into the district, where they had common
kraals guarded by LDUs. Now each camp has these clearly visible, though each camp still has a common
kraal.
•
After the assessment in 2001, a Joint Communication Centre was set up for information on
security and related issues to be exchanged between UPDF and Katakwi District authorities. However,
information is still scanty. This line of communication has to be strengthened, such that the people of
Katakwi know more on what is being done by Government to stop the Karimojong from creating insecurity
in their district.
•
Many of the IDPs are bitter about the violence meted out by the Karimojong raiders and they feel
that peace initiatives can only really start when disarmament in Karamoja is complete." (OCHA 10-12 June
2002).
Women and girls continued to be targets of abuse and rape in IDP camps and refugee
settlements (2000-2002)
•
Girls surveyed in Gulu named “rape and defilement” as their third most important concern
•
UPDF Soldiers reported to be perpetrators of sexual violence in IDP camps
"There are no figures on the incidents of sexual and physical abuse. However, it can be assumed that the
incidence is much higher than in a normal situation. 41% of women are vulnerable to domestic violence in
89
Uganda. In non-conflict areas, research has shown a high level of defilement. In a study of press reports of
abuse cases from 1986 to 1996, physical and sexual abuses of children are the most common cases
reported. In addition, defilement is widespread: in one study, 13% of primary school students and 24% of
secondary school pupils had been defiled. Of these, 26% of the primary school students had been defiled by
a boyfriend and 25% by a brother or cousin." (UN November 2001, pp. 47-48)
"Adolescent girls have been and are prime targets for rape, sexual assault and sexual exploitation, including
sexual slavery and prostitution. In nearly every interview, adolescent girls described personal knowledge of
“rape and defilement” either against themselves or their peers. Adolescent girls and boys told researchers
that girls are raped, or “defiled,” in IDP camps, the Achol Pii refugee settlement and in noncamp settings.
The perpetrators and their tactics vary by location and include the LRA, UPDF soldiers, Ugandan nationals,
IDP camp and refugee settlement residents, neighbors, family members and adolescent males.
Girls surveyed in Gulu, including those living in six IDP protected villages, named “rape and defilement”
as their third most important concern behind “insecurity, abduction and murder” and “displacement,” and
both boys and girls in the village of Omiya Anyima ranked “rape and defilement” as among their top five
concerns. This unrelenting violence causes girls to endure terrible psychological and physical harm,
including increased teen pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and other health concerns. Girls
who have not been raped also suffer the constant fear that it will happen to them. [...]
IN THE IDP CAMPS: UPDF SOLDIERS ARE THE MAIN PERPETRATORS
Internally displaced Ugandan girls and young women living in camps said that they, too, live in fear of
rape, but in their case it is committed mostly by UPDF soldiers, who are supposed to be responsible for
providing security. Girls stated that sometimes the UPDF will lie in wait for them along roads at night,
ambush them and rape them, or even go straight to their huts and rape them. They also explained that girls
who refuse sex in exchange for gifts or other goods or services are often forced to comply. Rose, 14, who
lives in Awer IDP camp in Gulu, told researchers: “The soldiers ask girls to spend time with them, and they
give them gifts. They expect them to have sex with them, and if they don’t, they just defile them anyway.
Sometimes they don’t even ask about anything, they just ambush you and attack you while you are in your
hut or while you are walking in the bush.” (WCRWC July 2001, p.19)
"[T]he distinctive needs of young girls, elderly women, widows, victims of violence and rape, and female
heads of households in Uganda’s crisis areas are particularly alarming and deserve added attention.
Roughly 60% of the population in the war torn districts of Gulu and Kitgum are women and as many as
one-third are widows in the four main crises areas. Many women lost their husbands to conflict. HIV/AIDS
is also causing many deaths among men, thus affecting women and their children. Many lost members of
their family along with their belongings and homes, the latter often being legally inherited by the husband’s
surviving male relatives. Lacking physical and legally enforced protection, they continue to be targets of
abuse and rape in IDP camps and refugee settlements where leadership is male-dominated. Lack of
employment in protected areas also forces women and girls into socially unacceptable forms of wage
labour to support their families. Many have the added burden of caring for dead relative’s children in
addition to their own." (UN November 2000, p.27)
"There are reports of women being raped in and around IDP settlements. The local press also have reported
incidents of women being attacked, often by other women, at water points on the suspicion that they are
collaborators with the rebel forces. To address these and other protection concerns of internally displaced
women, attention needs to be paid to practical preventive measures such as adequate lighting near latrines
and escorts for women when they fetch water or firewood. Such measures as set forth in detail in
UNHCR's Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women provide a useful reference for the government,
UN and NGOs involved in the management of IDP camps. There are also reports of women having to
exchange sexual favours to obtain food rations and supplies. In order to avoid such problems, WFP has
wisely taken the decision to distribute food only through women. This practice should be adopted by other
relief efforts and extended to non-food items as well." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p.74)
90
IDP camps in northern Uganda under direct LRA attack (2002)
•
Renewed attack on IDP camp (June 2003)
•
Civilians in Gulu, Pader and Kitgum have been given 48 hours to move into town or camps under
army's control (October 2002)
•
"Operation Iron Fist" has deflected UPDF troops away from northern civilian populations and left
them without adequate protection
•
IDP camps burnt down by LRA fighters leaving 23,660 IDPs homeless again (August 2002)
•
Thousands of IDP huts burnt down, many IDPs killed and hundreads abducted in July LRA's
attacks (2002)
•
IDPs forced to sleep unsheltered in the "bush" by fear of LRA's attacks and lack of government
protection (July 2002)
•
Critical lack of protection by government soldiers due to small deployement of troops as well as
abuses by UPDF soldiers (2002)
•
IDPs fleeing from most camps as a result of UDPDF soldiers abandonning the camps as LRA
rebels attack
"On June 16, rebels burned over 250 huts in Anaka camp, 40miles south wes of Gulu town." (E-mail from
NRC Gulu 21 June 2003)
"Civilians in the north of the country have been ordered by the army to leave their homes and move closer
to camps protected by the military.
Army spokesman Shaban Bantariza told the BBC's Focus on Africa programme that up to 100,000 people
in three districts were affected.
[…]
Major Bantariza said that rebels hid in villagers' huts when they were pursued by the army, and civilians
should therefore move closer to areas the rebels could not reach.
Civilians in the districts of Gulu, Pader and Kitgum have been given 48 hours to move into towns under the
army's control, or camps set up for the hundreds of thousands of people already displaced by the fighting,
AP news agency reported." (BBC, 3 October 2002)
"After four months, "Operation Iron Fist," the military operation underway to root out the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA), has yielded few results and destroyed the security of civilians in both Sudan and Uganda.
Consequently, the civilian population has been left without adequate protection while the Ugandan army is
concentrated on the pursuit of the LRA in Sudan. The current crisis shows the high cost of the collective
failure to protect the civilian population (including IDPs) and the urgency for international action without
further delay." (NRC August 2002)
"It is estimated that until the recent LRA rebel incursion a month ago, over 500,000 people were living in
Internally Displaced Peoples' Camps. But with the rebels burning down camps, the region is now
experiencing the displacement of already displaced people. The entire Alero camp, which was home for
17,403 persons was burnt down. Part of Purongo, Pabbo, Pagak, and Olwal camps were also burnt leaving
23,660 people homeless." (World Vision 8 August 2002)
"[2] ALERO CAMP.
What happened in Alero;
A] On 3rd July 2002 at 6:00am, rebels entered and attack Alero camp and did the followings;
-1106 huts were burnt down with all the household properties
-One civilian died.
91
-Two people injured.
The rebels told the people whose huts were burnt not to put it back again and they want people to go home
not to stay in the camp.
Most of the people do not have things for living.
Some people who were abducted are still missing including 57 children.
People want to move away from the camp but they still have fear because the rebels are many in the area.
People want relief assistance like food, bedding and cooking utensils. Since the grass is not yet ready, there
is need for tent and tarpaulin for shelter.
Report from Camp Leader,
[xxx names of people have been purposedly removed]
[3] GIRI-GIRI CAMP IN OLWAL.
LRA rebels burnt 456 huts in the camp and abducted five people.
Urgent needs for the people whose huts were burnt
1 Food
2 Blankets
3 Tarpaulins for shelter.
4 Enough soldiers to protect people in the camp.
Camp giri-giri is under Olwal.
I am xxx, Camp leader Olwal.
[…]
[6] OPIT CAMP.
Bad things happening in opit camp;
1Hunger
2Government soldiers are behaving the same way as the rebels against civilian population. Most
people sleep in the bush everyday for Fear of rebels.
3Government soldiers killed two civilians in Opit camp.
So what is needed urgently are; Tarpaulins for shelter, Blanket to help children not to get Malaria.
NB-This war has no end.
I am xxx Camp Leader Opit
[…]
[9] AWACH CAMP.
There is much fear in the Camp.
On the19th June-2002 rebels looted civilian properties and one person was injured in the crossfire.
A vehicle was ambushed three people died, five injured and admitted in the hospital.
UPDF is also causing fear by shooting at night and taking civilian land for putting up defence.
Hunger, People are hungry because WFP have not taken food there since May. They should hurry
with the food.
Soldiers also should not create fear among the population, they should go back to their old detach
and leave the land of Mr xxx.
Thanks
[…]
[14] AMURU CAMP.
Situation; People have fear in the camp because rebels always passes nearby the camp and they tells those
who are abducted that they will come and burnt the whole camp and abduct children, they said people of
Amuru are few with the rebels.
Emergency need:
Number of soldiers should be increase or one ‘mamba’ should be sent to protect people.
WFP should assist and send food to the camp, many small camps have moved to the bigger one
for fear of rebels.
Tent and tarpaulins is needed because people are sleeping in the bush.
92
[…]
[22] PALARO CAMP.
On the 3/7/2002 rebels attacked and looted Palaro camp, over 20 people were abducted and asked to carry
the loots then were released later. Huts were not burnt.
Emergency need for these people are foodstuff, Blankets and cooking utensils.
[…]
[25] LALOGI CAMP.
1Hunger is too much, people are almost running away because of hunger.
2People always leave camp to go and sleep in the bush for fear of LRA rebels.
3Government soldiers are not protecting people in the camp.
4If government forces are not able to protect people life in the camp, then United Nation should
take it up and people should be sent back to their village and die from their home.
5There is no medicine in the dispensary.
[…]
[29] PARABONGO CAMP.
People sleep in the bush for fear of rebels and there are very few soldiers to protect the whole camp. When
the rebels are said to be nearby the soldiers disappears and leaves the people unprotected.
Many people who came from Guru-guru camp are without food, shelter, blankets, they are more than 100
households.
Soldiers beat people at night starting from 8:00pm.
Malaria is killing people in camp.
Emergency needs;
Soldiers should be reinforced.
Soldiers should stop beating people in the camp.
Needs for dispensary or health centre in the camp.
Relief assistance to be sent to people from Guru-guru.
[…]
[33] PALARO OROKO CAMPS.
Since the rebels entered the country from Sudan, the army has been withdrawn and people are sleeping in
the bush. Therefore, we need enough security, we need drugs, and we need relief food since April we have
not got any food. We need school to open because our children are at home.
Thanks,
Yours, camp leader Palaro Oroko. xxx."
(Situation Report in 36 IDP camps in Gulu, Northern Uganda, OCHA, 10 July 2002)
"Rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on Tuesday night abducted 56 people when they attacked
two camps occupied by displaced persons in the troubled northern Ugandan district of Gulu.
According to the Uganda army spokesman based in Gulu, Lt. Paddy Ankunda, LRA rebels abducted 26
people from Wiya Nono camp on the outskirts of Gulu the northern Uganda provincial capital, 360 km
north of Kampala.
"They met little resistance as our soldiers had been withdrawn from there to boost our mobile military units
owing to the increasing number of highway ambushes in the area," Ankunda told PANA Wednesday in a
telephone interview." (PANA 10 July 2002)
"There is still a gap in timely and accurate information on security related issues, consequently, numerous
rumours on security incidents abound. Hopefully with the UPDF Public Relations Officer (PRO) in place,
and a Joint Command Center that was opened up on 22nd June to act as an information focal point, flow of
facts pertaining on the ground might be easier. Furthermore, the Assistant Commissioner in the Office of
the Prime Minister, Department of Disaster Management and Refugees, informed humanitarian agencies
during a meeting on 4th July that Government will look into how it can avail relevant information on the
situation in the north to them.
93
[…]
Security is definitely the main issue, that is, increase security around the camps, and provision of proper
escorts plus securing the main roads. The LRA seem determined to operate in small groups, and attack as
many places as possible." (OCHA June 2002)
"The Ugandan media also reported on Wednesday that residents were fleeing camps set up by the army for
internally displaced people in Gulu District, following the increased LRA attacks. The camps of Mutema
and Oberabich in Amuru were abandoned, following the withdrawal of the UPDF from those areas on
Sunday, according to the independent Monitor newspaper.
"UPDF has left the people very vulnerable to rebel attacks; that is why most of them abandoned the
camps," the paper quoted Bataringaya Opoka Odoch, the local council chairman, as saying. He said people
had camped in Amuru trading centre, where there were a few soldiers left, according to the Monitor.
However, UPDF Fourth Division Deputy Commander Col Francis Okello said he had not heard about the
army's withdrawal from the camps. "This is still news to me. I am not aware of the UPDF withdrawal from
these mentioned camps," the paper quoted him as saying.
Bantariza said the new wave of LRA violence on northern villages was aimed at compelling residents to
bring more pressure to bear on the Ugandan government. "This is just plain terrorism. They are terrorising
everybody in the hope that the people will put pressure on the government," he said." (IRIN 26 June 2002)
"This state of affairs has caused internally displaced Ugandans in affected areas to leave their camps for
fear of their lives. There has also been a marked increase in night robberies with guns." (JRS 25 May 2001)
"The security has remained fluid throughout the month [April 2001]. The security situation has been
unpredictable and the intentions of the rebels have remained enigmatic in the face of election results. There
have been reports of rampant rebel movements in the west, northwestern, northeastern and southwestern
parts of the Gulu district." (OCHA April 2001)
For a complete chronology of LRA June 2002 raids and ambushes in the North click [here] to access the
OCHA Humanitarian Update June 2002 volume IV, Issue VI.
LRA abducted children used as human shields instead of beeing protected (19972002)
•
Women's commission urges to distinguish between "hostage and fighter"
•
Out of a total of some 28,217 registered abducted children about 9,818 are under 18
•
Abducted children as young as 6 years of age kept in captivity and tought to kill
•
IDPs and adolescents in "protected villages" sleep in the bush out of fear to become abducted
•
Abducted girls reported being raped, sexually enslaved and forced into domestic servitude
•
LRA aducted 56 IDPs when they attacked and burned Wiyanono and Ajulu camps in early July
•
LRA abducted 70 people in an attack on Wiyanono IDP camp 16 September 2002
•
At least 10,000 children and young people abducted over the past five years
"Thousands of parents in northern Uganda are desperately trying to find out what has happened to their
children who have been abducted by the rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and taken into
southern Sudan. Ten weeks into a Ugandan military operation in southern Sudan to root out the LRA,
"Operation Iron Fist" has yielded no results.
94
Parents are concerned that their children have been sacrificed in a war that does not distinguish between
hostage and fighter," said Allison A. Pillsbury, program manager of the Children and Adolescents Project
of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children." (WCRWC 13 June 2002)
"Uganda had made clear that its military campaign in Eastern Equatoria, southern Sudan, was designed to
destroy the LRA while also securing the release of thousands of abducted children, the United Nations
Children's Fund (UNICEF) stated earlier this month, in expressing grave concern over the fate of children
caught up in the fighting.
[…]
According to the Abducted Child Registration and Information System (ACRIS) set up by UNICEF and the
government of Uganda, some 9,818 children under the age of 18 have been abducted since the LRA war
began, or about one third of the total of 28,217 recorded abductions." (IRIN 18 April 2002)
"While UNICEF has expressed grave concerns over the fate of children caught up in the fighting and urged
all parties to regard those caught in the conflict "as children", Bantariza said it would be difficult for the
UPDF to guarantee their safety, because most of them had become highly militarised and were
combatants." (IRIN 5 April 2002)
"The current conflict in the north is characterised by extreme forms of brutality and terror. Terror
campaigns against the population in local communities are among the worst of its kind: children are
abducted, separated from their families and kept in captivity where they are taught to terrorise and kill other
children and adults. 8,866 children, some of them as young as six years old, have been abducted by LRA in
Apac, Gulu, Kitgum and Lira districts in the north. They were forcefully brought to camps in Sudan where
they were trained as soldiers and sent to the battlefields in Sudan and Uganda. Girls are often used as sex
slaves and are “married” off to senior adult rebels." (UN November 2001, pp. 47-48)
"The registration of abducted persons in Uganda started in 1997.
[...]
An ‘abducted person’ as defined for this registration exercise, is a person who has been forcibly taken away
by armed persons operating in northern and southwestern Uganda. Even people who were in captivity for a
short time (a day) have been registered.
[...]
A total of 30,839 children and adults are registered as having been abducted between 1986 [sic!] and 2001.
Of these, 28,903 abductees were from northern Uganda, while 2,036 were from south-western Uganda.
Kitgum/Pader and Gulu Districts account for 41 and 38 percent of the total number of abductees
respectively. These are the districts where the LRA has been most active over the past ten years
Most abductions took place in the rural areas where people are most exposed to rebel attacks. The most
vulnerable persons are in rural homes where the rebels often strike at night. The majority of the people
(73.1 percent) were abducted from homes, while 9 percent were abducted from roads. Other places of
abductions include: the field (5.3 percent), school (3.6 percent), market (1.2 percent) and other (i.e. water
sources and IDP camps). There was no indication of place of abduction for 2.6 percent of the abductees.
[...]
A total of 17,228 persons are recorded as “returned from captivity”. Of these, 303 people (149 of them
children) returned through Entebbe airport with the help of the Government of the Sudan, IOM, UNICEF
and other international agencies. The rest, 13,611 persons, are recorded as “not returned from captivity”. Of
these, 5,923 were abducted as children and 7,327 were adults. The age for 361 abductees could not be
deducted." (UNICEF November 2001)
"While adolescents [in "protected villages" for IDPs in Gulu]said that the security situation has somewhat
improved during the past year, many revealed that they continue to sleep in the bush for fear of abduction.
[...]
Adolescents who have managed to escape their captors depicted compelling scenarios of their abduction –
some lasting six to 10 years. These mostly involve raids by small LRA bands, where children are rounded
95
up in schools, at home or elsewhere and forced to carry heavy loads between 50 and 100 miles to southern
Sudan, receiving little food along the way. En route to Sudan, many are forced to commit acts of violence
and thievery, including against other children. They are warned that refusal to obey will result in their own
deaths. Once in Sudan, they are trained as fighters in LRA encampments and, after training and
indoctrination, they are often forced to return to Uganda to commit atrocities against their own
communities and the UPDF. Some young people are even forced to kill members of their own families and
communities. As a result, many believe they can never return home because of the terrible acts they have
committed. The leaders of the LRA have created a virtual human shield in the form of a young army of
forced recruits. Anyone seeking to fight back against the LRA does so knowing that they are fighting
against a troop of abducted adolescents.
Abducted girls reported being raped, sexually enslaved and forced into domestic servitude, as described
further below, while smaller numbers are forced into armed combat. While most victims are Ugandan,
Sudanese refugee adolescents living in settlements in northern Uganda have not been spared LRA attack
and abduction.
[...]
While recorded numbers of abducted children and adolescents are estimated at over 11,000, actual numbers
may be much higher, as many young people were abducted for shorter periods of a few weeks and made it
home without further report. In a group interview with 21 randomly identified adolescent orphaned girls in
the Padibe IDP camp in Kitgum, the Women’s Commission asked for a show of hands of those who had
been abducted. Every hand but one went up.
The principal characteristic of these short-term abductions is forced labor. The girls in Padibe, for
example, told stories of being forced to carry loads and do other chores for the rebels before being let go.
This labor, along with money and supplies looted by the LRA, help to sustain the LRA’s survival and
campaign of terror." (WCRWC July 2001, pp.12, 14, 17)
"Consideration is overdue to the fact that the focus on LRA abductees and returnees has, for some time,
diverted attention from the extreme needs of the children who live in the affected districts of northern
Uganda as a whole. The 99.8% of the child population left behind experience a daily catalogue of major
forms of abuse. Most are in constant fear of abduction due to a lack of adequate protection from the
government. A majority of them live in ‘protected villages’ where parenting and socialisation practices are
severely disrupted. From there some are forcibly recruited into the government’s own Home Guard - the
Local Defence Units (LDUs) deployed to other conflict zones such as the DRC." (ACCORD 2002, "Which
children count?")
"After about 12 months of relative calm in war-torn Acholiland, a group of LRA rebels launched an armed
attack on Agoro IDP camp on 23rd February 2002. Three LDUs and two civilians were reported killed by
the rebels in the attack and a large number of IDPs abducted." (OCHA March 2002)
"Rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) on Tuesday night abducted 56 people when they attacked
two camps occupied by displaced persons in the troubled northern Ugandan district of Gulu.
According to the Uganda army spokesman based in Gulu, Lt. Paddy Ankunda, LRA rebels abducted 26
people from Wiya Nono camp on the outskirts of Gulu the northern Uganda provincial capital, 360 km
north of Kampala.
"They met little resistance as our soldiers had been withdrawn from there to boost our mobile military units
owing to the increasing number of highway ambushes in the area," Ankunda told PANA Wednesday in a
telephone interview.
Eyewitnesses said the camp's estimated 20,000 residents were obliged to flee into the nearby bushes as the
machine gun totting rebels estimated at between 150 and 200 ransacked their huts for food and other items.
96
Ankunda said the rebels had earlier on stormed another displaced persons' camp in Ajulu village also near
Gulu and abducted another 30 people, bringing the total number to 56.
The rebels have abducted more than 100 people and burnt 10 displaced persons' camps in Gulu district
since they were flushed out of their hideouts in southern Sudan's Imatong Mountains." (PANA 10 July
2002)
"Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels raided two displaced people's camp in northern Ugandan early on
Monday and abducted more than 70 people, the army and local authorities said.
A local councillor in Gulu district, Santo Okia, told AFP by telephone that rebels attacked Wiyanono camp,
20 kilometres (12 miles) west of Gulu town, abducting 70 people after looting food and other goods from
the camp and nearby shops in the pre-dawn raid.
Earlier, an army spokesman said another group had raided Pabo camp, the largest displaced camp for
displaced people in the Gulu district, during the night and abducted six teenage girls after engaging soldiers
in a firefight.
[…]
He added that people housed in Wiyanono were reluctant to leave the camp when the army a few months
ago asked them to go to nother settlement where they could be better protected.
Okia said there were no soldiers stationed at Wiyanono when the rebels struck. Several smaller camps have
been closed and residents moved to larger ones where security has beefed up." (AFP 16 September 2002)
For more details on the government's anti-LRA campain's impact on abductions, see IRIN special report
of the 18 April 2002
97
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS (HEALTH NUTRITION AND SHELTER)
Food
Distribution in Soroti municipality ends on 06 December and will resume after a reverification exercise (December 2003)
•
WFP is currently distributing 45-day rations in Gulu, 60-day rations in Kitgum and Pader
•
In the eastern Teso sub-region, WFP is currently distributing full rations of cereals, pulses, cornsoya blend and vegetable oil to over 100,000 persons
•
Distribution in Soroti municipality ends on 06 December and will resume after a re-verification
exercise and issuing of new cards
"WFP continues to provide food assistance under PRRO 10121.0. From 24 to 30 November, WFP
distributed 2,496 tons of food to 212,896 people in the Acholi and Lango sub-regions, including IDPs in six
camps in Gulu, two camps in Pader, three camps in Lira, and two refugee settlements in Arua and feeding
centres and primary schools in conflict-affected areas. WFP is currently distributing 45-day rations in Gulu,
60-day rations in Kitgum and Pader to ensure that all IDPs will have food during the Christmas period.
In the eastern Teso sub-region, WFP is currently distributing full rations of cereals, pulses, corn-soya blend
and vegetable oil to over 100,000 persons displaced from Soroti district. WFP has started distributing full
ration to 145,728 displaced people in Kaberamaido district. In Kumi district, most of the 18,315 people
who were displaced have returned to their homes. Distribution in Soroti municipality ends on 06 December
and will resume after a re-verification exercise and issuing of new cards. In Katakwi district, WFP food has
reached people displaced by the Karimojong warriors. The displaced population in Teso is currently 426,
470 people.
WFP and district authorities have completed the re-registration of all IDPs in the northern district of
Kitgum and will carry out a verification exercise. The current caseload in Kitgum district stands at 237,269
IDPs. From 03 to 12 December, WFP will carry out an Emergency Food Security Assessment (EFSA) in
the northern and northeastern regions of Lango and Karamoja and in refugee-hosting Moyo district in the
West Nile region, to assess the food needs of IDPs and other vulnerable groups and adjust food rations
accordingly. Rebels attacked and abducted six people in refugee-hosting Adjumani district on 03 December
and WFP consequently diverted the EFSA mission from Adjumani to Moyo district as of 04 December. "
(WFP, 5 December 2003)
Hunger gap is centered in the months of May, June, and July (November 2003)
•
Ninety-four percent of all the respondents[in food security assessment] indicated that they do
experience a hunger gap
•
June was indicated to be the most difficult month to access sufficient food
•
The most common coping strategies during the hunger gap are eating less food making less food,
and changing food
98
"Ninety-four percent of all the respondents[in food security assessment] indicated that they do experience a
hunger gap due to the cultivation calendar. The same percentage also claimed to experience a hunger gap in
the villages, though the duration has increased. The reasons for this are various, but primarily due to less
crop production hence less food in storage. The municipality/village TFC caretakers were asked if they had
the hunger gap before June 2002. Prior to that date only 40% of the respondents admitted to experiencing a
hunger gap; after 90% claimed to experience one. The hunger gap is centered in May, June, and July. June
was indicated to be the most difficult month to access sufficient food; this was also true in the villages and
prior to June 2002 (for municipality/villages). Since moving to the camps (and after June 2002), the hunger
gap has extended into other months –August and beyond. Although, the percentage of respondents claiming
to experience a hunger gap at those times is still lower than in other month. The most common coping
strategies during the hunger gap are eating less food, making less food, and changing food. The IDP
respondents also claimed to eat wild foods. These wild foods –wilds greens, cassava leaves, and yamsare
not normally consumed and only during the hunger gap." (Action Against Hunger, November 2003)
WFP faces a pipeline break of 35,079 tons of food commodities from September 2003
through March 2004 (October 2003)
•
WFP is in urgent need of resources to prevent hunger and serious malnutrition among IDPs,
refugees and other vulnerable groups
•
Malnutrition rates among children under five years reached 18.1 percent in Pabbo camp and 31.6
percent in Anaka camp in Gulu District during last pipeline break
"WFP has announced that it faces a pipeline break of 35,079 tons of food commodities (25,435 tons cereals
and 9,644 tons pulses) from September 2003 through March 2004. WFP is in urgent need of resources for
PRRO 10121.0 to meet the increased resource requirements to prevent hunger and serious malnutrition
among IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups. During the last pipeline break in December 2002 to
February 2003, malnutrition rates among children under five years reached 18.1 percent in Pabbo camp and
31.6 percent in Anaka camp in Gulu District – levels well above what is considered indicative of a
nutritional crisis. Supplementary feeding programmes for these children have been put in place during 2003
and a reduction in the amount of food provided would have a devastating effect on the already precarious
state of these children. Some donations in kind are expected to reach Uganda in January, but this may pose
a delay and therefore donors are urged to come forward with cash contributions to purchase food locally to
speed up the process. Donors are urgently requested to pledge resources against PRRO 10121.0 to provide
assistance to IDPs, refugees and other vulnerable groups.
A comprehensive assessment recently released puts the figure of Uganda's internally displaced persons
(IDPs) at 1,217,332 - based on recent surveys in the trouble-afflicted regions of Acholi (Gulu, Kitgum,
Pader districts), Langi (Apac, Lira districts) and Teso (Katakwi, Soroti, Kumi and Kaberameido districts)."
UN OCHA, 8 October 2003)
Hunger gap is increasing in Gulu camps (October 2003)
•
Main findings of food security assessment in Gulu IDP camps:
"WFP food aid rations are on average 38% of total food source for IDPs, but
only 35% received the standard 100% rations during assessment period.
· Plot sizes for agriculture are reducing – on average 1.25acres (.51ha) in 2003
vs. 2.2acres (.9ha) in 2002
· Estimated average incomes have reduced from US$ 465 in 1999 to $120 in
99
2003. At the same time household expenditures for food are increasing.
· The hunger gap is increasing to three months.
· Food stocks are highly vulnerable to post-harvest losses, contamination, and
looting.
· Cultivation of traditional food crops like millet, sim sim, and ground nuts are
on the decline.
· Food eaten in households is not diverse with most meas made of WFP food
rations.
· Safe water coverage only 3.1lt/per person vs.15lt and latrine coverage is at
only 37%.
· Natural resources are under pressure -especially land and fuel- and in danger
of being totally stripped from the highly populated camp areas.
· Women are completing 79% of the work load for IDP households.
· Camp residents are exploiting most of their coping mechanisms already (see
above).
· Food security projects not including food distribution by NGOs only found in
5% of camps assessed.
· The IDP population is by and large demoralized by the continuation of the
insurgency and by life in the camps. If the situation continues in this manner the IDPs are at risk for the
following:
· Increased malnutrition especially for the under-five population
· Seed sources may become insecure
· Municipality/villages have very little ability to absorb any extra population.
· Commodities’ prices in the camps may decrease
· Lack of diversity in crop production leaves crops vulnerable to disease on the
scale of the cassava mosaic epidemic in the 1990’s." (Action Against Hunger, 1 November 2003)
Draught and hunger in Karamajong dominated North-east
•
Household food stocks remain low in Karamoja Region(May 2003)
•
Rising food prices and declining livestock prices have weakened the terms of trade for pastoralist
households in Karamajong.
•
Controversy over possible deaths of hunger in Karamajong(2002-2003)
•
Key humanitarian concerns are food, security - and its impact on access - and rising rates of
malnutrition.
•
Over 80,000 IDPs in Usuk and Kapelebyong Counties have limited access to both food and clean
drinking water and epend on wild foods
“Household food stocks remain low in Karamoja Region (Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit Districts) and
will only improve after July when the harvest begins. Most households are managing with just one meal a
day, mainly relying on cereals purchased from the market, supplied from neighboring Lira, Mbale and
Soroti Districts. Cereal prices continued to rise during April, averaging UShs 410 per kilogram of
sorghum, about UShs 100 higher than in March 2003 and over two and half times higher than in April of a
normal year. Prices are likely to continue to rise during the "hunger period" of April to June as supplies
diminish and demand increases. Grain prices also remained more than double the usual April levels in
Dodoth and Jie Counties, where a kilogram of sorghum averages UShs 500.
To make up for diminished daily grain intake, households are complementing their diet with wild foods
(vegetables and a few fruits) that have sprouted following onset of the rains. Food shortages since January
have increased malnutrition rates among the population, mainly the children and elderly. Household food
stocks remain low in Karamoja Region (Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit Districts), where an April rapid
nutritional assessment by the World Food Programme found global malnutrition rates of 22.4 in Kotido
100
District and 14 percent, in Moroto District. This prompted the agency to step up its monthly delivery of
"emergency food aid" from 1,000 to 3,600 MT. WFP will continue delivering this amount on a monthly
basis for four months, starting in May 2003. The food aid will be targeted to 95,684 households,
approximately 535,000 people and nearly 60 percent of the combined population of the three districts.
WFP is working with local community leaders and administration to design a distribution system that will
ensure that food reaches the most affected households first. As a follow-up to the April rapid assessment,
and in order to gather more information on the food and nutritional status of the population in Karamoja,
WFP conducted a more detailed nutritional assessment of Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit Districts in
early May 2003. A report is due at the end of the month (FEWS, May 2003)
“WFP reports that rains throughout Karamoja began late – only in April. This means that prospects for a
July 2003 harvest in the region are questionable. To address the severe hunger crisis in Karamoja region,
WFP will increase emergency food assistance in from 1000 tonnes to 3000 tonnes with effect from May.
The District Director of Health Services (DDHS) conducted a rapid nutrition surveillance survey in Moroto
and Kotido in April. Results indicate a global malnutrition rate for children under five years of age, of over
14% in Moroto and 22% in Kotido. Currently, a complete nutrition surveillance survey is being conducted
in the region – Moroto, Kotido and Nakapiripirit – by Ministry of Health (MoH), WFP and UNICEF.
Results will be available at the end of May.(OCHA April 2003)
Controversy over possible deaths of hunger
“Meanwhile, controversy rages over whether or not anyone has actually died of famine. Reports about
people dying have been trickling through since the end of 2002, but it is thought some may be politically
motivated. Some say local leaders want to divert resources and aid away from the war-torn north of Uganda
so they are hyping the famine to boost Karamoja’s disaster profile.
But Achia is emphatic that people are dying. “I’ve seen with my own eyes people die of hunger, thin and
emaciated," he says. "The other day I had a priest confirm to me that 13 people had died of hunger in his
parish alone.”
Other local leaders are making similar claims. “Sixty-nine people have died of famine just in this village
[Lorengedwat]. There are others who won’t survive much longer,” says Simon Iriama, district councillor
for Lorengedwat sub-county.
But reports of deaths from famine are disputed. Moses Apopel, district commissioner for disaster
preparedness in Moroto, points out that there are some anomalies in the figures.
“We got reports that people were dying from hunger in Karamoja last November," he told IRIN. "We
investigated and got five sub-counties to give us lists of names. The total reported in these lists was 501.
But some of them were giving names of people who had died in 2000 or 2001.”
In the absence of forensic proof, reports of deaths have largely had to be taken on trust. “We asked for
proof, but of course they said ‘we are not doctors – we cannot prove these people’s deaths were caused by
famine’. There’s no equipment here to determine these things. Because these people are on the ground, you
have to trust them to some degree,” says Apopel.
He adds, however, that there is grisly evidence of famine available to the naked eye. “I recently went to a
place called Nakapelimen. You can see people emaciated to the bone with hunger, too weak to move.
Things are much more serious in Karamoja than they were when the government carried out an assessment
last October.” (IRIN 24 March 2003)
101
Rapidly deteriorating food security situation (November 2002)
•
Substantial food needs until the next harvest in September 2003
•
Chronic food insecurity in North-east due to cyclic/intermittent hydrological drought and civil
insecurity.
•
Humanitarian needs are being replaced by recovery priorities in Rwenzori
"The rapidly deteriorating security situation in northern Uganda, notably Gulu District, has prevented half a
million IDPs and formerly settled communities from moving to work in the fields near IDP camps for a few
hours a day. This is the livelihood strategy that IDPs sheltering in protected camps have employed for the
last six years to fend for themselves and access the balance of food requirements not provided by WFP. The
renewed insecurity has resulted in a drastic increase of food aid requirements for the IDPs, who are in a
desperate need of basic humanitarian assistance. The situation is so grave that even when tranquillity again
prevails, IDPs are going to have substantial food needs which they will not be able to address on their own
until the next harvest in September 2003. There is a risk that the next cropping seasons could be affected by
El Niño developments. Unfavourable weather has already affected cereal growth in WFP’s operational
areas causing poor grain filling in the North and early tussling in the Northeast. The number of food
insecure people receiving food assistance was 706,224 by mid-2001 and has risen to 784,121 by June 2002.
The affected population fluctuates according to the security situation.
Overview of food security situation in WFP operational areas in Uganda
Northern Region: The overall food security situation in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader has worsened since April
2002 due to the deteriorating security situation in the sub-region, affecting both availability of and access to
food. The primary cause of food insecurity in the sub-region is a result of the terror activities of the LRA.
The LRA attacks have forced the IDPs to remain in camps with no access to their relatively fertile
agricultural fields and no possibilities to explore other opportunities for accessing food and income. The
LRA rebels have heightened their activities and moved from threats to committing atrocities. They have
attacked IDP camps, burnt down hundred of homes, killed IDPs and abducted others in the process. They
have immobilised road travel by ambushing vehicles on most of the main routes leading to the sub-region.
Attacks on IDP camps have forced the people to flee for safety to larger camps and towns leading to IDP
numbers soaring in some camps. This has also led to the creation of transit camps in the towns of Gulu and
Kitgum, where WFP is offering food aid assistance to an estimated caseload of 40,000 in district towns in
addition to around 500,000 people in isolated rural IDP camps.The worsening security situation has
affected the food aid assistance strategy planned for 2002, which was to slowly phase out general food
distribution in favour of re-settlement initiatives including food for asset activities. As a result of this, WFP
recently announced an emergency response to save the lives of IDPs affected by the rebel attacks. Since
IDPs access to their gardens has been constrained by insecurity and fear of being killed or abducted, a full
ration was recommended and is being provided during the emergency intervention, originally planned for
three months. However, there is likelihood for extension through the year. In addition, during the
emergency phase, WFP is providing 100% of the food needs instead of the 30% that was provided before
the intensified attacks. The emergency assistance will be reviewed in October 2002 to determine the food
security situation and net food gap. Normal social/cultural structures are breaking down and leading to high
abandonment rates (i.e. men leaving their families), frequent teenage pregnancies, and lack of care for
vulnerable groups and high risk of AIDS.
Northeast Region: The overall food security situation in Karamoja can be characterised as a chronic
problem due to cyclic/intermittent hydrological drought and civil insecurity, affecting both availability of
and access to food. Traditional coping mechanisms are negatively affected by strained land resources and
environmental degradation caused by migrating Turkana from neighbouring Kenya and the depletion of
assets and interrupted inter-regional trade caused by cattle-raiding and clan fighting.
102
Coping mechanisms of food insecure households include provision of labour, collection of firewood,
gathering of wild fruits and vegetables, collection of white ants, collection and sale of stones, hunting for
wild animals, borrowing using kinship ties, migration in search of food and sale of livestock.
Northwest Region: The overall food security situation in West Nile is affected by widespread crop failure
in Moyo and rebel attacks on productive settlements in Adjumani. Limited access to agricultural land for
refugees has resulted in diversification into livestock rearing and other income strategies like casual labour
and petty trade. Seasonal flooding of the Nile basin and water logging of soils affected the already hard hit
settlements in Moyo causing total crop failure of 47.8% of the planted crops by mid-2002. Insecurity and
looting caused by the LRA rebels in Adjumani has led to displacement of refugees affecting household
food security and inter-settlement labour patterns.
Coping strategies in this region mainly include gathering of wild fruits and vegetables, hunting and fishing
or temporary migration to Sudan.
Among the Sudanese refugees, nutrition data from April 2002 shows that the global acute malnutrition rates
range between 5.6% and 10.6% measured in z-score for children aged 6-59 months with severe acute
malnutrition rates being 0.1% to 0.8% z-score. The problem of malnutrition is specifically apparent among
children aged 6-29 months with global acute malnutrition rates between 6% and 13.5% (z-score). However,
admissions to Therapeutic Feeding Centres are still low, suggesting that social factors account for a
significant part of the problem.
Western Region: In the Rwenzori area, IDPs are returning to their homes after peace has returned to the
area. Humanitarian needs are being replaced by recovery priorities." (UN November 2002, pp 31-32)
Health
Health care for IDPs continues to deteriorate (November 2003)
•
Peripheral health units closed
•
Migration of health workers
•
Less than half of rural health units are operational
•
Outreaches have collapsed
•
Malnutrition from protein-energy deficiency has become a major direct and underlying cause of
death among children and women
•
Wasting and underweight have increased
"The health care for IDPs has continued to deteriorate because of the worsening security situation. The
closure of peripheral health units and the migration of health workers have dealt a further blow to this
situation. A relatively small per capita expenditure of US$ 13 where Government contributes about US$ 6
and the remaining seven expected to be got from out pocket by communities. This leaves the IDPs in a
desperate situation, as they are not living a productive life due to insecurity, which has divorced them from
economic production. The situation is reflected in the highest incidence of communicable disease among
the displaced population compared with the non - displaced population of Uganda.
The continuous insurgency and instability in Acholi, a Lango, Teso and Karamoja region has resulted in
significant violations of the rights of children to survival, optimal growth and development, with a direct
negative impact on infant and under-five mortality rates.
103
Basic health services have been hit hard by the renewed insurgency, where less than half of rural health
units are operational. Reporting rates from health units in conflict-affected areas remain constantly below
30%, indicating capacity. Attacks on district health workers and clinics have made normal operations very
difficult.
Consequently, support services; such as outreaches have collapsed, leading to low Expanded Programme of
Immunisation (EPI) coverage and increased mortality and morbidity from vaccine-preventable causes and
other infectious diseases.
Malnutrition from protein-energy deficiency has become a major direct and underlying cause of death
among children and women in the conflict-affected districts; clearly, this is a manifestation of the
unfulfilled rights to proper growth and development, including cognitive development. Wasting and
underweight have both increased from inappropriate feeding practices and infectious diseases. Unless
significant interventions are undertaken, this is expected to increase with the deteriorating access to food. In
addition to the support that UNICEF is already providing to the therapeutic and SFCs in Gulu, Kitgum and
Pader, the project intends to focus strongly on activities that combat the major childhood killer diseases of
malaria, diarrhoea, ARI (acute respiratory illnesses), and anaemia.
In addition to the aforementioned challenges, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has caused major demographic crisis
in the conflict-affected districts. It is effectively erasing the gains in child survival efforts. The increased
number of clinically-ill AIDS patients has increased the workload of already over-stretched health staff,
over-burdened the weak referral system, weakened the economic capacity of households, and increased to
risk of other illnesses." (UN OCHA, 18 November 2003, pp 76-78)
Health situation in Soroti (October 2003)
"Health units lack health workers and adequate drugs. The district mobile clinic was seen in Father Hilda’s
P.S.
High morbidity was reported in sites visited like Soroti S.S., Swaria Primary School (right next to Soroti
SS) and Gweri sub-county headquarters. The three main causes of death were reported as malaria, measles
and diarrhoea." (UN OCHA, 14 October 2003)
Health situation has reached crisis proportions ( September 2003)
•
Most of those dying from preventable diseases are young children
•
Some of the younger children are visibly too weak to move
•
Latrines are nearly full and people are getting sick from water borne diseases
"The deteriorating health situation in areas occupied by eastern Uganda's internally displaced people (IDPs)
has reached crisis proportions, with malaria, measles, diarrhoea and pneumonia killing a number of people
every day, according to camp residents and local health officials.
Most of those dying from preventable diseases are young children. Parents in the camps are burying their
young on a daily basis as attacks of malaria rage through the Teso region's densely packed settlements.
"The biggest problem here is coughing and fevers, with some diarrhoea," said Peter Okama, a resident at
the Nakatonya camp, a kilometre outside Soroti town. "My little girl of seven is very sick with a fever and
we've had no treatment for two weeks. We took her to hospital but they didn't have enough people. When
we saw someone, he couldn't diagnose it."
104
The prevalence of sickness in Soroti's camps is audible from the moment of entering them. Most of the
children are coughing frequently and some of the younger children are visibly too weak to move.
Reverend Sam Opol of the Church of Uganda, which has been distributing food to the camps, said the
congestion inside the IDP camps was making them rife for disease.
"One child gets a cough and they all get it," Opol told IRIN. He said local government officials had to work
faster to get medical assistance to the camps.
According to local health officials, medical assistance has been slow because they are under-staffed and
under-resourced.
"We have just mobilised workers but even now we have only four in each camp," Soroti district health
secretary May Anero told IRIN. "Sanitation is the big problem because of the congestion in the areas where
IDPs are camped. Latrines are nearly full and people are getting sick from water borne diseases."
Anero also said Soroti still has a drug shortage, despite some aid which arrived a few weeks ago.
But Mads Oyen, child protection officer with UNICEF, said the government had requested the UN
Children's Fund not to supply any more drugs until the local health authorities in Teso purchased their own
with money already allocated." (UN OCHA, 25 September 2003)
Rape, sexual abuse, and exploitation by UPDF soldiers contribute to the transmission
of HIV (July 2003)
•
Closeness of people living in the camps with nothing to do leads to an increase in sexual activity
•
Rampant poverty means that young girls will accept sex for small amounts of money or favors
•
STD prevalence among armed forces globally is generally two to five times higher than in the
comparable civilian population
“A medical officer with the Office of Health Services in Gulu district identified several factors contributing
to the spread of HIV/AIDS in the north:
First, cultural education and the social system are disrupted. Children are not getting proper lessons at
home. Also, the closeness of people living in the camps with nothing to do leads to an increase in sexual
activity. Secondly, the mobile troops (UPDF) are forcibly raping women. There is real fear on the part of
the population to report these cases, but sometimes they go for medical treatment for STDs and the stories
come out. Third, rampant poverty means that young girls will accept sex for small amounts of money or
favors. And psychologically, people are traumatized so they take decisions that are not good for their health
as well. They may make rash decisions on sexual practice, not thinking of the future.[...]
Soldiers also use boys to put them in contact with women in the camps with whom the soldiers then seek to
have consensual or forced sex. ‘They pay the boys a little money, so the children would lure the women to
the army installations.’ Then the soldiers would force the women they could not buy. ‘Normally the women
would get money for a compensation, since they cannot report the rape, for they have to stay in the camps
with those soldiers.’
Rape, sexual abuse, and exploitation (including the use of women and girls who engage in ‘survival sex’)
by UPDF soldiers-as well as LRA rapes of women and "wives" contribute to the transmission of HIV.
UNAIDS reports that military personnel are especially vulnerable to STDs, including HIV/AIDS. During
105
peacetime, STD prevalence among armed forces globally is generally two to five times higher than in the
comparable civilian population; in times of conflict, it may be much higher.
Although overall HIV prevalence in Uganda has reportedly declined substantially in recent years from
previous highs, lingering high prevalence in the north and among other populations is a continuing concern.
Gulu reportedly has the second highest rate of HIV/AIDS prevalence after Kampala. An antenatal testing
program for mothers at Lacor Hospital found that of those who chose to be tested, 11 percent tested
positive for HIV in 2000, and 12 percent tested positive in 2001. In Kitgum and Pader, between May and
December 2002, testing programs at three hospitals found HIV prevalence between 4.8 and 10.4 percent of
women tested. Nationally, the rate of HIV was estimated at 5 percent of the adult population in 2001.
(HRW, 15 July 2003, p. 70)
Congestion, poor hygiene and changed sexual behavioral practices have worsened
the health situation in Rwenzori IDP camps (2002)
•
Prevalent diseases in the camps includemalaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), outbreaks of
cholera, diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, (STIs)
"Internally displaced persons were concerned with the increased morbidity and mortality due to
displacement. While the study did not collect statistical mortality and morbidity figures, the diseases
mentioned to be prevalent in the camps are: malaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), outbreaks of cholera,
diarrhea, sexually transmitted infections, (STIs), including HIV/AIDS. By the time of study, (December
2001), 12 cases of cholera were admitted at Bundibugyo hospital.
The principal causes of increased disease prevalence among people living in camps are congestion, poor
hygiene and changed sexual behavioral practices among the displaced persons.
Congestion in the camps was observable during the assessment and many people do the cooking within
their small shelters thus exposing themselves particularly children to domestic smoke. Though no statistics
were compiled, many of the children were observed to be with cough and running noses during data
collection.
On the other hand, respondents attributed the increased prevalence of STIs to increased involvement in sex
after displacement. This was attributed to poverty and increased interactions with outsiders as a result of
displacement. Displaced people singled out soldiers and teachers as leading catalysts for the spread of STIs
for they have a regular source of income thus able to seduce more girls and women." (Oxfam 8 February
2002, p. 11)
Poor health services available for the displaced population (2001)
•
Health care services and infrastructure in the chronically conflict-affected districts have
experienced tremendous stress
•
Six of 32 IDP villages in Gulu have no health facility
•
under five mortality rates in affected districts such as Bundibugyo are unacceptably high
•
HIV infection rates as high as 12.5% in camps compared with the national average of 10.5%
"[T]he continuing insurgency and political instability in some districts in southwestern (Bundibugyo,
Kasese Kabarole and Ntungamo) and northern (Gulu, Kitgum, Katawi) Uganda has contributed
significantly to further violations to the rights of children and women to survival, optimal growth,
development, and reproductive health. Health care services and infrastructure in the chronically conflict-
106
affected districts have experienced tremendous stress. Access to, and utilisation of services has decreased
due to the fluctuating insecurity, lack of staff and essential supplies and drugs. The pattern is very dynamic
as units close during period of insecurity and may later re-open when threats have subsided. Consequently,
a large segment of the populations in the affected districts has [sic!] access to health services. In Gulu
district, none of the approximately 32 IDPs villages in Gulu district, with a total estimated population of
250,000, has acceptable access to health services. Of the 32 IDP villages, six have no health facility. In
Pabbo IDP, with a current population of over 30,000 people, there is only one health facility. Furthermore,
chromic insecurity, exacerbated by poor living conditions and irregular and low salaries, makes it
extremely difficult to attract and retain qualified health personnel. In many IDP villages, nursing aides are
the only staff available to provide health-care services.
It is not surprising, therefore, that under five mortality rates in affected districts such as Bundibugyo are
unacceptably high at 3.1/10,000 children per day. In some of the affected districts, there are reports of
significant increases in maternal mortality ratios compared with the national average. Social conditions in
the crowded camps are horrendous, especially for women and children who suffer rape and abductions.
Sexually transmitted infections have surged and continue to increase. HIV infection rates are as high as
12.5% in camps compared with the national average of 10.5%. Malaria prevalence in under-fives is a
staggering 76.9% compared to 40% countrywide. Immunisation trails the national average considerably
with a fully immunised coverage of 25% compared to 44.3% nationally. Maternal mortality is high at
1,200/100,000 live births, and more than twice the national average of 506/100,000 live births. The lack of
psychosocial support has left the population severely traumatised." (UN November 2001, p.46)
Poor health conditions reported in Katakwi IDP camps (2002)
•
Most clinics in IDP camps overwhelmed by numbers
•
HIV/AIDS sensitisation and education needed
•
IDPs have to travel an average of 15 km on foot to reach a health center mobile health clinics need
to be strenghtened
•
Closely spaced and overcrowded huts common in most camps
•
IDPs commonly wear very minimal/unclean clothes
•
Lack of drainage, poor access to water and sanitation facilities has an adverse impact on the
hygiene and sanitation behaviors
•
"Most health clinics serving almost all camps visited are overwhelmed by numbers, the District
should ensure that the mobile clinics are more widespread, such that camps that are far from the trading
centres or sub-county headquarters benefit from basic medical services.
•
Due to the camps situation, the youth, especially the girls are more vulnerable to contracting STDS
and HIV/AIDS and there is need for education and sensitisation to create HIV/AIDS awareness among
camps residents.
[…]
•
The most common complaint in all camps visited was the rampant malaria. This was closely
followed by diarrhoea and RTIs, mostly in children.
•
Mobile health clinics do not reach all camps, and in particular, those camps away from services
•
General observations indicate good health in children and pregnant and lactating mothers
•
Most health centres seem well equipped but are overwhelmed by numbers
•
Need for support to HIV/AIDs sensitisation campaigns to raise awareness on HIV/AIDs " (OCHA
10-12 June 2002)
"Displaced people in the camps in Katakwi are reported to be suffering from unusually high rates of
malaria, diarrhoea, intestinal worms, upper respiratory tract infections and pneumonia. Many of the camps
107
are isolated and IDPs have to travel an average of 15 km on foot to reach a health centre. OCHA described
the sanitation situation within the camps as "a time bomb just waiting to explode". Similar to the situation
in north western Uganda, the camps have existed for many years and have been paid very little attention by
both the Ugandan government and international aid agencies." (OCHA 31 September 2001, pp.27-28)
"As the morbidity and mortality indicators disclose and for a multitude of reasons, health has been a major
concern in the camps. Closely spaced and overcrowded huts were common in most camps. IDPs commonly
wore very minimal/unclean clothes, particularly most children were topless. Children were unclean, not
bathed and dressed properly. IDPs lacked proper bedding and mattresses as warriors have looted them and,
households mainly use the local mats to sleep with/with out covers. Open air cooking with out lids was
widespread due to overcrowded and grass-thatched huts. Families usually throw their wastewater and
kitchen waste into unprotected open composts in the vicinity/around their huts. Lack of drainage, poor
access to water and sanitation facilities has an adverse impact on the hygiene and sanitation behaviors of
the IDPs. Swampy surroundings and stagnant water bodies have been further aggravating the
environmental cleanliness while also serving as breeding grounds for vectors. Livestock were tethered
inside the camps to further contaminate the camp environment.
Morbidity and Mortality
Consequently, mortality and morbidity rates have been alarmingly high. Crude and Under-5 mortality
prevails at >3deaths/10,000/day and the incidence of diarrhoea, malaria, ARI and worm infestation was
rampant in most camps at >40% prevalence.
[...]
Malaria, measles and diarrhoea have claimed more deaths either individually or in combination with other
complications. At the time of this survey, MOH and UNICEF launched immunization campaign and have
covered almost the entire under-5 population with measles vaccination and vitamin-A drops.
Generally, skin sepsis, lice infestation, suffering from Jiggers (Tunga Penetrans) and fungal infections were
widespread among children and adults. In most cases children and adults were found not bathed and in
unclean clothes (many wore minimal clothes and particularly most children were topless) despite plenty of
water sources in the nearby swamps. During informal discussions, many IDPs mentioned health facility,
clothing and bedding as their first requirements.
Cooking and eating-places were dirty attracting flies to further contaminate the surroundings. These
deficiencies could eventually prove to be the potential ground for the outbreaks of epidemics. In terms of
morbidity, the survey noted that 96% of the households reported having at least one sick member in the last
30 days prior to survey although everyone sought treatment.
[...]
Seeking post-natal services was found to be very poor among the IDPs either due to their ignorance/weak
household economy/due to the non-availability of services. Of the total deliveries, only 32% mothers
received Vitamin-A capsules after delivery. And 48% sought post-natal services from the health posts.
These deficiencies in health seeking behaviors could be the leading causes for around 47% of the mortality
before their first birthday i.e. 47% of the mortality has taken place among infants." (Oxfam 28 November
2001, pp.21-22)
Health service delivery suffered another serious set back as a result of LRA atrocities
(November 2002)
•
Over half of rural health units have been abandoned or destroyed (2002)
•
The under-five mortality for the northern districts has been already high 178 as compared to 152
nationwide figures
•
Re-displaced people increasingly being affected by malaria, diarrhoea, ARI, malnutrition and
HIV/AIDS
108
•
Malnutrition levels for children expected to rise
•
Rampant sexual and gender-based violence
"Health service delivery, which had began to normalise in the affected areas of northern Uganda, suffered
another serious set back as a result of the present increased rebel activity in the districts of Kitgum, Pader
and Gulu. Over half of rural health units have been abandoned or destroyed, and staff has escaped to safer
areas, following raids on health units and abductions by rebels. The delivery of essential medicines has
been dramatically reduced, as humanitarian access is limited. The under-five mortality for the northern
districts has been already high 178 as compared to 152 nationwide figures and will definitely continue to
worsen. Prevalence of diarrhoea is highest amongst children of northern Uganda 27% compared to 15% in
central Uganda (UDHS 2000-2001) Gulu and Kitgum reported the highest number of dysentery cases for
the month of May 724 and 516 cases respectively (even with low reporting rates). Re-displaced people are
increasingly being affected by malaria, diarrhoea, ARI, malnutrition and HIV/AIDS. Monitoring by the
Health Information Management System (disease surveillance) was weak in the affected area 48% for Gulu
even before the present resurgence of insecurity. NGOs have also been affected by insecurity with some of
their workers taken hostages.
Water and sanitation conditions in the IDP camps are critical, as more people have crowded into the larger
camps protected by security forces, away from the vulnerable satellite camps. This means that the number
of litres per person is sometimes more than three times lower than the recommended minimum level (5
litres vs 20 litres). Malnutrition levels for children have in the first half of 2002 risen, and this trend is
expected to continue as farmers have not been able to harvest or plant for 2002. Already, admissions at
therapeutic feeding centres in Gulu have increased by 35%.
The RH situation has also deteriorated considerably. The in-flow and active movements of rebels and
government forces as well as the high population density in IDP camps have resulted in rampant sexual and
gender-based violence. A volatile situation such as the one prevailing in Acholi region presents an enabling
environment for early debut in sexual activity, increasing risks of HIV infection. These conditions, together
with sexual violence and lack of adequate health services, raises serious concerns for safe childbirth,
prevention of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV/AIDS and care for victims of sexual
violence. This situation is exacerbated by peoples’ limited knowledge and means to prevent infections. For
instance, the recent Uganda Demographic and Health Survey (2000/2001) reports that the percentage of
women who have knowledge on two ways of avoiding HIV infection is 21% for the northern region
compared to the national figure of 53%. The Survey also reveals that during the previous two years, only
2% of men in the region used condoms with any partner compared to a national figure of 7%.(UN
November 2002, p 34)
The psychological trauma suffered by abducted children makes their reintegration
difficult (2001)
•
Health services in war areas are rarely equiped to provide mental health care to victims of traumas
•
Many health workers have fled from conflict areas and serious problems remain in the areas to
which the abducted children are returning
"Most of the services available to displaced persons look at the issues related to trauma, physical ill-health
and violations of rights in a non-integrated manner. Legal aid clinics are very few and legal information is
mainly available in urban areas. Health services are seldom prepared to offer counseling to survivors of
sexual abuse or violence, Probation and Welfare Departments are severely under-resourced and the Local
Councils (LCs) have little knowledge or training in child- and gender-sensitive handling of cases. Finally,
emergency psycho-social care and mental health care in areas of armed conflict is rarely available. A
109
number of international conventions specifically refer to the rights of children in armed conflict. (UN
November 2001, pp. 47-48)
"Moreover, the psychological trauma suffered by abducted children makes their reintegration difficult,
UNICEF and several NGOs provide much-needed reintegration and psychosocial support to these children
who manage to escape. Among returning girls, the problem of sexually transmitted diseases is widespread.
The World Health Organization (WHO) is assisting the Ministry of Health in ensuring the availability of
medication for those affected, but these efforts are hampered by a lack of health workers. That many health
workers themselves have fled from conflict areas suggests that serious problems remain in the areas to
which the abducted children are returning. Although some positive preventive work has been done,
abductions persist in some areas. Human rights monitoring and advocacy, such as the work of Amnesty
International and UNICEF, could be expanded." (Mooney and Mugumya 1998, p.75)
Chronic malnutrition rate was high among IDPs in Bundibugyo (November 2001)
•
Oxfam reported that 43 percent of IDPs percieved poor access to land as the main problem
•
Chronic malnutrition rate in Bundibugyo estimated at 61.3% compared to global Ugandan rate at
33%
•
An estimated 63,000 IDP receive food during a distribution cycle
"As a result of displacement, internally displaced people are faced with problems of access to cultivable
land, health plus economic and social problems in their settlements. While most of these problems existed
before, living in camps has aggravated them.
[...]
Majority (43%) of IDPs perceived poor access to land as the main problem they face during displacement.
One in four IDPs (26%) regarded food as the main problem, while access to income and health ranked
priority problem by 12% and 10% respectively. When asked about the second priority problem, 38% of
respondents considered health; water and sanitation did not emerge as a problem in IDP camps during
household interviews, although among the diseases mentioned several were water and sanitation related.
Internally displaced persons were concerned with the increased morbidity and mortality due to
displacement. Diseases prevalent in the camps are malaria, respiratory tract infections (RTI), cholera
outbreaks and diarrhea plus sexually transmitted infection (STIs), including HIV/AIDS.
Most of these problems are not new among the people of the three districts; however living in camps has
aggravated them. More than half (54%) for example, were concerned that staying in camps has made access
to income more difficult." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.7)
"The World Food Program (WFP) is responsible for food distribution. General food distribution is done on
a six weekly cycle. All IDP camps receive food except for the Bundibugyo Town Council camps and
Nyahuka camp. An estimated 63,000 IDP receive food during a distribution cycle. WFP provides a 50%
ration and the IDP cater for 50%. One ration per person represents 180 grams of cornmeal and 30 grams of
beans.
MSF runs a Therapeutic Feeding Centre (TFC) located at Bundibugyo Hospital.
[...]
The survey was conducted from October 22 to November 1, 2001; this period corresponds to the beginning
of the bean harvest.
[...]
The prevalence of acute malnutrition remains low. The nutritional survey carried out by MSF in November
1999 showed similar results.
110
Table 10
Comparison of Acute Malnutrition Rates in Z-Scores
ACF Survey Nov. 01
MSF Survey Nov. 99
6-59 months (n = 900)
6-59 months (n = 627)
Global acute malnutrition
1.6% [CI 95%: 0.7% ‹–› 3.3%]
2.6% [CI 95%: 1.5% ‹–› 4.2%]
Severe acute malnutrition
0.2% [CI 95%: -0.0% ‹–› 1.4%]
0.6% [CI 95%: 0.2% ‹–› 1.7%]
Children 6-29 months are at a higher risk of becoming malnourished compared to children 30-59 months
(RR 11.98). The difference between age groups might be explained in that generally mothers tend to
abruptly stop breast-feeding and start giving a normal diet to their children as soon as they conceive another
child. Sudden weaning could induce malnutrition. Weaning occurs mostly before the age of 30 months.
A relationship between malnutrition and other factors (illness, social setting) may exist. To show cause and
effect, a case control study would be needed.
The general food distribution in Bundibugyo District is under the mandate of WFP. The food distribution
is covering the IDP needs. The harvesting of beans had begun at the time of the survey.
The chronic malnutrition rate remains high (61.3%). The global Ugandan rate is 33%. The high level of
chronic malnutrition reflects the effects of poor long-term nutrition in this population. Early detection and
prevention is the only approach. Multi-sectorial activities that impact the health and nutrition at the
community, family, and individual levels are necessary to alleviate chronic malnutrition, as well as
improvement of general and individual economic resources." (ACF November 2001, pp. 5, 13-14)
Water and Sanitation
Water and sanitation in Soroti District (October 2003)
"Insufficient number of water (boreholes) in all sites visited. Consequence: low yield and long queues, with
water-points drying out.
Very poor sanitation and hygiene practices.
Existing toilets in schools visited filled up and blocked due to garbage inside.
IDPs in Gweri sub-county headquarters had grass structures for shelter, that are very susceptible to fire.
"(UN OCHA, 14 October 2003)
Water sources are insufficient for the population (July 2003)
•
•
Adilang camp depends on 6 boreholes and 8 latrine stances
Boreholes had broken down due to the intensive use
" [...] In Pader District, the Government of Uganda has required that all rural villages and homesteads
relocate to 8 central IDP centres. One IDP camp, called Adilang, is located only 13 miles from the Kotido
district border and is one of the few camps that can be reached by road without great risk of ambushes.
Beyond Adilang lies Patongo, an even bigger camp, but more isolated due to the road insecurity. Food
111
security has been disrupted as farms have been abandoned or can only be visited periodically. Also due to
safety reasons, the homes in the centres are relatively close together. This means that water sources are
insufficient for the population and over-used resulting in rapid wear of parts. Also the standard drug kits
sent out to government health posts are finished rapidly due to the large populations, this being an issue
especially in Patongo. Although this displacement has been going on periodically for the last 2 years, since
January 2003 the displacement has become more permanent. The population has coping mechanisms such
as being able to try to farm some crops in nearby areas (in Adilang only), collecting fruits and buying some
cash crops that traders bring sometimes.
The populations of Adilang and Patongo are 14,414 and 44,674 respectively, totalling around 60,000
people. In Patongo, 22% of the population (9,865) consists of children under the age of 5. By extrapolation,
that would indicate about 13,000 children under 5 in both camps. The figures are probably accurate, as the
authorities have documented arrivals, in Patongo these being the elected block leaders.
Medair’s base in Kotido has become a big advantage in reaching out into Pader district. Adilang depends
on 6 boreholes and 8 latrine stances. When Medair first heard of this situation, a small team of our local
staff first went for a visit. Two boreholes that were down were repaired. Three months later, news reached
Medair that all 6 boreholes had broken down due to the intensive use. The people had resorted to organise
protected convoys to drive 5 km out of the camp to a valley dam to collect surface water. Medair’s water
team then paid three visits to repair all 6 boreholes. Water provision is still very fragile, because there is no
trained pump mechanic in the camp, so whenever a borehole will breakdown again, the team will have to
return."(Medair, 7 July 2003)
Water and sanitation situation remains poor in conflict areas (2002)
•
UNICEF survey revealed that only 2% of schools surveyed had adequate latrine facilities (May
2002)
•
Only about the half population have adequate latrine coverage and access to safe water in Gulu
and Kitgum
•
Water and sanitation sector in all conflict districts has suffered from a lack of donor interest
•
Few schools access to clean and safe drinking water
"School-going children, particularly children attending primary school, are facing great difficulties keeping
themselves clean and healthy. Even in the best of times, the water and sanitation situation in Uganda’s
primary schools calls for serious attention. A study done by UNICEF in 1999 in 90 primary schools showed
that only 2% of the surveyed schools had adequate latrine facilities, only 37% of the teachers had received
sanitation related training and only 25% of schools had sanitation educational materials." (UNICEF 29 May
2002)
"Service delivery in these [conflict affected] districts has been made more difficult this year by a serious
increase in the number of security incidents. Local governments have struggled to deal with the effects of
conflict due to low institutional capacity caused by the displacement of district staff. According to current
statistics (September 2000) from the Directorate of Water Development (DWD), latrine coverage in Gulu
and Kitgum is 48% and 48.8%, respectively while access to safe water is 53% (47% in 1996) and 37%.
Figures for Bundibugyo are similar. However in the IDP camps the situation is much worse. Further, the
water and sanitation sector in all conflict districts has suffered from a lack of donor interest probably
caused by the prolonged conflict. NGOs and local government have both been challenged to find sufficient
112
resources to make a significant impact and have struggled to make a marginal improvement over the course
of the last year.
The problem is particularly acute at schools. In displaced areas, many children continue to study under trees
and use bushes for sanitation. Many other children study in temporary or makeshift schools where
adequate sanitation facilities have not been provided. They also study in a very unhygienic and polluted
environment. The problem is further compounded as children lack supporting materials to support
practicing sanitary and hygienic behavior. Few schools in these areas have access to clean and safe
drinking water during the school day." (UN November 2001, pp. 53-54)
"Besides the issue of poor feeding, in most of the camps water supply is also a big problem. A good
number of boreholes have been put in place in recent years by some Non-Governmental Organizations
(NGOs), but when they break down the cost of repair is beyond the means of the community. In Alero, with
a population of 15,000, we found six boreholes, three of them broken. In Cwero we found that all three
boreholes were broken and women had to walk a distance of three miles to fetch some water from a well.
This was also the situation we found in Amuru, where women told us bitterly that in these forages for water
a good number of them have been raped by rebels or by government soldiers. Little wonder that in many
camps a jerrycan of water is a highly treasured commodity which is sold at 500 shillings.
Inadequate sanitation is another big concern. In most camps we visited the latrines are located between the
houses, at very close distance, and are often overflowing. In some latrines the pits are left open, and we
have heard of a good number of cases of small children dying after they fell into them. In overcrowded
camps, like Padibe, Pabbo, Lukung, Anaka and Amuru, the stench is unbearable and flies are everywhere,
making it easy for an outbreak of infectious disease to spread quickly." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace
July 2001, p.11)
"Although 75% of the households in Katakwi have some level of access to safe water mainly from
handpumps, the number of water systems in the camps is far less than the required capacity. In some cases,
7000-8000 IDPs share one handpump and a lot of time is wasted in queuing up to fetch water. Imposition
of user fee further restricts IDPs’ use of water from these sources. 25% population fetch water from
unprotected sources.
There has been a complete failure in the hygiene and sanitation measures in the camps. 98% households
reported disposing their household wastes into open composts/around their huts. 78% lack access to
adequate water for bathing and hygiene practices. Open defecation has been one of their rampant behaviors
responsible for environmental pollution. 56% reported using open places for defecating." (Oxfam 28
November 2001, p. 6)
Most dramatic successes and broadest constraints in water and sanitation sectors
•
Year 2002 witnessed a low but steady increase in the access to safe water in the existing IDP and
refugee camps
•
Less progress been made in the areas of sanitation and promotion of hygiene behaviour.
•
Contamination of water between the source and the consumer remains high
"In Uganda during 2001-2002, providing access to adequate sanitation and safe drinking water for IDPs and
refugees is the issue where NGOs working in the water and sanitation sectors have seen the most dramatic
successes and the broadest constraints. As a whole, success has been achieved through rehabilitation of
existing water points, construction of new water points, sanitary facilities, health education, hygiene
promotion and the training of community-based maintenance systems that are handed over the local
113
authorities. NGOs have faced extensive constraints, especially after June 2002, in the access required to
install new infrastructure and maintain existing facilities in several districts.
The intervening year has witnessed a low but steady increase in the access to safe water in the existing IDP
and refugee camps, with coverage increasing from 16% in 1995 to approximately 50% in 2002. Sanitation
has increased from 7% in early 1990 to 42% in late 1990s. In more stable districts, water and sanitation
coverage has also been improved by both Government and NGOs. Overall, from 2001 to 2002 there was an
increase of 3,354 new or rehabilitated water points, including protected springs, deep boreholes, shallow
wells, community tapstands, and rainwater tanks. This increased water coverage for the general population
from 49.9% to 53.8% in one year. With an additional 678,200 people served by clean water systems,
progress is being clearly seen by beneficiaries around Uganda.
An additional 1,224 new stances of latrines were built during 2001-2002. While less progress has been
made in the areas of sanitation and promotion of hygiene behaviour, this is due partly to the focus on latrine
coverage as the only indicator for sanitation, and to the many factors involved affecting behavioural
change. However, there is improvement in hygiene practices in the refugee and IDP camps due to the
health education and hygiene promotions conducted by both local and international NGOs as implementing
partners. Several local and international NGOs working in health education continue to expand
encouragingly, though again access to fragile population lags behind the capacity to implement necessary
programmes.
Water usage rates, while improving, remain much lower than ideal. Contamination of water between the
source and the consumer, locally referred to as the “safe water chain”, remains high. A 1996 study found
average faecal cowliform counts (an indicator of faecal contamination) at protected sources to be less than
5 per 100ml of water. This rises more than 20-fold by the time the water is consumed, indicating that much
work remains to be done in both providing the means for consumers to maintain a clean-water chain, as
well as the knowledge and behaviour skills to motivate proper usage. Coupling health education and
monitoring activities with infrastructure improvements is an ongoing challenge that many organisations
continue to explore and improve.
Similarly, as infrastructure for clean water expands, much work remains to be done in promoting the use of
more and cleaner water in the household. While consumption has risen to approximately 15 litres of water
per person per day, the WHO recommendation is a minimum of 20 litres per person per day. NGOs
recognising the value of promoting higher levels of consumption are increasingly coupling education
efforts with the development of new water infrastructure.
The Government has put a priority on the water and sanitation sector with a plan of extending full coverage
for all Ugandans by 2025. With this in mind, NGOs bring valuable assets and assistance towards this goal
with reduced access in some areas because of the current insecurity of the summer and early autumn of
2002 some of the past year’s achievements have short-lived, particularly in Gulu, Pader and Kitgum
districts. For example, in the district of Gulu, water coverage was 3.5 l/p/d in 2001 and was expected to
increase to 10.l/p/d in 2002; due to insecurity, this may not be possible. Sixteen IDP camps have been
subject to attack and looting, causing further displacement to Gulu municipality and neighbouring environs
in June-August 2002. This influx of IDPs to new camps and municipality has reduced the water coverage in
both schools and in camps, with a rise of population of 25% within some areas of Gulu municipality. Water
resources that were already marginal have become over-stressed." (UN November 2002 pp. 38-39
Shelter and non-food items
114
No official assistance is provided to the children known as ‘night commuters’ (July
2003)
•
Some 1,000 children were coming into Gulu nightly while at the hospital more than 2,500 people
•
During the months of October and November 2002 over 40,000 individuals, the majority
unaccompanied children, made this nightly sojourn.
•
Since February, the number of night stayers in Gulu has tripled, to 13,400 in mid-May 2003
•
Children travel on foot, alone or in small groups, from as far as four miles away
•
The children have no access to water, and limited toilet facilities.
•
Three of the four children interviewed had blankets stolen from them in the past
“Around dusk, streams of children known as ‘night commuters’ begin to flow into Gulu, Kitgum, and Pader
towns to seek shelter and return home the next day at dawn. Often clutching reed mats or other sleeping
materials, these children travel alone or in small groups searching for places to sleep. A few children are
able to stay with relatives in their homes; many more sleep in groups on verandas, at the bus park, on
church grounds, or in local warehouses. Those living to the west and north of Gulu gather at Lacor hospital
at night, joining a group of displaced persons living there.
In February 2003, some 1,000 children were coming into Gulu nightly while at the hospital more than
2,500 people, mostly children, were seeking shelter. During the months of October and November 2002,
when insecurity reached its highest level, over 40,000 individuals, the majority unaccompanied children,
made this nightly sojourn.
Despite these high numbers, no official assistance is provided to the children and abuses to them, both
while en route and at night, have taken place. An assistant of the Chief Administrator's Office confirmed to
Human Rights Watch that the municipality was as of February 2003 providing no assistance to these night
commuters.
Since February, the number of night stayers in Gulu has tripled, to 13,400 in mid-May 2003. U.N. OCHA's
Gulu office sent out a plea for assistance for these children.
In Kitgum, thousands come to sleep at the Catholic Mission every night, according to a priest. Even during
the day, approximately 500 children stay in the Mission because they are too afraid to return to their nearby
villages. ‘Many have refused to leave the mission. Sometimes their parents bring them.’ The army has
deployed troops to protect the thousands sleeping in the Mission buildings at night.
Children travel on foot, alone or in small groups, from as far as four miles away. Children as young as five
are generally accompanied by older siblings or neighbors in their commute, which can take up to two
hours.
According to one international NGO worker, the night commuters are vulnerable to theft and physical and
sexual abuse from other children and adults. He cautioned that children, particularly those who are not
staying in more well-established areas, may also be tempted into drinking, drugs, and sexual activities.
Human Rights Watch researchers met with night commuters in Gulu town on two evenings, visiting the bus
park, the church mission, and two warehouses where children sleep. The children have no access to water,
and limited toilet facilities. In these areas, no assistance or formal supervision was apparent.
Two girls aged thirteen and eleven explained to Human Rights Watch why they choose shelter in town. The
thirteen-year-old said that LRA rebels abducted her sister from her home some two kilometers outside of
Gulu town in November 2002. Following the abduction, her parents, who are displaced from the interior of
the district, began sending her into town to avoid possible capture. The eleven-year-old girl spoke of three
neighborhood children who were abducted from her village, about a one-hour walk from Gulu. She fears
the LRA because they ‘burn homes, loot property and abduct children.’
Lacor Hospital is located four kilometers outside of Gulu town. The LRA has not attacked the hospital in
over a decade and so it serves as a place of safety for children and the displaced. Approximately 1,500
internally displaced persons live behind the hospital in a make-shift camp, venturing out during the day to
search for food or casual employment and returning in the evenings. In addition, in February 2003, more
than 2,500 people, the majority unaccompanied children, came to the hospital at night to sleep. Some
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children sleep in a partially constructed hospital ward, others in the courtyard, on terraces outsides of
rooms, or elsewhere on the hospital grounds. The hospital is considered a safer area for children to sleep
than on the street. But children who spend the night, mostly coming from a three-kilometer area around
Lacor, continue to face harassment on their way each evening and from other children at the hospital.
A group of boys and girls, aged ten to fourteen, interviewed inside the medical compound, said that it takes
them about one hour to reach the hospital in the evening. Sometimes while en route drunkards leer and
shout at them, but none had been physically abused. Since the hospital gate is closed at 9:00 pm, they must
walk quickly or risk being shut out if they don't arrive in time. They stressed that once inside the hospital
grounds, they are harassed and bullied by older children when they are sleeping and that they need shelter
especially during the rainy season. Another problem they identified was the lack of blankets for sleeping;
three of the four children interviewed had blankets stolen from them in the past when they were asleep.”
(HRW, 15 July 2003, pp 68-69)
LRA attacks in northern Uganda left hundreds of thousands IDPs without shelter
(2002)
•
Gulu, Kitgum , Pader towns overcrowded with IDPs sheltering in public buildings
•
Night population in Lacor Hospital peaked at 40,000 IDPs in July 2002
•
Hundreds of thousands of people without shelter and basic facilities
"Throughout July and August, Kitgum, Gulu and Pader towns have been overcrowded with displaced
people who are seeking refugee in institutions such as hospital grounds, schools, churches and shop
verandas. In July, Lacor Hospital alone had an estimated 40,000 night-stayers. However by 21st August
reports indicated that this number had reduced to between 5000-7000 per night. However, the humanitarian
situation can still be described as horrendous – the displaced sleep out in the cold (no shelter no blankets),
there is inadequate water and sanitation facilities, inadequate medical facilities, and so on – and the needs
of the displaced require urgent attention.
A few urban and rural centres and existing facilities for refugees and displaced that are still considered safe
are becoming congested with people seeking safety. This is stretching local capacities, amenities and
resources beyond limits and poses enormous dangers to the health and security of hundreds of 1000s of
people without shelter and access to basic services." (OCHA, July/August 2002)
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ACCESS TO EDUCATION
General
Schools have no capacity to provide shelter, teachers, and scholastic materials
(November 2003)
•
A minimum of 30 schools have been closed or displaced in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader
•
Re-displacement has curbed the ability of parents to provide basic scholastic material for children
•
The education authorities have clustered examination centres into pockets of security
"Schools in the areas affected by conflict in northern Uganda have again been severely hit by insurgency. In
the districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, a minimum of 30 schools have been closed or displaced. The need
to establish mechanisms to collect accurate or update information for planning and targeting scarce
resources is critical. With the wide scale displacement and destruction of school infrastructure and school
personnel, schools no longer have capacity to provide shelter, teachers, and scholastic materials. Teachers
in particular, with limited skills, have to cope with children in various phases of trauma caused by
abduction, displacement and death. Re-displacement has curbed the ability of parents to provide basic
scholastic material for children. Traditional community support mechanisms likewise have been greatly
weakened and efforts at school based counselling are easily eroded by other confounding community
based-factors such as lack of shelter, abuse and poverty.
Per UNEB [Uganda National Examination Boardrecords], a total of 50,000 candidates from 1,318 schools
registered for PLE in the eight districts in 2003. (EMIS 2003 indicates this cohort had a total number of
117,000 students in 2002).
Following the new insurgency, Uganda National Examination Board (UNEB) did not have up to date
information on the new number of candidates. This is being compiled and updated with the opening of the
new term. It can be expected that the total number will be below the 50,000 mark as some pupils have been
displaced, abducted or even killed.
UNEB has clustered examination centres (into pockets of security) and will issue instructions via mass
media to allow these centres to accept displaced but registered students to sit for examinations.
The MOES will require additional logistical support to ensure successful distribution, monitoring and
invigilation of examinations." (UN OCHA, 18 November 2003)
Educational system in the north severely disrupted ( July 2003)
•
Many schools have been closed or displaced
•
2,000 pupils but only ten teachers
•
Children simply dropped out because of the overcrowding and economic pressures
•
The budget of the Ministry of Education would be cut in order to increase defence spending
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“Attacks by the LRA have severely disrupted the educational system in the north, and many schools have
been closed or displaced. However, the Ugandan government has a responsibility for providing children
with access to education, and its national policy on internally displaced persons affirms the government's
obligation to ensure that children in the camps enjoy equal access to education as children elsewhere in
Uganda.
The government's failure to live up to this policy was glaringly evident to a primary school teacher from
Omoro County, seven kilometers from Gulu. He described the conditions at his school, which has been
displaced:
The educational system is very poor. Some children come from Gulu town, walking fifteen kilometers
round-trip. We operate under trees, with no structure. We have 2,000 pupils but only ten teachers. The
students are very poor and can't afford books or uniforms. We have no textbooks or supplies. Many
students drop out because no learning is taking place.
He predicted that of 2,000 pupils at the beginning the school year, only 700 would complete the year.
Another teacher estimated that the teacher: pupil ratio was low in general in areas of displacement: ‘In
areas of displacement, you can find more than 100 students to a teacher. Drop out rates are high. There are
several factors: abduction, defilement [rape of minors] leading to early pregnancy, and economic
hardships.’
In a different IDP camp near Gulu, there were some 200 children in each class. Each room was small, and
with just one teacher, there were too many students for each to be attentive, according to the camp leader.
The WFP provided food for the school, and the government paid school tuition. Parents were required to
bring firewood and to pay the cooks in order for their children to attend. But the Parent-Teacher
Association and the school management charged additional fees. Although these were waived for orphaned
or destitute children, the camp leader acknowledged that even this was not enough in some cases and the
children simply dropped out because of the overcrowding and economic pressures:
Still, some children are at home taking care of parents, getting food. They don't see the point in going to
school sitting in a classroom with 200 students and not getting anywhere.
War has sharply reduced families' ability to make a living and limited many families' ability to pay school
fees. Although Uganda officially adopted a policy of universal primary education in 1997, expenses per
child per term (there are three terms per year) can exceed 50,000 Ugandan shillings (U.S. $ 30). These
include costs for textbooks and notebooks, uniforms, lunch fees, and extra charges established locally to
pay for school maintenance and construction, school furniture, and transportation, accommodation and
incentives for teachers. Families living in camps, with restricted sources of income, rarely have the ability
to pay such fees.
In late January 2003, government officials announced that the budgets of some ministries, including the
Ministry of Education, would be cut in order to increase defence spending. The Ministry of Education was
directed to cut its budget by ten percent. A teacher observed that ‘Since the NRM came into power, the
government's priority has shifted from education and agriculture to security.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, p 72)
Destructed schools structures in Soroti District (October 2003)
"Overcrowding of IDPs in schools provoked the destruction of school property and disrupted studies. Most
schools outside Soroti municipality are abandoned"(UN OCHA, 14 October 2003)
Low attendance in Katakwi schoold due to hunger (June 2002)
•
Katakwi schools in proximity of IDP camps are overwhelmed by numbers
•
School feeding programes urgently needed to encourage and ameliorate school attendance
•
All schools were operation during the mission and no school-age going children were found in
camps during the visit to camps as these were done during school hours.
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•
Most of the schools are overcrowded due to the fact that the displaced children now go to schools
near to the camps where they reside which has increased the numbers of pupils for schools near IDP camps.
•
District officials requested that a school feeding programme be started for schools in Katakwi
District, citing the fact that many children did not go to school due to hunger, and such a programme would
encourage children to attend school. An example was given of Feed the Children, an NGO that was
carrying out a school-feeding programme for children in 4 schools in Ngariam. (OCHA 10-12 June 2002)
Over 200,000 school children displaced in Northern Uganda (2002)
•
Schools have become targets for the LRA as a place to abduct children
•
Families blindly sending their children off to neighbouring districts without any support
•
There is a need to strengthen “safe environments for children” for learning, recreation and
psychosocial support within the IDP camps
"Progress made in primary education in areas recovering from conflict has been set back due to the
devastation of schools in northern Uganda.
Schools have become targets for the LRA, both as a place to abduct children who are forced to become
combatants, and as soft targets for money and supplies. Over 200,000 school children are displaced in
Northern Uganda. Some children have been able to continue schooling in recently erected temporary
schools in town centres, where humanitarian access has been maintained, but in many inaccessible areas,
schools have simply closed.
In Northern Uganda, a new and very worrying trend is appearing, whereby families have blindly sent their
children off to neighbouring districts without any support. At the time of writing, nearly a thousand
unaccompanied children were in Kotido, having been sent away by their parents in Pader and Kitgum
Districts. In Pader alone, rebels have attacked at least 20 schools over a three-month period. The attacks
have resulted in abducted students and teachers, looted supplies and vandalised schools. In Gulu District,
NRC has constructed 245 classrooms in 49 schools over the last two years, and renovated three schools and
ten classrooms. However, at least half of these have been abandoned in the face of insurgency, and rebels
have used some for accommodation. Prior to the resurgence of conflict in mid-2002, 76% of eligible
children in Kitgum district were benefiting from Universal Primary Education. This figure is estimated to
have dropped by half due to the current insecurity.
In the foreseeable future, there is a need to strengthen “safe environments for children” for learning,
recreation and psychosocial support within the IDP camps. These have to be provided with education kits
and basic learning materials for primary school children. Education responses must be linked to key intersectoral priorities, such as sexual abuse and exploitation, HIV/AIDS, safety and security (e.g. mine
awareness), health and nutrition messages, and psychosocial support. In addition, scholastic and nonscholastic materials must be provided to schools that are attacked but not abandoned. (UN November 2002,
pp 30-31 )
Positive assessments about access to primary education in northern Uganda despite
high drop out rates of girls (2002)
•
Reported that most of school-age children in IDP camps were attending schools
•
Only 7% of the households reported having children not in schools due to lack of fees or
scholastic materials
119
•
Girls often don't get beyond the early years of primary school
•
Dropouts occur mostly in the later years of primary school when young people are entering
adolescence
•
Success related to combined efforts by authorities, donors and the communities themselves
•
Education at secondary level remain inadequate
"The assessment team had anticipated education as one of the services that Internally displaced persons
have problems to access. However it did not emerge as a major problem. During a ranking exercise, it
always came fourth or beyond. Most of the school going age children in the camps especially at primary
level were in schools may be because many camps are closer to schools and the UPE program. Some key
informants noted that some children were abducted and or lost their parents and are no longer in schools.
However only 7% of the households reported having children not in schools due to lack of fees or
scholastic materials and 2% due to distance to schools. Some households had children above 6 years and
not in schools but perceived them still young to go to school." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p. 12)
"Access to universal free primary education has been one of the brightest successes of this period of
displacement among the Acholi.
[...]
Thanks to the combined efforts of the authorities (through the national programme of universal, free
education), the donors and the communities themselves, these goals have broadly been achieved, though
too many children still fail to take advantage of the education on offer for lack of funds to cover the
remaining, modest expenditures required, or because their support is required for other family activities.
The lack of a similar programme for secondary studies is a serious problem, as the destitution caused by
more than 15 years of conflict and displacement prevents all but a few families from otherwise providing
for their children’s education. The sale of livestock was the principal source of cash to cover post-primary
school fees; few, if any, families have any saleable assets remaining. Means need to be found to ensure that
the emerging generation will have an adequate skills base to meet the economic challenges of the future,
and to reduce the number of young people left entirely idle and marginalized."
(Weeks March 2002, p. 27)
"A system of Universal Primary Education (UPE) instituted by the Ugandan government in 1996 has
created great opportunities for Uganda’s children to attend primary school by offering free, although not
compulsory, education for up to two girls and two boys in each family. UPE has given many young people
in northern Uganda the opportunity to attend primary school. But this opportunity is short-lived for most,
especially for girls, as they don’t get beyond the early years of primary school. The insecurity of the war
has hindered the full implementation of UPE, and has created enormous barriers for young people to gain
access to and complete quality primary education.
At least half of the Ugandan population in the conflict areas of northern Uganda are internally displaced.
According to the World Food Program (WFP), 26.4 percent of the IDPs living in camps are children aged 5
to 14 years old. The majority of these children have been out of school since the conflict escalated in July
1996, ironically just as UPE was instituted. Currently, less than 30 percent of school-age children in IDP
camps are enrolled on a full-time basis, with young girls affected disproportionately. 68 According to the
UPDF Fourth Division Commander in Gulu, over 300,000 children in northern Uganda are unable to go to
school because of LRA activity.
[...]
In the districts covered by this research, a number of barriers have made sporadic attendance, late arrival
and dropouts in primary school seem the norm . P r i m a ry school levels run from P1 through P7,
beginning usually at age five. Dropouts occur mostly in the later years of primary school when young
people are entering adolescence. Adolescents and school officials report that many young children are
starting P1 at seven, eight or even nine years old, and others try to complete their primary studies when
they are older and have missed some years. Huge numbers of young people are unable to attend school at
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all because of other responsibilities and barriers. These include c h i l d - c a re, long travel distances,
security pro b l e m s and an inability to pay school fees. Many adolescents told the Women ’s Commission
that they had completed a number of primary school years but simply could not continue. Gender
discrimination, which will be discussed later, is also a huge factor in the lower enrollment and higher
dropout rate of girls."(WCRWC July 2001, p.25 )
Education system does not address the needs of traumatised displaced children and
adolescents (1998-2002)
•
A major barrier to learning and effective participation in class is the experience of displacement
and the traumas associated with it
•
The conflict in the north and south-western districts threatens children's physical well-being and
psycho-social development
•
The conflict has left significant numbers of children either unaccompanied or orphaned
"Comprehensive, accurate and verifiable educational statistics on the numbers and profiles of children
excluded from education are not readily available. Since 1997, the development of free primary education
has led to a doubling of enrollment to some 6.5 million children. However, it is estimated that 15% still do
not have access to schooling. High dropout rates have been noted, especially among those girls and boys
who have enrolled in school late, and who are therefore older than their peers. Over 500,000 children are in
schools without basic facilities such as classrooms, scholastic materials or latrines. Some 300,000 children
are estimated to be victims of conflict and almost all the children in areas of conflict are suffering from
some type of trauma. Stress levels of children are dramatically increased because of displacement,
separation, experience of death, abduction and sexual abuse. For formerly abducted children and child
soldiers this trauma is particularly acute. Girls are particularly at risk and are often forced to sell sex. This
emotional stress is carried into the school/classroom and is a major barrier to learning and effective
participation.." (UNICEF, 31 January 2002)
"The conflict in the north and south-western districts of the country disrupts the education of children and
adolescents and threatens their physical well-being and psycho-social development. For the large number
of child and adolescent Sudanese and other refugees seeking sanctuary in Uganda the trauma of their
displacement is similarly threatening to their well-being. Populations in conflict-affected areas and
refugees have been exposed to ruthless killings and systematic abductions, and face displacement due to
unstable and volatile security. In addition, conflict has left significant numbers of children either
unaccompanied or orphaned.
Although a concerted effort has been made over the past two years to increase school attendance through
the provision of Universal Primary Education (UPE), UPE in its present form does not yet practically
address the needs of children and adolescents who are displaced and who are traumatised. Furthermore, up
to now, refugee children do not have access to the UPE system. Education has been severely affected in
many places due to displacement or through the destruction of school buildings or the targeted killings of
teachers. There is a strong commitment to education in the affected communities and education is often the
top priority identified by communities immediately following an attack or displacement. While the
educational needs of refugees are relatively well-catered for due to their strong interest and support from
donors, UNHCR and partners, efforts to integrate refugee education within the government structures will
be made in the future. " (UN December 1998, p. 21)
Children prevented from attending school in Lira (February 2003)
•
40 primary schools have closed down because of insecurity in Lira
121
•
Most children in Lira has not been taught since August 2002
"Officials in the district of Lira, northern Uganda, have launched an appeal to finance 36 temporary
"learning centres" for children displaced by insecurity caused by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebel
group.
'The situation in Lira is terrible because over 40 primary schools, four secondary schools and two technical
schools have closed down and we have no hope of them opening soon as the place is still too insecure for
the children to study,' Daniel Omara Atubo, a Member of Parliament for Otuke County in Lira, told IRIN.
'Teachers are displaced, the children who are supposed to go to school are displaced and their parents too
are also displaced and are unable to facilitate their children to go to schools due to poverty,' he said, adding
that most children in Lira district had not been taught since August 2002, while a new school term was due
to start next week.
Lena Schildt, from the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) office in Kampala, said UNICEF would set up
learning centres for Lira district "as soon as possible" which would include teaching materials and facilities.
Similar centres had so far been set up in Gulu and Pader districts, she said.
Over 100,000 pupils in 159 primary schools in 12 sub-counties have been affected and displaced by the
LRA since August 2002, prompting the district to launch the appeal for help." (UN OCHA 5 Feb 2003)
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ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Self-reliance
Lack of initiative to develop copying mechanisms (October 2003)
•
Reduction in cultivation
•
Decrease in income
•
Difficult access to fuel
•
Too much reliance has been put on WFP to bear the burden of addressing food security
"Camp residents currently lack of initiative and external output to develop
other copying mechanisms. The majority only maintain their current
livelihoods on a delicate balance. As a result, the majority of camp residents
have little defense to deal with any major negative changes or “shocks” to their lives. The potential of
changes happening is great –sickness, attacks from rebels, crop loss, delays in WFP food ration deliveries
and inaccessibility to land and Gulu Town. For some residents of the municipality/villages, livelihoods are
also showing
serious signs of decline. The same patterns seen in the IDP population are
appearing in this population as well - reduction in cultivation, decrease in
income, and difficult access to fuel. If camp residents choose moving into town as a coping mechanism the
capacity for the rural areas of the municipality to absorb this extra population are very low.
Many NGOs, GoU agencies, and IOs are involved in various activities in the
camps. For food security (at least in the camp visited in this assessment), the
involvement is very limited in scope and focus. Too much reliance has been
put on WFP to bear the burden of addressing food security in the camps."(Action Against Hunger, 1
November 2003)
The lowest level household would be living off of 5 US cents per person per day
(October 2003)
•
Three different wealth groups were identified by IDP camp respondents: upper, middle, and lower
•
Definitions of the wealth groups were done by IDPs
•
What separates the groups essentially are the level of their livelihoods, level of self-reliance, and
potential coping mechanisms
"The average number of household residents for respondents was six with a
range of five to eight. Three different wealth groups were identified by IDP
camp respondents: upper, middle, and lower.
Definitions of the wealth groups were done by IDPs and focus on access and
ownership of specific resources. TFC caretakers had a difficult time to do the
wealth ranking exercise because of the different camps or parts of the
municipality they reside in (i.e. municipality can be town center or village-like
setting). However, from an analysis of the overall findings, the wealth ranking
123
can be generally applied to municipality residents as well. [...]
Level of vulnerability is related to economic grouping. It is safe to say that all
IDP residents are vulnerable, but the upper less than the middle and middle
less than the lower. What separates the groups essentially are the level of their
livelihoods, level of self-reliance, and potential coping mechanisms. Save the
Children-UK in their household economy study in IDPs11 pointed to similar
economic groups. They found that the income for these groups ranging from
$90-450 a year. The lowest level household would be living off of 5 US cents
per person per day. The highest range of the upper would be living off 20 US
cents per person per day.12
The middle economic groups make up the majority in all camps. Generally the
lower groups are second in size then followed by the upper economic groups.
The average for each group for all camps is 13% upper, 66% middle and 21%
lower. The percentages ranged per group per camp. For the upper group the
range was 5-20%. For the middle group the range was 60-80%. For the lower
group the range was 10-30%. " (Action Against Hunger, 1 November 2003)
Serious concern that over half a million Acholi will depend on humanitarian
assistance until August 2003 (August 2002)
•
An estimated 522,000 IDPs will loose their current harvest as well as the next due to insecurity
and impossibility to access their gardens
•
Insecurity also hampers movement of tradable goods and people are loosing income-generating
opportunities
•
Between 20-30% supplies Acholi displaced food needs (end 2001)
•
20 percent of Uganda's arable land excluded from production
•
Deteriorated infrastructure in the west, north and northeast has made marketing of surplus
commodities unprofitable
•
Relative calm in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts enhanced conditions for favorable crop
cultivation and production during 2001
Northern region:
"A serious complication of the current insecurity, due to people's inability to access fields, is the likelihood
that 522,000 IDPs will lose both the current harvest now in the fields and the smaller second harvest which
should already be in the ground. There is also concern over a possible El Nino event that may reduce the
limited own production of the over half a million IDPs who supplement WFP assistance from own
production and small market purchases. Taken together, this is likely to significantly increase relief
requirements for this large caseload over the coming 12 months, until the subsequent harvest in August
2003." (WFP, 23 August 2002).
"High insecurity on roads in the districts hinders road travel and limits district authorities and humanitarian
organizations efforts to deliver humanitarian assistance to communities and IDPs. Movement of tradable
commodities is also low, reducing the populations’ ability to procure food and earn income. Armed escort
is recommended for road travel, which is best done in convoys." (FEWS 7 August 2002).
" The overall food security situation in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader is also chronic due to civil insecurity,
affecting both access and availability of food. The primary cause of food insecurity in this region is the
activities of the LRA (threats of looting, murder, rape, and abduction). As a consequence, normal
124
social/cultural structures are breaking down and leading to high abandonment rates (i.e. men leaving their
families), frequent teenage pregnancies, and lack of care for vulnerable groups and high risk of AIDS.
The “protected village” life has dramatically altered the livelihoods of people in this region, resulting in
various coping strategies. One significant change is the reliance on food aid, with many people reporting
that on average food aid supplies between 20 and 30% of their food needs, though this varies by camp.
Searching for labour opportunities is increasingly a coping strategy in the camps, although due to the
concentrated and saturated labour market, daily wages are experiencing diminishing returns. Other
strategies include increased reliance on gifts from relatives or outright begging, selling of household
property and stealing of food. Young girls are susceptible to acquiring money through prostitution."(UN
November 2001, pp. 43-44)
"The major source of income for the IDPs is casual labour, and money is spent mainly on food and medical
care. Food prices in Kitgum and Pader have generally shown a downward trend during the reporting period.
Millet for example decreased from Ush. 400 in July, to Ush. 275 in August and September. Sorghum is also
down from Ush.230 to Ush.180. Commodities supplied by WFP such as beans vary per month and the
observation is that the variation is closely linked to the WFP distribution pattern - in the months where
beans constitute the IDP food basket, the bean prices are lower.
Reports show that most IDPs in Kitgum, Pader can now access their land due to the long lull in the rebel
activities. Consequently, they now produce crops to supplement WFP relief food. About 60 percent of the
IDPs reportedly spend their days in their gardens, away from the camps, leaving behind children, the
elderly." (OCHA October 2001)
"IDPs are taking advantage of the improved security situation to work in their gardens outside the camps.
There is increased movement along the roads and people are traveling deeper into the villages where they
have not been able to go for so long. Though this trend has been observed in Kitgum increasingly over the
last six months, it is encouraging to see that Gulu is also perceived to be safer - 25 percent of IDP
population in Gulu are estimated to be accessing their gardens. Although District authorities have not
directed “decongestion” per se, there are numerous reports of people responding to new deployments by
UPDF and creating settlements close to these. New smaller camps have been set up (from large camps)
throughout the sub-county, especially around larger camps like Pabbo." (OCHA December 2001)
"Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Northern Uganda: Relative calm in these three districts enhanced
conditions for favorable crop cultivation and production during 2001, although land acreage cleared and
harvested remain below normal levels compared with early 1980s’ levels (before populations were
displaced). Nonetheless, the improved food production realized has enhanced households’ access to food,
along with the ongoing food aid distribution by the World Food Programme (WFP), whose Protracted
Relief and Recovery Program is well supplied and runs until March 2002. The agency is working on
extending it from April 2002 through March 2005, providing food through general distribution for people
who cannot leave the protected settlements, school feeding for primary schools, food for work, and
assistance to vocational training. Food will continue to be provided as supplemental and therapeutic
feeding in health centers for malnourished children as well as to orphans and formerly abducted children
who have been returning from captivity in Sudan since pacts were reached in 2001. The combination of
relatively improved household food stocks, limited remittances, and food assistance augur well for food
security in the three districts over the next four months." ( FEWS NET 26 February 2002)
"Given the great hardships involved in getting access to their original land, those who can afford it have
tried at times to rent a plot of land from camp residents whose fields are within reasonable distance. We
were told in some camps that the usual yearly rent for an acre of land is between 30,000 and 40,000
shillings. Landlords can evict their tenants at any time and, understandably, this is one of the main sources
of local conflict among camp residents." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.12)
125
Collapse of social fabric and pastoral economy in the North
•
Gulu and Kitgum cattle herds reduced from about 285,000 to an estimated 5,000 head between
1985 and 1997 collapsing pastoral economy and social fabric.
•
Almost all the area's livestock was removed as Karamajong cattle raiders continued to harass
livestock owners on Kitgum's far eastern border.
•
Acholi farmers reported NRA (National Resistence Army) to collude in Karamajong cattle raids
in the second half of the 1980s.
"Cattle has long been the main repository of Acholi wealth. By 1985, their nearly 300,000 cattle (and even
more numerous goats, sheep and other livestock), represented not only their savings, but also their
contingency reserve for sickness, drought, retirement, education and marriage dowry. In 1986 and much of
1987, farmers provided livestock to the UPDA, sometimes against promissory notes payable after the
victory they expected. The UPDA used most of this livestock for food, but some might have been traded in
Sudan for arms and ammunition, which were in short supply.
The NRA confiscated cattle as needed to support its operations. Fearing such confiscations, some Acholi
preemptively liquidated parts of their herds. Local veterinary experts report that a small part of the herd was
also lost to diseases like rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia which they believe originated in southern Sudan.
Karamojong cattle raiders continued, as they had throughout history, to harass livestock owners on
Kitgum's far eastern border.
However, beginning in about August 1987, during the Alice Lakwena period, an event unique in Acholi
history occurred: an overwhelming number of Karamojong cattle raiders swept through Kitgum and eastern
Gulu and removed almost all the area's livestock. Those who resisted the rustlers were brutally attacked. In
areas where both Karamojong and NRA soldiers were present, some farmers reported that the latter
colluded in these activities, but in general Karamojong raiders were observed to be operating on their own.
In western Gulu, it appears that at about the same time, a similar large-scale removal of livestock was
conducted by NRA forces.
Data provided by veterinary officers indicated that the cattle population of Gulu and Kitgum in 1985 was
about 285,000. The cattle raids removed almost the entire herd. In 1997 - ten years after the raids - the
combined herd for both districts is estimated at 5,000 head, less than 2% the earlier number. Goats and
other livestock have been similarly affected. The replacement cost of the plundered cattle herd alone is
estimated at close to US$25 million.
To put this loss in perspective, the Gulu branch of the Cooperative Bank - which serves principally a rural
clientele and is one of only two banks in Gulu - observed that in times of insecurity, savings deposits tend
to increase. Yet, on average for the years 1991 through 1996, it estimated its total deposits at about US$1.5
million. [...]
The attitudes which had motivated the Acholi to launch or continue the armed anti-NRA struggle - pride,
military humiliation, sense of betrayal and alien rule, loss of government power and its economic impact were compounded by the loss of their livestock and the apparent loss of control over their environment, as
well as the defeat of the Lakwena forces at the end of 1987. Six months later, the UPDA signed its peace
agreement with the NRA. But perhaps in part because of bitterness over the cattle raids, not all the rebel
forces abandoned the armed struggle.
The disappearance of the police Tracking Force which in the past had restricted Karamojong raiders to
sporadic incidents along the eastern Kitgum border contributed to the lawless environment in which these
raids occurred. The Acholi people, except its active insurgents, were disarmed. That there was no reported
confrontation in Acholi between the cattle raiders and the police, military or other Government authorities
126
led the local population to believe that they were tolerating the plundering, which later occurred in the same
magnitude in other districts. The attitude of most Acholis ranges from deep suspicion to absolute conviction
that lawlessness of this magnitude could not have occurred if it had not been instigated - or at least
approved - at the highest level of government.
Authoritative government sources acknowledge some of the NRA raids in western Gulu, which they
attribute to corrupt elements in the military at that time. Efforts at restitution by the government have been
made for a fraction of these thefts. Government sources also concede that the Karamojong raids were
carried out with little armed Government opposition. They argue, however, that in 1987 the NRA's armed
forces were relatively small and not yet consolidated. Nonetheless, in Acholi they were forced to confront
both the UPDA and Lakwena forces at the same time. This allowed the NRA few resources to spare to
combat the cattle raiders and hesitant to risk opening another major armed front against Karamoja.
The enduring political fact, nonetheless, is the widespread belief in Acholi that the Government instigated
or at least approved the raids, a source of irreconcilable and continuing bitterness against the present
administration." (Gersony, 1997, Section 1,"The cattle factor")
Rwenzori report shows that displacement has changed traditional livelihood patterns
•
Subsistence agriculture as the main source of livelihood declined from 81% to 56% after
displacement
•
More people getting engaged in casual labor
•
Returning IDPs demand sustainable support in the form of seeds and tools rather than food rations
"The situation in Southwestern Uganda can generally be summarised as very promising. With increased
security and favourable weather during 2002, the region has experienced an increase in food production,
increased individual and family income directly due to the fact the IDPs are returning/or have returned to
their homes. The majority of the population in Bundibugyo, approximately 80 percent, were IDPs and
currently depend on agricultural activities as their main source of food and income. This is a very big
improvement from being almost wholly dependent on relief food, with hardly any source of income."
(OCHA July/August 2002)
"Lack of access to income and potential sources of income is a significant problem faced by IDPs. Most
people used to depend on selling crops as a source of income, but this was disrupted by displacement.
[...]
Subsistence agriculture was and still remains the main source of livelihood, however, tremendously
declined from 81% to 56% after displacement. People’s ability to sell crops as a source of livelihood has
fallen 10 times after displacement. More people (23%) are currently engaged in casual labor as a form of
survival during displacement compared to only 1% before. Others or nothing include those who depended
on remittances from families and relatives before displacement and now depend on donations from
humanitarian agencies after displacement. Those who entirely depend on others for survival have increased
from 3% to 11% after displacement.
[...]
Despite the disruptions in livelihood and income sources, demands for money have increased due to
displacement. Many people for example need cash to pay for food items they never paid for before, such as
renting land where they have their shelters or for cultivation.
[...]
A change in perceived good living standards has led to an increase in demand for cash. This was reported to
be due to mixing with well off families. Men were of the view that their wives have adopted new demands
and need more cash than before, seeking to join the well off class." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 9-10)
127
"On a more positive note, the south-western region has benefited from sufficient rains and a good harvest is
expected; although on occasions the rain has fallen so heavily it has even destroyed crops and
buildings/IDP shelters. IDPs continue to have access to gardens near the camps for minimal cultivation and
the harvest will supplement WFP relief food (WFP continues to provide food aid, at half ration, to IDPs in
camps). A lack of seeds has also posed a problem and will be sorely needed for the next planting season.
IDP returnees frequently ask humanitarian agencies for support in the form of seeds and tools rather than
relief food. Fortunately, the security situation has continued to improve over recent months, enabling IDPs,
in particular, to carry out farming activities in relative security which bodes well for the future." (OCHA
31 September 2001, p.28)
Worst crop failure ever seen in the last 20 years hits Karamoja (2002)
•
Reports indicated a 90% crop failure in Karamoja's dey belt and further soil depletion is encured
as people try to cultivate these dry lands(September 2002)
•
Long-distance trekking will erode livestock resources and deprive most vulnerable groups from
milk, blood and meat
•
Westwards movements in search of unusually remote grazing lands may sparkle conflicts with
neighboring districts
•
Each Katakwi household attacked several times resulting in loss of livestock and household
assets
•
50% of Katakwi households have lost access to their lands and 90% owners have completely lost
their cattle
"A massive crop failure brought about by a long dry spell is causing serious concerns for food security in
the Karamoja region of northeastern Uganda, where at least half a million people are now at risk.
Peter Lokeris, the Ugandan minister in charge of the Karamoja region, has warned of a severe famine in the
region in the coming months, and urged the international community to support the government's efforts to
supply relief food there.
[…]
Of the half a million people affected by the current drought, three-quarters will have no food left in three
months' time, while those unaffected so far will have exhausted their stock, according to Lokeris." (IRIN 12
September 2002)
"Reports from Karamoja indicate that there has been more than 90 percent crop failure in its dry belt. Those
who have been in the region for more than two decades are quoted as saying that since the eighties, there
has never been such crop failure. Sadly, in Dodoth county - the largest, most populated and remotest of all
Karamoja counties - the Karimojong are destroying their soils as they attempt to cultivate in the dry belt,
i.e. Kaabong, Kathile, Kapedo, and Loyoro. Already, gully erosion can be noticed everywhere and there are
reports of a village that was swept away due to soil erosion.
[…]
This drought has worsened the poverty in the region. Reports from the Eastern Karamoja - the Turkana and
Pokot - are not much better. Training of the pastoralists in various ways of lessening the impact of the
drought cannot be over-emphasized. It should also be stressed that the Karimojongs have not been trained
in harvesting grass when it grows (instead they burn it). They also do not harvest crop residues, nor plant
grass, yet this is cattle feed for the dry season.
With the intense and prolonged dry season, cattle will need to be moved in search of pastures. The trekking
decreases and finally erodes the capacity of the cattle to maintain a good milk/meat/calve production. The
livestock will only be able to cover their survival needs. Additionally, families – mainly women, children,
the elderly and sickly - remaining in dry belt villages will not benefit from any milk or blood, which
128
increases their vulnerability to malnutrition. In any case, there is an expected strong move for pastures and
water towards the west and that conflicts will increase with neighbouring districts.
[…]
Karamoja’s situation is dramatic, and needs a development strategy so that relief efforts do not continue to
hinder development, as has been the case in the past. Some agencies hope a socio-economic strategy will be
applied, that is, using relief support to re-settle Karamojongs/Turkana/Pokot in the greenbelt productive
fertile areas. Otherwise conflicts with neighbours will continue, even increase in future.
In addition to the above strategy, technical training relevant to the Karamoja potentials, such as water
harnessing/fodder conservation/water-soil conservation, animal husbandry, dry season zero-grazing,
manure use, alive fence planting (using euphorbia cuttings), food/fodder trees family planting, dams
desilting and construction, shallow wells using concrete culverts, and so on." (OCHA July/August 2002)
"The overall food security situation in Karamoja can be characterised as a chronic problem due to drought
and civil insecurity, affecting both access to and availability of food. Other contributing factors to food
insecurity include: (1) periodic drought and erratic rainfall which affects both crop and livestock in the
Northeastern arid pastoral and middle transitional; (2) international migration during period of stress in
neighbouring Kenya; (3) Gun culture and cattle raiding which results in depletion of assets and affects
inter-regional trade; (4) pest, disease and shortage of agricultural inputs and services and (5) environmental
degradation.
Coping mechanism of food insecure households include provision of labour, collecting firewood, gathering
wild fruits and vegetables, collecting white ants, collecting and selling stones, hunting for wild animals,
borrowing using kinship ties, migration in search of food and selling livestock. ."(UN November 2001, pp.
43-44)
"Rampant warrior raids have displaced 1/3 of Katakwi population and have completely devastated their
household economy. Each household has been attacked at least 5 times in the last 5 year. Losses of human
lives, livestock and household assets have been the common consequences of these raids. In all, warriors
have killed 5.4% of the IDPs, injured 6.2% and have abducted 3.6% during their chronic and/or intermittent
raids. 75% of the households have lost an average of 10 cattle, 9 goats/sheep and 15 poultry birds to
warriors. Losses of agricultural implements, kitchen utensils, stored food items, clothes, bedding and
mattresses have been common among the IDPs. 83% households have lost their cassava in the last season
as warriors uprooted them.
Household food security:
Food security was severely tied to traditional agriculture and animal husbandry before displacement. Due to
raids and prevailing insecurity, 50% households have lost access to their lands and 90% owners have
completely lost their cattle. The area offers restricted coping to include wage labor on local farms (mainly
weeding) and small businesses, dominated mainly by brewing (p14-17). In total household food security of
most IDPs is highly compromised in quality, quantity and diversity." (Oxfam 28 November 2001)
Dramatic diminishing of cattle herds due to cattle raids and increased demand for
meat by army (1985-1997)
•
Gulu and Kitgum cattle herds reduced from about 285,000 to an estimated 5,000 head between
1985 and 1997 because of cattle raids
•
Almost all the area's livestock was removed as Karamajong cattle raiders continued to harass
livestock owners on Kitgum's far eastern border, with a peak of intensity in 1987
"Cattle has long been the main repository of Acholi wealth. By 1985, their nearly 300,000 cattle (and even
more numerous goats, sheep and other livestock), represented not only their savings, but also their
129
contingency reserve for sickness, drought, retirement, education and marriage dowry. In 1986 and much of
1987, farmers provided livestock to the UPDA, sometimes against promissory notes payable after the
victory they expected. The UPDA used most of this livestock for food, but some might have been traded in
Sudan for arms and ammunition, which were in short supply.
The NRA confiscated cattle as needed to support its operations. Fearing such confiscations, some Acholi
preemptively liquidated parts of their herds. Local veterinary experts report that a small part of the herd was
also lost to diseases like rinderpest and pleuro-pneumonia which they believe originated in southern Sudan.
Karamojong cattle raiders continued, as they had throughout history, to harass livestock owners on
Kitgum's far eastern border.
However, beginning in about August 1987, during the Alice Lakwena period, an event unique in Acholi
history occurred: an overwhelming number of Karamojong cattle raiders swept through Kitgum and eastern
Gulu and removed almost all the area's livestock. Those who resisted the rustlers were brutally attacked. In
areas where both Karamojong and NRA soldiers were present, some farmers reported that the latter
colluded in these activities, but in general Karamojong raiders were observed to be operating on their own.
In western Gulu, it appears that at about the same time, a similar large-scale removal of livestock was
conducted by NRA forces.
Data provided by veterinary officers indicated that the cattle population of Gulu and Kitgum in 1985 was
about 285,000. The cattle raids removed almost the entire herd. In 1997 - ten years after the raids - the
combined herd for both districts is estimated at 5,000 head, less than 2% the earlier number. Goats and
other livestock have been similarly affected. The replacement cost of the plundered cattle herd alone is
estimated at close to US$25 million.
To put this loss in perspective, the Gulu branch of the Cooperative Bank - which serves principally a rural
clientele and is one of only two banks in Gulu - observed that in times of insecurity, savings deposits tend
to increase. Yet, on average for the years 1991 through 1996, it estimated its total deposits at about US$1.5
million.
In an instant, the Acholi farmers were deprived of the milk their cows provided; the additional acreage and
higher yields which their oxen permitted them; their fallback for marriage dowries and education; and the
savings which carried them through drought, hard time, sickness and old age. The self-respect which
attached to cattle ownership and the cultural functions upon which exchange of cattle had relied were
disrupted. It was one of the greatest economic and moral blows of the war. It also deprived the insurgents
of livestock upon which they relied for food and which they might have used to trade for the arms and
ammunition upon which their viability increasingly depended.
The attitudes which had motivated the Acholi to launch or continue the armed anti-NRA struggle - pride,
military humiliation, sense of betrayal and alien rule, loss of government power and its economic impact were compounded by the loss of their livestock and the apparent loss of control over their environment, as
well as the defeat of the Lakwena forces at the end of 1987. Six months later, the UPDA signed its peace
agreement with the NRA. But perhaps in part because of bitterness over the cattle raids, not all the rebel
forces abandoned the armed struggle.
The disappearance of the police Tracking Force which in the past had restricted Karamojong raiders to
sporadic incidents along the eastern Kitgum border contributed to the lawless environment in which these
raids occurred. The Acholi people, except its active insurgents, were disarmed. That there was no reported
confrontation in Acholi between the cattle raiders and the police, military or other Government authorities
led the local population to believe that they were tolerating the plundering, which later occurred in the same
magnitude in other districts. The attitude of most Acholis ranges from deep suspicion to absolute conviction
that lawlessness of this magnitude could not have occurred if it had not been instigated - or at least
approved - at the highest level of government.
130
Authoritative government sources acknowledge some of the NRA raids in western Gulu, which they
attribute to corrupt elements in the military at that time. Efforts at restitution by the government have been
made for a fraction of these thefts. Government sources also concede that the Karamojong raids were
carried out with little armed Government opposition. They argue, however, that in 1987 the NRA's armed
forces were relatively small and not yet consolidated. Nonetheless, in Acholi they were forced to confront
both the UPDA and Lakwena forces at the same time. This allowed the NRA few resources to spare to
combat the cattle raiders and hesitant to risk opening another major armed front against Karamoja.
The enduring political fact, nonetheless, is the widespread belief in Acholi that the Government instigated
or at least approved the raids, a source of irreconcilable and continuing bitterness against the present
administration."(Gersony, 1997, Section 1,"The cattle factor")
Public Participation
Female Headed Housholds limited capacity to ensure assistance
•
•
•
•
Female Headed Households (FHH) compared to Male Headed Households (MHH) have limited
capacity to ensure that they are registered for relief distribution.
Appropriate to include active female leaders in the registration process
"Fair" female representation on the camp committees not reflected by participation in the daytoday decision making forums
Women only holding junior positions in the administrative hierarchy of camps
"While women have been designated as the initial point of control for relief food distribution, 40% and
13% of FHH [Female Headed Households] and MHH respectively felt that the two groups (FHH and
MHH) did not have equal registration opportunities. It was further discovered that almost twice as many
FHH compared to MHH had all their resident members not registered. From these statistics, it is evident
that within the current registration system, FHH compared to MHH have limited capacity to ensure that
they are registered for relief distribution, thus should be considered as disadvantaged.
A number of reasons appear to be responsible for this trend of events. Male hegemony in the Acholi
society coupled with high illiteracy rates among the female population gives the FHH a low status thus
limiting their chances of making themselves heard. As argued by Britt (1993), implementing resettlement
programmes through the existing power structures may not benefit the entire community especially the
FHH. This calls for alternative mechanisms to be explored on a case-by-case basis. As observed by
Mooney (1998), it would be appropriate to include active female leaders in the registration process, as this
would especially deter women from having to trade sexual favours to have their names registered for relief
supplies." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, p. 51)
"At the local level, it was discovered that female participation is very limited in camp management and that
the situation was not different before displacement. While all the three camps covered by the study had a
fair female representation on the camp committees, it was evident that this was only by record in the books,
and not by actual participation in the day-today decision making forums.
Where women were active, they still occupied junior positions in the administrative hierarchy of the camp,
thus did not participate in actual decision-making. While meetings with camp committees had been
scheduled for days that rebels forbid people from going to their gardens (Tuesdays and Fridays), there was
still limited female participation in the meetings. In one camp, only one female leader attended a series of
meetings [...], while in another; two educated female leaders attended all the meetings. In the later case, it
was obvious that the two were very vocal and represented women views extremely well.
131
The study learnt that male dominance and high illiteracy rates among the female population were
responsible for blocking women from effectively participating in decision making forums." . (World
Vision/Cranfield University December 2001 p. 37)
132
ISSUES OF FAMILY UNITY, IDENTITY AND CULTURE
General
Apathy and despair (October 2003)
•
IDPs demoralized by the continuation of the insurgency
•
Drinking becoming the preferred coping strategy for many
"What is also apparent is that the IDP population is by and large demoralized by the continuation of the
insurgency and by life in the camps. This demoralization was noted in conversations with IDPs in every
camp and has been noted by other organizations as well. 36 IDPs are increasingly having a difficult time to
take initiative to be innovative for solutions to their seemingly ever-growing daily challenges. Drinking is
also a camp-wide phenomenon and seemingly becoming the preferred coping strategy for many in order to
deal with life in the camps. This is particularly true with a percentage of the now largely redundant male
population.
Apathy and despair are more noticeable than in particular for the children and
the youth. All respondents voiced great concern over the future of their children; they were continually
placed first as beneficiaries of potential
intervention programs." (Action Against Hunger, 1 November 2003)
Many abducted women and girls find it hard to adjust to the life back home(July 2003)
•
Higher rate of acceptance back into the community for long-term female abductees as opposed to
male returnees
•
Women who were married before being abducted are rarely accepted back by their husbands
•
Returned women know they are a burden for their relatives
“Although abduction is a traumatizing experience for all abductees, abducted women and girls suffer
unique abuses and consequent problems. Whereas beating, torture, and maltreatment are the experiences for
most people abducted by the LRA, rape and forced sexual slavery is inflicted on women and girls. While
there seems to be a higher rate of acceptance back into the community for long-term female abductees as
opposed to male returnees who spend several years with the LRA, the pattern is different for mothers who
have LRA-born children.
According to several Ugandan NGOs in Gulu working with returnees, the children born in captivity as a
result of rape by one or several LRA soldiers are sometimes seen as unacceptable outsiders. According to
the custom and kinship structure found amongst the Acholi people, the child belongs to the father and his
family. Since the father in cases of gang rape is not known, or the father is an LRA rebel, the child may not
be accepted by the mother's kin. Women who were married before being abducted are rarely accepted back
by their husbands, who often fear their wives are infected with sexually transmitted diseases including
HIV/AIDS.
Another factor that makes it difficult for women to return from captivity is that they are expected to
conform to certain stereotypes of female behavior. Women captive with the LRA for years have become
used to war, fighting, rough bush life, harsh conditions, and living with other fighters. At times they may
have difficulty adjusting to traditional expectations of women.
133
The twenty-two-year old former "wife" of LRA Commander Tabuley is one case in point, according to a
woman responsible for following women's issues at Caritas: "She is a convinced LRA fighter and does not
want to be here." Many women and girls find it hard to adjust to the life back home. "They know they are a
burden for their relatives, they will not be able to go to school if they return with children, and they don't
see any future for themselves here." ( HRW, 15 July 2003, p 30)
Conflict affected areas in Northern Uganda suffer social and cultural breakdown
•
Loss of livestock one of the greatest economic and morale blows of the war.
•
Parents feel they loose control over their children
•
Problems include increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug abuse, loss of respect and
values and breakdown of family structure
•
Anecdotal evidence suggests an increasing trend in child abuse
•
Camp regulations undermining traditional gatherings
Further to decimation of livestock
"In an instant, the Acholi farmers were deprived of the milk their cows provided; the additional acreage and
higher yields which their oxen permitted them; their fallback for marriage dowries and education; and the
savings which carried them through drought, hard time, sickness and old age. The self-respect which
attached to cattle ownership and the cultural functions upon which exchange of cattle had relied were
disrupted. It was one of the greatest economic and morale blows of the war. It also deprived the insurgents
of livestock upon which they relied for food and which they might have used to trade for the arms and
ammunition upon which their viability increasingly depended."(Gersony, 1997, Section 1, " The cattle
factor")
"Whereas the Acholi are accustomed to living in widely dispersed settlements, the populations of the
“protected” villages are tightly packed together, often with only an arm’s length between houses.
Sanitation is inevitably poor, and exposure to communicable diseases high. Social conditions are a matter
of universal concern: parents feel, in particular, that they are losing control over their children’s behavior.
Sexual promiscuity is perceived to be unacceptably high, with correspondingly high rates of sexually
transmitted diseases, including HIV. Girls and women turn to prostitution in the absence of other economic
outlets, boys to brawling, to petty crime, to rape, and in some cases to armed banditry." (Weeks March
2002, p.3)
"The ongoing conflicts have also caused loss of life and major disruptions to the communities. Many
children have witnessed violence and atrocities; lost family members to the war; been separated from their
families, and undergone severe physical and mental hardships in fleeing the conflict. In addition, there have
been massive abductions of children being trained as fighters or forced into slave labour. The conflict has
destroyed or undermined the community support systems that once assisted and protected these affected
children and reintegrated them in the community.
With the full consensus of the members of the Psycho-social Core Team composed of NGOs working with
affected communities in northern Uganda, national technical experts, line ministries and UN Agencies, an
in-depth Northern Uganda Psycho-Social Needs Assessment (NUPSNA) was carried out in 1998. The final
report highlighted negative social trends of magnitudes previously unknown to the affected areas. These
problems include social and cultural breakdown e.g. increased crime rate, consumption of alcohol and drug
abuse, loss of respect and values, as well as breakdown of family structure e.g. separation, orphan hood and
increased domestic violence." (UN November 1999, p.21)
134
"Anecdotal evidence points to an increasing trend in child abuse, especially sexual abuse. One problem is
that there is little knowledge of legal protection and how to obtain justice. To respond to this need, Child
Rights Advocates are being trained. These advocates have basic training on the legal aspects of child
protection and child abuse. In cases of child abuse, the advocates can give advice as to how to pursue the
case and to ensure that justice is obtained. So far, 30 Advocates have been trained in Nwoya County, Gulu
district." (UN July 2000, p.8)
"Over 800,000 IDPs have been traumatized by terrorist attacks and have remained physically and mentally
idle in camps for over five years. Nearly all traditional community and family mechanisms for ensuring
cohesiveness and stability in society have broken down. Children have lost years of schooling, preventing
them equal access to employment and future opportunities for participating in the national political system
and economy." (OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")
"As one moves through any of the displaced camps, one of the most depressing sights is to see scores of
unattended children everywhere, idle youth loitering about and men drinking alcohol. This is just the
surface of a deeper problem that most people, especially elders, feel as something very painful: the collapse
of the good cultural values that people used to feel proud of. A whole generation is growing up in a moral
and cultural vacuum, and considering that children under the age of 15 account for more than 55% of the
total population in the IDP camps in Acholi this is a very serious situation.
The main means of transmitting the Acholi traditional culture to the younger generations is the evening
family gathering at the fireplace, referred to in the Acholi language as Wang oo. Army-enforced regulations
in most camps state that everybody is expected to be indoors or at least next to their huts by 7:30 p.m.
Those who break this rule are routinely beaten. The consequence is that since there is no more wang oo,
children - adults often complain - are not taught good cultural values.
Cramming together people in a small space is seen in all camps as another main reason for the lack of
respect that children show towards their parents, since both parents share the same hut with the children
without any privacy and at times children make fun of their parents when they see them sleeping together at
night.
As a result, very early pregnancies (at the age of thirteen or fourteen), children becoming thieves, and
alcoholism among adolescents who have dropped out of school, are worrying features of life in the
displaced camps. People resent very bitterly the fact that in recent years no pupil from a school in the
camps got a first grade. Little wonder when one considers that in Acholibur there are only four classrooms
for 1050 pupils (only 17% of their students pass exams to continue to secondary school after P7). Palabek
Gem Displaced Schools had 20 teachers for the 1060 enrolled pupils, and only 13% were able to pass
exams to continue to secondary school. Pajule Displaced Primary School has an average of 300 pupils in
the P1 classes, and in Pabbo the average size of a P1 class is about 500 pupils. Given these circumstances
for most young people going to Secondary School is just a dream beyond all possibility." (Acholi
Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p.13)
"Displaced persons were concerned with the degeneration of social values and order, as a result of
displacement and staying in camps. Respondents noted that displacement has led to moral degeneration as
reflected in behavior changes, neglect of responsibilities and disrespect.
[…]
Change in sexual behavior is among the areas that have significantly deteriorated. Many people confessed
engaging in multiple and casual sexual relationships than before displacement. While the team did not
collect any statistical data on this issue, female youth were reportedly most affected by the problem
although adult and married people too are involved.
[...]
Alcoholism and drug abuses have been on the increase among IDPs staying in camps in particular those
located in towns. The assessment observed several people chewing mairungi/khati in union camp located
135
near Bundibugyo town. The youth were reported to be mainly engaged in drugs, while all categories
(youth, men and women) locally brewed alcohol.
[…]
Respondents noted that the rate of domestic violence had increased with staying in camps. Wife battering
and sexual harassment were reported as the most common forms of domestic violence. Women were
particularly affected most by domestic violence. Idleness, poverty and increased alcohol use has aggravated
the problem of domestic violence. Women reported being sexually harassed and or battered after their
husbands were drunk." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. 13-14)
Contradicting perceptions of gender roles (2002)
•
Male perception: Men looking after children
•
Female perception: Men resorting to alcohol and shunning work
"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic
roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands
or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or
separating with their wives.
“It is us the men who are mostly affected because for example when your wife is taken, it is us men who
will look after the children by feeding them and doing domestic work”
Women on other hand reported taking over men’s roles, as many men have resorted to drinking thereby
shunning work. Some men were reported to avoid going to the gardens under the pretext that rebels will
abduct them. This has resulted in increased workload for the women." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.10)
Female-headed households disadvantaged during resettlement (2002)
•
Survey found that Female-headed households (FHH) were extremely disadvantaged and
vulnerable compared to male-headed households (MHH)
•
FHHs will have limited capacity to grow and access enough food upon resettlement
•
FHH have limited sources of income and thus limited access to required farm inputs
•
The number of MHHs that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement found to be
almost double that of FHH
•
Only 7 percent of FHHs endowed with house construction skills
"Meanwhile the changes in the household economy have also led to changes in economic and domestic
roles. More than ¼ (54/190) of the women interviewed are now heads of household due death of husbands
or separation, while many men reported to be now responsible for child care than before after losing or
separating with their wives." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, p.10)
"The purpose behind this inquiry was to understand the required support priorities of both displaced male
and female-headed households [MHH/FHH in the Gulu district] which would in turn enhance strategic and
effective targeting of donor, government and aid agency resettlement programmes.
[...]
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Key findings include a deprivation trap [...], in which most female-headed households are entrapped
making them extremely disadvantaged and vulnerable compared to male-headed households.
[...]
The project also discovered that resettlement priorities differ according to the age and gender of the
household head. It was further discovered that though there may not appear to be a big divide between
female and male-headed household resettlement priorities, the two groups emerge as two worlds apart
when viewed from the vantage point of how their assessed capacities and vulnerabilities will impact on the
identified resettlement priorities.
[...]
the FHH phenomenon has been exacerbated by the now 15 year-old civil conflict. An article by OnyangoObbo (1996) observed that, “in Acholiland, there is virtually no generation of elders. Most people are
widows or orphans. In some families, the grandmother was a young widow, the mother a widow, and the
grandchildren too are widows or orphans.” The same article reports that by 1991, women were heading
about 60% of the homes, while a survey report by ICRC (2001) indicated that on average, widows head
about 20.4% of the households in Acholiland.
[Food Production]
When it comes to crop production, a typical Acholi household practices gender division of labour. Opening
virgin land and digging is traditionally a male occupation, while planting and weeding is a female
occupation.
[...]
For those that mentioned inability to grow enough food upon resettlement, a number of reasons were given
to explain their responses and included the following. “The land is fertile, but being a woman with young
children, it will be very difficult at the beginning…I don’t have enough working tools, and there will be no
man around to help me. We will try, but I don’t even know where to begin,” said Lucia, a 43 year-old
widow and mother of eight.
[...]
A comparison of findings between FHH and MHH reveals that upon resettlement, FHH will have limited
capacity to grow and keep enough food. This is explained by a number of factors. Firstly, FHH have weak
labour compared to MHH and will comparatively not be able to open up enough land. This is coupled by
the fact that digging is traditionally a male activity thus women don’t have enough digging skills. Thirdly,
compared to MHH, FHH have limited sources of income, thus limited access to required farm inputs, e.g.
farm tools, animal traction technologies, and improved seeds.
Again, compared to MHH, FHH do not have the skills to make granaries nor the funds to have one made
for them. They will therefore experience more post-harvest losses than MHH, and may continue to be lured
into selling their produce during the immediate harvest period. There is therefore ample evidence for this
study to conclude that compared to MHH, FHH will be more vulnerable to food insecurity during the
reconstruction period." (World Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp. 1, 6 , 24, 52)
[Means of production]
"All respondents confirmed having had some form of life supporting skill before displacement. For the
FHH, new and old life supporting skills include embroidery, brewing, pottery, modern agronomic practices,
knitting, baking and cookery, livestock keeping, fish farming, bee keeping, TBA skills, tailoring, handcrafts
and witchcraft. For the MHH new and old life supporting skills include modern agronomic practices,
bicycle repair, tailoring, building huts and thatching skills, pitsawying, carpentry, brick making, brick
laying, and making and weaving local crafts.
All interviewed MHH confirmed ability to continue using all their new and old skills, but mentioned
problems associated with lack of investment capital. On the other hand, only 75% of the FHH confirmed
ability to continue using all their life supporting skills amidst grinding constraints.
[...]
In their long lists of constraints, both FHH and MHH emphasised lack of capital as one of the leading
constraints that continues limiting their production potential. “I learnt carpentry and tailoring while
137
undergoing rehabilitation with agency X, and am still taking tailoring classes for returned abducted
children in the camp…If I had a sewing machine, I would be able to make dresses for sale,” says Vincent, a
17 year ex-child soldier (formerly abducted). Vincent was abducted for two years, is still single but heads a
household of eight, including his very weak mother.
[...]
Traditionally, the Acholi would keep livestock, especially cattle, as their main form of wealth. The study
discovered that the number of IDP MHH keeping some form of livestock is more than double that of FHH,
and the number of MHH that acquired new life sustaining skill during displacement is also almost double
that of FHH. It would therefore follow that in times of severe stress; more MHH would have some form of
fall back, which their FHH counterparts would not have.
Arguably, most of the MHH skills especially building, carpentry, opening up new land etc, will be more
marketable during the reconstruction period, while for the FHH, their non-agricultural skills will have lost
much of the market to the scattering effect caused by resettlement. It would therefore appear that during
resettlement, more FHH will be more economically disadvantaged than MHH.." (World Vision/Cranfield
University December 2001, pp.27, 28, 54)
[Housing]
"House construction is a male domain activity, and as a result, only 7% FHH acknowledged to be endowed
with house construction skills, and can construct their own huts without seeking for male participation.
Male participation is usually paid for in cash or in-kind, and the study discovered that some women have
had to trade unwanted sex in exchange for the required male construction skills.
[…]
The study also found out that while in displacement, a number of FHH had acquired some of the required
hut construction skills in order to reduce expenditure on house construction. Some of the skills include
brick making, and the meticulous work of constructing the roof frame from the ground […], instead of
doing it from the housetop as usually done by men. Once the bricks are ready and the roof frame is in place,
they then hire men to erect the wall and thatch the roof using the finished roofing frame." (World
Vision/Cranfield University December 2001, pp. 30)
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PROPERTY ISSUES
General
The threat to Acholi lands has become a major point of contention in the on-going war
in Acholiland(October 2003)
•
The Acholi people have generally become convinced that the government intends to remove the
people from their farmland
•
It is believed that this would create room for commercial farmers from abroad
•
Salim Saleh, [the President’s half brother]through his enterprise called the Divinity Union has
engaged in a series of projects under his personal control to exploit Acholi land
“Although not linked to the original causes of the conflict, the threat to Acholi lands has become a major
point of contention in the on-going war in Acholiland. The Acholi people have generally become convinced
that the government’s reluctance to end the rebellion by peaceful means, and hence the keeping of the
people in the “protected camps,” are part of the strategies intended to remove the people from their
farmland. It is believed that this would create room for commercial farmers from abroad to come and
exploit it under the U S African Growth and Opportunity Act.
One key informant pointed out that on the 8th October, 1995 when he was launching the new constitution,
president Museveni had protested to the joint meeting of the National Resistance Council (then the
country’s parliament) and the Constituent Assembly for the failure by the Assembly to grant the
government rights to own land for “development.” But in March 1996 he expressed satisfaction that there
was plenty of unoccupied land in Acholi, which could be put to use. His half brother Lt. General Salim
Saleh and Geoffrey Obel, a presidential adviser on AGOA have plans to utilise this land for production of
cotton for clothing for US markets.
Salim Saleh, through his enterprise called the Divinity Union has engaged in a series of projects under his
personal control to exploit Acholi land. These projects have not succeeded but new attempts are being
made under different guises. This is why there is a lot of suspicions about the new project called the
“Security and Production Programme” which has come under the personal control of Salim Saleh himself,
although it is supposed to be a UPDF/government project. (HURIPEC, 30 October 2003, pp 94-95)
The government plans large scale mechanized farming (August 2003)
•
The concept is modeled on the Israeli Moshav, where populations are grouped in defensive
clusters and farm the surrounding lands using high intensity mechanized methods
•
An average of 2,500 households are foreseen for each SPP, [Security and Production Programme
]i.e. some 45 SPPs for Gulu, Kitgum and Pader
•
It is questionable whether this scheme would ever achieve all that it proposes
•
The scheme would nstitutionalize the concentration of the IDP population
"The Government has recently proposed to implement a comprehensive resettlement programme for the
camps in the Acholi sub-region – the Security and Production Programme (SPP). The concept is modeled
on the Israeli Moshav, where populations are grouped in defensive clusters and farm the surrounding lands
using high intensity mechanized methods. The proposed programme foresees that these larger groupings of
139
populations will be able to better defend themselves through their collective ‘civil defense’ . An average of
2,500 households are foreseen for each SPP, i.e. some 45 SPPs for the three districts. While few would
dispute the desirability of reducing the IDPs’ near total dependence on food aid through returning large
tracts of the once fully food-secure Acholi region to productive agriculture, it is questionable whether this
scheme would ever achieve all that it proposes. Indeed, the fact that the UPDF is unable to provide reliable
security to many of the existing camps suggests that the SPPs will also face problems of insecurity which,
in turn, will place at risk any attempts at large scale mechanized farming. Indeed, it can be argued that if
this scheme were to be implemented, it would institutionalize the concentration of the IDP population in
permanently ‘protected’ villages. If the scheme does go ahead, the UN system and its partners should
carefully monitor the implementation to ensure that such resettlement is voluntary and in keeping with the
guidelines set out in the Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement."
93 percent of women being locked out of ownership to land (2003)
•
Parliament passed an amendment to Section 40 of the 1998 Land Act in June 2003 that achieves a
measured victory by broadening the definition of spousal land
•
Activists' original intentions to assert a wife's co-ownership rights are still on hold.
"Though there are no laws against women owning land in Uganda, the custom of male inheritance in a rural
and poor society has resulted in 93 percent of women being locked out of ownership. To counter this trend
and curb the widespread dispossession of widows and wives, activists for years have tried to amend
Uganda's property laws so that spouses are deemed co-owners of "family land," that land on which the
couple lives and depends. Despite Uganda's progressive 1995 Constitution, which values gender equity and
reserves a significant number of seats in Parliament for women, despite numerous studies linking women's
property rights to economic development, despite extensive coverage of the movement for women's land
rights in Uganda, both in academia and in the press, and despite five years of activism, advocates for
women's land rights have achieved few legislative successes.
Women, who supply 80 percent of agricultural labor in Uganda, are simply not expected to own land.
When activists tried to have wives deemed co-owners of family land in 1998, opponents of the measure
blocked such a clause from being incorporated into Section 40 of the Land Act, which required a spouse's
written consent to sell land that provides the family both shelter and sustenance. Implementation of even
this modest protection has been poor: one-third of adults are illiterate and a husband's verbal claim to the
buyer that his wife agrees is often sufficient. If more proof is required, there are no safeguards to prevent a
husband from supplying forged documents, or even hiring an impersonator.
Last month, Parliament passed an amendment to Section 40 of the 1998 Land Act that achieves a measured
victory by broadening the definition of spousal land and preventing a spouse's objection to its sale from
lapsing. However, activists' original intentions to assert a wife's co-ownership rights are still on hold. "
(Women's E-news, 20 July 2003)
Elders ensured that individual men did not have the right to sell land
•
In the past, elders ensured that land, especially land held under customary tenure, did not leave the
clan through sales
•
Women whose husbands had died were not thrown out of their land by other relatives
140
•
Selling of land by citizens who held leases or rights in customary land was therefore legally
limited to only improvements on land
•
The Land Act of 1998 does not recognise the important role played by elders in the protection of
land from leaving the clan, and protection of women
•
Section 40 of the 1998 Land Act that was meant to protect women is ineffective because the
names of the women and children are not reflected on the land titles or certificates
•
Land transactions, including the selling of land are in compliance with the Land Act of 1998
presided over by the Local council chairmen, and not elders
"History. Control of land sales by elders - hence protecting women and children.
In the past, elders ensured that land, especially land held under customary tenure, did not leave the clan
through sales. The elders believed that land should be held for the present generation as well as for the
future generation. This strict watchdog role of the elders over land meant that women whose husbands had
died were not thrown out of their land by other relatives. It also meant that INDIVIDUAL men did not have
the right to sell land. The role of elders in managing land therefore had one very important function, which
was that of protecting women and children from losing access to their land.
Land vested in the Government with rights to sell only “improvement” on land.
Until 1998, land was vested in the Government of Uganda. Selling of land by citizens who held leases or
rights in customary land was therefore legally limited to only improvements on land.
Changes. Role of Elders “a group of men” in controlling land sales - not recognised.
In 1998, a new Land Act was passed that vested land in Citizens of Uganda. The Act does not recognise
the important role played by elders in the protection of land from leaving the clan, and protection of women
and children from losing access to their land. In the absence of the elders’ important protection role, and in
the belief that “women do not own land”, individual men now seek to take absolute control of land,
including the right to sell the land. Section 40 of the 1998 Land Act that was meant to protect women is
ineffective because the names of the women and children are not reflected on the land titles or certificates,
making it difficult for the buyers to know that there are other claimants to the land, whose consents are
legally required.
By passing elders by the L.C. system in land sales.
Even in circumstances where elders are still able to control the selling of land, the introduction of the Local
Council systems now means that land transactions, including the selling of land are presided over by the
Local council chairmen, and not elders. Whilst elders preoccupation was to stop the clan from losing their
land, the Local Council chairmen have different values and interests to that of elders. The elders, whose
primary concern was keeping the land in the clans, are powerless to stop the sales of land and to protect the
women and children from the process of landlessness.
Conclusion.
Because of the changes in the way land is managed in this country, changes brought about by the Land Act
and the political system, women and children are seeking to have the law amended to reflect the reality on
the ground and to protect them from becoming landless. NGO Women Activists such as the Uganda Land
Alliance and the Uganda Women Network, (UWONET) have spearheaded an amendment to the Land Act
that seeks to introduce family land titles. This would ensure that names of women and children are
registered in the title deeds and land certificates. It would mean that if a family unit wants land sold, family
members would ALL sit, discuss and agree on how much to sell the land for, and decide how to use the
money. If this amendment went through as proposed and not watered down, it would mean that the
intention of S.40 of the Land Act, requiring spouses to give consent to sales of land will be met." (Gender
Equality Incorporated, 1 August 2003)
141
"The Land Act of 1998 changed the meaning of the word ‘ownership’ to mean
‘individual ownership (2000)
•
The 1998 Land Act, in Uganda, introduced individual ownership to encourage a more productive
use of land, based on the principles of economic liberalisation
•
It converted customary ownership of land into formal ownership through the creation of written
deeds
•
Before the Land Act, women’s land-use was protected under customary law
•
It did not recognise the role of elders as protectors of women’s rights
•
The Land Act of 1998 vested ownership with the individual man.
"Without economic assets, such as land to farm and on which to grow food, women and men can never
make a lasting living.
But as women rarely own land, what methods of ownership or tenure are most effective to reduce their
vulnerability, and to increase recognition of their contribution to agriculture? Are women better protected
by rights established by custom, or by "western-style" ownership of land?
The 1998 Land Act, in Uganda, introduced individual ownership to encourage a more productive use of
land, based on the principles of economic liberalisation. It converted customary ownership of land into
formal ownership through the creation of written deeds. Oxfam in Uganda worked with the Uganda Land
Alliance to lobby the government to ensure that the Act protected women’s rights to land as much as
possible, and gave women the right to consent, before their husbands sold land. The Alliance lobbied for
the names of women to be entered on the certificates of ownership and title deeds. However, Oxfam
believes that what is really happening to women on the ground should be the basis for future lobbying
work, and has encouraged a re-consideration of customary tenure.
Before the Land Act, women’s land-use was protected under customary law. Customary tenure presumes
that women do not own land and that land is not for sale. In the past, these two presumptions, taken
together, protected women’s land-use. The Land Act removed the presumption that land is not for sale, and
thus distorted the significance of customary tenure. Although women did not own land, traditionally elders
protected women’s access to land and ensured that it did not leave the clan permanently. However, the
elders would lease land for use by people outside the clan, sometimes freely, sometimes not. Strictly
speaking, individual men did not own (have rights to use and dispose of) land under customary tenure. The
security of marriage protected women’s access to land, as divorce was so rare.
The Land Act changed the meaning of the word ‘ownership’ to mean ‘individual ownership’, rather than
‘ownership under customary tenure’. It did not recognise the role of elders as protectors of women’s rights.
The use of the word ‘ownership’ in the Act removed the elders’ controlling role over land sales and vested
it with the individual man. Men automatically assumed this role because of the presumption that women
did not own land. They have now become outright individual owners of land. Therefore, women have lost
ownership, and are now doubly disadvantaged by the higher incidences of divorce, and the fact that wives
rarely inherit."(Oxfam, 1 July 2000)
People not given sufficient time to collect their belongings when forced to move to
"protected villages" (1997)
142
•
Claimed that property left behind was looted by both rebels and soldiers
•
Foodstuff and crops left behind
•
Claimed that the Army has planted landmines in villages soon after being deserted
"While it is true that some people moved voluntarily closer to Army units before August 1996 seeking
protection, most people were indeed forced to move by Army personnel, who often used rather drastic
methods. In every camp we visited in Gulu, people told us invariably that they were forced. In some cases
people remember that soldiers gave them a seven-day deadline (Opit) or only three days (Awac),
threatening to treat those who resisted as rebels. In most cases, however, it would appear that soldiers just
stormed villages - often at dawn - without any previous warning. They told people to move immediately
without giving them much time to collect their belonging. People were often beaten to force them out of
their compounds.
Much of the property left behind was looted by both rebels and soldiers. A number of people who ventured
to go back to their former homes soon after found them burnt down.
[…]
In Pabbo, Opit, Anaka, Cwero and Unyama we met a good number of people who had direct experience of
having had their villages shelled. We were told that big guns of the BM21 6 barrel type were used to fire at
villages where people refused to move. The Army has consistently refuted these allegations and stated that
it only fired at or shelled rural areas where it suspected that the LRA was present. Aerial bombardments
were used - we were told - in places like Kaloguro village, in Pabbo, Awach, KocGoma, Amuru and
Anaka. This first wave of forced displacement occurred at a time of the year which normally marks the
beginning of the harvesting season. Given the fact that in most cases people were not given time to collect
any foodstuff, their crops remained in the fields or in the granaries. In Pabbo and Opit people told us that
there were cases of Army helicopters being used to collect foodstuff from abandoned villages.
[…]
According to the camp-dwellers we interviewed, the UPDF planted landmines all around the mountainous
villages soon after they were evicted: at the riverside, in doorways to huts, by granaries, and any other place
they thought the rebels would go. As a result, a number of people were injured or killed when they went
back to collect their belongings. This information is consistent with records from the office of the Catholic
Justice and Peace Committee in Kitgum, who in April that year met a number of people who had been hit
by landmines near Potika and had been sent to Kitgum Hospital. Moreover, during our visits to Agoro and
Potika we met people with missing limbs who told us how they were hit by landmines. We also heard sad
personal experiences from women who told us how their children were killed by landmines when they tried
to reach their villages looking for food. People in Potika and Agoro told us that they would like to go back
home, but the Army does not allow them." (Acholi Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, pp. 5, 8)
143
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT
General
Improved security in Rwenzori induced return
•
Increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to smaller
settlements near their places in Rwenzori (2003)
•
Most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts either returned home or integrated(August 2002)
•
Many people may not wish to return home after losing their economic bases in the original
villages
•
The youth singled out as a category that may be reluctant to return to villages.
Southwestern Uganda (Rwenzori region 2002)
" As a result of the relative peace that returned to most of the Southwest, IDPs started trickling back to the
original homes in 2002. This process was further accelerated by the provision of return and reintegration
packages distributed by the WFP in July/August 2002. This included: three months ration of posho, beans
and cooking oil for up to 87,000 IDPs; hoes, pangas and sickles; School feeding programmes for 59 schools
in the district (18 on solid meals and the rest on porridge). After the resettlement of the IDPs that ended in
October 2002, WFP continued to provide social support to a total of 4,500 extremely vulnerable individuals
(EVIs) throughout the district.
[...] it is estimated that about 90% of the IDPs have since returned home, although it has also been noted
that many of them are still living in communal settings. It is also noted that while many have returned to
their villages, a sizable number still maintained homes in the areas surrounding the former camps, many of
which are now sprawling trading centers. The remaining 10% of the IDPs are scattered sparsely through the
existing camps in Nyahuka, Kaputabule, Bubukwanga, Mantrooba, Bugoto, Picfare and Busunga. It was
observed in Nyahuka trading center that many former IDPs now engage in petty trading for subsistence
while others relay on their small plots in the villages for food supply. Local authorities and IDPs have
observed that many have opted to stay in the trading centers for any of the following reasons:
•
Rural life is no longer attractive given that most of the former camps are now small trading centers
•
Some IDPs it was reported still suffer from the trauma of the war and still need to be reassured that
their homes are safe.
•
Some have taken to petty trade.
•
Many still assume that staying in the camps will entitle them to assistance from various agencies."
(OCHA 31 may 2003)
“Developments in the situation in southwestern Uganda are more positive than in the North The threat
from the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) appears to have reduced significantly and the Amnesty
Commission and Mission d’Observation des Nations Unies au Congo (MONUC) are currently approaching
donors in Uganda for the repatriation and rehabilitation of the ADF as stipulated by the Amnesty Act
(2000). As a result, the situation in the Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo District, is much calmer.
As a direct result, an increasing number of IDPs are in the process of returning to their original homes or to
144
smaller settlements near their places of origin. While there has been no recent verification of the numbers
in IDP camps in Bundibugyo (last established in February 2002 at 87,000), there are indications that up to
40,000 people have since left the camps. Similar returns has taken place in Kasese and Kabarole, where all
IDPs have either returned home or integrated in the community.(UN November 2002, p. 6)
"Though no comprehensive assessment has been undertaken, most IDPs in Kasese and Kabarole districts
either returned home or integrated into the community. Kasese reports less than 200 IDPs remain and are
in the process of integrating into the local population. Kabarole reports less than 100 IDPs remain and are
expected to return permanently upon repairing their homes and community infrastructure. Repair of
community infrastructure has been identified as one of the main incentives to facilitate IDPs return to their
homes of origin. Other factors that would act as pull factors for IDPs are provision of building materials
such as iron sheets; household supplies including jerry cans, kitchen utensils, blankets and so on;
agricultural inputs (seeds, farming implements and livestock). Health interventions, particularly
immunizations, HIV/AIDs awareness, sensitisation in early childcare, prenatal care, malaria prevention and
nutrition is also a key area of concern both for the displaced and those returning home.
Since late 2001 ADF attacks have greatly diminished resulting in the gradual return of IDPs to their
original homes, greater access to gardens, markets and purchasing power. The changing situation has
meant agencies move from relief efforts to development.
WFP, a major actor in the region, is distributing a settlement package, both food and non-food items (NFIs)
to about 74,657 out of 87,000 IDPs. The beneficiaries are receiving food for three months and agricultural
tools of a hoe and a panga per family and distributions are scheduled to end in the first week of September.
Meanwhile, WFP, which ceased general food distributions in the first week of July 2002, is still receiving
registrations of IDPs who have returned to their homes of origin and also concentrating on its remaining
programmes - school feeding to cover all 112 primary schools with an estimated 62,000 pupils and Food
for Assets (FFA) which is slowly picking up pace.
Several factors have been cited as cause for residual IDPs especially in Bundibugyo District. These include
urbanization, the need to rebuild community infrastructure, disrepair of homes and pit latrines, lack of land
- some families sold their land during the war – and, many IDPs remain sceptical about security in the
villages thus remaining in the IDP camps. ." (OCHA July/August 2002)
"As a result of great reduction of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) threat, there has been prolonged
improved security in Rwenzori region, particularly Bundibugyo District. As a direct result of security there
is increasing return of IDPs to their homes or to smaller settlements near their homes of origin.
According to the last verification exercise done by WFP in February 2002, there were 87,000 IDPs in
camps in Bundibugyo. However, current reports indicate that about 40,000 IDPs have left the camps and
either gone home or to smaller settlements near their homes of origin. This means that there are about
47,000 IDPs left in camps. There have not been current verification exercises in the neighbouring districts
of Kasese and Kabarole, but reports from district authorities and some agencies indicate that IDPs in here
have either returned home or been integrated into the community. It has however been noted that those
IDPs in camps in valleys are not moving back as fast as those on the mountain side, and this could possibly
be because of the social changes experienced during the period of displacement; for example, some have
started income generating activities that are keeping them in the camps. This brings out the fact that some
IDPs may never leave the camps, which may then turn into rural trading centres and humanitarian agencies
will then have to support Government in addressing the issue." (OCHA June 2002)
"According to the WFP April report, a total of 25,084 IDPs (12,063 males and 13,021 females) have
returned to their original homes in Bundibugyo district. WFP and the District authorities continued to track
and document the return of IDPs to their homes." (OCHA April/May 2002)
145
"Security is a key concern for people to resettle in their communities, this was reported by 52% of the
respondents. When some IDPs were asked why they have not yet returned to their homes, the general
feeling is that security has improved in the region, there is still uncertainty about the sustainability of
relative security that they are enjoying. Most respondents (82%) want government to make a statement
guarantying that their villages are secure before they can go back.
Many people may not wish to return home after losing their economic bases in the original villages. During
the war many cocoa and coffee plantations were destroyed. While majority of the household (94%) had
land before displacement, some people have sold it out during the period of displacement. Several
internally displaced people lost their houses and household property during the insurgency.
Meanwhile, data obtained from focus group discussions and key informant interviews indicates that some
people may be reluctant to go back to their original villages, due to better life experienced while in camps
or changes that have occurred in their social life. The youth were particularly singled out as a category that
may be reluctant to return to villages.
Other challenges for resettlement include:
Breakdown of social infrastructure in the original communities where IDPs came from
Lack of accurate data on the magnitude of displacement in the region
Local leaders who are allegedly using the insurgency for their own selfish political gains
Inadequate districts’ capacities to handle the resettlement process
High expectations by IDPs from government and other agencies before returning home
[...]
"Internally displaced persons look forward to leaving camps and go back to their villages.
During household interviews 90% of the respondents noted the desire to return home but only constrained
by issues such as security in their original villages (52%), lack of shelter (25% - lack roofing materials such
as grass or iron sheets) or waiting for others to return to their original villages (6%). Only 7% would opt to
stay in camps and the remaining 3% undecided. [...].
Existing efforts towards resettlement
Internally displaced people, central government and districts have begun some activities that are directed
towards resettlement. Majority of the displaced people in the three districts go back to their homes during
day to carry out cultivation and later return to camps in the evening. In Kasese and Kabarole, many camps
are getting smaller as most people are beginning to return to their homes voluntarily. For example, in
Kyamukube camp, the camp size has reduced from 956 households to 496 (reduced by 63%), and in
Mitandi camp, 53% of the households have returned ….
[…]
People from Bundibugyo who had camped in Kasese and Kabarole, Mubende, Masindi or other districts are
already joining camps in Bundibugyo that are closer to their homes as a process of returning home.
[...]
The statement from central government on its intention to have all IDPs resettled by March 2002, as well as
the visit of the second deputy prime minister in the region was a good signal, many people seem to be
mentally preparing for return to their homes. However even before this statement, district authorities in the
region had begun some efforts toward resettlement. In Bundibugyo for example, the RDC encouraged IDPs
to go to camps that are closer to their homes so that they can access their gardens. Other IDPs have applied
to the security authorities for setting up decongestion camps. In Kasese there is a draft document towards
displaced persons although the focus was more on providing services to people who are still in camps.
Security Personnel in the districts indicated their desire to see people going back to their original
communities. All these are indicators of the political will for solving the problems of displaced persons,
which is important if resettlement is to be done." (Oxfam 8 February 2002, pp. vi-vii, 15-16)
146
Positive signals of improved opportunities for return in most areas during first half of
2002
•
Original IDP camps in Bundibugyo being decongested allowing IDPs to cultivate new gardens
•
Indicated at the end of November 2001 that the President had directed that IDPs in Bundibugyo
could resettle back to their traditional homes
•
Government expected that weakened LRA and improved relations with Sudan would facilitate
return in the north
•
In the first year about 40% IDPs were expected to return and an estimated 28% would have not
wished to return
•
Reported in March 2002 that the security situation in Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, Kyenjojo
and Kamwenge continued to improve
"The security in the southwestern region and more so in Bundibugyo has been rather calm over the past few
months. Bundibugyo has one reported incident on 25th August, where suspected ADF rebels attacked
Kikyo IDP camp.
The sense of more security has more and more people moving out of camps in certain areas and back nearer
to the their homes in Bundibugyo, mainly to be able to access their gardens. Majority are still coming back
to the IDP camps at night, but some small groups have been settling in smaller camps closer to their homes
and gardens. Some have moved where there are no UPDF detaches and the Resident District Commissioner
(RDC) says it is a challenge that people are moving before security has been provided.
UPDF and District Status: It has to be noted that there has been no formal guarantee of security from the
District or UPDF that declares “safe for IDPS to go home”. However, they are not discouraging this
voluntary movement to open up new camps, where sanctioned by UPDF because they may lose all hope of
returning home and become dependent on aid. There was a particular case where IDPs returned to a parish
higher on the lowland plateau of the Rwenzoris, but the UPDF went and ordered them lower down again.
Likewise, the district cannot encourage IDPs to return because they cannot guarantee security. Currently,
the RDC is providing security to “new” camps like Mirambi (with an unverified 2200 people already
settled), where people have moved without informing district authorities" (OCHA August 2001)
"Improvements in security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA in recent months had facilitated
the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas, humanitarian sources told IRIN on
Thursday, 10 January 2002.
'It is happening in a fairly ad hoc manner. It is pretty slow but it is going in the right direction,' they said.
The population of one of the largest camps at Pabbo, Gulu District, had fallen by around 5,000 and was
now estimated at 41,000 people, sources added.
[...]
Humanitarian sources confirmed that there were good prospects for large-scale IDP returns in the west.
'The war in the west is pretty much won," sources told IRIN. 'The number of ADF [fighters] is very, very
small. Almost everyone that wants to go home should be able to do so.'
[...]
Although the Ugandan government has no clear policy on tackling internal displacement, Museveni said in
his end of year address that the security status of the northern and western Uganda would improve enough
to allow the IDP camps to be dismantled.
"I would like to assure those Ugandans that are still in those camps that they will be able to go back to their
homes this year," he said on Radio Uganda on 31 December." (IRIN 11 January 2002)
147
"As Kony’s position is weakened and the UPDF estimates LRA numbers in Uganda at only 100 with a
further 300 in southern Sudan, Museveni appears confident that there will be a direct, and positive, impact
on the situation for IDPs in the north and he has expressed a hope that IDPs will be able to return to their
homes by early April. While there continue to be a small number of attacks and ambushes on roads, these
are often attributable to banditry and incidences of abduction have decreased. In response, IDPs have
begun to venture out of the camps to work in their gardens and travel to their villages, a trend that had
already been noticed in Kitgum over the last six months, and is now apparent in Gulu where 25% of the
IDP population are estimated to be accessing their gardens. While this is encouraging, IDPs continue to be
cautious, leaving children in the camps for example, and it is likely to take a sustained period of peace
before camps can be dismantled prior to return, or suitable settlements created and existing ones improved
to house those IDPs who do not wish to return to their villages of origin and prefer to benefit from trading
centres and infrastructure developed during the period of insecurity.
[...]
All IDPs expressed in the most emphatic terms their desire to see the villages dismantled and for conditions
to change to allow a quick return to their place of permanent residence. Some just needed Government or
UPDF to declare they wouldn’t oppose a return to their villages, others needed a guarantee of security from
Government, and a package to help them resettle back to their homes, while yet others felt that no return
would be conceivable as long as Joseph Kony and the LRA remained in Southern Sudan, even if their level
of activity were to continue to be substantially reduced.
[…]
The Rwenzori region, comprising Kasese, Kabarole, Bundibugyo, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge (the two later
being formally part of Kabarole) has also seen an improvement in security and there appears to be a
growing desire on the part of IDPs to return to their homes. The western area of Uganda has been
subjected to attack and destruction by the ADF over the last five years, leading to the displacement of over
100,000 and, as insecurity barred their access to land or livelihood, their subsistence upon humanitarian
assistance. UPDF action against the rebels, combined with increased promotion of amnesty (an Amnesty
Office was opened in Kasese in August 2001), and work with the organisation Give Me A Chance to
demobilise and reintegrate captured or surrendered rebels, finally appears to be bringing some result. IDPs
in Bundibugyo have started to cultivate new gardens, four settlements have been established closer to these,
decongesting original IDP camps, and three further locations for possible new villages have also been
identified, pending further improvements in security. At the end of November, it was indicated that the
President had directed that IDPs could resettle back to their traditional homes as the security situation in the
area has ‘normalised’ and district authorities have been urged to encourage this movement before the next
planting season. " (OCHA 28 February 2002, pp.31-33)
"There is a pervasive sense of despondency, bitterness, and alienation that is palpable in every interaction
with protected-village communities. Every group and individual with whom the consultant spoke expressed
in the most emphatic terms their desire to see the protected villages dismantled and for conditions to
change to allow a quick return to their place of permanent residence.
When asked what would be required for this to happen, however, groups differed considerably in their
responses. For some, it would be enough for the GOU and/or the UPDF to declare that they would not
oppose such a return. For others, such a return would need to be preceded by a “guarantee of security”
from attack on the part of the authorities. Others still would require such guarantees and would also require
a “package” of material assistance to make the transition. Meanwhile, some groups (though by no means
all) felt that no return would be conceivable as long as Joseph Kony and the LRA remained in Southern
Sudan, even if their level of activity were to continue to be substantially reduced." (Weeks March 2002,
p.22)
"Improving security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA - the Sudanese government
discontinuing its support for the rebel movement as a result of improved relations with Kampala - had
facilitated the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas until February, humanitarian
sources told IRIN.
148
[…]
Of that number [500,000 IDPs], only about 200,000 (or 40 percent) would be expected to return in the first
year of any resettlement exercise, it added.
[…]
Apart from those inclined to return, and assuming that re-congestion of protected villages and
return/resettlement was not forced upon IDPs, some 143,000 (or 28 percent) of the IDP population might
choose to remain in or around the camps and protected villages for a variety of reasons, the OCHA update
stated.
Among the factors it cited for some IDPs not wanting to go home were: people having grown used to social
and economic services available in the camps, but not in their home areas; diversification of economic
activity, and the adoption of new, skilled occupations that are more lucrative than agriculture; the sale or
loss of land over time; and irrevocable social change as a result of the displacement experience." (IRIN 12
March 2002)
"Although outright victory is unlikely, expectations that the LRA will have less territory in which to
manoeuvre, coupled with hopes that the Government’s amnesty for former rebels will coax increasing
numbers of fighters away, has created anticipation that the long-term security situation will eventually
improve.
[...]
According to unverified reports from civilian authorities in the north there has already been an observable
return home from some camps by those residents who came from parishes where security incidents have
not occurred in over the last 12 months." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)
"The security situation in Bundibugyo, Kabarole, Kasese, Kyenjojo and Kamwenge continues to improve
and the general trend indicates that the Rwenzori region is peaceful. Voluntary return of IDPs continues to
increase. However, despite this positive trend, there are still insecurity incidents along the border with the
DRC. The incidents are minor and do not pose a threat to the District’s overall improved security situation.
The few incidents of cholera outbreak over the last months, are under control and the curative and
preventive measures in fighting the epidemic have yielded tangible results.
Efforts are underway between the Districts of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole to organize the
transportation of IDPs back to their respective homesteads. This commendable effort is done on the
initiative from the Districts themselves. District officials in Bundibugyo are actively encouraging IDPs to
return home and so far the process is going on gradually. It is very satisfying to see more concrete
examples of IDPs returning home and organizations concentrating their efforts in the areas of return, rather
than cementing efforts in the camps." (OCHA March 2002)
Challenges identified in order to
degradation (February 2002
facilitate return in the North before security
•
Public services poor in areas of return
•
Some forced to sell their land when displaced
•
All secondary school facilities are located in the larger trading centers
•
Analyst warns that single-stage return process in the north would likely fail (2002)
"Although most of the 508,400 presently residing in protected villages have expressed a desire to return, it
is estimated that only 365,150 or 72 percent will actually opt to return under any security conditions and
that only 200,000 or 40 percent will return in the first year. Assuming decongestion of protected villages
and return/resettlement is not forced upon them, it is estimated approximately 143,250 or 28 percent will
remain in/around the protected villages or in main trading centres indefinitely for the following reasons:
149
Many IDPs frequented the centres in the pre-crisis period because of the education, health, religious,
entertainment and market facilities/services that they provided. They have grown accustomed to these
facilities, which have led to irrevocable social change and made life at the village/parish level less
attractive.
Children and the elderly are particularly dependent upon education and health care services that are
unavailable at parish/village level. All secondary school facilities are located in the larger trading centres.
Many have resided in trading centres for six years and have adopted new skills or occupations that are more
lucrative than agriculture.
Many had previously been involved in non-agricultural sectors and formed a transient population that had
resided but not been registered in the trading centres and municipalities.
Some were forced to sell their land and no longer have a home to which they can return.
Women heads of households lost access to land upon becoming widowed or separated
While over 365,000 are likely to eventually return, the majority will remain in the protected villages a
while longer until several confidence-building measures are taken and conditions in their places of origin
are conducive to their return on a full time basis. Such determining factors or pre-requisites include the
following:- reduced threat of rebel attacks at the Parish/village level; a declaration by Government on the
rights and entitlements of IDPs (or a national policy on IDPs); on the areas to which they will be allowed to
return, and the circumstances under which they can return; extension of basic services and physical/social
infrastructure to Sub-county and Parish levels. Other Practical Concerns/Constraints will include resolving
land disputes and identification/distribution of additional land; Provision of shelter and timing return to
coincide with availability of elephant grass (specifically for northern Uganda); Food/Subsistence (distribution at Parish level is likely to be particularly problematic); essential/Non-Food Items, including
utensils, blankets, hoes, pangas, pick-axes; water and sanitation issue, employment/income generating
activities, etc.
All stakeholders need to be engaged in the preparation of a phased policy implementation plan, identifying
needs and existing resources, including those which could be made available through re-orientation of the
existing Country Programmes of each agency. Resources potentially available under the Northern Uganda
Social Action Fund (NUSAF), the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal and through other
programmes should be considered, along with possible delays in the funding and implementation of these
programmes." (OCHA February 2002)
"Though all of the interviewees with whom the consultant spoke expressed a passionate desire to return
home as soon as feasible, many recognized that the circumstances now were not right, and that as long as
insecurity continued to prevail they would choose to remain in the camps until (for example) “guarantees of
security” could be given by the authorities. Many of these would doubtless choose to remain in the villages
even if a blanket green light for a return home were given.
But many others feel passionately that the time to return is now.
[...]
It will be important to see outward movement as a gradual and, at least initially, tentative process.
Individual family members may at first move out of their villages for brief periods and then return, then
larger family units may do so, while more cautious individuals will remain behind and observe the process.
Others still will have grown accustomed to their surroundings and to living in a larger community and will
choose to remain where they are permanently. Thus, for reasons both of principle (i.e., that one’s place of
residence must, as affirmed in the Guiding Principles, always be freely chosen) and of efficacy (people
forced to make a definitive choice before they feel ready to do so will likely opt for caution), any process
that presents outward movement as a single-stage, single-choice large-scale “event” (as seems to be the
case for the concept of “decongestion” as it has been discussed) is likely to fail. The fun-da-mental wrong
of the present system is that it has deprived indivi-duals of choice and initiative in the ordering of their own
lives. No solution that perpetuates this defect can be an effective remedy." (Weeks March 2002, p. 27)
150
Displacement and ongoing conflict have eroded resources needed for successful
return (2001)
•
Estimated that as many as 25% of the displaced will prefer not to return even if security situation
improves
•
Opportunities for reconstruction and rehabilitation of northeastern Uganda hampered by cattle
rustling effects, food shortages, pests and diseases
"It needs to be emphasised however that many of the displaced may not opt to return home under any
conditions. Considerable social change has occurred since their displacement and a generation of children
have been born and raised in trading centres/protected villages.” It is estimated that as many as 25% of the
displaced will remain in these centres once they are decongested allowing for improved basic services and
overall living conditions. Those resettling to parishes near the trading centres will continue to benefit from
the services and facilities they provide. Thus, physical and social infrastructure at the level of trading
centres/protected villages and at the parish level should both be considered, with priority given to the latter
and to the road network that connects both types of population centres.
[...]
The districts affected by Karamojong attacks in northeastern Uganda include Lira, Soroti, Kaberamaido,
Katakwi and Kumi. These districts have a combined estimated population of 1.7 million people. More than
85% of the population are peasants and depend on agriculture for their livelihood. At present, there are
88,000 IDPs living in 46 camps in the Katakwi district as a result of Karamojong attacks. During 2000,
over 70,000 persons in Lira and over 5,000 in both Soroti and Kumi districts were internally displaced.
Although they have all returned to their homes, they remain disadvantaged due to property losses to
Karamojong cattle rustlers.
As a result of cattle rustling, livestock numbers have been reduced from 507,000 to 33,000. The lack of
draught power, traditionally provided by oxen, has led to a marked reduction in the land area under crop
production. In the Katakwi district, for example, only about 100,000 hectares of the 425,000 hectares of
arable land are cultivated. According to the Farm System Analysis in the Magoro and Ngariam subcounties of the Katakwi district, 70% of the farmers prepare land-using hoes and the average family
prepares up to 1-2 acres per cropping season. This requires a lot of labour, limits the acreages for
production and delays planting, leading to reduced crop yields and consequent food insecurity.
The reconstruction and rehabilitation of the region has been hampered by cattle rustling effects, food
shortages, pests and diseases, inadequate knowledge and skills of good farming practices, limited access to
and inadequate purchasing power for basic production inputs, poor market channels/infrastructure, lack of
electricity and poor market prices.
Northern Region: Sixteen years of insecurity in this region have had a profound effect on the food security
and agricultural production of the Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts. Most of the population has been unable
to access their land for cultivation for the past few years. The resulting food insecurity has been further
exacerbated by the destruction of large areas under cassava production (second crop of the country after
banana) by the African Cassava Mosaic Disease (ACMD). Without significant and immediate support, the
war-affected populations will remain food insecure. The population needs assistance in agricultural inputs
and capacity development in order to regain their livelihoods. In cases when people are able to access land,
the critical support mechanisms are often inadequate for them to achieve self-sufficiency.
Farmers face difficulties in obtaining sufficient, good quality and affordable agricultural inputs at
appropriate times for planting. Given the meagre income and savings of IDPs and returnees, micro-credit is
essential but scarce. When farmers or IDPs are able to produce a surplus crop, they are faced with the
problem of few viable markets and low sales prices. Farmers tend to lose a significant portion of their crop
151
to poor post-harvest handling and storage. They also lack the technology or financial capacity to add value
to their products. The crisis-affected districts, particularly eastern Kitgum and Pader, will remain
vulnerable to drought for the foreseeable future. It must be noted that the eastern parts of Kitgum and
Pader districts are also prone to insecurity and population displacements, in addition to LRA threats, due to
Karamojong cattle rustling. Both opportunities and capacities for income generating activities for food
security are seriously limited in the whole region at present.
Over the last two decades, the region has lost almost its entire livestock (cattle and small ruminants). This
has a negative impact on food security as the lack of animal traction reduces capacity for land preparation
and in turn reduces food production, the lack of milk and animal products leads to a decline in nutritional
levels for the population, the lack of animal manure reduces soil fertility; and theft of the cattle is a huge
loss of capital and income."(UN November 2001, pp. 36, 38
Return
Return of abductees
•
Many children said they had been under pressure to join the army upon return
•
The children continue to remain under constant risk of re-abduction
•
Community usually welcomes child returnees
•
Problem of acceptance has occurred mostly with child mothers
“Returning abductees are required to first report to the Child Protection Units set up within the UPDF,
before being taken to rehabilitation centres such as GUSCO and KICWA. While under the control of the
UPDF, many said they had been under pressure to join the army.
Fifteen-year-old Denis Nyero, who was rescued by the army, told IRIN he had refused to give in to the
pressure, but many boys who were with him at the child protection centre had agreed to remain behind and
join the army.
The rehabilitation centres are, however, just a temporary respite for returning abductees. Once return to
their families has been facilitated, the children continue to remain under constant risk of re-abduction,
which would mean almost certain execution at the hands of the LRA.
There are also children in the centres who were born in LRA captivity, and have no parents or relatives to
care for them because they were either orphaned or separated from their parents in the bush.
One positive aspect of the human tragedy in the Acholi subregion is that the community usually welcomes
child returnees, despite the atrocities they may have committed against their own people. Even where
children’s parents are dead, the extended families will always accept them back without attaching much
stigma to them, according to the KICWA centre manager. “I do not remember of any children who have
been rejected by their families,” said Christopher Arwai, who heads the KICWA centre
The problem of acceptance has occurred mostly with child mothers, because relatives are often not willing
to support their children, according to Julius, a programme manager at GUSCO. “Our major problem is
with the child mothers who often find it difficult to get support from their families. When they are with two
or three children, they become an extra burden for the families,” he said. (OCHA 31 September 2001, p.26)
152
What prospects do the IDPs themselves have for return?
•
Strong desire to see the camps dismantled
•
Some would return as soon as the GOU and/or the UPDF declare that they would not oppose
return
•
Only about 365,000 (some 72 percent) would return home under any security conditions March
2002
Sense of bitterness over the protected villages
"There is a pervasive sense of despondency, bitterness, and alienation that is palpable in every interaction
with protected-village communities. Every group and individual with whom the consultant spoke expressed
in the most emphatic terms their desire to see the protected villages dismantled and for conditions to
change to allow a quick return to their place of permanent residence.
When asked what would be required for this to happen, however, groups differed considerably in their
responses. For some, it would be enough for the GOU and/or the UPDF to declare that they would not
oppose such a return. For others, such a return would need to be preceded by a “guarantee of security”
from attack on the part of the authorities. Others still would require such guarantees and would also require
a “package” of material assistance to make the transition. Meanwhile, some groups (though by no means
all) felt that no return would be conceivable as long as Joseph Kony and the LRA remained in Southern
Sudan, even if their level of activity were to continue to be substantially reduced." (Weeks March 2002,
p.22)
"Of over 500,000 people displaced from their homes by violent conflicts in northern and southwestern
Uganda in the past 16 years, and still residing in and around protected villages/IDP camps in northern
Uganda (either full-time or part-time), it was estimated that only about 365,000 (some 72 percent) would
return home under any security conditions, OCHA stated in its 28 February report."(IRIN 12 March 2002)
"Improving security in the north and increasing isolation of the LRA - the Sudanese government
discontinuing its support for the rebel movement as a result of improved relations with Kampala - had
facilitated the spontaneous return of several thousand IDPs to their home areas until February, humanitarian
sources told IRIN.
[…]
Of that number [500,000 IDPs], only about 200,000 (or 40 percent) would be expected to return in the first
year of any resettlement exercise, it added.
[…]
Apart from those inclined to return, and assuming that re-congestion of protected villages and
return/resettlement was not forced upon IDPs, some 143,000 (or 28 percent) of the IDP population might
choose to remain in or around the camps and protected villages for a variety of reasons, the OCHA update
stated.
Among the factors it cited for some IDPs not wanting to go home were: people having grown used to social
and economic services available in the camps, but not in their home areas; diversification of economic
activity, and the adoption of new, skilled occupations that are more lucrative than agriculture; the sale or
loss of land over time; and irrevocable social change as a result of the displacement experience." (IRIN 12
March 2002)
"Although outright victory is unlikely, expectations that the LRA will have less territory in which to
manoeuvre, coupled with hopes that the Government’s amnesty for former rebels will coax increasing
numbers of fighters away, has created anticipation that the long-term security situation will eventually
improve.
153
[...]
According to unverified reports from civilian authorities in the north there has already been an observable
return home from some camps by those residents who came from parishes where security incidents have
not occurred in over the last 12 months." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)
154
HUMANITARIAN ACCESS
General
The rebels should be influenced to not attack those who help their own
people(November 2003)
Humanitarian access in northern Uganda has been a matter of particular concern. How might this be
improved in light of increased rebel activity?
A: I think we need to do a number of things. We need to have the government provide more effective
protection. And we need to be able, directly or indirectly, to tell the rebels that they must change their
behaviour. This is not a normal guerrilla war between rebels and a government. This is a war on, and with,
and against children. So, hopefully, we can somehow use those who can influence – whether they be
governments or community leaders or organizations or religious leaders – to influence the rebels to not
attack those who help their own people.
Captured drivers are killed vehicles burned (September 2003)
•
WFP demands military escorts for all food deliveries.
•
Each convoy of trucks is accompanied by two army vehicles and around 70 armed soldiers
•
Drivers are briefed to stay at least 100 meters from the nearest army vehicle in case it runs over a
mine or is ambushed
•
In the event of an ambush the vehicle in front of the incident will drive on while those behind will
either turn around or reverse out of trouble
"The security environment in northern Uganda is particularly challenging. LRA fighters regularly ambush
vehicles, using maximum brutality. Captured drivers are killed. Once looted, vehicles are burned. Refugee
and IDP camps are targeted in order to steal food and personal possessions and to abduct and forcibly
recruit children. Both the LRA and the army have planted landmines. Staff offices and accommodation are
at risk of robbery.
Given the dangers of any travel, WFP demands military escorts for all food deliveries. Each convoy of
trucks is accompanied by two army vehicles and around 70 armed soldiers. Drivers are taught convoy
skills, to note the presence of vehicles to the front and rear and briefed to stay at least 100 meters from the
nearest army vehicle in case it runs over a mine or is ambushed. In the event of a mechanical breakdown
drivers of the vehicle in front are instructed to stop. In the event of an ambush the vehicle in front of the
incident will drive on while those behind will either turn around or reverse out of trouble as the situation
dictates. In desperate situations vehicles drive into the bush before their occupants disembark.
NRC is incorporated into the UN security system which operates a five tiersystem in which one is the
lowest perceived threat level. Northern Uganda is currently rated at security level four, meaning that only
155
essential staff should be deployed and only operations of an urgent nature conducted. Level five requires
evacuation. "
NGOs that access some of the camps without escort place themselves at
considerable risk (August 2003)
•
Overarching constraint to enhanced protection and assistance to IDPs is that of security
•
UN agencies and other international NGOs are restricted to movement only in the presence of
armed escort
•
WFP runs convoys six days a week to camps under heavy protection
•
Action Against Hunger (AHH) is as of August 2003 able to access 21 of the 33 camps in Gulu
District
•
UPDF expects the same ‘compensation’ to be provided as is by WFP for its food convoys
"The overarching constraint to enhanced protection and assistance to IDPs is that of security. While some
international NGOs and local CBOs risk LRA ambushes in accessing the camps, the UN agencies and other
international NGOs are restricted to movement only in the presence of armed escort provided by the UPDF.
WFP runs convoys six days a week to camps under heavy protection. While agencies are able to join such
convoys, their time in the camps is limited to the time it takes to distribute the food and when the majority
of the camp population is preoccupied in collecting their allotments.
The few NGOs that access some of the camps without escort place themselves at considerable risk,
especially if they are delivering tangible goods as distinct from providing social services. For example,
Action Against Hunger (AHH) is currently able to access 21 of the 33 camps in Gulu District, albeit some
of them only on rare occasions. While some NGOs/CBOs do not wish to use military escorts out of
principle, others are unable to afford the costs of such escorts as UPDF expects the same ‘compensation’ to
be
provided as is by WFP for its food convoys. The relatively limited access to the camps is also a deterrent
for many NGOs to set up programmes in the three districts, and especially in Pader District where lack of
access is
acute. Given the scale of the problem and the concomitant needs, it is disappointing yet understandable that
the number of international NGOs in the region remains relatively
modest." (UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
Karamajoa insecurity prevails (August 2003)
•
No significant change in the security situation in Karamoja
•
Twelve commercial trucks carrying WFP food aid to Kotido and Moroto were stopped at gunpoint
by Karimojong warriors
"There is no significant change in the security situation in Karamoja. Major roads in the region remain
unsafe as a result of inter-clan clashes. The insecurity along the major roads in the region has resulted in the
death of over twenty civilians, including a missionary priest in recent weeks. In three separate incidents on
18th August, twelve commercial trucks carrying WFP food aid to Kotido and Moroto were stopped at
gunpoint by Karimojong warriors. Additionally, WFP operations in Kaabong area have been temporarily
156
halted due to the continuing insecurity between Kotido and Kaabong. Government recently stated that the
disarmament exercise would resume soon." (UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
Humanitarian relief convoys attacked (July 2003)
•
In Gulu and Kitgum districts, WFP relief food is subject to LRA looting after it is delivered.
•
Pader district conditions are so unstable and insecure that the WFP can barely operate there
•
UPDF accompanies WFP convoys to protect them from LRA attack-but only if the WFP provides
the necessary fuel for army vehicles
•
Security services have been unsuccessful in attempts to open up arterial roads.
“In response to the crippled economy, humanitarian agencies have undertaken to provide relief to the
afflicted area of northern Uganda. But LRA abuses against internally displaced persons extend to its attacks
on humanitarian relief convoys. A crisis of great proportions has developed: the level of malnutrition of
children in IDP camps is very high.
The World Food Programme has become the principal source of food assistance in northern Uganda-and its
trucks and stores and delivery points are therefore frequently attacked and its beneficiaries way laid by the
LRA. In Gulu and Kitgum districts, WFP relief food is subject to LRA looting after it is delivered.
In Pader district conditions are so unstable and insecure that the WFP (which has become the only provider
of relief food for the district's needy population) can barely operate there. The U.N. OCHA reported in
January 2003 that "Humanitarian organizations cannot access almost all IDPs in Pader District" as a result
of insecurity. LRA military activity aimed at civilians and civilian transport and movement is not the sole
cause of the desperate lack of food in northern Uganda. The UPDF has come in for its share of criticism by
the agencies attempting to provide relief to the stricken population, for failure to provide adequate
protection (including sufficient armed escorts for the relief trucks) and for limiting access of farmers to
their fields. After a February 2003 assessment mission to isolated and congested camps in Pader district
that had been cut off without any tangible humanitarian assistance due to fighting in the district, the WFP
noted other factors that compounded the blockage of food deliveries: "inadequate coping mechanisms and a
lack of access to the fields." (HRW, 15 July 2003, p37)
“Finally, the UPDF accompanies WFP convoys to protect them from LRA attack-but only if the WFP
provides the necessary fuel for army vehicles, and food for the UPDF troops in the convoy. This additional
payment, which the UPDF routinely requires of many who wish UPDF escorts in northern Uganda, is
viewed by some NGOs as a completely unjustified charge. They believe that the UPDF is the national army
and should provide such protection as a matter of course, first of all to Ugandan civilians and secondly to
aid organizations supplying assistance to needy Ugandans. These NGOs resent the privatization of
protection and fear the development of a ‘protection racket.’
An NGO umbrella group composed of organizations working in northern Uganda wrote of its concerns to
the prime minister in May 2003:
The protection of civilians and the assurance of safe access to humanitarian aid are the immediate priorities.
A first step is for the Government of Uganda to take concrete measures to ensure the observance of their
obligations under domestic and international humanitarian law. For example, road travel in Karamoja and
Acholiland is becoming intolerably risky. . . . Attacks on humanitarian vehicles and civilian convoys are
regular. Despite this intolerable situation, the security services have been unsuccessful in attempts to open
up arterial roads. They are not even able to provide escorts for transport services or aid agencies without
first receiving money for fuel and food.
A group of donor countries had similar concerns about relief assistance in the north:
Substantial humanitarian support is required and donors have made resources available. . . . However
insecurity continues to disrupt the delivery of humanitarian assistance. We therefore call upon the
[government of Uganda] to ensure the effective protection of food convoys and humanitarian agencies
157
working in the North and to better resource and strengthen its own humanitarian response and coordination
structures.
Even if provided with fuel and food, the UPDF will not go to the locations it deems too dangerous. The
WFP noted that it was unable to distribute food even to camps in Gulu district -due to lack of military
escort-during the week of February 17-21, 2003. ‘This points to the inadequate security available for escort
to the humanitarian organizations and agencies in northern Uganda,’ U.N. OCHA said.
Although the government of Uganda's policy is that food must be secured for the internally displaced, it has
not performed well in carrying out this policy in northern Uganda.” (HRW, 15 July 2003, pp. 64-65)
Constant volatile security situation for humanitarian workers (May 2003)
•
High risk of attack on roads hampers travel and humanitarian activities
•
Pader remains largely inaccessible
•
"Extremely dangerous", says WFP Programme Officer
High risk of attack
“A high risk of attack on roads hampers travel and humanitarian activities, which take place under armed
escort. In addition, traders are not able to deliver commodities from neighboring districts, which could
otherwise help to alleviate local food and non-food shortages. (FEWS, May 2003)
“The Uganda Red Cross Society (URCS) resumed activities in Northern Uganda on Tuesday, 15th April
2003. URCS activities in the region had been suspended on 9th February 2003, following an ambush on a
convoy of two URCS vehicles at Paiula, Pader district on, Saturday, 8th February, in which six volunteers
were seriously injured and two vehicles vandalized. URCS is expected to continue with its relief
distribution of non-food items as well as health and community mobilization activities in the region.”
(OCHA April 2003)
Rebels Attacking Catholic Mission
“On 23rd April Palabek Catholic mission was raided at night by rebels, and two days later the priests of
Gulu Cathedral suffered the same fate.
In the case of Gulu Cathedral residence the rebels came in after cutting the fence at around 1:00 am, then
they tried to smash one of the doors with an axe. Fr. Vittorio Albertini, 85, went to open and when he did
he was roughed up and beaten by the rebels, who numbered twelve. They looted the radio communication
system and the solar panels. The Parish Priest, Fr. Gabriel Durigon, 65, was made to walk with the rebels
for about a kilometre. Later on he was released.
The area around Lacor has been under attack from LRA rebels since 14th April, when they killed two
people in Obiya West village and abducted 20. On the 18th they came to the same place and abducted 14
more, and on the following day they abducted some thirty persons in homesteads around the area known as
"For God". In all these incidents the UPDF soldiers were notoriously absent.” (ARLPI 26 April 2003)
"Ambush on Caritas vehicle“In the late afternoon of Wednesday, April 2, 2003, a clearly marked Caritas
vehicle was ambushed by suspected LRA rebels, on the way from Patongo to Kalongo in Pader District.
However, the Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) acted quickly, and the two employees in the vehicle
survived with minor injuries and were rushed to Kalongo Hospital for treatment
This is the second attack on a Caritas staff/institution within ten weeks. In late January, the Reception
Center in Pajule/Pader District was attacked and two children killed by the LRA rebels. This attack/ambush
is just one of many incidents that are indicative of a very fluid security situation in the area, and a constant
reminder that humanitarian workers trying to ease the suffering of the people in Acholiland continue to face
dangerous challenges.
158
World Vison lost staff member in April (2003)“ UN-OCHA joins other humanitarian agencies in
expressing our sorrow and heartfelt condolences to World Vision International (WVI) and the bereaved
family of late Davis Chelangat, the World Vision staff who was killed in an ambush on, Wednesday, 30th
April 2003, by unknown gunmen suspected to be Karimojong warriors.
Following this unfortunate incident, WVI has suspended its relief operations in the Karamoja region until
facts of the incident are established and safety assurances received from the Ugandan government. A WVI
team has visited the location where the incident took place, in order to establish the circumstances under
which the aid worker was killed." (OCHA April 2003)
Extremely dangerous
“WFP, currently the only UN agency with access to northern Uganda's displaced villagers, relies on heavy
military escorts to reach the IDP camps.
The agency's operations feed some 1.2 million Ugandans, including 800,000 IDPs and 150,000 refugees
from the civil war in southern Sudan. However, a serious shortfall in funding is now threatening the WFP
lifeline (see box for details)
Without aid, people will be forced to venture outside of their camps to search for food and run the risk of
being abducted by the rebels.
"It is extremely dangerous", says Fred Olaa, a WFP Programme Officer in the region, "communities have
recounted several cases of abduction, estimating on average, that 20 take place each day in and around the
camps." (WFP 1 Feb 2003)
Overview of the access situation at September 2002
•
NRC suspends food delivery for one week following attacks on WFP convoy
•
September 2002 LRA attack suspended food delivery to 120,000 displaced in the north
•
LRA attacks in the north prevented WFP deliveries to 490,000 IDPs during June 2002 in northern
Uganda
•
All roads linking three major northern districts Pader, Kitgum and Gulu are seriously insecure,
thus restricting humanitarian activity
•
All operations on hold in northern Uganda due to insecurity
•
Humanitarian work hampered by insecurity on all roads linking northern districts of Gulu,
Kitgum, Pader, Lira and Pakwach
•
Reports of regular armed attacks on WFP and NGO vehicles in the North Eastern region
•
Rwenzori National Park (South-western Region) re-opened in July 2001
Northern Region
"The Norwegian Refugee Council suspends its ongoing food distribution in parts of Northern Uganda,
following an attack on one of the food convoys from the World Food Program (WFP) last Saturday. One
WFP officer was killed in the attack, which was carried out by armed rebel forces.
The food convoy was on its way to a location in Kitgum in Northern Uganda, where the Norwegian
Refugee Council are forwarding the distribution of aid.
- Because of the difficult security situation we've been forced to suspend our work several times during the
past months, says Erling Bratheim, Head of Distribution in the Norwegian Refugee Council in Uganda. He
assumes that the WFP and the Norwegian Refugee Council will continue the distribution next week,
provided that the security situation allows it." (NRC 18 September 2002)
159
"The UN World Food Programme (WFP) has condemned an attack by Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)
rebels on an aid convoy in northern Uganda, which has resulted in the suspension of relief food deliveries
to some 120,000 people." (IRIN 17 September 2002)
"This is the second time this summer that WFP shipments have been grounded. In June, WFP suspended
deliveries to about 490,000 internally displaced people due to ambushes, abductions and looting by LRA
rebels. As of July, WFP estimated it would need 24,000 tons of food to feed about 546,000 displaced
people in Uganda." (UN News, 8 August 2002)
"Heightened insecurity on roads linking major towns in Gulu and Kitgum and neighboring districts hinders
road travel, thereby limiting the district authorities and humanitarian organizations’ effort to deliver
services and humanitarian assistance to communities and IDPs. Further, ongoing attacks by the LRA have
affected most economic activities in outlying areas of Gulu and Kitgum Districts, as well as neighboring
districts of Pader and Adjumani, reducing the movement of commodities therefore the populations’ ability
to procure goods and earn income. Armed escort is recommended for road travel, which is best done in
convoys." (FEWS 7 August 2002)
"According to WFP, the food security prospects in northern Uganda for this year remain unstable due to
continued attacks by the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). Residents in outlying areas of the northern
Uganda districts and IDPs in protected camps in the three districts have very limited or no access to their
gardens. People continue to abandon their homes for big displacement camps or nearby towns. Virtually all
humanitarian organisations still have their operations on hold in northern Uganda due to the rise in
insecurity. All roads linking the northern districts of Gulu, Kitgum, Pader, Lira and Pakwach are now
unsafe, further limiting the movement of relief workers. This has severe humanitarian implications.
Reports also indicate that the ongoing violent attacks by LRA have grounded all economic activities in
outlying areas in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader and Adjumani Districts." (OCHA July 2002)
160
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES
Donor response
€2 million in humanitarian aid to the victims of the deplorable humanitarian situation
in northern, central and eastern Uganda (December 2003)
•
This decision will target priority needs including health, nutrition, water, sanitation and food
security
•
ECHO also plans to tackle the issue of schooling for children displaced by the crisis
"The European Commission, through its humanitarian aid office ECHO, has approved €2 million in
humanitarian aid to help the victims of the deplorable humanitarian situation in northern, central and
eastern Uganda. The people of northern Uganda have suffered from guerrilla warfare carried out by rebel
groups since the late 1970s, and attacks by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have increased in number
and intensity in recent months. More than a million people are displaced and almost 2 million people
(abducted children, night commuters, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees) are affected by the
crisis. This decision will target priority needs including health, nutrition, water, sanitation and food
security. Health services will include monitoring and treatment for child malnutrition. Reintegration
programmes for former child soldiers will continue to be funded. ECHO also plans to tackle the issue of
schooling for children displaced by the crisis. ECHO has allocated a total of €8 million for the humanitarian
crisis in Uganda in 2003." (ECHO, 4 December 2003)
Serious shortfall in funding
•
None of ten international NGO’s received funding through the Country Action Plan for 2002
•
Shortfall undermined the recovery of food security efforts for those affected by the Karimojong
cattle raids
•
The perception of Uganda as a strategically located and favoured nation discouraged some
potential donors from acknowledging the complex emergency in Uganda
“The 2002 Consolidated Appeal (CAP) requested a total of US$ 68.1 million, which is slightly below the
2001 request for US$ 78.7 million. Funding against the food requirement for the Rwandese, Congolese and
other small group of refugees are funded under the Great Lakes Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation
Operation (PRRO) 10062 until end of January 2003. The caseloads will then come under PRRO 10121 for
Uganda. The pie chart below shows the 2002 CAP response compared to 2001 CAP 2001 at the same stage.
The charts below take into account only non-food appeal. The non-food appeal for 2002 was US$ 32.8
million compared to US$ 36.7 million in 2001. Food response will distort the overall response analysis to
the CA.
161
CAP 2001 Response
CAP 2002 Response
required
response
44.6 %
response
46.5%*
response
uncovered
* 46.50% as of Financial Tracking System (FTS) record of 29 September 2002.
Response to the Consolidated Appeal:
An analysis of the response to the 2002 CAP shows some disturbing variations. During the past two years,
approximately ten NGOs participated in the preparation of the 2002 CAP. However, none of these NGOs
received funding for the projects submitted. Certain sectors also suffered from weak response: Recovery
and Infrastructure, Protection and Human Rights, and Security and Staff Safety received no funding under
the 2002 CAP. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), World Health Organization (WHO),
and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) received no funding through the 2002 CAP. Lack
of funding prevented WHO and UNDP from adequately supporting Government in their health coverage
programme. Calls for improved coordination and information exchange by the donor community were not
translated into support, with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) receiving
only 28.4% of its total requirement of US$ 1.2 million. Over all, assistance during 2002 appears largely to
be driven by supply rather than demand. Humanitarian interventions to alleviate the sufferings of the
displaced population are still inadequate as a result of low funding.
Funding available for development assistance through the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund [NUSAF]
has not been utilised on the ground as it has been in other parts of the country. Such imbalances had a
negative impact on implementation of a CHAP that had called for an integrated programme addressing
multi-sectoral needs and focusing on capacity building.
[...]
The under-funding had concrete effects on agency programming. Insufficient funding to Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) programmes led to the inadequate supplies of agricultural seeds and tools
in Karamoja and Katakwi. This has greatly undermined the recovery of food security efforts for those
adversely affected by the Karimojong cattle raids in northeastern Uganda. By mid-August 2002, only two
projects from FAO’s Appeal had been funded for northern and southwestern Uganda. The required amount
of food aid for WFP in CAP 2002 was US$ 35,265,184 but only US$ 11,957,402 was received. This
under-funding could well result in a higher incidence on malnutrition. The United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) lacked sufficient funds to engage in humanitarian assistance outside its on-going five-year
country programme. Some NGOs with funding from outside the CAP were able to make a slight impact,
but others were forced to terminate on-going and proposed projects due to insufficient or delayed funding.
More generally, inadequate funding combined with lack of access in some areas has eroded past
programming gains.
Discussions with donors on the 2002 results provided the following insights:
· Donors do not always receive sufficient information on country specific needs at the decision-making
level;
· Competing demands of crises in other countries reduced funds that might otherwise have been available
for Uganda;
· The perception of Uganda as a strategically located and favoured nation discouraged some potential
donors from acknowledging the complex emergency in Uganda; and
162
· Donor fiscal years are not synchronised with the CAP period, and thus contributions are not received until
May and June at the earliest." (UN November 2002, pp.3-4)
81,5 % of requirements for Consolidated Inter-agency Appeal for 2003 met (November
2003)
International donors are concerned (January 2003)
•
The UK, Netherlands and Ireland plan to cut aid grants because of the government’s increase in
defence spending
•
Donors do not know what the overall solution to the Northern situation should be
•
Donors share responsibility for the lack of attention to the humanitarian crisis in Uganda
"International donors are concerned about the government's balance between a military and non-military
solution to the northern conflict. Many donors are unhappy about the level of defence spending and the
recent increase for the northern operation. The UK, Netherlands and Ireland plan to cut aid grants because
of the government’s increase in defence spending beyond the agreed limits. Some accept that the
military is inevitably part of the solution to the conflict but the way the government is going about it
worrisome. Donors do not know what the overall solution to the Northern situation should be however,
163
or what the game plan for a way forward could be. This is where political guidance from the international
community is critical, necessary and justified."(Liu Institute, 2 January 2003)
"Donors share responsibility for the lack of attention to the humanitarian crisis in Uganda. Donor nations
consider Uganda to be a model developing country and for many years have been reluctant to recognize the
severity of the conflict in the north. Now they have begun to pay attention, at least as far as funding levels
are concerned. Funding for the UN Consolidated Appeal for Uganda is 300 percent greater than that for last
year. This figure does not include bilateral aid, which has also increased." (Refugee International, 15
October 2003)
References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
Known references to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (as of August
2003)
•
Draft of IDP policy has drawn extensively on the Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement
•
Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
•
Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
•
Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
"For the past year, the Government has been developing a national policy on internal
displacement. The current and near final draft of this policy, which has drawn
extensively on the Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement, meets most of the
requirements that a national policy should include. One area where it could be
strengthened is with respect to the search for, and implementation of durable solutions.
Hence, OCHA may want to continue a dialogue with the Office of the Prime Minister on
this issue in order that durable solutions are more comprehensively dealt with in the
policy. The Government has indicated that the draft policy will go before Cabinet by the end of
the year. It is hoped that this timeline will be adhered to and it would be desirable if the
Humanitarian Coordinator uses his good offices to encourage the highest levels of
Government to ensure that the policy be endorsed as early as possible. Once the policy is
endorsed, a major challenge will be the implementation of the policy. OCHA should
work closely with its counterparts in the Office of the Prime Minister to ensure that an
implementation plan is developed and, if required to, provide any technical support for
this process." (UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
Reference to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
"The draft on policy on Internal Displacement remains with the Ministries of Justice and finance and has
not yet been submitted to Parliament by the Office of the Prime Minister" (E-mail from NRC Gulu, 21 June
2003)
Other references to the Guiding Principles
The National Policy on Internal Displacement Policy and Institutional Framework:
164
In consultation with the UN IDP UNIT, and Dr Deng, the Government of Uganda working on the development of a national policy
paper on internal displacement. The Policy seeks to protect Ugandan citizens agianst displacement and to protect and assist IDPs
during displacement, return, resettlement or local integration. It also seeks to prevent displacement. The policy does this by clearly
defining the roles and responsabilities of Government institutions, humanitarian organisations, donors, the displaced community
and other stakeholders and spelling out the rights of IDPs.
Source: The Republic of Uganda
Date: April 2002 draft
Document: Final draft not yet available
Availability of the Guiding Principles
The Government of Uganda has translated the UN Guiding Principles into the first three African/local languages Swahili (regional),
Luo (Northern Uganda) and Rutoro (Southwestern Uganda).
Source: OCHA
Date: 2002
Documents: To access the Swahili document click [here]
To access the Luo document click [here]
To access the Rutoro document click [here]
Training on the Guiding Principles
Workshop on the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement:
The Office of the Prime Minister - Minister for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, and the Norwegian Refugee Council hosted a
3 day workshop, which brought together District officials from Gulu, Kitgum, Kasese and Kabarole, IDPs from Gulu, Kitgum and
Masindi and a number of NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC.
The workshop called for strengthening Government assistance to and protection of IDPs and for greater coordination between
government and relief organizations. A core conclusion from the workshop was that as human beings, IDPs have human rights that
include rights to greater protection and involvement in decisions affecting their lives. Participants also concluded that strategies
aimed at long term self-reliance for IDPs should be sought.
Regarding the military, there was a call for greater discipline, and training and sensitization in international human rights and
humanitarian law.
Participants also recommended the dissemination of the Guiding Principles more broadly to affected
communities.
Source: Norwegian Refugee Council
Date: Kampala, Uganda 29-31 March 1999
Document: http://www.idpproject.org/training/reports/Kampala_workshop_1999.pdf
Analysing the "Protected Villages" in reference to the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement (March 2002)
•
Prolongation of forced encampment seem arbitrary
•
Lack of clarity if IDPs may or may not leave the “protected villages" seem to contradict a number
of core personal freedoms
•
Complaints about lack of reaction or preventive measures against destruction and looting of
property and possessions
165
•
Reason for concern but no direct evidence of punitive treatment of the Acholi on ethnic grounds
Only extracts from the analysis included here. It's recommended to read the complete chapter in Weeks'
report (March 2002, pp. 26-35)
" Finding 1:
While the establishment of the “Protected Villages” may have been justifiable on grounds of military
exigency in 1996, their prolongation into 2002 would seem to be inconsistent with international
humanitarian principles.
In the UN “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement”, Principle 6 states as follows: “(1) Every human
being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place
of habitual residence. (2) The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes displacement:…(b) In
situations of armed conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so
demand; ….(3) Displacement shall last no longer than required by circumstances”. [Emphasis added.]
While the LRA is still an active menace to civilians, it seems to have been sub-stantially weakened in
recent years. The “imperative military reasons” that presumably led to the establishment of the villages
would thus seem to have re-ceded accordingly, while the situation with regard to the security of civilians
would appear to vary considerably from one area to the next, making the blanket prolongation of forced
encampment to seem arbitrary and to reflect a failure to fully examine possible alternatives.
[...]
Finding 2:
The arbitrary nature of the forced encampment of the majority of the people of Acholiland, and the lack of
clarity as to the circumstances under which they may or may not leave the “protected villages”, for example
to pursue agricultural activities in their home areas, would seem to stand in contradiction of a number of
core personal freedoms.
Though all of the interviewees with whom the consultant spoke expressed a passionate desire to return
home as soon as feasible, many recognized that the circumstances now were not right, and that as long as
insecurity continued to prevail they would choose to remain in the camps until (for example) “guarantees of
security” could be given by the authorities. Many of these would doubtless choose to remain in the villages
even if a blanket green light for a return home were given.
But many others feel passionately that the time to return is now. Guiding Principles 14 states: “(1) Every
internally displaced person has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to chose his or her residence.
(2) In particular, internally displaced persons have the right to move freely in and out of camps or other
settlements.”
[...]
Finding 3:
Most or all property and possessions of the internally displaced, including houses, have been destroyed or
looted. Personal security in the “protected villages” is often poor, with attacks, abductions, rapes, lootings
and other violent acts being committed variously by LRA assailants, by UPDF elements, by free-lance
bandits, and by other village residents. While there is no evidence of a deliberate official policy to incite or
encourage such acts, residents complain that too little is done to prevent them or to hold perpetrators
accountable.
Guiding principle 11 (2) holds that “internally displaced persons, whether or not their liberty has been
restricted, shall be protected in particular against: (a) rape, mutilation, torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, another outrages upon personal dignity, such as acts of gender-specific violence,
forced prostitution or any form of indecent assault.'
166
Guiding Principle 21 (2) states: 'The property and possessions of internally displaced persons shall in all
circumstances be protected, in particular, against the following acts: (a) Pillage; (b) Direct or indiscriminate
attacks or other acts of violence….'
[...]
Finding 4:
Prolonged, enforced encampment of the Acholi threatens the basis of their economic system.
According to Principle 9, “States are under a particular obligation to protect against the displacement of
indigenous peoples, minorities, peasants, pastoralists and other groups with special dependency on and
attachment to their land.”
As a long-established agro-pastoral society, the Acholi have such a dependency, and their displacement is
consequently far more destructive, socially and economically, than might be the case for, say, a more
urbanized population.
Finding 5:
There is no direct evidence that the Acholi displaced are being targeted for punitive treatment on ethnic
grounds.
Principle 6, (2) (a) and (e), is relevant here: “The prohibition of arbitrary displacement includes
displacement: (a) when based on policies of apartheid, “ethnic cleansing” or similar practices and at/or
resulting in altering the ethnic, religious, or racial composition of the affected population…(e) When it is
used as collective punishment.”
When combined with the history of tension and mutual suspicion between the Acholi and the central
government mentioned previously in this report, the very fact that Acholiland is ethnically so homogeneous
(virtually all the displaced are presumed to be of Acholi origin and ethnicity) and so distinct from the rest
of the country must raise some concerns. Loose talk noted among government officials in Kampala adds to
the concern: at a super-ficial level, remarks are often made that, taken out of context, could be interpreted
as laying collective blame on the Acholi for, for example, the actions of the LRA. If this came to reflect a
clear pattern of thought, as opposed to being mere passing expressions of frustration, it would raise the
matter of enforced encampment in Acholiland to the very highest level of interna-tional concern and invite
a level of scrutiny that the circum-s-tances do not at present appear to warrant." (Weeks March 2002, pp.
26, 27, 28)
"Guiding principles" tailored for the Ugandan operational context rationalise provision
of humanitarian assistance in 2001
•
Guiding principles "written such that the majority of agencies can agree upon them"
•
Principles to be translated into "round rules"
•
"Principles" reflect existing global principles for humanitarian action but are adjusted to the
Uganda context
"CHAP in 2002 will […] be guided by a set of basic and commonly agreed upon principles or standards of
behaviour.
[...]
During 2002, the principles will be translated into a clear policy or set of ground rules governing:
a)
the basis upon which the humanitarian community engages with authorities; and
b)
the ground rules by which assistance will/will not be provided.." (UN November 2001, pp. 32-33)
Background:
167
"A voluntary set of 'guiding principles' has been included in CA 2001 to rationalise the provision of
humanitarian assistance and to define minimal, universal standards of behaviour tailored to specific
operating conditions in Uganda. The guiding principles are written such that the majority of agencies can
agree upon them. The principles will later be incorporated in ground rules to be agreed upon with “local
authorities.”
[...]
With a view to rationalising the provision of humanitarian assistance and defining standards of behaviour,
organisations such as the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement together with NGOs have
elaborated several documents (Code of Conduct, Principles for Humanitarian Action) spelling out basic
humanitarian principles to be abided by humanitarian actors. Because of their agency-specific content, none
of these documents can be endorsed by the entire humanitarian community (UN Agencies, NGOs, IGOs).
Similarly, some country-specific particularities rendered inapplicable such documents, obliging
humanitarian agencies in Uganda and other countries to tailor their own Code of Conduct to ad-hoc
constraints or country specific aspects. Obtaining the adherence and endorsement of all humanitarian actors
can be a long process, hence the idea to define a set of most basic and commonly agreed upon principles
that could be applied by a majority of agencies operating in Uganda." (UN November 2000 p.8)
Content:
"The Guiding Principles is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of international aid agencies who agree to
maintain the standards set forth. The basic elements of these principles are drawn from recognised legal
instruments and international law, including the 1945 UN Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of war; the two
additional protocols to the 1949 Conventions dealing with the protection of victims of international armed
conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. The other texts of reference for
humanitarian assistance are the UN Security Council Resolution 1265 (17/07/99) concerning the protection
of civilians in armed conflicts, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement of 1998 and the
Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (the Sphere Project).
Those agencies participating in the CA for Uganda, will be guided by the following basic principles of
conduct:
[Humaniy, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Participation, Accountability, Transparency,
Coordination, Supporting Local Capacities, Cultural Sensitivity, Additionality, Commitmen, Do no harm,
Proportionality, Professionalism and Cost-Effectiveness] (UN November 2001, pp. 179- 181)
National response
Local authorities poorly capacitated (August 2003)
•
The local authorities generally supportive of the efforts of the international community
•
The local authorities poorly capacitated and appear capable of providing only limited support to
the IDPs
"The local authorities in the three districts, while generally supportive of the efforts of the international
community, are poorly capacitated and appear capable of providing only limited support to the IDPs. While
the head of the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) in Gulu is a very capable individual, his
effectiveness is limited by an almost complete lack of access to any resources. Hence, strengthening the
capacity of the national counterparts should be placed high on the agenda of the UN system and its partners
in the three northern districts." (UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
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The Government of Uganda developping a national policy on internal displacement
(2002)
•
In consultation with the UN IDP UNIT, and Dr Deng, the Government of Uganda is drafting a
policy paper on internal displacement
•
The policy intends to secure IDP proteccion while ensuring consistency with Uganda's
Consitution
•
Along the line of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement the policy aims at preventing
displacement and protecting and assisting IDPs at all stages of displacement
•
The policy also defines the roles and responsabilities of the GoU, humanitarian organizations,
donors and the displaced communities
"The last positive element is that the Office of the Prime Minister and the Department of Disaster
Management, nominally responsible for the internally displaced have, with the encouragement of the
OCHA office and the country team, embarked on formulating a national policy on IDPs. The National
Policy and Institutional Framework on Internal Displacement (hereby called the policy) moves away from
the controversial ‘protected villages’ to a more dignified approach based on the UN Guiding Principles on
Internal displacement. The policy also puts large emphasis on finding durable solutions to the plight of the
displaced." (OCHA/IDP Unit 3 April 2002, p.2)
"This was originally part of an effort by the Government of Uganda to facilitate the return of displaced
persons to their homes in the norhtern region in view of the relatively calm state of affairs that had been
present." (OCHA 31 July 2002)
"Today Uganda has approximately 550,000 IDPs, mainly in the northern and southwestern parts of the
country. Although the Government (GoU) has the will and determination to deal with the problem of
internal displacement, the administrative and institutional framework within which to provide for the
assistance and protection of IDPs is still weak.
In trying to address this problem of internal displacement and find durable solutions for IDPs in Uganda,
the Government decided, with valuable assistance from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), to develop a policy on internal displacement based on the UN Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement.
The consultative process that GoU had with OCHA, included inputs from the United Nations Secretary
General’s Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons, the OCHA IDP Unit in Geneva and
inputs from various international conferences which the representatives of GoU have attended. Internal
consultations with various stakeholders in Uganda, like Local Governments, humanitarian agencies, IDPs
and Members of Parliament are still ongoing. The aim is to develop the IDP policy with full participation of
all stakeholders. NGOs, Government Institutions - at central and district level, an inter-ministerial board,
UN agencies, IDP communities and donors, will all meet for a final stakeholders meeting in Kampala in the
very near future to agree on the final version of the policy document. When this consultative process is
finalized and all comments on the Policy Document have been studied and debated, it will be presented to
Cabinet for approval.
The intention of Government is to start implementing the National Policy and Institutional Framework on
Internal Displacement during the course of the next 2 to 3 months. Uganda’s policy on IDPs will not only
secure the protection of IDPs, but will also ensure consistency with the Constitution of Uganda and the UN
Guiding Principles on internal displacement.
Summary of the Proposed IDP policy
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The Policy broadly seeks to protect Ugandan citizens against displacement and to protect and assist IDPs
during displacement, return, resettlement and local integration. The policy does this by clearly defining the
roles and responsibilities of GoU, humanitarian organizations, donors, the displaced community and other
stakeholders, and spelling out the rights of IDPs. While IDPs are Ugandans and should thereby enjoy
similar rights like all Ugandans, Government recognizes the hardship the IDPs face, and therefore in
formulating the policy on IDPs, efforts have been made to clearly articulate the rights of IDPs with the
view to mitigate their sufferings.
The policy mainly focuses on:
Focus 1 Goals, objectives and Principles,
Namely:
To provide for the protection and assistance of IDPs;
To protect Ugandan citizens against arbitrary displacement;
To specify the roles and responsibilities of Government institutions, humanitarian organizations, donors
and the displaced community in providing assistance and protection to IDPs; and
To ensure that IDPs are not discriminated against in the enjoyment of any of their rights just because they
are displaced.
Focus 2 Institutional Framework
Explains the administrative structures, which sets out institutional arrangements, roles and responsibilities
of GoU at central and local levels, and humanitarian organizations including donors. At the central level is
the Minister of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in the Office of the Prime Minister working closely
with other departments and committees including a Working Group on IDPs. The Working Group will
consist of senior officials from all ministries, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, a representative of the
national and international NGO community and a representative from the Donor community, and will
establish a Protection Sub Committee, which will actively monitor respect for the rights of IDPs.
At the district level is the District Disaster Management Committee (DDMC) whose secretariat will be
headed by the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). The DDMC includes the Resident District
Commissioner, the District Council Chairperson, and representatives from UN Agencies, NGOs and IDP
community. This is where actual implementation of the policy will take place.
Focus 3 The Rights of IDPs
Outlines the rights that the Government of Uganda endeavours to secure to IDPs owing to their special
circumstances. These rights are:
Security; IDPs shall be given adequate safety and security. This will include extending police services to
IDP centers, maintaining law and order within displaced communities, and protection of perimeters and
areas surrounding IDP sites.
Freedom of movement; IDPs have the right to freedom of movement and to choose their residence(s).
Protection against displacement; all Ugandan citizens shall be protected against being arbitrarily
displaced from their homes.
Voluntary resettlement and return; IDPs have the right to return voluntarily and in safety and dignity to
their homes or to resettle in any part of the country.
Legal status, identification and registration; IDPs shall be issued with all necessary documents to enable
them full enjoyment and exercise of their legal rights.
Property rights; IDPs’ property and possessions including land shall be protected and IDPs shall be
assisted to acquire or recover their property.
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Graduated tax; IDPs will be exempted from paying graduated tax except where it is proved after an
assessment by a Tax Assessment Committee that the internally displaced person has sufficient means of
income to pay graduated tax.
Family unification; families separated by displacement shall be reunited as quickly as possible and where
children fail to reunite with their families, their rights to food, shelter, clothing, medical attention, and
education shall be ensured.
The following basic needs will be provided to IDPs during displacement, and on return to their homes:
Food, shelter, clothing, education, health, water and sanitation and start-up kits, and the infrastructure in
areas of return will be rehabilitated and/or reconstructed.
Focus 4 Forging Partnership
Deals specifically with external assistance i.e. seeking support from local NGOs and INGOs, CBOs, UN
agencies, Bilateral Aid Missions, International Organizations and.
Focus 5 Information and Public Awareness building
An important part of the National Policy, will be to make sure that everybody understands the content of
the policy and how to implement it.
For instance, so far, GoU has translated the UN Guiding Principles into the first three African/local
languages Swahili, Luo and Rutoro. These languages are useful, not only in Uganda, but could also prove
useful on a regional basis, e.g Swahili. The translations are currently in the process of receiving official
status from the United Nations.
To enhance the widest possible dissemination of the policy, GoU plans to invite OCHA’s IDP unit to train
Government officials, the police, the army, IDP representatives and other stakeholders, on the guiding
principles on internal displacement." (OCHA, April/May 2002)
'Decongestion' plans on government agenda (2001-2002)
•
Government signaled by mid-2001 that it would pursue "decongesting" plans consisting in
moving IDPs away from overcrowded protected villages to smaller dispersed sites nearer to their
home areas
•
Strategy of phased return of about 200,000 IDPs from districts of Kitgum, Gulu and Pader (north)
being developed by beginning of 2002
"Government officials discussed a plan to transfer uprooted people from overcrowded protected villages to
smaller, dispersed sites closer to their homes. Officials called the plan “decongestion.” Some local
residents opposed the strategy because they preferred to return to their original homes when security
improved. UN officials supported the decongestion plan as a way to resettle permanently some displaced
families “who may not opt to return home under any conditions.”
Organized transfers to new decongestion sites did not occur during 2001. As security gradually improved
late in the year, however, some displaced persons began to farm and travel farther outside protected
villages, making short trips to their original homes to assess conditions for their eventual return." (USCR
June 2002)
"Ojwok [Minister for the North] told IRIN the government was pursuing a policy of “decongestion” under
which the more heavily populated camps would be gradually moved out. If the favourable security situation
continued and a programme of phased resettlement could be agreed upon, “we would have cleared the
camps in three to five years,” he added.
171
It is as yet unclear where exactly IDPs would be resettled under the decongestion plans. The Resident
District Commissioner in Gulu, Musa Ecweru, said there were plans to resettle displaced people around
schools nearer to their home villages, where they would have some access to land, and would live in
temporary structures for a limited period.
However, ARLPI [Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative] said there appears to be little enthusiasm for
the decongestion among IDPs, as it could simply mean they were moved to a smaller version of their
present camps, and would still not be able to return home." (IRIN 24 July 2001)
"The Government of Uganda (GOU) has publicly declared its intention of seeing IDPs return home as early
as March 2002. While this is a very encouraging sign, it is imperative that any return or resettlement of
IDPs should conform to the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Uganda and basic
guiding principles on internal displacement. It is in this regard that the Department of Disaster
Preparedness in the Office of the Prime Minister with the assistance of the United Nations is drafting a
national Policy to make provision for the protection and assistance of IDPs and facilitate their integration,
return, resettlement and recovery." (OCHA February 2002)
"The UN Disaster Management Team (UNDMT) met 18 January 2002 to discuss the return of 374,000
IDPs from their respective “protected villages”. Participants were drawn from the UN Agencies, the World
Bank, IOM and the Office of the Prime Minister. It was agreed that various actors will assist the GoU to
work out a policy and strategy for a phased return of about 200,000 IDPs from districts of Kitgum, Gulu
and Pader (north), during a period of 6-8 months. The Agencies will relocate resources within their existing
country programmes, where possible. However, a flash appeal may be required. It is expected that the
President will call for a meeting within the coming two weeks to further discuss the UN’s contribution to
the return.
[…]
On 22nd January the DDMC endorsed the plan for a resettlement survey produced by the Sub-Committee
on Peace, Justice and Resettlement. While the UNDMT & OPM are preparing a policy and plan for return,
agencies in Gulu District join forces to map the current geographical pattern of resettlement. The survey
will identify major resource gaps at the Parish level as well as IDPs plans and capacity for leaving the
camps. The District has set aside funds for the survey, but there is still need for some external assistance.
So far the following contributions have been identified: IOM and OCHA contributes with technical advice
and some logistical support, URC contributes with personnel trained in PRA techniques, CRS, NRC and
ACF contribute with transport. There is still need for some additional funding and a budget will be
circulated to agencies in the District. The District Planning Unit is responsible for administering the survey
and if all agencies respond quickly to appeals for contribution, the assessment should be ready by midFebruary.
The UNDMT agreed that sector plans should include updated information on agencies’ activities and
planned programmes, preferably with information at Parish level." (OCHA January 2002)
"The Government of Uganda introduced an Amnesty Law in 2000 intended to lure back ADF and LRA
forces. Unfortunately, the terms of the law are not well understood, if even known, by those it is intended
for. Although a demobilisation process has been launched by the Office of the Prime Minister,
implementation is constrained by inadequate funding and the lack of proper long-term planning. The
process has yet to be successful, and the numbers reintegrated remain relatively insignificant. The slow
mobilisation risks provoking a loss of confidence in the process.
Government plans to decongest camps have their merits but as yet do not include sufficient input from the
greater aid community. To gain support, they need to include sufficient safe-guards for IDPs and to place
emphasis on return/resettlement rather than decongestion. Any initiatives to enable the population to resettle should be coordinated and planned between all stakeholders, particularly the IDPs, so that the
unfortunate outcomes of their displacement are not repeated in reverse. Items to be included in
resettlement packages need to be identified and stock-piled prior to any planned movements. If revised, the
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Government initiative could reorient existing humanitarian assistance towards establishment of physical
and social infrastructure at the parish level. Concerns that decongestion would simply replace large camps
with smaller ones and that infrastructural development would create a pull factor towards the parishes and
away from home villages, are unwarranted. Under pre-conflict conditions, displaced persons did not live in
villages but in small concentrations of the extended family consisting of 2-3 huts. The local parish was
frequented daily for religious services, education and marketing. Decongestion and development of the
parishes would greatly facilitate resettlement to areas within easy walking distance of farms, enabling the
IDPs to be self-sufficient and that, least we forget, is a primary objective." (OCHA October 2001)
Lack of commitment from Ugandan government
Rwenzori region (May 2002)
to assist returning IDPs in the
•
Government plans to close down 80 "protected camps"(May 2002)
•
Major concern in Kabarole and Kasese is the shattered infrastructure awaiting on IDP return
•
Serious information gaps on physical security between government's army and returning IDPs
exposes them to landmine casualties
•
No government funding allocated to development needs of returning IDPs has left them totally
dependent on humanitarian's good offices
•
GoU has no programme to ensure basic socio-economic and infrastructural needs of IDPs else
than promises of "resettlement packages"
"Relative calm has returned to much of the west since 2000, when the Ugandan government launched a
heavy military campaign to drive the ADF out of the Rwenzoris. The authorities now hope to close down
more than 80 'protected camps' and have begun encouraging the IDPs to go home, while the districts
involved also report the return of large numbers of the displaced.
When IRIN visited the region earlier this month, most of the camps in Kabarole and Kasese had been
dismantled, but significant doubts remain in Bundibugyo District, from where almost 90 percent of the
IDPs were displaced, according to relief workers.
[…]
According to local authorities in Kabarole, the security situation in the area stabilised ever since the
government deployed UPDF battalions around the IDP camps, and on the mountains as far as the border
with the DRC to ensure the safety of the population.
In Kabarole, and Kasese, local authorities greatest concern was not security but the poor state of the
infrastructure awaiting returning IDPs, Robert Karubi, Kabarole District security officer, told IRIN in Fort
Portal, Kabarole District.
However, there were local concerns that IDPs wishing to go home were not receiving clear information on
their security from the government. According to local NGOs, most IDPs have not returned because they
are still awaiting the return of the many people abducted by ADF fighters, and believed to be still in
captivity.
[…]
However, the UPDF has been criticised for "failing to give correct advice" on the physical security of
returning IDPs, following claims of a number of casualties caused by landmines.
[…]
Moving from aid to development for resettled IDPs appears to be one of the most daunting tasks facing
local authorities, especially following the imminent withdrawal of relief agencies from the area.
[…]
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However, aid agencies have argued that that lack of a clear commitment on the part of government, which
has not allocated funding to fulfil the development needs of IDPs in its national budget, is making the
displaced - and many returnees - almost wholly dependent on humanitarian organisations.
This is the single biggest impediment to resolving the solution of the IDP crisis in the region, they say.
"Most aid agencies have overstayed," a humanitarian sourced told IRIN. "The time is ripe now for the
government to take over, but they are not showing any signs of taking responsibility."
There also appeared to be confusion between the government and NGOs about the nature and direction the
IDP resettlement should take. In particular, NGOs have taken issue with the government's recent
announcements that it was exploring ways of providing IDPs with a "resettlement package".
Businge argued that although the IDPs were being encouraged to go home, the government had failed to
develop a proper programme to ensure basic social and economic infrastructure for them.
The return of the Rwenzori IDPs has not been governed by a specific official strategy, because the
government lacks a clear framework for resettlement; instead, he said, the process is taking place in an adhoc basis, with government officials promising resettlement packages such as iron roofing sheets, which
have no long-term significance for the future of the mainly agricultural communities." (IRIN 29 May 2002)
Ministry of Health planning an emergency one-year health programme for IDPs in
Katakwi (September 2001)
•
Sanitation and nutrition interventions planned for over 88,000 IDPs living in displacement camps
•
Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister has a budget of 560 million shillings (US $318,000) for
Katakwi's water supply problem
"Uganda's Ministry of Health is planning an emergency one-year health programme at a cost of 1.6 billion
Uganda shillings (about US $909,000) for internally displaced people (IDPs) in the troubled northeastern
district of Katakwi.
The coordinator of the Katakwi Health Emergency Plan, Sam Engenyu, told IRIN that the plan,
provisionally approved in mid-August, was expected to provide for sanitation and nutrition interventions
for over 88,000 IDPs living in displacement camps as a result of raids by neighbouring Karamojong
warriors.
The Karamojong raids on Katakwi, which intensified in March last year and prompted Katakwi District
Council into declaring a state of emergency last month, have systematically driven residents from their
homes and forced them to build camps in which they live, sometimes without water and health services
[...]
The Ugandan Office of the Prime Minister, which has primary responsibility for coordinating assistance to
Katakwi, also has a budget of 560 million shillings (US $318,000) to tackle Katakwi's poor water supply
problem by drilling 40 boreholes in and around the IDP camps, humanitarian sources told IRIN on
Wednesday. It has also proposed that UNICEF contribute 50 million shillings (US $28,000) to deal with
HIV/AIDS, malaria, sanitation, and social mobilisation, sources said." (IRIN 13 September 2001)
Operation to disarm the Karamojong initiated by end-2001
•
Parliament approval of law in March 2000 instructing the government to disarm the Karamojong
174
•
District political leaders in Karamoja sensitising the people in July 2000 about the forthcoming
campaign
•
Disarming exercise officially initiated in January 2001
•
Reported in December 2001 that some 7,000 illegal weapons had been handed over out of a
targeted 40,000
•
Reported in February 2002 that the army would forcibly disarm the Karamojong because they had
largely ignored the call to surrender their guns under the voluntary disarmament programme
•
Concern among local population that warriors will hide illegal weapons and that raids will
continue once defense forces pull out
•
Disarmament programme has increased the scale of tensions in Karamoja where the volatile
security also indicates that too many guns are still circulating in the area (April 2002)
"Tension has been mounting in the [Karamoja] district, compounded by parliament's approval of the law
last week [March 2000]. The law requires the government to disarm the Karamojong and remove them
from neighbouring districts within six to 12 months. It also calls for deploying the army at strategic points
along Karamoja's border with neighbouring districts. Observers warn that the stage is set for a confrontation
between the army and the heavily-armed warriors. (IRIN 22 March 2000)
"There are contradictory reports on the disarmament process. The UPDF spokeman reports that the Vice
President officially launched the Disarmament process in Karamoja on February 10, 2001. The political
head of the process is Hon. Ruhakana Rugunda, Minister in charge of the Presidency, to be assisted by Hon
Peter Lokeris, Minister in Charge of Karamoja Affairs. Col Taban, 3rd Division Commander is in charge of
the UPDF troop deployment in the region.
[...]
Some agencies on the ground report an increase in building of security roads and military presence/army
detaches. Others say that the process seems to be on hold." (OCHA February 2001)
"The security situation in Karamoja is still very fluid, with a significant increase in the number of ambushes
and armed robberies on the road especially between Kotido-Moroto and Moroto-Namalu, over the last four
weeks or so. On the other hand, inter-tribal clashes have somewhat subdued and some attribute this to the
increased presence of UPDF officers deployed to facilitate the disarmament programme.
To some though, the disarmament programme is still not very evident on the ground, save for the increased
UPDF presence. The sensitization of the community in particular and other related activities have
apparently not happened obviously, and many people are still waiting to see more on disarmament."
(OCHA April 2001)
"The highlights of incidents in November and December [2001] , show the violent effects of the gun and
underscore the importance of the ongoing disarmament program. The disarmament process began in
earnest, with the President himself spearheading the process. The programme is ongoing and reports
indicate that upwards of 10,000 guns have been voluntarily handed in. Government is also appealing for
funds to aid the programme and for parallel development projects in Karamoja. With Karamoja in the
spotlight, and the President himself meeting with donors and international agencies to appeal for funds for
the region, the hope is that Karamoja is finally on the path to meaningful recovery and development."
(OCHA December 2001)
"In Karamoja, Eastern Uganda, violent skirmishes have continued even as the disarmament programme is
being implemented, with, on one occasion, the presidential guard being attacked. 88,500 remain displaced –
over 38% of the local population - in Katakwi, sub-counties of which have been persistently attacked by
Karamajong pastoralists, resulting in substantial population movement, food insecurity as crops cannot be
planted or are abandoned, and limited access to basic services. The UPDF has been heavily deployed to
help restore order and implement the ambitious disarmament of the Karamajong. Initially under the
175
personal supervision of President Museveni, the programme began on 2 December and, by 7 December it
was reported that some 7,000 illegal weapons had been handed over out of a targeted 40,000. The first
phase of the disarmament process (voluntary handing over of the guns) ended on 15 February. The second
phase began immediately after this – disarmament by force undertaken by the UPDF – and is currently
ongoing." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.34)
"The Ugandan army at the weekend announced the launch of a forcible disarmament operation in the
insecurity-prone Karamoja subregion of northeastern Uganda, following the expiry of a month's grace
period which the government extended to the Karamojong community to voluntary surrender their arms.
Maj Shaban Bantariza, the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) spokesman, told IRIN from Kampala
on Monday [25 February 2002] that the army had decided to move in and forcibly disarm the Karamojong
because they had largely ignored the call to surrender their guns under the voluntary disarmament
programme launched by President Yoweri Museveni.
In December, Museveni travelled to the Morulinga area of Karamoja's Moroto District, where he
spearheaded the voluntary disarmament exercise. He gave a deadline of 15 February, after which, he said,
those found in possession of illegal firearms would be arrested.
By the expiry of the deadline, only 7,676 guns - less than a quarter of the an expected 40,000 - had been
handed in by the community, according to Bantariza." (IRIN 25 February 2002)
"We had given the Karamojong up to 15 February to hand in their guns. As far as 'voluntarily' is concerned,
we think they are not doing well," he said. "It is not working. Some of them want to keep their arms so they
can rustle their neighbours' cattle."
"[...], the President of Uganda has launched a disarmament campaign from December 2001 to retrieve the
weapons from the warriors in order to ensure security and peace in the region so that the IDPs would return
and settle back in their villages by March 2002.
[...]
But, as is said elsewhere and according to local understanding, warriors have possessed weapons both
through legal and illegal means. They acquired legally on the pretext of guarding their livestock while they
smuggled more as their raiding interest grew commercially. The public interpretation is that “even if the
campaign is successful in retrieving all the legal weapons, the illegal weapons would still stay with the
warriors and the raiding spree continues once the defense is pulled out”." (Oxfam 28 November 2001, p.24)
"The security situation in Karamoja can be described as volatile. There was the high media publicity of
clashes between the UPDF and the Jie (of Kotido), which led to a ban on people travelling in and out of
Kotido for some days. These clashes have resulted in an unspecified number of deaths and injuries on both
sides. The internal clashes also largely contributed to the insecurity in the region. The Jie (Kotido) seemed
to have intensified their raids on the Bokora (Moroto), with a reported 10 open raids in April alone.
Meanwhile, the relations between the Bokora and Matheniko; and Bokora and the Pian also started to sour
as a result of frequent thefts of animals among themselves. Further, the conflict between the Tepeth,
Matheniko and Turkana has continued to intensify since March. These inter-tribal raids often result in
several deaths and an even larger number of injuries
Road ambushes also contribute to Karamoja’s insecurity. In April, there were 3 reported road ambushes in
the districts of Moroto and Nakapiripirit. These resulted in three people being injured and one who died
from bullet wounds in Matany hospital.
The above incidents indicate that there are still many guns in the hands of Karamojong warriors. It is also
apparent that the disarmament programme has increased the scale of tension, even violence among ethnic
Karimojong groups of Jie against Bokora; and Bokora against Matheniko. This purportedly arises from a
176
number of factors, including the suspicion by those disarmed that Government is not protecting them and
their property.
Further, media reports that have also been corroborated by some agencies show that there have been
various abuses by military personnel. In Moroto for example, some UPDF were confiscating shukas and
other traditional attire like beads and bangles, and indiscriminately beating men and women. Unfortunately
the trend seems to be no notice, no sensitization and indiscriminate beatings, even of the elderly and
women." (OCHA April/May 2002)
Ministry for Disaster Preparedness and Refugees main coordinating body for IDP
assistance since 1998
•
MDP/R act as focal point for Government on disasters and humanitarian affairs and has the
responsibility to coordinate and monitor assistance and protection of IDPs
•
District Disaster Management Committees are charged with coordination and facilitating the
response to disasters at the district level
•
Reported by end-2000 that DDMCs lack the organisation, expertise and resources to be effective
•
Inadequate funding limited capacity for emergency response of the Government’s Department of
Disaster Preparedness and Refugees in 1999
•
District authorities are generally lacking coordination capacity
"The Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees acts as the main coordinating body for IDP relief and
rehabilitation in Uganda. The Ministry is supported with financial and technical assistance from UNDP,
WFP and other agencies comprising the United Nations Disaster Management Team (UNDMT). UNDP is
to contribute 500,000 US dollars to establish an inter-ministerial Disaster Management Unit and a national
policy for disaster relief and mitigation.
The Uganda Constitution calls for a Disaster Management Commission, which is currently being formed,
but generally government coordination and assessment of needs has been poor. In Gulu and Kitgum the
District Disaster Management Committees (DDMCs), organized under the Chief Administrative Officer
(see box), have been assisted by UNICEF in updating their population censuses and District Emergency
Plans of Action. However, the DDMCs have depended too much on information gathering without putting
enough effort into proactive coordination and have yet to provide effective direction." (WFP September
1999, p.28)
"Over-all coordination is the responsibility of the OPM. However, limited resources and capacity have
severely hampered OPM’s efforts. Monthly donor meetings provide a forum for updating the donor
community on the overall humanitarian situation but provide no scope for detailed discussion, joint analysis
or planning. Sectoral coordination meetings are held regularly in Kampala and in crisis areas to collect and
compare data gathered either informally or through agency-sponsored assessments. These parallel meetings
of District Disaster Management Committees (DDMC) meetings, comprised of GoU, NGO and UN field
staff. The DDMCs are held irregularly and lack the organisation, expertise and resources to be effective."
(UN November 2000, p.36)
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(WFP September 1999, p.29)
"The Government’s ability to detect, respond to, or facilitate response to an emergency in a timely manner
is limited due to a woefully inadequate annual budget at the Government’s Department of Disaster
Preparedness and Refugees (DDPR). In addition to this is the budget cut at the units responsible for
monitoring early warning indicators. Increasing the financial and human resources provided to DDPR
could assist the GoU in monitoring, coordinating and intervening effectively during crises." (UN
November 1999, p.12)
"In the decentralised administrative structure of Uganda, the main responsibility for governmental
humanitarian coordination lies with district authorities. District authorities are generally lacking
coordination capacity, in particular because the function of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) who is
normally in charge of humanitarian coordination is overstretched. While capacity building to support CAOs
and their Disaster Management Commissions is important, there is general consensus that district
authorities at present cannot provide for dynamic inter-agency coordination. However, unlike in other
countries where local authorities often try to curtail humanitarian actors, authorities in Uganda accept selfdriven inter-agency coordination. In Kitgum, such internal mechanisms for inter-agency coordination –
undertaken in all transparency and with a systematic link to the district administration – have proven
successful." (OCHA 7 October 2000, para.16)
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International response
OCHA Director denounces the world's biggest, neglected, ignored humanitarian crisis
(November 2003)
•
Appeal for assistance for hundreds of thousands of people
•
UN OCHA can certainly assist in the peace process with things like demobilisation
•
UN OCHA do not have a mandate to mediate
"An appeal for assistance for hundreds of thousands of people affected by conflict in northern Uganda is to
be launched later this month, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, said
on Tuesday.
Speaking in Nairobi following a two-day visit to northern Uganda, Egeland said the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) planned to launch the appeal on 19 November, when it
would urge donors to increase funding for humanitarian aid.
"This is not a war in which the population is affected by the collateral damage. It is a war which is directed
against the civilian population and children," Egeland said. "How can we live with a situation where nearly
1,000 children are being abducted every month to become killing machines."
Egeland, who described the situation in northern Uganda as the "world's biggest, neglected, ignored"
humanitarian crisis, also lamented the lack of humanitarian access for the displaced population, which he
said had reached 1.3 million. He pledged to help increase the humanitarian presence of UNOCHA and
other UN agencies in the region.
The situation in northern Uganda, where rebels of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) have been fighting
the Ugandan government for 17 years, worsened considerably around July 2002, when the Ugandan
authorities, in cooperation with the government of Sudan, launched an operation to destroy LRA bases in
southern Sudan. LRA tactics include attacking and looting villages, abducting children to carry loot and
forcibly recruiting them into their ranks.
During his visit to the northern town of Gulu, Egeland and his team visited a child rehabilitation centre run
by World Vision, where they spoke to former LRA victims. The UN representatives were visibly moved as
they listened to 13-year-old Patrick Komakech relate how he was abducted by the rebels and forced to fight
alongside them, and how he was eventually recovered by the Ugandan army after an ambush against his
company in which he sustained three bullet wounds in the leg.
Patrick described to the delegation how he was forced to kill one of his commander's bodyguards and sit on
the body before cutting up victims of an LRA assault and putting them in a large cooking pot.
In Gulu, Egeland also met representatives of the Acholi Religious Leader's Peace Initiative (ARLPI), who
requested a more active UN involvement in peace building in northern Uganda. Speaking to IRIN on
Sunday, Egeland said he had explained to the representatives that while he had mediated in conflicts in the
past, his mandate was purely humanitarian.
"We can certainly assist in the peace process with things like demobilisation, but I don't see us [UNOCHA}
mediating. We don't have a mandate to mediate and neither side has even asked us to," he said.
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In an interview with IRIN in the town of Kitgum on Saturday, ARLPI member father Joseph Gerner of
Kitgum mission, which houses hundreds of displaced children each night, spoke of the desparate situation.
"These children are terrified. [LRA leader Joseph] Kony is still abducting and looting and killing in Kitgum
and no one can seem to stop this. To suggest that the government can end the crisis militarily is simply
untrue," he said."
United Nations to scale up assistance to Northern Uganda (November 2003)
•
Steps are already underway to send additional humanitarian aid workers to the north
•
This consensus emerged after the Emergency Relief Coordinator discussed the situation in
northern and eastern Uganda with senior colleagues from UN departments, agencies, funds and
programmes, as well as donors
"Following the recent visit of Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland to Northern Uganda, United
Nations agencies have committed to expanding the UN's presence and activities in northern and eastern
Uganda. This consensus emerged after the Emergency Relief Coordinator discussed the situation in
northern and eastern Uganda with senior colleagues from UN departments, agencies, funds and
programmes, as well as donors. Steps are already underway to send additional humanitarian aid workers to
the north to meet the increasing emergency needs there.
The situation in the north has worsened since summer 2002. The number of persons internally displaced by
fighting, and in dire need of humanitarian assistance and protection, has increased from 600,000 to over 1.3
million, while the districts beset by conflict have risen from three to eight. Children, in particular, have
suffered enormously. The Lord' Resistance Army had abducted more than 10,000 children since June 2002,
the highest number since the insurgency began. All children are at risk of being abducted, forced to fight
and commit atrocities, and subjected to sexual violence and sexual slavery. To escape this fate, tens of
thousands of children-'night commuters'--leave their homes each evening, seeking protection in towns. In
Kitgum and Gulu, for example, the Emergency Relief Coordinator found that there are 27,000 night
commuters. This trend is also reported in other districts as well.
'This is a war against children. They are abducted, abused and violated,' Egeland said.
Despite the dramatic increase in needs, it remains extremely difficult to deliver humanitarian aid outside the
main northern and eastern towns without the use of military escorts. The escorts accompany food convoys
to camps for displaced persons in northern Uganda. The utter lack of security has made it nearly impossible
to maintain a humanitarian presence in these areas, meaning there is no sustainable assistance for health,
education or other basic services.
'I urge those concerned to take all possible steps to allow free, unhindered and secure humanitarian access
to those in need,' the Emergency Relief Coordinator said. "(UN OCHA, 21 November 2003)
The UN Country Team in Uganda is focused on long-term development and has done
little to respond to the humanitarian crisis (October 2003)
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•
World Food Program (WFP) and the Norwegian Refugee Council, are the only relief
organizations that regularly visit the camps
•
Even agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the
UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), have been slow to engage in the north
•
UNICEF’s lack of response is puzzling
•
The Ugandan government continues to pursue a failed military strategy
"With the exception of Action Against Hunger in Gulu, whose staff travel unescorted, the UN World Food
Program (WFP) and its implementing partner, the Norwegian Refugee Council, are the only relief
organizations that regularly visit the camps, and they do so with heavy military escort. Other organizations
have policies against travel with military escorts, and because they are unable to establish links with the
LRA to secure safe passage, have determined that travel is too risky. Government employees told us that if
they were provided proper security, they would travel to IDP camps. As a result, some agencies are calling
for separate “service” convoys, but it is unclear if the UPDF has the capacity to provide the additional
troops. The best solution would be for the UPDF to secure the main roads, which would allow agencies to
travel without escorts.
The assistance needs in the displaced person camps are overwhelming, especially as few agencies will
travel to the camps to provide services. When security worsened in June 2002, government employees
providing services in the camps fled, which created a “service vacuum.” The camps are overcrowded and
lack adequate infrastructure to support the large numbers of people living there. Malnutrition is high,
sanitation is almost non-existent, water is insufficient, medicine is in perpetually short supply, medical
care—particularly reproductive health—is generally unavailable, education is not available or of poor
quality, and gender-based violence is believed to be widespread. Prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS are
estimated to be higher than the rest of Uganda outside Kampala, and condoms are unavailable.
With the exception of WFP, United Nations agencies are noticeably absent from the conflict-ridden areas of
Uganda. The UN Country Team in Uganda is focused on long-term development and has done little to
respond to the humanitarian crisis. Even agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) and the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), have been slow to engage in the north. UNICEF’s
lack of response is puzzling, given that the war in Uganda impacts mostly children. The needs in
UNICEF’s traditional areas of focus—emergency education, maternal/child health, water/sanitation, and
child protection—are massive. For example, all but 26 of the 164 primary schools in Kitgum district have
been closed, and even if many teachers are living in the camps, there are often no school buildings or
furniture, nor do children have easy access to educational materials. Teachers also explain that they need
training in educating traumatized children.
UNICEF’s recent decision to place a child protection officer in Gulu is a step in the right direction, but
more needs to be done. UNICEF is working with an inadequate emergency budget of only $2
million.Donors share responsibility for the lack of attention to the humanitarian crisis in Uganda. Donor
nations consider Uganda to be a model developing country and for many years have been reluctant to
recognize the severity of the conflict in the north. Now they have begun to pay attention, at least as far as
funding levels are concerned. Funding for the UN Consolidated Appeal for Uganda is 300 percent greater
than that for last year. This figure does not include bilateral aid, which has also increased.
This increase in support to the humanitarian emergency has not been matched by political pressure on the
government to attempt to end the conflict. The Ugandan government continues to pursue a failed military
strategy. The U.S. is probably the only country with the clout to influence Uganda, but Uganda is an ally in
the war on terrorism, so the U.S. is inclined to support President Museveni’s approach to the conflict.
According to a diplomat based in Kampala, “Museveni is a good manipulator. He’s one of three African
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leaders who joined the coalition [in Iraq]. The U.S. won’t force Museveni to do something he doesn’t want
to do. Using a stick against Museveni is not a U.S. option." (Refugee International, 15 October 2003)
Call for international political involvement in the conflict (October 2003)
•
The international involvement have so far been humanitarian in nature
•
The war is a regional war, with global implications
“The voices calling for an international involvement have increased since the Acholi Religious Leaders
called for it. The leaders noted that they were troubled by the intolerable situation the people of the north
found themselves in and noted that the international involvement had so far been humanitarian in nature.
They now wanted a political involvement on the part of the international community to stop the war. As
quoted above, the ARLPI said:
‘We are sounding a strong appeal to the UN to address the conflict in northern Uganda so that all necessary
measures are put in place for the protection of the civilians. We appeal to various international bodies,
heads of diplomatic missions, the East African Community, African Union, European Union, International
Governmental Authority on Development-IGAD and Arab League to support our proposal’
This voice of the religious leaders was re-echoed in a number of quarters. An official of the EU
Humanitarian Aid Organisation (ECHO), Ms Costanza Adinolfi, who was on fact-finding mission to
Uganda at the end of June called on the international community to give more attention to the forgotten
crisis of northern Uganda, where about one million people had been displaced: ‘We have witnessed a
forgotten crisis in northern Uganda, a crisis that has aroused little interest in the donor community.’While
noting Sudan's alleged support for the Lord's Resistance Army rebels, she said that the conflict in northern
Uganda is essentially internal and must be solved internally. But this overlooked the fact that the war is in
fact a regional war, with global implications since the LRA was now regarded as a ‘foreign terrorist
organisation’ by the U.S. government. Therefore it is only international involvement that can help bring this
war to an end.” (HURIPEC, 30 October 2003, pp 144-145)
The Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs on official visit to Uganda
(August 2003)
•
The purpose of the visit was to assess and reach a better understanding of the situation of internal
displacement
•
An additional purpose was to hold consultations with the Government on the draft national policy
on internal displacement.
"The Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, Dr. Francis Deng undertook an official visit to
Uganda from 11 to 15 August 2003. The purpose of the visit was to assess and reach a better understanding
of the situation of internal displacement in Uganda, which now affects more than one million persons in the
north and east of the country. An additional purpose was to hold consultations with the Government on the
draft national policy on internal displacement.
Dr. Deng met Government officials, international donors, United Nations agencies and programmes
representatives, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) heads of mission. He also undertook a
visit to the districts of Kitgum and Gulu, where he met local officials, religious dignitaries, NGOs and
182
representatives of the internally displaced. In Gulu he visited a camp for the internally displaced, where he
witnessed their living conditions and also attended a food distribution by the World Food Programme.
The Representative expressed his determination to raise the awareness of the international community to
the plight of the internally displaced in Uganda. He indicated that this humanitarian crisis deserves the full
support of the international community, in terms of financial and operational support in order to provide the
needed protection and assistance to the displaced and in the search for a peaceful resolution to the conflict.
He also encouraged the Government of Uganda to ensure that the national policy on internal displacement
is adopted in the very near future and that every effort be made towards its effective and efficient
implementation. RSG Deng also urged the Government of Uganda to redouble its efforts to ensure the
physical protection of the internally displaced and to provide appropriate levels of humanitarian assistance."
(UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
US contributes $3million to Uganda's defence budget(January 2003)
•
The cover the cost of Operation Iron-Fist is being recovered through across the board cutbacks of
23% on all government programs
•
Many international donors are outraged
“The strong backing of the government by the USA is evident with a recent highly publicized $3million
contribution to Uganda's defence budget. The Government's increase in defence spending to cover the cost
of Operation Iron-Fist is being recovered through across the board cutbacks of 23% on all government
programs, which is in violation of its debt relief agreement through HIPC. Many international donors are
outraged and have threatened to cut basket program funding to the government
in response. With a worsening humanitarian situation and absolute poverty increasing dramatically in the
north, and the governance principles of NEPAD being weakened in Uganda, the international community
faces a dilemma over how to react and what to do next.” (LIU, 1 February 2003)
International response to the resurgent crisis in Northern Uganda (2002)
•
WFP distributed food to 40 scattered IDP camps in norhtern Uganda with army escorts
•
WFP received only 23,322 tons of food out of the total 175,646 tons pledged, which does not even
cover the estimated IDP needs of 23,760 tons for the next 3 months
•
On 19th June 2002 WFP halted humanitarian assistance and projects in Gulu to 316,000 IDPs due
to insecurity
•
Security delays in Kitgum and Pader resulted in 29% reduction on planned monthly food delivery
(June 2002)
•
UNICEF collaborating with World Vision in distribution of tents and other non-food items
•
520 000 IDPs in the north almost entirely dependent on food aid and no harvest is forseen before
August 2003
•
WHO distributing medical kits in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader and requesting funding to address
cholera, meningitis, female hygiene and malaria particularly affecting IDPs
•
ICRC providing non-food items and registering newly diaplaced
"Despite the high-levels of insecurity, the World Food Programe (WFP) had been able, with enhanced
military escorts from the Ugandan army, to deliver food to the 40 scattered and isolated camps in the three
war-torn northern districts.
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According to WFP, however, a serious complication of the current insecurity was the likelihood that the
522,000 displaced people would lose both their current harvest, and the smaller second harvest, as they
were unable to access their fields." (IRIN 9 September 2002)
"WFP desperately requires additional pledges for PRRO 10121, which as of 8 August had only 23,322 tons
pledged out of a total requirement of 175,646 tons. A pipeline break is projected for September for cereals.
WFP estimated that 522,000 IDPs will require 23,760 tons of food over the next 3 months at a cost of USD
14,199,393. WFP appeals to the donor community to respond quickly with donations to meet the
humanitarian requirement. Cash donations for the local purchase of maize and beans are urgently required."
(WFP 9 August 2002)
"The United Nations’ World Food Programme (UN WFP) reports precarious food-security prospects in
northern Uganda this year due to the LRA attacks, which have also severely limited access to fields for
farmers in outlying areas and for IDPs in protected camps in the three districts. The agency reveals people
continue to abandon their homes, opting to move to large displaced people’s camps or to nearby urban
locations and trading centers. In response to increasing food requirements by the 546,000 IDPs and
affected refugees, the agency has begun a three-month food distribution, starting July 2002, to cater to each
affected person’s daily recommended ratio of 400 grams of cereals, 60 grams of pulses, and 20 grams of
oil. Sugar and salt will also be provided at 20 and 5 grams, respectively, per person per day when they are
available. The emergency response will require 19,656 tons of maize meal, 2,945 tons of pulses, 983 tons
of oil, 35 tons of salt, and 139 tons of sugar." (FEWS 7 August 2002)
"WFP, a major actor in the region, is distributing a settlement package, both food and non-food items
(NFIs) to about 74,657 out of 87,000 IDPs. The beneficiaries are receiving food for three months and
agricultural tools of a hoe and a panga per family and distributions are scheduled to end in the first week of
September. Meanwhile, WFP, which ceased general food distributions in the first week of July 2002, is still
receiving registrations of IDPs who have returned to their homes of origin and also concentrating on its
remaining programmes - school feeding to cover all 112 primary schools with an estimated 62,000 pupils
and Food for Assets (FFA) which is slowly picking up pace." (OCHA July/August 2002)
•
"UNICEF has availed tents to World Vision (2), Lacor (4), Gulu (1) and Anaka (1) hospitals, 55
cartons of High Protein milk, 25 bicycles, 50 Crest latrines (30 Lacor, 10 Gulu Hospital, 10 for Anaka
Hospital). It has also delivered blankets, jerrycans, soap, biscuits, plastic sheeting and several household
items like cooking pans and basins.
•
Before the resurgence in June 2002, WFP was distributing 30 percent of minimum daily dietary
requirements to 520,000 IDPs, but is currently working to distribute 100 percent to this massive caseload.
People are now depending almost entirely on WFP for food. Moreover, even if the security situation
improves rapidly, sustained food need is anticipated, as there is no planting going on for the second season
– thus there will be no significant harvest prior to August 2003, at best.
•
WHO dispatched some 10 medical kits to Gulu, with plans to dispatch the same to Pader and to
Kitgum through NGOs; has also availed 4 medical kits to UNHCR for the refugees moving to Kiryadongo;
is funding Gulu district to allow medical staff carry out outreach programmes and has requested more
funding from headquarters to address cholera, meningitis, female hygiene and malaria.
•
UNFPA shifted its programme to emergency response and has given 8 tonnes of safe birth kits to
IRC for distribution to medical units and has ordered more from headquarters. Has also subcontracted
AMREF and CPAR to equip some maternity units on the periphery of Gulu
•
FAO dispatched agricultural kits to Gulu, Kitgum and Pader, but these are currently still in
Government stores. With the constant movement of people they are not likely to be distributed soon. Aim
of the kits is to make the people more self-sufficient in the long run." (OCHA, July/August 2002)
"District authorities recommend UPDF escorts particularly for food relief vehicles, but also for those
traveling/working outside the town centres. Since the LRA incidents intensified though, many NGOs and
international organizations have either scaled down field activities to a minimum, or are on standby. Many
184
local residents spend nights in Gulu town, for safety. Agencies are however continuously assessing the
situation so that they resume activities to the vulnerable population. WFP, a major humanitarian actor in the
north, halted food distributions on 19th June 2002 to 316,000 IDPs in protected camps and other projects in
Gulu District. In Kitgum and Pader Districts, only 71 percent of the planned monthly distribution was
achieved during June due to security delays, affecting a further 149,000 IDPs and refugees. WFP, which
has had talks with the 4th Division Commander in Gulu, plans to resume food distribution when
requirements for security/escort are provided by the UPDF.
WFP notes that delays in food distribution during this hungry season will result in increased hunger, anger
and frustration in IDP settlements. It is therefore necessary to increase security for all food convoys, WFP
staff, other humanitarian actors and vehicle movements. The increased risk of LRA attacks on IDP
settlements following food deliveries and distribution consequently means need for increased security
around IDP settlements." (OCHA June 2002)
ICRC response:
"However, the Uganda Red Cross Society has remained active in most of the affected areas to curb the
impact of the disaster on the lives thousands of civilians who have lost their livelihoods by. The Red Cross
is carrying out field assessments, registrations and distributions of non-food items including, tarpaulins,
blankets, cooking pots, soap and jerry cans.
So far tarpaulins, blankets, saucepans, bars of soap and jerry cans have been distributed in the camps of
Alero, Aparanga, Labongogali, Katikati, Pece, Laro and Pagak.
[…]
Alero camp has 2,304 households with a population of 11,520 people. Recently, the rebels burned down
820 houses and the Uganda Red Cross assisted the people by providing them with tarpaulins for temporary
shelter.
[…]
The priority needs for the internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are food, shelter, clothing and
household items, and the Uganda Red Cross is hoping to be able to distribute relief items to 100,000
affected persons in coming months." (ICRC 4 September 2002)
IDP related food aid during 2002
•
7000 tons of food distributed to 585,400 beneficiaries during August 2002
•
As of 31 August, 60,900 people had received their three-month food-resettlement ration in
Rwenzori
•
WFP stopped food distribution in Bundibugyo in July 2002
•
WFP appeals to other organizations to urgently provide agricultural inputs and construction
materials to returning IDPs in Rwenzori region
•
WFP expect the IDP beneficiary numbers to decrease from 542,000 during 2002 to 115,000 by
the beginning of 2005
•
Recovery activities to comprise Food For Asssets; educational support (school feeding); and
support for social care structures
"WFP distributed almost 7,000 tons of food to over 585,400 beneficiaries during the month of August
under the PRRO 6176.00/10121.00 and the regional PRRO 10062.0. WFP continued to extend food aid
assistance to over 530,400 IDPs and refugees in the Acholi sub-region amidst deteriorating security in
August. WFP will continue to provide a full ration to IDPs in 40 isolated settlements for the next two
months, pending a review of the food security situation in October. The deteriorating situation continues to
curtail IDPs from accessing their gardens to harvest and plant for the second season crops." (WFP, 27
September 2002)
185
Rwenzori Region
"After the finalisation of relief food distribution to IDPs in Bundibugyo District, WFP commenced
distribution of a three-month resettlement food ration to IDPs who have now returned to their homes after
five years of displacement. This distribution was expected to be completed by 15 September after which
assistance will be geared towards recovery activities through food-for-assets and support to education
through the school-feeding programme. As of 31 August, 60,900 beneficiaries had received their settlement
rations. Non-food items provided by WFP will be distributed immediately after completion of the food
distribution." (WFP, 27 September 2002)
"With the above positive trends, need for general food distribution has been greatly reduced and it is on this
note that WFP stopped general food distribution in Bundibugyo on 5th July 2002. A three-month family
ration will be distributed to IDPs who return and already, 1000 families who returned have received a ration
for 45 days. In November 2001, WFP also distributed 6000 sickles, hoes and pick-axes along with seeds
from COOPI. Through meetings with the various stakeholders in Bundibugyo, including district leadership,
sub-county chiefs, and humanitarian agencies, WFP communicated its intentions to end general food
distributions and all are in agreement with the move.
Other WFP programme’s that will continue are:
•
The current school-feeding programme, which caters for 30,000 children in an estimated 51
schools in the district. By end of December 2002, WFP hopes to have covered an additional 30,000
children, thus covering the whole district, which has an estimated 60,000 school going children.
•
Food for asset programme which has two components - food for work and food for training (for
example training in contour planting so as to improve the ecology of the district). WFP will start
sensitisation on food for assets in the district in July.
•
Thirdly, WFP has plans to start a development project in agriculture and marketing in July and
Bundibugyo is one of the target districts.
There are more needs to meet for IDPs as they return home; mainly agricultural inputs (seeds and
agricultural tools) and construction material (i.e plastic sheeting and thatch material). WFP is a food aid
organization and its financial resources are limited, it therefore has met just some of all the required
interventions, and other humanitarian partners are urged to intervene. Consequently, WFP drafted a budget
for the identified needed items as follows;
•
•
•
Agricultural tools $135,000 (includes 37,878 hoes; 18,939 axes and 18939 pangas)
Seeds - $212,841 – (includes beans, 115.4Mt; soya beans, 96Mt; Maize, 96Mt; upland rice 95 Mt)
Estimates for construction materials need to be done
There is need for other humanitarian agencies to come in and intervene in provision of the above needs"
(OCHA June 2002)
Kitgum
"Following a WFP verification exercise in Kitgum, the beneficiary numbers have increased from the
current beneficiary caseload of 82,645 to 126,322 beneficiaries. This represents a 34.5 percent increase in
the beneficiary caseload at IDP camps." (OCHA April/May 2002)
"The protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO) expansion envisages an increase in the selfsufficiency of substantial numbers of IDPs over a three-year period. Relief interventions (including
supplementary feeding) and/or as a return/reintegration package, will continue to constitute the majority of
food aid inputs. IDP beneficiary numbers are expected to reduce significantly to 115,000 by the beginning
of the third year. By contrast, the refugee caseload will remain above 100,000, though at reduced ration
levels as government land allocation enhances livelihoods.
186
Some 292,000 primary schoolchildren in refugee, IDP and host population areas will receive a cooked
breakfast or lunch as part of an expanding programme aimed at enhancing attendance and learning. This
will be linked with current government priorities under the Universal Primary Education scheme.
Opportunities to increase assets through food-based activities will be extended to some 48,000
beneficiaries in the first year of the PRRO, with a further 23,000 beneficiaries added in each subsequent
year. In addition, the PRRO will assist some 11,300 individuals who are being provided with residential
and/or rehabilitative care through partners, including former abductees and those assisted through AIDS
service organizations.
[...]
IDP beneficiary numbers are expected to decrease significantly, from 542,000 during the first year to
115,000 by the beginning of third year. Relief needs during the initial resettlement phase will remain high
as people return to face overgrown land, poorly maintained infrastructure and additional expenditure on
household reconstruction. Included in the relief needs is a three-month resettlement food package for IDPs.
In IDP and refugee settlements receiving WFP assistance, WFP will provide 100 percent of food needs for
extremely vulnerable individuals (EVIs), i.e. those without family or community support, including the
disabled, orphans and the lone elderly. These persons are estimated at 19,900 in the first two years and
11,150 in the third year. The community and/or partner organizations will select EVIs, and food will be
provided for them through existing distribution structures. WFP will help communities refine their targeting
criteria and will provide suggestions on how those communities can further support vulnerable persons
living among them. To date, between 60 and 95 percent of IDP and refugee recipients at distributions have
been women.
WFP will continue to provide food commodities to supplementary and therapeutic feeding centres (SFCs
and TFCs) in IDP and refugee situations when the prevalence level of global acute malnutrition indicates a
need for selective nutritional intervention.
[...]
Recovery/School Feeding
Baseline surveys for the UPE scheme have recognized an urgent need to bolster attendance in previously
run-down or abandoned schools. In the northern region, a further 126,000 children in IDP camps and native
homestead areas will be included in the programme. In West Nile refugee catchment areas, school feeding
will assist both refugee and national primary-school students in refugee-hosting sub-counties, 106,000
students in 191 schools will be assisted by year three. In Bundibugyo, the PRRO will support an estimated
60,000 schoolchildren by the second year. HIV/AIDS education will be introduced in the school curriculum
through WFP partners. WFP will also advocate for HIV/AIDS education through participation within the
Ministry of Education/Donor Group on Education.
Food-for-assets
The PRRO will support 48,000 persons with food for assets (FFA) in the refugee, IDP and Karamoja
regions, during the first year. As resettled populations stabilize and general distribution drops, more diverse
and numerous FFA projects (including food for training [FFT]) will be encouraged, with an additional
23,000 beneficiaries in the second and third years. In line with WFP’s Commitments to Women, efforts
will be made to ensure that at least 50 percent of FFA direct beneficiaries and owners of assets created are
women. Food for work (FFW) will benefit former IDPs after resettlement in home villages and refugees
phased out of general food distributions. FFT will facilitate resettlement and self-reliance through training
for refugees and IDPs in skills that support sustainable livelihoods.
[...]
The largest relief operation is for IDPs in the north. There are 33 IDP camps in Gulu district and 8 in
Kitgum/Pader districts. The general trend is towards more people accessing their land; their spending time
in their original homes; and their leaving children, the disabled and the elderly in the camps. These people
return to the camps to receive their food rations and/or for safety, when the security situation is
unfavourable. The PRRO 14 WFP/EB.1/2002/8/2 projects general food distribution needs for 462,000
187
people in the first year, dropping to 115,000 by the third year. The figure includes resettlement food
packages and continuing support to specific vulnerable individuals.
In western Uganda, WFP supports IDPs in some 46 camps in Bundibugyo. The actual total IDP figure,
including those spontaneously settled in Nyahuka and Bundibugyo towns, is about 120,000. In the first year
of the PRRO expansion, a working relief figure of 80,000 is envisaged, dropping to zero in the second year
as home areas are fertile and anticipated rates of resettlement are high. [...] The school feeding programme
locates the PRRO within a wider developmental framework for Uganda, assisting disrupted schools in reopening and ensuring that children have at least one nutritious meal a day. The number of pupils benefiting
from school feeding will increase from 258,000 in the first year of the PRRO to 292,000 in the second year,
as a greater number of schools come on-line. The school feeding programme will introduce activities
related to the conservation and rehabilitation of natural resources, including the introduction of fuel-saving
stoves, tree nurseries and vegetable gardens.
Recovery activities for both refugees and IDPs comprise FFA (including training); educational support
(school feeding); and support for social care structures. FFA is vital for re-establishing income-generation
and subsistence farming activities in resettled communities. Appropriate FFW infrastructure projects will
be complemented by skills training, particularly for women, in efforts to stimulate diverse means of support
for the women’s families. Participatory planning is central to the strategy; likewise, projects will for the
most part be linked with complementary inputs from donors and the Government. Notable among such
projects is the FAO-supported Plan for the Modernization of Agriculture (PMA)." (WFP 27 December
2001, pp, 3, 10-11, 13-14)
"The World Food Programme (WFP) continues to feed the displaced and refugees under the Protracted
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 6176) that ends in March 2002 with a planned extension from April
2002 – March 2005. The activities under the current PRRO and the new one range from general food
distribution; school feeding of primary level pupils; food for work/assets and food for training projects;
supplementary and therapeutic feeding of moderately and severely malnourished children respectively; and
provision of food to orphans and formerly abducted children. Women continue to be earmarked as a
priority target group in WFP operations because of their special vulnerabilities to food insecurity and offer
an opportunity for using WFP assistance to build long-term food security." (OCHA January 2002)
"Re-registration of IDPs in Bundibugyo is currently going on as a joint District and WFP enterprise and it
was announced that general food distribution will be discontinued as of July this year. Food distribution
will only continue through school feeding and reaching especially the vulnerable part of the population for
another couple of years. Active promotion for return is being done in close cooperation with the grassroot
level of the community.
[...]
World Food Programme (WFP) continues to feed the displaced and refugees under the Protracted Relief
and Recovery Operation (PRRO 6176). During the reporting period WFP distributed food to 146,197 IDPs
in Gulu out of 315,966; 82,645 IDPs in Kitgum and 23,000 refugees in Achol-pii. Gulu beneficiaries get a
45-day cycle food distribution, whereas Kitgum’s food distribution is monthly. Implementation of all WFP
operations is done in close collaboration with government and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
Implementing Partners (IPs). Norwegian Refugee Council is the implementing partner for general food
distribution to IDPs, whilst International Rescue Committee (IRC) is the IP for refugees in Achol-pii. WFP
also provides food aid to support activities of other partners working in areas parallel to it’s own operations
in northern Uganda, such as the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) on Food for Assets (FFA); Gulu Save the
Children Organization (GUSCO), World Vision and KICWA on feeding returned/formerly abducted
children in psychosocial support centers; and others on a demand driven basis." (OCHA February 2002)
Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Uganda 2003: Mid-Year Review
188
•
Objectives for the rest of 2003:
•
To ensure adequate provision of humanitarian assistance, both food and non-food to IDPs
•
To increase Human Immune-deficiency Virus awarness among IDPs
•
Strengthen reproductive health facilities/primary health care units
•
The World Bank and the GoU have started the implementation of five-year Northern Uganda
Social Action Fund to enhance the capacity of communities to systematically identify, prioritise,
and plan for their needs
"The Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CA) for 2003 aims to address the needs of more than 800,000
internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 190,000 refugees. As of 16 May 2003, the United Nations (UN)
and its partners had received US$ 51,828,109, approximately 41% of the revised CA 2003 requirements of
US$ 126,614,674. The initial requirements (US 88,538,479) had been revised upward in April for increased
WFP food needs.
The following are the priorities until end of 2003:
•
To ensure adequate provision of humanitarian assistance, both food and non-food (especially food
education, water and sanitation), to the estimated 800,000 IDPs population;
•
Strengthen the coordination mechanisms at the field level;
•
To increase Human Immune-deficiency Virus / Acquired Immune-Deficiency Syndrome
(HIV/AIDS) awareness among IDPs in camps or 'protected villages' to prevent the spread of the pandemic;
•
To strengthen reproductive health facilities/primary health care units in the North, Northeast and
West Nile regions;
•
Strengthen the Amnesty Commission to enable it fully discharge its obligations in processing
applications, issuing certificates, resettling returnees/reporters, and reintegrating ex-combatants;
•
To promote measures to protect children and prevent further abductions;
•
To strengthen the three rehabilitation centres (Kitgum Concerned Women's Association
[KICWA], Gulu Support for Children Organization [GUSCO] centres in Kitgum and the World Vision
centre in Gulu) which receive returning abductees following their escape or capture;
2. External environment: effects on the humanitarian programme
The steps taken by the Government of Uganda (GoU) to reconcile its differences both internally and
externally have contributed towards improvement in the security situation in the West Nile sub-region on
the one hand, and rapprochement in relations between Uganda and Sudan, on the other. Though the latter
situation led to the renewal of the security protocol that allowed Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) to
pursue the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebels into Southern Sudan, the insecurity has remained chronic
and in some instances has escalated. However, it is important to note that unconfirmed reports of covert
military assistance by both sides to each other's opposition groups could seriously compromise prospects
for an early realisation of peace in the region, and Northern Uganda in particular.
On the home front, the total restoration of relative calm in Southwest Uganda coupled with the signing of a
peace agreement between the GoU and the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) II, on 24 December
2002, has considerably improved the security situation in the West Nile sub-region. Similarly, recent peace
moves in the Acholi sub-region provided a glimmer of hope for a resolution of the conflict in the sub-
189
region, despite the setbacks created by the continued LRA atrocities, and the cancellation of the limited
Presidential ceasefire, leading to a resumption of hostilities by both sides.
Of concern to the humanitarian organisations, is the current escalation of insecurity in the Acholi subregion that has caused further re-displacement of population, increased humanitarian needs, and greatly
limited humanitarian access to the affected population.
However, several developments in the region have also raised hopes for a return of peace. In the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), these include the establishment of the Ituri Pacific Commission
(IPC) and the commitment by Uganda to withdraw its troops from the Ituri region by the 24 April 2003.
The recent appointment of the President of Tanzania, Mr. Benjamin Mkaapa, to mediate peace negotiations
between Uganda and Rwanda, is another positive development.
The following factors are also worth mentioning:
1. The ongoing Machakos/Karen peace process on the Sudanese conflict gives hope for an early realisation
of peaceful in Southern Sudan. This could, in turn, lead to the elimination of LRA bases in Southern Sudan,
reduction in proliferation of weapons across the common border, and making the end of the Northern
Uganda conflict more achievable;
2. The stalled disarmament process and the alleged increasing commercialisation of cattle rustling within
and outside Karamoja as well as the issue of cross-border small arms proliferation have all combined to
perpetuate insecurity in the Karamoja sub-region and the neighbouring districts of Katakwi, Kapchorwa,
Kitgum, Lira and Pader;
3. The recently concluded NRM National Executive Committee meeting and National Conference and the
recommendations on opening up the political space for the return to multi-party politics, if successfully
implemented, could reduce political tensions, thereby improving security and stability in much of the
country;
4. Uganda's commendable efforts in combating the spread of the HIV/AIDS virus, the declaration of
Universal Primary Education (UPE), and other initiatives aimed at poverty alleviation such as the Poverty
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), and the Recovery Plan for Northern Uganda could easily be undermined
by the insurgency in the North, unless concrete measures are taken to resolve the conflict peacefully;
5. The successful multi-party elections in neighbouring Kenya, and the resulting peaceful transition poses a
major challenge to Uganda's image as a role model in terms of economic recovery.
To complement provision of humanitarian assistance by UN agencies, the World Bank and the GoU have
started the implementation of five-year Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) programmes in 18
districts of the North. The main objective of the programme is to enhance the capacity of communities to
systematically identify, prioritise, and plan for their needs, and to implement sustainable development
initiatives that improve socio-economic services and opportunities in crisis areas in Northern Uganda.
Another development is an initiative by a consortium of NGOs to implement a Community Resilience and
Dialogue (CRD) programme. Depending on a positive security environment, these changes would have
direct impact on the humanitarian programme in Uganda.
The Donor Technical Group (DTG) on Amnesty, and on North and Recovery from Conflict has played a
major role in sensitising the GoU and its development partners on the need to adopt an integrated approach
to development, through recognising the importance of emergency humanitarian assistance, while at the
same time preparing the ground for recovery and rehabilitation. The DTG also ensures that marginalised
and vulnerable groups as well as those benefiting from the amnesty in the North and Northeast are
mainstreamed in development planning through increasing funding to programmes in these areas.
190
In recent years, the Government has increasingly urged donors to support the budget funding modality,
which provides the Government with the greatest flexibility with which to deliver public services
efficiently and to implement the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP). GoU is further urging all
financial assistance received from Global Funds to be utilised as part of sector budget support or project aid
and integrated into the appropriate budget-line.
Last year's total budget for all the Ministries was cut by 23% in order to subsidise the Ministry of Defence
expenditure. This was due to a cut in defence budget subsidies by the UK and other donors. The situation
for next year's budget is unclear.
The other factors which directly or indirectly affect the humanitarian situation and response are:
•
The two-sided images of Uganda (a success story in terms of economic reforms, and yet embroiled
in combating insurgency in the North of the country and the DR Congo) detract attention from vulnerable
groups;
•
Effects of prolonged drought in Karamoja, coupled with the cattle rustling traditions of the
Karimojong themselves have exacerbated the humanitarian situation in the sub-region as well as that of the
neighbouring districts;
•
Progress made on the IDP policy;
•
Likely impact of the Iraq crisis on funding for humanitarian operations.
The ongoing peace moves in the North are not seen to be producing any immediate significant impact on
humanitarian activities.
3. Progress made towards stated goals and objectives:
The overall goals remain the same, given that the humanitarian situation has not changed significantly.
With the continuing insecurity in the Northern region, humanitarian agencies are expected to continue to
implement life-saving activities such as provision of relief food, drugs, shelter materials, water and
sanitation, educational materials and psychosocial support services to the affected population. While the
relative peace in the Rwenzori region has encouraged a return of some IDPs to their homes, the support of
the international organisations will still be required through implementation of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes that are expected to improve their livelihoods.
While the return and recovery of IDPs in the Acholi sub-region remains a major concern, concerted efforts
have been made by government and UN agencies to put together an IDP return and re-integration plan for
Gulu, which can be replicated in other affected districts.
The following activities have been carried out to achieve the stated goals:
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) through its regular funding from the UN Trust Fund for Human
Security carried out health reproductive related activities such as training courses on Life Saving Skills for
15 midwives from Gulu district. Although it was initially planned to expand the programme to Kitgun and
Pader districts, insufficient funding has limited the assistance to Gulu.
WFP continues to provide food assistance to 33 IDP camps in Gulu, 7 IDP camps in Kitgum, and 66
refugee settlements in the districts of Arua, Moyo, Adjumani, Masindi, Hoima, Kyenjojo, and Mbarara.
The assisted populations in Uganda include 534,872 IDPs in Gulu, Kitgum, and Lira (an additional
caseload of 241,216 IDPs in Pader to be reached once UPDF military escorts become available), and
141,828 refugees in Arua, Moyo, Adjumani, Masindi, Hoima, Kyenjojo, and Mbarara.
191
Several inter-agency needs assessment missions have been conducted in the North and Northeast to identify
needs as well as existing gaps.
About 6,500 reporters and ex-combatants have availed themselves of the Amnesty by renouncing rebellion
and returned home. (It is important to specify that the vast majority of the 6,500 reporters and excombatants are those individuals who were abducted when they were children and are only in a position to
avail themselves of the Amnesty as a result of successfully escaping, or being captured during the
hostilities by UPDF forces. Only a very small number of LRA commanders can be said to have renounced
rebellion and chosen to leave the LRA in a voluntary manner).
International Organization for Migration (IOM) continues the repatriation of rebels (LRA, UNRF II and
Uganda National Freedom Movement (UNFM).
An inter-agency Protection Working Group (PWG) was established to monitor the violation of IDPs basic
rights.
District Disaster Management Committees in all the affected districts have been reactivated and
strengthened through training.
The June 2002 LRA rebel resurgence in the North led to the establishment of the Contact Group on
Northern Uganda that meets bi-weekly to discuss, develop humanitarian strategy, share information and
advocate for the rights of IDPs as well as supporting efforts aimed at peaceful resolution of the on-going
conflict.
Reactivated the inter-agency website (Ugandaid.org) that will soon provide on-line, instant access on
Uganda-specific information, including needs assessments, situation and evaluation reports; detailed project
proposals, maps, agency directories, monthly humanitarian updates, and appeals and contributions.
The Humanitarian Coordinator through series of consultation with the GoU officials has continued to
advocate for humanitarian access to the affected population, and where possible, access by the internally
displaced persons to their gardens. Besides, he has continuously advocated for increased humanitarian
assistance from donors, in addition to sensitising government on the need for more budget resources for
humanitarian assistance.
Food and other essential services such as health and nutrition, water and sanitation, psychosocial support
and vocational training continue to be provided by the humanitarian organisations." ( UN May 2003, midyear review)
Constraints encountered and progress made by the humanitarian community (2002)
•
Principal operational constraint
environment
•
Uganda is widely perceived by donors to be doing well in rehabilitation and recovery programmes
•
Procedures for implementing the Amnesty Act of 2000 still unclear
•
National Policy on Internal Displacement based on study carried out
•
Training session on the Guiding Principles conducted
•
Government created three working groups to address the Amnesty, IDPs and Karamoja issues
was the rapid and unexpected deterioration of the security
192
Operational constraints
"Lack of sustained reliable access to affected people in some parts of the country because of insecurity;
military escorts still lack regular supplies of fuel, armoured vehicles and personnel resulting in delayed
convoys, high transport costs and untimely deliveries of relief items.
Uganda is widely perceived by donors to be doing well in rehabilitation and recovery programmes, yet
insufficient attention is being paid to the complex emergency areas.
Funding through the CAP is low for most UN agencies and non-existent for participating NGOs, resulting
in partial or non-implementation of projects.
Access by vulnerable groups to their farms and homes have been impeded by land mines. Furthermore,
humanitarian actors have been hampered by presence of mine fields in their areas of operations.
Poor quality of roads that makes it difficult to travel as well as relief convoys more vulnerable to banditry
and rebel attacks.
Donors continue with a strategy that disburses significant funds for development in more stable areas, but
leaves humanitarian activities under-funded.
Due to lack of funding, humanitarian programmes often lack complementarity and fail to build synergies.
For example, the success of emergency school feeding in increasing enrolment and providing children with
improved diets and cognitive performance is yet to be matched with the provision of adequate school
structures, scholastic materials and teacher training.
Despite concerted efforts by the police, military and paramilitary forces to maintain law and order, the LRA
continues to carry out attacks on civilians in those areas in Northern and Northeast regions (Gulu, Kitgum,
Pader, Katakwi, Kotido, Moroto and Nakapiripirit) and in the West Nile Region, particularly Adjumani.
These incidents have resulted in heightened security risks to humanitarian staff, their vehicles and
equipment.
There has been a delay in finalising the National Policy on Internal Displacement by the Government of
Uganda. Therefore, specific interventions planned by the Government in resolving the problems of
insecurity, and its strategy on IDP camps/protected villages and reintegration, have still not been
streamlined. This has prevented the UN, bilateral aid missions and others from articulating an integrated
framework for relief and recovery.
Funding constraints experienced by the Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees (DDPR), which
is under the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) have prevented the government from fully exercising its
strategic coordination role.
Inadequate human resources and capacity in the area of emergency response within Government ministries
and departments continues to hamper the Government’s ability to place the internal crisis higher on the
national agenda.
Procedures for implementing the Amnesty Act 2000, which provides amnesty to any Ugandan who has
been engaged in armed rebellion or war against the Government since 1986 are still unclear, staffing and
funding for the Amnesty Act remain inadequate, and overall progress with the programme is too slow. In
this situation, domestic conditions are not be conducive to the return and reintegration of reporters,
abducted children and unarmed opposition groups.
Progress made based on the consolidated appeal 2002
193
Despite the inadequate resources and operational constraints encountered by the humanitarian community
in Uganda, some progress was made to reduce human suffering and improve the prospects for the affected
population. The following activities were carried out to achieve the goals in the 2002 CAP:
The relative calm in the country during 2001 allowed for a study on the 'Protected Villages' in northern
Uganda between November 2001 and January 2002. As a result of the recommendations of the study, the
Government, with support from OCHA, has drafted a National Policy on Internal Displacement.
·
OCHA’s IDP Unit visited Uganda to assist the Government, the UNCT, the NGO community and
International organisations in the development of the national IDP policy. A training session on the Guiding
Principles was conducted, and recommendations for addressing IDP needs as well as elements of a return
strategy for IDPs in the north, (Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts) were made.
In March 2002, the Government created three working groups to address the Amnesty, IDPs and Karamoja
issues. The working groups have helped to strengthen the coping mechanisms and the Government’s
capacity to provide services in the affected districts.
The OCHA field office in Gulu has assisted the humanitarian agencies with coordination and information
management services, and ensured that returnees are provided with accurate and timely information on the
security situation.
The joint visit of heads of agencies to the West Nile assessed the performance of the Self-Reliance Strategy
and discussed ways and means of improving coordination.
An inter-agency forum on early warning system was established, building national capacity to design
uniform formats and use the Deep Field Mailing System (DFMS) for data collection and compilation on
early warning indicators.
A consolidated inter-agency contingency plan for the country was developed to: a) review recent
events/trends; b) identify likely and worst-case scenarios; c) consider consequences, assumptions, and
triggering mechanisms.
Further work has been done to establish an inter-agency web site, under the auspices of the UN Resident
Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator system. However, funding is needed to keep it up and running so
that it is useful as a source of information sharing among humanitarian and development partners." (UN
November 2002 pp 7-8)
UN coordination mechanism
Interview with UN responsible for coordination of IDP activities(November 2003)
•
OCHA should be the most flexible, service-minded and proactive fire brigade for humanitarian
concerns, helping to make the UN as a system more efficient and effective in meeting
humanitarian needs
•
OCHA should coordinate between the UN and NGOs
•
OCHA will increase its presence in northern Uganda from one office, to three to five offices in the
next months
•
OCHA will coordinate more efficient and effective action by humanitarian organizations - NGO
and UN
•
OCHA will work closely with donors and others to influence the government to provide more
effective security
194
"On 2 September 2003, Jan Egeland of Norway began work as UN Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, succeeding Kenzo Oshima.
Egeland has 25 years of experience in humanitarian affairs, human rights and peace efforts with the UN,
the Norwegian government, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, as well as with NGOs and
academic institutions.
IRIN spoke with Egeland while he was in Nairobi on Tuesday, during which he talked about his vision of
the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), his recent visit to northern Uganda
and his upcoming visit to the DRC, as well as his hopes for donor support of peace and humanitarian relief
efforts in the Great Lakes region.
Q: You have been the head of OCHA for two and a half months now. What is your view of OCHA and the
role it should play in humanitarian affairs?
A: OCHA should be the most flexible, service-minded and proactive fire brigade for humanitarian
concerns, helping to make the UN as a system more efficient and effective in meeting humanitarian needs.
We are not the ones to be operational - we will never deliver food nor medical supplies - but we should
support humanitarian partners within the UN system, as well as outside. As I also serve as emergency relief
coordinator, it is important for me that OCHA serves to coordinate between the UN and NGOs, who play
an increasingly important role in providing humanitarian assistance.
Q: You visited northern Uganda from Friday until Monday. What is your assessment of the situation there?
A: The reason that I wanted to go to Uganda is that I knew that the situation was bad - worse than any other
forgotten and neglected crisis in the world at the moment. But I was shocked at the testimonies of the many
children I met who could tell of the most grotesque cruelty against them: children abducted and forced to be
child soldiers or sex slaves, forced to attack their own villages, their own families. And to see the tens of
thousands of children forced to become internally displaced, or "night commuters", as they are called,
walking every night for hours to sleep safely on the grounds around hospitals and other community centres
in the towns because they are afraid to be abducted or killed. This is a moral outrage, and it cannot and
should not continue. The world must invest more political, diplomatic and financial capital to make it end.
Q: You pledged to lend OCHA's efforts to get northern Uganda on to the international agenda. What would
this intervention involve?
A: We will do a number of things. While I say that the world as well as Uganda has not done enough for
the civilian population caught in the crossfire in northern Uganda, I also admit that the UN should do more,
and we will do more. UN agencies are scaling up their operations. Presently, it is only the very effective,
efficient and courageous work of the World Food Programme, which is virtually the only major UN and
humanitarian agency in the whole of northern Uganda, and it has averted starvation, kept people alive.
So, OCHA will increase its presence in northern Uganda from one office, to three to five offices in the next
months. We will thereby help coordinate more efficient and effective action by humanitarian organizations
- NGO and UN - and we will try to work closely with donors and others to influence the government to
provide more effective security for our aid workers and our humanitarian convoys, because we do not even
have access to most of the victims in northern Uganda today.
Q: Humanitarian access in northern Uganda has been a matter of particular concern. How might this be
improved in light of increased rebel activity?
195
A: I think we need to do a number of things. We need to have the government provide more effective
protection. And we need to be able, directly or indirectly, to tell the rebels that they must change their
behaviour. This is not a normal guerrilla war between rebels and a government. This is a war on, and with,
and against children. So, hopefully, we can somehow use those who can influence - whether they be
governments or community leaders or organizations or religious leaders - to influence the rebels to not
attack those who help their own people.
Q: Do you believe the political will exists in Uganda to bring an end to the conflict?
A: I was told as much by the vice-president of the country, by the deputy prime minister, and a number of
ministers, and I have no reason to doubt their word that they will do more to help stop the conflict, stop the
fighting, stop the atrocities - and not only by military means, which have proven themselves to be
ineffective and even, to some degree, counter-productive over the last two or three years.
I am sure that it will be getting due attention at the highest levels, and not only from my visit. I think all
world leaders are now more seized with the matter than before. And I am sure that beyond the political
leaders of Uganda, with whom the UN has spoken, and also President [Yoweri] Museveni, who has had
contact with the UN, I am sure that major capitals in North America, Europe and Africa will send a very
clear message to the parties that this situation cannot continue as it is.
Q: Do you think that the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) can be positively engaged in a process that could
bring the conflict to a peaceful and permanent conclusion? If LRA leader Joseph Kony is unwilling to
negotiate, what then?
A: There have been a number of initiatives in recent years and they have not borne fruition, for a variety of
reasons, and certainly it is not within my mandate to suggest or initiate new political initiatives. However,
through our humanitarian staff, we will try to reach out on humanitarian issues, such as humanitarian
access, security for humanitarian operations and convoys, protection of civilian populations, and
demobilization and reintegration of child soldiers. And it remains to be seen which channels we can use to
send these messages to the LRA. We are already in full contact with the government. But as for the LRA, it
is more difficult. However, we have been speaking to community leaders and others who have regular
contact with them.
High level UN mission held discussions with district officials, NGOs and Civil Society
Organisations (November 2003)
"The worsening humanitarian situation in northern Uganda was last week highlighted during a mission to
Kitgum and Gulu districts by the United Nations Under-Secretary General and Emergency Response
Coordinator (ERC OCHA). The delegation included the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNAIDS
Coordinator, OCHA Head of Office and Representatives of WFP, UNICEF, and FAO. In Kitgum town, the
ERC flagged off a WFP food convoy travelling with military escort, to a rural Internally Displaced Person's
(IDP) camp. The delegation held discussions with district officials, NGOs and Civil Society Organisations
(CSO) in the community, visited an urban IDP camp in Kitgum town and witnessed how children are
forced to seek shelter at Kitgum hospital each night to avoid abduction by the LRA. In Gulu, the delegation
met with District officials, the NGO/CSO community and visited the World Vision International centre for
formerly abducted children. The delegation also held discussions with the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace
Initiative (ARLPI) and the traditional chiefs. UN will launch a USD 130 million appeal for food and nonfood items to assist victims of the civil war in northern Uganda."
196
Sectoral coordination is not what it should be (September 2003)
•
Coordination will soon be decentralized in the district of Gulu and Kitgum
•
OCHA’ s field presence should be strengthened as soon as possible
•
Need for heightened coordination with respect to information gathering, processing and
dissemination
"It is more and more apparent that sectoral coordination is not what it should be within the district of Gulu
and that efforts should be coordinated and increased to deliver assistance to the IDPs in the camps.
Discussions have been initiated at Kampala level between organizations and agencies and will be soon
decentralized in the district of Gulu (and Kitgum as soon as possible) for programming an increased level
of assistance to camps." (UN OCHA 1 October 2003)
"The effectiveness of coordination structures was raised a number of times during the mission,[by UN
OCHA's IDP Unit in August 2003] both with respect to the capital but especially so with respect to the
field. With the OCHA office in Kampala now at full strength, coordination will doubtless be enhanced.
However, it is also important that OCHA’ s field presence be strengthened as soon as possible. Hence, it is
proposed that a Senior IDP Advisor be recruited and deployed to Gulu. He/she would be responsible for
coordinating IDP-related activities throughout the north and, if the LRA penetrates further southwards, for
additional areas where IDPs are being generated. The Senior IDP Advisor should be supported by national
programme officers based in Gulu and Kitgum, and if conditions deteriorate the Teso sub-region, possibly
also in Soroti. OCHA’ s Internal Displacement Unit should be approached with respect to assistance in
recruiting such an advisor. There is also a need for heightened coordination with respect to information
gathering, processing and dissemination. IDP numbers are regularly provided by WFP, but there is no
centralized IDP database where UN data, NGO data and Government data can be centralized. Ideally such a
central IDP database should be located with the DDMC, [ District Disaster Managment Committee]
however, the local DDMCs do not currently have the capacity nor the hardware to assume such a task. It is
proposed, therefore, that OCHA assumes this role, in close association with the DDMC, with the view of
handing over to the local authorities at some appropriate time in the not too distant future. To get the
process started, OCHA should approach its Field Information Support Unit in New York, as well as the
NRC IDP database in Geneva, for possible assistance with this task."(UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
Recommendations following UN mission to IDP camps (August 2003)
•
The Protection Working Group that has been established in Kampala, consisting of UN OCHA,
the Ugandan Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Prime Minister, UNICEF, IOM, and
two NGOs should be replicated at the field level
•
The local level representatives of the DDMCs [District Disaster Management Committee] must be
brought into any protection coalitions that are developed at the field level
•
OCHA in close collaboration with the DDMC, could create a detailed ‘inventory’ of the camps
that would highlight the prevailing gaps in both protection and assistance needs
" It is clear from recent reports by independent human rights monitors that abuses and exploitation of IDPs
continue to be perpetrated in the camps and that both LRA and UPDF are responsible for these, albeit to
differing degrees. Because the international actors have only limited access to the camps, the ability to
monitor and respond to protection needs remains limited. Notwithstanding, there is scope for increasing the
197
international community’ s role in protection by strengthening the coordination mechanisms at the field
level to ensure that information flows are timely and reliable and
that support is provided to IDPs seeking restitution and/or due judicial process. Thus, the Protection
Working Group that has been established in Kampala. [Consisting of UN OCHA, The Ugandan Human
Rights Commission, the Office of the Prime Minister, UNICEF, IOM, and two NGOs] should be replicated
at the field level so that local issues can be more effectively addressed and brought to the attention of the
appropriate authorities. Moreover, the local level representatives of the DDMCs [District Disaster
Management Committee] must be brought into any protection coalitions that are developed at the field
level. The mission was pleased to learn that UNICEF is deploying a child protection officer to the north
which will doubtless strengthen the overall protection response by the UN system and its partners. This will
also allow the special protection needs of the ‘night commuters’ to be more comprehensively addressed,
especially with regard to the desocializing impacts of the phenomenon. At the capital level, increased
support and encouragement must be given by the UNCT[Unite Nations Country Team] to the Humanitarian
Coordinator to bring recurrent protection problems to the very highest levels of Government in order to
ensure that national authorities fully meet their responsibilities of providing adequate protection for IDPs.
The restricted access to the IDP population in the camps is also limiting the levels of assistance provided to
them. While WFP provides basic food rations to all camps, social services remain rudimentary at best.
Education and health facilities are over taxed and under serviced. The limited NGO capacity in the region is
unable to cover the shortfalls in assistance due to inadequate Government resources flowing to the camps.
There exists a great need for psychosocial support which is largely unmet, albeit is available to a limited
degree in Gulu and Kitgum. There is virtually no income generating activity taking place in most of the
camps and food production is limited to the immediate vicinity of the camps due to security concerns.
An important role that OCHA can play, in close collaboration with the DDMC, is to create a detailed
‘inventory’ of the camps that would highlight the prevailing gaps in both protection and assistance needs
and thereby serve as an important tool for future coordination activities." (UN OCHA, 31 August 2003)
WFP to strengthen partnerships with NGOs (2002)
"WFP will seek and strengthen partnerships with NGOs. Tripartite agreements will be signed with UNHCR
and NGO implementing partners in the five refugee hosting districts. Memoranda of Understanding
(MOUs) will be negotiated with AAH (Bundibugyo/Moyo districts), Lutheran World Federation
(Adjumani), Norwegian Refugee Council (Gulu/Kitgum), Gulu Support the Children Organization (Gulu),
International Rescue Committee (Achol Pii refugee settlement) and German Development Service (Arua).
Other NGO partners include Médecins sans Frontières (MSF)/France (Therapeutic Feeding and Food for
Work in Bundibugyo; Sleeping Sickness in Arua), Action contre la faim/USA (nutritional surveys), World
Vision International (WVI) (former abductees rehabilitation centre; HIV/AIDS support programme; and
support to farmers’ groups in Gulu), Maltheser (TB project in Arua), Gulu Women’s Empowerment
Network (TB project in Gulu) and Kitgum Concerned Women’s Association (formerly abducted children).
Cooperazione Internazionale/Italy will provide seeds to IDPs in Bundibugyo. Deutscher
Entwicklungsdienst (German Development Service) (in Arua) and the Agency for Cooperation and
Research in Development (in Adjumani and Moyo) will undertake agricultural production and
environmental protection initiatives with refugee populations. The country office is in the process of
identifying appropriate partners in Karamoja. The country office will explore the possibility of a joint
performance review for partners and incorporate this into the MOU. Greater emphasis will be given to
strengthening the capacity of community distribution committees, including through ensuring female
participation and leadership. (WFP 27 December 2001, p. 17)
Registration and Information system for abductions set up by the GoU and UNICEF
198
•
Registration and Information system for abductions set up by the GoU and UNICEF: Abducted
Child Registration and Information System (ACRIS)
•
Most abductions take place from homes in rural areas.
•
1/3 of abductions registered to be children under 18.
•
A war that does not distinguish between abducted children and rebels.
Abducted Child Registration and Information System (ACRIS)
"An ‘abducted person’ as defined for this registration exercise, is a person who has been forcibly taken
away by armed persons operating in northern and southwestern Uganda. Even people who were in captivity
for a short time (a day) have been registered.
[...]
A total of 30,839 children and adults are registered as having been abducted between 1986 [sic!] and 2001.
Of these, 28,903 abductees were from northern Uganda, while 2,036 were from south-western Uganda.
Kitgum/Pader and Gulu Districts account for 41 and 38 percent of the total number of abductees
respectively. These are the districts where the LRA has been most active over the past ten years
Most abductions took place in the rural areas where people are most exposed to rebel attacks. The most
vulnerable persons are in rural homes where the rebels often strike at night. The majority of the people
(73.1 percent) were abducted from homes, while 9 percent were abducted from roads. Other places of
abductions include: the field (5.3 percent), school (3.6 percent), market (1.2 percent) and other (i.e. water
sources and IDP camps). There was no indication of place of abduction for 2.6 percent of the abductees.
[...]
A total of 17,228 persons are recorded as “returned from captivity”. Of these, 303 people (149 of them
children) returned through Entebbe airport with the help of the Government of the Sudan, IOM, UNICEF
and other international agencies. The rest, 13,611 persons, are recorded as “not returned from captivity”. Of
these, 5,923 were abducted as children and 7,327 were adults. The age for 361 abductees could not be
deducted." (UNICEF November 2001)
[…]
According to the Abducted Child Registration and Information System (ACRIS) set up by UNICEF and the
government of Uganda, some 9,818 children under the age of 18 have been abducted since the LRA war
began, or about one third of the total of 28,217 recorded abductions." (IRIN 18 April 2002)
The Rebels: armed enemy or abducted minors?
"Parents are concerned that their children have been sacrificed in a war that does not distinguish between
hostage and fighter," said Allison A. Pillsbury, program manager of the Children and Adolescents Project
of the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children." (WCRWC 13 June 2002)
"While UNICEF has expressed grave concerns over the fate of children caught up in the fighting and urged
all parties to regard those caught in the conflict "as children", Bantariza said it would be difficult for the
UPDF to guarantee their safety, because most of them had become highly militarised and were
combatants." (IRIN 5 April 2002)
“The UPDF spokesman, Shaban Bantariza, told IRIN that since the beginning of Operation Iron Fist,
Military offensive to wipe out the Rebelsover 6,000 minors had been "rescued" from the LRA. "We have
rescued thousands, killed hundreds [of rebels], and over 90 percent of Kitgum District is peaceful," he said.
"Operation Iron Fist has been more than 80 percent successful," he added. "People may be hungry and not
have enough medicines [in the camps], but they cannot be captured in hundreds and massacred."
”…But for every "rescued" child, many more have been abducted, Mao pointed out.” The government has
failed to stop abductions. It doesn't make sense to talk of the rescued as an achievement," he said
199
“For now, the child recruits, who are both victims of abduction (80-90 percent of LRA members are
estimated to have been abducted) and perpetrators of crimes, are regularly killed in combat. "It is not
possible to differentiate between children and adults," Bantariza told IRIN. "Although they are minors, they
are armed and shooting."
Other observers note the tragedy of the situation. "Who are these rebels? If you look at them, they are just
abductees who are being killed. Ours son and daughters are being killed," said Omona of ACORD. "The
army is protecting the population from their own children." (IRIN 2 Apr 2003)
Characteristics of abductions
[...]
Adolescents who have managed to escape their captors depicted compelling scenarios of their abduction –
some lasting six to 10 years. These mostly involve raids by small LRA bands, where children are rounded
up in schools, at home or elsewhere and forced to carry heavy loads between 50 and 100 miles to southern
Sudan, receiving little food along the way. En route to Sudan, many are forced to commit acts of violence
and thievery, including against other children. They are warned that refusal to obey will result in their own
deaths. Once in Sudan, they are trained as fighters in LRA encampments and, after training and
indoctrination, they are often forced to return to Uganda to commit atrocities against their own
communities and the UPDF. Some young people are even forced to kill members of their own families and
communities. As a result, many believe they can never return home because of the terrible acts they have
committed. The leaders of the LRA have created a virtual human shield in the form of a young army of
forced recruits. Anyone seeking to fight back against the LRA does so knowing that they are fighting
against a troop of abducted adolescents.
Abducted girls reported being raped, sexually enslaved and forced into domestic servitude, as described
further below, while smaller numbers are forced into armed combat. While most victims are Ugandan,
Sudanese refugee adolescents living in settlements in northern Uganda have not been spared LRA attack
and abduction.
[...]
While recorded numbers of abducted children and adolescents are estimated at over 11,000, actual numbers
may be much higher, as many young people were abducted for shorter periods of a few weeks and made it
home without further report. In a group interview with 21 randomly identified adolescent orphaned girls in
the Padibe IDP camp in Kitgum, the Women’s Commission asked for a show of hands of those who had
been abducted. Every hand but one went up.
The principal characteristic of these short-term abductions is forced labor. The girls in Padibe, for
example, told stories of being forced to carry loads and do other chores for the rebels before being let go.
This labor, along with money and supplies looted by the LRA, help to sustain the LRA’s survival and
campaign of terror." (WCRWC July 2001, pp.12, 14, 17)
Efforts to strengthen the UN capacity for coordination (2000-2001)
•
The UN Humanitarian Coordinator (same person as UN Resident Coordinator) for Uganda is
responsible for coordinating United Nations humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance to
the country
•
OCHA serves as the secretariat for the Humanitarian Coordinator
•
OCHA enlarged its office from one to six professional staff during 2000
•
OCHA field office established in Gulu and western region (Bundibugyo) during first half of 2001,
and attempt will be made to establish similar in the northeast (Karimoja)
•
Improved information systems established during 2001
200
"Overall responsibility within the UN system for coordination rests with the newly appointed UN
Humanitarian Coordinator. The Coordinator is responsible for ensuring that assistance is provided on the
basis of assessed needs and in accordance with humanitarian principles. OCHA will serve as the secretariat
for the Humanitarian Coordinator, working closely with the Office of the Prime Minister, (OPM), within
the Government of Uganda. The OPM is the line ministry responsible for natural disasters, IDPs and
refugees in Uganda.
The main goal is to support coordination mechanisms within the Government of Uganda in order to
maintain an integrated approach to policy and programming issues by strengthening existing coordination
structure. To reach this goal, the humanitarian partners in Uganda aim to:
Introduce extensive use of the Disaster Management Team (DMT) coordination mechanism including
NGOs, GOU and other relief actors. The DMT would serve as the main forum for discussion and planning
of the overall direction of the humanitarian and transitional interventions in Uganda.
Strengthen and support the District Authorities and civil society focused initiatives in the districts of
Uganda dealing with humanitarian issues.
Through capacity-building support the OPM to take the lead role on coordination of humanitarian
assistance, emergency preparedness on natural disasters and complex emergencies.
[…]
To ensure the fullest possible integration of emergency relief activities under the CAP with reconstruction
and development activities under the Framework, the position of UN Humanitarian Coordinator has been
combined with that of the UN Resident Coordinator." (UN November 2001, pp. 32, 36)
"In 2000, OCHA hired a Senior Humanitarian Adviser/Chief of Unit supported by two international
officers and five national staff, including three National Officers." (UN November 2000, p.119)
"Lead agencies will be elected to coordinate activities within their sector of expertise. These will include
both NGO and UN Agencies, depending on their competencies and capacities. UNDP and the UN Security
Coordinator (UNSECOORD) will provide security services for the humanitarian community through field
based Area Security Coordinators. UNICEF will continue to play a lead role in most social sectors,
particularly human rights and education. WFP will be responsible for coordinating telecommunications and
advising on logistics and UNHCR will remain the logical focal point for refugee assistance and protection.
AVSI, MSF, ACF, IFRC, OXFAM and other agencies will continue to facilitate coordination in other
sectors."(UN November 2000, pp. 36-37)
"In May [2001], OCHA established a field office in Gulu, co-located with WFP, International Organization
for Migration (IOM), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) with staff seconded from the NRC and
funded by the Norwegian Government. The Field Coordination Support Unit will establish District Disaster
Committees, undertake inventories of on-going and planned projects, identify resource gaps by area,
affected group and sector and establish inter-agency monitoring mechanisms in Gulu, Kitgum, Pader and
Adjumani districts. OCHA established similar coordination structures in the western region (Bundibugyo)
late April and an attempt will be made to do the same in the northeast (Karimoja) in June 2001." (OCHA
21 May 2001, "Monitoring")
"Needs assessment and planning of humanitarian assistance were vastly improved in 2001 with the
establishment of supportive information systems. The World Food Programme's (WFP) Vulnerability and
Mapping Unit worked to strengthen existing inter-agency data collection efforts and refine methodologies
and instrumentation, culminating in a comprehensive Emergency Food Needs Assessment (EFNA) that
provided valuable information on the needs, capacities and vulnerabilities of groups throughout the
country.
With assistance from the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and the Norwegian Government, OCHA
posted staff up-country to establish sector groups, support disaster planning at district level and establish,
for the first time, a database covering all UN and NGO agencies involved in humanitarian assistance
201
including inventories of on-going and planned activities by crisis area, sector and beneficiary group. The
UN is now working with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning to amalgamate data on
humanitarian and development interventions. This data, along with inter-alia situation reports, sectoral
assessments, maps, vulnerability analyses and early warning information is contained in the UgandAid.Net
Humanitarian Information Network website launched in conjunction with the CHAP/CAP 2002
(October/November 2001). The site includes forums and discussion groups for each crisis area, sector and
beneficiary group enabling agencies to share lessons-learned and maintain a general dialogue on
humanitarian issues of mutual concern." (UN November 2001, p.5)
NGO response
NGO activities in Gulu camps (October 2003)
"All camps assessed had a least one NGO/IOs currently working with the
population. The numbers of NGOs range from 1 to 11 and seem to increase by
population. The NGOs/IOs with most activities in the camps, in order of
presence, are WFP, followed by ACF-USA, Red Cross, AMREF, CPAR, and
World Vision equally represented. NRC, AVSI, GUSCO, CARE, and ACORD
also received equal mention for activities in the camps. Four camps identified
a reduction in NGO activities. Some of this can be attributed to finished work
(e.g. drilling of boreholes, protecting of springs).
The activities that identified NGOs/IOs are involved in are WAT/SAN (36%),
distribution (23%), nutrition (9%), school construction (9%), psycho-social
support (9%), health (5%), and land-mine awareness (5%), and food security
(5%)."
Humanitarian response in Soroti District (October 2003)
" 1.
MSF – France – established OPD centre at Pioneer Primary School, treat about 100 – 152 people
daily; established ORS centres; and planned to open TFCs.
2.
War on Want – supplied assorted drugs and blankets; nfis in store.
3.
ITESO – distributed NFIs to formerly abducted children; and provide training and education to the
children.
4.
Self-Help Organisation – planned to provide latrine in Amuria s/c in Katakwi.
5.
CONCERN worldwide – provided sanitation, cooking shelters, laying new water-pipes, and
supplied NFIs.
6.
CCF – Soroti – conducted registration of IDPs in Municipality; and distributed 66 mt of food
received from WFP.
7.
URCS – distributed NFIs to the affected districts (four); seven s/c in Kaberamaido received NFIs;
planned to access more IDPs in Kaberamaido; and translated IHL into calendars for dissemination among
IDPs.
8.
Global Harvest Church – distributed food and medicines; every week distribute food to the
southern part of Soroti.
9.
WVI – Soroti – distributed 15,000 blankets to IDPs in Arapai; delivered assortment of drugs to the
district; supplied soap, cooking utensils and 100 mobile toilets." (UN OCHA, 14 October 2003)
World Vision activities in the north (September 2003)
202
•
Gulu Health Project, funded by the Australian government, continued its activities within the
environs of Gulu town
•
Food was distributed to people living with AIDS (PLWA) in Atiak and Lamogi.
"Arapai and Tubur Area Development Programmes (ADPs) World Vision and UNICEF transferred LRA
abducted children to Soroti district authorities. The children from Soroti were brought from World Vision's
Gulu Children of War Rehabilitation Centre where they received psychosocial therapy and rehabilitation.
Arapai and Tubur ADPs, still operating from Soroti town, received 12,000 blankets, 660 plastic sheeting
for shelter and 36 mobile toilets for IDPs.
World Vision secured approval from district authorities to temporarily settle IDPs from Arapai and Tubur
project areas in Soroti prison grounds on the outskirts of Soroti town. World Vision will extend relief items
and services to this area.
NORTHERN UGANDA
Gulu Health Project
Gulu Health Project, funded by the Australian government, continued its activities within the environs of
Gulu town. World Vision trained community health workers (CHWs) and educated communities on family
planning and communicable diseases such as malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections.
Project staff trained two water source committees on maintenance of springs protected by World Vision
and the communities.
Food was distributed to people living with AIDS (PLWA) in Atiak and Lamogi.
Gulu Area Development Programme (ADP)
Gulu ADP, funded by World Vision New Zealand, monitored 47 sponsored children at home and at school.
The project facilitated medical treatment for 14 of them. 586 goats were distributed to World Vision
supported children. Two out of five low cost houses for families of supported children were completed
during the week.
Project staff visited people living with AIDS (PLWA) that are registered with World Vision - there are
around 5,207 people. Staff distributed WFP food supplements (high protein foods including corn soya
meal, beans and cooking oil) to 1,094 PLWA.
Project staff continue to provide counselling and home based care to PLWA. Treatment for opportunistic
infections was provided for 55 people.
The project facilitated HIV pre-test counselling and voluntary testing services (VTS) to 34 people. Three
people were assisted with access to post-test counselling.
Gulu Children of War Rehabilitation Programme
Between September 14-20, the Gulu Children of Rehabilitation Programme received 43 formerly abducted
children, five of them girls. Fifty-seven people were reunited with their families/relatives. They each
received a rehabilitation package including a mattress, a blanket, a jerrycan, maize flour and beans.
Pader Agago Former Child Soldiers (FCS) Reintegration and Resettlement Programme
203
Pader Agago FCS RR was started in July 2002 to pay school fees for formerly abducted children who are
now resettled in communities and attend secondary schools or private primary schools. The scheme helps to
provide school materials, vocational skills and help with medical bills for formerly abducted children.
During the week, the project received report cards from children in the programme and made arrangements
for payment of school fees for the coming term. Children learning vocational skills in brick and concrete
laying, tailoring as well as carpentry and joinery, sat their practical examinations.
Pader Aruu Former Child Soldiers (FCS) Reintegration and Rehabilitation Project
Pader Aruu FCS RR, funded by Charitable Trust Fund through WV Australia, received three former child
soldiers- all boys, and reunited them with their families. There are now 88 formerly abducted persons in the
centre, 76 of them children. The centre is continuing with counselling, feeding and treating the sick and
tracing the families of the former abductees." (World Vision, 24 September 2003)
Ugandan Red Cross Society (URCS) relief efforts in the North (September 2003)
•
20.000 family parcels of non-food items for IDPs in Kitgum and Pader.
•
Priority needs include shelter, food, blankets, clothes, saucepans, soap, drugs, Public health
education, water and sanitation awareness campaigns and HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns.
"Danish Red Cross will be supporting the Ugandan Red Cross Society (URCS) relief efforts in the North.
ECHO funding will make it possible for URCS to deliver 20.000 family parcels of non-food items for IDPs
in Kitgum and Pader. Final target locations may change in accordance with needs and accessibility. Each
parcel will contain 3 blankets, 2 cooking pots, 1 piece of plastic sheeting, 2 jerry cans and 5 bars of soap the first distribution is tentatively planned for November.
In addition to the above, URCS has launched a six-month appeal for emergency assistance for 12,500
families (62,500) internally displaced persons in the Teso sub-region, namely the districts of Soroti, Kumi,
Katakwi and Kaberamaido. The total appeal amounts to US $812,228.
Using its volunteer network from their Soroti and Kumi branch, URCS have in the last two months been
conducting rapid assessments and registration of IDPs in Soroti, Kaberamaido and Kumi districts. Priority
needs identified include shelter, food, blankets, clothes, saucepans, soap, drugs, Public health education,
water and sanitation awareness campaigns and HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns. With funding, URCS
would like to intervene in:
Non Food Item distribution.
Public Hygiene, Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) awareness campaigns.
HIV/AIDS awareness campaign in and around camps.
IDP related NGO activities included in the 2002 UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal
for Uganda
The table below only includes planned activities by international NGOs that have been included in the
2002 Appeal, and that may have a direct impact on IDPs. Several NGO activities in the Appeal that are
not included below are likely to benefit IDPs indirectly, and it is recommended to consult the 2002
204
Appeal document if more detailed information is needed. See OCHA's Financial Tracking Database for
Complex Emergencies for information about funding of the 2002 Appeal.
Activity
AFRICA 2000 NETWORK-UGANDA: Sustainable agriculture for improved land production in
Bundibugyo and Kasese Districts (UGA-02/A08)
"To enable households to improve nutrition and income through skills development, provision of
farm inputs and information dissemination."
HUNGER ALERT: Fish Farming Project for Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu district
UGA-02/A10
Requirement
s
(US$)
US$ 291,500
US$ 159,070
The proposed project aims to introduce fish farming by establishing a fish-breeding centre that will
supply fish fry commercially to the 240 beneficiaries. The fish-breeding centre will be established and
managed by Hunger Alert at Bungatira village, about six kilometers from Gulu town.
HUNGER ALERT: Rice production initiatives project for the rehabilitation of US$ 201,000
war-affected people in Gulu District, Northern Uganda (UGA-02/A11)
"To generate income from rice growing in order to facilitate re-settlement of war-affected people and
reduce poverty"
NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL: Support to return, resettlement and reintegration of Internally US$ 401,000
Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader Districts, Uganda (UGA-02/ER/I02)
"Increase the number of returnees to the villages and strengthen the sustainability of the local
communities: (1) support the IDPs’ efforts to rehabilitate communal structures like schools, access
roads, smaller bridges/culverts and shallow wells, by providing necessary materials for rehabilitation;
(2) provide grass for thatching until the long grass is available; (3) provide individual assistance for
vulnerable groups such as orphans, child-headed households, elderly, disabled, etc.; (4) enable children
to attend schools in the villages by giving them assistance; (5) stimulate and facilitate former and
current IDP food production activities in the return and resettlement phase..."
ACTIONAID-UGANDA: Education emergency response (Rwenzori, Kitgum and Katakwi Projects US$
1,000,800
(UGA-02/E02)
"To increase displaced children’s access to basic education, to train school financial management
committees, to promote peace education and to establish adult literacy programmes."
OCKENDEN INTERNATIONAL: Education support to traumatised Internally Displaced Persons and US$ 350,000
refugees in Northern Uganda (West Nile and Gulu) (UGA-02/E03)
"Counselling; Pyscho-Socio Training; Life Skills Training of the traumatised women, men and youths
in IDP camps"
SAVE THE CHILDREN NORWAY : Education Support to Internally Displaced Children in Katakwi US$ 374,000
district (UGA-02/E04)
"Enable displaced children in camps to access basic education through provision of temporary
classrooms, classroom furniture and equipment, teaching/learning materials, training of teachers in
appropriate teaching methodologies and sensitisation of community members on child rights and the
value of education in difficult circumstances."
OXFAM GB: Emergency Preparedness and Response Capacity Building (UGA-02/P/HR/RL01)
"(1) To enhance the preparedness capacity and humanitarian response of government and local NGOs.
205
(2) To advocate for IDP rights and provisions, ensuring that there is more sensitivity and
responsiveness by government and key donors."
US$ 191,200
ACTIONAID-UGANDA : Protection and Human Rights (UGA-02/P/HR/RL04)
Strengthen the capacity and raise awareness of local NGOs, CBOs, and other civil society institutions
on human rights issues
Alleviate human suffering by the most vulnerable
Promote and protection of human rights especially for women in situations of armed conflict
CANADIAN PHYSICIANS FOR AID AND RELIEF: Safe Water and Sanitation Project for US$ 136,834
Internally Displaced Persons in Gulu District (UGA-02/WS03)
"To improve the health status of IDPs living in 10 protected camps in Gulu through the development
of safe water facilities."
NGO responses to re-emerging crisis in northern Uganda (2002)
•
World Vision to install sanitation services to avert looming diarrhoea epidemic in schools hosting
large numbers of IDPs
•
IRC delivering water and sanitation and non-food items to thousands of IDPs in Kitgum
•
Oxfam providing safe water an dsanitatoin facilities to 16,036 IDPs
•
NGO Forum for Education in Uganda (FENU) registrered 490 IDP students to ensure they will be
able to take their "O" and "A" final exams
"World Vision Australia has committed $30,000 towards the construction of 48 latrines in 20 schools of the
war affected districts of Gulu, Kitgum and Pader in Northern Uganda. This is intended to forestall a
looming epidemic of diarrhoea related diseases as a result of large numbers of children being crammed in a
few schools because of insecurity in the towns. In Gulu alone, over 150 schools have closed leaving only
50 functional.
This commitment is in response to an appeal by World Vision Uganda for $346,551 to provide emergency
shelter, blankets for 10,000 displaced families and improve sanitation conditions in schools that have taken
on large numbers of displaced children." (World Vision, 6 August 2002)
•
"Action Against Hunger (ACF-USA) begun a cautious re-engagement of water, sanitation and
nutritional activities in Gulu municipality and its immediate environs beginning 18th August.
•
GOAL have been giving small scale support to Kalongo Hospital in Pader, but stepped up their
support, with UNICEF facilitation, to respond to the increasing humanitarian demand of the displaced
people camped at the hospital grounds.
•
AVSI has offices in Gulu and Kitgum. The Pshyco Social Support Programme in Kitgum and
Pader ended on 31st July and one of the last activities was the creation of in Kitgum of a buffer stock of
emergency NFI of about 150 kits. The kits are currently used and distributed in co-ordination with the
DDMC to particularly vulnerable group of people affected by the recent insurgency. Other programmes
include support to the reintegration of former child soldiers in Kitgum and Pader, distribution of NFIs to
various locations in Kitgum and construction of latrines in collaboration with IRC, AVSI has also
submitted a proposal for funding to OFDA to support to war affected population in northern Uganda.
•
CRS resumed several activities at the end of August, after suspending them in July. Activities
resumed include seed fairs in counties of Kilak, Omoro, Nwoya and Aswa in Gulu and continuation of their
peace and justice projects.
206
•
CARE has so far sent medical supplies and shelter materials to Gulu for distribution by others and
has submitted proposals to donors for additional shelter material and health interventions in Gulu. It is also
seeking funds to rehabilitate boreholes in Gulu.
•
Following the safe release of five of its staff members by the LRA on August 10, IRC is
continuing its humanitarian programs in northern Uganda. In Kitgum town, IRC is currently providing
water and sanitation assistance to thousands of internally displaced persons seeking shelter in the town,
assisting KICWA to care for over 100 former abductees of the LRA, assisting Lira district officials
distribute NFIs to the hundreds of displaced in the town and surrounding areas, IRC has expanded medical
facilities, built water and sanitation facilities and begun food distributions for the new refugee caseload in
Kiryandongo refugee settlement in Masindi District
•
OXFAM plans an intervention for three months - to provide safe water supply and sensitisation
and construction of sanitary facilities, targeting 16,036 IDPs (Kitgum hospital, hill top) and 6,020 most
vulnerable night commuters in St. Joseph Hospital, Kitgum hospital, Kitgum Public and Guilio Pastore
Schools.
[…]
The LRA presence in Lira resulted in several attacks causing direct displacement, deaths and injuries,
abductions and destruction of properties. In-depth assessments are yet to be done to ascertain the extent of
the crisis. Additionally, an estimated 531 students are stranded in Lira from the districts of Gulu and Pader.
Furthermore, Uganda is approaching the third term where children will sit for their Primary Leaving and
“O” and “A” level exams. As of 4th September 2002, the NGO Forum for Education in Uganda (FENU)
had registered 490 candidates from the affected districts in northern Uganda and their plight was raised
with the Office of the Prime Minister/Department of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees, such that the
Ministry of Education ensures these students do their exams in the districts they fled to." (OCHA
July/August 2002)
Selected UN activities
UNICEF provides shelter and non-food items to 15,000 IDPs (December 2003)
•
Selected UNICEF activities:
•
support to seven reception centers for formerly abducted children and 2-3,000 unaccompanied
children in Kotido
•
provision of temporary schools and scholastic materials for 27,000 children and teachers
•
construction of 27 boreholes
•
motorization of boreholes for two camps of 62,000 and 48,000
"In northern and eastern Uganda 1.4 million people, of whom 800,000 are children under the age of 15, are
displaced in northern and eastern Uganda due to the insurgency of the Lord's Resistance Army. In a war
where children are the first targets, 8,000 children have been abducted in 12 months. Global acute
malnutrition rates are 10-25%, and admissions in therapeutic feeding centers have more than doubled over
the last 12 months. Water availability is 5-10 liters per person in most IDP camps.
UNICEF is active in the fields of protection, health and nutrition, water and sanitation and education
through: support to seven reception centers for formerly abducted children and 2-3,000 unaccompanied
children in Kotido; provision of shelter and non-food items to 15,000 IDPs; provision of temporary schools
and scholastic materials for 27,000 children and teachers, construction of 27 boreholes; motorization of
boreholes for two camps of 62,000 and 48,000 (currently under way); provision of 1500 latrines to schools
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and public places; conducting emergency measles vaccination for 1.9 million children; and support to 11
therapeutic feeding centers with 700 - 1000 severely malnourished children."( UNICEF, 1 December 2003)
UN plans to shift away from emergency interventions towards recovery and
resettlement shattered by recent havoc in northern Uganda (2002)
•
Renewed LRA attacks have now shifted assistance to emergency, mostly food aid (August 2002)
•
Plans for return and recovery by Government and humanitarian agencies following period of calm
(2001-March 2002)
"Since mid-June 2002, there has been a resurgence of attacks by LRA rebels thus wreaking havoc in the
three districts (Gulu, Kitgum and Pader) of northern Uganda. There have been almost daily security
incidents – raids on villages, trading centres or camps and road ambushes – which have resulted in either
killing of civilians, injuries, abduction and massive destruction or looting of property. The intensified rebel
activities in the north came in the wake of about twelve months of calm in the region. Due to this,
Government and humanitarian agencies were looking at the return and recovery as opposed to providing
relief for the over 490,000 IDPs in northern Uganda. However, the renewed LRA attacks and their resultant
negative humanitarian impact on the IDPs and other civilians in northern Uganda demand emergency
response from the humanitarian community. Unfortunately, the insecurity in the region has not permitted
any assessment of the impact so far of the ongoing rebel attacks in northern Uganda. In the face of lack
accurate and timely data, most agencies are responding mainly to needs of those newly displaced or those
redisplaced to towns and urban centres or where applicable, using estimates to plan for interventions in
camps and urban centres." (OCHA 7 August 2002)
"The preliminary findings and recommendations of the OCHA-initiated study of IDPs in the north were
presented on 7 January and indicate that the situation in the three northern districts represents a catastrophe
for the people of the region and for the nation of Uganda as a whole." (OCHA 28 February 2002, p.34)
"Based on survey responses, the forecast is for a slight improvement of the situation for many of the IDPs
in the country, erring on the side of optimism, with a likely return of IDPs in the south western districts of
Uganda.
The affected population will remain weakened, particularly as the need for support during the return and
resettlement phase is equally crucial as during the time of plight. Should the overall situation improve,
access to populations outside the present operational area will be gained, but this will also increase the
numbers of people to be assisted. Should the possibilities for a solution to the displacement become a
reality for the areas mentioned, the emergency interventions presented under CAP 2002 will be reoriented
towards recovery and resettlement pending donor concurrence.
Lack of funding remains the major obstacle for effective assistance to the vulnerable population, but there
is hope that donors would favour funding initiatives that support the generation of infrastructure, incomes
and other forms of social security conducive to an early return of the IDPs. The Government of Uganda is
responsible for protection of the IDPs, but lacks the finances and capacity to do this effectively." (UN
November 2001)
OCHA Inter-Agency Assessment of IDPs in Katakwi June 2002
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•
Following up on the July 2001 inter-agency mission the team assessed IDP needs in the context of
Karimojong disarmament and in view of potential returns
•
Most IDP camps are beeing transformed into trading centers which need planning, building
materials and sanitation facilities
•
Infrasturucture re-building was identified as a priority in areas of return
•
Hope was expressed by the UN that the Government of Uganda designs a development plan for
the disarmed Karimojong
"After almost a year of relative calm in Katakwi District, combined with interventions by humanitarian
agencies and various Government initiatives in Katakwi and in Karamoja region (Disarmament of
Karimojong) aimed at helping the displaced return to their homes of origin in secure circumstances, OCHA
initiated an inter-agency rapid assessment in Katakwi to review the present situation of the internally
displaced Persons (IDPs) in the district. This assessment was a follow-up of a joint agency mission to
Katakwi between July 23-July 26, 2001.
[…]
In terms of intervention, the mission strongly recommends transitional projects, which will not only
strengthen the IDPs current coping mechanisms, but will prepare the IDPs for their return home. For
example, sensitisation in hygiene practices and in HIV/AIDs awareness, training in various income
generating skills, training in modern methods of farming, etc. Further, the district needs to encourage inputs
or interventions at parish level so that those who return find a functioning infrastructure in their areas of
origin. The assessment team observed strong indicators that some of these camps will eventually turn into
rural urban trading centres. In this case the district needs to undertake careful planning and sensitisation of
the people, such that houses are constructed in such a way as to enable essential amenities like latrines, to
be put in place. Already, the district has identified and surveyed 30 centres in different sub-counties, and
some are sub-county headquarter IDP camps like Acowa, as future trading centres. According to the district
authorities, those IDPs in the identified future trading centres, with nowhere to go will be allocated land
elsewhere.
In addition, infrastructure in the district is poor, a factor that has been identified as aiding the insecurity.
The major constraint to development and the sole cause of the current displacement is no doubt insecurity,
and with this in place, the IDPs say they will return home and - hopefully with a little help from
humanitarian agencies in terms of a return package - be independent. The ongoing disarmament process in
Karamoja is thus viewed with interest and hope, that Government will able to get all guns from the region
and also start development projects which will keep the Karimojong away from raiding and concentrating
on development. Successful disarmament will also give the various peace initiatives between the two
regions a chance of succeeding." (OCHA 10-12 June 2002, pp.1-8)
OCHA appeals for the creation of an Emergency Response Fund (2000)
•
Response mechanisms lagging behind rapidly changing humanitarion situation
•
Emergency Fund to fund activities up to US$ 30,000 aimed at fulfiling the immediate, life-saving
needs of the most vulnerable affected groups
"Trends in Uganda reveal a series of rapid-onset, low to medium intensity conflicts resulting in
spontaneous displacement of civilian populations. The evasive, hit-and-run tactics of rebel groups often
result in displacement in several different locations simultaneously. Early warning systems have focused
primarily on slow evolving natural calamities and have failed to systematically monitor and warn agencies
of impending man-made disasters. Even under the best circumstances, it is not always possible to forecast
or to pinpoint specific outcomes of complex social conflict. Traditional funding mechanisms are often not
rapidly accessible with agency response generally lagging behind need, resulting in undue human suffering.
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While early warning, contingency planning, stockpiling and other disaster preparedness measures are being
improved, there is a need to establish an Emergency Response Fund (ERF) or quick dispensing facility that
will enable NGOs and UN Agencies to respond to unforeseen crises in a more timely, effective and humane
manner.
Proposals for funding will normally be limited to US$ 30,000, depending upon assessed need and agency
capacity. The interventions must aim to fulfil the immediate, life-saving needs of the most vulnerable
affected groups and must pass stringent project selection criteria. Implementing agencies must also
demonstrate that they have adequate capacity and that their interventions are technically feasible and socioeconomically sound. OCHA will administer the ERF and will account and report on fund utilisation
through the Humanitarian Evaluation and Advisory Team (HEAT), which will be responsible for approving
individual project proposals and for monitoring progress and impact." (UN November 2000, p.121)
UNICEF IDP-targeted activities (2002)
•
UNICEF will construct 200 stances of latrines and hand washing facilities at IDP primary schools
•
UNICEF to provide access to HIV/AIDS testing and counseling for 70% of adolescent displaced
in war-affected areas (2002)
•
Camps with populations of 45,000 IDPs and face major sanitation and water-related problems
•
Only 2%of the schools surveyed by UNICEF had appropriate latrine facilities
•
"The renewed insurgency in northern Uganda has reversed a positive trend where IDP camps were
experiencing a reduction in the population. This trend had now seen a sharp reversal. Camps and temporary
shelters that were earlier set up at the onset of displacement were never intended for long-term use. Many
are starting to exhibit problems similar to that of small cities but without the resources needed to deal with
them. In these camps, over-crowding, low water supply and sanitation coverage and a failure to ensure safe
disposal of human excreta and refuse has led to disease outbreaks like cholera leading to increased
morbidity and mortality. This problem has been exacerbated by ‘recongestion’ of the camps. Many camps
have seen an increase in the population by 30-40% in the space of a few months, with no increase in water
and sanitation infrastructure.
Main activities: Assuming the security situation permits, UNICEF interventions will include: promoting
girl and women’s special needs in sanitation and hygiene in camps and schools; support access to water
supply to IDP camps through construction of new water supply systems, rehabilitation of existing systems
or extension of existing ones; support towards construction of sanitary facilities like latrines with handwashing facilities in primary schools; hygiene education teacher training for school; construction of
communal latrines and putting in place systems for maintenance; promotion of construction of latrines and
hand-washing facilities in households; promotion of a sanitary environment and hygiene education in IDP
camps through the engagement and supporting of sanitation promoters; capacity building efforts especially
amongst districts and sub-district level staff, administrators and CBOs. This will especially be towards
improvements in planning/management and technical skills to support sustaining interventions."
Outputs: 200 stances of latrines and hand washing facilities constructed at IDP primary schools separate
for boys and girls with provision for disabled pupils; at least three teachers in IDP primary schools trained
in hygiene education and promoting hygiene and sanitation in their respective schools; 200 appropriate safe
water points constructed and operated/maintained by IDPs; a safe and hygienic environment created in IDP
camps including safe use of systems for disposal of liquid and solid waste, hygienic practices in all
households in IDPs resulting into increased correct utilisation of sanitation facilities and safe water. (UN
November 2002, pp. 106-107)
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The situation described above disproportionately affects children and women. School-going children,
particularly children attending primary school, are facing great difficulties keeping themselves clean and
healthy. Even in the best of times, the water and sanitation situation in Uganda’s primary schools calls for
serious attention. For example, a study of schools by the Uganda National Examination Board [UNEB] in
1996 in several sample districts found the coverage of water facilities to be 66.7% while only eight percent
had access to adequate number of latrines. Another study done by UNICEF in 1999 in 90 primary schools
showed that only two per cent of the surveyed schools had adequate latrine facilities, only 37% of the
teachers had received sanitation related training and only 25% of schools had sanitation educational
materials. When an outbreak of cholera struck the country in February 1998, at least 560 primary schools
were closed due to lack of adequate sanitation facilities. As indicated in the UNEB study, school sanitation
also has a significant gender implication. The study found that one of the major factor contributing to the
high drop out rate of girls was poor sanitation.
HIV/AIDS
"Target beneficiaries 200,000 IDPs and drought victims
Ugandan adolescents face a number of challenges as they emerge from childhood to adulthood. The
potential for engagement in risky sexual behavior, for early marriages, for substance abuse, as well as their
limited opportunities for gainful employment, are only some of the issues that require understanding and
support from the family and community. Vulnerable groups include adolescents in extreme poverty, those
caught up in armed conflict or displaced by armed conflict, adolescents who are sexually and economically
exploited, disabled adolescents and orphans and those living with HIV/AIDS.
Young girls are especially at risk. They receive insufficient family and community support and their
psychosocial needs are even less understood and addressed. Consequently, basic rights essential to
adolescents’ health and development are often not realized. This is even truer in the conflict-affected
districts.
At various levels, UNICEF will adopt broad, generic strategies that will include advocacy and
communication, institutional capacity building, training, and support to service delivery, to ensure that
adolescents’ rights to health and development are met. The overall objectives of these activities is to ensure
that 70% of adolescent boys and girls in war-affected areas have increased access to adolescent-friendly
services including testing and counseling. These effected districts are priority districts for UNICEF
supported interventions and the additional resources requested will complement already ongoing activities.
A network of relevant partners on HIV/AIDS emergency related issues is to be established and there is a
need to assemble a toolkit of essential HIV/AIDS supplies and materials. The additional resources will help
in the development of both." (UNICEF January 2002)
Water and environmental sanitation
"Target beneficiaries 600,000 IDPs in northern and western Uganda.
In a conflict situation especially so, where there is internal displacement, access to safe water and adequate
sanitation facilities in the affected areas remain a major priority. This is particularly true in the SouthWestern districts of Bundibugyo, Kasese and Kabarole and parts on Kibaale districts where land formations
and security conditions have led to overcrowding and very poor sanitation. In the Northern districts of
Kitgum, Gulu and sometimes Adjumani, difficulties experienced with access make it difficult for rapid
response. Katakwi district in Eastern Uganda has particularly hard hit with as many as 50,000 people
displaced.
IDPs are living in camps and temporary shelters that were earlier set up at the onset of displacement. They
were never intended for long term use. Many are starting to exhibit problems similar to that of small cities
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but without the resources needed to deal with them. Some camps with populations reaching 45,000 are
highly congested. In these camps, over-crowding, low water supply and sanitation coverage and a failure to
ensure safe disposal of human excreta and refuse has led to disease outbreaks. Water, sanitation and
hygiene related diseases like diarrhoea, cholera, dysentery are now endemic in the affected zones.
This situation disproportionately affects children and women. School-going children are facing great
difficulties keeping themselves clean and healthy. Even in the best situations, the water and sanitation
situation in Uganda’s primary schools calls for serious attention. UNICEF has reported that only 2% of
surveyed schools had adequate latrine facilities, only 37% of teachers had received sanitation related
training and only 25% of schools had sanitation educational materials. School sanitation also has a
significant gender implication – one of the major factors contributing to the high drop-out rate of girls has
been shown to be poor sanitation.
UNICEF’s activities in this sector will focus on ensuring that IDP camps with the highest population of
women are prioritized, and that the rights of IDPs and displaced primary school pupils to safe and healthy
will be upheld through activities that that allow for safe disposal of excreta and improved access to, and
safe handling of water. Efforts will be undertaken to promote hygienic household environments in 90% IDP
camps. UNICEF activities will also contribute significantly to providing a friendly learning school
environment with special emphasis on primary school hygiene and sanitation. Teachers will especially be
targeted to be the main agents of change." (UNICEF January 2002)
"The support of access to a 24 hour, safe water supply to IDP camps through the construction of new water
supply systems, the rehabilitation of existing systems and/or the extension of existing ones. Support
towards the construction of sanitary facilities like latrines with hand-washing facilities in primary schools.
Hygiene education teacher training for schools. The construction of communal latrines including putting in
place systems for maintenance. The promotion of construction of latrines and hand-washing facilities in
households." (UNICEF 29 May 2002)
Policy and recommendations
Third party mediation needed to successfully achieve a lasting peace (August 2003)
•
The Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr.
Francis M. Deng, undertook an official visit to the country from11 to 15 August 2003
•
The Representative was informed by the Government that the policy on Internal Displacement is
expected to be adopted by Cabinet before the end of 2003
•
The Representative recognizes that the conflict in the North is complex and intertwined
The following statement was issued today in Kampala by the Representative of the Secretary-General on
Internally Displaced Persons, Francis M. Deng:
'At the invitation of the Government of Uganda, the Representative of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral on Internally Displaced Persons, Dr. Francis M. Deng, undertook an official visit to the country
from11 to 15 August 2003.
The purpose of the visit was to assess and reach a better understanding of the situation of internal
displacement in Uganda, which now affects approximately one million persons throughout the country. An
additional purpose was to hold consultations with the Government on the draft national policy on internal
displacement. As always, Dr. Deng approached his visit in a spirit of openness and constructive dialogue
212
with the Government and other interlocutors. He emphasizes that while protecting and assisting the
internally displaced is first and foremost the responsibility of the Government, it is often necessary for the
international community to complement the national efforts.
During his visit Dr. Deng had a number of meetings with Government officials, international donors,
United Nations agencies and programmes, as well as non-governmental organisations (NGOs). He also
undertook a visit to the districts of Kitgum and Gulu, where he met with a number of local officials,
religious dignitaries, NGOs and representatives of the internally displaced. In Gulu he visited a camp for
the internally displaced, where he witnessed their living conditions and also observed food distribution by
the World Food Programme.
The displacement crisis in Uganda essentially falls into three situations. By far the largest displacement
situation is in the northern districts of the country, mainly in Kitgum, Pader and Gulu, and is due to the
armed conflict between the Ugandan People's Defence Forces and the rebel Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
In the East of the country, displacement has been caused by drought and cattle rustling by armed
Karamojong tribal warriors. In the Rwenzori mountains, in the West of the country at the border with the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), displacement was previously caused by attacks of the rebel
Allied Democratic Front (ADF). However, this situation is now largely resolved.
With regard to the draft national policy, the Representative found it to be comprehensive and rich in
substance. It addresses all phases of displacement, including prevention, protection and assistance during
displacement as well as durable solutions. The Representative was impressed by the very broad and
inclusive consultative process in drafting the policy, which included inputs from the United Nations, the
international donor community, non-governmental organizations and the displaced themselves. The
Representative was informed by the Government that the policy is expected to be adopted by Cabinet
before the end of the year, and that the text itself will also be issued in a simplified version and translated
into local languages.
In the North of the country, the Representative was struck by the level of devastation due to the conflict and
the precarious security situation the internally displaced are facing. While efforts of the UPDF to protect
the displaced are recognized and appreciated, the level of insecurity still remains high. In the camps, the
displaced are struggling to survive and are in dire need of basic access to education, health, water and
sanitation. The spread of HIV/AIDS also seems to be matter of serious concern in the camps. The World
Food Programme, which is performing an admirable task in providing food relief to the displaced, is faced,
along with its humanitarian partners, with insufficient resources and serious problems of accessing the
camps due to the insecurity situation. The Representative was also saddened to witness the situation of the
'night commuters', especially children, who come to the urban centres at night to sleep in order to avoid
abduction by the LRA.
The Representative expressed his determination to raise the awareness of the international community to
the plight of the internally displaced in Uganda. This serious humanitarian crisis deserves the full support
of the international community as a whole, both in terms of financial and operational support in order to
provide the needed protection and assistance to the displaced and in the search for the peaceful resolution to
the conflict.
The Representative encourages the Government to ensure that the national policy on internal displacement
is adopted in the very near future, and that every effort is made towards its effective and efficient
implementation. He urges the Government to redouble its efforts to ensure the physical protection of the
internally displaced, and to provide appropriate levels of humanitarian assistance. He calls on international
donors and the agencies of the United Nations to provide the Government with support in this endeavour.
The Representative recognizes that the conflict in the North is complex and intertwined. There is a need for
a regional perspective, and possibly third party mediation to successfully address the problems and achieve
a lasting peace".
213
IDP camps: "protected villages" or "protected barracks"?
•
Protected villages established as military tactic, argue opponents
•
Assisting the villages would violate the neutrality of NGOs
•
The Geneva Convention permits the Government to displace populations for their protection
•
The Army says it is incapable of protecting the people in dispersed rural areas
"When the protected villages were established, a debate ensued among some elements of the humanitarian
assistance community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) concerning the appropriateness of
assisting their involuntarily displaced residents. Some organizations, such as the World Food Program and
World Vision, did respond promptly to requests for assistance.
Some opponents of the protected villages withheld their assistance. They argued that these villages were
established as a military tactic, and were not a spontaneous civilian response to conflict. To assist the
protected villages would therefore violate the neutrality of NGOs. They also questioned the military
effectiveness of the strategy and whether civilians were better protected in them. A few, including some
who had not visited any such places, asserted that they were all similar to the site at Pabo (i.e., they were all
co-located with the military detachments), which was inaccurate. Referring to cases like Pabo, they
characterized all the centers as 'protected villages' or 'protected barracks,' alleging that the civilians were
used as a first-line of alert against rebel attacks against the military. Advocates of the 'protected villages'
argued that the UPDF was in the process of an aggressive operation against the LRA. To the degree that the
LRA could replenish its losses by abducting more youngsters - which in the highly dispersed rural areas the
army could not effectively prevent - its effort and sacrifice seemed futile. By eliminating the LRA's ability
to loot food and abduct youngsters - frequent complaints of the rural population - rebel forces would be
weakened. Able to concentrate its stationary units in a limited number of locations, the remainder of the
army would be freer to pursue the rebels. The Geneva Convention, it was argued, permits the Government
to displace populations for their protection [although it also requires that adequate arrangements for their
material well-being be provided]. As long as the LRA continues its attacks and executions on undefended
civilians, advocates argue, it is impossible for the UPDF to protect so many potential targets in such a vast
area. The army is criticized for not effectively protecting the civilian population from LRA assaults, yet it is
also criticized for attempting to concentrate the population so that is can address the problem more
effectively. " (Gersony, Section 1, 1997, "The Protected Villages debate")
"In human rights terms the movement of people into camps in Gulu and Kitgum Districts presents a series
of dilemmas. Villagers are being attacked with extreme violence by the LRA, in breach of Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions. The authorities have an obligation to protect people from violence
perpetrated by the LRA and, of course, by UPDF soldiers and other government agents. The authorities
argue that providing protection from the LRA is not possible if people remain dispersed throughout the
countryside." (AI 17 March 1999 "Breaking the Circle", para.2)
The Geneva Convention awards right to move or contain people
"Under the Geneva Convention, the GoU has the right to move or contain people if, for reasons of
insecurity, such relocation is in the people’s best interest. In the majority of cases, it would appear as if
displaced Ugandans have been able to exercise their right to residence and movement and that their choice
of location/abode has generally been voluntary. Due consideration must be given to the fact that rebel
movements have not only failed to establish a basis of civilian support but have continuously launched
214
campaigns of terror against the civilian population. Rarely do they engage in combat with the UPDF."
(OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")
"Protected villages" and lack of clear GoU policy on internal displacement (September
2002)
•
The government pledged to provide 20% of the total costs of the humanitarian needs in response
to the unfoldinunfolding g crisis in the north
•
It is well established that so called "protected villages" offer little protection and standards of
living were discribed by NRC as a "chronic humanitarian catastrophe"
•
The existence of "protected villages" beyond the 1996 military exigency which then justified their
establishment, is inconsistent with international humanitarian principles
•
Army maintains that only through relocation and concentration of the population in secured
villages can the Acholi be protected
•
Budget of the Ministry of Disaster Preparedness decreased since 1996
•
Government started in 1996 to move rural families in conflict areas into "protected villages"
•
The "protected villages" are located near UPDF detachments as means of protection but also to
deny support to the LRA
•
Larger camps were during 2001 being re-grouped into smaller settlements
"In response to the evolution in LRA tactics, UPDF tactics in Gulu included, by September 1996, the
creation of camps and the removal of people from strategically important areas or places where the army
was unable to prevent LRA activity. The decision to create camps was taken at the highest level. On 27
September 1996 President Yoweri Museveni informed members of the Parliamentary Committee on the
Offices of the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs that the authorities were going to establish
"protected villages". However, from interviews with villagers and others, it appears to Amnesty
International that some UPDF units were already moving people out of their homes a number of weeks
before the top-level decision to create camps was communicated to the Parliamentary Committee. " (AI 17
March 1999, para.2.1)
"The decision to create camps was officially announced by President Yoweri Museveni on the 27th
September 1996 to members of the Parliamentary Committee of the Office of the President and Foreign
Affairs. However, in at least in two of the camps surveyed (Pabbo and Ajulu) people told us that they
remember that as early as August that year Uganda People’s Defence Force (UPDF) soldiers were already
moving in villages and ordering people to move to the trading centres.
[…]
While it is true that some people moved voluntarily closer to Army units before August 1996 seeking
protection, most people were indeed forced to move by Army personnel, who often used rather drastic
methods. In every camp we visited in Gulu, people told us invariably that they were forced." (Acholi
Religious/Justice & Peace July 2001, p. 5)
"In the north, government forces continued their policy of concentrating inhabitants in so-called "protected
villages" with UPDF detachments nearby as a means of protecting them and denying support to the LRA"
(US DOS March 1999, sect. 1g)
"A Ugandan government plan to scale down "protected villages" in the rebel-hit north,
while basically welcomed, has also attracted criticism that it is no solution to the army's protracted war
against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).
215
'It is not a question of scaling down,' Gulu area MP Norbert Mao told IRIN on Monday. 'The villages
should be dismantled and the government come up with a firm policy to step up security.'
As strategy to curb insurgency, the protected villages had failed, Mao said. "We have never supported
these camps. Our people will not miss them.'
'The camps were not for the protection of civilians, but to control their movement,' Mao added, saying they
were 'major arenas for human rights abuses.'
'People become totally dependent on the military and are highly vulnerable to acts of rape and illegal
arrests,' he noted. He argued there was no provision for humanitarian assistance such as health facilities,
and the people were simply rounded up and forced into the villages.
The protected village policy was mooted [sic!] by the government of Uganda and supported by some
villagers who thought it would ensure protection from the LRA, as well as denying the rebels logistical
support, food and new recruits. However, the policy later became unpopular with allegations of gross
human rights violations in the camps.
Press reports recently quoted Gulu commander Briagdier Wamala Katumba as saying the armed forces
intended to establish more detachments 'so we can decongest protected villages.'
The deputy editor of the independent daily "The Monitor", David Ouma Balikowa, said the concept of
protected villages had failed and local communities blamed them for the destruction of family units.'
(IRIN-CEA 19 April 1999a)
"The GoU has a relatively good humanitarian rights record, but there are documented cases where
Ugandans have been displaced either by force or 'creative persuasion.' The GoU claims that the wide,
geographical dispersion of Acholi farms makes it virtually impossible to protect every household and that
only through concentration of the population in 'protected villages' can Uganda’s Defence Forces (UPDF)
defend Ugandans, particularly given present austerity measures restraining defence spending. Local
Defence Units (LDU’s) have been deployed but lack the training and resources to effectively combat rebel
forces that are evasive, mobile and widespread. Many IDPs claim that their displacement is largely due to
UPDF misplacement." (UN November 2000, p.15)
"During 2001, there was a concerted effort by Government and community leaders to facilitate the
movement of IDPs back to their homes. Larger camps are now being re-grouped into smaller settlements.
Officials have designated certain areas, which have been provided with military protection, as being 'safe'
from the rebels, for people to move back home; and some people are temporarily re-settling behind military
detachments as security roads are being constructed to link remote areas.
At present, IDP movements have become less restricted as a result of the increased security situation and/
or political climate. This, in turn, has increased their household well- being. It is important to stress here
that any initiatives to enable the population to re-settle should be coordinated and planned between
different actors, particularly the IDPs, so that the unfortunate outcomes of their displacement are not
repeated in reverse. Indeed, the proposal for decongestion was more a statement of intent than a feasible
plan of action.
Concerns that decongestion would simply replace large camps with smaller ones and that infrastructural
development would create a pull factor towards the parishes and away from home villages, are
unwarranted. The GoU, is to be commended for the initiative, which if refined, would reorient existing
humanitarian assistance towards establishment of physical and social infrastructure at the parish level.
216
Decongestion and development of the parishes would greatly facilitate resettlement to areas within easy
walking distance of land, enabling the IDPs to be self-sufficient. Agencies participating in CAP 2002,
support the GoU initiative and are working closely with district officials to transform the existing concept
paper into a practical plan."(UN November 2001, p. 36)
"Hundreds of thousands of people are still forced to live in “protected villages” which obviously offers little
protection while their residents live in what amounts to chronic humanitarian catastrophe. It is the very
nature of this system that engenders these unacceptable levels of human suffering. While the establishment
of the “protected villages” may have been justifiable on grounds of military exigency in 1996, their
prolongation would seem to be inconsistent with international humanitarian principles. Until the recent
upsurge of violence, several developments had occurred to put the subject of IDP return on the political and
humanitarian agenda. One of them has been the formulation of a national policy on IDPs which moves
away from the protected village system to a more dignified approach based on the UN Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement. This change cannot await the outcome of efforts to neutralise and disband the
LRA. This national policy on internal displacement remains to be passed by the Government." (NRC
August 2002)
"No government policy exists to address the plight of IDPs. 70% of IDPs are women and children, many of
whom have been displaced since 1996. Attempts are underway to work with the Government to address
their suffering; for the first time government representatives expressed interest in playing an active part in
the CAP 2002 exercise. To this end, OCHA, in collaboration with the GoU and the Makarere University,
UN agencies, NGOs and community and religious leaders, will commission a comprehensive and
authoritative IDP study. Emphasis will be put on identifying specific steps/measures that can be taken by
all parties to make immediate/simultaneous progress in the following areas:
Amnesty/Disarmament/Demobilisation
Re-integration
Resettlement/Recovery/Sustained Security.
[…]
In the absence of the Disaster Management and Preparedness Bill, there appears to be no official GoU
policy on displacement, protected villages or the forced confinement of IDPs within these villages. The
‘protected villages’ have raised a number of controversial issues: the perceived endorsement by the
international community of a policy of forced relocation, the coherence of this policy with humanitarian
principles and human rights law, the advisability of investing resources into temporary IDP settlements, the
ambivalence towards funding or working in these settlements, the creation of aid-dependency amongst a
population no longer able to work in its fields, the security threats posed to IDPs, etc." (UN November
2001, pp.3, 9)
"Militarily, the UPDF maintain that the wide, geographical dispersion of Acholi households makes the
protection of each household impossible and that only through relocation and concentration of the
population in secured villages can the Acholi be protected. An opposing view is that increased defence
spending in recent years, if appropriately targeted, would provide for adequate security of the Acholi and
that displacement of Ugandans is largely attributable to UPDF misplacement in neighbouring countries,
namely Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Southern Sudan. In May, the Ugandan
Government announced plans to withdraw entirely from the DRC. Other critics consider the protected
villages to be a deliberate attempt by the Government to ethnically marginalize, weaken and otherwise
prevent the Acholi from posing a political or military threat. There is no known evidence to support such
conspiratorial hypotheses which have only succeeded in discouraging joint attempts to find solutions."
(OCHA 23 May 2001, "Lessons learned")
"UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 (1992) stipulates “the affected State has the primary role in the
initiation, organisation, coordination, and implementation of humanitarian assistance within its territory.”
Yet, as humanitarian assistance has increased, particularly since July 1996, the budget of the Ministry of
Disaster Preparedness (formerly the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare) has proportionately decreased,
resulting in emergency aid flows “substituting” rather than complementing the Government’s own
217
resources. In their rush to assist people in need, well-intentioned aid agencies have frequently overlooked
the GoU’s coordination role and the importance of building its response capacity." (UN November 2000,
p.15)
For further information, see:
Civilians moved by Government into "protected villages" (1996-1999)
Mixed opinions about the physical protection offered by the "protected villages" in Northern Uganda
(1996-2000)
NGO initiatives to promote IDP rights (2002)
•
Oxfam GB project to promoting awareness and recognition of IDPs rights
•
ActionAid to work in partnership with grass-roots organisations and government line departments
in the districts
"Oxfam GB regional programme plan prioritises capacity-building as one of the areas to focus on in the
humanitarian crisis areas. This programme seeks to enhance the capacity and preparedness of key
stakeholders (government and non- government) in ensuring effective and coherent response in the country.
The programme is designed along the themes of preparedness, protection and quality response, and focuses
on five areas: (1) promoting development of early warning systems and policies for perennially drought
affected areas; (2) promoting awareness and application of alternatives when free food is not appropriate;
(3) promoting awareness and recognition of IDPs rights and situations; (4) supporting the development of
disaster preparedness plans for two-piloted conflict affected districts of Kitgum and Katakwi (plans for
western Uganda conflict affected areas were already developed by OCHA); and (5) promoting awareness
and application of international humanitarian principles and provisions by humanitarian agencies, including
national and local NGOs.
Oxfam GB in Uganda will lead the implementation process. However, the project is to be based in the
Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugees to maximise collaboration, learning and capacity-building.
This will involve recruiting a Programme Officer to be based in the Ministry of Disaster Management and
Refugees. Oxfam will maintain a line management responsibility for guidance and support. The Officer
will also maintain a matrix management responsibility with the Ministry, and joint planning will be
enhanced between Oxfam, the Ministry and selected joint implementing partners (for example, OCHA,
WFP, Etc). The details of this model will further be discussed with the Ministry of Disaster Management
and Refugees. Oxfam GB in Uganda has a similar model with the Uganda Participatory Poverty
Assessment Project (UPPAP), which is in the Ministry of Planning and Finance." (UN November 2001, p.
113)
"The main focus of the ActionAid programme is to build peace and mitigate the effects of conflicts that
have rocked the Rwenzori region, Kitgum and Katakwi districts for the many years. ActionAid has
responded by supporting education of the displaced children in camps, improving health services through
raising awareness on sexual rights and health rights (SRHR), providing care and support for HIV/AIDS and
supporting the search for peaceful solutions through peace-building initiatives at community, district and
national levels.
ActionAid worked with local partners and CSO to promote peaceful means as a response to ending the
rebellion and cattle rustling in northern, western and north-eastern Uganda. The insurgency has resulted in
heavy losses in civilian lives and disruption of socio-economic developments in Bundibugyo, Kitgum, and
Katakwi, which caused extensive psycho-social trauma and stress and leading to breakdowns in the
community coping mechanisms.
218
ActionAid will work in partnership with grass-roots organisations and government line departments in the
districts in order to raise the voices of the voiceless and implement the humanitarian, human rights,
protection and integration programmes. These are local council structures (i.e. local policy making
government structure in the community), Peace building Initiatives, DDMCs at all levels, women groups,
theatre clubs, elders councils, school management committees. In addition, the media, government troops
(UPDF) and other peace-building-related networks will be engaged to support processes leading to conflict
resolution and sustainable peace." (UN November 2001, p. 118)
219
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ADF
DMI
DDMC
DHT
DRC
FFA
FHH
FUNA
FCU
HACU
ISO
LDU
LRA
MDP/R
MHH
MoH
NALU
NRA
NRM
SPLA
UHRC
UNDMT
UNLA
UPDA
UPDF
UPC
UPE
UNRF
WNBF
The Alliance for Democratic Forces
Directorate of Military Intelligence
District Disaster Management Committee
District Health Team
Democratic Republic of Congo
Food for Assets
Female Headed Household
Former Uganda National Army
Field Coordination Unit
The Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
Internal Security Organization
Local Defense Unit
The Lord’s Resistance Army
Ministry of Disaster Preparedness and Refugees
Male Headed Household
Ministry of Health
National Army of the Liberation of Uganda
National Resistance Army
National Resistance Movement
Sudan People’s Liberation Army
Uganda Human Rights Commission
United Nations Disaster Management Team
Ugandan National Liberation Army
Uganda People’s Defense Army
Uganda People’s Defense Forces
Uganda People’s Congress Party
Universal Primary Education
Uganda National Rescue Front
The West Nile Bank Front
220
LIST OF SOURCES USED
(alphabetical order)
Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), 2002, Protracted
conflict, elusive peace: Initiatives to end the violence in northern Uganda
Internet : http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/index.htm , accessed 14 January
2003
Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), 31 December 2002,
Causes and consequences of the conflict in Acholiland
Internet : http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/theconflict.shtml , accessed 12
November 2003
Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), 8 May 2003,
"Implementing the 1999 Nairobi Agreement"
Internet : http://www.c-r.org/accord/index.htm?uganda/accord11/index.htm , accessed 12
June 2003
Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives (Accord), November 2002,
Restoring relations between Uganda and Sudan: The Carter Center process
Internet : http://www.c-r.org/accord/uganda/accord11/restoring.shtml , accessed 24
October 2003
Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, 3 April 2003, "Slow, silent death"
Internet : http://www.acholipeace.8k.com/articles.html , accessed 12 June 2003
Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, 30 April 2003, Chronologies 2003 Events between
March 1 - 31, 2003
Internet : http://www.acholipeace.8k.com/chronology.html , accessed 11 June 2003
Acholi Religious Leaders Initiative, July 2003, Justice and Peace News Middle of May
to End of June 2003
Internet : http://www.acholipeace.org/justice_news.html , accessed 5 November 2003
Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA), December 2001, Nutritional
Anthropometric Survey Children Under-Five Years Old Pader District - Uganda
Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA), December 2001, Nutritional
Anthropometric Survey Children Under-Five Years Old (Kitgum District – Uganda)
Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA), November 2001, Nutritional
Anthropometric Survey Children Under-Five Years Old Bundibugyo District - Uganda
Action Against Hunger - USA (AAH-USA), November 2003, Food security assessment
in Gulu IDP camps
221
Internet : http://www.aah-usa.org/thought/AAH_Uganda_Oct03.pdf , accessed 12
November 2003
Action by Churches Together (ACT), 30 January 2003, ACT Appeal Uganda:
Emergency Relief - AFUG-31
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/a8dde1e648e3075685256cbf0074f6c1?OpenDocu
ment , accessed 24 June 2003
Action by Churches Together (ACT), 30 October 2003, Emergency Assistance to IDPs
in Katakwi District
Internet : http://act-intl.org/appeals/appeals_2003/AFUG32-sum.html , accessed 18
December 2003
Action by Churches Together (ACT) International, 23 October 2001, ACT appeal
Uganda: Emergency assistance for the IDPs in Katakwi District - AFUG-12
Internet
:
,
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/CE796C99784FB197C1256AEF004375B9
accessed 12 June 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 16 September 2002, Rebels abduct 70 people from camps
for displaced people
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/9bda79fd09ff
078685256c36006d0b5e?OpenDocument , accessed 7 October 2002
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 17 January 2000, "Twenty-four killed as rebels raid camp
in western Uganda"
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/46b7b9a585
74ad29c1256869005d4367?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 18 August 2003, Uganda accuses Sudan of current
impasse on relations
Internet : http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/7043.html , accessed 14 November 2003
Agence France-Presse (AFP), 29 November 2003, Conflict between army, insurgents
set to continue in northern Uganda (November 2003)
Internet
:
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/57ba435c665
d84b649256def000c549d?OpenDocument , accessed 8 December 2003
Amnesty International (AI), 17 March 1999, Uganda Breaking the Circle: Protecting
Human Rights in the Northern War Zone ( Report - AFR 59/01/99)
Internet : http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AFR590011999 , accessed 21 August
2002
222
Amnesty International (AI), 17 March 1999, Uganda The full picture - uncovering
human rights violations by government forces in the northern war
Internet
:
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b5e69c0525673700668026?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
BBC News, 3 October 2002, Uganda orders 100,000 from homes
Internet : http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2296637.stm , accessed 9 October 2002
European Commission - Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) , 4 December 2003,
Commission adopts €2 million humanitarian aid decision for forgotten crisis in Uganda
(December 2003)
Internet
:
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d7645c1256df20044f8b7?OpenDocument , accessed 8 December 2003
European Parliament, 6 July 2000, Human rights: Child soldiers in Uganda
Internet
:
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6424cc125691a005248cb?OpenDocument , accessed 14 July 2000
European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation (EPCPT),
December 2000, Uganda:Explosive Mix of Problems could re-ignite Civil War
Internet
:
http://web.archive.org/web/20010714152759/www.oneworld.org/euconflict/sfp/part2/258
_.htm , accessed 22 August 2002
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) , 20 May 2003, "WFP
increases food aid in Karamoja"
Internet : http://fews.net/current/monthlies/report/?submit=y&m=1000919&f=ug ,
accessed 13 June 2003
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) , 26 February 2002, Uganda Monthly Food Security Update (Jan 13 - Feb 12, 2002)
Internet
:
http://www.fews.net/centers/current/monthlies/report/?submit=y&f=ug&m=1000501&l=
en , accessed 18 December 2002
Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET) , 7 August 2002, Uganda Monthly Food Security Update, August 2002
Internet
:
http://www.fews.net/current/monthlies/report/?submit=y&m=1000646&f=ug&l=en
,
accessed 7 October 2002
223
Gender equality incorporated, August 2003, Justification for Family land Rights in
Uganda
Internet
:
http://www.genderequality.ca/uploads/Articles/Justification%20for%20family%20land%
20rights%20-%20GEI.doc , accessed 19 November 2003
Gersony, Robert, 2 October 1997, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, Section 1, (US
Embassy - Kampala)
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/4233a0bf81
1d7767c1256525002b8e44?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
Gersony, Robert, 2 October 1997, The Anguish of Northern Uganda, Section 2, (US
Embassy - Kampala)
Internet
:
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b31798c1256525002bcd94?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
Government of Uganda, 11 November 2003, IDP Numbers November 2003-For Soroti
Cabinet meeting
Government of Uganda, 18 February 2003, The National Policy on Internally Displaced
Persons, (Policy and Intstitutional Framework), Draft
Human Rights and Peace Centre (HURIPEC), Faculty of Law, Makerere
University, Kampala, Uganda, 30 October 2003, The hidden war: the forgotten people
Internet : http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/_media/_reports/031106uganda_fullreport.pdf , accessed
11 November 2003
Human Rights Watch (HRW), 15 July 2003, Abducted and abused-renewed conflict in
Uganda
Internet : http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0703/ , accessed 18 July 2003
Human Rights Watch (HRW), 27 February 2003, Briefing to the 59th Session of the
UN Commission on Human Rights
Internet : http://www.hrw.org/un/chr59/uganda.htm , accessed 11 June 2003
Human Rights Watch (HRW), 31 March 2003, Uganda Stolen Children: Abduction and
Recruitment in Northern Uganda
Internet : http://hrw.org/reports/2003/uganda0303/uganda0403.pdf , accessed 2 April
2003
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CEA), 12 March 2003, “Hopes for peace in north and an end to suffering”
Internet : http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ , accessed 11 June 2003
224
Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN –
CEA), 19 April 1999, Uganda: Cautious welcome for scaling down protected villages
Internet
:
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84663e8525675f006edc6b?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN –
CEA), 29 March 1999, Uganda: Health situation of Bundibugyo displaced "critical"
Internet
:
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CEA), 6 May 2003, UGANDA: Special report on the northern crisis
Internet
:
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=33891&SelectRegion=East_Africa&Selec
tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 24 June 2003
Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN –
CEA), 8 December 1999, "Uganda: IRIN Special Report on the ADF rebellion
Internet
:
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/3a81e21068ec1871c1256633003c1c6f/6fd2b49f84
494512c12568410064386d?OpenDocument , accessed 31 January 2000
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 January 2002, IRIN Focus on
humanitarian issues in 2001 //yearender//
Internet
:
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=18924&SelectRegion=East_Africa&Selec
tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 21 January 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 11 November 2003, UGANDA:
UN to appeal for help for IDPs
Internet
:
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37790&SelectRegion=East_Africa&Selec
tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 12 November 2003
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 March 2002, Uganda: Plans
afoot to pave the way for IDP returns
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 19 August 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 March 2003, "Hopes for peace
in north and an end to suffering"
225
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:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 12 June 2003
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 May 2003, Uganda:
Stakeholders aim to restart peace talks in north
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 14 May 2003
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 November 2003, GREAT
LAKES: IRIN interview with OCHA chief Jan Egeland
Internet
:
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=37810&SelectRegion=Great_Lakes
,
accessed 14 November 2003
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 12 September 2002, Uganda:
Focus on Karamoja drought crisis
Internet
:
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Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 13 September 2001, Emergency
plan to tackle Katakwi health needs
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 April 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 14 November 2002, "Uncertainty
over IDP returns"
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 11 June 2003
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 15 August 2002, Uganda:
Karamojong attack IDP camp in the east
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 October 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 15 August 2002, Uganda:
Karamojong attack IDP camp in the east
Internet
:
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Oubreak of ebola fever in the north"
Internet
:
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148c6f8525697b004e0691?OpenDocument , accessed 21 August 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 17 September 2002, Uganda: UN
condemns attack on aid convoy
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 October 2002
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 18 April 2002, Uganda: Special
Report on concerns at anti-LRA campaign
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 October 2002
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Government in peace deal with UNRF-II rebels
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Ebola confined to Gulu"
Internet
:
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Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2 April 2003, “Civilians targeted
by their own people”
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 11 June 2003
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crumbling in north
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 15 May 2003
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on growing tension in Karamoja
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 21 August 2002
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displacement in the north
Internet
:
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famine and insecurity in Karamoja"
Internet : http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=33011&SelectRegion , accessed
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Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 25 February 2002, Army to begin
forcible disarmament of Karamojong
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 5 April 2002
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LRA attacks raises fresh humanitarian concerns
Internet
:
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tCountry=UGANDA , accessed 7 October 2002
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on government proposal for talks with LRA
Internet
:
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Internet
:
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Ebola epidemic now contained, WHO says"
Internet
:
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unilateral ceasefire"
Internet
:
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calls for peace talks
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:
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:
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Internet
:
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Internet
:
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Internet
:
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Internet
:
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229
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:
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