COMPARATIVE
10.1177/001041402236309
Gabel,
Hix / DEFINING
POLITICAL
THE EU
STUDIES
POLITICAL
/ October
SPACE
2002
Descriptive models of the EU political space are fundamental components of both descriptions
of EU politics and theories of EU policy making. But there is no consensus on which, if any,
model accurately captures the EU political space. In this article, the authors seek to advance their
understanding of the EU political space by bringing evidence to bear on the accuracy of four
extant models. Following the methodology used to analyze the national political space of European democracies, they assemble and code manifestos of party federations written prior to European elections. They then use confirmatory factor analysis to analyze the underlying structure of
these party federations’ policy positions. They also examine temporal differences in party federation positions over several sets of issues. The results of the study indicate that the EU political
space is basically one dimensional and similar to the domestic Left-Right dimension in policy
content.
DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
An Empirical Study of the European
Elections Manifestos, 1979-1999
MATTHEW GABEL
University of Kentucky
SIMON HIX
London School of Economics and Political Science
A
s Marks and Steenbergen (2002 [this issue]) describe, scholars of EU
policy making have adopted conflicting assumptions about the
dimensionality and character of the EU policy space. Because the shape of
the political space—the number of dimensions, the policy content of these
dimensions, and the location of actors in this space—is a central determinant
of political competition and outcomes, these conflicting assumptions often
lead to different conclusions about and interpretations of EU policy making.
This is a serious impediment to advancing our theoretical understanding of
EU politics. A resolution of this theoretical conflict depends on assessing the
relative value of the conflicting assumptions about the character of the policy
space.
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, Vol. 35 No. 8, October 2002 934-964
DOI: 10.1177/001041402236309
© 2002 Sage Publications
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Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
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To help address this problem, we attempt to examine empirically whether
the structure of EU political space is consistent with these existing models of
the EU political space. Specifically, we investigate whether the models
described by Marks and Steenbergen (2002) account for the EU policy space
as defined by the European party federations—or Euro-parties. These Europarties bring together the domestic and European-level political elites in the
four main European party families—Socialists, Christian Democrats/Conservatives, Liberals, and Greens. In the European elections of 1979, 1984,
1989, 1994, and 1999, the Euro-parties drafted manifestos describing their
positions across a broad range of policies involving the EU. We use an established content analysis technique to turn these text documents into numerical
data representing Euro-parties’ positions on specific issues. Through confirmatory factor analysis, we then examine whether these policy positions are
related in ways consistent with existing models of the EU political space.
Finally, we describe how the positions of the Euro-parties in the EU political
space have changed during the past 20 years.
THE SHAPE OF THE EU POLICY SPACE:
FOUR RIVAL MODELS
Marks and Steenbergen (2002) describe four extant models of the EU policy space: the international relations model, the regulation model, the HixLord model, and the Hooghe-Marks model. To examine the empirical accuracy of these models of the EU political space, we adopt a common analytical
approach in the empirical study of the political space in national contexts
(e.g., Budge, Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, & Tanenbaum, 2001; Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987b; Gabel & Huber, 2000). A traditional approach to
characterizing a policy space is to describe its dimensionality, where dimensions represent constraint on the policy positions of political actors. For
example, to understand the political space of a national party competition,
scholars examine how parties’ positions on a variety of salient policy questions are interrelated (e.g., Budge et al., 1987b, 2001; Laver, 2001). A dimension reduces differences in parties’ positions across many issues to differences on that dimension. To take one common example, the Left-Right
dimension simplifies differences in parties’ positions on a variety of socioeconomic issues into differences along a single dimension. As a result, if one
can identify the relationship between specific policies and the underlying
dimensions, then one can infer parties’ positions on individual policies from
their positions on the underlying dimensions (Gabel & Huber, 2000, p. 95).
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
Each of the aforementioned models of the EU political space specifies a
distinct dimensionality to the EU political space. To examine their accuracy,
we need information about the positions of relevant political actors on a variety of EU political issues. In the national context, a common source of such
information would be party manifestos, which present parties’ promises and
positions regarding a vast array of issues (see especially Budge et al., 2001).
Since national parties compete for office and adopt policies, these actors’policy positions are an obvious object of study for defining the national political
space. However, in the EU context, no comparable source of data exists.
There are no elections determining control of EU governance that are contested by political parties who issue manifestos detailing their positions on a
broad array of EU issues.1 But there is one source of data that offers a reasonable approximation: the manifestos of the Euro-parties.
DATA: THE EURO-PARTIES’ ELECTION MANIFESTOS, 1979-1999
Euro-parties are federations of national parties that organize according to
political family into the following groups: Socialist, Christian Democrat/
Conservative, Liberal, and Green. Like their constituent national parties, the
Euro-parties have their own administrative organization, budget, and secretariat (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 63). The Euro-parties are active in setting and
coordinating the EU policy agenda for their members. In addition, party leaders’ meetings—which include national party leaders, European commissioners, and party group leaders in the European Parliament (EP) from the same
party family—help coordinate policy positions and proposals across different EU policy-making institutions (Hix & Lord, 1997, p. 64). Hix and Lord
(1997) argue that these Euro-parties serve as effective umbrella organizations
for structuring the policy agendas of their members in EU policy making.
Thus, whereas representatives of national parties are the primary actors in EU
policy making (in the Council of Ministers and the EP), their behavior is
structured by the overarching Euro-parties.
These Euro-parties state their positions publicly in manifestos that are
adopted immediately before the elections for the EP (which have been held
every 5 years since 1979). Specifically, we collected, coded, and analyzed the
manifestos of the Socialist, Christian Democrat/Conservative, Liberal, and
Green Euro-parties. We then used this information about Euro-party policy
positions to examine the aforementioned models of the EU political space.
1. National representatives chosen in national elections constitute the Council of Ministers—
which must approve all legislation—and the European Council, which decides on treaty
reforms.
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
937
These manifestos are a valuable source of information about the EU policy space for several reasons. First, these documents are a reasonably accurate statement of the positions that the European political elites take on issues
on the EU agenda at different points in time. Granted, these documents are
rarely used in the parties’ election campaigns in the domestic arena and are
not well known by European citizens. However, the domestic media like to
point out the inconsistencies between the commitments made by national
party leaders in these European manifestos and those made in their national
party programs or manifestos. Consequently, to monitor commitments made
at the European level, national party leaders have gradually delegated
increasingly senior party officials to the task of negotiating these documents.
For example, in 1998, the British Labour Party sent its foreign minister,
Robin Cook, to lead the working group drafting the European Socialist Party
family’s manifesto for the 1999 European elections. Similarly high-ranking
figures were sent by the French, German, and Italian Socialist Parties, all of
whom were in government in the domestic arena at the time. And once these
negotiations are complete, the manifestos are signed at the highest political
level, by the national party leaders. These signatories are the key political
actors in the EU system: competing for the highest offices in the domestic arena
and scrutinizing the behavior of their representative in the EU institutions—
ministers in the council, commissioners, and the national delegations of the
parties in the EP.
Second, since their emergence around the first EP elections in the mid1970s, the member parties of the four transnational party federations in our
analysis have dominated politics in the EU (Hix, 1996; Hix & Lord, 1997, pp.
30-39, 167-197). The Party of European Socialists (PES) incorporates the
major party on the Center-Left in every EU member state, who together
receive the support of about 30% of voters in the EU. And at the time of writing (November 2001), they made up 181 of the 626 seats in the EP, 10 of the
20 commissioners, and 10 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government in 11 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eurosocialists.org).
The European People’s Party (EPP) involves 23 national Christian Democratic and Conservative Parties, who together incorporate the main CenterRight party in every EU state except Ireland (Fianna Fail). These parties command the support of approximately 30% of voters in the EU; at the time of
writing, EPP politicians made up 232 of the 626 seats in the EP, 6 of the 20
commissioners, and 4 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government
in 5 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eppe.org/home/default.asp).
The European Liberal, Democrat, and Reform Party (ELDR) incorporates
18 liberal, centrist, reform, radical, and agrarian parties and the ELDR group
in the EP. In the mid-1990s, the ELDR lost two of its most influential parties
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
to the EPP: the Portuguese Social Democrats and the French Republicans.
Nevertheless, the ELDR remains present in every EU state, and these parties
command the support of approximately 10% of voters in the EU; at the time
of writing, ELDR politicians made up 51 of the 626 seats in the EP, 2 of the 20
commissioners, and 1 of the 15 EU prime ministers and were in government
in 8 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.eldr.org).
Finally, the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) incorporates 18
environmentalist, ecologist, and Green-Left parties and the Green members
of the Green/European Free Alliance group in the EP. These parties command the support of approximately 5% of voters in the EU; at the time of
writing, EFGP politicians made up 38 of the 626 seats in the EP, 1 of the 20
commissioners, and 1 of the EU foreign ministers (from Germany) and were
in government in 4 of the 15 EU states (see http://www.europeangreens.org).
Overall, these four Euro-parties dominate politics at the national and
European levels in the EU, commanding the support of more than 75% of voters and controlling more than 80% of seats in the EP, 100% of EU commissioners, more than 90% of EU prime ministers, and more than 85% of parties
in government. Hence, if we look at how these parties position themselves
against each other in their manifestos for European elections, we can gain a
fairly accurate picture of the terrain of politics in, and relating to, the EU.
CODING AND MEASUREMENT: FROM MANIFESTO
PROMISES TO POLICY LOCATIONS
The EPP, PES, and ELDR have adopted manifestos in every European
election since 1979, whereas the EFGP has adopted manifestos only since the
1989 elections. This leads to 18 Euro-party manifestos in total—3 from the
1979 and 1984 elections and 4 from the 1989, 1994, and 1999 elections.
To convert these texts into numerical data for analysis, we used a standard
content analysis technique that has been widely used to examine national
party manifestos (Budge et al., 1987b, 2001). This technique involves the following steps. First, we draw up a coding frame, which is set out in the appendix. Our coding frame is based on Michael Laver’s reformed version of the
European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Party Manifestos project coding frame (Laver, 2001; Laver & Garry, 2000). This scheme differs
from the ECPR scheme in three ways. First, it is more hierarchical than the
ECPR scheme, which allows for categories to be amalgamated more systematically. Second, the scheme includes exclusively directional categories. The
ECPR scheme also included categories that were simply designed to tap issue
saliency—for example, the category “free enterprise”—without any clear
directional character to the category. As we are interested in the relative posi-
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
939
tions of Euro-parties on each issue rather than the relative saliency, this coding is appropriate to our analysis. Third, to Laver’s scheme we add a whole
new set of issue categories (categories beginning with the number 6), relating
to positions on the general question of European integration, specific views
of the EU institutions and EU policies, and a number of general issues on the
EU agenda.
Second, each document is then coded, using the same content-analysis
technique as that used in the ECPR Party Manifestos project (Budge et al.,
2001, pp. 215-218; Budge, Robertson, & Hearl, 1987a). This process
involves coding every statement (sentence or part sentence) in each manifesto for one and only one of the issue categories in the coding frame. From
these raw scores, we then calculate the proportion (percentage) of sentences
in each document dedicated to each policy category. These percentages are
the data we use in the analysis.2
For example, if a manifesto contains 2 sentences stating that the party supports the EU single market, followed by 1 statement qualifying this support
(for example, by criticizing the failure of the EU to complete the single market effectively), the 1st two sentences are coded as “support for the EU single
market” (Category 63121), and the 3rd sentence is coded as “criticism of the
EU single market” (Category 63123). Then, if the manifesto contains 100
statements and there are no other references to the single market in the document, the proportional score for Category 63121 is 2.0%, and the proportional score for Category 63123 is 1.0%.
The result is a valuable data set that could have a number of applications in
the study of EU politics. To give the reader an idea of the extent of this data
set, Table 1 shows the number of political statements (raw scores) in each
manifesto. As the table shows, the EPP tended to issue shorter manifestos
than the other parties. However, this does not bias the results. The EPP manifestos covered as many issues as the other parties’ manifestos, simply in less
depth. And because we are interested in the proportion of the manifesto dedicated to each issue category rather than the absolute raw scores, the length of
the manifesto is irrelevant for our analysis.
Third, to create a smaller number of variables for statistical analysis, we
combined the percentage scores into a number of consolidated issue catego2. One potential problem with this coding method is that by using percentages of total statements, the percentages in each category are not independent. However, since manifestos vary—
sometimes dramatically—in length, we need to adjust the categories to control for the level of
verbosity in each text. We should also note that this coding method has proved effective in identifying the dimensionality of the political space in the national context (e.g., Gabel & Huber,
2000).
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
Table 1
Number of Political Statements (Raw Scores) in the Manifestos
Election Year
Party
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
Average
Party of European Socialists
European People’s Party
European Liberal, Democrat,
and Reform Party
European Federation of
Green Parties
Average
246
76
429
26
389
75
258
82
173
96
247
71
760
659
339
273
257
458
—
361
—
371
134
234
512
281
220
187
289
278
Note: Dashes indicate empty cells.
ries.3 These categories are designed to both capture the breadth of the content
in the manifestos and allow us to differentiate among the empirical claims of
the theoretical models of the EU political space discussed earlier.
We focus on these categories because they involve issues of both EU policy and EU integration, which are the issues hypothesized to characterize the
EU political space. Note that each category has a directional opposite, which
is necessary for coding purposes.4 Consistent with this expectation, these categories represent, on average, about 72% of all statements in a manifesto.5
Below, we list the categories (the subcategories from the appendix are in
parentheses):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
pro-state/–economic intervention (11, 3311, 3332),
antistate/–economic intervention (13, 3331, 3312),
nontraditional political/social values (21, 141, 311, 3314, 3316, 3318, 3333),
traditional political/social values (23, 142, 313, 3313, 3334, 3336, 3338),
pro–Democratic EU institutional reform (62311, 62321, 62331, 6421, 6431,
6441, 64721, 64731, 64741, 64751, 6491, 62513, 62521, 63323, 62611,
6112),
3. Due to low levels of covariation across many of the categories, it was difficult to identify
the confirmatory factor analysis models estimated here. Also, given the empirical implications
of the models of the EU political space, we needed to create supercategories consistent with the
hypothesized policy areas.
4. Note that the hypotheses we test identify specific relationships between positive and negative statements across issue areas. We therefore want to test these claims directly, not through
some aggregate pro-con score.
5. Note that the EU reform categories were omitted because they average about 1% of statements in a manifesto.
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
941
6. anti–Democratic EU institutional reform (62313, 62323, 62333, 6423, 6433,
6443, 64723, 64733, 64743, 64753, 6493, 62511, 62523, 63321, 62613,
6132),
7. pro–new EU regulatory/redistributive policies (63111, 63131, 63141, 63343,
63251, 63333, 63361, 63371, 63431),
8. anti–new EU regulatory/redistributive policies (63113, 63133, 63143, 63341,
63253, 63331, 63363, 63373, 63433),
9. pro–EU enlargement (64101),
10. anti–EU enlargement (64103),
11. pro–EU economic integration (63121, 63311, 63221, 63161, 63411, 6111),
12. anti–EU economic integration (63123, 63313, 63223, 63163, 63413, 6131),
13. pro–new EU political integration (63511, 63521, 63611, 63621, 63631,
63641, 63651), and
14. anti–new EU political integration (63513, 63523, 63613, 63623, 63633,
63643, 63653).
Some of these categories deserve further discussion. The categories concerning institutional reform of the EU (Numbers 5 and 6) include statements
regarding (a) strengthening the European Parliament vis-à-vis other EU institutions, (b) increased transparency and reduction in the democratic deficit,
and (c) increased interest representation in the EU. The categories concerning new EU regulatory/redistributive policies include statements about new
policies that have a specific expected policy outcome. Policy outcomes that
involved regulation of business or the economy or that generally favored
labor at the expense of capital were coded as pro. For example, support for
more EU regulation of the economy or environment was coded pro in this category. A statement supporting the single goal of price stability was coded as
anti. The categories for EU economic integration include statements referring to the fundamental economic components of EU membership: the internal market, competition policy, common external trade policy, and common
agricultural policy. The categories for new EU political integration include
statements referring to further policy integration, with no policy outcome
specified. For example, a statement in support of common immigration policies does not specify whether that policy would be restrictive or liberal.
Table 2 presents the proportion of all parties’ manifesto commitments in
each election dedicated to these consolidated issue categories. Together,
these issue categories consume more than 60% of the Euro-parties’ manifestos in this period. Furthermore, most of these categories had broadly the same
level of saliency across each election. The few exceptions are easily explainable. For example, pro–new EU regulatory/redistributive policies were
highly salient in the 1989 election following the delegation of new regulatory
competences to the EU level in the 1987 Single European Act, which
942
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
Table 2
Percentage of All the Parties’ Manifestos Dedicated to Each Issue Category (in percentages)
Election Year
Issue Category
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
Average
Pro-state/–economic intervention
Anti–state/economic intervention
Nontraditional political/social
values
Traditional political/social values
Pro–democratic EU institutional
reform
Anti–democratic EU institutional
reform
Pro–new EU regulatory/
redistributive policies
Anti–new EU regulatory/
redistributive policies
Pro–EU enlargement
Anti–EU enlargement
Pro–EU economic integration
Anti–EU economic integration
Pro–new EU political integration
Anti–new EU political integration
Total
16.7
3.5
11.2
3.5
7.1
3.3
7.9
4.5
10.9
7.3
10.7
4.4
13.8
2.6
12.1
2.1
14.0
2.7
13.2
1.9
13.1
1.0
13.3
2.1
4.9
7.2
5.9
6.1
7.0
6.2
0.6
0.2
0.1
0.8
0.5
0.4
8.9
9.5
11.3
8.5
4.3
8.5
0.5
1.5
0.2
3.3
0.8
2.0
0.5
59.8
0.6
2.0
0.2
6.1
1.7
5.3
0.4
62.1
0.9
0.2
0.1
6.4
4.1
4.8
2.4
63.2
1.4
1.6
0.6
4.0
2.9
8.2
1.7
63.5
0.7
2.9
0.5
3.8
1.2
6.5
1.5
61.2
0.8
1.6
0.3
4.7
2.2
5.4
1.3
62.0
included the program to complete the EU single market by the end of 1992.
Conversely, the issue of EU enlargement (either pro or anti) was not very
salient in the 1989 election, because following the membership of Spain and
Portugal in 1986, it was clear that the next round of enlargement (which did
not come until 1995) was several years away.
Finally, Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for these 12 variables.
Note that with only 18 observations, many correlations are insignificant at
standard levels of statistical significance.
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
METHOD
To test the rival models of the shape of the EU political space in statistical
analysis, we use confirmatory factor analysis of these 14 issue categories.
Factor analysis examines how the covariation among manifesto emphases
Table 3
Correlation Matrix (Pearson Correlation Coefficients)
Pro-statist
Antistatist
Pro–traditional
values
Anti–traditional
values
Pro–democractic
reform
Anti–democratic
reform
Proenlargement
Antienlargement
Pro–EU statist
Anti–EU statist
Pro–economic
integration
Anti–economic
integration
Pro–political
integration
Anti–political
integration
Pro-Statist
Antistatist
—
–0.49**
—
–0.12
–0.24
–0.42**
0.50**
0.07
–0.44**
0.30
0.18
0.33
–0.16
0.30
–0.20
–0.04
–0.32
–0.28
–0.21
Pro–Traditional
Values
Anti–Traditional Pro–Democractic Anti–Democratic
Values
Reform
Reform
Proenlargement
—
0.18
0.33**
–0.14
0.27
–0.28
–0.17
–0.29
—
–0.40**
0.04
0.04
–0.28
–0.38
0.06
—
–0.10
0.19
0.20
0.05
–0.25
—
0.32
0.48**
–0.18
0.32
—
0.05
–0.41**
–0.21
0.19
–0.69**
0.03
–0.50**
0.42**
–0.13
–0.18
–0.12
0.25
–0.43**
0.37
–0.47**
–0.26
0.31
–0.55**
0.02
–0.63**
0.29
0.35
–0.18
0.28
0.09
0.45**
–0.28
0.42**
–0.36
0.10
–0.46**
943
(continued)
944
Table 3 (continued)
Antienlargement
Pro-statist
Antistatist
Pro–traditional
values
Anti–traditional
values
Pro–democractic
reform
Anti–democratic
reform
Proenlargement
Antienlargement
Pro–EU statist
Anti–EU statist
Pro–economic
integration
Anti–economic
integration
Pro–political
integration
Anti–political
integration
**p < .10.
—
–0.37
0.50**
0.06
–0.19
Pro–EU Statist
—
–0.37
0.48**
Anti–EU Statist
Pro–Economic
Integration
Anti–Economic
Integration
Pro–Political
Integration
Anti–Political
Integration
—
–0.13
–0.12
0.51**
0.65**
–0.10
0.06
–0.31
—
–0.18
—
0.39
0.33
–0.31
0.33
–0.31
0.61**
—
–0.20
—
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
945
across issue categories is structured by latent or underlying factors (dimensions). Confirmatory factor analysis evaluates the performance of a particular factor structure in explaining the covariation among these parties’ emphases across policy categories. The factor structure specifies the number of
factors, their interrelationships, and their relationships to the categories,
which serve as indicators of the factors. The performance of the factor structure is evaluated through a measurement model that assesses the fit of the
structure with the data.
Note that we estimate the measurement models with the full set of manifestos data for all five European elections. With all manifestos included, we
have 18 observations (manifestos) for each policy category, which is a very
small number for estimation purposes. We therefore cannot estimate measurement models for subsets of the data by year or by party federation.
The four models predict different factor structures for the covariation in
the issue category variables:
1. International relations model: All variables should load on one factor (dimension), which will be identified by the variables measuring European integration (Numbers 5 to 14). For these variables, the parameter estimates for the pro
variables should be in the same direction (positive or negative), with the
parameter estimates for the anti variables sharing the opposite direction.
2. Regulation model: All variables should load on one dimension, with the variables for Left-Right (Numbers 1 to 4) defining the dimension. The pro-state/intervention variable should load in the opposite direction to that of the
antistate/-intervention variable, and the traditional values variables should
load in the opposite direction to the nontraditional values dimension. Also, the
variables for EU-level regulation should load consistently with the Left-Right
variables.
3. Hix-Lord model: The variables should load on two distinct (orthogonal)
dimensions. The European integration variables should load on one dimension, and the traditional Left-Right socioeconomic variables (Numbers 1 to 4)
should load on the other dimension. On the European integration dimension,
the parameter estimates for the pro variables should be in the same direction
(positive or negative), with the parameter estimates for the anti variables sharing the opposite direction. On the Left-Right dimension, the pro-state/-intervention variable should load in the opposite direction to that of the antistate/intervention variable, and the traditional values variables should load in the
opposite direction to the nontraditional values dimension. These two dimensions should be unrelated.
4. Hooghe-Marks model: The variables should load on two dimensions as specified in the Hix-Lord model. However, these dimensions should be strongly
related to each other such that prointegration positions are associated with
Left positions and anti-integration positions are associated with Right posi-
946
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
tions. This would result in a policy space where basically two camps compete:
those supporting regulated capitalism and those supporting neoliberalism at
the EU level.
RESULTS
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood results from the three measurement models designed to evaluate the aforementioned models of the EU
political space. We report the standardized coefficients for these models as
well as several measures of model fit. As recommended by Hoyle and Panter
(1995), we report the following fit indices: the goodness-of-fit index
(Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1981), the non-normed fit index (Bentler & Bonnett,
1980), the incremental fit index (Bollen, 1989), and the comparative fit index
(Bentler, 1990). The values of the goodness-of-fit index, non-normed fit
index, incremental fit index, and comparative fit index range from 0 to 1.0,
with higher values indicating better model fit (Bentler & Bonnett, 1980;
Hoyle & Panter, 1995). Note that for all of the models, the model fit is objectively small. This may indicate that we have not specified the correct model
for capturing the policy space. Alternatively, there may be very little underlying structure to the positions of the party groups on these issues, as the low
correlations between many policy areas suggest (see Table 3). At any rate, we
will focus on the relative level of model fit for each theoretical model.
The first model assumes one factor underlies all 14 categories. For the
nonintegration variables (1 through 4), opposing categories load on this
dimension in opposite directions (one positive, one negative). This is not true
for the integration variables. Of these, only the variables for new political
integration and economic integration load in opposing directions by topic
(and only the economic variables are both significant). The basic interpretation of the dimension is that parties that are antiregulation in general express
traditional values and support new political integration but also support economic integration. Note that parties that are against new EU regulatory policies are for economic integration and new EU political integration.
These results are inconsistent with the international relations model, as
the integration variables do not load consistently with expectations. The
results are roughly consistent with the regulation model, as the traditional
Left-Right variables load consistently with expectations and the antistate/intervention and the anti–new EU regulatory policies variables load in the
same direction. Thus, of the one-factor conceptual models, the regulation
model performs best.
Model 2 presents a two-factor model designed to test the Hix-Lord model.
The results are consistent with expectations on the Left-Right dimension
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
947
Table 4
Factor Patterns (Standardized Solution)
Model 1:
Single Factor
Model 2:
Two Factors
(orthogonal)
Observed Indicator
Factor 1
Factor 1
Pro-state/-intervention
Antistate/-intervention
Nontraditional values
Traditional values
Pro–EU democratic reform
Anti–EU democratic reform
Pro–new EU regulatory/
redistributive policies
Anti–new EU regulatory/
redistributive policies
Proenlargement
Antienlargement
Pro–EU economic
integration
Anti–EU economic
integration
Pro–new EU political
integration
Anti–new EU political
integration
Factor correlation
Goodness-of-fit index
Non-normed fit index
Incremental fit index
Comparative fit index
–0.761*
0.545*
–0.708*
0.049
0.447*
0.349
0.780*
–0.629*
0.641*
–0.054
Factor 2
Model 3:
Two Factors
(interrelated)
Factor 1
Factor 2
0.718*
–0.604*
0.722*
0.002
0.181
0.542*
0.333
0.449*
0.128
–0.108
0.119
0.542*
0.118
0.196
0.916*
–0.367
0.525*
0.674*
–0.082
0.368
0.550*
0.069
0.359
–0.435*
–0.201
–0.345
0.812*
–0.393
—
.499
.061
.218
.138
0.719*
–0.010
—
.492
–.018
.218
.205
0.952*
–0.241
–.838
.505
.045
.280
.202
Note: Dashes indicate empty cells.
*p < .05.
(Factor 1). However, on the national sovereignty dimension (Factor 2), the
loadings are not clearly indicative of a pro-/anti-integration dimension. The
loadings indicate that parties that are antienlargement are also anti–new EU
regulatory policies and anti–EU democratic reform. But these parties would
be favorable to new political integration. In addition, this factor does not
account for parties’ positions on EU economic integration. It is also important to note that the goodness of fit of this model is generally inferior to that of
the one-factor model presented in Model 1.
Model 3 attempts to capture the specifications of the Hooghe-Marks
model by relaxing the assumption of orthogonality. In terms of interpretation,
948
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
the factor loadings in this model are basically the same as those in Model 2.
The interfactor correlation is quite high (–.838), suggesting that these two
dimensions are strongly related. The factors interrelate such that positions
that are pro–state intervention and anti–traditional values on the first dimension are negatively related to anti–EU democratic reform positions and anti–
new EU regulatory policy positions on the second dimension. This is consistent with expectations, representing a regulated capitalism camp. However,
these same Left positions on the first dimensions are negatively related to
pro–EU political integration positions and have an ambiguous relationship to
positions on EU economic integration. This is inconsistent with a regulated
capitalism agenda. As for the neoliberalism camp, there is some supporting
evidence. Positions against state intervention were positively related to positions opposed to EU democratic reform and new EU regulatory/redistributive
policies. But these Right positions on the first dimension were positively
related to positions favoring new EU political integration. This is not consistent with a neoliberalism agenda.
One reason for the unexpected results regarding positions on new EU
political integration is that these categories did not specify the direction of
policy in a proposed area of new EU authority. Support for new political integration simply indicated that a manifesto supported the extension of EU
authority to a new policy area—irrespective of whether that policy might be
consistent with a Left or Right ideological position. Thus, the relationship
between the Left-Right dimension and these positions is not particularly
important for the Hooghe-Marks model. The more important categories are
those regarding institutional reform and regulation of the EU market. For
those categories, the model performs generally as expected. Consequently,
we find the results, on balance, to support the Hooghe-Marks model.
The model fit for Model 3 is an improvement on Model 2 but not clearly
better than that of Model 1. The Bentler-Bonnett non-normed fit index
(Bentler & Bonnett, 1980) is smaller for Model 3 than for Model 1 whereas
the other goodness-of-fit measures favor Model 3 slightly over Model 1.
Thus, particularly with the high factor correlation in Model 3, we cannot conclude that the Hooghe-Marks model is a better representation of the EU policy space than the one-factor model. Our interpretation of these results is that
the policy space is basically one dimensional, consistent with the regulation
model, where European economic integration represents an antiregulation
enterprise. That is, Euro-parties that are against state intervention in the economy are also for economic integration in the EU. Certainly, there is evidence
that this space has a multidimensional character and is basically consistent
with the Hooghe-Marks model, but the correlation between these dimensions
is very high.
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
949
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
METHOD
Finally, we also used these manifestos data to evaluate how the parties differentiate themselves from each other and over time in the policy areas and
whether this is in accordance with the expectations of the four models of the
EU political space. As mentioned above, for the confirmatory factor analysis,
we did not have sufficient degrees of freedom to examine temporal dynamics
of the EU policy space or Euro-party policy positions. However, we can give
some descriptive account of these changes by simply tracking Euro-party
policy positions in particular areas over time.
We use the raw score data from the manifestos to calculate the location of
the parties in each election in different policy areas. Following the ECPR
Party Manifestos project method, the location of a party on a particular issue
is the proportion (percentage) of a manifesto dedicated to one side of the issue
minus the proportion dedicated to the other side of the issue (Budge, 2001;
Budge & Klingemann, 2001). For example, if a manifesto contains 10% of
pro-state/–economic intervention statements and 5% of antistate/–economic
intervention statements, the manifesto is located at +5.0 on the state/
economic intervention dimension.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows that the Euro-parties were relatively distinct on economic
Left-Right issues (see Figure 1A). The Socialists moved dramatically to the
Right in the 1980s and came close to the positions of the EPP and the Liberals
in the 1989 election. But in 1994 and 1999, the Socialists again presented a
distinct Center-Left agenda. The EPP (which at that time had few explicitly
conservative member parties) also moved from a more centrist economic
agenda in the late 1970s—to the Left of the Liberals—to a clear free-market
agenda in the late 1990s, very close to the position of the Liberals. Also, the
EFGP party emerged as a new force—clearly to the Left of the Socialists in
the 1999 election. The results consequently support the Hix-Lord, HoogheMarks, and regulation claims about party distinction on economic issues
relating to the traditional Left-Right conflict.
On European integration issues, Figure 1B shows that the positions of the
two main parties have almost completely reversed. At the end of the 1970s
and in the early 1980s, the EPP was generally prointegration, whereas the
Socialists were generally more skeptical. Conversely, at the end of the 1990s,
the Socialists were the main champions of economic integration and the EPP
950
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
1A. Economic Left-Right (Pro- vs. Antistate Intervention)
30%
20%
PES
EPP
10%
ELDR
EFGP
0%
-10%
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
1B. EU Economic Integration (Pro- vs. Antistate Intervention)
15%
10%
5%
PES
EPP
0%
ELDR
EFGP
-5%
-10%
-15%
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
Figure 1. Euro-party locations over time.
is one of the more skeptical forces. In between, the Liberals followed the EPP
on issues of EU economic integration. And the Greens emerged as the only
anti-integrationist force at the European level. Since the parties crossed paths
on many of these issue dimensions, the results refute the claims of all the
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
951
models that parties maintain clear and distinct positions on European integration issues.
However, if we map the party positions at the beginning and end of the
period in a two-dimensional space, we can modify this conclusion. As Figure
2 shows, across the whole period, as the Hix-Lord model predicts, all four
positions were present: Left/anti-integration (Socialists in 1979 and Greens
in 1999), Left/prointegration (Socialists in 1999), Right/anti-integration
(EPP and Liberals in 1999), and Right/prointegration (Liberals and EPP in
1979).
As a result, the Hooghe-Marks claim about the relationship between the
two dimensions does not hold in 1979: where the Center-Left PES was more
anti-European than both the EPP and ELDR. But their claims do hold in
1999. The Socialists became more pro-European as they began to endorse
regulatory capitalism at the European and national levels (instead of welfare
capitalism at the domestic level). On the other side, the EPP became more
anti-European as they began to advocate neoliberal economic policies, and
the already neoliberal ELDR became more anti-European as the EU became
more regulatory.
Nevertheless, the regulation prediction that the party line-up on the economic Left-Right should map directly onto the pro-/anti-Europe dimension
does not hold. In 1979, whereas it was PES-EPP-ELDR on the Left-Right, it
was the reverse (ELDR-EPP-PES) from prointegration to anti-integration. In
other words, at the beginning of the period, the correlation between the directions was in the opposite direction to the regulation prediction: with the Left
mapping onto anti-Europe and the Right mapping onto pro-Europe. The predictions were closer in 1999—where it was PES versus EPP/ELDR from Left
to Right and PES versus ELDR/EPP from prointegration to anti-integration.
But this holds only if the Greens are excluded as outliers (perhaps on the
grounds that they are weaker at the European level than the other party families), and the Liberals, Conservatives, and Christian Democrats are treated as
a single Center-Right bloc.
CONCLUSION
As have Gabel and Anderson (2002 [this issue]) and Hooghe, Marks, and
Wilson (2002 [this issue]), we have explored empirically whether political
agents take positions on EU policy that are structured by ideological dimensions that define a coherent EU policy space. We have focused on the policy
positions of Euro-parties as presented in their electoral manifestos. Our
952
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
1999
EU Economic Integration
1979
PES
1979
EPP
ELDR
1999
EFGP
1999
1999
1979
Economic Left-Right
Figure 2. Euro-party positions in a two-dimensional space.
results indicate that the positions of these parties are interpretable through the
lens of existing models of the policy space.
First of all, the manifestos data reveal that the Euro-parties have differentiated themselves on some major policy issues, but this differentiation is not
simply a copy of the domestic, ideological, “family” distinctions between
Socialists, Christian Democrats/Conservatives, and Liberals. On economic
issues on the EU agenda and relating to European integration, Euro-parties
consisting of national parties on the domestic ideological Left or Right took
positions that were distinct and consistent with these ideological positions.
But on the questions of the speed and nature of economic integration in
Europe (such as what powers should be delegated to the European level), the
Euro-parties were less consistent in how they differentiated themselves from
one another in the positions they took. In fact, across the 20-year period, the
Left and Right parties swapped positions on the question of European integration: with the Socialists moving from being the least prointegration party
to being the most prointegration party and the Christian Democrats/Conservatives moving in the reverse direction.
As a result, if the 20-year period is taken as a whole, the Hix-Lord model
of a two-dimensional political space appears the most appropriate of the
extant models. According to this model, the Left-Right and EU integration
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
953
dimensions are orthogonal, which produces four distinct and enduring positions in the space. Alternatively, one could argue that the Hooghe-Marks or
the regulation model captures the evolution from a two-dimensional space to
a new one-dimensional space: between a regulatory capitalist position (on
the Left and prointegration) and a neoliberal position (on the Right and less
prointegration). From the Hix-Lord perspective, though, this new structure is
only temporary, as Left/anti-integration and Right/prointegration positions
are sure to emerge at some point in the future.
Second, the results of the confirmatory factor analyses provide systematic
empirical evidence as to the accuracy of four prominent models of the EU
political space. Interestingly, arguably the most common model—the international relations model—is inconsistent with the pattern of policy positions
adopted by Euro-parties in their election manifestos. In addition, the evidence provides only modest support for the Hix-Lord model and the HoogheMarks model. Instead, the Euro-parties, to the extent that they structure their
policy positions, appear to structure their policy space more in terms of traditional socioeconomic Left-Right—that is, the regulation model. The best
performing model was one in which the traditional socioeconomic LeftRight determined the positions of the Euro-parties on EU socioeconomic policies and on issues relating to further economic integration in Europe. But a
related yet distinct dimension structures issues of further political integration, new EU roles in regulating the economy, and EU territorial enlargement.
However, given the strong relationship between these two dimensions, for
practical purposes we would conclude that the single dimensional model is a
reasonable depiction of the EU and a reasonable assumption for spatial modeling. That single dimension would best be characterized as reflecting a traditional socioeconomic Left-Right dimension.
This political space is roughly consistent with the mass-level political
space identified by Gabel and Anderson (2002). One interesting implication
of this congruence is that transnational party groups appear to be organizing
their policy positions in a fashion generally similar to that of the voters they
ultimately represent. Although it is clear from studies of European elections
(e.g., Van Der Eijk & Franklin, 1996) that this congruence is not due to voters’ choosing parties based on their concerns about EU policy, the coincidence of these political spaces is striking. Among other things, it indicates
that were transnational party groups to supplant national parties as the primary contestants in European elections, voters and party groups would have a
common shorthand language to communicate about policy. This would facilitate representation and democratic accountability, as discussed in Gabel and
Anderson (2002).
954
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
We should emphasize that we consider these conclusions as tentative.
While the Euro-party manifestos data are valuable as a source of information
about relevant political actors’positions on EU policy, they have some limitations. First, not all political actors involved in EU policy making are members
of Euro-parties. In particular, those actors (e.g., political parties) with policy
positions outside the mainstream of the traditional party families were
ignored in our analysis. To the extent that these actors are important to EU
policy making and take considerably different positions on EU policy from
those of the Euro-parties, our results will misrepresent the EU policy space.
However, as we argued above, most of the key players in EU politics are
members of these Euro-parties.
Second, and possibly of greater concern, the Euro-parties may have significant internal conflict over EU policies, yet they must write a common
manifesto. Such internal dissent could result in manifestos that avoid sensitive issues or ones that are ambivalent. For example, if all Euro-parties suffer
from an internal division over further institutional and territorial integration
of Europe, then this integration dimension of conflict may simply be ignored
in the Euro-party manifestos. If this concern about integration is an important
determinant of national parties’ behavior in EU policy making, our analysis
would fail to capture this dimension of the EU policy space (Hix, 1999).
Put more generally, this problem is important for our results if (a) national
parties largely act independently of their Euro-parties when they participate
in EU policy making and (b) national parties within Euro-parties are divided
on important issues of EU policy. We can only speculate on the likelihood
that either of these conditions accurately describes EU politics. As we argued
above, Euro-parties appear to influence the behavior of their members and to
shape the agenda of EU politics. Also, the Euro-parties are not simply arbitrary groupings of national parties. The Euro-parties consist of parties with
similar constituencies and ideological/policy concerns. However, to the
extent that national parties pursue policy agendas distinct from their party
federations, the results of our analysis may mischaracterize the
dimensionality of the EU political space. But lacking an alternative and better
source of data about national parties’ positions on EU policies, we hope that
the results reported here provide some empirical guidance on how to describe
and model EU politics.
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
955
APPENDIX
Coding Frame
1 ECONOMY (including environment)
11 ECONOMY/ + State + Increase role of the state (e.g., social justice/solidarity/
redistribution)
111 increase budget (pro–public spending/increased taxes/budget deficit)
112 public ownership (increase or defense against privatization)
113 increased state regulation of private sector
1134 trade protectionism
114 direct action (i.e., concern for unemployment)
1144 corporatism
115 efficiency and value for money not a priority
13 ECONOMY/ – State – Reduced role of the state (e.g., free market/individual
freedom)
131 reduce budget (e.g., tax reform)
132 increased privatization
133 decreased state regulation of private sector/deregulation
1334 trade protectionism–opposed (pro–free trade)
134 direct action—opposed
1344 corporatism—opposed
135 efficiency, thrift, and value for money a priority
14 ECONOMY/Environment versus Growth
141 favorable mention of environment/anti–science and technology
143 favor growth over environmental protection/pro–science and technology
2 POLITICAL SYSTEM
21 POLITICAL SYSTEM/Radical
211 promote constitutional reform
213 promote reform of bureaucracy (e.g., openness and transparency)
214 positive discussion of democratic decision making/human rights
23 POLITICAL SYSTEM/Conservative
231 oppose constitutional reform
233 oppose reform of bureaucracy
234 negative discussion of democratic decision making/human rights
3 SOCIETY
31 SOCIETY/Values (public action on social norms and values)
311 liberal, permissive, or nontraditional social values
3111 liberal, permissive sexual values (e.g., gay rights, proabortion)
3112 liberal discussion of role of the family
3113 liberal attitudes on crime/policing
3114 promote equal treatment of individuals
313 conservative, restrictive, and/or traditional social values
956
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
3131 traditional sexual values (e.g., gay rights, proabortion)
3132 traditional discussion of role of the family
3133 conservative attitudes on crime/policing
3134 conservative attitudes toward equal treatment of individuals
33 SOCIETY/Sectional interests
331 promote interests of
3311 workers and organized labor
3312 employers and employers’ federations
3313 farmers and other rural interests
3314 women and women’s groups
3315 particular religious groups
3316 particular ethnic groups (e.g., immigrant/migrant workers)
3318 consumers
3319 elderly
33110 children and young persons
33111 disabled
333 opposed to interests of
3331 workers and organized labor
3332 employers and employers’ federations
3333 farmers and other rural interests
3334 women and women’s groups
3335 particular religious groups
3336 particular ethnic groups
3338 consumers
3339 elderly
33310 children and young persons
33311 disabled
4 EXTERNAL—Role of the state in external relations
41 EXTERNAL/bilateral
411 Pro—support closer relations with
4111 United States
4112 (Former) Soviet Union/Communist bloc
413 Con—oppose closer relations with
4131 United States
4132 (Former) Soviet Union/Communist bloc
42 EXTERNAL/multilateral
421 Pro multilateralism—support closer relations with
4211 United Nations
4214 GATT/WTO
4215 NATO
423 Con—oppose closer relations with
4231 United Nations
4234 GATT/WTO
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
957
4235 NATO
43 EXTERNAL/security
Total “dove” policies (4311, 4321, 4331, 4341)
Total “hawk” policies (4313, 4323, 4333, 4343)
431 nuclear weapons
4311 oppose nuclear weapons (prodisarmament)
4313 support nuclear weapons (antidisarmament)
432 conventional weapons
4321 oppose conventional weapons (prodisarmament)
4323 support conventional weapons (antidisarmament)
433 war/peace
4331 oppose military engagement
4333 support military engagement
434 neutrality
4341 support neutrality
4343 oppose neutrality
44 EXTERNAL/Aid (and preferential trade with second/third world)
441 Pro—support increases/oppose cuts
4411 to former Communist states
4412 to developing world
443 Con—oppose increases/support cuts
4431 to former Communist states
4432 to developing world
45 EXTERNAL/Talks and Peace Resolution
451 Pro—positive discussion of talks in trouble spots/peace resolution
453 Con—negative discussion of talks in trouble spots/peace resolution
5 GENERAL
51 GENERAL/Partisan (negative campaigning against other parties, or pro–own
party)
52 GENERAL/Policy (substantive policy positions not classified elsewhere)
53 GENERAL/Personal (personal attacks or personal eulogies)
54 GENERAL/Pap (general empty discussion—“the bullshit box”)
6 EUROPEAN UNION/INTEGRATION
61 EU/Integration—General
611 Pro—general statement of support for EU/goal of European integration
6111 for economic reasons (e.g., prosperity, social justice, welfare)
6112 for political reasons (e.g., peace, democracy/freedom, security)
613 Con—general statement of opposition to EU/goal of European integration
6131 for economic reasons (e.g., prosperity, social justice, welfare)
6132 for political reasons (e.g., peace, democracy/freedom, security)
62 EU/Institutions
Total proinstitutions (62111, 62211, 62311, 62411, 62511, 62611)
Total anti-institutions (62113, 62213, 62313, 62413, 62513, 62613)
958
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
Total proreform (62121,62131,62141, 62221, 62231, 62241, 62321, 62331,
62521)
Total antireform (62123,62133,62143, 62223, 62233, 62243, 62323, 62333,
62523)
621 Commission
6211 general
62111 support (more powers) for Commission
62113 opposition/criticism of Commission
6212 reform of Commission administration
62121 support for reform of the Commission
62123 opposition to reform of Commission
6213 Commission President powers
62131 support for more power to Commission President
62133 opposition to more power to Commission President
6214 number of Commissioners
62141 support for fewer Commissioners
62143 opposition to fewer Commissioners
622 Council/European Council
6221 general
62211 support (more powers) for Council
62213 opposition/criticism of Council
6222 more qualified-majority voting (QMV)
62221 support for more QMV
62223 opposition to more QMV
6223 change vote weighting (increase votes of larger states)
62231 support for more votes for larger states
62233 opposition to more votes for larger states
6224 reform of Council Presidency
62241 support for reform of Presidency
62243 opposition to reform of Presidency
623 European Parliament
6231 general
62311 support (more powers) for European Parliament
62313 opposition/criticism of European Parliament
6232 more legislative/budgetary powers of European Parliament (EP)
62321 support for more powers for EP vis-à-vis Council
62323 opposition to more powers for EP vis-à-vis Council
6233 more powers of EP over Commission
62331 support for more powers of EP vis-à-vis Commission
62333 opposition to more powers for EP vis-à-vis Commission
624 Court of Justice
6241 general
62411 support (more powers) for Court of Justice
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
959
62413 opposition/criticism of Court of Justice
625 European Central Bank (ECB)
6251 general
62511 support for ECB
62513 opposition/criticism of ECB
6252 reform of ECB decision making
62521 support for reform of ECB decision making
62523 opposition to reform of ECB decision making
626 Court of Auditors
6261 general
62611 support for Court of Auditors
62613 opposition/criticism of Court of Auditors
63 EU/Policies
Total anti-EU policies (63113-63163, 63213-63253, 63313-63373, 63413-63453,
63513-63523, 63613-63653, 63673, 63683)
Total pro-EU policies (63111-63161, 63211-63251, 63311-63371, 63411-63451,
63511-63521, 63611-63651, 63671, 63681)
631 regulatory policies
6311 general regulatory policies
63111 support for (more) EU regulation of economy/society
63113 opposition to (more) EU regulation of economy/society
6312 single market
63121 support for the single market
63123 opposition to/criticism of the single market
6313 environmental regulation
63131 support for (more) EU environmental regulation
63133 opposition to (more) EU environmental regulation
6314 social regulation/social policy—workers
63141 support for (more) EU social regulation/policy for workers
63143 opposition to (more) EU social regulation/policy for workers
6315 social regulation/social policy—women
63151 support for (more) EU social regulation/policy—women
63153 opposition to (more) EU social regulation/policy—women
6316 competition policy/state aids
63161 support for EU competition/state aids policies
63163 opposition to EU competition/state aids policies
632 budgetary policies
6321 general budget/increase versus decrease (budget reform)
63211 support increase in EU budget
63213 oppose increase in EU budget/support decrease
6322 common agricultural policy (CAP)
63221 support CAP/increased CAP budget
63223 oppose CAP/increased CAP budget/support reform
960
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
6334 structural funds/cohesion policy
63231 support increase in structural funds/cohesion policy
63233 oppose increase in structural funds/cohesion policy
6324 research and development
63241 support increase in EU budget on R&D
63243 oppose increase in EU budget/support decrease on R&D
6325 development/humanitarian aid
63251 support increase in EU budget on development/humanitarian aid
63253 oppose increase/support decrease on development/humanitarian aid
633 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
6331 general
63311 support exchange rate mechanism (ERM)/EMU/single currency
63313 oppose ERM/EMU/single currency
6332 independent central bank (vs. political control)
63321 support ECB independent from political control
63323 oppose ECB independent/support political influence on EMU
6333 goal of price stability (vs. growth/employment)
63331 support single goal of price stability
63333 oppose single goal of price stability/support of growth goal
6334 convergence criteria
63341 support “economic” convergence criteria
63343 oppose “economic” convergence criteria/support other criteria
6335 stability pact/constraints on national budget deficits
63351 support stability pact/constraints on national budget deficits
63353 oppose stability pact/constraints on national budget deficits
6336 fiscal federalism
63361 support increased EU budget as part of EMU
63363 oppose increased EU budget as part of EMU
6337 macroeconomic policy coordination/tax harmony/common employment
policies
63371 support macroeconomic policy coordination
63373 oppose macroeconomic policy coordination
634 external trade/common commercial policy
6341 EU trade policy
63411 support for EU external trade policy
63413 opposition to/criticism of EU external trade policy
6342 bilateral free trade with United States
63421 support for more free trade with United States
63423 oppose free trade with United States
6343 preferential trade with developing world/development policy
63431 support for more trade policies with developing world
63433 oppose/critical of preferential trade with developing world
6344 preferential trade agreements—Eastern Europe
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
961
63441 support for preferential trade with Eastern Europe
63443 oppose preferential trade with Eastern Europe
6345 preferential trade agreements—other
63451 support for preferential trade with other states/in general
63453 oppose preferential trade with other states/in general
635 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)/defense policy
6351 CFSP—general/integration
63511 support for more integration in area of CFSP
63513 oppose more integration in area of CFSP
6352 independent EU defense capability
63521 support independent EU defense capability
63523 oppose independent EU defense capability/support NATO
636 Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
6361 JHA Citizenship—general/integration
63611 support for more integration in area of JHA/EU Citizenship
63613 oppose more integration in area of JHA
6362 removal of internal borders/free movement of persons
63621 support for removal of internal borders/free movement
63623 oppose removal of internal borders/free movement
6363 common immigration/asylum policies
63631 support for common immigration/asylum policies
63633 oppose common immigration/asylum policies
6364 common policing/policies to fight drug trafficking, terrorism, crime
63641 support for more common policing
63643 oppose more common policing
6365 judicial cooperation
63651 support for more judicial cooperation
63653 oppose more judicial cooperation
637 other EU policies
6371 support for any other existing EU policy
6373 oppose/critical statement on any other existing policy
638 new EU policy competences
6381 support for a new EU policy competence
6383 oppose a new EU policy competence in a particular area
64 EU/Issues
641 institutional reform—general (i.e., intergovernmental conferences [IGCs])
6411 general statement of support for institutional reform/a new IGC
6413 opposition to further institutional reform/a new IGC
642 transparency/accountability
6421 support for more accountability/transparency in the EU
6423 opposition to more accountability/transparency in the EU
643 democratic deficit—reduction
6431 support for efforts to reduce the democratic deficit
962
COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
6433 opposition to reduction of the democratic deficit
644 national parliamentary control of the EU
6441 support increase role for national parliaments in EU policy making
6443 oppose increase role for national parliaments in EU policy making
645 subsidiarity
6451 support for more subsidiarity/codification of subsidiarity
6453 opposition to subsidiarity/codification of subsidiarity
646 flexible integration/opt-outs
6461 support for flexible integration/opt-outs
6463 opposition to flexible integration/opt-outs
647 interest representation
6471 business interests
64711 support more say for business interests in EU
64713 oppose more say for business interests in EU
6472 trade unions (or other diffuse interests—e.g., women, migrants)
64721 support more say for trade unions in EU
64723 oppose role of trade unions in EU
6473 environmental groups
64731 support more say for environmental groups in EU
64733 oppose role of environmental groups in EU
6474 consumers
64741 support more say for consumer groups in EU
64743 oppose role of consumer groups in EU
6475 regions
64751 support more say for regions in EU policy process
64753 oppose role of regions in EU policy process
648 European elections—reform
6481 support reform of European elections/reform (e.g., uniform procedure)
6483 opposition to reform of European elections
649 Pan-European parties
6491 support for pan-European political parties
6493 opposition to pan-European political parties
6410 enlargement
64101 support for EU enlargement
64103 oppose/delay EU enlargement
Gabel, Hix / DEFINING THE EU POLITICAL SPACE
963
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COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES / October 2002
Matthew Gabel is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and the
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration at the University of Kentucky. He is
the author of Interests and Integration: Market Liberalization, Public Opinion, and European Union (1998, Michigan). He is the associate editor of the journal European Union
Politics and a member of the European Parliament Research Group.
Simon Hix is a reader in European Union politics and policy at the London School of
Economics and Political Science. He is the author of The Political System of the European Union (1999, Macmillan), coauthor (with Christopher Lord) of Political Parties in
the European Union (1997, Macmillan), and coeditor (with Klaus Goetz) of
Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems (Frank
Cass). He is also the associate editor of the journal European Union Politics and the
director of the European Parliament Research Group.