VOL. 30, NO. 1, OCTOBER 2011
THE AVALANCHE REVIEW
PAGE 23 t
Search and Recovery in the Tetons
Story by Nick Armitage
I write this account with the intent of
learning from the experience. I provide the
reflections with the utmost respect for the
subjects, their families, and the rescuers who
risked a lot for this recovery.
On the afternoon of Saturday, April 16,
2011, Greg Seftick and Walker Kuhl entered
Garnet Canyon with the hopes of another
successful summit on an increasingly
impressive list of technical climbs and
ski descents. The two men planned on
skiing the Grand Teton. Because of the
previous day’s storm snow, wind, and the
possibility of another storm that night, they
had considered a more conservative plan
of skiing the Teepee Glacier. What actually
happened and how they were thinking, one
can only speculate. Most likely, sometime
during that first night, Seftick and Kuhl were
struck by a large avalanche originating high
on the north face of Nez Perce over 2000'
above their camp. The slide buried them and
all of their equipment. The weight of over
13' of snow killed them instantly or within
a couple of hypoxic minutes.
When Walker Kuhl did not arrive at work the
following Monday he was reported missing.
With only a last-seen point at the entrance
of Garnet Canyon at approximately 4:30pm
on Saturday, a search for the missing skiers
began. As snow and wind continued through
Monday, rescuers and equipment – including
a helicopter – were assembled. An afternoon
aerial search revealed no signs or clues.
On Tuesday morning approximately
50 rescuers assembled from Grand Teton
National Park: Teton County search
and rescue, ski patrols, and local ski
mountaineers. Due to continued bad
weather and avalanche hazard, the searchers
accessed lower Garnet Canyon by ground.
That afternoon the skies briefly cleared,
allowing the helicopter to conduct an aerial
search, dog team transports, and avalanche
hazard reduction in upper zones of Garnet
Canyon. The first full day of searching in
snow and wind ended without any clues,
signals, or alerts.
With four previous days of unsettled
weather clearing on Wednesday, search teams
accessed the upper reaches of the canyons as
well as several aerial sorties of the peaks and
surrounding terrain. Due to a large search area,
several days of storms, and unsettled spring
weather, there was no shortage of debris piles.
By Wednesday afternoon approximately 30
searchers re-converged on the Meadows
area of Garnet Canyon for more thorough
searching of a debris field extending from the
Meadows to the Platforms (over 1 km long).
Searchers again stayed in the field until dark
with no results.
Thursday and Friday were a return to
unstable weather allowing only a few
aerial search sorties and hazard-reduction
explosives operations to prepare for a larger
effort on Saturday, April 23.
The weather cleared on Saturday as
forecasted, and an operation with three
RECCO units, four dog teams, and over 40
searchers focused on the five acres of debris
in lower Garnet Canyon. After 10 hours of
searching the entire debris there were still
no clues, signals, or alerts. As darkness fell,
searchers with blistered hands and raw paws
began to fly back to the valley from the helispot at the lowest end of the debris.
As the division supervisor, I was tasked
with managing the ground search operations
that day. I remained at the upper end of the
debris while the crew shuttle continued
below. Standing in the half light of the
canyon, perplexed as to the location of
Seftick and Kuhl, I searched the surrounding
slopes and the corners of my mind for a
clue. With the area quiet and clear of all
search personnel, I decided to pull out my
transceiver and give it one last sweep. About
halfway down the debris I got a signal and
pinpointed it to a strength of 7.5 meters on
my Tracker 2. I radioed down to the group
and was joined by five others. We probed the
area twice, confirmed a second signal, and
began to dig. After digging down four feet,
we finally obtained a positive probe strike
still over eight feet down. With nightfall
upon us and many hours of digging to go,
we decided to return with bigger shovels in
the morning. Six of us returned the following
morning and dug for over three hours. We
finally excavated Greg and Walker buried
in their tent 13.5' deep.
Why did I do that last search? It was all
I could come up with for a solution. I have
done this before on other searches with no
results, and it seemed to give me closure
and the feeling that we had done everything
we could. But why hadn’t that signal been
picked up sooner? Had I missed an earlier
opportunity when the field operation was
transitioned to me?
Yes. When I arrived at the search area, I
was told the area had been searched with
transceivers at least three times previously;
however, I did not see it happen. It was
decided to focus the day’s efforts on probing,
RECCO, and dog teams. The debris was long
and convoluted with some narrow spots,
varying depths, and several lobes extending
hundreds of feet up the north side of the
canyon. Subsequent avalanches both natural
and explosive-triggered had buried the debris.
An additional 20" of snow with high winds
had scoured and buried the area reshaping the
snowscape. Confusion in stormy weather as to
what was actual debris may have contributed
to the delay in finding the subjects. Also,
with the threat of avalanches to searchers,
transceivers were switched from search to
transmit many times on the previous days
of stormy weather. The depth of the subjects
and their weakening transceiver batteries
could also have contributed to the difficult
search conditions.
All of that being said, I feel that a lot of
rescuers and backcountry users do not
practice the hard skills enough. Even if you
have been around for decades, transceiver and
RECCO skills are very perishable and need
to be practiced often and in a varied format.
Creative weekly transceiver searches are the
benchmark for good hard skills. Avalanche
rescue work has evolved so much in the last
15 years that I think a much greater emphasis
should have been placed on the technology
and skills to use it correctly. Large probe lines
are time consuming, painful, and expose very
high numbers of rescuers to the hazards of
mountainous terrain as well as the hazards
involved with heli transport. I still consider
well-organized, specific spot probing to be an
effective tool. However, with regular practice
all guess work can be taken out of searching
with RECCOs and transceivers. The use
of these devices along with spot probing
and well-trained search dogs should all but
eliminate the need for massive probe lines.
Nick Armitage works as a Jenny Lake climbing
ranger during the summer, and he plans to return to
Big Sky Resort this winter as avalanche forecaster.
As The Avalanche Review goes to press, Nick
married his sweetheart, Allison, at Lupine Meadows
in Grand Teton National Park.
R
Photographs taken on April 22, 2011, of the location in Garnet Canyon where
two skiers were buried in their tent on April 17. Evidence of the crown and debris
associated with this fatal avalanche was covered by post-event wind and snow. The
two skiers pitched their tent in a wind moat on the uphill side of one of the two
large boulders in the lower left portion of this image.
Photos by Jim Springer
Top: A probe line of 18 people is dwarfed by the size of terrain and debris in
Garnet Canyon. Above: Thirteen feet of deposition calls for terraced strategic
shoveling techniques.
Photos by Nick Armitage