China’s Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior, 1949-2001:
A Second Cut at the Data1
By John J. Chin
Draft: March 11, 2013
Ph.D. Candidate
Politics Department
Princeton University
[email protected]
Abstract: Only two studies have ever used quantitative data to study China’s conflict behavior
over the entire Cold War period. In his groundbreaking article analyzing data on China’s Cold
War militarized interstate disputes, Iain Johnston (1998) argued that China tended to resort to
force over territorial disputes and occur in periods when Chinese leaders perceived a growing
gap between desired and ascribed status. Similarly, Xiaoting Li (2013) has found that China was
more likely to use force during the Mao era when China’s leaders held a militarized worldview.
Both authors come to relatively sanguine conclusions about the trends in China’s propensity to
use military force against other states. Johnston emphasized how China had largely resolved its
long-standing territorial claims and had become less dissatisfied with status inconsistencies over
time. Li argues that China’s Hobbesian worldview has undergone a “Lockean” transformation.
This paper takes a second cut at the data on China’s militarized interstate disputes and questions
Johnston’s and Li’s conclusions using the same source of data on China’s militarized interstate
disputes. I argue that it may not be as easy to “tame the red dragon” as optimists like to believe.
Keywords: China, post-Cold War, conflict behavior, militarized interstate disputes
1
This is a working paper. Please do not quote or cite. I thank Aaron Friedberg for comments on the first draft of this
paper which was submitted as a seminar paper for a spring 2012 graduate course in International Security (POL 554)
at Princeton University. I also thank James Lee and participants at Princeton University’s Contemporary China
Colloquium for useful feedback last week. I thank Xiaoting Li for providing me with replication data. All errors are
my own. I will present a revised version of this paper at the Midwest Political Science Association Conference in
April 2013, so all feedback is appreciated. Has China’s behavior in militarized interstate disputes (MID) changed after the Cold War?
Has China become less prone to MIDs as post-Mao leaders resolved territorial conflicts, became
more satisfied with China’s international status, and held relatively less militarized worldviews?
Or is China more prone to MIDs as China’s power and force projection capabilities have grown?
Once in a MID, is China more or less prone to militarized escalation than during the Cold War?
This paper provides new insights into these questions by using quantitative data and methods to
identify the correlates of China’s MID behavior.2 In particular, I scrutinize claims made by Iain
Johnston (1998) and Xiaoting Li (2013) in the only two quantitative studies to date that study the
patterns in China’s MIDs and use of force. Whereas those authors find cause for optimism, the
analysis here indicates that China has not acted as peacefully in the first decade of the post-Cold
War period as their depictions of a “satisfied” or “Lockean” Chinese leadership would lead us to
expect. In short, I argue that it may not be as easy to “tame the red dragon” as optimists claim.
The quantitative approach to studying China’s conflict behavior employed in this paper is
very rare, despite the fact that the statistical study of conflict and war in general has mushroomed
in recent decades. Andrew Scobell’s (2003, 8) observation in China’s Use of Military Force that
“the overwhelming majority of studies” that examine China’s use-of-force record are qualitative
remains true a decade later. The vast majority of studies—including Scobell’s—adopt a small-N
research strategy that analyze the most prominent cases of China’s interstate disputes and uses of
force. The lion’s share of attention has gone to just eight cases: (1) the Korean War of 1950-53,
(2) the first Taiwan Strait crisis in 1954-5, (3) the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958, (4) the
Sino-Indian border conflict in 1962, (5) the Vietnam War of 1965-72, (6) the Sino-Soviet Ussuri
2
According to the coding criteria of the Correlates of War (COW) project, a MID is defined as an interstate conflict
“in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards
the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state” (Jones et al. 1996,
168). MIDs only identify those conflicts serious enough to ‘‘to carry the implication of war’’ (Jones et al. 1996, 166).
Each MID consists of one or more “militarized incidents” over time which can be seen as a united historical case.
- Chin 1 River border clash in 1969, (7) the Sino-Vietnam Punitive War in 1979, and (8) the third Taiwan
strait crisis (1995-6).3 We have learned a great deal from this historically deep small-N literature,
particularly regarding the revealed perceptions and motivations of China’s top decision-makers.
However, a potential limitation of total reliance on small-N studies is that the patterns uncovered
among the few cases analyzed may not be very representative of the whole population of China’s
MIDs. According to the most recent version of the Correlates of War (COW) data set on MIDs,
China engaged in a total of 145 MIDs over the 1949-2001 period.4 Only a large-N analysis of the
kind undertaken in this paper can confirm or reject conventional wisdom passed down to us from
the dominant small-N accounts of China’s use of force. Thus, while MID data cannot give us
insights into perceptions or intentions, it does alleviate concerns of selection bias and may alert
us to previously un-examined correlates of China’s dispute proneness and violence proneness.
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. First, I briefly review four hypotheses
suggested by Johnston and Li’s first cut at the data. Second, I offer several competing hypotheses
about trends in China’s MID behavior by drawing on a few stylized facts and on the qualitative
empirical literature on China’s crisis behavior and use of force. Third, I introduce the data and
describe patterns in Chinese MID behavior, paying particular attention to any change in trends in
the post-Cold War period. Then I take a “second cut” at both Johnston’s and Li’s analysis of
alternative explanations of the patterns in Chinese MID behavior. I conclude by discussing the
validity of the hypotheses and next steps for the quantitative study of China’s conflict behavior.
3
For example, Steve Chan (1978) analyzed cases 1 and 3-6. So did Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang (1980).
Gerald Segal (1985) analyzed cases 1-7 along with China’s liberation of Tibet in 1950-1 and the 1974 Xisha Islands
conflict with Vietnam. Chih-yu Shih and Jonathan Adelman (1993) analyzed cases 1, 3, 4, 6, and 7. Allen Whiting
(2001) analyzed cases 1-8 and the less prominent 1962 Taiwan Strait deployment. Andrew Scobell (2003) analyzed
cases 1, 4, and 8 (in addition to two cases of the PLA’s internal use of force in the Cultural Revolution and the 1989
Tiananmen protests). Patrick James and Enyu Zhang (2005) analyzed cases 1-4 and 6-8 as well as the 1962 Taiwan
Strait deployment. Thomas Christensen (2006) analyzed cases 1-7 along with the 1974 Xisha Islands conflict. Larry
Wortzel (2012) analyzes cases 1, 3, 4, 6, 7 as well as a series of Nansha (Sptratly) Island disputes.
4
For an introduction and codebook for version 3.1 of COW’s MID data, see Ghosn and coauthors (2003; 2004). - Chin 2 I.
Four Hypotheses from Johnston and Li’s First Cut at the MID Data
Only two studies have used quantitative data or methods to study China’s MID behavior.
The first study is Iain Johnston’s (1998) influential article in China Quarterly titled “China’s
Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data”,5 which analyzed
data6 on China’s 118 Cold War MIDs. From his analysis, Johnston derived three key conclusions:
H1) China is not more dispute-prone than the other great powers, but once in a militarized
conflict, China is more likely to escalate to violence than other states in such a dispute.
Following his previous work (1995; 1996), Johnston argued China’s parabellum (hard
realpolitik) strategic culture gave its leaders an ingrained preference for offensive uses of force
or “active defense” in a world of zero-sum conflicts. This made peaceful crisis management with
China difficult. This finding was sobering, as it contradicted earlier literature arguing there was a
distinctly pacifist and Confucian “Chinese way of warfare” (e.g. Kierman and Fairbank 1974). It
also contradicts those Chinese scholars who have argued that Chinese leaders follow the maxim
youli, youli, youjie (translated as “on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint”) in
assessing when and how much force to use in an interstate crisis. That maxim implies China uses
force defensively and symmetrically in response to provocation (seeSwaine et al. 2006, 23-31).
H2) China is less dispute-prone over time in part because it has resolved most of its longstanding territorial disputes and consolidated its borders.
Johnston hypothesized that most of China’s territorial disputes would occur early in the
regime and that early in the regime most of China’s MIDs would involve territorial issues and
asserting control over its boundaries.7 Johnston suggested China would become less MID prone
over time, as long as China’s territorial sovereignty is not challenged (e.g. Taiwan independence).
5
Many authors take Johnston’s (1998) findings as a given or cite them as inspiration For example, James and Zhang
(2005, 37) cite it as “among the few available systemic” studies of China’s conflict behavior and crisis management.
6
It appears Johnston (1998) used a preliminary version of version 2.1 MID data documented in Jones el al (1996).
7
In imperial China, most peripheral wars occurred in the first-third of the dynasty (Swaine and Tellis 2000, 46-7).
- Chin 3 H3) China is less dispute-prone over time in part because the perceived gap between Chinese
leaders’ desired international status and China’s actual status has closed.
Johnston measured satisfaction with the status quo using China’s power [using the COW
Project’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC)] relative to other major powers, on
the assumption that the major powers are China’s status “reference group.” He found a negative
correlation between this measure and the frequency of Chinese MIDs, and thus suggested that
the growth of Chinese power need not result in a power-transition driven conflict with the U.S.
Johnston also considered but discounted three other explanations of PRC MID behavior.
First, using data from the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (Taylor and Jodice
1984), Johnston showed that there was little correlation between the frequency of Chinese MIDs
and the frequency of social protests in China from 1949-1982. Therefore, he generally dismissed
diversionary incentives as a cause of China’s MIDs, even though prior qualitative research had
identified them as causes in prominent cases.8 Second, Johnston found no correlation between
the “militarization” of Chinese society in the Mao era on the hand and China’s MID involvement
on the other. Johnston measured “militarization” as the share of China’s total power capabilities
(as measured using the CINC score) that derived from either military expenditures or military
personnel.9 Third, Johnston dismissed realist power-balancing explanations for China’s MIDs.10
8
Gerald Segal (1985, 254) found that domestic turmoil was present in almost every case of China’s use of force.
Christensen (1996) persuasively showed that Mao precipitated the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis for the purpose of
mobilizing the Chinese population for the Great Leap Forward. Domestic mobilization in the Cultural Revolution
also appears to have been a factor in China’s 1969 Zhenbao Island dispute with the Soviet Union (Goldstein 2001).
But Taylor Fravel (2008) dismissed diversionary theories in explaining China’s territorial dispute behavior, as he
found that China is more likely to make concessions than to escalate territorial disputes when it is weak at home.
9
The other four components of the CINC score are iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, total
population, and urban population. For more on the CINC measure, see Singer et al. (1972). A country with x% of
world military expenditures and personnel and a CINC score of x% would have a “militarization” index score of 1.
Scores above or below 1 indicate relative strength of military sub-components relative to the others.
10
Johnston did note a positive correlation between U.S. relative power and the frequency of Chinese MIDs with the
United States, but he found no such correlation for the Soviet Union. He also noted that U.S. and Soviet MIDs made
up a shrinking share of China’s MIDs over time, suggesting a decline in importance of great power politics to China.
- Chin 4 The second study is Xiaoting Li’s (2013) forthcoming article in Foreign Policy Analysis
titled “The Taming of The Red Dragon.” That article analyzes 155 country-year observations in
which China used force against another state over the 1949-2001 period (of which 147 were
during the Cold War and 8 after the Cold War).11 Following COW coding rules, Li defined the
use of force as only including a blockade, occupation of territory, seizure, clash, raid, and war.12
However, the use of force is only a subset of MID behavior as it excludes lower level threats and
displays of force.13 Thus, by restricting his dependent variable to the most hostile MIDs, Li can
assess China’s violence proneness but not Johnston’s hypotheses regarding dispute proneness.
According to Li’s logic, China was born as a revolutionary state, which bred a Hobbesian
or militarized worldview (akin to Johnston’s parabellum strategic culture) in which the perceived
inevitability of war by Mao and his comrades drove China’s leaders to use force to defend China.
Since 1985, Li argues that China’s worldview has undergone a “Lockean” transformation
making China less violence prone. Like Johnston’s (2003) logic of China as a status quo power,
Li sees China’s transformation from an “outsider” to an “insider” in the world system as working
to “mellow” China’s propensity to use force (pg. 18). Li’s major conclusion is stated as follows:
H4) China is more likely to use force when its China’s leaders hold a militarized worldview
and see the probability of war as very high.
11
Based on a review of primary and secondary sources, Li (2012) makes several adjustments to the MID v3.1 data,
which identifies 180 country-year observations of China’s use of force over the 1949-2001 period. Li identifies 32
country-years observations during the Cold War when China used force against another state but was not coded as
doing so in the latest version of the MID data set. He also identifies 57 country-years during the Cold War in which
MID v3.1 miscodes China as using force when it did not. Li adopts the same eight cases of post-Cold War use of
force coded in the MID data (v3.1). For more on coding rules for version 3.1, see Ghosn and coauthors (2003; 2004).
12
MID data include a detailed 21-point scale reflecting the highest militarized action each state took (hiact). These
acts include no militarized action (0), threat to use force (1), to blockade (2), to occupy territory (3), to declare war
(4), to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (5), to join war (6), show of force (7), alert (8), nuclear alert (9),
mobilization (10), fortify border (11), border violation (12), blockade (13), occupation of territory (14), seizure of
material or personnel (15), attack (16), clash (17), declaration of war (18), use of WMD (19), begin interstate war
(20), join interstate war (21). For a definition of these terms, see Jones et al. (1996, 173).
13
MID data include a general five-point hostility level scale (hostlev) for each state where 1 indicates no militarized
action, 2 indicates threat to use force, 3 indicates display of force, 4 indicates use of force, and 5 indicates war.
- Chin 5 To test this hypothesis, Li fits a series of rare events logit models14 to predict China’s use
of force against 196 countries with the dyadic country-year as the unit of observation.15 His main
independent variable is China’s “militarized worldview,” operationalized as an estimate of PRC
leaders’ perceptions of the probability of war without China’s use of force. He claims China’s
leaders saw “war as inevitable” from 1949–1953 and 1960–1974, saw “war as postponable”
from 1954–1959 and 1975–1984, but have seen “war as avoidable” since 1985. In his preferred
model, Li attaches numeric values of .95, .3, and .05 to these three levels of war probability.
Controlling for a series of other factors, Li found a militarized world view to have the most
aggravating influence on China’s violence proneness. Ceteris paribus, China’s probability of
using force is four times higher in the 1949–1953 and 1960–1974 periods than since 1985.
Johnston (1998) used MID data released in 1996 to show a series of bivariate correlations
between potential independent variables and time series variation in China’s 118 MIDs from
1949 to 1991. Even though new (v3.1) MID data was released in 2007, scholars have yet to fully
exploit the additional data on China’s 27 MIDs from 1992 to 2001. Li (2013) is the first author to
use the new MID data, but he only explains a subset of China’s MID behavior: the use of force.
To my knowledge, no existing quantitative work has sought to systematically explain how
patterns and determinants of China’s dispute proneness and use of force have changed since the
end of the Cold War. Johnston simply did not have the data to do so. Because China’s militarized
worldview has been constant since 1985 (according to Li’s coding), this variable cannot explain
any of the variation in China’s use of force since 1985. So how can we explain post-1985 trends?
14
For more on the statistical properties of rare events logit models, see King and Zeng (2001b). For a friendlier
introduction on using such models to predict binary outcomes in international relations, see King and Zeng (2001a). 15
So, for example, the “China-U.S. 2001” observation is coded as a 1 indicating China used force against the United
States that year. That use of force reflects the COW projects coding of China’s “seizure” of an American spy plane
and crew in April 2001 as a use of force. The “China-U.S. 1996” observation is coded as a 0 because COW only
codes China as displaying force against the United States in the Taiwan Strait. China’s use of force is a rare event in
the sense that the 155 1’s are a tiny share of all possible 7,358 dyadic country-year observations in Li’s dataset.
- Chin 6 II.
Some Competing Hypotheses of China’s Militarized Dispute Behavior
I lay out a number of previously untested hypotheses regarding China’s MID behavior:
H5) As a regional power, China is more likely to engage in militarized behavior along its
strategic periphery in Asia than in other regions, particularly during the Cold War.
Allen Whiting (1975) famously argued that the “Chinese calculus of deterrence” was not
driven by an expansionist ideology.16 Gurtov and Hwang (1980), Segal (1985), and Nathan and
Scobell (2012) also emphasize Chinese leaders’ defensive pragmatism in their quest for national
security. In this view, China is not expansionist and rarely “goes abroad in search of monsters to
destroy.”17 However, China’s territorial boundaries are not all settled for a number of reasons,
not least of which is the fact that China defines its borders in very expansive ways (Terrill 2003).
Regardless of whether China’s motives are offensive or defensive, China’s use of force should
be expected to involve issues of Chinese sovereignty and thus be concentrated in Asia. Because
of U.S. alliance commitments in Asia (esp. to Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act), an Asia
“ripe for rivalry” would also lead to more PRC MIDs with rivals like the U.S. (Friedberg 2011).
H6) Whereas China was more likely to engage in MIDs with stronger adversaries during the
Cold War, China’s MIDs are more likely to be with weaker adversaries afterwards.
Existing literature on China’s use of force is almost unanimous in arguing that China was
risk acceptant against superior enemies during the Cold War (e.g. Burles and Shulsky 2000;
Whiting 2001). For example, Thomas Christensen (2006) argued that China used force against
stronger foes in the belief that enemy superiority and aggressiveness would grow if force was not
used—a “window of opportunity” and “window of vulnerability” logic led China to use force
even if it couldn’t permanently resolve a security problem. Feeling cornered, China lashed out.18
16
Steve Chan (1978) similarly argued that China’s “conflict calculus” rationally seeks crisis mitigation if possible.
17
For a recent version of this argument concerning prospects for China’s territorial expansion, see Fravel (2010).
18
This also suggests China’s leaders worries about their grip on domestic power may create diversionary incentives.
- Chin 7 However, China’s relative power has continued to grow in the 1990s relative to other
regional powers (e.g. Russia, the United States, Japan), which by dint of its position makes it less
probable China will encounter a much stronger adversary. In addition, we might expect China to
escalate to the use of force less often in the name of post-Cold War “good neighbor” diplomacy
(Kurlantzick 2007), while at the same time engaging in more lower levels MIDs against weaker
neighbors in order to pursue coercive diplomacy and secure maritime security. This pattern
would be consistent with a “calculative grand strategy” in which China seeks all the benefits of
regional economic development while trying to “bide our time, build our capabilities” (taoguang
yanghui) and achieve asymmetrical gains whenever possible (Swaine and Tellis 2000, pg.113).19
H7) Changes in civil-military relations and the rise of autonomy by the People’s Liberation
Army after the Cold War should make China more dispute-prone and violence- prone.
In contrast to Li, Andrew Scobell (2003) argues that moderating ideology after Mao has
not decreased the frequency or intensity of China’s use of force as offsetting changes in civilmilitary relations have made the PLA more autonomous, increased China’s defense spending,
and made external uses of force more likely. Whereas paramount leaders Mao and Deng were
central to major decisions over the use of force during the Cold War, current CCP leaders do not
command the same deference since they are not “Long March” veterans or statesmen-soldiers.
In the 1995-1996 Taiwan crisis, Scobell documents how relatively hawkish generals “got out in
front of the civilian leadership on the necessity for using force” (pg. 197). Similarly, Scobell
suggests that Chinese pilots’ risky maneuvers which led to the 2001 EP-3 incident most likely
were sanctioned by military leaders without the knowledge of civilian leaders (pg. 196). When
the military makes such decisions, China’s worldview in effect becomes militarized (Lam 2012).
19
In contrast to this line of argument, David Kang (2007) and Steve Chan (2012) argue that East Asian states have
not balanced against China after the Cold War, implying China has become less dispute prone with its neighbors as
they accommodate (or bandwagon with) China’s emerging and relatively non-coercive hegemony.
- Chin 8 III.
Patterns in Chinese MID Behavior: A Descriptive Quantitative Analysis
This section partially replicates the analysis of Johnston (1998) using version 3.1 of the
MID data set in order to introduce the broad patterns in Chinese MID behavior (frequency of
MIDs over time, changing types of revisionist goals, and against which countries). Due to space
limitations I do not include every table and figure presented in Johnston (1998).20 To facilitate
comparison, I indicate the corresponding figure or table that appeared in Johnston’s work (“J98”).
Frequency. Table 1 (J98, Table 1) reports the comparative frequency of MIDs for all
seven current major powers in the world plus India.21 I divide the 1816-2001 period into three
periods corresponding to the multipolar era prior to the Cold War, the bipolar era during the Cold
War, and the unipolar era after the Cold War. Prior to the Cold War, China was one of the least
dispute prone countries among today’s major powers. An imperial and Republican China only
participated in an average of 0.86 MIDs per year from 1860-1945, placing it behind all today’s
major powers except Japan. Evidently, China was neither a very frequent instigator nor target of
MIDs during its “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi).
Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, however, China has become the third most
dispute-prone major power in the world after the United States and Russia (or the Soviet Union,
during the Cold War). Like the United States and Russia, China has been increasingly dispute
prone with each successive era: it engaged in 0.86 MIDs per year from 1860-1945, 2.81 MIDs
per year from 1949-1991, and 3.00 MIDs per year from 1992-2001. Like the United States and
Russia, the PRC has also been much more dispute-prone than other Asian and European major
powers (India, Japan, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
20
However, these additional replication results are available from the author upon request.
21
Johnston excluded Japan and Germany from his comparative analysis but included India, even though Japan and
Germany became major powers after the Cold War according to COW’s coding and India has never been a major
power according to COW’s coding. I include all three countries here to the extent they “matter” in world politics.
- Chin 9 Table 1: Comparative Frequency of MIDs by Contemporary Major Powers
Pre-Cold War
Cold War
Post-Cold War
State
Period
MIDs/year Period
MIDs/year Period
MIDs/year
U.S.
1816-1945
0.98
1946-1991
3.93
1992-2001
4.55
Russia
1816-1945
1.12
1946-1991
3.33
1992-2001
5.11
China
1860-1945
0.86
1949-1991
2.81
1992-2001
3.00
India
1947-1991
1.84
1992-2001
0.89
N.A.
N.A.
U.K.
1816-1945
1.29
1946-1991
1.69
1992-2001
1.67
Japan
1860-1945
0.71
1946-1991
1.26
1992-2001
1.89
France
1816-1940
0.96
1952-1991
0.84
1992-2001
1.33
Germany
1816-1945
1.34
1954-1990
0.25
1992-2001
0.79
Note: MIDs/year refers to the average number of new MIDs per year over the period indicated. Following
Johnston (1998), I include entries for all of the Cold War “major powers” (as designated by the COW project) plus
India. I also include entries for Japan and Germany, which according to the COW project became “major powers”
after the Cold War. Data for Russia refers to the Soviet Union for the 1922-1991 period. Data for China refers to
Imperial China for the 1816-1911 period, the Republic of China for the 1912-1948 period, and the People’s
Republic of China for the 1949-2001 period. Data for Germany refers to West Germany for the 1954-1990 period.
This table corrects earlier estimates that Johnston (1998, Table 1 pg. 9) reports.
When we disaggregate MID frequencies by decade, as shown in Figure 1 (~J98, Fig. 2),
we can see that the PRC was most dispute-prone in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, it was the most
dispute-prone major power in the 1950s. It became the third-most dispute-prone major power in
the 1960s on account of the increase in frequency of U.S. and Soviet MIDs. China’s aggregate
dispute-proneness fell by half in the 1970s and 1980s. But then China became more disputeprone in the 1990s in aggregate, even though at lower levels than in the 1950s and 1960s. China
was more dispute-prone than the other Asian behemoth India in every decade except the 1980s.
60
Figure 1: Relative Frequency of MIDs per Decade
40
China
USA
USSR
UK
France
India
0
20
N
1950s
1960s
1970s
- Chin 10 1980s
1990s
Figure 2 (~J98, Fig. 3) disaggregates the
Figure 2: # of Chinese MIDs per 5-Year Period
20
MID data further by showing China’s MID
N
10
one structural break in the data around 1969,
15
totals per five-year period. It suggests at least
5
with far more MIDs occurring before than
1999-01
1994-98
1989-93
1984-88
1979-83
1974-78
1969-73
1964-68
1959-63
1954-58
in the fewest number of MIDs in the five years
1949-53
0
afterwards. It also shows that China participated
after the Tiananmen protests of 1989 than any
other five-year period. However, China participated in more MIDs in the 1994-98 period than in
any other five-year period since the 1960s. These MIDs involved not only the Taiwan issue but
also disputes with China’s neighbors over policy and maritime claims.
Type. China has rarely been dragged into disputes in which it doesn’t have direct interests.
As a result, the MID data codes the PRC as an “originator” of 136 of its 145 MIDs (94%). In
terms of the political goals at stake in China’s disputes, the MID data also records whether a state
is revisionist or not in its goals and it classifies such goals as either territorial, policy, or regimerelated. Of China’s 145 MIDs, China has had identifiable revisionist goals in 91 MIDs (63%). Of
those, its goals related to territory in 46 MIDs (50.5%), policy in 39 MIDs (42.9%), and regimechange in 5 MIDs (5.5%). However, if we re-classify four regime MIDs with Taiwan from 1962
to 1967 as territorial (as done by Johnston), 50 MIDs (56.0%) would be territorial. Of these, 24
occurred before 1968, 14 occurred later in the Cold War, and 12 occurred after the Cold War.
Contrary to Johnston’s expectations, the downward trend in China’s territorial MIDs has
not continued. In fact, China engaged in more territorial MIDs in the mid-1990s than it had in
any five-year period since the mid-1950s. These post-Cold War territorial disputes were mainly
- Chin 11 (4) and Vietnam (2) over the Spratly Islands,
Figure 3: China's MID Frequency by Dispute
Type per Five Year Period
10
with China’s maritime neighbors: the Philippines
6
8
Japan (3) over the Senkaku Islands, Indonesia (1)
in his paper was the dramatic and steady rise of
China’s “policy” MIDs after the end of the Cold
19
49
-5
19 3
54
-5
19 8
59
-6
19 3
64
-6
19 8
69
-7
19 3
74
-7
19 8
79
-8
19 3
84
-8
19 8
89
-9
19 3
94
-9
19 8
99
-0
1
0
addition, one trend that Johnston did not foresee
4
N
2
over the Natuna Islands, and Taiwan (1).22 In
Territorial
Regime
Policy
Non-Revisonist
War (Figure 3, ~J98, Fig. 5).
Force Levels. Based on a 5-point hostility scale (1=no militarized action, 5 = war), the
most hostile MIDs occurred during the Korean War and in the mid-1980s due to conflicts with
Vietnam. China’s two least hostile periods are those when it was preoccupied internally, as it
was during the middle of the Cultural Revolution (1969-73) and when Deng Xiaoping ended
China’s period of class struggle and launch its program of ‘reform and opening’ (1979-83).
China’s average hostility level for MIDs from 1949 to 1991 was 3.2, which is significantly
higher than the average of the other five Cold War major powers (2.9).23 After the Cold War,
however, China’s average hostility level for MIDs from 1992 to 2001 (3.1) is not statistically
different than any of the other seven post-Cold War major powers whose average is 2.8.24
A similar picture emerges from an index of violence that multiplies the 5-point hostility
index and the MID data’s more detailed 21-point militarized action index (so that violence scores
ranges from 0 when a country takes no militarized action up to 105 when a country joins an
22
By contrast, the only territorial MID with a land neighbor occurred when China launched an attack over the Amur
River boundary between Russian Siberia and Manchuria.
23
A difference-in-means test is significant at the p = .0094 level, which means that China’s higher-than-average
hostility level during the Cold War is unlikely to be random. China was more hostility prone on average than the
Soviet Union (2.9), U.S. (2.7), and U.K (2.6) but no more hostility prone on average than France (3.3) or India (3.2).
24
A difference-in-means test is insignificant at the 0.3367 level, which means that we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that China’s average hostility level is any different than the other post-Cold War major powers.
- Chin 12 interstate war). China’s average violence score per MID fell from 44.8 during the Cold War to
32.5 after the Cold War. Whereas China was more violent overall than the other major powers
during the Cold War, this was not the case after 1991 (Figure 4, ~J98 Fig. 9).
Figure 4: Major Powers' Mean Violence Score per MID
Cold War
Post-Cold War
United States
U.K.
France
Germany
Soviet Union
China
Japan
India
United States
U.K.
France
Soviet Union
China
India
20
30
40
50
60
0
Mean Violence Score/MID
20
40
60
80
Mean Violence Score/MID
95% confidence intervals
95% confidence intervals
Note: The vertical dashed line shows the sample mean for that period for all the countries shown.
In terms of relative hostility within a MID, China was most likely to match the hostility
level of its disputants during the Cold War. However, since 1989 China more often escalated to
higher levels of hostility than its adversary. This pattern is most noticeable in the 1989-93 and
1999-2001 periods. If anything, hypothesis 1 finds even more support in the post-Cold War era
as China became less violent but often achieved escalation dominance (Figure 5, ~J98, Fig. 7).
Cold War
Same
Higher
Lower
Percent of Dyadic MIDS (N = 31)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Percent of Dyadic MIDS (N = 159)
0 10 20 30 40 50
Figure 5: Level of Hostility Reached By China in Relation to the Levels
Reached by its Adversaries in the Same MID
Relative Hostility
Same
Higher
Relative Hostility
- Chin 13 Post Cold War
Lower
Adversaries. As shown in Table 2, China’s most frequent MID adversaries have been
quite stable from the Cold War period to afterwards. During the Cold War, over three-fifths of
Table 2: PRC MID Disputants, 1949-2001
Total #
Year Total of Post of Last
# of Cold W.
Country
MID MIDs
MIDs
6
United States
2001
30
6
Taiwan
2001
21
4
Philippines
2001
8
1
Australia
2001
4
3
Japan
1999
6
1
Mongolia
1999
2
3
Vietnam
1998
14
3
North Korea
1997
3
1
Indonesia
1996
1
2
USSR (Russia)
1994
19
1
South Korea
1994
10
0
India
1987
22
0
Malaysia
1984
1
0
Laos
1979
3
0
Vietnam, DR
1975
8
0
Cambodia
1975
1
0
Thailand
1973
5
0
New Zealand
1971
3
0
Myanmar
1969
3
0
U.K.
1968
11
0
Netherlands
1966
2
0
Nepal
1960
3
0
Pakistan
1955
1
0
France
1953
3
0
Canada
1953
1
0
Colombia
1953
1
0
Belgium
1953
1
0
Greece
1953
1
0
Ethiopia
1953
1
0
Turkey
1953
1
China’s 159 dyadic MIDs were with one of six
countries: the United States (24), India (22),
Soviet Union (17), Taiwan (15), Vietnam (11),
and the United Kingdom (11). After the Cold
War, by contrast, over three-quarters of China’s
31 dyadic MIDs were with one of the following
six countries: the United States (6), Taiwan (6),
Philippines (4), Japan (3), Vietnam (3), and
Russia (2). Some 19 of the 30 countries that have
ever had MIDs with China have not had any in
the first decade after the Cold War. The most
prominent case in this group is India.
The PRC waged four interstate wars in
this period: the Korean War (1950), the Assam
War (1961), and Sino-Vietnamese Punitive War
(1978), and the Sino-Vietnamese Border War
(1986).25 Each was fought on China’s periphery.
The Korean War was unique in that it was a
multilateral war that pitted China and North
Korea against South Korea, the United States,
25
Version 4.0 of COW data on inter-state wars (Sarkees and Wayman 2010) also codes the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan
Straits crises as inter-state wars. It is unclear why there is this discrepancy across these COW data sets.
- Chin 14 and 12 other countries. For six of these countries (Canada, Colombia, Belgium Greece, Ethiopia,
and Turkey) the Korean War is the only case in which they have found themselves on the other
side of China in a MID. China’s other wars were quite different--bilateral, brief, and limited.
China’s escalation pattern varies across adversaries. For example, during the Cold War
China usually escalated to the same level as the Soviet Union, Taiwan, India, and Vietnam in
MIDs with those adversaries. However, China was more prone to escalate to a higher level than
the United Kingdom and United States in MIDs with those adversaries. After the Cold War,
China was more likely to escalate to higher levels in disputes with major powers such as Russia,
the United States, and Japan. This suggests China may be more prone to displaying and using
violence against the world’s strongest powers, both during and after the Cold War.
MID Type and Violence Levels. There is a low correlation between violence levels across
territorial, policy, and regime MIDs both during the Cold War and after. China used force in
about 80% of its policy and regime disputes during Cold War. It also used forced in about 60%
of its Cold War territorial disputes. As far as its wars aims were concerned, China never went to
war to topple a regime, but it did go to war over territory with India in 1962 and Vietnam in
198626 and went to war over policy with Vietnam in 1979. After the Cold War, the actions China
takes has changed and the scope of those actions has narrowed. After the Cold War, China has
displayed force in about 80% of its territorial and policy disputes, and has used force in the rest
of its disputes. Although China became less violent in its territorial disputes after the Cold War,
this is a small comfort in comparative terms. China is also the only post-Cold War major power
in the world that still engaged in militarized disputes over territory.
These broad patterns beg for explanation. In the next two sections, I build on the work of
Johnston (1998) and Li (2013) to help better explain these patterns of China’s MID behavior.
26
In my view and that of LI (2013, Appendix 1), the MID data miscode this war as being over “policy.”
- Chin 15 IV.
The Correlates of China’s MIDs: A Second Cut at Johnston (1998)
Johnston (1998) discussed five potential explanations to explain the pattern of China’s
MID behavior. Johnston favored territorial conflict and status satisfaction as explanations of
China’s declining MID behavior, whereas he dismissed domestic unrest, militarization, and
power balancing. In light of post-Cold War data, does that general assessment still make sense?
1) Domestic Unrest as a cause of interstate crises. I use estimates for “mass incidents” in
China for the 1993-2001 period as reported in Tanner (2004) to measure domestic unrest.27 I find
a weak correlation (ρ = .14) between the incidence of mass incidents in China and number of
Chinese MIDs over this period. As shown in Figure 6, mass incidents in China increased over the
entire 1993-2001 period, especially after reform of the state sector in the mid- to late-1990s
dismantled the “iron rice bowl” for urban Chinese and led to massive layoffs and a rise in
inequality (Huang 2008). By contrast, the number of new Chinese MIDs per year declined
through 1997 then rose through 2001. However,
50000
5
over the 1997-2001 period, there is a striking
40000
4
correlation of 0.996 between aggregate protest
30000
3
20000
2
time lags between domestic unrest and MIDs,
1
Johnston’s dismissal of the domestic political
10000
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Year
Mass Incidents
New MIDs
New MIDs
Mass Incidents
Figure 6: Number of Chinese MIDs and Domestic Protests
and MIDs incidence. Given the potential for
roots of China’s MIDs based on Cold War data
may have been somewhat premature.
2) Militarized societies as a cause of interstate crises. The two components of Johnston’s
militarization index (military personnel and military expenditures) are barely correlated over the
27
As of this date, there has been no update of the Handbook data used by Johnston to compare subsequent trends.
- Chin 16 1949-2001 period (ρ = -0.06). Given this discrepancy, I compare these components with Li’s
(2013) more subjective and less differentiated “militarized worldview” variable. It turns out that
the correlation for the militarization index using only military expenditures as a share of China’s
CINC score is very strongly correlated with Li’s “militarized worldview” measure (ρ = 0.79)
whereas an index using only military personnel is very weakly correlated (ρ = 0.23). As a result,
I argue that a better measure for militarization is the index using military expenditures only.
Using the expenditure-based militarization index, China has not become significantly
less militarized since Mao, as shown in Figure 7.28 By contrast, China’s military spending as a
share of total capabilities has gone through three
Figure 7: Number of Chinese MIDs
and Militarization of China
Mil. Spending
Mil. Personnel
New MIDs
from 1970-1988, and increasing since 1989. The
1.5
6
1
4
.5
2
0
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
Year
2000
phases, increasing from 1949-1969, decreasing
8
New MIDs
Militarization Index
2
military expenditure measure is significantly and
positively correlated with the frequency of new
Chinese MIDs (ρ = 0.24, p = .004) from 19492001. Seen in this light, China’s growing military
spending since 1989 is somewhat ominous.
3) Foreign policy balancing as a cause of interstate crises. Although power per se has
not always determinative, the strategic triangle clearly does matter. Ideological rivalry
contributed to Soviet-Chinese conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, during which time the two
countries had 17 of their 20 MIDs. By contrast, 24 of 30 U.S.-China MIDs took place before
1972. After 1972, the U.S. and China were tacit allies in against the Soviet Union. The remaining
six U.S.-China MIDs took place since 1994, after the Soviet Union no longer existed.
28
Using the less plausible personnel-based militarization index, China has become less militarized throughout its
entire history, with the exception of the 1970s just when the Cultural Revolution was winding down and Mao died.
- Chin 17 Meanwhile, China’s relative CINC score to the United States increased steadily from
1953 to 1980, fell during the Reagan buildup, and increased again since 1989. Thus, the period
of U.S.-China tacit alliance in which China had no MID with the United States was also a period
of U.S. relative weakness. By contrast, the post-Cold War period that has witnessed a return of
U.S.-China MIDs is also a period of rising Chinese strength. Even though China’s power has
greatly increased compared to Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has had very
few MIDs with its neighbor. The U.S. now finds itself on the other side of the strategic triangle.
4) Territorial conflict as a cause of interstate crisis. China’s again appears dispute prone
over territory: almost as many territorial MIDs (12) occurred after the Cold War as did in the
first 10 years of the PRC. Whether this is China’s “fault” or not is not revealed in this data.
5) Status gaps as a cause of interstate crisis. Like Johnston, I find a significant negative
correlation between China’s relative CINC score (his status measure) and the frequency of its
Figure 8: Indices of China's Status Satisfaction
.2
.6
.15
.4
.1
.2
.05
0
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
Year
1990
Existing IO's Joined (%)
Diplomatic Recognition (%)
However, after the Cold War, this correlation
.25
.8
MIDs during the Cold War (ρ = -0.39, p=0.00).
has disappeared (ρ = 0.025, p= 0.90). Other
measures show a similar trend. For example,
the share of countries recognizing China instead
of Taiwan has gone up, especially since 1970.29
2000
Share of World Diplomatic Recognition
Share of Existing IO's China Has Joined
China has also joined international institutions,
especially since 1979 (see Figure 8).30
Yet China has still become more dispute-prone in recent years. This suggests that it may
not be so easy to satisfy a rising China; recognition and integration alone are insufficient.
29
Data are from Lee (2013), who fills in gaps of COW’s Diplomatic Exchange data (Bayer 2006).
30
Data are from version 2.0 of COW’s Intergovernmental Organizations data set (Pevehouse et al. 2004).
- Chin 18 V.
The Correlates of China’s MIDs: A Second Cut at Li (2013)
The analysis to this point has followed Johnston (1998) in showing a series of simple
bivariate correlations between potential independent variables and China’s MID behavior. In
“The Taming of the Red Dragon”, Li (2013) is the first author to actually put these pieces
together in to attempt to explain a subset of China’s MID behavior: the use of force. Li fit a
series of multivariate logit regression models to explain 155 dyadic country year observations in
which China used force against another state. His included his independent variable of interest,
China’s “militarized worldview”, and the following controls:
(1) relative power (measured as the logged ratio of CINC scores for China and that state),
(2) territorial claim, a dummy variable (1 if claim is outstanding that year, 0 otherwise),
(3) diplomatic recognition, a dummy variable (1 if grants China recognition, 0 otherwise),
(4) joint IGO membership, a count variable (# of shared international institutions),
(5) trade dependence of China on that state31,
(6) domestic unrest in China in that year measured on a scale from 0 to 1032,
(7) contiguity, a dummy variable (1 if a state shares land border China, a state is within
150 miles by sea of China, or a state is “colonially contiguous” with China, 0 otherwise).33
(8) peace years, a count variable for the number of years since the last use of force, and
(9) a cubic spline function to control for time dependence in the data.34
Due to space limitations, I omit further detail on these variables and instead direct
interested readers to consult Li (2013, pg. 10-14) for additional explanation of these variables.
31
Measured as the ratio of bilateral trade to Chinese GDP. Li takes trade data from version 2.01 of the COW
bilateral trade data set (Barbieri et al. 2009). He takes China’s GDP data from the World Bank and official statistics.
32
Measured using the CIVTOT variable from the Major Episodes of Political Violence data set (Marshall 2005).
CIVTOT sums four sub-components for civil violence, civil war, ethnic violence, and ethnic war on 0-10 scales.
33
Data are from version 3.1 of COW’s Direct Contiguity data set (Stinnett et al. 2002).
34
For more on this method, see Beck et al. (1998).
- Chin 19 There were 289 dyadic country-year observations in which China was engaged in a MID
of any kind with another state over the 1949-2001 period (of which 254 were during the Cold
War and 35 after the Cold War), whereas China used force in 155 of those dyadic country years.
There are a total of 7,358 dyadic country year observations in my data set. In Table 4, I show the
initial results for a series of regressions that replicate Li’s preferred model (model 4) to explain
both China’s MIDs (models 1-3) and use of force (models 4-6). Models 1 and 4 are run on the
whole sample, models 2 and 5 are run for the Cold War period only, and models 3 and 6 are run
for the post-Cold War period only. Since China’s “militarized worldview” is coded as constant
since 1985, it falls out of regression run on the post-Cold War sample. In other words, China’s
militarized worldview cannot explain variation in China’s MID behavior after 1985. Nor can it
explain where China has MIDs or uses force because the variable does not vary across dyads.
China’s worldview does help explain temporal variation in China’s dispute proneness
(MIDs) and violence proneness (use of force), though at lower levels of statistical significance
than Li since I calculate cluster robust standard errors (by country). As expected, conflicting
territorial claims were more likely to cause MIDs between China and its disputants after the Cold
War than before, though China was less likely to use force in those territorial disputes. However,
contrary to Li, it appears joint IGO membership may actually increase rather than decrease the
probability of a MID between two countries, at least during the Cold War. Interestingly, it also
appears that diplomatic recognition was correlated with fewer uses of force during the Cold War,
but not after. As expected, Whereas trade dependence exerted no impact on the likelihood of
MIDs during the Cold War, its impact is positive and significant after the Cold War. Apparently,
trade may actually lead to more conflict with China rather than “taming” or binding its leaders.
Finally, domestic unrest led to fewer MIDs and uses of force during the Cold War, but not after.
- Chin 20 Table 4: Logit Analyses of China's MIDs and Uses of Force Behavior from 1949-2001
on All “Politically Relevant” Dyads [Model 4 Semi-Replicates Li (2013)]
Militarized Interstate Disputes
Uses of Force
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1949194919921949194919922001
1991
2001
2001
1991
2001
1.980** 2.218**
1.705+
1.785+
Militarized Worldview
(0.72)
(0.78)
(0.95)
(1.01)
-0.345** -0.365**
-0.122 -0.487** -0.513**
-0.715
Relative Power
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.26)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.80)
1.211** 1.072**
1.906* 0.998** 1.100**
2.672
Territorial Claim
(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.81)
(0.39)
(0.33)
(1.95)
-0.677+
-0.594
0.309 -1.268** -1.655**
1.427
Diplomatic Recognition
(0.38)
(0.43)
(0.93)
(0.32)
(0.45)
(1.73)
0.035*
0.037
-0.020
-0.031 -0.063+ -0.085*
Joint IGO
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.026
-0.034 0.400**
-0.028
-0.034
0.261
Trade Dependence
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.15)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.43)
-0.104** -0.099*
-0.167 -0.155** -0.158**
-0.124
Domestic Unrest
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.26)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.47)
0.658+
0.635+
0.544
1.178*
1.172+
2.313+
Contiguity
(0.36)
(0.33)
(0.88)
(0.59)
(0.61)
(1.21)
-0.732** -0.745** -0.480*
Years Since Last MID
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.21)
-0.750** -0.792**
-0.006
Years Since Last uforce
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.19)
-1.471* -1.696*
0.932
-0.699
-0.621
-1.709
Constant
(0.75)
(0.76)
(1.61)
(0.63)
(0.58)
(4.13)
N
195
164
191
195
164
191
6549
4737
1812
6549
4737
1812
Pseudo-R2
0.56
0.57
0.54
0.62
0.64
0.38
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines not displayed due to space
limitations. Model 4 replicates Li’s (2013) preferred model (see Table 1, Model 2, pg. 15)
with three minor adjustments. I use standard logit instead of rare events logit. I use the
standard contiguity variable without time-varying adjustments. I include cluster robust
rather than conventional standard error. Results are generally similar to Li (2013).
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Identifying China’s Politically-Militarily Relevant Dyads
Which countries are politically-militarily relevant for China such that they even have the
opportunity to have conflicts of interest that could potentially lead to any militarized dispute with
China? Li (2013) included every country in the world in his sample on the premise that the
- Chin 21 Correlates of War project has coded China as a major power since 1950.35 However, this case
selection criterion only makes sense if China truly had global military force projection
capabilities since 1950. However, most authors recognize that China has really only been a
regional power for most of its existence and even today does not have truly global force
projection capabilities (e.g. Nathan and Scobell 2012; Shambaugh 2013, Ch. 7). Therefore, it is
necessary to identify and exclude from the analysis all dyads with zero probability of a MID.
After all, who could ever imagine China and, say, Andorra ever engaging in a MID?
Indeed, through 2001 the PRC has only had a MID with 30 countries36 (and used force against 28
countries).37 Of these 30 countries, 19 are in Asia, 6 in Europe, 3 in the Americas, 1 in the
Middle East, and 1 in Africa. Since 1992, the PRC has only had MIDs with 11 countries (and
used force against six countries).38 Of these 11 countries, 9 are in Asia, 1 in Europe, and 1 in the
Americas. Thus, China has never had a MID with about 85% (167) of the countries in the world
since 1949. What’s more, about 70% of China’s 289 dyadic country-years engaged in MIDs have
been with its regional Asian neighbors.
Since the population of “politically relevant” dyads is too inclusive, I identify the
subpopulation of what Quackenbush (2006) calls politically active dyads. Politically active dyads
should comprise all dyads with a non-zero probability of a MID.39 For China, such countries
must meet one of the following conditions: (1) the state is contiguous with China directly by
35
Following the standard definition, all countries are politically relevant for major powers (Maoz and Russett 1993). 36
These countries are listed in Table 3. 37
According to Li, these include Australia, Belgium, Britain, Burma, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece,
India, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Korea, North Vietnam, Philippines,
Portugal, Russia, South Africa, South Korea, South Vietnam, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and the United States.
38
The six countries China has used force against since 1991 include Mongolia, North Korea, Vietnam, Philippines,
Russia, and the United States. China has also had MIDs with Australia, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
39
An alternative method for identifying these dyads is to use split population binary choice models to estimate
political-military relevance as a latent variable (e.g. Clark and Regan 2003; Xiang 2010). - Chin 22 land40 or sea41 or through a colony42, (2) the state is located in Asia43, (3) the state is a “global
power” (e.g. United States, United Kingdom, France, Soviet Union44), (4) the state is allied to
states contiguous with China, or (5) the state is allied to the United States in years when it is in a
militarized dispute with China. Based on these criteria, I identify a total of 120 countries that
have ever been politically active with the PRC since 1949, whereas a total of 77 countries have
never been politically active with China.45 Politically active dyads represent only 48% of all of
China’s directed dyads in the world over this period (3,555 out of 7,358), but they fully capture
99% of Chinese MIDs (286 out of 289 directed dyad years). Only one MID is not captured by
this procedure: Ethiopia’s participation in the Korean War from 1951-1953. This appears to be
the exception that proves the rule.
Table 5 replicates the same models shown in Table 4 but only on the population of
“politically active” dyads. The results are similar to Table 4 but with one key difference. Now
40
China has shared a land border with fourteen states: Afghanistan, Bhutan, Myanmar, India, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, Vietnam, Pakistan, Russia, and Tajikistan. 41
China has been water contiguous with five states: Taiwan (across the Taiwan Strait, under 12 miles), South Korea
(across the Yellow Sea, under 150 miles), S. Vietnam (across the Gulf of Tonkin, less thaundern 150 miles), Japan
(across the East China Sea, under 400 miles), and the Philippines (across the South China Sea, under 400 miles).
42
China has had colonial contiguity with three states: the United Kingdom from 1949-1997 (through Hong Kong),
France from 1949-1954 (through Vietnam), and Portugal from 1949-1999 (through Macau).
43
Asides from China, there are a total of 43 states in the Asian region: Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Taiwan, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, India, Bhutan, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam,
Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Papua New Guinea, New Zealand, Vanuatu,
Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Fiji, Tonga, Nauru, Marshall Is, Palau, Micronesia FS, and Western Samoa.
44
According to Quackenbush (2006) and Maoz (1996), China has been an Asian regional power since 1949, Japan
an Asian regional power since 1991, Germany a European regional power since 1991, and Russia a European
regional since 1992. Despite being coded by the Correlates of War as “major powers”, regional powers arguably do
not have force projection capabilities that make it appropriate to consider all countries worldwide militarily relevant..
45
The 77 states that have never been politically active with China include: Ireland, Monaco, Liechtenstein,
Switzerland, Andorra, Austria, Slovakia, San Marino, Malta, Macedonia, Croatia, Yugoslavia, Bosnia, Slovenia,
Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé-Principe, Guinea-Bissau, Equatorial Guinea,
Gambia, Mali, Senegal, Benin, Mauritania, Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Ghana, Togo, Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon, Central Africa, Chad, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Burundi,
Rwanda, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana,
Swaziland, Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libyan, Sudan, Lebanon, Israel, Saudi
Arabia, North Yemen, Yemen, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
- Chin 23 Table 5: Logit Analyses of China's MIDs and Uses of Force Behavior from 1949-2001
on All “Politically Active” Dyads
Militarized Interstate Disputes
Uses of Force
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1949194919921949194919922001
1991
2001
2001
1991
2001
1.775** 2.065**
1.553
1.645
Militarized Worldview
(0.68)
(0.73)
(0.95)
(1.02)
-0.252** -0.265**
-0.207 -0.390** -0.414**
-0.820
Relative Power
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.23)
(0.08)
(0.09)
(0.89)
1.084** 0.968**
1.709* 1.011** 1.065**
2.380
Territorial Claim
(0.31)
(0.31)
(0.68)
(0.34)
(0.31)
(1.55)
-0.535
-0.472
0.298 -1.132** -1.548**
1.366
Diplomatic Recognition
(0.36)
(0.40)
(0.85)
(0.29)
(0.44)
(1.62)
0.032+
0.035
-0.030
-0.024
-0.050 -0.091*
Joint IGO
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
-0.031 -0.039+
0.295+
-0.032
-0.034
0.172
Trade Dependence
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.15)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.50)
-0.087* -0.083*
-0.175 -0.133** -0.138**
-0.119
Domestic Unrest
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.25)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.49)
0.467
0.468+
0.020
0.989+
1.072+
1.609
Contiguity
(0.30)
(0.28)
(0.83)
(0.53)
(0.57)
(1.29)
-0.695** -0.707** -0.456*
Years Since Last MID
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.19)
-0.727** -0.774**
0.012
Years Since Last uforce
(0.13)
(0.13)
(0.20)
-1.490* -1.776*
1.490
-0.893
-0.798
-0.881
Constant
(0.72)
(0.72)
(1.35)
(0.64)
(0.60)
(3.48)
N
119
90
100
119
90
100
3099
2301
798
3099
2301
798
2
Pseudo-R
0.49
0.51
0.47
0.57
0.60
0.31
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines not displayed due to space
limitations. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
China’s “militarized worldview” is positive but no longer statistically significant in explaining
temporal variation in China’s use of force. Although Li did not test his models on China’s MIDs,
his variable does still help explain variation in MID frequency, at least during the Cold War.
In Table 6, I augment models in Table 5 by including several control variables omitted by
Li. The first is a country’s S-score, which measures how similar the alliance portfolios are for the
two countries in each dyad (Signorino and Ritter 1999). Politically similar countries should have
- Chin 24 fewer MIDs. To help test hypothesis 5, I also include dummy terms for international rivalry
(Klein et al. 2006) and Asia. Both terms should be positively related to Chinese MIDs and use of
force. Results are largely consistent with these expectations.
Table 6: Logit Analyses of China's MIDs and Uses of Force Behavior from 1949-2001
on “All Politically Active Dyads” with Additional Covariates
Militarized Interstate Disputes
Uses of Force
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
1949194919921949194919922001
1991
2001
2001
1991
2001
2.027** 2.124**
1.723+
1.848+
Militarized Worldview
(0.64)
(0.67)
(0.96)
(1.01)
-0.292** -0.377**
-0.387 -0.257* -0.277*
1.209*
Relative Power
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.43)
(0.10)
(0.11)
(0.61)
0.735*
0.830*
-0.044
0.443
0.552
0.357
Territorial Claim
(0.35)
(0.36)
(0.69)
(0.37)
(0.40)
(3.16)
-0.374
-0.370
2.254 -0.774* -1.054**
3.741*
Diplomatic Recognition
(0.29)
(0.31)
(1.68)
(0.30)
(0.41)
(1.76)
0.019
0.015
-0.014
-0.025
-0.040
0.116+
Joint IGO
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
(0.07)
-0.028 -0.051*
0.017
-0.020
-0.027
0.820
Trade Dependence
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.14)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.57)
-0.091* -0.089* -0.846* -0.148** -0.162**
-0.451
Domestic Unrest
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.38)
(0.05)
(0.05)
(0.94)
-0.083
-0.150
0.192
1.119*
1.122+
1.532+
Contiguity
(0.43)
(0.46)
(1.17)
(0.49)
(0.61)
(0.89)
-0.648
-0.880 4.163** -2.042** -2.522** 26.86**
Alliance Similarity (S)
(0.64)
(0.65)
(1.15)
(0.69)
(0.70)
(8.40)
0.703*
0.065 6.026** 1.031**
0.983* 12.47**
Rivalry
(0.35)
(0.44)
(1.39)
(0.40)
(0.40)
(3.43)
1.617** 1.976**
-0.143
1.112*
1.399*
0.033
Asia
(0.46)
(0.52)
(0.79)
(0.53)
(0.57)
(2.08)
-0.650** -0.662** -0.673**
Years Since Last MID
(0.09)
(0.10)
(0.25)
-0.653** -0.693**
0.855
Years Since Last uforce
(0.13)
(0.14)
(0.55)
-2.132** -2.236** -4.990+ -1.578* -1.668* -34.95**
Constant
(0.77)
(0.76)
(2.60)
(0.68)
(0.65)
(11.30)
N
119
90
100
119
90
100
2999
2301
698
2999
2301
698
2
Pseudo-R
0.52
0.54
0.60
0.59
0.62
0.60
Note: Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. Cubic splines not displayed due to space
limitations. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
- Chin 25 Measuring Within Dyad Variation: Some Fixed Effects Models
Because much of the variance from the previous set of regressions may come from across
countries rather than within countries over time, I subject the data to one more model: a fixed
effects logit model that includes a dummy term for each dyad. These terms control for all of the
constant un-modeled heterogeneity across dyads (Green et al. 2001).46 For similar reasons, I
include leader dummies to control for un-modeled heterogeneity in worldview during each
Chinese ruler’s era (e.g. decision-making style, etc.). Dummies for the Hua Guogeng era (197678), Deng Xiaoping era (1979-1992), and Jiang Zemin era (1993-2001) show the relative MID
propensities for China under these leaders relative to the Mao era (1949-1976). In this fixed
effects model, I also include several standard control variables omitted by Li. The first is a
country’s S-score. The second is China’s GDP, which is often used in quantitative studies to
measure diversionary war incentives (e.g. Prins 2001).
Table 7 reports the results for the fixed effects logit regression run on the entire 19492001 period. The coefficients show the effect of changes on that variable for the probability a
MID within each country-dyad over time. The inclusion dyadic fixed effects restricts the sample
to the 28 countries to have MIDs with China (since there is no ‘within’ variation for other dyads).
The results are decidedly mixed with respect to the analysis offered by Johnston and Li. On the
one hand, the effect of China’s militarized worldview is positive and statistically significant, as
Li would expect. But this is more than offset by the fact that the coefficient on the leader dummy
for the Jiang Zemin era is even more positive and statistically significant. Thus, all things being
equal, China in the last years for which we have data (199347-2001) became much more dispute 46
Thus, I cannot include dyadic variables such as contiguity, distance, or region dummies that do not vary over time.
I code 1993 as the beginning of the Jiang era rather than 1997 when Deng Xiaoping actually died because Deng’s
health prevented him from playing a prominent leadership role after 1993. He went into semi-retirement after his
famous 1992 Southern Tour that reignited domestic economic reforms.
47
- Chin 26 Table 7: Fixed Effect Logit Analysis of China's
MIDs and Use of Force Behavior from 1949-2001
MIDs
UForce
2.418**
3.049**
Militarized Worldview
(0.47)
(0.61)
-1.515**
-0.280
Relative Power
(0.45)
(0.83)
1.641*
-0.329
Territorial Claim
(0.69)
(1.50)
-0.504
0.788
Diplomatic Recognition
(0.36)
(0.69)
0.001
-0.025
Joint IGO
(0.02)
(0.04)
-0.029
-0.059*
Trade Dependence
(0.02)
(0.03)
-0.066
-0.093+
Domestic Unrest
(0.05)
(0.05)
-0.534
-1.159
Similarity (S Score)
(0.79)
(0.98)
-0.002*
-0.005*
China’s GDP
(0.00)
(0.00)
-0.154
0.593
Hua Guogeng Era
(0.73)
(1.26)
0.454
-0.198
Deng Xiaoping Era
(0.55)
(1.13)
3.378**
3.176+
Jiang Zemin Era
(0.92)
(1.84)
-0.487**
Year Since Last MID
(0.07)
-0.497**
Year Since Last Uforce
(0.10)
Number of Countries
28
25
Number of Observations
1291
1179
Pseudo R-Square
0.38
0.56
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Dyadic Fixed effects not displayed.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
prone with countries with which it had a
history of disputes than China had been
under Mao. This trend obtained despite
the fact that China’s world view was at
historic low levels of militarization by
Li’s coding.
Most other variables turn out to be
insignificant, though this may be a
function of the smaller sample size.
Consistent with Johnston’s argument,
China’s GDP and relative power is
significant and negative—suggesting
China’s increasing relative capabilities
by themselves have not made China
more prone to MIDs. Nevertheless,
contrary to Johnston and Li’s forecast, it
appears that territorial disputes yet again
appear have led China to become more
dispute prone (though not more likely to
use force). Trade dependence is leads to
less Chinese uses of force, though it has had no effect on China’s dispute proneness. On balance,
these results bely the simplistic characterization. Chins is neither a hegemon on the march, but
neither has China’s international dispute behavior become neatly “Lockeanized” or tamed.
- Chin 27 VI.
Conclusion
This paper has taken a second cut at the data on China’s militarized interstate disputes. I
began by arguing that the literature on China’s conflict behavior has been dominated by small-N
qualitative research, and that quantitative analysis may prove effective in shedding new light on
an important topic. In order to advance the literature and further debate, this paper systematically
reviewed all the available quantitative data in search of the correlates of China’s MID behavior. I
then used new data and new methods to replicate and extend the laudable and groundbreaking
work of Johnston (1998) and Li (2013), who until now were the only scholars to systematically
use quantitative data and methods to study China’s militarized interstate behavior since 1949.
Throughout the paper, I have also noted reasons to be cautious about the optimistic
conclusions offered by Li and Johnston in their work. The record of China’s dispute proneness
and asymmetric escalation behavior in crises with major powers (hypothesis 1) confirms that
China’s parabellum strategic culture is alive and well. Thankfully, at least, neither domestic
unrest nor China’s growing relative power (or GDP) by themselves have made China more
dispute prone. At the same time, neither China’s growing trade dependence or its participation in
international institutions has transformed China into a peaceful and satisfied status quo power.
Rather than becoming “Lockeanized” (contra hypothesis 4), China at the end of the twentieth
century remains heavily dispute prone and just as likely to engage in territorial conflict as
revolutionary China was under Mao (contra hypothesis 2). That disturbing fact suggests that
“taming the red dragon” may not be as easy or straightforward as optimists like to claim.
Much more can be done to carry forward this line of research. One is to more fully model
China’s MIDs statistically as a strategic rather than decision theoretic process. A second route is
to more fully consider different decision processes leading to MIDs and escalation to use of force.
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