Indigenous Peoples and Communal Land Management in Asia
Regional Workshop at ADB Headquarters, Manila
Upholding Indigenous Access to Natural Resources
in Northeast Cambodia
John P. McAndrew
&
Oeur Il
Analyzing Development Issues Project
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia
Paper read at the Regional Workshop on Indigenous Peoples
and Communal Land Management
8 and 9 December 2004
2
Abstract
Indigenous people in northeast Cambodia have practiced communal land management from time
immemorial. Nevertheless, traditional practices began to be usurped gradually with Khmer in-migration
after independence in 1954 and then rapidly with the opening up of the market economy in the early
1990s. Development specialists have sometimes seen communal land ownership act as a deterrent to
the full participation of indigenous people in the benefits generated by the market economy. Research
studies undertaken in northeast Cambodia by the lead and joint authors among the Tampuan in
Ratanakiri province, the Phnong in Mondulkiri province, and the Stieng in Kratie province suggest
otherwise. Findings from these studies while varying from location to location indicate that, given the
opportunity, indigenous groups were eager to participate in benefits brought about by the growth of local
markets. By contrast, it was precisely the dismantling and disregard of communal tenures by outsiders in some instances through the buying up of land for cash crops or future speculation and in other
instances through concession and illegal logging – that diminished natural resources necessary for
sustaining livelihoods and, in some instances, debilitated cultural and social resources needed to deal
with the exigencies of change itself. This paper argues that indigenous groups that retain control over
their land and forest resources are in a stronger position to adapt to the rapid and inevitable change
brought on by the market economy than those who do not. In this regard efforts in Cambodia to support
indigenous land rights through the issuance of communal land titles and community forestry management
agreements are reviewed and discussed. Policy options to enhance indigenous access to natural
resources in northeast Cambodia are likewise presented.
3
Table of Contents
Introduction
4
Logging in Cambodia
5
Economic Concessions and Land Encroachments
in Northeast Cambodia
8
Indigenous Responses to Natural Resource Depletion
9
Livelihood Strategies
16
Market Participation
19
Cumulative Effects of Market Expansion
21
The Emerging Legal Framework
23
Conclusions
24
4
Introduction
The region of northeast Cambodia that includes Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Kratie, and Strung Treng
provinces has historically been a crossroads of diverse influences. As early as the thirteenth century
Khmer and Cham people living along the Mekong river in Stung Treng are thought to have been in
contact with the indigenous inhabitants of the forest areas through the Sesan and Srepok rivers. Trade
was conducted through these river systems to secure forest products such as elephant ivory, hides,
feathers, wood, wild spices and herbs. In addition to the trade in goods there was also a trade in slaves,
which lasted until the nineteenth century. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the French
colonialists operated rubber plantations and gem mines in the area. For centuries the Khmer and Cham,
the Vietnamese and the Lao, and later the Thai and the French have been in contact with indigenous
people of the highlands.
While indigenous people of Cambodia’s northeast highlands maintained trade relations with
lowland groups, they were nevertheless able to assert domain over their own territories. This began to
change during the French colonial period with the establishment of permanent settlements around
plantations and mines. After independence in 1954, the Sangkum Reastr Niyum regime took decisive
steps to incorporate the indigenous hill tribes of the northeast into mainstream Khmer society. Inhabitants
of the plains regions of the country were encouraged to resettle in the northeast highlands and to teach
the hill tribes “how to follow Khmer ways.” This in-migration was curtailed in the 1970s as a consequence
of the civil war and later the Khmer Rouge regime. After 1979 the indigenous people who had been
relocated by the Khmer Rouge began to return to their own villages. In the 1980s the in-migration of
Khmer settlers into the northeast remained limited with the exception of Kratie province.
Since the 1990s the opening up of Cambodia’s economy has had far reaching consequences for
the northeast region. The pursuit of logging and economic concessions has occasioned a major shift in
the use and ownership of land resources. Traditionally, indigenous people have used natural resources
as communal property to support their own subsistence. Now, more and more, private commercial
interests exploit natural resources to increase their own wealth. The opening up of the economy, which
included the construction of roads by logging concessions, has likewise spurred a new in-migration of
Khmer settlers to the northeast and the growth of market centers. The increased market activity in these
areas has led Khmer settlers to obtain land rights from indigenous groups for the cultivation of cash crops
or for future speculation.
This paper draws on three empirical studies conducted by the lead and joint authors which
examine changes taken place among indigenous people of northeast Cambodia as a result of increased
market activity and diminished natural resources.1 These studies were conducted in two Tampuan
villages of Ratanakiri province, two Phnong communes of Mondulkiri province, and two Stieng villages of
Kratie province.2 The paper traces broad trends that have emerged in the three provinces and documents
1
John P. McAndrew, a social anthropologist with a doctorate from the University of Amsterdam, has worked in
Southeast Asia, notably the Philippines and Cambodia, for more than 30 years. Oeur Il holds a masters degree and
has worked in development in Cambodia for 10 years. The authors acknowledge the contributions of the following
in developing this paper: Graeme Brown, Susie Brown, Jeremy Ironside, Russell Peterson, Katrin Seidel, Seng
Maly, Seng Thany, Todd Sigaty, and Peter Swift.
2
See John P. McAndrew, Indigenous Adaptation to a Rapidly Changing Economy: The Experience of Two
Tampuan Villages in Northeast Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: CIDSE Cambodia, December 2001); John P. McAndrew,
Mam Sambath, Hong Kimly, and Ly Bunthai, Indigenous Adaptation to a Decline in Natural Resources: The
Experience of Two Phnong Communes in Northeast Cambodia, (Phnom Penh: CIDSE Cambodia, September
2003); and Analyzing Development Issues Trainees (Round 14) and Team, Indigenous Response to Depletion in
Natural Resources: A Study of Two Stieng Villages in Snoul District, Kratie Province, (Phnom Penh: CCC/ADI,
5
the responses of the indigenous groups that have emerged as a result. This includes an assessment of
livelihood strategies and market participation. The paper argues that indigenous groups that have
retained control over their land and other natural resources are in a stronger position to adapt to the rapid
and inevitable change brought on by the market economy than those who do not.
Logging in Cambodia
A recent Cambodia Development Resource Institute (CDRI) and Wildlife Conservation Society
(WCS) study places Cambodia’s forest cover in 2000 at 52.4 per cent of the country’s land area, down
from about 75 per cent during the 1960s.3 From the 1960s to the mid-1980s deforestation progressed at
an average annual rate of about 0.5 per cent, increased to about one per cent from the mid-1980s to mid1990s, and then rose to about 1.7 per cent since the mid-1990s. These figures underscore the
accelerated rate of deforestation that has occurred over the years.
The increased rate of forest exploitation, which began in the late 1980s, accompanied
Cambodia’s reintegration into the global market economy but cannot be explained simply as a
consequence of this. An understanding of the broader political economy is crucial. The three main
political factions struggling for control of Cambodia - the Cambodian People’s Party, the FUNCINPEC
party, and the Khmer Rouge - were intensely involved in logging the areas under their control.4 The need
to fund political and military power bases which consumed the warring factions until the late 1990s meant
that forest exploitation in Cambodia was conducted, for the most part, illegally with little of the proceeds
flowing into the public treasury for reconstruction and development.5
In an attempt to rationalize the logging industry and enable the state to capture more of the
revenues generated from timber sales, international donors led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank promoted forest management through forest concessions. From 1994 to 1997, the
Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) granted 30 forest concessions, covering 6.5 million hectares or
35 per cent of Cambodia’s total land area. Some of these concessions were later cancelled. By late
2001, when a logging moratorium was put into place, 15 timber concessionaries held 21 concessions
covering 4.2 million hectares or 26 per cent of the country’s land area.
The granting of forest concessions in Cambodia in the mid-1990s sought to eliminate illegal
logging and to generate more state revenues from forest exploitation. But the forest concession system
failed to do this. Illegal logging continued unabated under the concession regime and was often abetted
by it.6 Similarly, the forest concessions never generated the state revenues expected, which in 1996 the
World Bank had projected to reach US$ 100 million annually. From 1992 to 1998 the estimated value of
Cambodia’s timber exports reached a staggering US$ 2.139 billion, while the estimated government
September 2004). A field report from the Ratanakiri study was published in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, Vol. 32, No.4: 39-51 and an article in the Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 5, No.3: 5-8. An article
from the Mondulkiri study was published in the Cambodia Development Review, Vol. 8, No.1: 9-12.
3
Bruce McKenney, Yim Chea, Prom Tola, and Tom Evans, Focusing on Cambodia’s High Value Forests:
Livelihoods and Management, (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute and Wildlife Conservation
Society, November 2004). The study cites UNDP, FAO, Mekong Secretariat, and Cambodian government sources.
4
Bruce McKenny and Prom Tola, Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods in Cambodia: A Baseline Assessment,
Working Paper 23, (Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, 2002).
5
Philippe Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989-1999: War, Peace and Forest
Exploitation,” Development and Change, Vol. 31, No.4, September 2000.
6
See Global Witness reports from 1996 to 2002.
6
revenue during the same period was only US$ 98.8 million.7 Moreover, the effects of concession forestry
on local communities were devastating, including severe forest deforestation and degradation.8
Logging in Ratanakiri
Logging concessions granted to private corporations covered thousands of hectares of Ratanakiri
forest. In January 1998 the RGC authorized a 25-year timber concession to the Hero Taiwan Company to
log 60,150 hectares of forest in O' Chum, Vonsai, and Taveng districts. The area was inhabited by almost
10,000 people, primarily ethnic Kreung. Logging operations commenced in May 1999. In April 2000, the
Asian Development Bank (ADB)-funded Cambodian Forest Concession Review gave Hero the lowest
performance score of all forest concessions inspected. As a result of conflicts that occurred between the
Hero Taiwan Company and Kreung people living in the concession area, the Governor of Ratanakiri
authorized an independent cultural resource study in July 1999. The study concluded that the Hero
logging concession should be cancelled.9 The company subsequently withdrew its concession.
In April 1998 the Pheapimex Fuchan Cambodia Company was granted a concession for 350,000
hectares of forest in Ratanakiri and Stung Treng provinces. The Pheapimex concession included most of
a proposed buffer zone for Virachey National Park, inhabited by more than 10,000 indigenous people.10
The grant was awarded without consultation with government environment authorities or with those living
in the affected areas. The company did log in Stung Treng until the 2001 moratorium but never became
operational in Ratanakiri. In addition to Pheapimex Fuchan and Hero Taiwan, Ratanakiri's two legally
sanctioned logging concessions, illegal logging was endemic in the province.
Logging in Mondulkiri
While several companies including Utama Overseas, Macro Panin, Chung Sing, Thai Boon
Roong, King Wood Industry and Samling were awarded logging concessions to cut timber in Modulkiri
most of these grants were subsequently cancelled. Samling, a Malaysian company, did however become
operational in southern Mondulkiri
Samling was awarded a forest concession in August 1994 covering 457,466 hectares in the
provinces of Kratie, Kompong Cham, and Mondulkiri. Samling's logging operations in Mondulkiri were
conducted in 1997 and 1998, mainly in Srae Khtum and Srae Preah communes of Keo Seima district,
and in Sen Monorum commune of Ou Reang district. In March 1997 Global Witness reported that
Samling was paying the Khmer Rouge $350 per truck per month to permit the removal of logs from the
concession, payoffs estimated at over $17,000 per month. In April 1997 the RGC Minister of Agriculture
in a letter to the Director of Samling noted that the company was guilty of several infractions including
cutting in areas not permitted by Forestry Department officials and cutting undersized logs. In January
1999 Samling ceased operations in protest over the government's increased royalty from $14 to $54 per
cubic meter. The ADB Concession Review of 2000 listed the contractual breaches of Samling as no
7
Le Billon, “The Political Ecology of Transition in Cambodia 1989-1999.”
Bruce McKenny, “Questioning Sustainable Concession Forestry in Cambodia,” Cambodia Development Review,
Vol. 6, No.1, January-March 2002.
9
Sara Colm, "Forests of the Spirits: Impacts of the Hero Logging Concession on the Indigenous Culture of the
Kreung," Watershed Vol. 6, No.1 (2000), 32, 34.
10
Sara Colm, "Sacred Balance: Conserving the Ancestral Lands of Cambodia's Indigenous Communities,"
Indigenous Affairs, Vol. 4 (2000), 38.
8
7
submission of financial statement, non-compliance with environmental impact assessment rules,
unacceptable forest management plan, illegal logging, and breach of investment agreement.11
The Khmer Construction Company was a joint venture between a Taiwanese company and a
senior official in the Interior Ministry. The company, while not on any concession list, built a sawmill in the
hills of Mondulkiri's Dak Dam commune in Ou Reang district in 1997 intending to export all the processed
wood to Taiwan through Vietnam. A military task force sent to Mondulkiri revealed that in November and
December 1999 the Khmer Construction Company in collusion with provincial authorities illegally
transported about 380 truckloads of timber across the border to Vietnam. Key government officials
involved in the illegal log export deal were replaced and some were even jailed. However Global Witness
subsequently learned that those in prison had been released and most of those involved had been
reinstated or reassigned to new positions.12
The Mondulkiri illegal logging scandal in December 1999 brought attention to a practice that had
been endemic to the province for several years. But it did not curtail it. Indeed, the reinstatement of
government officials involved in the crackdown emboldened others to pursue illegal logging activities. In
2001, Global Witness documented numerous instances of illegal logging that took place in Mondulkiri in
late 2000 and early 2001 mainly in Keo Seima district.13
Logging in Kratie
From 1994 to 1996, the RCG awarded 9 forest concessions covering 702,642 hectares in Kratie.
When two of these concessions were cancelled in January 1999, the 7 remaining companies controlled
502,530 hectares in the province. These companies, which included GAT International, Casotim,
Samling, Pheapimex Fuchan, King Wood Industry, Everbright, and Timas Resources, did little to curb
illegal practices. In 2000 the ADB Concession Review documented numerous contractual breaches
made by the 7 forest concessions operating in Kratie. Global Witness noted that the concessionaires in
Kratie cooperated closely with Military Region (MR) 2 units perpetuating destructive and illegal logging
practices.14
The logging concessions operating in Kratie did not curtail illegal practices. In March 1997, Global
Witness reported that in Snoul district the Rethy Mecco Company, which did not appear on any
concession list, was involved in illegal logging in the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary. At the same time, the
logging concessions in many ways provided a legal front that allowed illegal activities to continue. In
March 1997, Global Witness reported that Samling had been buying illegal timber from MR2 units, and
from local villagers, with many of the trees cut in Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary. The shutdown of Samling’s
operations in January 1999 did not stop illegal logging in Snoul district. In May 2001 Global Witness
reported that luxury timber and pepper poles had been exported to Vietnam on a daily basis. The timber,
which originated mostly inside the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary, was transported by motorbike, oxcart and
buffalo cart through anarchic crossings in the district. In May 2004 Global Witness reported that illegal
loggers hired by military, military police and police cut timber in Snoul district to sell to a businesswoman
11
Global Witness reports: A Tug of War, March 1997; Just Deserts for Cambodia? June 1997; The Untouchables,
December 1999; The Credibility Gap, May 2001; and Deforestation Without Limits, July 2002.
12
Global Witness Reports: Just Deserts for Cambodia?; Chainsaws Speak Louder Than Words, May 2000; and
The Credibility Gap.
13
Global Witness Reports: A Tug of War; Just Deserts for Cambodia?; Going Places, March 1998; Crackdown or
Pause; Chainsaws Speak Louder Than Words; and The Credibility Gap.
14
Global Witness Reports: Going Places and Deforestation Without Limits.
8
who owned a sawmill in Mondulkiri province. Global Witness also reported that this same
businesswoman commissioned soldiers to carry out illegal logging inside the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary.15
Current Situation
While illegal logging continued in northeast Cambodia after the logging ban was imposed in 2001,
the operations of large-scale forest concessions were effectively curtailed. With the long-term profitability
of many concessions in question due to the degraded state of their remaining forest resources, some
companies abandoned their concessions while others faced the termination of their agreements. In mid2004 the World Bank-funded Technical Review Team assigned with evaluating the forest management
plans of the forest concessions indicated that it would recommend the approval of six concessions with
four (Colexim, Everbright, Timas Preah Vihear, and Cherndar Plywood) covering about 340,000 hectares
in high value forest areas.16 The recommendations of the Technical Review Team contrasted sharply
with the policy options proposed by the April 2004 Independent Forest Sector Review (IFSR) funded by
DANIDA, DFID, SIDA, GTZ, and the World Bank. The IFSR recommended that the concession system
be closed, that the logging moratorium be continued, and that community forestry be supported.17
Economic Concessions and Land Encroachments in Northeast Cambodia
Ratanakiri
Efforts to establish economic concessions in Ratanakiri, although not always successful, involved
the takeover of large tracts of land used by indigenous people for swidden cultivation. Concessions for
growing mostly oil palm, coffee, and cashew nuts were located mainly on the rich volcanic red soils along
national road 78 near the market centers of Banlung and Bokeo districts and in the southern parts of O'
Chum and O Yadao districts. One project of particular interest was a huge oil palm plantation slated for
development in O Yadao district.
Approved by the Council of Ministers and the two Prime Ministers in 1995, the US$ 20.36 million
investment project for planting 20,000 hectares of oil palm and constructing a palm oil mill in O Yadao
district was a joint venture between two Cambodian companies, Rama Khmer International and
Mittapheap-Men Sarun, and a Malaysian partner, Globaltech Sdn. Bhd. Once completed, the concession
was to have affected the livelihoods of 4,500 people, mostly ethnic Jorai, living within the six communes
of the concession area.18
After early failures in oil palm production, the government reduced the concession area allocated
to the company from 20,000 hectares to 5,000 hectares in 1999. In 2000 the company harvested 60 tons
of coffee on 100 hectares of concession land but due to low prices the crop remained unsold in the
15
Global Witness Reports: Just Deserts for Cambodia; A Tug of War; The Credibility Gap; and Press Release, May
2004.
16
McKenney, Yim, Prom, and Evans, Focusing on Cambodia’s High Value Forests. The other two concessions
recommended for approval were Samrong Wood Industries and TPP Cambodia Timber Products.
17
In a further elaboration of its policy the World Bank acknowledged in October 2004 that logging concessions in
Cambodia had failed, although it did not directly endorse an end to the system. See Liam Cochrane, “World Bank
Admits Concessions Failed,” Phnom Penh Post, 22 October–4 November 2004 and Solana Pyne, “World Bank
Toughens Stand on Concessions,” The Cambodia Daily, 21 October 2004.
18
Sara Colm, Options for Land Security among Indigenous Communities, Ratanakiri, Cambodia, (Banlung,
Ratanakiri: Non-Timber Forest Products, 1997). See also Sara Colm, Effects of Oil Palm Plantation Development
on Indigenous Communities, Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia, Natural Resource Management Project, May 1996.
9
company's shed. At the time it was worth US$ 6,000 compared to the US$ 400,000 reportedly spent to
date on coffee plantation development.19
Despite the fact that most investors encountered difficulties in marketing their cash crops, efforts
to acquire land along national road 78 to the Vietnam border continued unabated. Indigenous villagers
were generally ill prepared to deal with the forces that drove the land market. Intimidation and fraud were
not uncommon in land acquisitions. In one noteworthy case a high-ranking military general in 1997
fraudulently obtained title to 1,250 hectares of land located in three villages of Bokeo district. After
several years of litigation the Prime Minister intervened and ordered the general to return the land to the
indigenous residents.
More than the large economic concessions, it was the proliferation of smaller cash crop farms
acquired by Khmer settlers from indigenous swidden cultivators that had more severe consequences for
highland people. Khmer in-migration in the 1990s was a factor that exacerbated land encroachments in
the province. Population growth from 1992 to 1998 was proportionally higher in Ratanakiri at 41 per cent
than in Cambodia as a whole, and proportionally higher in Banlung district at 82 per cent than in Phnom
Penh. In less than four years, from September 1996 to May 2000, the number of establishments in the
Banlug market increased by 77 per cent – a rapid growth in market activity. In the same period the
number of stores in the Bokeo district market along highway 78 increased by 110 per cent. To
supplement their earnings as market sellers, Banlug and Bokeo storeowners often invested in cash crop
production on farmlands acquired primarily from indigenous peoples in the province.
The passage of the Land Law in August 2001 made the sale of indigenous land illegal. Despite
this prohibition, a recent study conducted in Ratanakiri provided detailed documentation of extensive
sales and seizers of indigenous land throughout the province in direct contravention with the law.20 In
addition in Ratanakiri gem mining concessions were awarded in 2003 in Lumphat district (1,200
hectares) and in Bokeo district (1,600 hectares).21
Mondulkiri
From 1992 to 1998 the population of Mondulkiri increased by 51 per cent. This was due in part to
Khmer in-migration. Mondulkiri is the largest province in Cambodia and, despite rapid population
increases, has the lowest number of inhabitants. Still Khmer in-migration along the new road in Keo
Seima district posed a potential threat to surrounding Phnong villages in the form of land encroachments
for settlements, forest clearance for cash crops, and competition for resin trees. Similarly, Khmerinmigration in the capital town of Sen Monorum spurred market activity in wildlife trade and, more
recently, in land speculation with potentially adverse consequences for Phnong villagers.22 The Chinese
Wuzhishan L.S. Group requested a 200,000 hectare pine tree plantation in Ou Reang district with 10,000
hectares initially approved by the Council of Ministers. Clearing of land had already begun in late 2004
despite complaints from 2,000 Phnong residents in three villages.23
19
Jeremy Ironside and Sal Yuch, "Options for Upland Agricultural Development: Examples from Northern Thailand
and Oyadao District, Ratanakiri Province," Paper presented at the International Conference on Strengthening
Partnerships in Community Natural Resource Management, Ratanakiri Province, 6-8 March 2001.
20
Land Alienation from Indigenous Minority Communities in Ratanakiri. NGO Forum on Cambodia, November 2004.
21
Land Alienation from Indigenous Peoples in Cambodia: Statement by NGOs working closely with indigenous
people, October 2004.
22
Michael Coren, “Landgrabs Loom for Mondolkiri Minorities,” Phnom Penh Post, August 15-28, 2003.
23
Solana Pyne and Kuch Naren, “Clearing of Grasslands Igniting Villagers’ Anger,” The Cambodia Daily, 30
November 2004.
10
Indigenous Responses to Natural Resource Depletion
This section examines indigenous responses to natural resource depletion in three study areas.
The Ratanakiri research was conducted in the Tampuan villages of Kahoal in Andong Meas district and
Kamang in Borkeo district. The Mondulkiri research was undertaken in the Phnong communes of Dak
Dam in Ou Reang district and Srae Preah in Keo Seima district. The Kratie research was completed in
the Stieng villages of Mil and Thmar Hal Veal both in Snoul district (see Figure 1).
Tampuan Responses in Kahoal and Kamang Villages
Despite the rapid increase of market activity in the Ratanakiri capital of Banlung, the growth of the
Okop market in Andong Meas district had been slow, albeit steady. While store owners in Okop had
acquired land for cash crop production, this had not resulted in land sales in Kahoal village four
kilometers away. As of May 2000 none of the 67 households in Kahoal had sold land rights. Still the
reach of the market had been evident. Kahoal residents reported that Khmer buyers had come to the
village desiring to purchase land. Prices offered for one hectare of swidden land already cultivated
reportedly reached as high as 10 chis of gold (roughly $400). Prices for one hectare already cleared
reached up to four or five chis. And prices for one hectare of forest area not cleaned ranged from
100,000 to 200,000 riel (from about $25 to $50). The buyers did not make their offers through the village
chief or elders. They talked directly with individual villagers.
As a result of these inquiries, Kahoal villagers had started to form positions about land sales in
the village. The central position was that villagers did not have the right to sell their land. If an individual
household sold land without the knowledge of the others, that household would be forced to leave the
village and would not be allowed to open up new swidden plots in the village. A variation of this course of
action was that Kahoal villagers would not permit the buyer to cultivate the land. The villagers would force
the Tampuan occupant to remain on the land and to return the money from the land sale to the Khmer
buyer, even if this meant selling a buffalo or borrowing money from relatives. While Kahoal villagers had
yet to reach consensus on how to deal with those involved in land sales, they were in agreement that
communal rights took precedence in all land transactions. As the senior elder in the village stated
resolutely, "The land in the village is communal land. It should be used for communal purposes and not
for personal gain."
In contrast to Kahoal the rapid growth of the Bokeo market and district center had far reaching
effects on Kamang village. The transformation began in 1988 when the district center of Bokeo was
transfered to its present location along national road 78. According to Kamang village leaders,
government workers employed in Bokeo district started to cultivate farms along the national road within
the boundary of Kamang. Permission to cultivate these lands was given by a former district governor. No
permission was sought from, or given by, the Kamang villagers. When the government workers left the
district they sold the parcels they had acquired to Khmer buyers who planted them to cash crops. The
government workers who sold the first parcels were police officers. They claimed that the district had the
authority to allocate the lands to them. The Kamang villagers countered that the parcels were old
swidden plots under crop rotation. But there was little they could do to get them back.
Since the initial land sales along the road in the mid-1990s, the Khmer population of Bokeo town
center increased steadily along with the expansion of the Bokeo market. With large numbers of Khmer
migrants seeking to acquire land for the cultivation of cash crops, the pressure on Kamang villagers to
relinquish their land rights was severe. The land parcels most desired by the Khmer buyers were those
located along the road. These were easy to reach by motorbike and were directly accessible by transport
to either the Banlung market or the Vietnam border.
11
Figure 1. Map of Northeast Cambodia
12
According to the village development committee (VDC) chief of Kamang, amounts received for
the sale of land along the road were about 200,000 riel ($50) per hectare. In some instances land was
sold for as little as 50,000 riels ($12.50) per hectare. Some of the Khmer buyers bought parcels and then
extended them into areas they had not bought. Others occupied and cultivated land without paying for it.
Most of the land sales had been transacted in the three previous years and there were few parcels along
the road that were not already sold. Kamang villagers dealt independently with buyers and did not consult
with the village chief or elders about the details of their land sales. As a result, it was not precisely known
how many villagers were involved in land sales or how much land they had sold. The village chief
identified 35 of the 67 Kamang households as having sold land to Khmer buyers. The village chief, who
himself had sold one hectare of land in the interior of the village, argued that Kamang villagers with plots
along the road feared that their land would be taken free, if they did not sell it. This argument expressed
the sense of powerlessness and resignation that had come to characterize Kamang villagers in their
property dealings with Khmer people.
Decisions to sell land along the road were made individually by households without consultation
with the village chief, the elders, or the village as a whole. This eroded the communal approach to
decision-making that characterized Tampuan villages for ages. Most households that sold land along the
road were reluctant to admit it and harboured a sense of shame. Those who had not sold land resented
those who had. The narrative of one elder graphically illustrated the situation. The elder said that he
personally did not have the right to sell his land for in the past the Tampuan people had never sold land.
He likewise confided that he did not want other villagers speaking out against him, questioning why he
had sold land, and demanding to know where villagers would cultivate swidden crops in the future. The
elder was acutely aware of the resentment villagers held against those who had sold land. Only later did
the research team learn that this elder had been named by the village chief as someone who had sold
land.
Since the village chief had sold a parcel of his own land he was in no position to generate
communal resistance to other land sales. If anything, his participation in the land sales deepened
resentment. Nonetheless, a sense of resignation emerged among many Kamang villagers that they really
had no choice but to sell their land. True, the market pressure was formidable, but it also provided an
excuse for villagers to act in their own short-term interest rather than in the interest of the larger group.
Land sellers made small cash gains but they were left with feelings of self-pity and diminished selfrespect. Villagers could no longer trust each other to act in the communal interest. With households
acting on their own behalf, looking after their own immediate interest, it was difficult to foster communal
solidarity and cooperation.
While these individual transfers had taken productive land out of village control, they were small
compared with the sale of 100 hectares of communal land in the interior of the village. Much like the
negotiations over individual plots, the sale of the 100 hectares of Kamang communal land in late 1999
and early 2000 was done without the full consultation of all village residents. The transactions started
when police officers came to the village with an offer to purchase the land. They claimed that they
represented a police commander from Banlung and that they had already discussed the matter with the
village chief. The buyer was reportedly willing to pay $50 per hectare or $5,000 for the entire 100
hectares. Subsequently, two officials from the provincial land title office traveled to Bokeo and called the
village chief to the district headquarters to receive payment for the land. The village chief objected saying
that he could not receive the money alone. Eventually a group of five village leaders, which included the
VDC chief but excluded the three village elders, went to the district headquarters to collect the payment.
At the district office the two provincial officials offered them $2,500 for the 100 hectares. The officials
reportedly told them that if they did not accept the money, the land would be taken free. The distrist
authorities advised them to take the money.
13
While the village chief and VDC chief insisted that everyone in the village agreed to the sale of the
100 hectares, this indeed was not the case. Several villagers remarked that they learned about the land
sale only after it had been concluded. Only one of the three village elders expressed agreement with the
sale of the 100 hectares. This elder belonged to the extended family of the VDC chief. The two other
elders were not in agreement with the land sale and resented the fact that they were excluded from the
deliberations and decision making. One elder expressed his objections this way, "People in Kamang will
encounter difficulties if they continue to sell land, for the land is becoming smaller and smaller and the
population is getting bigger and bigger. If the land sales continue, future generations will have no land to
cultivate their crops. How will they survive?"
The sale of the 100-hectare plot of interior land further eroded communal decision-making in the
village. The provincial buyer worked through government agents, who in turn worked through the village
chief. The village chief relied on a small group of village men and effectively excluded the elders. As
members of the negotiating team the village chief and VDC chief insisted that they acted in the best
interests of the village. But by excluding the elders and the village as a whole from the decision-making
process, they deepened mistrust and resentment among many villagers. The situation appeared beyond
remedy. The Kamang villagers were unable to rely on their own resources to deal effectively with the
forces that were driving the land market. At the same time they were unable to depend on the commune
and district officials for assistance.
Phnong Responses in Dak Dam and Srae Preah Communes
Logging of Mondulkiri forests diminished natural resources in both Dak Dam and Srae Preah,
communes although the immediate impact was felt more severely in Srae Preah than in Dak Dam due to
the loss of resin trees.
In Dak Dam commune villagers from Pou Less, Pou Chob, and Pou Ontreng observed that forest
cover had steadily declined in the commune since their return from Khmer Rouge resettlement in Koh
Nhek district in the 1980s. The most severe drop occurred after 1998. The Phnong villagers attributed the
loss of timber resources mainly to the operations of the Khmer Construction Company in the late 1990s,
illegal logging by people with chainsaws, and the building of homes to accommodate the growing
commune population.
Dak Dam villagers reported that the Khmer Construction Company represented itself as a legal
entity that had a contract with the government. Early on, company representatives convened a meeting
with the villagers and told them that they could benefit from the logging operations. The officials
encouraged the Phnong to cut and sell logs to the company, and several of them did just that. Village
residents, both men and women, were also hired at $10 per month to work at the company sawmill. By
the time they closed their operations, the company had cut and left a large number of logs in the forest.
Villagers noticed that illegal loggers later came into the commune and hauled this timber away.
Illegal logging in Dak Dam was conducted on a large-scale. Villagers remembered that truck
convoys use to pass through the commune bringing logs across the border into Vietnam. The illegal
loggers were armed and at times accompanied by border police and soldiers from Ou Reang district. In
recent years the once rampant illegal export of logs to Vietnam had been considerably contained.
Nevertheless, some illegal logging ventures still continued. Villagers mentioned that people from Sen
Monorum sometimes logged at night using trucks to transport the timber. Provincial officials, too, had
reportedly made requests for wood to build homes. Within the commune a few households had
chainsaws and still cut logs for sale. Officially, Dak Dam villagers were not allowed to cut trees to build
houses. But as long as they used handsaws commune officials did not object.
14
In Srae Preah commune Phnong villagers in Pou Kong, Ochra, Pou Ya, Gati, Srae Ampil, and
Srae Preah delineated a decline in timber resources and linked this directly to logging activities. In
several Srae Preah villages large-scale logging was carried out from about 1993 to 1996 by members of
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) working in collusion with Vietnamese loggers. In Pou Kong
villagers remembered the Khmer soldiers telling them, "The trees belong to the government. We are the
government." While some villagers resisted the felling of their resin trees, they soon realized that district
officials would not support their protests.
In 1997 and 1998 the Samling company, whose concession covered most, if not all, of Srae
Preah, accelerated the pace of logging in the commune cutting down large resin trees as part of their
operations. When villagers protested the cutting of their resin trees, the loggers often replied derisively,
"Why do you complain? We are not cutting the tapping hole of the resin tree. We are cutting above the
tapping hole." Since armed guards protected the Samling loggers, the villagers could do little to prevent
their resin trees from being cut. Villagers present when their resin trees were felled received 5,000 riels
($1.25) per tree. Others received no compensation at all. In Gati resin tappers protested by seizing the
chainsaws of the company and bringing them to the district center. During a meeting shortly after with the
district governor, Samling officials promised the protesters that the cutting of resin trees would stop. The
Gati villagers relented but the cutting of resin trees continued.
By the time Samling ceased its operations in early 1999, the loss of resin trees in Srae Preah
commune had severely affected the incomes of most local inhabitants. Key informants interviewed
reportedly lost anywhere from 20 to 80 trees; one Khmer tapper in Srae Ampil village lost 600 trees.
Estimates of average resin tree losses in the six villages were around 50 per cent. These estimates were
higher than those of a recent study conducted by the Wildlife Conservation Society which recorded a 20
percent resin tree loss in Pou Ya and a 26 percent resin tree loss in Gati.24 But by any of these measures
the losses were severe. One villager in Pou Kong observed, "If the forest is destroyed, my life and the life
of my family will also be destroyed." A widow with three dependent children in Gati lamented, "My resin
trees provide the rice in my rice pot. They are my family's major source of income." Another villager in
Pou Ya expressed this concern, "Our children are increasing but not the number of our resin trees." By
the mid to late 1990s resin tappers had staked ownership claims to almost all of the large resin trees
found in Srae Preah commune. As a consequence households were not able to offset the losses incurred
from logging by expanding resin tapping into new areas. In several villages resin tappers sought to
compensate by making more than one hole in their resin trees. Small immature resin trees were also
tapped although the quantity and quality of the resin they produced was low. Commune residents also
linked low rice yields resulting from soil erosion and droughts to deforestation.
Stieng Responses in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal Villages
From 1960 to 1975 forest resources were plentiful in Kratie’s Mil village. Stieng villagers reported
that timber was abundant during this period as were rattan, honey, medicinal plants, vegetables and
fruits. Wildlife, including tigers and elephants, inhabited surrounding forests. Villagers also had ample
lands to clear for paddy rice and swidden cultivation. The soil was fertile, rains were regular, and rice
yields were enough for household consumption. Under the Khmer Rouge regime Mil settlers were forced
out of the village to work for the revolutionary government in another area of Khsim commune. Since the
Khmer Rouge focused its efforts on irrigated rice cultivation, forest areas remained largely untouched.
24
Tom D. Evans, Hout Piseth, Phet Phaktra, and Hang Mary, A Study of Resin-Tapping and Livelihoods in Southern
Mondulkiri, Cambodia, with Implications for Conservation and Forest Management, (Phnom Penh: Wildlife
Conservation Society, 2003).
15
Under the Vietnamese supported governments of the 1980s the population of Mil increased as did
the exploitation of forest resources. In Mil settlers returning to the village cut timber for houses, cleared
forests for cultivation, collected forest foods and products, trapped wild animals, and fished in nearby
rivers and streams. The growing needs of villagers increased the level of forest exploitation but not to an
unsustainable extent. By contrast, logging activities controlled by military and police ushered in a rapid
decline of forest resources. In an attempt to counter the deleterious effects of logging the Snoul Wildlife
Sanctuary, which encompassed Mil village, was established in 1993 by Royal Decree under the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Environment.
From the 1993 national election to the present forest resources in Mil suffered a severe decline as
the Samling concession and illegal entities conducted major logging operations in Snoul district, including
areas located within the wildlife sanctuary. In Mil the loss of resin trees that resulted from Samling’s
operations substantially reduced the cash incomes of many villagers. This occurred precisely at the time
when Mil villagers were coming to terms with the expanding market economy. Loss of income from resin
trees reduced the buying power of villagers and led to increased sales of rice, which undermined
consumption. Meanwhile forest foods except for bamboo shoots became more difficult to find. Wildlife
also became scarce as game moved further into the forests. Fish supplies were depleted as villagers and
outsiders resorted to illegal practices to catch fish. Villagers reported that in recent years deforestation
had caused floods and soil erosion and that soil fertility had declined.
In an effort to counter the decline of natural resources in Mil and two nearby villages, the
residents established a community protected area of 2,459 hectares within the wildlife sanctuary in March
2004 with the approval of the Ministry of Environment. The impetus for the protected area came from the
Cambodian NGO Satrey Santepheap Daoembei Parethan (SSP) or Women of Peace for the
Environment. The people were given the obligation to monitor and protect the area, and to report any
illegal operations that took place inside it. The villagers with the permission of the committee were
allowed to collect non-timber forest products for family use and to cut timber for community purposes.
They were likewise permitted to gather resin under instructions provided by the Ministry of Environment.
They were not allowed to clear and expand farm areas, to trap or hunt wildlife, to cut trees for poles,
fuelwood, or charcoal, and to engaged in illegal fishing practices. This limited opportunities to expand
farmland particularly as the status of the adjacent Samling concession remained unclear.
From 1960 to 1975 forest laws in Thmar Hal Veal village were respected and only old logs were
cut for timber. Forest foods were also plentiful. Wildlife such as rabbits, musk deer, large lizards, wild
chickens and pigs roamed close to the village and their sounds could be heard from inside houses.
Villagers had easy access to land for paddy rice farming and cleared forest areas for swidden. In Thmar
Hal Veal villagers were also displaced under the rule of the Khmer Rouge. At the same time, the closed
borders with Vietnam precluded the trade of forest products, which minimized forest destruction.
In Thmar Hal Veal settlers likewise returned to the village after the Khmer Rouge era to rebuild
their lives. Similarly, in the 1980s the population of Thmar Hal Veal increased, as did the exploitation of
forest resources. The growing population cleared forests for cultivation and cut trees for house
construction. Villagers gathered forest food and forests products, and trapped wild game. As Vietnamese
traders came across the border to buy forest products and wildlife, an incentive grew to exploit forest
resources beyond the needs of consumption. The local cutting of logs for sale to Vietnamese
businessmen proved particularly destructive. Decimated forests reduced shelters for animals and the
abundance of forest foods.
In Thmar Hal Veal forest resources from 1993 to the present were seriously depleted by Samling
operations and by illegal logging controlled by military and police. Thmar Hal Veal’s proximity to the
Vietnam border made it particularly vulnerable to illegal logging activities. Even in recent years after the
16
logging ban was issued, illegal logging continued with border guards acting in collusion with Vietnamese
loggers. Increasingly the villagers from Thmar Hal Veal found it more and more difficult to find timber for
their own homes and began to construct their houses mainly with thatch. The gathering of forest food and
products, and the trapping of wild game became more infrequent and less critical to everyday
subsistence. Fish resources were virtually exhausted by illegal practices. While villagers took no steps to
reverse the decline of forest resources, the Provincial Department of Rural Development (PDRD) with
support from the World Food Program (WFP) constructed a US$ 120,000 reservoir in the village in 2003
to increase the production of paddy rice. Although the long-term benefits of the reservoir could offset the
losses in forest income, its immediate contribution to increased agricultural productivity remained unclear.
At the same time, the construction of the Samling road through the village opened up the area to further
incursions.
In contrast to Mil, the depletion of forest resources in Thmar Hal Veal had left the villagers
despondent and immobilized. When staff from the Provincial Department of the Environment requested
the help of Thmar Hal Veal villagers to reforest degraded areas, the village leaders replied, “Let those
who cut the trees, replant the trees.” Without support from NGOs promoting community forestry and
government officials acting to ensure the enforcement of community statutes, it was unlikely that Thmar
Hal Veal villagers would take active steps to reverse the decline. Illegal logging backed by powerful
actors was just too pervasive in the area.
Livelihood Strategies
Despite the natural resource depletion that had occurred in the study areas, indigenous residents
were still largely dependent on land and forest resources to sustain their livelihoods. This was true even
for sites near market centers.
Tampuan Strategies in Kahoal and Kamang Villages
Despite the fact that Kahoal was relatively more remote than Kamang, and more removed from
the exigencies of Khmer in-migration and the land market, the livelihood strategies documented in each
village were more similar than different (Table 1). All sample households were involved in swidden
cultivation. Few Kahoal households and no Kamang households cultivated wetland rice. Pig and chicken
raising were undertaken by more households in Kahoal than in Kamang, although half of the Kamang
sample raised chickens and slightly more raised pigs. Gathering food from the forest, hunting and fishing
were practiced by a large majority of households in both villages. By contrast, neither the making and
selling of goods nor the buying and selling of goods enjoyed wide appeal in either village. Wage work
was very common in Kamang and much less so in Kahoal, although more than two-fifths of the Kahoal
sample earned from it.
Despite the rapid growth of the market economy Kahoal and Kamang households remained
essentially subsistence swidden cultivators who supplemented their livelihoods by gathering, hunting and
fishing. The numerous sales of land rights in Kamang had yet to transform the basic livelihood structure
in the village. Still, since most of the land sold laid fallow under crop rotation, the long-term effects of the
land transfers had yet to be fully appreciated. Similarly, the consequences of opening up forest areas for
cultivation had yet to be felt on the sustainable yields of food gathered and hunted. Meanwhile, proximity
to the market notwithstanding, few Kamang households had become entrepreneurs or traders. While a
large number of Kamang households earned from wage work this was largely seasonal farm labor. As
expected, Kahoal households were predominantly engaged in swidden cultivation and gathering, hunting
and fishing. More noteworthy, many Kahoal households raised chickens and pigs for sale to Khmer
17
middlemen who regularly visited the village. Also remarkable was the number of Kahoal households that
earned from wage work, although this, too, was mostly short-term farm labor.
Table 1. Livelihood Strategies by Household*
Ratanakiri, May 2000
Mondulkiri, Nov. 2002 –
Jan. 2003
Kahoal
Kamang
Dak Dam
Srae Preah
Village
Village
Commune
Commune
Swidden
Cultivation
Wetland Rice
Cultivation
Pig Raising
Chicken Raising
Duck Raising
Gathering Forest
Food
Gathering Other
Forest Products
Hunting
or
Trapping
Fishing
Making and Selling
Goods
Buying and Selling
Goods
Wage Work
Kratie, June 2004
Mil
Village
34
34
64
61
21
Thmar Hal
Veal
Village
44
6
0
3
43
54
44
27
29
**
33
22
17
**
34
59
63
22
60
54
68
10
69
40
47
**
49
39
44
**
44
**
**
57
71
55
40
27
28
45
52
11
9
33
7
27
9
60
28
69
23
53
4
32
0
2
5
9
13
5
1
14
28
36
31
19
37
n=34
n=34
n=65
n=74
n=59
n=61
*Survey results are based on a 50 per cent random sample of households in Kahoal and Kamang
villages, a 25 per cent random sample of village households in Dak Dam and Srae Preah communes,
and a purposive sample of Stieng households in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal villages.
**Specific questions for these strategies were not included in the survey.
Phnong Strategies in Dak Dam and Srae Preah Communes
Household livelihoods in Dak Dam and Srae Preah communes were supported by a multiplicity of
productive activities (Table 1). Almost all sample households in Dak Dam and a large number of sample
households in Srae Preah were involved in swidden agriculture. While few households cultivated wetland
or paddy rice in the uplands of Dak Dam, more than half of the households in the lower areas of Srae
Preah did so. Raising pigs and chickens were prominent in both communes. Of note, gathering food and
other products from the forest, and hunting and trapping were practiced by a large majority of households
in both communes. This underscored the importance of forest resources in the lives of the local people.
Fishing was likewise prevalent in the two communes. By comparison, neither the making and selling of
goods nor the buying and selling of goods were pursued by large numbers of residents in either area.
Wage work was somewhat more common in Dak Dam than in Srae Preah but not among the leading
livelihood strategies in either commune.
In Dak Dam and Srae Preah communes average cash values of household income in the past
year were also computed (Table 2). This provides some indication of the relative importance of various
strategies in sustaining household livelihoods.
18
Table 2. Average Cash Values of Household Income in Past Year (in riels)*
November 2002-January 2003**
Dak Dam Commune
Srae Preah Commune
Swidden rice
193,292
10.3%
87,986
4.2%
Swidden crops (other than rice)
271,585
14.5%
160,816
7.6%
Wet land (paddy) rice
4,615
0.2%
259,297
12.3%
Pigs raised
242,308
12.9%
211,149
10.0%
Chickens raised
65,077
3.5%
58,784
2.8%
Ducks raised
7,692
0.4%
2,567
0.1%
Food gathered from the forest
46,769
2.5%
42,239
2.0%
Other products gathered
252,376
13.5%
870,799
41.2%
from the forest
(34,415 liquid resin)
(600,845 liquid resin)
Animals hunted or trapped
527,405
28.2%
133,755
6.3%
Fish caught
32,412
1.7%
51,342
2.4%
Goods made and sold
40,708
2.2%
35,270
1.7%
Goods bought and sold
26,069
1.4%
67,635
3.2%
Wage work
161,323
8.6%
132,486
6.3%
Total
1,871,631
99.9%
2,114,125
100.1%
n = 65
n = 74
*4,000 riels equal one US dollar.
**Data were collected during this period.
Note: Percentages do not add up to 100% due to rounding.
Comparing household income shares by source in the two communes reveals noticeable
differences and similarities in the household income structures. The Dak Dam sample households
received the largest shares of their income from hunting and trapping, and from swidden cultivation. By
contrast, the Srae Preah sample households received the largest shares of their income from forest
gathering (particularly resin tapping), and from wetland rice cultivation. Despite these differences, the
importance of forest and land resources in the lives of the people from both communes was clear (see
Figure 2).
Figure 2. Household Income Shares by Source
November 2002 – January 2003
Dak Dam
Fishing
1.7%
Fo rest
p ro d uct s,
hunt ing ,
t rap p ing
4 4 .2 %
Sr ae Pr e ah
Hand icraf t ,
t rad e, w ag e
w o rk
12 .2 %
C ult ivat ing
cro p s
2 5.1%
Livest o ck
and p o ult ry
raising
16 .8 %
Fishing
2 .4 %
Fo rest
p ro d uct s,
hunt ing ,
t rap p ing
4 9 .5%
Hand icraf t ,
t rad e, w ag e
w o rk
11.1%
C ult ivat ing
cro p s
2 4 .0 %
Livest o ck and
p o ult ry raising
12 .9 %
19
Notably, the incidence of poverty in both communes was high. In a report published by the RGC
and the World Food Programme (WFP) in March 2003 the poverty line for rural areas in Cambodia was
set at 1,036 riels per capita per day, which amounts to 378,140 riels per capita per year. In Dak Dam 35
or 54 per cent of the 65 sample households fell below this poverty line. In Srae Preah 47 or 63 per cent of
the 74 sample households likewise fell below this mark. These incidences of poverty were considerably
higher than the 40.1 per cent of rural households in Cambodia considered to be below the poverty line by
the RGC Ministry of Planning in 1999.
Stieng Strategies in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal Villages
Livelihood strategies in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal reflect similar although somewhat diverging
patterns (Table 1). Nearly all the sample households in both villages were involved in crop cultivation.
However in Mil the emphasis was on paddy rice cultivation, with swidden cultivation a secondary pursuit
for less than half of the households. In Thmar Hal Veal paddy rice and swidden cultivation were
undertaken by equal numbers of sample households with some families involved in both. Raising pigs
and chickens were important in both villages. Despite the decline of forest resources gathering food and
other products from the forest were still practiced by a large majority of Mil households, and by a smaller
majority of Thmar Hal Veal households. Hunting was not reported by many households in either village
although this may be due in part to the fact that it was illegal. Fishing was very prominent in Mil and much
less so in Thmar Hal Veal. By contrast, neither the making and selling of goods nor the buying and selling
of goods were embraced by many households in either village. Wage work was decidedly more common
in Thmar Hal Veal than in Mil with more than half of the Thmar Hal Veal sample earning from this source.
Market Participation
Overall, indigenous households in the study areas were very much integrated into the market
economy. Large numbers of the households sampled bought and sold cash crops, livestock, forest
products, wildlife, and even their labor. These transactions allowed them to buy rice in periods of annual
shortfalls and to purchase manufactured goods for everyday use. At the same time indigenous villagers
interacted selectively with the market and transformations of indigenous life ways occurred unevenly.
Tampuan Buying and Selling in Kahoal and Kamang Villages
In general, Kamang households were more involved in buying and selling than Kahoal
households (Table 3). Large numbers of Kamang households sold swidden crops and worked for wages.
This was due primarily to their proximity to the Bokeo market and the Khmer-operated cash crop farms
along the road. The number of households in Kamang selling forest products was unexpectedly higher
than those selling rice, pigs or cattle. This indicated that Kamang villagers still harvested forest resources
and that a market for forest products thrived in Bokeo.
Considering the distance of Kahoal to market centers, relatively large numbers of households in
the sample were involved in buying and selling. This became more intelligible when one took into account
the frequent visits of Khmer traders to the village to buy chickens, pigs, wildlife, and black sesame. Work
done on farms opened up by two Khmer soldiers explained in large part the high number of Kahoal
households that worked for wages. Low rice yields in Kahoal similarly accounted for the high number of
households that bought rice. The fact that households in both villages bought as well as sold products
indicated a level of integration into the cash economy.
20
Table 3. Buying and Selling by Household*
Ratanakiri, May 2000
Mondulkiri, Nov. 2002 –
Kratie, June 2004
Jan. 2003
Kahoal
Kamang
Dak Dam
Srae Preah
Mil Village
Thmar Hal
Village
Village
Commune
Commune
Veal Village
Land
Labor
Rice
Cash
Crops
Cattle/
Buffalo
Pigs
Forest
Products
Wildlife
Bght
1
***
15
12
Sold
0
14
6
16
Bght
0
***
12
12
Sold
4**
28
12
22
Bght
3
9
61
32
Sold
0
36
6
49
Bght
13
15
69
49
Sold
1
31
5
24
Bght
6
21
42
28
Sold
0
19
25
14
Bght
6
13
46
22
Sold
2
37
11
8
5
3
2
6
9
19
13
28
10
24
9
5
14
3
11
11
17
10
10
15
29
18
34
49
39
20
23
67
29
6
27
25
21
11
24
11
***
***
***
***
18
37
26
30
34
5
23
0
n=34
n=34
n=65
n=74
n=59
n=61
* Survey results are based on a 50 per cent random sample of households in Kahoal and Kamang
villages, a 25 per cent random sample of village households in Dak Dam and Srae Preah communes, and
a purposive sample of Stieng households in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal villages. Data for the buying and
selling of land includes the past five years, while data for the buying and selling of all other items includes
only the past year.
**Only four of the sample households in Kamang acknowledged that they had sold land. However, when
asked to identify households in the village that had sold land the village chief included 19 households in
the sample.
***Specific questions for these items were not included in the survey.
Despite the rapid growth of the market economy the decision-making practices of husbands and
wives in buying and selling in both villages remained largely intact. In keeping with long-standing
practices, decisions about buying and selling goods of great value were made collectively by husbands
and wives. While husbands usually interacted more directly with Khmer traders, they did not conclude
agreements of substantial worth without the consent of their wives. This was evident in the buying and
selling of livestock such as cows and pigs, and the selling of high-value crops such as rice and sesame.
In trading goods of lesser value, husband and wives operated more independently. Women acted on
their own to sell chickens they had raised, forest products they had gathered, and swidden crops of low
cash value.
Of note, rather high numbers of households in both villages sold cash crops and forest products.
This underlied the importance of sustainable natural resources in their lives. Diminished yields from
swidden plots, forests, and rivers would undercut their returns from the market. At the same time,
increased sales of food cultivated or gathered for the purchase of manufactured goods could undermine
nutrition and good health. Wage work was high in Kamang and relatively so even in Kahoal. But the
returns on wage work were generally low and infrequent. By comparison, labour exchange on swidden
plots was practiced by more households in each village, and swidden cultivation remained the
predominant source of livelihood. While the market economy had made inroads in Kamang and Kahoal
and residents had participated accordingly, it had yet to transform a majority of villagers into anything
other than subsistence cultivators.
21
Phnong Buying and Selling in Dak Dam and Srae Preah Communes
While the market economy had made inroads in both Dak Dam and Srae Preah, it had affected
sectors unevenly. To illustrate, the buying and selling of land by residents was practically non-existent in
the two communes to this point. At the same time land speculators had begun to make claims to land in
Dak Dam unbeknown to the commune residents. Working for wages was more common than hiring for
wages but neither was especially pronounced in either area. By comparison, the buying of rice in both
communes was high, while the selling of rice was extremely low. In Dak Dam more households sold, than
bought, cash crops while in Srae Preah the pattern was reversed. The buying and selling of pigs was
practiced by about half of the households in both communes, and the trade in cattle or buffaloes by
somewhat less. The selling of forest products was very high in Srae Preah and slightly less in Dak Dam.
At the same time, the selling of wildlife was higher in Dak Dam than in Srae Preah.
Current trends in buying and selling revealed market forces at work in the two areas. The logging
of forests did not require ownership of property and did little to stimulate the land market. However, road
construction led to increased in-migration in Sen Monorom provincial town and Keo Seima district centers
with incidences of land grabbing already evident in Dak Dam although yet to be documented in Srae
Preah. While increased market activity in Sen Monorum and Keo Seima centers did not give rise to wage
work opportunities for local residents, the growing populations of these areas did create more demand for
crops and livestock. Low rice yields resulted in rice shortages and the need for local farmers to buy rice.
The market for liquid resin in Vietnam spurred high sales of this forest product from Srae Preah. The
market for wildlife supported trade in wild game particularly in Dak Dam where conservation regulations
were less stringently enforced.
Stieng Buying and Selling in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal Villages
Rather interestingly, the patterns of buying and selling in Mil and Thmar Hal Veal were generally
more similar than different, although trends specific to each village were evident. The land market had yet
to emerge in either of the two villages, although residential lots along the Samling road in Thmar Hal Veal
were beginning to be sold to Khmer people. In Mil households hired other villagers to expand their rice
fields, while in Thmar Hal Veal the hiring of farm labor was less common. By contrast, households in
Thmar Hal Veal took advantage of more opportunities in wage work. In both villages, the large numbers
of households that bought rice reflected rice shortages. In Mil, more so than in Thmar Hal Veal, rice was
sold to buy goods. Rather surprisingly in the two predominantly farming villages, more households
bought cash crops than sold them. The trade of cattle and buffaloes was much higher in Mil than in
Thmar Hal Veal, while the buying and selling of pigs was more equal. Situated in the community
protected area of the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary, it was not surprising that more households in Mil sold
forest products. At the same time, the high numbers of households in both villages that bought wildlife
indicated that a market for wild game flourished in Snoul district.
Cumulative Effects of Market Expansion
While indigenous groups in the study areas embraced many of the opportunities brought about by
the market economy their lack of tenure security over land and forest resources made them vulnerable to
further incursions. The cumulative effects of market expansion in the study areas are briefly noted before
examining the legal framework that has emerged to address the issue nationwide.
22
Effects in Ratanakiri’s Kahoal and Kamang Villages
The experiences of Kahoal and Kamang documented in this study are instructive for both
development practitioners and policy makers. Clearly the expansion of the market economy had far
reaching consequences for both villages, with the long-term effects still yet unknown. It would be unfair,
though, to state that the market economy produced only disastrous outcomes in the two villages. In both
Kahoal and Kamang villagers showed themselves eager to participate in the benefits brought about by
the growth of local markets. By raising pigs and chickens, by cultivating cash crops like black seasame,
and by hunting wildlife like squirrels and python villagers were able to barter or buy manufactured goods
they desired. By working for daily wages now and again, villagers were also able to supplement their
livelihoods. By living close to roads and district centers villagers, too, were able to take advantage of
development projects introduced by the government and NGOs. The changes brought about by improved
roads and expanded trade were not all detrimental to the valued lifeways of the indigenous people.
This noted, market forces operating in Ratanakiri province demonstrated nonetheless the
potential to drastically undermine the well-being of indigenous communities. This was dramatically
highlighted in the experience of Kamang. Here the market economy, particularly the land market,
seriously eroded local governance structures and communal solidarity. Sales of land rights in the village
not only diminished natural resources necessary for sustaining livelihoods, they also debilitated cultural
and social resources needed to deal with the exigencies of change itself. By comparision, the experience
of Kahoal illustrated how a village, while collectively resisting land sales, was able to build capable local
governance structures and maintain communal cooperation.
Effects in Mondulkiri’s Dak Dam and Srae Preah Communes
Despite the destruction of forest resources through concession and illegal logging and
unregulated hunting in Dak Dam and Srae Preah communes, the largely indigenous Phnong inhabitants
of these areas remained largely dependent on forest resources for their subsistence. The adaptation to
the decline in natural resource had essentially been to subsist on less and to exploit the further limits of
their diminished resource base. This led to intensive hunting in Dak Dam and the tapping of young resin
trees in Srae Preah. Losses of income from forest resources placed greater importance on the cultivation
of crops and the raising of livestock and poultry. But decreases in soil fertility and irregular rainfall linked
to deforestation limited the potential of crop production. Market demand for cash crops such as cashew
nuts had also been less than expected. Meanwhile increased market activity had not transformed the
local residents into entrepreneurs or traders nor had it provided them with remunerative and sustained
opportunities in wage work.
Given the inward direction of household subsistence strategies and the lack of viable short-term
alternatives, access and control over natural resources remained critical. A resumption of logging
activities in either commune would be devastating for local communities but especially for the resintapping households in Srae Preah. With almost all resin trees currently tapped in Srae Preah commune,
households would not be able to offset future losses from logging by expanding into new areas. Already
diminished levels of income and food security would be reduced even further. As documented above 54
per cent of the Dak Dam sample households and 63 per cent of the Srae Preah households already fell
below the poverty line, compared to 40 per cent of all rural households in Cambodia.
Effects in Kratie’s Mil and Thmar Hal Veal Villages
The legally sanctioned operations of the Samling concession and the illegal logging activities
perpetuated by military and police forces had devastating consequences for villages in Snoul district. The
experiences of Mil and Thmar Hal Veal villages revealed a downward trend in the quality of their resource
23
bases and the sufficiency of their resources. This decline had exacerbated the incidence of poverty in
both villages. But although natural resources had diminished in both areas, villagers remained dependent
on land and forest resources for their subsistence.
To some extent, Mil village located in the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary had responded more creatively
to the challenge of resource management in a highly contested forest area. By forming supportive links
with NGOs and the Ministry of the Environment, Mil villagers were able to establish a community
protected area within the sanctuary. They also had the strong support of some district officials.25 This
enabled them to deal more effectively with the threat of illegal logging and to impede the further
deterioration of their natural environment. In Mil forest gathering and fishing were still important livelihood
pursuits. At the same time, constraints on the expansion of agricultural land made their prospects for
improved livelihoods and quality of life uncertain.
By contrast, Thmar Hal Veal village located within the forest concession along the Samling road
and near the Vietnam border had not been able to respond proactively to the ongoing decline of their
natural resource base. Thmar Hal Veal villagers lacked contacts with NGOs and government officials,
needed to effectively counter the endemic illegal logging in the area. As a consequence, the downward
slide in the quality of their natural resource base was likely to continue. The recent construction of a
reservoir in Thmar Hal Veal held promise for the expansion of paddy rice cultivation in the village. But the
capacity of the reservoir to provide sufficient water supplies remained unclear, as did the effects of forest
decline on the levels of rainfall and conditions of soil erosion. Meanwhile, Thmar Hal Veal's location along
the Samling road made it vulnerable to future encroachment by Khmer settlers and traders.
The Emerging Legal Framework
While indigenous groups in northeast Cambodia struggle to adapt to the rapid depletion of their
natural resource base, progressive legislation enacted in recent years provides a legal framework for
preventing further decline. Of paramount importance, the Land Law promulgated on 30 August 2001
enables indigenous communities to gain collective title to traditional land, understood to include
residential land, agricultural land, and land kept in reserve as part of traditional swidden cultivation.
Importantly, the Land Law protects the rights of indigenous communities to use and manage their lands
even before they have been recognized and granted collective titles. As such sales of indigenous land
since the promulgation of the law are deemed illegal. While the issuance of communal titles prohibits
individual and communal land sales, it does allow for individual possession rights under community
ownership. This is consistent with traditional allocation of use rights to individuals and families.
In 2003 the Ministry of Land Management Urban Planning and Construction (MLMUPC) initiated
pilot land titling activities in two indigenous villages of Ratanakiri province and one indigenous village of
Mondulkiri province. Procedural issues which have arisen in this process will be addressed in a Subdecree drafted in early 2005 to clarify the provisions contained in the law.26 One important point under
discussion is whether communal land titling should maximize the level of detail and the amount of
exclusions or whether it should be undertaken for a single large area of community land which would
25
McKenney, Chea, Prom, and Evans, Focusing on Cambodia’s High Value Forests, argue that there is a need to
identify community forestry “patrons” within government who can ensure tenure security and the enforcement of
community forest rules.
26
See Jeremy Ironside, Summary of Issues Coming Out of the Land Use Planning Activities on Le-in Village,
Toeurn Commune, Kon Mum District, Ratanakiri Province, 20 January 2004 and Jeremy Ironside, An Overview of
Mapping Issues and Process for Implementing Indigenous Land Titling in Ratanak Kiri Province, Cambodia,
Seila/PLG Project, March 2004.
24
include small forest areas, small farms, and cash crop areas. In the latter instance individual rights would
be given under the community by-laws rather than under the land law and communal land titling would
proceed more expeditiously for a greater number of indigenous communities. Meanwhile, steps have
been taken to update the General Policy for Indigenous and Highland Peoples Development drafted by
the Inter-Ministerial Committee in 1997. Government adoption of this policy would help to guide
legislation on implementing indigenous land rights registration.
Efforts to develop and implement the indigenous land provisions of the 2001 Land Law have
involved the participation of indigenous peoples. In 1999 indigenous leaders consulted on the proposed
Law considered communal land titling more in keeping with traditional land use practice than individual
titling. In September 2004, during a National Forum of Indigenous People convened in Kompong Speu
province, indigenous representatives from 11 different groups reiterated their preference for communal
titles. In September 2004 villagers from the two pilot sites in Ratanakiri province unanimously voted for
communal title. In November 2004 indigenous people from the provinces of Kompong Thom, Oddar
Meanchy, Banteay Meanchay, Siem Reap, and Preah Vihear, at a Regional Forum held in Kompong
Thom, expressed strong support for communal land titling which respected individual user rights under
collective ownership. On its part the MLMUPC formed an inter-ministerial National Taskforce in March
2004 to coordinate the work in the three pilot villages, and to oversee the development of the Sub-decree
for communal land titling. Importantly, NGOs and international organizations have likewise acted as
agents in promoting indigenous law reform in Cambodia. 27
While communal land titling under the 2001 Land Law provides a legal basis for curtailing land
encroachments in indigenous communities, the Forestry Law promulgated on 31 August 2002 reaffirms
the protection of resin tapping contained in the 1988 Forestry Law. In clear contravention with the
practice of logging concessions operating before the moratorium, the law prohibits the cutting of trees
that local communities have tapped to extract resin for customary use. In addition the Sub-decree on
Community Forestry Management approved by the Council of Ministers on 17 October 2003 enables
local communities to enter into Community Forest Agreements with the Forestry Administration for a
period of 15 years. These lease agreements place the management of forest resources under the
domain of local communities.28 Since tenure security of land and forest resources are inextricably linked
for indigenous people, it makes sense to undertake communal land titling with indigenous communities
concurrently with the development of community forestry agreements.29
Conclusions
While the emergence of progressive and comprehensive legislation has helped help to provide a
legal framework for redressing land encroachment and forest destruction in indigenous communities, it
will at best supply only a partial solution to the problem. In 2004 numerous cases of illegal land sales and
land grabbing were identified in Ratanakiri and Mondulkiri.30 The judicial system in Cambodia needs to be
strengthened considerably before it can guarantee adequate protection for indigenous people under the
law. This means that indigenous communities must empower themselves and advocate for their own
27
Indira Simbolon, Access to Land of Highland Indigenous Minorities: Plural Property Rights and Law Reform in
Cambodia, Paper presented to the Workshop on Indigenous Peoples and Communal Land Management in Asia,
Asian Development Bank Headquarters, Manila, December 8-9, 2004.
28
Community forestry agreements with the Ministry of Environment in protected areas are covered separately. The
community protected area established in Khsim commune in the Snoul Wildlife Sanctuary was approved by the
Council of Ministers on 16 March 2001 under Sachkdei Choun Domneung 295.
29
See Jeremy Ironside, Securing Land Tenure Rights for Cambodia’s Indigenous Communities, November 2004.
30
Land Alienation from Indigenous Peoples in Cambodia, October 2004.
25
rights. Donors and development practitioners are well placed to assist in this effort, although for some it
will require a strategic shift in emphasis. Support of key policy options with the government is critical.31
• Terminate the forest concession system and continue the moratorium on logging. These
recommendations were made by the Independent Forest Sector Review (April 2004), which also
recommended that there should be no demarcation of the permanent forest estate until indigenous
people’s rights are secured and the collective titling process is complete. At the very least commercial
logging should be prohibited in areas where resin trees represent a high proportion of standing
commercial timber.32 The cancellation of forest concession agreements and a total crackdown on illegal
logging are clearly steps consistent with the government’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy 20032005. Community forestry agreements should be encouraged including the piloting of timber production
for local development.33
• Declare a moratorium on land sales and cash crop (economic) concessions affecting
indigenous groups until the communal land titling process is completed. Land sales transacted in
indigenous areas since the promulgation of the 2001 Land Law should be reviewed and reversed with
land taken illegally from indigenous communities returned to them. Proposals for economic concessions
in indigenous areas should not be entertained and non-performing concessions awarded prior to the
Land Law should be cancelled. Importantly, full details of all agro-industrial land concessions awarded in
indigenous areas for any form of commercial exploitation should be made public. Meanwhile, donors and
NGOs should support government efforts to disseminate information about indigenous land rights and the
provisions of the Land Law. Donors could further assist the government by funding the communal titling
process and NGOs could help by supplying human and technical resources for the identification and
mapping of indigenous lands.
Certainly, efforts to reverse the destructive trends of recent years in northeast Cambodia and to
empower indigenous groups to regain control over their natural resources will be met by opposing selfinterests. But the lesson for government, donors, and development practitioners is clear. Genuine
development of indigenous groups in northeast Cambodia must become synonymous with the struggle
against land encroachments and the productive use of land and forest resources.
31
The policy options proposed in this section are contained in the NGO Statement to the 2004 Consultative Group
Meeting on Cambodia, Phnom Penh, 6-7 December 2004 and Land Alienation from Indigenous Peoples in
Cambodia, October 2004.
32
See McKenney, Yim, Prom, and Evans, Focusing on Cambodia’s High Value Forests.
33
McKenney, Yim, Prom, and Evans, Focusing on Cambodia’s High Value Forests, promote piloting “commercial”
community forestry near high value forest areas as an approach to make community management of forest
resources more attractive. The Independent Forest Sector Review endorses Partnership Forestry between
Commune Councils and the Forestry Administration which includes small-scale timber production to fund local
development. To prevent abuses the Sub-decree on Community Forestry Management prohibits timber production
within the first 5 years of approval of the Community Forest Management Plan.