Current Border Disputes
in Sudan and South
Sudan: An Illustration
of the Failure of the
Sudanese Peace
Process
Chia Shu Xuan
NUS
2014 Emirates NBD Middle East Essay
Prize Winner
Introduction
The mediation in the Sudan-South Sudan conflict is an example of a state that is
built on fault lines where sovereignty of South-Sudan was deemed to be the
ultimate solution in the 2005 Agreement1. The problem is that merely splitting the
territories will not necessarily result in peace, which is seen in many disputed
territories (such a Kashmir2). There are a number of disputed borders in the Sudan
and South-Sudan split, which link to traditional land uses (such as grazing) by the
indigenous populations3. The inference is that in a country where there a number of
indigenous populations, traditional tribal boundaries and differential approaches to
land, there cannot be division of land and its access merely through national and
international political agreement4. This raises a number of questions on whether
mediating with the political elites in some international conflicts will result in
implausible agreements when it relates to specific local issues, such as a state
border through grazing land5. This paper will explore the extent that the mediation
process in the Sudan and South-Sudan conflict is avoiding peace by failing to
engage with the local disputes, especially when there are a number of conflicts
based upon the confusion associated with the borderlands. Resultantly, the
Sudan/South-Sudan mediation may have reached the success that it envisaged (i.e.
a two-state solution), however, due to the complexity of the region and the interests
of local groups, elitist mediation will not bring sustainable peace to the region.
Therefore, this paper will recommend that it is necessary that civil society and local
Knox, C “The Secession of South Sudan: A Case Study in African Sovereignty and International
Recognition” (2012) College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s Political Science Paper 1, 2
2 Misra, A (2001) “The Centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan Security Dynamics” International
Politics 38(103), 104
3 Craze, J Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border (2013) HSBA
Working Paper 30, 6
4 ibid, 10
5 ibid, 10
1
1
interests come to the forefront of mediation, in order to ensure that the division of
Sudan and South-Sudan will create peace.
The Sudan Conflict – An Overview
The civil war in Sudan started in 1955 and is the longest in African history. There
are a number of fault lines; however the continued dispute centred on the wealth
that derives from oil6. One of the most explosive fault lines was the separation
between the Islamic North and the non-Islamic South, which made finding a two
state solution difficult because the oil reserves were in the Middle7. Consequently,
the militarised Islamic North in the post-colonial era ruled with an iron fist that did
not give into the diverse interests and tribal differences to the South8. The result
was a long-standing civil war between the North and the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement (SPLM) and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). These two groups
kept a semblance of order in the South and throughout the period of civil war held
semi-autonomy over the South9. The implication is that the South could separate
from the North as a self-determined nation because it was already treated in a
semi-federalist manner. Nevertheless, actual independence and even true selfdetermination (i.e. separation from the military rule of Khartoum) was difficult due
to the oil resources that both sides laid claim to10. Thus, the intervention of the
international community, most specifically the USA, in the peace talks of 2004 and
the final agreement (i.e. the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005) was necessary
or the conflict would continue. The overall aim of the CPA 2005 was to provide the
North and South with shared wealth, as well as ensure that the South was able to
self-rule in order to eventually create the Republic of South Sudan11.
al-Abdin, ATZ “The Outstanding Issues between the Two Sudans: A Way to Peace or Conflict”
Sudan Tribune June 23, 2012 Retrieved from: http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43062
accessed August 27, 2014
7 ibid
8 ibid
9 ibid
10 ibid
11 ibid
6
2
Self-determination resulted out of mediation and negotiation, as opposed to war.
The interest of the USA derived from the fears of terrorist groups from Sudan,
which meant that stability in the region was important12. Additionally, to have a
non-Islamic state (i.e. South Sudan) could be an important strategic move for the
USA and its allies13. Resultantly, the development of a negotiated agreement that
would ultimately end in the separation of the state had political benefits to the
USA. Although, separation as not official until South Sudan had developed a
comprehensive governing body and a referendum on the North and South of Sudan
agreed to secession14, the reality was the negotiated agreement would have this
outcome. The reasoning for this is that the long war between the regions indicated
that this solution would be deemed preferable, especially as the international
community would recognise the state.
The Two State Solution and the “Comprehensive” Peace Agreement (CPA
2005)
The development of a two-state solution that derived from the power sharing
agreements that culminated with the 2005 negotiations was a necessary outcome
(i.e. the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 (CPA 2005))15. The rationale for this
outcome is to bring stability to a region that was associated with Islamist terrorist
activities that threaten the global community16. Nonetheless, there are fundamental
issues that remain between the two Sudans because the 2009 referendum that
brought sovereignty to the South failed to deal with a number of issues that are
central to the day-to-day lives of individuals on the border, which means that
conflict remains17. The inference is that unless the mediation is taken to the local
level, it is unlikely that the conflict on the two Sudanese borders will not be settled.
Thus, the primary failure of the CPA 2005 is that it focused upon the elites and
Dagne, T “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism and US Policy” CR Issue Brief for
Congress June 9, 2005, 9-10
13 ibid, 10
14 al-Abdin (n6)
15 Dagne (n12), 9
16 10
17 al-Abdin, (n6)
12
3
failed to recognise the interests and realities of the persons living on the contested
borders18 (i.e. the so-called comprehensive agreement in 2005 (i.e. the CPA 2005)
was not so comprehensive after all19).
The separation of the state of Sudan occurred before there was proper
determination of a number of issues, which is why the conflict is still present (albeit
in a new form). Article 67 of the Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009, which
paved the way for separation, identified that there were a number of outstanding
issues that were to be negotiated into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. These
issues included: (i) nationality rights after division; (ii) currency (i.e. retention of the
same currency or separation); (iii) the role of the joint integrated units of national
security and intelligence (i.e. would they remain); (iv) the division of public service
and the rights of public servants (i.e. can those who want to remain in North Sudan
migrate to positions in the state); (v) determination of whether Southern Sudan
should be bound by international agreements and covenants; (vi) the division of
assets and debts; (vii) oil division; (viii) environmental and contractual obligations
linked to oil fields; (ix) riparian rights; (x) property rights; and (xi) any other issue
that may arise20. The indication is that there are a large number of issues that have
to be consolidated between the parties, which in many cases affect the everyday
lives of individuals on the border. Thus, the processes of extending the CPA 2005
may not be appropriate because it is focused on the political elite and not the
interests of the affected local communities.
The Role of the African Union (AU) in the Mediation of the CPA 2005 and
their Failure for a Sustainable Resolution
The AU played a pivotal role in the mediation of the CPA 2005 under the leadership
of former South African president Thabo Mbeki. The South African mediator was an
important choice because it had the trust of the Southern Sudanese due to the
Harrigan, S South Sudan: Waiting for Peace to Come L2GP Working Paper September 2011, 2
Verwijk, M “Is Peace not for Everyone?” in Grawert, E Forging Two Nations Insights on Sudan
and South Sudan (OSSREA, 2014), 219
20 al-Abdin (n6)
18
19
4
support of the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) for the South Sudanese
liberationists21. The support of the AU through South Africa meant that there was a
significant amount of political pressure placed on the Northern power to allow the
Southern region to achieve self-determination22. When the USA also supported the
initiatives of the AU, in addition to UN missions, the result inevitably ended in an
internal
partition
that
would
eventually
result
in
self-determination23.
Consequently, the political and structural concerns of the elite were satisfied in the
CPA 2005 (i.e. the road to a two-state solution). Thus, the role of the AU in the
mediation of the CPA 2005 was successful, however, there was an overall failure in
the process to achieve sustainable peace.
It would be incorrect to argue that the CPA 2005 is a complete failure because it
does meet the power/resource sharing agreements through the development of two
states24. This means that the high-level political interests have a mediated
agreement that has resulted in the expected end25. These high level interests,
however, cannot engage with local disputes and the specifics of putting a sovereign
border across grazing (and other traditional industry) territories that never existed
before26 (i.e. tribal borders are generally malleable and do not follow the same
rigidity of international sovereign states27). The dispute over land and traditional
rights in this land is a long-established issue that arises after the introduction of or
delimitation of sovereign borders28. The rights of local communities will have little
effect when a border is placed in their way because it is the right of the sovereign
Hendricks, C & Lucey, A “South Africa and South Sudan” (2013) Institute for Security Studies
Policy Brief 49, 2
22 ibid, 2
23 ibid, 2
24 ibid (n8)
25 Kimenyi, MS “Future Engagement between the South Sudan and the Republic of Sudan” in
Brookings Institute South Sudan: One Year After Independence June 2012, 8
26 Salman, SMA “The Abyei territorial dispute between North and South Sudan: Why has its
resolution proven difficult” in Unruh, J and Williams, RC Land and Post-Conflict Peace Building
(Earthscan, 2013), 31
27 ibid. 32
28 ibid, 30
21
5
government to rule its boundaries29. Thus, for the mediation process to ensure that
there is a sustainable future, it is necessary that the local level is engaged. Thus,
this paper will now turn to the specific problems that are associated with mediation
processes that do not engage effectively with the local communities, especially when
there is border delimitation. In doing so, it will draw upon problems in other regions
that are experiencing the same problems.
Mediation – Engaging with all Stakeholders
The premise of many political conflicts are social issues, however, these social issues
are multidimensional and need to be examined at all levels of dispute30. In the
Sudan-South Sudan dispute the higher political disputes were focused upon, which
is indicative of the interests of the external political players31 (i.e. USA and the
international community bringing stability to provide better policing of the terrorist
threats). The engagement with key international players can be an important
incentive to mediate a solution32 because it provides a basis for a common ground to
be found, additionally, the dispute can be deemed of sufficient importance that the
parties can constructively put forward their demands33. The problem that is
associated with the role of the third party is that the local concerns and demands
can be lost because they are not deemed to be of political importance to ending the
conflict34.
In fact, one of the reasons that there was agreement for splitting Sudan was due to
perceived local conflicts. Salman identifies that:
“The argument amongst some Northern circles that because of the difficulties
the Southerners were encountering in governing the South, and because of
Johnson, DH “New Sudan or South Sudan? The Multiple Meanings of Self-Determination in
Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Process” (2013) Civil Wars 15(141), 144
30 Bercovitch, J. Social Conflicts and Third Parties. (Westview Press,1984), 25
31 Miall, H, Ramsbottam, O & Woodhouse, T Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention,
Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, (Polity, 2011) 55
32 Melin, MM & Svensson., I “Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in international and civil
wars” (2009) International Interactions, 35(3), 253
33 Ross, S “United States Involvement in Conflict Resolution in Africa” Cornerstone Global: Blue
Paper December 21, 2012
34 Craze (n3), 12
29
6
their inter-tribal differences, disputes, and conflicts, they would opt for unity.
Those raising such arguments allowed themselves to forget that those same
factors are also characteristics of, and prevalent in, the North”35.
The basis for the arguments in separation were deemed sufficient to bring an
overall stability by separating the country into two based upon Islamic and nonIslamic grounds36. These grounds are not sufficient to understand the specific
concerns of the local communities that will be affected by the border delimitation.
As Figure 1 illustrates there remain disputes over land, which are associated with
traditional grazing rights37. The implication is that it is necessary to ensure that
there is a mediation process that is in place, which represents these traditional
disputes that have been exacerbated through the placement of a border.
In fact, the concerns raised by the North with respect to the instability of the South
are illustrated in grazing and tribal raids that have been experienced internally in
this region (Figure 2)38. The primary implication is that the mediation process
during the CPA 2005 failed to recognise that there were a wider set of historic
disputes that had to be engaged, in order to bring sustainable peace to Sudan and
South Sudan39. Therefore, it is the local disputes in this conflict that has to be
directly mediated; otherwise there will be continued instability between the two
states40.
Salman, SMA “South Sudan Road to Independence: Broken Promises and Lost Opportunities”
(2013) Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law Journal 26(2), 345-6
36 ibid, 345
37 Craze (n3), 12
38 Ottaway, M & El-Sadany, M Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict Carnegie Endowment: Middle East
May 2012, 5
39 Craze (n3), 10
40 ibid, 11
35
7
Figure 1: Sudan-South Sudan Border – Disputed and Claimed Areas41:
41
ibid, 10
8
Figure 2: South Sudan Disputes42:
International Mediation at the Local Level
The role of mediators will be necessary in the local resolution of land disputes
because creating legal boundaries or using force will not be effective to deal with
42
Ottaway, & El-Sadany, (n38), ii
9
this local level problem43. However, some of the techniques and processes that were
used when dealing with the higher level political mediated solution should be
considered, most notably the power and resource (wealth) sharing model44. The
border and tribal disputes, which are linked to riparian and land rights mean that
the resource sharing framework should be considered as a possible way forward,
however, as Figure 1 illustrates some of these rights now cross a sovereign border,
this will mean that there is permeable approach to border crossings. This may not
be a desired approach because it will threaten the sovereignty of each of the states
and rebels can use these crossings and threaten national security45. Nonetheless,
the history of Africa illustrates that placing manufactured borders can create
further disputes without engaging the local communities46. The implication is that
the process that has been used is through the interests of the elite, which has
resulted in the division of the country is no longer appropriate. The process needs to
diverge from merely representing the North and South of Sudan elites; rather these
interests have to be migrated to the local level, in order to develop a resolution that
will accommodate the needs of the local communities, whilst effectively dealing with
the national security concerns that may arise from a permeable border with respect
to traditional grazing.
The role of the mediator at a local level is different to that of the international and
national level because the interests of the parties are fundamentally different47 (i.e.
national interest will include natural resource acquisition, whereas the local
community is concerned with land rights for livelihood). Arguably, at the national
level there will be a greater greed quotient that needs to be considered and dealt
with, in order to come to a peaceable solution48. However, as these interests are
Greig, MJ. “Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?” (2005) American Journal of
Political Science, 49(2): 254
44 The Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004; The Protocol on
Power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004
45 Craze (n3), 21
46 Salman (n26), 32
47 Arai, T Creativity and Conflict Resolution: Alternative Pathways to Peace (Routledge, 2009), 2
48 Mutanda, D "The art of mediation in resolving African conflicts: lessons for Zimbabwe and Africa",
(2013) Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research, 5(130), 134
43
10
based within the international framework, such disputes can be easier to resolve
through international mediation, negotiation and arbitration49. For example, the
territorial dispute in the Abyei Region, at a national level, was resolved in the
Permanent Court Arbitration50.
In this arbitration the border in this region was redrawn (see Figure 1), in order to
provide a fairer split in this oil rich region, whereby concessions were made on both
sides to create a cemented border that is necessary for the division into two states51.
However, the interests and the concessions that the PCA considered were focused
on the elite interests that were espoused in the civil war and continued conflict52.
The mediator (or arbitrator) when settling a dispute will only engage those issues
that will resolve the conflict with the parties present and identified (i.e. mediation
can be very limited unless third party concerns at a local level are identified as
necessary to a solution)53. Consequently, the mediator has a bias towards the
conflict as presented to him/her, which means that a local view can be ignored54. It
may be that the local view is not necessary to engage, in order for a sustainable
solution to be achieved. Nonetheless, the cultural and tribal history (including
conflicts) will need to be engaged in Sudan, which is a common theme in the African
states55. Therefore, the approach of mediators have to change when it comes to
localised disputes, especially when historical and cultural challenges are in place.
Cultural Border Disputes
Beardsley, K, Quinn D, Biswas B, & Wilkenfeld J "Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes" (2006).
Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(58), 65
50 Government of Sudan v The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei Arbitration), Final
Award of the PCA of 22 July 2009.
51 Craze, J “Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei” in Vaughan, C, Schomerus, M & de
Vries, L The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and Identity in Contemporary and Historical
Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 62
52 ibid, 46
53 Svensson, I., “Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace” (2007). Journal of
Peace Research, 44(114), 116
54 Brahimi , L & Salman, A "In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of
Mediation",(2008)
New York, Center on International Cooperation retrieved
www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/7sinspolicybrief.pdf accessed August 27, 2014, 4
55 Craze (n51), 62
49
11
Although the disputes on the Sudan and South Sudan border are linked to land and
land rights, it is necessary to recognise that these disputes are ingrained in the
historical-cultural framework56. It is in such disputes that there has to be full
engagement with the interests and aspirations of the parties on a personal, as
opposed to formalistic basis. As Arai identifies
“Conflict remains intact as long as parties with different aspirations are
unable to interrupt their confrontational patterns of interaction, breaking
patterns, which come to form what the parties may consider a conventional
reality, invites resistance inevitably. Therefore taking unconventional action
for conflict resolution requires mobilising the cognitive and emotive resources
of the parties and other attentive stakeholders, in such a way as to break the
conventional patterns that have sustained their conflict”57.
To a certain extent the Sudan and South Sudan conflict is a cultural one, however,
the elites recognise that to meet the ends of shared wealth and power that will
allow for separate states requires international recognition58. This means that the
motivations of the political elite will be more prone to be influenced by international
opinion59, especially when the USA became involved. This means that the mediator
style will be significantly different in the case of a dispute between the political elite
in a civil war scenario.
Border disputes between local communities, on the other hand, require engagement
at a local and personal level because this is how these disputes affect the
individual60. The role of the mediators in these new disputes may have been deemed
minor during the civil war and peace process, however, the instability on the border
and within South Sudan illustrates that the approach of the mediation process will
need to move away from the focus on elites and to personal level. This is a necessary
ibid, 62
Arai (n47), 2
58 al-Abdin (n8)
59 Rauchhaus RW “Asymmetric information, mediation and conflict management” (2006). World
Politics. 58(207), 221
60 Craze (n51), 62
56
57
12
process in transitional processes from a single to two state solution, whereby
transformation must be the focus of the mediators61. The key state actors will still
play an important role, but engagement with stakeholders and representatives of
interest groups will be required to ensure that the correct communication is being
engaged62.
Correct communication and direction of the mediation will be required to create the
trust that is required for the disputing local communities to engage the dispute
resolution process63. The nature of the historical cultural disputes, which are present
in local communities can be one of the most difficult types of dispute to settle
because of the much personalised nature of the dispute64. Land and the rights over
land are linked to the rights of the tribe and can be reflective of their status
and power in the region. The implementation of borders through traditionally
contested lands will intensify local disputes if not properly considered within the
conflict resolution process. The interests in Sudan/South-Sudan conflict resolution
through the PCA 2005 were focused upon the two main parties and the
international community’s drive to ensure that there is stability meant that
ingrained cultural conflicts were not considered, which have manifested themselves
in the current border and land disputes. Therefore, the disputes that are currently
present in this region are intrinsically linked to the conflict that has resulted in the
two-state solution, nonetheless, the focus of mediation and dispute resolution needs
to move to the local level.
Conclusion
The mediation in the Sudanese conflict has to be examined on a multilateral basis,
in order to determine whether it was a failure. The CPA 2005 and the eventual
Teitel, R “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation” (1996-7) 106
Yale LJ 2009, 2018
62 Richards, M. C. “Separating and Connecting: The Vessel and the Fire” in Ryan MJ The Fabric of
the Future: Women Visionaries Illuminate the Path to Tomorrow (1998, Conari Press) 213;
63 Kydd A. “When can mediators build trust?” (2006) American Political Science. Review 100(449).
453
64 Craze (n3), 22
61
13
achievement of self-determination and statehood for South Sudan can be identified
as a success for the mediators in the process. Nevertheless, there was a fundamental
failure in the mediation process because the resolution was limited to the higherlevel political interests. Arguably, the reason for this is that statehood of South
Sudan is in the political interests of South Africa, the AU and the USA65. However,
the local issues that are the cause of the current conflicts illustrate that
the mediation failed to be sustainable. Thus, the CPA 2005 may have been a success
in the short term, nonetheless, it is not sufficient for ongoing peace. Rather, this
needs to be achieved through multilevel negotiation and mediation with local
communities and the political elite.
In conclusion, the Sudan/South Sudan conflict mediation that resulted with the CPA
2005 was a success because it created two independent states. Nevertheless, the
conflict remains because in the peace making process the focus on elites failed to deal
with the conflicts that may arise amongst local communities, especially when a
sovereign border was placed through traditional grazing lands. The role of
mediation will be important to this transformed dispute, however, the approach and
techniques of the mediators will have to change. Arguably, the nature of the dispute
will be more caustic because it is dealing with one of the most personal areas of
conflict, local and neighbourhood land and land rights disputes.
The mediator in the current land disputes will need to directly communicate with
the local communities, as well as the national and commercial (i.e. oil) interests in
the region. It is unlikely that the border disputes between Sudan and South Sudan
will allow for border changes, however, it is necessary to ensure that a resolution is
met to allow traditional grazing practices to continue. This means that the history
of power and wealth sharing between the governments (albeit contentious) should
be drawn upon, in order to provide border crossing rights with regards to these
traditional practices. This will be a very difficult set of rights to negotiate, especially
as rebels in both regions threaten the stability of the border. Nonetheless, it is
65
Hendricks & Lucey (n21), 2
14
plausible that through the settlement of local community rights that the security of
the border can be strengthened because local communities will not want their
grazing and land rights to be ceased by unconnected rebels. Therefore, it is
plausible that through a direct and open mediation process that engages the local
community, the hearts and minds of the conflicting tribes can be engaged with in
order to increase (as opposed to threaten) stability. The implication of this is that a
multidimensional conflict mediation framework needs to be developed from the local
through to national/international levels, in order to bring sustainable peace to
Sudan and South Sudan.
15
Legal Agreements/Cases:
Government of Sudan v The Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (Abyei
Arbitration), Final Award of the PCA of 22 July 2009.
Protocol on Power-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 26 May 2004
Protocol on wealth-sharing: Signed in Naivasha, Kenya, on 7 January 2004
References:
al-Abdin, ATZ “The Outstanding Issues between the Two Sudans: A Way to Peace
or
Conflict”
Sudan
Tribune
June
23,
2012
Retrieved
from:
http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article43062 accessed August 27, 2014
Arai, T Creativity and Conflict Resolution: Alternative Pathways to Peace
(Routledge, 2009), 2
Beardsley, K, Quinn D, Biswas B,& Wilkenfeld J "Mediation Style and Crisis
Outcomes" (2006). Journal of Conflict Resolution 50(58)
Bercovitch, J. Social Conflicts and Third Parties. (Westview Press,1984)
Brahimi , L & Salman, A "In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of
Mediation",(2008)
New York, Center on International Cooperation retrieved
www.cic.nyu.edu/internationalsecurity/docs/7sinspolicybrief.pdf accessed August 27,
2014, 4
Craze, J “Unclear Lines: State and Non-State Actors in Abyei” in Vaughan, C,
Schomerus, M & de Vries, L The Borderlands of South Sudan: Authority and
Identity in Contemporary and Historical Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013),
Craze, J Dividing Lines: Grazing and Conflict Alon the Sudan-South Sudan Border
(2013) HSBA Working Paper 30
Dagne, T “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism and US Policy” CR
Issue Brief for Congress June 9, 2005
16
Greig, MJ. “Stepping into the Fray: When Do Mediators Mediate?” (2005) American
Journal of Political Science, 49(2)
Harrigan, S South Sudan: Waiting for Peace to Come L2GP Working Paper
September 2011, 2
Johnson, DH “New Sudan or South Sudan? The Multiple Meanings of SelfDetermination in Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Process” (2013) Civil Wars 15(141)
Kimenyi, MS “Future Engagement between the South Sudan and the Republic of
Sudan” in Brookings Institute South Sudan: One Year After Independence June
2012,
Knox, C “The Secession of South Sudan: A Case Study in African Sovereignty and
International Recognition” (2012) College of Saint Benedict and Saint John’s
Political Science Paper 1
Kydd A. “When can mediators build trust?” (2006) American Political Science.
Review 100(449)
Hendricks, C & Lucey, A “South Africa and South Sudan” (2013) Institute for
Security Studies Policy Brief 49
Melin, MM & Svensson., I “Incentives for talking: Accepting mediation in
international and civil wars” (2009) International Interactions, 35(3)
Miall, H, Ramsbottam, O & Woodhouse, T Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The
Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, (Polity, 2011)
Misra, A (2001) “The Centrality of Kashmir in India-Pakistan Security Dynamics”
International Politics 38(103)
Mutanda, D "The art of mediation in resolving African conflicts: lessons for
Zimbabwe and Africa", (2013) Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research,
5(130)
Ottaway, M & El-Sadany, M Sudan: From Conflict to Conflict Carnegie
Endowment: Middle East May 2012
17
Rauchhaus RW “Asymmetric information, mediation and conflict management”
(2006). World Politics. 58(207)
Richards, M. C. “Separating and Connecting: The Vessel and the Fire” in Ryan MJ
The Fabric of the Future: Women Visionaries Illuminate the Path to Tomorrow
(Conari Press, 1998)
Ross, S “United States Involvement in Conflict Resolution in Africa” Cornerstone
Global: Blue Paper December 21, 2012
Salman, SMA “South Sudan Road to Independence: Broken Promises and Lost
Opportunities” (2013) Pacific McGeorge Global Business & Development Law
Journal 26(2)
Salman, SMA “The Abyei territorial dispute between North and South Sudan: Why
has its resolution proven difficult” in Unruh, J and Williams, RC Land and PostConflict Peace Building (Earthscan, 2013)
Svensson, I., “Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace”
(2007). Journal of Peace Research, 44(114)
Teitel, R “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation”
(1996-7) 106 Yale LJ 2009
Verwijk, M “Is Peace not for Everyone?” in Grawert, E Forging Two Nations
Insights on Sudan and South Sudan (OSSREA, 2014)
18