6
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
OPIUM, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THE CIVILIZING MISSION IN
COLONIAL SOUTHEAST ASIA1
ANNE L. FOSTER
Abstract. Opium played a critical and contradictory role in the rhetoric
and practice of the civilizing mission in colonial Southeast Asia at the turn
RIWKHWZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\)XQGVIURPVDOHRIOLFLWRSLXPKHOSHG¿QDQFH
civilizing projects, while colonial governments struggled to justify the sale
of opium to colonized peoples. The United States entered the region as a
colonial power at the height of these debates. This article argues that US
SROLF\UHJDUGLQJRSLXPZDVQRWVHWWOHGLQ,QLWLDOO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
permitted legal opium sales, and opium policy developed in the context of
this regional debate about proper colonial governance. By 1908, the United States had fully adopted a prohibitionist policy, and thereafter promoted
prohibition as the only policy compatible with the civilizing mission.
7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO2SLXP&RPPLVVLRQKHOGLWVRSHQLQJVHVVLRQRQWKHPRUQing of February 2, 1909 in Shanghai, China. Presiding over the meeting was
Bishop Charles H. Brent, U.S. Episcopal Bishop in the Philippines and by
1909 a leading anti-opium advocate. This meeting is well known to scholars
of the history of international opium regulation, who draw on it to illustrate
that U.S. international narcotics policy consistently has favored prohibition,
and that U.S. policymakers consistently have linked concern for social welfare with limiting access to narcotics.26LQFH86RI¿FLDOSROLF\KDVEHHQ
fairly consistent in advocating prohibition of non-medical uses of narcotics,
but the 1909 meeting represented the culmination, for Americans, of a debate
DERXW WKH DSSURSULDWH XVHV RI RSLXP UDWKHU WKDQ UHÀHFWLQJ ORQJVHWWOHG ZLVGRP,Q86SROLF\PDNHUVKDGHQWHUHGDQRQJRLQJFRQYHUVDWLRQDPRQJ
the colonial powers of Southeast Asia about the proper uses of opium and
the relationship of opium to the civilizing mission in the colonies. That the
FRQYHUVDWLRQZRXOGHQGLQZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¿UPO\RQWKHVLGHRI
prohibition was not a foregone conclusion. This article explores the relationship of opium consumption to the civilizing mission for the colonial powers
LQ 6RXWKHDVW$VLD DQG WKH ZD\V LQ ZKLFK WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV FDPH WR GH¿QH
the civilizing mission to exclude the possibility of legal, non-medical opium
consumption.
The United States became a colonial power in Southeast Asia when ideas
Anne Foster is Assistant Professor in the Department of History, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, Indiana.
SHAD (Winter, 2010): 6-19
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
7
about the civilizing mission of imperialism had most powerful hold over European, and American, conceptions of the imperial project. The three remaining
European colonial powers in Southeast Asia, France, Britain, and the Netherlands, each had their own phrase for this change in sentiment, purpose, and
policy. Respectively, these were mission civilisatrice, white man’s burden,
and ethische koers. The civilizing mission could be realized in at least two
different ways. One conception is inherent in the French phrase, and meant
that colonial rule had to offer at least the possibility that colonial subjects
would be civilized in the course of their interaction with Europeans. This
notion of uplift was highly controversial and even unsettling to Europeans,
and later Americans, since it seemed to call into question immutable racial
hierarchies and, at its logical conclusion, even the legitimacy of colonial rule.3
But there was an apparently more simple part of the civilizing mission, more
readily discernible if one uses the Dutch phrase, which translates as Ethical
Policy. This second conception rests on the notion that colonialism should be
EHQH¿FLDOWRWKHFRORQL]HG7KHPDWHULDOFRQGLWLRQVRILQWKLVFDVH6RXWKHDVW
Asians, should improve.
,Q RUGHU WR ³FLYLOL]H´ 6RXWKHDVW $VLDQV (XURSHDQ FRORQLDO JRYHUQPHQWV
built schools, provided more opportunity for higher education and European
language education, began to allow limited and usually carefully controlled
participation in institutions of self-government, and even created pathways
WR(XURSHDQFLWL]HQVKLSIRUDVHOHFWIHZ,QRUGHUWRLPSURYHPDWHULDOFRQditions, Europeans provided improvements such as roads, health clinics, irrigation projects, improved sanitation, more regulation of pawn shops, and
minimal legal protection for workers.4,IDVPHQWLRQHGDERYHWKHSRVVLELOLW\
of uplift created some tension around identity and power, the provision of better roads and health clinics was generally a source of pure pride for colonial
governments. Both strands of the civilizing mission, however, cost money:
all these new institutions, all these building projects, all these new governPHQWHPSOR\HHV6RMXVWDWWKHPRPHQWZKHQWKHLGHRORJLFDOMXVWL¿FDWLRQ
for empire switched from providing revenue for the home government and its
citizens to one of tutelage, the imperative that colonies make money for their
rulers increased. Revenues from government control of opium sales could
provide a substantial portion of that revenue.
The United States became a colonial power as these ideas about the civilizLQJPLVVLRQUHDFKHGWKHLUKHLJKW,QYROYHG$PHULFDQVKDGWRGHFLGHZKDWNLQG
of colonial power the United States was going to be. The civilizing mission
idea decidedly appealed to these Americans, and even a cursory reading of the
literature of the day reveals many references to civilizing, uplift, and tutelage.
3UHVLGHQW:LOOLDP0F.LQOH\¶VRYHUTXRWHGMXVWL¿FDWLRQIRUWDNLQJWKH3KLOLSpines is a prime example. He used the language of “uplift, Christianize and
civilize” because it resonated, however.5 And although many U.S. Progressives were anti-imperialists, the Progressive ideals about reform and building or improving of institutions pervaded the American colonial project. The
8
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
U.S. government moved quickly to build schools, health clinics, and sanitation projects.686FRORQLDORI¿FLDOVVKDUHGZLWKWKHLU(XURSHDQFRXQWHUSDUWV
the “white man’s burden” of needing to come up with substantial funds.
Promotion of opium consumption would seem on its face to be antithetical
to the civilizing mission, or conversely, it would seem an easy claim that one
ZD\IRUFRORQLDOSRZHUVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKHLUEHQH¿WWRFRORQL]HG6RXWKHDVW
Asians would be to facilitate diminished opium consumption. For Americans
particularly, one would think that opium consumption could have no positive
relationship with policies of uplift, and that promotion of prohibition, a good
Progressive cause, would naturally be part of any civilizing mission. The
FRPSOLFDWLRQDULVHVIURPWKHIDFWWKDWRSLXPSURYLGHGIURPWHQWR¿IW\SHUFHQW
of colonial revenues in the colonies of Southeast Asia at the end of the nineteenth century. Paying for the civilizing mission seemed to mean reliance on
opium.
Opium was crucial to the imperial project in Southeast Asia from the early
QLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\(XURSHDQVIRXQGLWGLI¿FXOWWRPDNHFRORQLDOLVPLQ6RXWKHDVW$VLDSD\XQWLOWKH\GLVFRYHUHGWKHPXOWLSOHEHQH¿WVWRWKHPRIRSLXP
,QGHHGWKHSRZHURIERWKGUXJDQGFRORQLDOVWDWHJUHZXSWRJHWKHULQPDQ\
ways. Singapore provides the most dramatic example. A nearly-empty island
before the British decided to make it a hub port, Singapore did not have the
ready supply of inexpensive workers for the docks, and for the heavy work of
ORDGLQJDQGXQORDGLQJVKLSV,PSRUWHG&KLQHVHODERUHUVFRXOGPHHWWKHQHHG
and opium, as Carl Trocki has so persuasively argued, meant that those workers could be induced to work long hours at physically demanding jobs for low
pay.7 Ethnic Chinese were sometimes even paid in opium, literally smoking
away their chances of saving up for a better future. While Singapore relied
more than other colonies on opium to tie workers to undesirable jobs, European enterprise in all the colonies faced the same labor shortage, and many
turned to the same solution. Many people viewed opium as a useful medicine
as much as a pleasure-giving narcotic. Opium was the most effective and
UHOLDEOHSDLQNLOOHULQWKH\HDUVEHIRUH$VSLULQ,WVFRQVWLSDWLQJHIIHFWVUHOLHYHG
symptoms of dysentery, so common throughout Southeast Asia, and it was
equally useful in relieving the fevers and chills of malaria, another common
illness in the region. Many workers viewed opium as a stimulant rather than
narcotic, a medicine which eased their aches and pains so that they felt strong
enough to work.8
Opium also provided revenue crucial for the functioning and growth of
WKH FRORQLDO VWDWH DQG LWV LQIUDVWUXFWXUH +LVWRULDQ &DUO7URFNL ¿QGV RSLXP
fundamental to the establishment of the imperial system: “without it, there
may have been no empire at all.” Opium sales provided revenue for colonial
states, as well as opportunities for Europeans to amass necessary capital to
engage in other capitalist, then industrial enterprises.9 Singapore, as a free
port with no reliable tax base, relied most heavily on the opium farms for revenue. These opium farms, or government-granted monopolies over the retail
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
9
sale of opium in a certain geographical area, brought in approximately half of
6LQJDSRUH¶VUHYHQXHIURPWKHPLGQLQHWHHQWKFHQWXU\WKURXJKWKH¿UVWGHFDGH
of the twentieth century.10 From 1898 to 1906, for example, the percentage of
total revenues deriving from opium in the Straits Settlements ranged from a
low of 43.3% (1900) to a high of 59.1% (1906).11 The other colonies earned
less from their opium farms but all, with the exception of the United States in
the Philippines, implemented the farm system.12 With at least ten percent of
revenues coming from opium, the colonial projects of modernity – whether
roads, schools, irrigation canals, or public health clinics – depended on addiction.
The Dutch even made administration of the sale of opium a key part of the
modernizing project with creation of the Opium Regie in 1894. To replace
the opium farms, increasingly seen as corrupt and outside control of the state,
WKH'XWFKLPSOHPHQWHGDJRYHUQPHQWEXUHDXFUDF\WRLPSURYHHI¿FLHQF\DQG
ensure proper distribution of opium. The Opium Regie was supposed to serve
as part of a regime of tutelage, since its ranks were more open than many other
SDUWV RI WKH FLYLO VHUYLFH WR ,QGRQHVLDQV 7KH VXFFHVVHV ERWK LQ SURYLGLQJ
training in self-government and in more careful regulation of who had access
to opium, were at best partial. The Opium Regie was usually perceived as a
second-rate career, low in prestige and ill paid. Not surprisingly, corruption
continued and evasion of the opium regulations through smuggling and illicit
production perhaps even increased.13
When the United States acquired the Philippines in 1898, these debates
about opium and the civilizing mission were on-going in the region. All the
colonial powers in the region, including Spain in the Philippines, had had or
still had opium farms. These opium farms had proved lucrative and easy to
administer. Governments imported the opium, auctioned off the right to sell
opium in a particular area, and sold the opium to successful bidders. The
governments’ part was then complete. Opium farmers had to administer sale
RIWKHRSLXPDVZHOODVSUHYHQWVPXJJOLQJZKLFKZRXOGXQGHUFXWWKHLUSUR¿WV
As a revenue-generating scheme, the opium farms were nearly perfect. But,
concerns about them were growing, in part because notions of a civilizing
mission meant that colonial governments should ensure better regulation and
control. Control of borders and populations were crucial parts of this project,
as colonial states asserted their authority over both behaviors and frontiers.
,QWHULPSHULDOULYDOU\VRPHWLPHVVKDSHGFRPSODLQWVDERXWDGPLQLVWUDWLRQRI
neighboring colonies’ opium farms, but primarily when administration was so
OD[WKDWVPXJJOHUVKDUPHGSUR¿WVUDWKHUWKDQDVDZD\RIGLPLQLVKLQJULYDO
powers’ revenues. Taking the opium trade back into government hands meant
that smuggling would be policed by government authorities. Not incidentally,
the power and wealth of the feared ethnic Chinese would be diminished. So
WKH'XWFKLQSDUWVRIWKH,QGLHVDQGWKH)UHQFKLQ,QGRFKLQDZHUHDWWHPSWLQJ
government monopolies, which were proving still lucrative if more challengLQJWRDGPLQLVWHU:3*URHQYHOGWDPHPEHURIWKH,QGLHV&RXQFLOLQWKH
10
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
1HWKHUODQGV ,QGLHV YLVLWHG ,QGRFKLQD GXULQJ WR LQYHVWLJDWH WKH QHZO\
instituted French monopoly. His report, critical but also sympathetic to the
French effort, detailed many of the obstacles governments faced in the transition from opium farms to government monopolies. For instance, European
RI¿FLDOVGLGQRWNQRZKRZDQGZKHUHWRSXUFKDVHWKHKLJKHVWTXDOLW\RSLXP
so they made some bad business deals, harming revenue. From the standpoint
of good administration, though, the vast amount of smuggling across the rePRWHPRXQWDLQRXVERUGHUVRI,QGRFKLQDSRVHGSUREOHPVIRU)UDQFH¶VÀHGJOLQJFRORQLDOVWDWHDSSDUDWXV7KHUHVLPSO\ZHUHIHZRUQR(XURSHDQRI¿FLDOV
present in the areas where smuggling occurred. The result was substantial
payments to secret informers, often for information of dubious quality. Additionally, corruption within the service was a constant problem.14
A small but growing number of people were also debating whether opium
LWVHOIZDVDQDFFHSWDEOHSURGXFW,QWKHVDQGWKURXJKWKH¿UVWGHFDGH
of the twentieth century, however, this issue was really debated, with strenuous arguments made on both sides. Prohibitionist, anti-opium groups had
EHJXQWRDUJXHDERXWPLGFHQWXU\WKDWRSLXPSURYLGHGQREHQH¿WVZRUWKWKH
costs of addiction, and that colonial governments should not permit the drug.
$QHDUO\RI¿FLDOUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHFDOOVZDVWKH5R\DO&RPPLVVLRQRQ
Opium, formed in response to a Parliamentary Resolution which referred to
WKH³VWURQJREMHFWLRQVRQPRUDOJURXQGVWRWKHV\VWHPE\ZKLFKWKH,QGLDQ
opium revenue was raised.” The British Anti-Opium Society furnished literally hundreds of witnesses willing to testify to the degeneracy associated with
WKHRSLXPKDELW,QWKH1HWKHUODQGV,QGLHVRQHJRYHUQPHQWRI¿FLDOZDQWHGD
total ban in his area, so that “the native peoples can be protected from opium
smoking.” But others argued that opium really was still a medicine, one effective against pain as well as malarial symptoms and dysentery.15 The authors of
the report of the Royal Commission on Opium even argued that physical degeneracy caused opium consumption, rather than resulted from it: “As a fact,
it is well known that in all countries where the opium habit prevails, sufferers
from the effects of malarious fever, pulmonary complaints, syphilis, rheumatism, and other diseases are apt to take opium, and to be more or less physical
wrecks, apart from any effect of the drug.” Equally important, moderate levels
of consumption were often deemed not harmful, especially to ethnic Chinese,
who were the largest group of opium users in most colonies. One Dutch
source suggested opium was culturally appropriate for Asians, claiming that
when opium was restricted in these areas, alcoholism rates increased.16
This debate extended to the Americans charged with administering the Philippines. Turning attention back to the debates and decisions about opium
by the United States during 1898-1908 provides a better understanding of
KRZSURKLELWLRQFDPHWREHGH¿QHGDVWKHZD\WRDFKLHYHWKHFLYLOL]LQJPLVsion. Beginning in 1909, Americans were relatively successful in reframing
the terms of the debate about opium among the European colonial powers.
After that date, opium remained legal throughout the European colonies of
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
11
6RXWKHDVW$VLDEXWFRORQLDORI¿FLDOVJUDGXDOO\PRYHGIURPGHIHQGLQJRSLXP
DVDKDUPOHVVRUHYHQEHQH¿FLDODFWLYLW\DQGLQVWHDGWRXWHGWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVV
of their control regimes.
During the nineteenth century, Americans had two different, nearly opposed, views of opium consumption. When opium was consumed for ostensibly medical reasons, such as relief of symptoms of malaria or cholera,
pain management, or to alleviate nervous conditions, Americans generally
approved. Careless or uninformed physicians as well as self-treatment often
led patients to take addictive doses. David Courtwright’s careful examination
estimates the number of opium addicts in the late nineteenth century to be a
bit more than 300,000. Addiction was clearly neither common nor rare, but
RFFXUUHGVXI¿FLHQWO\RIWHQWKDWPDQ\SHRSOHSUREDEO\NQHZDQDGGLFWRUWZR
Until the 1890s, this type of addiction caused little public outcry. Addiction
to smoking opium, which in the United States was not used as a medicine, by
contrast was generally viewed as a vice, and associated with the lurid and foreign world of the opium den. The general perception, not far from wrong, was
that smoking opium was consumed primarily by ethnic Chinese.17 The skeptical view most Americans had developed in the United States about smoking
opium informed attitudes as they considered opium policy for the Philippines,
since most opium consumed there, as in all of Southeast Asia, was smoked.
The generally negative views Americans held of smoking opium might
have determined US policy in the Philippines, but initially did not. US policymakers often held contradictory sentiments about the American purpose in
the Philippines. On the one hand, they often believed the United States was
a different kind of colonial power, and that US colonial policies should stem
from American values and models. This sentiment would tend to suggest that
Americans would oppose opium smoking. On the other hand, the perceived
expertise of European colonial administrators, and the civilizing mission ideal, appealed to those Americans who faced administering the new colonies.
Historian Paul Kramer has explored the ways in which Anglo-American racial
DI¿QLW\SURPSWHGPDQ\$PHULFDQVLQYROYHGLQDGPLQLVWHULQJLPSHULDOLVPWR
see themselves as engaged in a common endeavor with their British counterparts. Other scholars have explored the books US policymakers read, and the
VWXG\WULSVPDGHWR(XURSHDQFRORQLHV0DQ\86FRORQLDORI¿FLDOVEHJDQWR
see the world as “us” versus “them.” Southeast Asians became a relatively
undifferentiated mass, encouraging Americans to emphasize similarities with
Europeans, rather than differences from them.187KLVDI¿QLW\ZLWKWKHLU(XURSHDQFRXQWHUSDUWVSURPSWHG86RI¿FLDOVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHVLQLWLDOO\WRDFFHSW
opium smoking. They viewed it as part of local culture, not particularly harmful to certain populations, and an important revenue stream.
These swirling and sometimes contradictory sentiments, about both opium
and the nature of US colonialism, informed the initial rush to ensure continuity of government and yet differentiate US colonial rule from its Spanish preGHFHVVRU2QHRIWKH¿UVWDFWVRIWKHQHZ86JRYHUQPHQWLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV
12
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
was to abolish the opium farm which Spain had operated there. There was
remarkably little debate or even discussion of this decision, which appears to
have been considered both pragmatic and possibly temporary. The intent was
not to abolish opium, but merely to replace the farm system with a more easily administered high import tax. The purpose was to minimize governmental
involvement, not to stop opium consumption. Additionally, since the war was
not over, and the United States exercised military rather than civilian government in the islands until 1901, switching to an import tax allowed the necessary opiates for medicine more easily to enter the country and marketplace.
7KHLQYROYHG86RI¿FLDOVGLGQRWPHQWLRQOHWDORQHHQGRUVHSURKLELWLRQRU
VXSSUHVVLRQLQWKHVHHDUO\\HDUV,QGHHGLQWKH¿UVW\HDUVRI86UXOHDQRI¿FLDO PHPRUDQGXP IURP WKH 86 'HSDUWPHQW RI WKH7UHDVXU\ EOXQWO\ QRWHG
that opium was a legal commodity in the United States, subject to import
duty, and recommended the same policy for the Philippines.19 Some U.S. of¿FLDOVHYHQWKRXJKWEULQJLQJEDFNWKHRSLXPIDUPV\VWHPKHOGSURPLVH,Q
a December 1899 memo, the Collector of Customs merely reported on the
situation rather than recommending policy, but did note that “as a business
proposition” the opium farm system was likely to be most lucrative and had
the added advantage that it would “entirely relieve the Government from the
necessity of maintaining an expensive Secret Service Department to prevent
the smuggling of opium.”20 These were precisely the reasons opium farms had
long been popular with other colonial governments.
Both of these writers operated on the assumption that ethnic Chinese were
the primary smokers of opium in the Philippines. Spanish law had restricted
opium smoking to ethnic Chinese, forbidding it to Filipinos, and that law apSHDUVWRKDYHEHHQUHDVRQDEO\HIIHFWLYH86RI¿FLDOVEHOLHYHGWKDWHWKQLF
Chinese “as a class seem to be expert smugglers,” so that if access to legal
RSLXPZDVHQGHGWKHHWKQLF&KLQHVHZRXOG¿QGDZD\WRVPXJJOHLW21 That
would mean government expenditure to prevent the smuggling, as well as loss
RIWKHWD[UHYHQXHIURPOHJDORSLXPVDOHV7KHÀHGJOLQJFRORQLDOJRYHUQPHQW
GLGQRWVHHPXFKEHQH¿WWRSURKLELWLQJRSLXP1RSDUWLFXODUYDOXHMXGJPHQW
about consumption of opium appears in this early correspondence, and since
all the practical issues pointed to maintaining legal opium sales, that policy
was recommended and adopted without controversy.
Very quickly, however, American missionaries began to get involved in the
opium question. They spoke with an uncompromising voice about the “vice”
of opium.22 They had persistence, and good contacts. From China in 1899,
Presbyterian missionary Rev. Hampton C. Du Bose wrote to his Senator, John
0F/DXULQ RI 6RXWK &DUROLQD FRQGHPQLQJ WKH SRVVLEOH RSLXP IDUP V\VWHP
in the Philippines and noting the “great responsibility” the Government had
“in reference to the sale of this poison to a semi-civilized people.” The letter
made the rounds at the Departments of War, Treasury, and State, each referring
it along to others. The December 1899 memo by Collector of Customs SpurJLQTXRWHGDERYHIRUPHGWKHEDVLVRIRI¿FLDOUHSOLHVDWKLJKHUOHYHOV23 The
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
13
RI¿FLDO UHVSRQVHV GLG QRW DFNQRZOHGJH WKH PRUDO FKDUDFWHUL]DWLRQ 'X %RVH
was attempting to put on the issue, however, and merely mentioned practical issues such as smuggling and customs. The missionaries continued to
SUHVVWKHLUFDVHEXWWKURXJK86RI¿FLDOVPRVWO\FRXQWHUHGE\DVVHUWLQJ
that opium was not all that harmful. Member of the Philippine Commission
+HQU\&,GHZURWHLQWKDWRSLXPIDUPVZHUHWKHPRVWHIIHFWLYHZD\WR
deal “with this vice, if opium smoking among orientals is to be considered a
vice.”24 Even the Governor of the Philippines, William Howard Taft, wrote in
1903 that “Chinamen are hard working, quiet, law abiding people and this in
itself shows that most of them are temperate in smoking it merely as [a] sedative and that effects are probably not worse than those of liquor habit among
Americans.”25
These assertions about lack of harm pertained only to the ethnic Chinese,
however. When it became clear that one consequence of the U.S. move from
opium farm to high import tax was an increase in the number of Filipino
smokers, the arguments pressed by the missionaries began to gain traction.
Taft wrote that opium use among “Chinamen, Moros and Filipinos” had
increased.26 The period 1898-1901 had opened up the opium business to
many more people. During the war, both the Spanish and Philippine governments attempted to administer opium contracts, but in the chaotic conditions
RIPDQ\&KLQHVHÀHHLQJWKHLVODQGVDOWRJHWKHURUDWOHDVWWR0DQLODDQGRI
U.S. Admiral Dewey blockading the port of Manila – meaning no opium got
in – opium was distributed in much less regulated ways.27 By 1903, scholar
:RQJ.ZRNFKXUHSRUWVWKDWPRUHWKDQWHQ&KLQHVH¿UPVLQ0DQLODFODLPHG
to be opium dealers. Many more would register as sellers of opium when the
United States passed a law requiring such registration in 1906.
Missionaries could point to this apparent increase in consumption as they
launched their campaign against legal opium in the Philippines. They helped
their cause, as well, by organizing a major letter-writing campaign in the
United States, with literally thousands of pre-printed slips distributed to Protestant churches throughout the United States, stating “the undersigned favors
SURKLELWLRQRIRSLXPWUDI¿FLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV´2QHKLVWRULDQFODLPVWKDWWKH
White House received 2,000 of these protest messages. Some people merely
signed; others included personal notes expressing a variety of prohibitionist
sentiments. President Theodore Roosevelt and Secretary of War Elihu Root
began to get concerned about this publicity, especially about an issue which
did not concern them greatly one way or the other.28 As a result, the Government of the Philippines appointed an investigation commission in 1903 to
travel around Asia and see how well various methods of opium control and
regulation worked, before making a decision about what course to pursue in
the Philippines. The Philippine Opium Commission, headed by Bishop Brent,
traveled to Japan, Formosa, China (Shanghai), Hong Kong, Saigon, Singapore, Burma and Java over the course of four and a half months, interviewing
ORFDORI¿FLDOVEHIRUHSURGXFLQJDQHDUO\SDJHUHSRUWGHWDLOLQJWKHLU¿QG-
14
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
ings.
This report, which did not appear until 1905, embodies the evolving nature
RIFRQFHSWLRQVRIWKHFLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQE\86RI¿FLDOV2SLXPSROLFLHVRI
the various Southeast Asian colonies were judged almost solely on their ability to protect indigenous Southeast Asians from acquiring or maintaining the
vice. The British in Burma, for instance, received criticism for implementing
a system requiring registration only by Burmese in order to purchase opium,
EXWDOORZLQJSHRSOHRIDQ\RWKHUQDWLRQDOLW\PHDQLQJ,QGLDQ&KLQHVHRU(Xropean) to possess amounts appropriate for personal use. The system seemed
doomed to failure, and the report suggested that it had failed. But the report
suggested as well that “Buddhism was once so strong a force as to keep the
Burmese from the use of opium; but this force became weakened by contact
ZLWK(QJOLVKLQÀXHQFH´,PSHULDOLVPZDVQRWDOZD\VFLYLOL]LQJDSSDUHQWO\
The Dutch policy met with greater, although not unconditional, approval. The
report praised the Dutch for abandoning the farm system, and adopting a system of complete government control, which the Dutch claimed would lead
to gradual suppression. The authors appreciated Dutch attention to the need
to create structures and systems which would decrease opportunities for corruption and smuggling, as well as better controlling the choices available to
Javanese. Most critical is this idea that it is the overriding duty of the colonial power to provide protection for indigenous Southeast Asians, while often
&KLQHVH DQG ,QGLDQV LQ WKH FDVH RI %XUPD ZHUH QRW VWDWHG WR EH LQ QHHG
of protection.29 The civilizing mission could be applied only to those as yet
“semi-civilized” or even “uncivilized,” whom one could protect, like a child,
DQGWKHQWHDFK$IWHUWKLVSRLQWQR86RI¿FLDODUJXHGLQIDYRURIDQRSLXP
farm, even as a transitional institution, for the Philippines.
The shift in rhetoric is interesting for two main reasons. First is that from
DSSUR[LPDWHO\86RI¿FLDOVHYHQWKRVHZKRSUHYLRXVO\KDGIRXQGWKH
sale of opium in the Philippines completely acceptable, adopted the language
of the missionaries. Historian Arnold Taylor has argued that the missionaries “were listened to” because, unlike in Britain, the U.S. government had no
¿QDQFLDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHVDOHRIRSLXP(VVHQWLDOO\WKHUHZDVQRUHDVRQQRWWR
listen to these prohibition-minded missionaries.30 But what is puzzling, then,
is that the missionaries initially were not “listened to.” A fuller explanation
acknowledges that notions of the U.S. purpose in the Philippines evolved, especially notions regarding the nature of the duty, or mission, of the American
administration to Filipinos.
A second interesting observation to stem from the shift in rhetoric with
WKLV UHSRUW LV WKDW 86 RI¿FLDOV TXLFNO\ PDGH D WUDQVLWLRQ IURP WKHLU HDUO\
tendency to model U.S. colonial policies on those of the Europeans in the
region, to a tendency to hold up U.S. policy as the exemplar. The image of
Americans believing themselves to be the model for the rest of the world is
more familiar, so the existence of, and shift from, the earlier tendency to imitate has gone largely unnoticed by scholars.31 The importance of this period,
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
15
ZKHQ86RI¿FLDOVSHUFHLYHGWKHPVHOYHVDVHQJDJHGLQDQHQGHDYRUVLPLODUWR
WKDWRI(XURSHDQFRORQLDORI¿FLDOVLVWKDWLWVHQGFDQEHOLQNHGWRDQLQFUHDVH
in calls for region-wide policy changes, in this case regarding opium, to meet
WKHQHZO\VROLGL¿HG$PHULFDQFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHFLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ
A prime example of both of these shifts is William Taft, quoted above as
saying the opium habit among Chinese was no worse than the liquor habit
among Americans. By 1906, he had a different analysis, demonstrated in this
OHWWHUWR7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOW³,GRDJUHHZLWK%LVKRS%UHQWWKDWWKHRSLXP
question in China is one of the most important in the improvement of Chinese
and Oriental civilization.”32 Taft was commenting on the proposal of Bishop
Brent, who had been on the 1903 Philippine Opium Commission and thereafWHUEHFDPHDPDMRU¿JXUHLQWKHDQWLRSLXPPRYHPHQWWKDWWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
convene an international conference to discuss how to encourage the countries
with opium interests in Asia to move toward prohibition.33 Roosevelt was
willing to endorse this proposal, which bore fruit as the 1909 Shanghai Opium
Commission, over which Brent presided as chair.
The Dutch and British governments accepted invitations to the Shanghai
Opium Commission meeting, but worked assiduously to prevent discussion of
the opium situation in the colonies, choosing to emphasize that the magnitude
of the problem in China took precedence. The invitations for the conference were issued only to nations in Asia or those having interest in the opium
problem by virtue of “possession of dependencies in the Orient.” Britain,
without whom there would not have been a viable conference, made its acceptance conditional on extension of the “inquiry... into production of opium
in China.”34 7KHUH WKH RSLXP SUREOHP ZDV VXI¿FLHQWO\ YDVW DV WR SURYLGH
plausible distraction from the colonial opium issues, especially as British (and
WRDOHVVHUH[WHQW'XWFKDQG)UHQFKRI¿FLDOVFRXOGDUJXHWKDWWKHH[FHVVLYH
supply of opium emanating from China made it impossible for them to fully
solve colonial opium consumption. Opium from China would be smuggled
into any place which restricted access too severely. The U.S. delegation had
GLI¿FXOW\GLVPLVVLQJWKHVHFODLPVQRWOHDVWEHFDXVH%LVKRS%UHQW¶VUHSRUWRQ
WKH3KLOLSSLQHVQRWHGWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVWKHJRYHUQPHQWWKHUHKDGLQSUHYHQWLQJ
illicit opium from entering the colony to undermine what was, after 1908, a
policy of absolute prohibition of opium other than as a prescribed medicine.
%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVZRQWKLVEDWWOHEXWDUJXDEO\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZRQWKHZDU
since the U.S. delegation was successful in getting passed a resolution calling
for the “gradual suppression” of opium consumption.35%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVDFFHSWHGWKLVSKUDVHDVDJRRGFRPSURPLVHEHFDXVHLWZDVYDJXHDQGVSHFL¿HG
QRWLPHWDEOH86RI¿FLDOVXVHGWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDODJUHHPHQWWRFRQVLVWHQWO\
press for more action by the other powers in Asia.
The U.S. success in getting acceptance of the “gradual suppression” resolution can be traced in large measure to the skillful deployment of the rhetoric
RIFLYLOL]DWLRQ&HUWDLQO\'XWFKDQG%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVKDGWRDUUDLJQWKHPVHOYHV
RQ WKHVLGHRI FLYLOL]DWLRQRIEHLQJDFLYLOL]LQJLQÀXHQFHLQWKHUHJLRQ ,Q
16
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
'XWFKDQG%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVVWLOOPDGHDWWHPSWVWRDUJXHWKDWRSLXPZDV
GLI¿FXOW WR SURKLELW EHFDXVH LW ZDV D ORQJVWDQGLQJ WUDGLWLRQ DQG WKHUHIRUH
that the government monopolies were better than prohibition in suppressing
consumption. They had, however, endorsed the connection between a goal
RIVXSSUHVVLRQDQGIXO¿OOPHQWRIWKHFLYLOL]LQJPLVVLRQ7KHFRQVWDQWUHIUDLQ
RI%ULWLVKRI¿FLDOVIRULQVWDQFHWKDWRSLXPZDVSULPDULO\DPHGLFLQHZKLFK
indigenous people throughout Asia relied upon was undercut by the U.S. inVLVWHQFH DW 6KDQJKDL WKDW DOO GHOHJDWHV HQGRUVH FRQ¿QLQJ RSLXP XVH ³WR OHgitimate medical practice.” Debates could be, and would be, held about what
was meant by “legitimate” but no one wanted to endorse use of opium for “illegitimate” medical practice. The ability of U.S. representatives to seize this
language for the cause of prohibition was a key factor in their success.36
This struggle continued through the 1910s, and by the early 1920s, the U.S.
victory over rhetoric was nearly complete, even if opium consumption rePDLQHGOHJDOLQFRORQLDO6RXWKHDVW$VLDXQWLO:RUOG:DU,,$WWKH/HDJXH
of Nations conference on opium in 1924-25, U.S. Congressman Stephen
Porter played a provocative role which ultimately caused the breakdown of
WKHFRQIHUHQFH7KHVSHFL¿FLVVXHZKLFKFDXVHGVHYHUDOGHOHJDWLRQVWRVXJgest adjournment was Porter’s proposal to that all participant nations reduce
opium consumption by ten percent per year, and shortly end all non-medical
opium use.37,QPDNLQJWKLVSURSRVDOKHVNLOOIXOO\GHSOR\HGWKHUKHWRULFRI
the civilizing mission in ways which boxed in the more practically-minded
British. Porter noted that some attending nations had prohibited opium in
their home countries “and yet leave unprotected the homes of the peoples”
ZKLFKWKH/HDJXHRI1DWLRQV&RYHQDQWGHVFULEHGDV³SHRSOHVQRW\HWDEOHWR
stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the world” and whose
“well-being and development… form a sacred trust of civilisation.”38 The
British representatives made nearly no attempts, as at earlier conferences, to
defend their opium policies as being anything but a necessary measure due to
the practical impossibility of preventing illicit consumption and smuggling.
Viscount Cecil (Clementi-Smith), the head of the British delegation, merely
stated that there were four primary uses of opium. First was medical and
VFLHQWL¿FDERXWZKLFK³QRTXHVWLRQDULVHV´6HFRQGDQGWKLUGZHUHUHVSHFtively, “eating opium” and “opium-smoking.” About eating opium, primarLO\ SUDFWLFHG LQ ,QGLD &OHPHQWL6PLWK DUJXHG WKDW LW ZDV ³XQGHVLUDEOH´ EXW
was habitual in that part of the world, and “probably harmless” when done
LQPRGHUDWLRQ2SLXPVPRNLQJKHFODLPHGZDV³QHYHUEHQH¿FLDO´DQG³LWLV
certainly the policy of the British Government to bring opium-smoking to an
end throughout the Empire at the earliest possible moment. To put his claim
in context, it is helpful to know that the Straits Settlements netted several million dollars each year from opium sales throughout the 1920s. Finally, fourth,
people consumed opium through its derivatives of morphine and heroin. This,
he stated dramatically, “is the gravest possible evil” and the “most serious asSHFWRIWKHFDVHWKDWZHKDYHWRFRQVLGHU´7KH¿QDOSRLQWZDVGHSOR\HGZLWK
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
17
the clear intention of distracting attention from the others, but even in those,
Clementi-Smith consistently acknowledged that governments could not promote opium consumption and the civilizing mission simultaneously.39
British and Dutch representatives were incredibly frustrated by this hijacking of what they believed to be rational, practical, considered approaches
to opium policy in the context of the civilizing mission. The U.S. insistence
on the moralistic approach of prohibition as the only policy compatible with
the civilizing mission ironically was fully realized as colonialism began to
FRPHWRDQHQGDIWHU:RUOG:DU,,LQERWKWKH8QLWHG1DWLRQVHIIRUWVWRSURhibit narcotics and in the commitment of newly independent Southeast Asian
nations to prohibition as part of their break with colonial rule.
Indiana State University, Terre Haute
[email protected]
ENDNOTES
1. $JUDQWIURPWKH8QLYHUVLW\5HVHDUFK&RXQFLODW,QGLDQD6WDWH8QLYHUVLW\VXSSRUWHGVRPH
RIWKHUHVHDUFKIRUWKLVDUWLFOH,WKDQNWKRVHZKRFRPPHQWHGRQDQHDUOLHUGUDIWRIWKLVSDSHU
presented at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, especially Shawn McHale
and Cary Fraser, as well as the two readers for this journal.
2. William B. McAllister’s authoritative Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century: An International History/RQGRQ5RXWOHGJH$UQROG+7D\ORUAmerican Diplomacy and
WKH1DUFRWLFV7UDI¿F (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969), 25-27.
3. .HQQHWK3RPHUDQ]³,PSHULDOLVPDQGµ&LYLOL]LQJ¶0LVVLRQV3DVWDQG3UHVHQW´Daedalus
134,2 (Spring 2005), 34-45 explores the idea of a civilizing mission in a comparative context. See
DOVR-RVHS0)UDGHUD³5HDGLQJ,PSHULDO7UDQVLWLRQV6SDQLVK&RQWUDFWLRQ%ULWLVK([SDQVLRQ
DQG$PHULFDQ,UUXSWLRQ´LQColonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American
StateHG$OIUHG:0F&R\DQG)UDQFLVFR6FDUDQR0DGLVRQ:,8QLYHUVLW\RI:LVFRQVLQ3UHVV
2009).
4. An overview of both strands of the civilizing mission can be found in Nicholas Tarling, ed.
The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, vol. 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), especially chapter 3.
5. 0F.LQOH\¶VTXRWHLVGLVFXVVHGEULHÀ\LQ'DYLG-RHO6WHLQEHUJThe Philippines: A Singular
and a Plural Place (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 65. For an extended exploration of the
issues of tutelage, see Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political
Culture in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), 25-34.
6. A classic source is Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims,
([HFXWLRQ DQG ,PSDFW RI $PHULFDQ &RORQLDO 3ROLF\ (Westport: Greenwood Press,
1980). More recently, Patricio Abinales has written provocatively on the subject, “Progressive0DFKLQH &RQÀLFW LQ (DUO\7ZHQWLHWK&HQWXU\ 86 3ROLWLFV DQG &RORQLDO6WDWH %XLOGLQJ LQ WKH
Philippines,” in The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives ed. JuOLDQ*RDQG$QQH/)RVWHU'XUKDP'XNH8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV)RUGLVFXVVLRQRI
the health projects, see Warwick Anderson, Colonial Pathologies: American Tropical Medicine,
Race, and Hygiene in the Philippines (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
7. Carl A. Trocki, Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800-1910
,WKDFD&RUQHOO8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
8. Trocki, Opium and Empire, 67.
9. Carl A. Trocki, Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian
Opium Trade 1750-1950/RQGRQ5RXWOHGJH
10. Trocki, Opium and Empire, 70-78.
18
Social History of Alcohol and Drugs, Volume 24, No 1 (Winter 2010)
11. Commission appointed to Enquire into Matters relating to the Use of Opium in the Straits
Settlements and the Federated Malay States, Proceedings vol. 1 Reports and Annexures/RQGRQ
+06WDWLRQHU\2I¿FH
12. See James Rush, Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910,WKDFD&RUQHOO8QLYHUVLW\3UHVVDQG&KDQWDO'HVFRXUV*DWLQQuand
O¶RSLXP ¿QDQoDLW OD FRORQLVDWLRQ HQ ,QGRFKLQH O¶HODERUDWLRQ GH OD UpJLH JHQHUDOH GH O¶RSLXP
(Paris: Editions l’Hartmann, 1992).
13. Ewald Vanvugt, :HWWLJ2SLXP-DDU1HGHUODQGVH2SLXPKDQGHOLQGH,QGLVKH$UFKLSHO
(Haarlem: Onze Tijd, 1985), 341-51; B.N. van der Velden, De Opiumregie in Nederlands-Indie
(Batavia, 1937), 75-82.
14. W.P. Groenveldt, Rapport over het Opium-Monopolie in Fransch Indo-China in verband
met de Vraag in hoever Beheer in Regie van dat Middel voor Nederlandsch-Indie Wenschelijk
is%DWDYLD/DQGVGUXNNHULMHVS%HSDOLQJHQYRRUGH2SLXPUHJLHRS-DYD
en Madoera (Ordonnatie van 15 October 1898; Staatsbeld 1898 No. 277, Gewijzigd bij Staatsbladen 1901 no. 62, 1902 no. 174 en 1906 no. 317, published as Wettelijke Bepalingen voor de
Opiumregie%DWDYLD/DQGVGUXNNHULMAdministratieve Voorschriften voor de Opiumregie
%DWDYLD /DQGVGUXNNHULM (ULF7DJOLDFR]]R Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling
and States along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865-1915 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2005), 128-39, 186-96.
15. Royal Commission on Opium, Final Report vol. VI, part 1: The Report with Annexures
/RQGRQ +0 6WDWLRQHU\ 2I¿FH 'XWFK RI¿FLDO TXRWHG LQ 9DQYXJW Wettig Opium,
354.
16. Royal Commission on Opium, Final Report vol. VI, part 1: 87; Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-IndieYROµV*UDYHQKDJH0DUWLQXV1LMKRII
17. David Courtwright, Dark Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 9-34 for a careful discussion of the complicated issues of
estimating addiction.
18. Paul A. Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the
%ULWLVKDQG86(PSLUHV´DQG'RQQD-$PRURVR³,QKHULWLQJWKHµ0RUR3UREOHP¶
Muslim Authority and Colonial Authority in British Malaya and the Philippines,” both in Go and
Foster, American Colonial State, 43-91, 118-47.
19. /\PDQ*DJH6HFUHWDU\RIWKH7UHDVXU\WR(OLKX5RRW6HFUHWDU\RI:DU$SULO¿OH
HQWU\5HFRUG*URXS5*5HFRUGVRIWKH%XUHDXRI,QVXODU$IIDLUV8QLWHG6WDWHV
National Archives (USNA), College Park MD. Smoking opium was legal in the United States
until 1909, and other forms until the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914.
20. William F. Spurgin, U.S. Collector of Customs, Manila, to Secretary of War, December 21,
¿OHHQWU\5*861$
21. ([DFWO\KRZLWZDVGHWHUPLQHGZKRZDV³&KLQHVH´,KDYHQRWEHHQDEOHWRGLVFRYHU7KH
proposed US law to establish an opium concession, which never passed, would have limited
opium use to “full-blooded Chinese.” Proposed law “An Act to suppress the sale of opium to the
)LOLSLQRSHRSOH«´QG¿OHHQWU\5*861$6SXUJLQWR6HF:DU'HFHPEHU
¿OHHQWU\5*861$
22. From the earliest presence of American missionaries in China, in the 1830s, they had
viewed opium as harmful, but sometimes as an absolute harm, while at other times as proviGHQWLDOO\RSHQLQJWKHFRXQWU\WR&KULVWLDQLQÀXHQFH6HHWKHGLVFXVVLRQLQ0LFKDHO&/D]LFK
“American Missionaries and the Opium Trade in Nineteenth-Century China,” Journal of World
History 17 (2006) especially 212-14, 218-20.
23. 5HY +& 'X %RVH WR 86 6HQDWRU -RKQ 0F/DXULQ LQ PHPR RI 6HSWHPEHU ¿OHHQWU\5*861$'X%RVHZDVZLVHWRZULWH6HQDWRU0F/DXULQRQHRIWHQ
Democrats to vote in favor of the treaty annexing the Philippines in February 1899. Suspicions
WKDW0F/DXULQKDGEHHQUHZDUGHGIRUKLVYRWHOHGWRDFFXVDWLRQVRIEULEHU\E\WKHRWKHU6RXWK
&DUROLQDVHQDWRU%HQ7LOOPDQ0F/DXULQFDOOHG7LOOPDQDOLDUDQGWKHWZRH[FKDQJHGEORZVRQ
WKH6HQDWHÀRRUOHDGLQJWRWKHLUFHQVXUHE\6HQDWHFROOHDJXHV0F/DXULQGLGKDYHDELOLW\WRJDLQ
the administration’s ear on issues related to the Philippines. Discussed in Frank H. Golay, Face
of Empire: United States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946 (Madison: University of Wisconsin
Foster: Opium, the US, and the Civilizing Mission in Colonial South-East Asia
19
Press, 1998), 41-42, 81-82.
24. 3KLOLSSLQH&RPPLVVLRQHU+HQU\&,GHWR6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH-RKQ+D\0D\¿OH
1023-5, entry 5, RG 350, USNA.
25. William H. Taft (Governor of the Philippines) to Elihu Root (Secretary of War), July 13,
¿OHHQWU\5*861$
26. 7DIWWR5RRW-XO\¿OHHQWU\5*861$,WLVYHU\GLI¿FXOWWR
GHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUXVDJHKDGLQFUHDVHGRUHYHQZKHWKHURSLXPLPSRUWVZHUHXS,VXVSHFWWKDW
it was easier to acquire opium in the early years of US rule, but also that some previously underground opium consumption merely had become public.
27. See discussions in Edgar Wickberg’s classic The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), 118-19 and Wong Kwok-chu, The Chinese in the
Philippine Economy, 1898-1941 (Manila: Ateneo University Press, 1999), 25, 29-33.
28. Charles H. Fahs ((Missionary Editor, Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal
&KXUFKWR7KHRGRUH5RRVHYHOW-XQH¿OHHQWU\5*861$)RUWKH
SUHSULQWHGVOLSVVHH¿OHHQWU\5*861$7DIW¶VDQG5RRW¶V-XQHDQG-XO\
WHOHJUDPVRQWKHLVVXHFDQEHIRXQGUHW\SHGLQ¿OHHQWU\5*861$$UQROG
+7D\ORU³$PHULFDQ&RQIURQWDWLRQZLWK2SLXP7UDI¿FLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV´3DFL¿F+LVWRULFDO
ReviewFODLPVWKDWWKHUHZHUHSUHSULQWHGVOLSV,GLGQRWFRXQWWKHP
P\VHOIEXWWKH¿JXUHLVFUHGLEOHHYHQORZEDVHGRQZKDW,VDZLQWKH¿OHV
29. U.S. Philippine Commission Opium Committee, Report of the Committee Appointed by the
3KLOLSSLQH&RPPLVVLRQWR,QYHVWLJDWHWKH8VHRI2SLXPDQG7UDI¿F7KHUHLQ (Washington, D.C.:
86:DU'HSDUWPHQW%XUHDXRI,QVXODU$IIDLUV
30. Taylor, American Diplomacy, 30.
31. Some attention, mostly by scholars of other countries, is being paid to this issue. See AmoURVR³,QKHULWLQJWKHµ0RUR3UREOHP¶´LQ*RDQG)RVWHUAmerican Colonial State, 118-47.
32. William H. Taft to Theodore Roosevelt, September 1, 1906, roll 104, Microcopy 862, RG
59, Records of the Department of State, USNA.
33. Charles H. Brent to Theodore Roosevelt, July 24, 1906, in Foreign Relations of the United
States (Washington, D.C., 1906), 1: 1360-61.
34. Brent to Roosevelt, July 24, 1906 and Alvee Adee to Whitelaw Reid, Sept. 27, 1906, both
in FRUS, 1906, part 1: 360-62.; G. J. Kidston, Dec. 31, 1907 “Prohibition of Opium Smoking
in China,” British Documents on Foreign Affairs, part 1, Series E Asia, volume xiii China misc.,
526.
35. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO2SLXP&RPPLVVLRQReport of the International Opium Commission, Shanghai, China, February 1-February 26, 1909, vol. 1 Proceedings (Shanghai: North-China Daily
News and Herald, 1909), 20, 49-50, 84.
36. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO2SLXP&RPPLVVLRQReport of the International Opium Commission, 46-49,
61.
37. McAllister provides a useful brief summary of this complicated development. See McAllister, Drug Diplomacy, 69-70.
38. /HDJXHRI1DWLRQVRecords of the Second Opium Conference, Geneva, November 17, 1924
to February 19, 1925 vol. 1 Plenary Meetings, Texts of the Debates&0;,*Hneva, 1925), 115.
39. /HDJXHRI1DWLRQVRecords of the Second Opium Conference vol. 1, 148.