BYU Studies Quarterly
Volume 7 | Issue 2
Article 5
4-1-1966
The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao
Tse-tung
Diane Monson
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq
Recommended Citation
Monson, Diane (1966) "The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung," BYU Studies Quarterly: Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Studies
Quarterly by an authorized administrator of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected].
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
strategy
joseph stalin
conflict
mao
alao
fiao tse tung
flao
DIANE
diame
dlane MONSON
world
various crises around
complexities
causes
intensified public confusion concerning
particular
order
conflicts
feasible alternatives
positive action
achieve meaningful solution
sino
sine soviet dispute
confessions
soothed already troubled brows
whats
really confidently knows
finally made
chain
events
dispute
wherefores
whys
ghys
ed political stereotypes disinformation
beleaguered
beleaguerer
beleaguer
lack
comelements let alone
courage understanding
available analyses
problem yet
plexities
sino soviet problem
issues
historical background
incomplete definition
essential frustration
disintellectual gaming
trying
problem compounded
applied tension dispute
cern
appropriate term
hairs
splitting
split break rift cleavage conflict etc suchsplitting
common ground
tends however
overlook
soviet
chinese camps actually share both
intactics
idal
military strategy
itai
ital theory
political
Polit
difference
nces
aces
nuances
shared elements andnua
sensitivity
essential committends
make
onlooker oblivious
conflict
both sides
ongoing strategy
ment
causes issues
delineate
thus attempt
paper
rather
rathe focus
but willrathe
particular bue
sino soviet conflict
conflict
broader aspects
communist theory
0n
able
view
reader
believed
way
specific dispute
greater perspective
communist theory occurred first
ex
since
exploitation
adaptation
since stalin
pivotal figure
russia
distactics
both strategy
communist theory
mao tse tung
him moving then
cussion begins
foremost chinese theorist
dr
monson
assistant professor
political science
brigham young
university
117
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
1
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
BRIGHAM YOUNG
118
university
STUDIES
theory
totally absorbed
communists
evidenced
significance
supreme dedication
theory per se
almost mechanical acceptance
provoking
seemingly dehumanized fanaticism
mainly
theory
practice communist theory provides
realization
comprehensive explanation
working dynamic
inevitable outcome
time once
events
sequence
cause
outestablished
factors
history
effectively chanhuman participator
come determined
end
using
making
outcome
task
neled
means 2
causes
practice
communist theory
integration
derivatives
tactics
view
strategy
result
strictly logical deduction without revolutionary
theory
revolutionary movement 3
cannot
theory
vanguard
act
advanced theory
party guided
theory
application
fight 4 whereas strategy
direct practical application
broad context tactics involves
particular daily
strategic principles
theoretical
situation
1
concerned
tsarism
rism
war against tsa
winning
war
concerned
tactic
campaign
fighting
whereas strategy
wide purposes
bourgeoisie
whole
15
dictate
action does
categorization
does orient
particular situation
specific decision
contriburesponsibility
awareness
communist
resultant zealousness
total historical commitment
tion
conflict whose characteristic
strategy
further sparked
continued discord breeds peculiar dynamism
evaluation
exposition comparison
illuminated
mao
joseph stalin
conflict propounded
strategy
tse rung
tung
comsubstantive guideposts
western search
future strategy
present
munist ideology
although
committee
munism p 5
manism
ikid
ibid p 24
ibid p 5
foreign affairs
strategy
tactics
world com-
clr
cit
loc cir
ibid p 6
loc cit
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
2
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
STRATEGY
CONFLICT
STALIN
MAO
119
inattention
method
communism
what obscured
conflict
sustained period
time ie
space
7
conflict
method
conflict both serves
protracted
establishment
due
communist society
goal
self accelerating excesses
method appears
becomes
end
itself
communist conception
reality
detailed
struggle
power
comprehensive
theater
methods
terms
goals
context
itsgoals
marx
limitless contest
first formulated
engels
socio
recognized
economic forces
world area lenin
socioeconomic
conflict integral communist development
11
discuss conflict outside
historical
concrete setting
misunderstand elementary dialectic materialism
economic evolution
unc tures
various punctures
unctures
depending
junctures
upon changing political national cultural social
conditions differing types
struggle may become important
even predominant 10
concerned
stategy
indeed
communist theory
stately
diverse altime
period
opponent
annihilating
conflict
utilization
though coordinated
ordinated tactics
wear down
keep
means
opponent off balance
geared
objective
total conquest
resistance
objective
procedure
extremely close attunement
almost makes
means
method
conflict
highlights
end appear identical
inevitable
stalin adds
implying
lenin analysis
internal
conflict
external contradictions
result
within society
prorepresented respectively between
between socialism
capitalleta riat
letariat
peasantry
implied
single nation
ism
certain inadequateness
several countries
efforts
need
proletariat
external conflict moreover
resolve
technique proexternal conflict even
implied internal involvement
motes
contradiction between
elimination
prolethese theoretitariat
peasantry apparently oblivious
establishment
cal inconsistencies stalin dauntlessly envisions
strausz hupe protracted conflict p
robert strauszhupe
strausz
strauszhupe
hupe op cit p 29
loc cit
ibid pp
30
ap 29
2930
prog
problems
63
Prob
leins
joseph stalin pfob
leninism p 65
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
7
3
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
BRIGHAM YOUNG
120
university
STUDIES
achieved
proletariat
maintained
dictatorship
class struggle 12
bloodless violent
persistent struggle sanguinary
administrapeaceful military
aaministra
economic educational
tive against
forces
old society
traditions
1
diccontinued contradictory vein stalin assures
merely indeed
tator ship
preclude
proletariat
tatorship
dictatoreven mainly 14
use
violence
labor
higher type social organization
ship justified
inevitable
capitalism
reasoning
compared
indeed presumptuous pricommunism
complete victory
violence
ambiguity
nature
marily due
features
logical outproletarian organization
comes
appear
procedural
vagueness
irrelevance
theory
reality
organizational chaos
admit practical freedom
latter possibility
unconstrained commitment
intensify
danger
conflict
socialism preextension
stalin preoccupation
inherent theoretical conflict
sents
interesting case study
does
term socialism appear
ffacade
theoretical
thcoretical indecision
realization
communism
stafin
statin
stalin
development provokes discordant interpretation
nisin 1924
advocates socialism
foundations
Leni
leninism
lenz
lehi
result
capitalist imperialism
country
socialism regardless
make
country vulnerable
admits
become industrialized yet
degree
achieve
impossible
organize socialist production
several
final victory
socialism without revolutions
latter forextremity
advanced countries realizing
tactoctober revolution
Reio lutlo n
reto
lation stalin substituted
mulation
mu
reiolutlo
acs
proposition
ics
russian communists december 1924
irs
ics
socialist society
must build
proletariat
achieve
does
complete
mean
sense
socialism 10
final victory
counterrevolution
counter revolution
danger
guaranteed against
11
stalin op clr
cir
cit
ibid p 42
141ZW
bid
fid p 25
loc
loc
lor
11
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
R
NN
crr
cir
clr
cit
crt
p
carev hunt
37
57
theor
practice
picc
Piec tice
tire
397
communism p 197
4
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
STRATEGY
CONFLICT STALIN
MAO
121
problems
rationale
leninism stalin explained
extended revolution
felt
previous rejection
poskept intact between
important distinction should
efforts
sibility
lity
sibi
socialism
building
country
country considering itself fully
impossibility
counter revolution without
victorious
guaranteed against counterrevolution
number
did
revolution
countries 111717
socialism
building
stalin later emphatically affirm
achieved
indicated
country
actually
socialism
victory
complete even
encircled
hostile
long
russia
particular country
hazy
seemingly contradictory
capitalistic states 38 thus
lack
measure
re formulations
stalin position indicate
am
comclear positive progr
lack
seem
proga
program
ambivalences
conflict
mask
pensated
pen sated
imcamouflaged through
thus
stalin theorizing
plemen tation
uncompromising policies
plementation
aggressive
sources
lack
reasoned analysis
despite
conflict stalin staunchly advocontradictions
causes
illuscates
inevitability
war
prediction
words
weasel use
assigned absolutrates
communist role
outside insinuation
tion
eve
nineteenth congress
instigating conflict
inevitability
CPSU
october 1952 stalin attributed
affirmed
peaceful policy
war
capitalist states
active enimmune
soviet union
war between
capitalist
emphasized
gagement stalin
unlikely since
capitalists
peace
camp
camp
avoid war where
very existence
seek
capitalaware
reviewed moreover capitalist states
ism
attack
them
russia peaceful policy precluded
conflict
soviet involvement
soviet union 19 yet
stalin writings
does find theoretical exposition
1
greatest difficulty
necesgreatest historical problem
russian revolution
call forth
necessity
solve international problems
sity
world revolution 200
conflict
inevitable
carew hunt op cit
clr p 199
cir
mid p 200
mis
wd
legislative reference service khrushchev
world forces p 2
2stalin
estalin
stalin op cit
fit p 19
1
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
shifting balance
5
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
BRIGHAM YOUNG
122
university
STUDIES
stalin
nevertheless balanced
aggressive clarion call
defensive soviet position
surrounded
intimation
governments
openly express
people classes
21
us 1121
note how stalin
interesting
intense hatred
reader
words
attaches connotative value
declarations
badness
impressed
allegations
certain process
occurrence
claim
ipso facto
necessary foundations
theoretical aggressiveness without
effective
uneducated public
seem
curtailment
powerful instruments
society controlled
enforcement
mere declaraalthough stalin technique affirming
significant
tion makes truth
questionable validity
Leni
nisin
illuminates
foundations
leninism
section
section
soviet tactics stalin theory
present reality
fabre
fibre
soviet foreign
zealously inculcated
having three main
policy stalin accused capitalist countries
frictions
I1
2
3
indignation
capital versus labor ie increase
capitalism 22
foundations
working class against
capitalist extension
capital versus colonies ie
colonial powers desire
influence versus
spheres
liberate themselves
uneven development
capital versus capital ie
leads
bitter
different capitalist countries
countries
struggle between
communist tactic aggravating these
analysis furthers
almost every soviet move today
frictions
extent
these frictions
least
motivated
exploitation
weaken
best way
outapparent rationale
do
easier
side world
play upon frictions
lack
theoretical implementations
quiet frictions thus
destructruism
practical specifics compensated
constructive
tive policy easler
easier
wars
contradictions conflicts
utilization
advantage
states
between non
nonproletarian classes
proletarian
communist re
strengthening
adversary
weakening
ibid p 66
ajoseph
2joseph
joseph stalin foundations
21
32
ap 31
ibid pp
3132
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
nisin p 31
Leni
leninism
6
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
CONFLICT
STRATEGY
STALIN
MAO
123
view
carefully considered
relating
both ideological impact
earthly gains
human actions
serves
tactics must
guided
transitory interests
immediate
guided b motives
movement
must
build
leave firm soil
political effect still less must
aims
castles
adapted
air tactics must
possibilities
strategy 24
utilization
resources
consists principally
I1
2
3
4
maximum stategic
strategic
egic advance
stat
revolution
main forces
concentration
decisive moment
vulnerable point
enemy 25
decisive blow
moment
selection
striking
crisis
coincide
moment
2
attained
highest pitch 21
course having
recognition
mapped
commatter what difficulties
must
pursued
road 27
encountered
plications may
effect correserves calculated
maneuvering
inretreat
rect retreat
enemy strong
evitable 28
similar thematic implications
tactical advice
chain
locate
given moment
single link
control
seized upon
events
enable us
achievement
whole chain
ground
prepare
strategic success 29
thus
weakness
timing
paraexploitation
communist method
steadfast importance
mount
lesconflict thrives
opponent disabilities
sened
existence
strong enemy
although mao
tse tung
ambiguity
deplores
stalin writings
explain
terms war
peace used
internal
complex social realities 30 mao himself draws upon
strategy
tactics
stalin foundations
ibid p 93
ibid p 94
ci t
loc cit
proletarian revolution p 28
leninism p 92
strausz
strauszhupe
hupe
p
24
21ibid1
ibid p 98
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
op cit
1
7
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
124
BRIGHAM YOUNG
university
STUDIES
necessity
explain
society
contradictions
almost paradoxically
greater development
abstraction
stalin analysis
conflict
theoretical
internal contradictions
chiefly due
social changes
productive
contradiction between
society namely
relations
forces
contradiction beproduction
classes
old
contradiction between
tween
new 31
mao like stalin sees
inevitable juxtaposition
contradictions resulting
apparently positive re
realignment although
alignment
ends
means involved
questioning
sought
development
starts
forward
new
society
hew
contradictions
impels society
old
process
superseding
32
moreover like stalin mao tse tung
stresses
imadds
international relationships
strength
portance
source
conquantity
implication
power itself
weak
flict
enemy
facing
strong
analysis fortified
danger subjugation 33 however
allows
theoretical relativity
strong measure
dynamism
practical strategy
absolute
either side
strength
superiority
nature
continually changing
conditions
course
war
long
employ correct military
decisive change
take place
political strategy
relative strength well
relative position
superiority
inferiority
bring aboutthe enemy
change
defeat
our victory 34
mao conceives
f ecting
effecting
acting
stategy
stately protracted conflict ef
relative strength
revolutionary
change
war regarded
multi dimensional
multidimensional
status quo
settlement
highest forms
struggle
necessity
contradictions 30
politics cannot prousual means 30
ceed
psycho
political economic
mao tse tung
contradiction p 13
loc cit
mao tse tung selected works 11
II 18
181
1
ibid p 182
maonw
H arthur steiner ed maona
afaofrm
mao selected works
work p 202
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
book p 13
souicebook
sourcebook
Source
8
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
STRATEGY
CONFLICT STALIN
MAO
125
nourished
conflict howlogical forces37
arsenal
forces37
mao theorization
ever
fundamental conlooms
tra diction
how war
tradiction
solve contradiction
war actually thrives
contradiction
war
viewed
especially
logical impasse
communists
protracted
conflict
solution
victory
settlement thus
mao theoretical frame
reference
wholly different
mao
level
traditional western approach
just
sets
war
criteria
synonymous
progress although
comdetermination
justness
progress
munists
unjust wars
opposed
impede progress
opposed progressive just wars 38
length
war entirely depends
amount
change
t
relative strength
communists
strength3939
opponents
term war acquired
qualitative haziness
thus
mao himself criticizes
easily assume
conflict
dilemwhatever form continues until victory even then
how
deal theoretically
ma might arise
practically
society mao
alleged internal dynamics
poses
does
problem
attempt solution
struggle
contradiction ceaseless 40
within
contradiction
socialism antagonism disappears
antagonism
utterly different under
contradiction exists 41
utilizing various fronts mao views
war
winning
methods
conseparamount objective regardless
theoretical assumptions
quences
quences military success prepared
whereby
each
two aspects
every contradiction finds
preeach
existence
supposition
opposite aspect
two contradictory aspects according
given conditions
transform itself
tends
opposite aspect 42
words these statements
interpreted
mean
fortified
communism
opposition
influence
secondary power
even though might
strausz
strauszhupe
hupe
mao
abd
ibid
lbd
mao
mao
nao
ibid
42
ibzd
ibid
Ibid
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
op clr
cir
cit
p 32
p 199
selected works
p 193
contradiction p 53
p
52
p 42
9
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
BRIGHAM YOUNG
126
university
world
given moment
moreover military victory readied
STUDIES
inevitably succeed
strategic crystallization
enemy advances
retreat
harass
enemy halts
attack
enemy tires
enemy retreats
pursue 43
mao
war ascertained
winning
highly organized implementations
strong mass base 44
strong party
strong red army
peasants
constrategically located territorial bases 45 although mao
terms
cerned
organization mainly
explosively blended
membership
peasants 46
fervor
maximize
strategy
theory
ingredients
revolutionary ferment
theoretical disstalin ruthlessly gear
both mao
conflict
eventual communist vicutilization
course
comstuff
bitter end
tory conflict
vaguemunism draws
very sustenance 17 although
both expositions
deep rooted definitive causes
ness
zealous consciousness
historical process
conflict
inexorably illuminated
unquestioning justitiming
verre
conassume
conflict
fi
fication
jalson
jarson
raison
detre
dare
ralson vetre
stages
very explicitness
flict serves
advantage
nevertheless counterbalmilitary advance
political
blindness
anced
present
certain indefiniteness
own distrust
possible boomerang repercussions
potential tactical immobility
imperviousness
however
theoretical shortcomings
political setbacks
dynamic aggressiveness
fearful
compensated
result
illiteracy
people theoretically wooed mainly
awesomely powerful politiparty disciplined education
doctrinal adherence
cal mechanisms
finally
mao selected works p 164
benjamin 1I schwartz chinese communism
rise mao p 189
igo
schwartz op cit p 190
magist
maoist development demonstrates fact
chinese communism
imbued
sincere faith
party organized along leninist lines
communist partyorganized
organicc
organ
exist quite apart
certain basic marxist leninist tenets
basic concern
ibid p 191 indeed
proletariat
connection
connect
conceal
severance
chinese communist party
minimize
ddevelopment indichinese party
proletarian base ibid p 192
international conflict
contrast
conflict within communism
cates
tries
promote
strausz hupe op cit p 19
strauszhupe
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
10
Monson: The Strategy of Conflict: Joseph Stalin and Mao Tse-tung
STRATEGY
CONFLICT STALIN
MAO
127
communism theoretical pretensions
mastery
stimulation
conflict
largely supported
devastating
technique
coordinating
political warfare
phases
ordinating
graduated violence
possible relationships between states
cultural 48
groups political economic
effective strategy
ubiquitous protracted
waging
conflict must
revolutionary strategy
necessity
loose
wit
strategy
revolutionary forces
puts
technology
politics economics culture science
own use
15
coordinated
ordinated
comcomprehensive qualities
abetted
munist strategy
conflict
enlarged vision
whereby military action
warmany forms
view
fare
enormous impact
western strategist
traditionally views quick decisive military victory
conconsiders political objectives
clusive
responsicontrast
bility
communists
politicians
diplomats
view policy
coin
war
being
two sides
strategy
conflict expounded
strategy
joseph stalin
mao tse tung presents challenge
survival
democratic
cruci alness
dire crucialness
contest real
peace loving nations
immediate
merely future oriented
imaginary
conflict
theoretical ivory tower
hypothesis
counteraction complex
approach
strategic policy
structural details
crux
our
implementations
result
positive response
deep awareness
conflict
intends
sustained clarity
strategy
decision making despite
deceive
continued
pressures
best features
emphasis
our system
improvement
beliefs
well
correction
our weaknesses
greater leadership
means
insight
strengthening our inmao tse tung
fluence abroad
formulations
stalin
forms
theory
presented
strategy whose effectiveness
ti veness
determined
testing grounds
reality
determined
similar fashion democratic theory
reality
details specifics
particulars
realities
ibid p 2
orbid
10
oibid
ib id p io
ap 3940
ibid pp
39 40
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1966
11
BYU Studies Quarterly, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1966], Art. 5
BRIGHAM YOUNG
128
university
STUDIES
determine the winner but the strength and identity of both
conflict and peace are at stake
note see map on page
books cited
158 of this issue
bibliography
carew hunt robert N the theory and practice of communism new york
the macmillan company 1958
mao tse tung on contradiction new york international publishers 1953
selected works volume 11
II london lawrence and wishart ltd
1954
schwartz benjamin 1I chinese communism and the rise of mao cambridge
harvard university press 1952
stalin joseph foundations of leninism new york international publishers
1932
problems of leninism new york international publishers 1934
Source book selections from the writings
steiner H arthur ed magism
maoism A sourcebook
of mao tse tung los angeles university of california 1952
strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution new york harper and
brothers 1959
strausz hupe robert protracted conflict new york harper and brothers
strauszhupe
1959
1
periodicals cited
committee on foreign affairs US house of representatives the strategy and
and session
tactics of world communism 80th congress 2nd
legislative reference service US library of congress khrushchev on the
shifting balance of world forces 86th congress ist session
4
http://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol7/iss2/5
t
12