Dr Aleksandra Gliszczyńska-Grabias
Memory Laws or Memory Loss?
Europe in Search of its Historical Identity
As noted by Jim Hoagland, Europe is a continent colonized by its past and memory. This
statement seems particularly true with reference to the history of 20th century Europe,
which is reflected by, among other things, the continually growing number of monuments,
museums, and other places and symbols which commemorate the past, and in the form of
memory laws established in the states of the Old Continent.
History, memory and national identity are phenomena which are not easily captured by the
language of law. Nevertheless, the legislators of many European states, including the
legislators of the European Union, have established legal regulations aimed at shaping the
specific historical memory of European societies. These laws are most often the expression
of the legislator’s desire to regulate the difficult problems left over from the previous era,
which for many reasons are still the object of disputes or constitute national traumas.
At the same time, many crucial questions arise: are legal measures, defined by some as
social engineering and the imposition of “imperative” versions of memory, consistent with
the principles inherent in open, democratic and free societies in Europe? Or are these laws,
although sometimes limiting individual freedom, established for a just cause - stopping those
who want to ‘cover up the truth with lies’?
Especially Poland is an interesting example of a state which, while putting its own history on
a pedestal of national values, wrestles with its difficult and often traumatic past, every now
and then mixing it with present-day politics and public life. While living for over four decades
under communist rule, the Poles did not have the opportunity to engage in an open, public
debate on history. In such circumstances the nation’s own guilt for acts in the past was
overlooked or ignored. Thus, memory laws established in newly democratic Poland must be
considered in this historical context.
The main argument of my paper will be to show how the use of legal means in case of
memory laws can be considered both harmful and necessary. In my presentation I wish to
discuss cases when states adopt legal regulations that sanction ‘reversed memory’ – I claim
that such memory laws should be opposed vehemently. If, however, it is individuals or
groups in the state who try to bring a fraudulent vision of history into public discourse, the
state must have the right to respond, also with the instruments of law.