A single problem with a single answer:
The institutional sources of framing in contemporary French prostitution
policy (2002-2012)
Abstract
Despite the primacy of the abolitionist policy regime, adopted in 1960 and which is centred
on concerns about the wellbeing of the “victims” of prostitution, contemporary French
prostitution policy has sustained a variety of inconsistent policies. Alone, these reforms have
not threatened the established abolitionist regime. Together, though, they amount to a
cumulative transformation of what French abolitionism stands for. This challenges traditional
conceptions of significant institutional and paradigmatic change as predicated on critical
junctures. This paper therefore argues that understanding the manner in which policy actors,
seeking to further their preferred policy options, garner legitimacy and support for their
project within established institutional frameworks requires analysing the interplay between
the constraining effect of institutions and the creative and constituting effect of strategic
framing. Presenting evidence from the preliminary process tracing of recent two policy
reform projects, this paper consequently suggests that framing prostitution policy proposals
as compliant with the dominant ideational framework is necessary but insufficient to
guarantee reform success. Drawing on ideational and institutional policy theory, the paper
concludes that, by virtue of the continuously (re)constructed and negotiated nature of
dominant ideational frameworks, the abolitionist paradigm is rendered capable of housing an
inconsistent variety of policies through the strategic framing of policy options.
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
1
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
Introduction
Since it signed the 1949 United Nations Treaty on the “Elimination of the Traffic in Persons
and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others” in 1960, the French state has adopted an
abolitionist stance when dealing with the issue of prostitution. Nevertheless, despite the
primacy of the abolitionist regime, which is centred on concerns about the wellbeing of the
“victims” of prostitution, contemporary French prostitution policy has sustained a surprising
variety of inconsistent policies. As such, these reforms have not threatened the established
policy regime. Such changes are usually apprehended as incremental adjustments to changing
external conditions, with large scale reforms considered the result of critical junctures.
Nevertheless, without amounting to regime change, the aggregation of these changes has led
to a revision of the dominant understand of what, exactly abolitionism is. Traditional
understandings of abolitionism as the abolition of the regulation of prostitution are being
overtaken by neo-abolitionist efforts to abolish the phenomenon of prostitution itself.
To date, the limited attention paid to such ‘cumulatively transformative’ (Palier, 2005)
changes has focused on the manner in which policy entrepreneurs seek to overcome
institutional constraints by attempting to ‘sell’ their reform projects as ‘tinkering’ around the
edges of established institutions. As yet, however, insufficient attention has been paid to the
manner in which proponents of particular policy options attempt to ‘sell’ these changes to
garner legitimacy and support. Through the lens of recent developments in French
prostitution policy, this paper therefore argues that, while the dominant institutional
framework constrains the range of policy action deemed plausible and legitimate, its
continuously (re)constructed and negotiated nature also grants policy entrepreneurs the
strategic and creative space within which to undertake the meaning-work necessary to both
garner support and establish their proposals’ symbolic compliance with the established
framework. Through the strategic framing of policy options, the abolitionist paradigm is
rendered capable of housing an inconsistent variety of policies.
The interplay between strategic framing and the influence of the institutional sources of
framing is evinced through a comparison of two cases based on the preliminary tracing of the
contemporary French prostitution policy process. The first case, that of the 2003 domestic
security bill, serves to illustrate the necessity for actors to frame their policy proposals as
compatible with the core abolitionist tenets, even in cases where political advantages could be
thought to confer sufficient freedom for actors to forgo dominant ideas and beliefs and in
favour of more strategically instrumental ones. Contrastingly, the second case – that of an illfated attempt to repeal the anti-soliciting measures contained in the 2002 domestic security
bill – is an example of a policy proposal which, despite being a priori compatible with
traditional abolitionist policy ideas, was dismissed largely because it did not meet the
minimum compatibility framing requirements.
A puzzle
The contemporary structure of French prostitution policy is predicated on fundamental beliefs
about the nature of prostitution and the appropriate means of dealing with it. The refusal to
2
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
distinguish between forced and voluntary instances of prostitution entails that the French state
approaches prostitution as a single policy problem. To this single problem, the French state a
single acceptable and legitimate policy response: the abolition of the regulation of
prostitution as a state sanctioned activity or form of labour. The ideas, beliefs and values that
underpin the abolitionist regime have contributed to a relatively stable policy paradigm.
Nevertheless, despite the dominance of the French abolitionist paradigm the policies that
govern the intervention of the state in prostitution have varied significantly over the last five
decades. Policies premised on tolerance of prostitution between consenting adults have given
way to some that all but outlaw street-based prostitution by targeting solicitation and, most
recently, to a political demand for the de facto prohibition of prostitution through the
criminalization of clients based on the pioneering 1998 Swedish law.
These different policies present different conceptions of the policy problem, promote
different goals and involve different policy instruments and nonetheless have all been housed
under the banner of abolitionism. Yet, their cumulative influence over time has led to a
discernible revision of prostitution policy orientation and of the meaning of abolitionism
itself. The existence of such changes presents a double puzzle for the literature. Firstly, they
challenge the historical institutionalist presumption that important changes are heralded in by
critical junctures, that is to say “the trigger events that set processes of institutional or policy
change in motion” (Hogan & Doyle, 2007: 885). These events, often born out of crisis, and
which see identities and objectives contested, are characterised by rapid change, with slowpaced changes over a long period conceptualised as incremental adjustments. Secondly, by
developing within the confines of the abolitionist framework, these reforms frustrate
conceptions of paradigmatic changes as conspicuous and brusque (Hall, 1993).
Bruno Palier (2005) argues that such gradual yet ‘cumulatively transformative’ change is
common in French social policy and, in particular, has driven the development of the French
welfare system which has been characterised by the progressive extension of changes
originally undertaken at the margins of the welfare system. This is indicative of a process of
policy layering whereby, in a ‘sticky’ institutional context where change is hampered by the
high costs and uncertainty linked to deviation from a locked-in policy trajectory, actors can
still bring about change by navigating between the constraints and immutable elements
(Schickler, 2001; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). They do this not by explicitly challenging
traditional institutional arrangements, but rather by “working on the margins by introducing
amendments that can initially be “sold” as refinements of or corrections to existing
institutions” (Streeck & Thelen 2005: 34). The ‘selling’ of policy proposals, in this context, is
conceptualised as securing support through the aggregation of numerous and frequently
contrasting interests (Palier, 2005). The ‘layers’ thus created typically circumvent
institutional obstacles and avert staunch opposition (Schickler, 2001; Thelen, 2002; Streeck
& Thelen, 2005).
The institutional sources of framing
Nevertheless, while layering hinges on the mobilization of sufficient support, the political
process through which interests are aggregated remains underinvestigated. Insufficient
attention is paid to the “meaning-work”, that is to say “the struggle over the production of
3
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 613)
undertaken by policy entrepreneurs to generate legitimacy through “symbolic compliance”
(Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999: 1383). Indeed, layering efforts are undertaken within the
context of existing institutional frameworks. This signifies that the success of change efforts
is predicated, to a greater or lesser extent, on the discursive processes through which policy
proposals are framed as consistent with dominant and pre-established beliefs (Schmidt &
Radaelli, 2004: 197). Explanations of framing must therefore be sensitive to the complex map
of opportunities and constraints faced by strategic policy entrepreneurs aiming to promote
their preferred policy proposal over multiple competing others. Consequently, layering
requires efforts to alter the meanings and functions attributed to an otherwise stable
institutional framework through two analytically distinct but intrinsically linked processes:
the persuasive framing of policy appeals in view of securing sufficient support from actors
with diverging interests, and the framing of policy appeals as compatible with the existing
dominant institutional framework.
Frames are “schemata of interpretation” that allow actors to “locate, perceive, identify, and
label” instances and occurrences in their lives and in the broader world (Goffman, 1974: 21).
The central assumption in the framing literature is that, by selectively presenting facets of a
shared social and economic ‘reality’, these schemata influence individuals’ perceptions of
this reality and, in turn, guides their behaviour in largely predicable ways (Entman, 1993;
Gross, 2008). This is because frames have a sense-giving function which renders events or
phenomena meaningful and therefore impacts on the extent and manner in which individuals
will notice, remember, and/or care about an event. Moreover, within the context of sensemaking, frames diagnose, evaluate and prescribe responses to events thereby serving to
articulate experience and direct action (Benford & Snow 2000; Entman, 1993). Two
processes, in particular, are used to impart frames with an influencing or steering capacity.
Firstly, frame articulation refers to the process by which aspects of experiences and events
are selectively assembled in order to present a coherent, meaningful and apposite account of a
perceived ‘reality’ (Benford & Snow, 2000). Secondly, frames can be amplified or
punctuated by selectively “accenting and highlighting some issues, events, or beliefs as being
more salient than others” in a bid to establish a compelling and effective cognitive shortcut
for a larger frame, movement or set of ideas, of which it is a part (Benford & Snow 2000).
Framing is therefore not function of the thoughtless (re)presentation of objective social
events; rather, by placing an emphasis on certain elements and selectively side-lining others,
framing is a strategic act “intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner
bystander support and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow & Benford 1988: 198).
Nevertheless, attempting to strategically mediate reality in order to impart particular
meaning and salience entails that frames cannot be imposed; rather, frame effectiveness is
predicated on its resonance with the intended audience (Benford & Snow 2000). This means
that frames cannot be constructed freely. In this sense, framing does not occur in a vacuum;
rather it takes place within a repertoire of shared understandings and values that are fluid,
subjective and continually (re)constituted as a result of debate. This is because, as Legro
(2000: 420) posits, “[c]ollective ideas have an intersubjective existence that stands above
individual minds and is typically embodied in symbols, discourse, and institutions.” Thus,
4
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
policy debates are shaped by institutional processes which establish and perpetuate
perceptions of shared social and economic realities that are subjectively interpreted rather
than objectively given (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999). Moreover, interpretation is itself
institutionally embedded in “prior ways of knowing, seeing, and doing” (Hoffman &
Ventresca, 1999: 1374). Thus, investigating the framing strategies enacted by policy
entrepreneurs seeking to advance their preferred policy option over multiple competing
others entails looking closely at the institutional sources of framing, that is to say the manner
in which institutions influence the frames put forward during policy debates.
Institutions are “the formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity […and] promulgated by formal
organization” (Hall & Taylor 1996: 938). They are argued to confer stability and constancy to
the policy-making process because they serve to regularize politics by enshrining rules that
govern decision-making and problem solving. Institutions can therefore constitute important
constraints on the policy process. From an institutional perspective, then, contemporary
French abolitionism amounts to both social regime and a policy regime. It is a social regime
insofar as it embodies a “set of rules stipulating expected behaviour and “ruling out”
behaviour deemed to be undesirable” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 18); it is a policy regime
insofar as it formalises these rules in a political governing arrangement established to
coordinate expectations and organize behaviour in this specific policy area (Kratochwil &
Ruggie, 1986; Streeck & Thelen 2005). Regimes involve several dimensions: power
arrangements, since a regime necessarily entails support from at least one powerful group; a
policy paradigm, that is to say the framework of ideas and values that specify the nature of
the policy problem, and the appropriate and acceptable means and ends of addressing it (Hall,
1993); the organizational arrangements and implementation structure that govern action in
that issue-area; and the policy itself.
Subsequently, the policy paradigm is of particular relevance to explanations of variation in
framing strategy. Indeed, the policy paradigm stands at the intersection of the social
expectations and the formalised policy arrangements that govern collective and public action
in a specific policy area. It serves as the cognitive and normative tool chest of ideas with
which to approach a particular policy issue and delineates the scope of acceptable and
legitimate action (Hall, 1993). As such, the paradigm constitutes both the cultural lens
according to which frames are interpreted and evaluated, and the cultural repertoire from
which any new meanings and interpretations are generated (Benford & Snow 2000). An
institutionalised paradigm is not only a diagnostic and prescriptive policy instrument but also
implies the embedding and institutionalisation of meaning (Radaelli 1995). Dominant and
well-defined policy paradigms are therefore supposed to constrain policy choices and
minimise policy variation. Insofar as paradigms transcend individual beliefs, then, they
constitute a coordinated and aggregated, though not fixed, ideational path taken by a
collectivity which takes on the mantle of a ‘dominant orthodoxy’ (Legro, 2000). To say that
an ideational framework is dominant is not to say that everybody adheres to it, only that its
support is such that it is endowed with a dominant status which grants it the legitimacy to be
used to guide, constrain and organise possible actions or solutions to identified problems. In
this sense, to identify an ideational framework as dominant or preferred is to emphasise the
5
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
need for new policy proposals to conform or ‘fit’ in with to a specific set of collectively held
and pre-established ideas and beliefs.
The perspective of ‘fit’, therefore, appears as an incontrovertible element of garnering
support around a reform project. But fit is not an objective and immutable phenomenon.
Indeed, the extent to which ideas appear to conform to a dominant framework is contingent
on the manner in which new policy ideas are framed as compatible and how persuasive this
effort is. Specifically, the diffusion of new policy ideas is predicated on its “resonance with
the host or target culture” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 627). This is because dominant
orthodoxies are made up of the most ascendant diagnostic, evaluative and prescriptive ideas
and the normative beliefs about what ought to be done. Thus, Entman argues that to consider
a meaning as ‘dominant’ or ‘preferred’ is to recognize the ascendency of particular frames by
virtue of their congruence with the “most common audience schemata” (1993: 56). Fit, in this
sense, is socially constructed through discourse and arrived at by social and individual
processes of interpretation and sense-making constrained by institutional frameworks
(Schmidt & Radaelli 2004).
The abolitionist paradigm: the institutional source of French prostitution policy framing
After having oscillated between regulationism and prohibitionism since the Middle Ages1,
France began to abolish the state regulation of prostitution after the Second World War. In a
first instance, brothels were closed by the Marthe Richard law of April 1946, though women
in prostitution were still registered and medically monitored. Then, in 1960, the country
finished the transition with the signature of the 1949 United Nations Treaty on the
“Elimination of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others”
thereby abrogating any remaining registries and regulations. Since then, prostitution in
France has essentially been dealt with on two fronts. The first is the criminalization of the
exploitation of prostitution, that is to say profiting from the prostitution of others (procuring).
The second element is the provision of social support to individuals in prostitution, who are
predominantly conceptualized as ‘victims’ (Mathieu, 2004). This is because, whilst
considering prostitution as a societal blight, abolitionists consider the women who participate
in this activity as victims. Indeed, in contemporary French prostitution policy debates, the
individual in prostitution was primarily represented as a mal-adjusted woman, the victim of
either unscrupulous pimps or an abusive past (Allwood, 2006; 2008). The criminalization of
the exploitation of the prostitution of others and the provision of social support to the
‘victims’ of prostitution therefore constitute the two pillars of French abolitionism (Allwood,
2003). Moreover, since prostitution is conceptualized as the exploitation of women and as the
ultimate expression of men’s power over them, legalization or regulation of prostitution as a
form of labor would amount to state support of a system of violence (Allwood, 2008).
The cardinal elements of the French abolitionist paradigm were inherited from the 1949
UN convention and consecrated by its ratification in 1960. In particular, this is where the two
pillars of abolitionism were initially articulated. Indeed, the treaty calls for the punishment of
1
Ibid.
6
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
the encouragement, facilitation and exploitation of the prostitution of others, even with the
consent of that person.2 The convention also stipulates that parties are committed to the
provision of social support to individuals in prostitution aimed at aiding their exit and
rehabilitation from prostitution and their reinsertion into society.3 The convention not only
sketches out the normative and cognitive pillars of abolitionism but also, as an
incontrovertible and sovereign element of the French abolitionist regime, is itself a central
symbol of the abolitionist paradigm. In this sense, respect for the 1949 convention, and other
abolitionist treaties, is a factor of institutional rigidity, manifested by “an excessive
preoccupation with conserving the ‘way things have always been’” (Alink, Boin, & T’Hart
2001: 294) and, consequently, constitutes a constraint not only on the scope of acceptable and
plausible policy solutions, but also on the range of strategic frames that can be used to
mobilise support.
In addition to setting up the normative pillars of abolitionism, the 1949 convention also
establishes the abolition of the regulation of prostitution through the implementation of “all
the necessary measures to repeal or abolish any existing law, regulation or administrative
provision by virtue of which persons who engage in or are suspected of engaging in
prostitution are subject […] to special registration […]”.4 While the abolition of the state
regulation or support of prostitution either as a form of labour or as a ‘necessary evil’ is the
initial concern of abolitionist regimes, contemporary abolitionist policy regimes also features
beliefs and ideas pertaining to the scope and nature of the state’s legitimate intervention into
the private realm of consensual sexual relations between adults. Insofar as it pertains to
prostitution, the incursion of the state into private matters is largely governed by the criteria
of the protection of public morality.
Deschamps (2007) argues that, together, the aggregate parts of French abolitionism create
a dominant framework from which there is very little dissention, and around which there is
firm agreement about the core elements. Arguably, however, because of the relative absence
of the issue of prostitution policy from the policy agenda until the late 1980s, the ascendency
of the contemporary abolitionist paradigm was only incontrovertibly established by the mid1990s, allowing its proponents to present it henceforth as non-ideological and non-partisan
(Allwood, 2004; Mazur, 2004). Since then, the dominance of the abolitionist framework has
been such that proposed prostitution policy projects have had to be framed as compatible to
guarantee reform success. Two recent cases of policy reform attempts stand out as
particularly illustrative of the importance of establishing compliance with the abolitionist
regime through framing efforts. The first case, that of the introduction of punitive antisoliciting measures in 2003, was selected as a ‘least likely’ case because, by virtue of the
policy entrepreneurs’ political advantage during the reform process, it was deemed to be the
least likely to require efforts to frame the policy measures as compatible with abolitionism in
order to garner support. The second case, concerning the attempted repeal of these antisoliciting measures, was selected as a negative case where, despite a relative political
advantage in the form of access to the policy agenda and support from key decision-makers,
2
article 1
article 16
4
article 6
3
7
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
the unwillingness to mobilise abolitionist frames contributed to the failure of the reform
effort.
The ‘exceptional’ 2003 Domestic Security Bill
The loi du 18 mars 2003 pour la sécurité intérieure (LSI – Domestic Security Bill), whose
main architect, Nicolas Sarkozy, was then Minister of the Interior, appears to mark a
departure from the traditional French abolitionist regime. Indeed, the bill presented
prostitution as law-and-order and domestic security issue and, as a result, shifted the policy
emphasis away from the provision of social support and towards the implementation of strict
anti-soliciting measures. In particular, the LSI reclassified soliciting as a major offence and
reintroduced the offence of ‘passive soliciting’ – that is to say adopting an attitude or posture,
even passive, with the aim inciting another to debauchery – which had been removed from
French law during the 1992 penal code reform.5 The bill also included measures to expulse
foreigners guilty of prostitution. Consequently, because it appeared to subordinate the core
abolitionist principle of victim welfare to the objective of cleaning up the streets, the LSI is
frequently apprehended as an anomalous episode in the history of contemporary French
prostitution policy.
To date, explanations of this ‘exceptional’ reform have been principally structural,
emphasising the influence of an unprecedented historical conjuncture engendering an
‘exceptional’ side-stepping of traditional abolitionist principles by actors reacting to
environmental shifts (Allwood, 2003; 2004). In this sense, the LSI is understood as a product
of its time. The reform was proposed at a time when the opening up of Eastern Europe led to
an important influx of migrant individuals involved in prostitution from former Soviet
republics. These individuals, mostly young women, often worked for large illegal networks,
practiced lower rates and were willing to take greater risks. The pressures exerted by this
rapid and important change in the modalities of commercial sex in France were twofold.
Firstly, the arrival of younger women, put pressure on the local individuals in prostitution,
who could not compete. As a result, reports of mounting tensions with racist undertones
between French and migrant sex workers became more frequent (Allwood, 2004). Secondly,
the increased visibility of prostitution on streets and in residential areas was perceived as a
security issue by inhabitants. Prostitution was no longer presented primarily as a social issue
and was instead presented as a law-and-order problem.
This period is characterized by the emergence of ideas about immigration, public order
and security which were articulated into a punitive and repressive discourse by the new
center-right government which took power in May 2002 after an election which, itself, was
indicative of a context within which a legislative proposal for tougher domestic security
measures resonated with public anxieties and were likely to find support. In this sense, at the
time of its proposal, proponents of the reform, who hailed primarily from the right of the
political spectrum, had hit the policymaking trinity: firstly, the right was in power; secondly,
large swathes of the population were clamoring for decisive action aimed at ridding the
5
Article 50 of law 2003-239 of the 18 March 2003 (LSI).
8
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
streets of prostitutes and other visible and anxiogenic populations (e.g. beggars and loitering
youths); finally, critics of the bill failed to effectively coalesce to oppose it. Indeed, despite
significant opposition from sex workers’ rights activists and left-wing political actors, the
debate over the bill was characterised by the “unproductive polarization” over diverging
conceptions of prostitution (Allwood, 2004). This resulted in an inability by the disparate
opponents to coalesce behind a single policy proposal to countervail the LSI.
Yet, despite strong indicators of the LSI’s political advantage during the period leading up
to its vote, its main proponents still put effort into framing their bill as abolitionist. In the
absence of strong institutional and/or ideational rigidities, the bill’s significant political
advantage should have been enough to obviate the need for the legislator to mobilise frames
that were not immediately seductive to the public. Public concerns over insecurity in the
public sphere entail that mobilizing frames that resonated with these fears would be the most
instrumentally useful for policy entrepreneurs seeking to garner support and legitimise their
intervention. While these frames did hold sway over the policy debate and media attention,
the purported abolitionist credentials of the measures were recurrently proclaimed.
One explanation for this framing strategy is that, despite its de facto prohibition of streetbased prostitution through the criminalization of all public acts, active or passive, likely to
lead to the provision of contractual sexual services, the LSI does not, in a programmatic
sense, constitute either a transition to prohibitionism, nor even necessarily a significant
deviation from abolitionism (Maugère 2010). This is because, despite adopting a largely noninterventionist stance, the French state has always retained the right to prevent both soliciting,
which remains an offence because of its public and morally reprehensible nature, and
procuring. In fact, while critics of the LSI were hostile to its measure to criminalize passive
soliciting on the basis that it was contrary to France’s abolitionist commitment not to revictimize individuals in prostitution, this offence had actually been part of the French penal
code until the 1992 penal code reform. The LSI only reintroduced the offence of passive
soliciting – though the bill made it an imprisonable offense when it had only been a finable
offense in the past – rather than proposing an entirely novel and outlandish measure.
Nevertheless, the extent to which the LSI constitutes a continuation or a departure from
traditional two-pillared abolitionism is highly contested. Consequently, resuming it to a new
iteration of traditional abolitionism is to be guilty of a certain conservative bias characterized
by the “propensity to explain way what might be seen to be new as just another version of the
old” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 1). Moreover, this perspective is problematic because it
resumes policy debates to a social process predicated on the mediation of a purported
objective nature of a policy programme rather than as a strategic act aimed at persuading
supporters and actualising reform opportunities. Indeed, policy entrepreneurs have as much
of a stake in the perceived legitimacy and plausibility of the reform as in its expected
effectiveness (Stone, 2012). This is because the perception of the policy and the expectations
actors have of it underpins the support it will generate help actualize the policy efforts of a
few into a collectively sanctioned undertaking (Stone, 2012). In this sense, the bill’s
architects could permit themselves to draw up a reform project that seemed out of the
ordinary firstly because they were mandated to do so, and secondly, because the extent of the
reform project’s exceptionalism was a matter of understanding and perception rather than an
objective and quantifiable evaluation – making its framing a matter of strategic
9
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
representation. Together, this mandate and the perceived appropriateness, effectiveness and
legitimacy of the proposal translated into sufficient support to pass and enact the bill.
Rather than serving as the primary frame through which to present the bill, the resort to
abolitionist frames principally served firstly to establish the bill’s legitimacy and compliance
with the dominant ideational framework and, relatedly to fend off opposition. Indeed, the
primacy of the abolitionist paradigm ensured that proponents of the LSI could accurately
anticipate opponents counterframing of the proposed reform as “prohibitionist”, “repressive”
and “re-victimising”. Counterframing refers to any attempt to “rebut, undermine, or
neutralize a person’s or group’s myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework”
(Benford, 1987:75). To deflect these counterframes, proponents of the LSI carefully
articulated ostensibly abolitionist frames which both singled out pimps as the cause the
problem and as the intended target of the reform, and conceptualised individuals in
prostitution as victims. These frames were then systematically deployed in reference to the
anti-prostitution measures in order to present them as being in tune with the two pillars of
abolitionism. Thus, during the first debate over the bill, in the Senate, Nicolas Sarkozy
asserted that: “[…] we have not created an offense with a view to punishing these unhappy
women who, it cannot be denied, are more often victims than culprits. If we have create an
offense it is, on the contrary, to protect them […]”6 – a point that was reasserted throughout
later debates in the Senate, National Assembly and in the media.
In addition, the repatriation of foreigners guilty of soliciting on French streets was framed
as a humanitarian service, thus placing it fully within the state’s abolitionist obligation to
provide social assistance to individuals in prostitution:
“Take the example of an Albanian prostitute. Where do you suppose she is
most in danger? In her home-town, near her family, where she speaks her
language, where she has roots and connections? Or in France, where she does
not speak a word of our language, where she is locked up in a hotel, subject to
the violence of unscrupulous pimps, and thrown onto the pavement where we
look at her as we drive by in our car, where we cry to ourselves – “Poor them!”
– only to forget them two minutes later?”7
Finally, the arrest of street-based prostitutes was put forward as an instrument with which the
police could better identify and apprehend the real object of the state’s wrath: the pimps and
criminal networks behind street-based prostitution:
“[…] it is not about stigmatising prostitutes; rather, on the contrary, to fight
against the mafia networks which organise this abominable slavery. The
penalization of passive soliciting has no other objective than that one. Those who
oppose this measure, arguing that the government wishes to fill our prisons with
prostitutes, do not grasp the reality of these people’s distress.”8
6
Nicolas Sarkozy, Senate Debate (2002, November 13).
Nicolas Sarkozy, National Assembly Debate (2003, January 14)
8
Jean-Patrick Courtois, Senate Deabte (2002, November 13)
7
10
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
The LSI’s political advantage had two tangible consequences on the framing of the policy
debate. Firstly, it gave proponents of the bill the latitude to introduce new frames into the
debate in addition to the traditional abolitionist frames. Most notably these frames extended
the category of individual who should be considered victims in the eyes of the state. Indeed,
while traditional abolitionism conceives of individuals in prostitution as victims, proponents
of the LSI also framed citizens who suffered the ‘nuisance of prostitution’ in their
neighbourhoods as legitimate and deserving victims. Thus, for example, Nicolas Sarkozy
declared, during the debate: “Prostitutes are victims, certainly. But let us not forget the other
victims: the people who live in the neighbourhoods where life has become impossible
because prostitution has the upper hand.”9 Secondly, it minimised the extent to which
proponents of the bills had to explicitly refer to abolitionism in order to establish their
proposal’s compatibility. In this sense, while it was necessary to establish the compliance of
the measures with abolitionist principles, it was nevertheless not necessary to resume the
debate to this point of order. As such, references to abolitionism itself, rather than to its
reigning principles, were relatively infrequent. Nevertheless, when they occurred, they were
deployed in such a way as to unequivocally proclaim the LSI’s anti-prostitution measures as
legitimately abolitionist in spirit:
“[This legislative proposal] cannot be reduced to a repressive project. Its objective
is to protect: to protect the victims of prostitution, to protect public tranquillity,
two objectives that are hard to conciliate but that we must nevertheless consider in
tandem. France has chosen to focus on an abolitionist approach, and this
legislative project fits into this intention. Contrary to certain other European
countries, we have chosen to wager on the effectiveness of long-term social
policies aimed at preventing prostitution rather than resorting to regulating it. This
is why the fight against pimps is of the utmost importance.”10
Paradigms, frames and non-compliance: the demise of the 2012 Benbassa amendment
Passage, however, does not necessarily entail perpetuity and, within a decade of its
implementation, political support for the LSI, which had always been far from unanimous,
began to further erode. Political actors, particularly from the Socialist and Green party began
to argue that there was increasing evidence of the anti-soliciting measures being harmful to
the ‘victims’ of prostitution, and, therefore, that it was failing to uphold the core principle of
French abolitionism. Socialist party’s (PS) victory in the 2011 presidential and subsequent
legislative elections entailed that the cause gained an advantageous platform. Indeed, without
explicitly making the repeal of the LSI’s anti-soliciting measures part of his official campaign
manifesto, socialist candidate François Hollande stated, in an interview prior to the election,
that:
9
Nicolas Sarkozy, National Assembly Debate (2003, January 14)
Patrick Delnatte, National Assembly Debate (2003, January 15) Session 2.
10
11
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
“[W]hat is most detrimental to individuals in prostitution’s access to care today is
the passive soliciting offence introduced by Nicolas Sarkozy. This offence, which
helps push prostitution underground where associations cannot get access to them
and, in the end, entails decreased access to care and social services for individuals
in prostitution, must be removed.”11
In addition to Hollande, other senior members of the PS, who when on to hold key positions
in the new government, are also committed to repealing the LSI’s anti-soliciting measures and none more so than current Minister for Women’s Rights, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem.12
Considered concurrently, Hollande’s affirmation, the PS’ elite’s sustained and long-running
efforts to see the measure repealed, and the recurrent reaffirmation of this policy intention by
current government ministers, serve to obviate any doubts as to whether Hollande’s state
intention was pure political posturing on the eve of an important election which pitted him
against the LSI’s architect, incumbent President Nicolas Sarkozy.
It is in this context that, on October 2nd 2012, Green party senators headed by Esther
Benbassa tabled an amendment aimed at abrogating the measure criminalizing passive
soliciting contained in the LSI. A preliminary reading of the text was scheduled for
November 21st, and auditions of expert testimonies had begun on October 30th. Interestingly,
the text was withdrawn from parliamentary consideration by the authors in early November.
Benbassa cited pressure from the government as the reason for the bill’s withdrawal:
“Both the President’s Cabinet and the Minister of Women’s Rights asked me to
withdraw this text from the senate’s scheduled legislative consideration. The
former did so because the President was getting ready to make important
declarations on the subject of violence against women. The latter did so because
she wished to elaborate a more complete and more ambitious reform project. I
very quickly became aware that this project was meant to supplement the long
awaited abrogation [of the anti-soliciting measures] with the penalization of
clients. […] I had no choice but to comply. My political group is part of the
majority in power. I was not about to go off alone, like Don Quixote.”13
(Benbassa, 2012)
Without necessarily calling into question the government’s intention to present a more
comprehensive prostitution policy reform project, the amendment’s dismissal still suggests
11
Hollande, François (2012, March 19) “Le Sida ne doit pas seulement concerner ceux qui sont porteurs de
cette maladie”. Available on: http://www.seronet.info/article/francois-hollande-le-sida-ne-doit-passeulement-concerner-ceux-qui-sont-porteurs-de-cette [Accessed 28/03/12]
12
Vallaud-Belkacem stated that her government would repeal the LSI because “we are here to protect
individuals in situations of prostitution, to help them rather than condemn them.” Novel Observateur
(20/11/12) http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/monde/20121120.FAP5751/vallaud-belkacem-nous-allonsabroger-le-delit-de-racolage-passif.html [Accessed 27/11/12]
13
Benbassa, Esther (2012, December 17) “Ne sacrifions pas les prostitué(e)s sur l'autel de la morale!” in
Huffington Post. Available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/esther-benbassa/vu-du-senat-17-ne-sacrifionspas-les-prostituees-sur-lautel-de-la-morale_b_2313870.html [Accessed 28/12/12]
12
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
that something more than a mere mistiming might be at fault. Indeed, a priori, the repeal of
the LSI does not preclude a serious discussion over the direction French prostitution policy
should taken. Benbassa also picked up on this point:
“This abrogation did not entail the initiation of a debate on the question of client
penalisation, nor on that of abolitionism. In no way did it preclude that we
consider and discuss, in its wake, the future of individuals in prostitution.”14
(Benbassa, 2012)
Nonetheless, a closer look at the framing of the amendment offers some possible insight into
its dismissal by key decision makers. Indeed, the legislative proposal featured three
justifications for the proposed repeal. Two of the reasons advanced attacked the practical
merit of the anti soliciting policy. The first rationale concerned the purported ineffectiveness
of the measure. The second justification highlighted the existence of other measures, in
particular those contained within common law and within the framework aimed at curbing
human trafficking, that could achieve the same purported objective of dismantling procuring
and trafficking networks without resorting to punishing individuals in prostitution for passive
soliciting. These charges echo the bulk of criticism aimed at the LSI and which have become
more vocal since the accession of the Socialist party to power in May 2012. In this sense,
these justifications do not appear particularly problematic and shed no particular light on
why, when so many political elites are voicing similar concerns, this legislative proposal was
so swiftly removed, without more support from key political actors known for their desire to
see the passive soliciting measures repealed. The third charge levelled at the LSI’s antisoliciting measures, however, was arguably one of the big nails in the proposal’s coffin.
Indeed, this charge justifies the abrogation of anti passive-soliciting measures because it has
led to:
“the stigmatisation and the precarisation of sex workers, especially with regards to
their access to care, to their vulnerability to violence” and because “this measure
has been used, to a great extent, to arrest undocumented/illegal foreigners in order
to escort them back to the border.”15 (my emphasis)
In light of this, the swift dismissal of Esther Benbassa’s proposal to repeal the LSI would
indicate that sidestepping the abolitionist paradigm may decrease the likelihood that a
particular prostitution policy proposal will be seriously considered by French decision
makers, even if it has an a priori programmatic or political advantage or, in fact, both. This is
consistent with institutional arguments that institutions shape human action by constituting
“normative and contextual constraints” that not only delineate the realm of acceptable and
legitimate potential policy ideas but also concomitantly influence individual and
organizational perceptions of the very policy issues at hand (Hoffman & Ventresca 1999, p.
14
Ibid.
nd
Senate amendment proposal number 3 (2012-2013) submitted October 2 2012 by Esther Benbassa et.al.
Available at: http://www.senat.fr/dossier-legislatif/ppl12-003.html [Accessed 12/10/12]
15
13
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
1371). In this way, actors who do not share, or appear to share, in the core elements of an
institutionalised policy paradigm find themselves at a disadvantage when seeking to establish
symbolic compliance and, therefore, satisfy the basic criteria for plausibility and legitimacy
(Braun & Busch 1999). In this sense, the breadth of action allowed by the abolitionist regime,
though by no means unlimited, as evidenced by the dismissal of the Benbassa amendment, is
circumscribed by the shared ideas and beliefs about abolitionism; these ideas and beliefs,
however, are not universal and fixed. Thus, the broader and more equivocal the shared
conception of the policy paradigm, the more generous the room for actors to strategically
frame their proposals in such a way as to maximise possible uptake by decision makers, and
the greater the possibility for policy diversification.
Ambiguity as a policymaking playground
Since its espousal in 1946, the ambiguous understanding of the ultimate aims of abolitionism
as either the abolition of the regulation of prostitution or the abolition of the phenomenon of
prostitution itself has allowed the regime to foster a broad support base made up of
proponents of both conceptions, as well as those who subscribe to abolitionism’s normative
and cognitive tenets more generally. The broad support base for the French abolitionist
project, as well as the regime’s institutionalisation, have been the primary sources of its
continuity and dominance. Moreover, the reason why contemporary the French abolitionist
regime has been able to house a broad variety of policy programs is because there is no
ultimate consensus on what abolitionism is. Put another way, the elasticity of the abolitionist
paradigm is predicated on its ambiguity. This is because ambiguity serves to facilitate
collective action by enabling political actors to drawn together otherwise disparate interests
around broad goals rather than risk alienating large swathes of their potential support base by
specifying discrete goals and motivations. As Deborah Stone argues: “in politics, ambiguity
works a kind of magic that allows political actors to do two incompatible things at one.
Symbolic meaning can combine and reconcile seemingly contradictory alternatives and there
make possible a new range of options” (2012: 258). Ambiguity, in this sense, is a space for
strategic action and creativity, and is often preserved for this reason. The meanings and
interpretations attached to the different elements of a policy paradigm change as a corollary
to the framing and meaning-work undertaken by policy actors in a specific domain over time,
as well as by virtue of shifts in cultural elements more broadly. This transformative process is
cumulative and incremental because:
“those who control social institutions […] are likely to have less than perfect
control over the way in which their creations work in reality. What an institution
is defined by continuous interaction between rule makers and rule takers during
which ever new interpretations of the rule will be discovered, invented,
suggested, rejected, or for a time, adopted” (Streeck & Thelen, 2005: 16).
Furthermore, policies that fail to operate or to be represented within the pre-established
parameters of the policy paradigm, and which are consequently excluded from serious
14
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
consideration, can be understood as operating outside the scope of the framework’s elasticity.
The introduction of such vividly different policies would require a reform effort unalike the
‘tinkering’ or ‘selling’ approaches favoured in layering attempts. Indeed, Hoffman and
Ventresca (1999) argue that change efforts can either be undertaken within the context of the
existing ideational framework or they can aim to supplant it and introduce previously
unconsidered policy approaches and instruments. Each mode of action is predicated on
different logics of action, each has the potential to yield different outcomes, and each entails
different drawbacks. Indeed, on the one hand, change efforts undertaken in the context of
exiting frameworks involve framing policy ideas in a manner consistent with dominant
beliefs and/or interests. Because they do not frustrate widely held beliefs or challenge
dominant interests, these efforts typically find support more easily. On the other hand,
because they operate within an established repertoire of understandings and conceptions of
appropriate action, they cannot effectively strive to introduce alien instruments or goals. The
introduction of the LSI in 2003 is illustrative of this type of reform effort. On the other hand,
change efforts that operate out with dominant frameworks of understandings and/or threaten
established interests, while they can aspire to introduce extraneous policy ideas because they
are not confined by the pre-established ideational framework, tend to face staunch opposition
and defeat in the short-term (Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999; Mintzberg 1979). The failure of
the Benbassa amendment, with its reconceptualization of prostitution as a form of voluntary
labour, is an example of this type of change attempt.
The contours of the abolitionist paradigm, and therefore the threshold of the framework’s
elasticity, beyond which layering is no longer an effective reform strategy, are principally
made visible by the exclusion of axiomatically incompatible policy ideas and frames. Axioms
are self-evident truth claims that are universally accepted and require no proof. The
dominance of the abolitionist paradigm confers an axiomatic quality to its ideational
underpinnings, and none more so than the conceptualization of individuals in prostitution as
‘victims’. Indeed, until recently, abolitionism in France can be seen as having been
constructed in opposition to prohibitionism and regulationism, which are considered nonbeneficial to the “victims” (Mathieu, 2004). The rejection of regulationism is, as such, a
central tenet of the abolitionist framework, in the same vein as the principle of victim
protection. This makes the dissonance between regulationist ideas and those plausibly housed
within the dominant abolitionist ideational framework instantly and irrevocably jarring. In
this sense, French abolitionism can support a wide variety of policy ideas drawn from the
traditional (prevention, rehabilitation and reinsertion) and non-traditional (passive
solicitation, the deportation of foreigners) repertoires as long as these ideas have been
convincingly established as compatible with the abolitionist framework. Failing this,
however, it is sufficient that a policy idea be framed in such a way that contravenes the
minimum ideational requirements embodied by the paradigm’s two pillars for it to be
rejected, even if that policy idea has a priori political support. Framing compatibility with the
two abolitionist two pillars/axioms therefore appears necessary but not sufficient to ensure
policy success.
From this perspective the swift dismissal of the Benbassa bill is function not just of the
sidestepping of the usual abolitionist frames, but more important, of the deployment of a
dissonant regulationist frame conceptualizing individuals in prostitution as “workers” rather
15
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
than “victims.” In this sense, this bill was victim not only of the failure to satisfy the basic
institutional criteria for compatibility and legitimacy but also of being axiomatically
incompatible with the hegemonic abolitionist framework. Conversely, it is precisely because
the measures aimed at prostitution contained within the LSI, despite being much contested,
were not axiomatically incompatible with the abolitionist framework, that proponents of the
LSI had the possibility of mobilising abolitionist frames in order to maximise their chances of
success.
Conclusion
Abolitionism, no matter how hegemonic a regime, is not an immutable archetype. In the half
century is has reigned over prostitution policy, the foundational principle of victim welfare
has had to coexist with an increasingly ambiguous conception of what, exactly, abolitionism
is. This has resulted in the development of multiple and, at times, apparently divergent
prostitution policies which have nevertheless all been housed under the common banner of
abolitionism. This is characteristic of a process of incremental yet transformative change
which challenges traditional institutionalist assumptions that important changes to policy and
dominant ideational frameworks are heralded in by critical junctures. Indeed, institutions are
commonly approached as constraining structures which restrict and direct action in such a
manner as to confer stability and constancy to collective action. Some of the most
constraining aspects of institutions are embodied within dominant ideational frameworks,
such as policy paradigms, which serve as the cognitive and normative tool chest of ideas with
which to approach a particular policy issue, and delineate the scope of acceptable and
legitimate action. Nevertheless, within the circumscribed space offered by rigid, dominant
and historically continuous institutional frameworks, actors are still allowed a creative space
within which to undertake the meaning-work aimed at garnering legitimacy and support for
their preferred policy solutions. They do this by establishing symbolic compliance with the
dominant framework through framing their policy proposals as compatible and plausible.
This ‘fit’, however, is not fixed, and the scope for framing compatibility is determined by the
elasticity of the dominant policy paradigm.
Two cases are particularly illustrative of the interplay between actors’ strategic meaningwork and the institutional constraints they face when fielding proposal. The first
demonstrates that, even in the face of considerable political advantages, policy proposals in
the domain of prostitution in France must establish minimum compliance with abolitionist
criteria. While other factors, and none-the-least the victory of the right in the 2002
presidential elections, converged to bring about the success of the LSI reform project, the
constructed compatibility of the reform project with the dominant ideational framework
secured its passage over one of the crucial hurdles facing all contemporary French
prostitution policy reform ideas: an abolitionist spirit. Contrastingly, proposals that appear a
priori compatible with traditional abolitionist ideas and values will not be seriously
entertained if they fail to meet the minimum compatibility framing. This is evidenced by the
swift dismissal of a recent amendment proposing to repeal the LSI’s anti-soliciting measures
despite its a priori programmatic advantage that it aligned itself with current political
16
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
intentions held by key policymakers. Indeed, the proposal’s conceptualisation of individuals
in prostitution as ‘sex workers’ ensured this particular bill came under intense pressure to be
withdrawn. This is because the recognition of prostitution as a form of voluntary labour is
axiomatically incompatible with the abolitionist dominant paradigm.
Versatility of the sort identified in recent French prostitution policy reform is made
possible because ideational frameworks entertain a certain degree of ambiguity over
meanings and beliefs. This is particularly true in the case with the French abolitionism
regime, the prevailing conception of which is gradually shifting from the initial historical
understanding of abolitionism as the abolition of the regulation of prostitution, to one that
emphasises the state’s intention to abolish the phenomenon of prostitution itself. Overall, by
virtue of the gradual modification of the abolitionist paradigm induced by the strategic
framing of policy proposals by policy entrepreneurs aiming to garner legitimacy and support,
what abolitionism meant when it was adopted as a policy regime in 1946 is not quite the
same thing that is understood by abolitionism in 2013.
17
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
Bibliography
Alink, Fleur, Arjen Boin and Paul T’Hart (2001) “Institutional crises and reforms in policy
sectors: the case of asylum policy in Europe” in Journal of European Public Policy. 8(2):
286-306
Allwood, Gill (2003) ‘Sarkozy’s Domestic Security Bill: war on prostitutes not on
prostitution?’ in Modern and Contemporary France. 11(2)
(2004) “Prostitution debates in France” in Contemporary Politics. 10(2): 145-157
(2006) “Prostitution in France” in Geetanjali Gangoli and Nicole Westmarland (eds)
International Approaches to Prostitution. Bristol: The Policy Press. Pp: 45-66
(2008) “The Construction of Prostitutes and Clients in French policy Debates” in Vanessa E.
Munro and Marina Della Giusta (eds). Demanding Sex: Critical Reflections on the
Regulation of Prostitution. Hampshire; Burlington: Ashgate. Pp: 67-82
Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. 2000. "Framing Processes and Social Movements:
An Overview and Assessment" in Annual Review of Sociology. 26: 11-39.
Benford, Robert D. and Lester R. Kurtz (1987) “Performing the Nuclear Ceremony: The
Arms Race as a Ritual” in Journal of Applied Behavioral Science. 23(4): 463-482
Deschamps, Catherine (2007) “La figure de l’étrangère dans la prostitution” in Autrepart. 42:
39-52
Entman, Robert (1993) “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm” in Journal
of Communication. 43(4): 51-58
Goffman, Erving. 1974. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience.
Harper & Row: New York.
Gross, Kimberly (2008) “Framing Persuasive Appeals: Episodic and Thematic Framing,
Emotional Response, and Policy Opinion” in Political Psyhcology. 29(2): 169-192
Hall, Peter A. (1993) “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State” in Comparative
Politics. 25(3): 275-296
Hall, Peter A., and Rosemary C. R. Taylor (1996) “Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms” in Political Studies. 44(5): 936-957
Hoffman, Andrew J. and Marc J. Ventresca (1999) “The Institutional Framing of Policy
Debates” in American Behavioral Scientist. 42(8): 1368-1392
Hogan, John and David Doyle (2007) “The Importance of Ideas: An A Priori Critical
Juncture Framework” in Canadian Journal of Political Science. 40(4): 883-910
18
Political Studies Association annual conference 2013
Kratochwil, Friedrich & John Gerard Ruggie (1986) “International Organization: A State of
the Art on the Art of the State” in International Organization. 40(4): 753-775
Legro, Jeffrey W. (2000) “The Transformation of Policy Ideas” in American Journal of
Political Science. 44(3): 419-432
Mathieu, Lilian (2004) “The Debate on Prostitution in France: A Conflict between
Abolitionism, Regulation and Prohibition” in Journal of Contemporary European Studies.
12(2): 153-163
Mazur, Amy G. (2004) “Prostitute movements face elite apathy and gender-biased
universalism in France” in Joyce Outshoorn (ed) The Politics of Prostitution: Women’s
Movements, Democratic States, and the Globalization of Sex Commerce. Cambridge:
Cambridge University press. Pp: 123-143
Mintzberg, Henry (1979) The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research.
Prentice Hall: NJ.
Palier, Bruno (2005) “Ambiguous Agreement, Cumulative Change: French Social Policy in
the 1990s” in Wolgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (eds.) Beyond Continuity:
Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford University Press: Oxford;
New York. Pp: 127-144
Schickler, Eric (2001) ‘Disjointed Pluralism and Congressional Development: An Overview’
Paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference,
September 2-5, Atlanta, USA.
Schmidt, Vivien A. and Claudio M. Radaelli (2004) “Policy Change and Discourse in
Europe: Conceptual and Methodological Issues” in West European Politics. 27(2): 183210
Snow, David A. and Robert D. Benford. (1988). "Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant
Mobilization" in International Social Movement Research 1: 197-219.
Snow, David A., E. Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford. 1986.
"Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization and Movement Participation" in
American Sociological Review. 51: 464-81.
Stone, Deborah (2012) Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. 3rd Edition.
W.W. Norton & Company: New York; London.
Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen Thelen (2005) “Introduction: Institutional Change in
Advanced Political Economies” in Wolgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (eds.) Beyond
Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies. Oxford University
Press: Oxford; New York. Pp. 1-39
19
Emily St.Denny
University of Stirling
[email protected]
Thelen, Kathleen (2002) “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative-Historical
Analysis” in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (eds.) Comparative Historical Analysis in
the Social Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp: 208-240
20