READING THE TEA LEAVES BEYOND BORDER BRINKMANSHIP
(Pioneer October 25, 2014)
http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/reading-the-tea-leaves-beyond-border-brinkmanship.html
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit attracted considerable attention in the country – even more than it
might have done otherwise because of the stand-off in Ladakh that came with it conjointly, as it were.
But not so much for the ‘considered’ message he, like any visiting leader, would have brought with him - as such, i.e. minus the hijacking of the visit by the jarring incident on the border just then, which overshadowed the ‘pre-meditated’ signaling. That should be of interest no less, whatever our own concerns
or preoccupations, from the point of view of understanding our neighboring country’s current approach
and outlook better. If so, some effort in trying to discern that message might be worthwhile.
(Of course, some may take the view that any such distinction – between the ‘intended’ message of the
visit and that implicit in staging of the border incident simultaneously – is invidious, on the ground that
the latter was very much a part of the former. Those convinced on that count might still bear with the
rest of this piece, without prejudice to their conviction, as an attempt to gauge the supplementary part
or remainder of the purpose and design of the visit.)
‘What is the message we wish to convey to our interlocutor(s) on this occasion and how’ is the central
question underlying any diplomatic demarché, anywhere, always. No diplomat walks into an encounter,
ever, without clarity on that question. (And political leaders are nothing if not natural diplomats or
diplomats by instinct – “you will have to learn to react instinctively”, the late Sardar Swaran Singh had
gently bidden us young puppies during the customary courtesy call of our batch of IFS Probationers on
the External Affairs Minister.) All copy book prescriptions for preparing for negotiations -- mastering
your brief on the nitty gritty of the issue at hand, along with the broader background as to ‘where the
interlocutor is coming from or seeking to go to’, etc. --being no more than contributory elements into
that overarching leitmotif propelling any interaction or negotiation.
What then of the Chinese decision to field its topmost leader; what might he have had in mind? A lot
has been written in speculative answer to that question, on the basis of intelligent assessment of the
currents and cross-currents sweeping the regions adjoining the two countries and their global
footprints, both today and prospectively. In anticipatory mode mainly, i.e. taking into account what was
already known about the scenario at either end, the visitors’ more than the hosts’, and applying astute
analytical and appreciation skills to it. This columnist can go along with most of that cogitation,
consisting almost entirely of explorations for equilibrating equations between emerging and established
powers in the Asia-Pacific region and on the global stage -- except for the definiteness of those
discerning a deceitful design. (On that latter aspect, the jury is still out, it would seem to the
undersigned, and in need of various ‘confirmatory tests’ before any finality can be accorded to guesses
about the Chinese ‘game plan’ in staging the incident in Chumar cheek by jowl with their President’s
charm offensive.)
But it wishes to go further, to examine what light if any can be shed on that question ex-post facto, i.e.
on the basis of what was actually conveyed during the visit by the Chinese side -- of its own, not in
reaction to anything from the hosts. The meat in this respect would naturally lie in the presentations
the visitor made in his official meetings, but these are not in the public domain. Some indicators are
available in his public utterances, nevertheless -- President Xi’s speech at the ICWA (in the presence of
the Hon’ble Vice-President), in particular. Besides his article in The Hindu on the eve of the visit and
Xinhua commentaries.
The most obvious aspect to be noted in this context is Chinese interest in projecting the India-China
relationship as totally non-adversarial. This was done with some care, to ensure not even a whiff, let
alone overt mention, of rivalry or competition of any kind. (The “border issue” was not dismissed but
made light of in one short paragraph in the by now standard Chinese formulation on striving for “a
solution that is fair and acceptable to both sides” but without letting it become a hindrance to the
“development and overall stability of our relations”.) Instead the picture painted was of India and China
working together “to benefit each other, the Asian region and the whole world” as “the driving force of
Asian and global development” and “two major forces in the development of global multi-polarisation”.
But not with any sense of complacency or satisfaction. Far from it. This was only a prelude to dwelling at
length on what more they can do (together) in those directions in an exhortatory vein, through a series
of “we should(s)”.
Particularly notable amongst the latter (exhortations) are Xi’s call(s) to “bridge China’s opening up to the
West with India’s policy of going Eastward”, ”commit ourselves to building a secure and cooperative
framework in the Asia-Pacific region that is open, transparent, equal and inclusive”, “push forward the
international order to a more fair and equitable direction”, “strengthen strategic cooperation in dealing
with global issues”, “stick to the ideas of sovereign equality, fairness and justice…………so that we can
maintain the common interests of ………the vast numbers of developing countries” and “put forward
plans that represent the interests of the vast numbers of developing countries in terms of climate
change, food security, energy and I-net security and other global issues”.
“China is willing to enhance (such) strategic cooperation with India”, he then goes on to say, in forums
such as the “Russia-India-China grouping, BRICS, G20, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”.
How is this manner of presentation of things to be understood? I.e. what underlying concern or anxiety
does it betray, if any? This columnist believes that this aspect (undercutting the India base for negative
portrayal of China internationally) is the heart of the Chinese diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis India. The
overarching Chinese aim here is to undermine the chances of a global anti-China alignment coalescing;
specifically, to prevent India from joining countries hostile to it (USA and Japan, above all). As a last
resort, should all else fail for any reason. But possibly to do better meanwhile, since things have not
come to such a bad pass yet (from the Chinese standpoint), by pro-actively reaching out to India with
flowery warmth and be perceived as having secured its support, as much as facts permit, for China’s
‘peaceful rise’, a euphemism for its strategic quest for parity with the leading pole of the global order.
They are some distance from the US still, exaggerated projections of the Chinese economy (which focus
mistakenly on gross figures, and not on net ones – i.e. not on disposable surpluses available after
providing for mandatory internal requirements) notwithstanding. And cannot afford to (have to) deal
with multiple fronts while they are engaged in a feverish effort to close that gap between ground
realities and their grand ambition.
The historically well-trodden path of ‘united front’ tactics, in other words, subordinating and
underplaying rather, for the present, ‘contradictions’ with India (and all other ‘minor’ contradictions) to
the task of dealing with the ‘principal’ contradiction (USA). Doughtily ignoring, and even usurping, the
very code words coined by adversaries for ‘containing’ Chinese expansionism in its ‘near abroad’ in
order to neutralize their negativity (towards China) by projecting a picture of peace and harmony. A bid
to blur natural fault lines on the regional Asia-Pacific and global chessboard and preempt the emergence
of any possible united front against itself.
If that is a correct reading, the ‘message’ for India coded in it could be surmised to be: whatever you do,
don’t please ever consider crossing this red line of ours (else all hell will break loose, as the obverse side
unsaid). The red line is, of course, a hazy one – not sharply defined – so there would be some leeway or
wiggle room for India to play around, but with definite limits. There lies the challenge for Indian
diplomacy – to recognize that not inconsiderable leverage but remain mindful of the ‘threshold’,
amorphous though the latter is, while pushing the envelope with ingenuity.
A second notable aspect of the Chinese President’s speech was its emphasis on the potential of the
South Asian sub-continent, which he projected as holding the promise of “become(ing) the new growth
pole powering the economy in Asia and even the world”. He presented China’s “One Belt and One
Road” proposal for boosting inter-connectivity of countries along the land and maritime Silk Road as a
part of China’s vision and desire “to take off together with South Asian nations” and suggested that
“China …….join hands with India” for “making greater contributions to the development of this region”.
The message here, at one level, was obviously one of reassurance to India, regarding China’s relations
with India’s SAARC neighbours. Of countering the perception that those ties are cast in some sort of a
diabolical design directed against India, one of steady Chinese advance towards its eventual
encirclement. At the same time, it was also serving notice, in the opinion of this columnist, of China’s
intention to go ahead with stepping up its (‘string of pearls’ kind of) infra-structure involvement with
countries surrounding India with or without India picking up its invitation to join hands with it -- the
mention of the “One Belt and One Road” project as being beneficial to the region as a whole being a
clear indicator in this regard.
Finally, a noteworthy feature of the speech was its extremely sophisticated and measured tone, be it in
presenting positives in the Chinese people’s philosophical practices and psyche or manner of dealing
with China’s constraints and considerations or, indeed, in plain talk in conclusion: “One who wishes to
be understood, understands others.” The last point was explicated a little more in his article in The
Hindu:
“Our bilateral relations have reached where they are today as a result of the following efforts:
we have deepened mutual trust by strengthening strategic dialogue and enhancing political
confidence....making the pie of common interests bigger…. And we have treated each other with
sincerity by respecting and accommodating each other’s concerns and properly managing
problems and differences” (emphasis added).
A Xinhua commentary on the day of his arrival was even more explicit in this respect, mentioning
“sincerity is the basis of mutual trust” and recommending a firm grasp over “correct strategic
orientation of bilateral relations, so that cooperation will always be the main theme”.
All in all, a by no means ‘soft’ message about the terms of Sino-Indian relations in the future, although
delivered softly. A kind of Chinese variant of the “tread softly but carry a big stick” precept popularly
attributed to US President Roosevelt.
This is in keeping with what is known about the personality of the man -- genial but one who has shown
grit in taking the bull of corruption amongst peer level Party cadres, including above all those in the
military that is the ultimate guarantor of power of an increasingly alienated Party elite (as well as
bureaucratism, formalism and wastefulness in general at all levels), by its horns, unafraid of the
possibility of its boomeranging on him. At the same time, a self-effacing person who reportedly
endeared himself to the peasants he was sent ‘down to the countryside’ to learn from during the
Cultural Revolution. (An innovative practice, albeit a much decried one, for countering the tendency
towards bureaucratism in Party/State cadres, whose spirit was not appreciated by most officials
interested only in getting by the letter of its stipulations by hook or by crook.)
The Chinese President is likely to prove to be a formidable interlocutor in the ensuing rounds of
engagement between the leaders of the two estranged neighbours condemned to grapple with an
unfortunate legacy of distrust and bad blood. The Indian side will do well to not take anything for
granted, least of all Chinese reticence and ‘yieldingness’ in official interactions, and observe a
moratorium on public statements on China – of any kind, critical or laudatory or accommodative – until
there has been adequate opportunity for probing the recesses of the Chinese mind in some depth. After
going over the bitter experience of the late fifties and pre-1962 guardedly.
The Chinese President’s visit was handled deftly but ‘advantage in’ can easily turn into ‘advantage out’,
as a result of free-wheeling and out of turn remarks magnified by a free and voluble media, digital media
thriving on sound byte sensationalism above all.
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