Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
IPSA Congress 2016 - Claudia Zilla
Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
Dr. Claudia Zilla
Head of Research Division „The Americas“
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), Berlin
German Institute for International and Security Affairs
[email protected]
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
2
Inclusion – an initial conceptual approximation ............................................................................................................................. 3
3
Democracy and Inclusion........................................................................................................................................................................... 5
4
Citizenship and Inclusion ........................................................................................................................................................................ 11
5
Civic and Political Inclusion ................................................................................................................................................................... 15
6
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21
7
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22
Abstract
In Political Science, we deal with a series of ideas, which are primarily political ideals. In Comparative
Politics, we need concepts that are able to “travel” across countries and regions and capable of being
measured. Inclusion is an equivocal notion in which both aspects converge: On the one hand, inclusion is
used as a code for normative claims regarding, for example, participation, equality, social justice and
recognition. On the other hand, it can be applied as an analytical tool for assessing the quality of political
regimes. How can inclusion be defined in order to maintain its value orientation and serve at the same
time as an empirical concept for systematic-qualitative comparative research? Combining the
perspectives of democracy and citizenship theory—two strands that run parallel to each other without
much interaction—I develop a bridging comprehensive qualitative approach to inclusion. Starting from a
normative conception of democracy and citizenship that leads to a procedural definition, I define
democratic inclusion as civic and political inclusion and lay out dimensions for comparatively assessing
political regimes from the perspective of inclusion-exclusion.
Keywords: Inclusion; Exclusion, Inequality, Equality, Democracy, Citizenship, Rule of Law, Accountability
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Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
IPSA Congress 2016 - Claudia Zilla
1
Introduction
In the context of Social Science, the notion of inclusion usually refers to heterogeneous groups’
participation in society on an equal footing, e.g. their equitable sharing of social goods. Frequently,
inclusion also denotes the targeted efforts to culturally, socially, economically, civically or politically
incorporate underprivileged, disadvantaged, marginalized or subaltern social groups. This is, for example,
the case of the definition that Talcott Parsons (1965: 1015) gives in his remarkable contribution “Full
Citizenship for the Negro American? A Sociological Problem”: “The process by which previously excluded
groups attain full citizenship or membership in the societal community will […] be called inclusion.” As one
dimension of the duality inclusion/exclusion, the concept serves for discussing a variety of problems such
as the lack of social justice, equal opportunity and social recognition as well as the existence of
marginalization, discrimination and oppression from different theoretical angles (Zilla 2015: 272).
Inclusive claims have been particularly raised in the language of democracy and citizenship. Robert E.
Goodin (1996) bemoans that, in scholarly writings and in politics, talks on inclusion have been used as a
code for many different demands. Peter Kivisto (2004: 294f.) indicates that some theorists have
increasingly framed their discussion of inclusion in terms of citizenship, social justice and/or the pursuit
of recognition. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman (1994: 368) state: “It is not clear whether adopting the
perspective of citizenship really leads to different policy conclusions than the more familiar perspectives
of justice and democracy.” Finally, Iris Marion Young (2010: 13) rightly warns: “The concepts of exclusion
and inclusion lose meaning if they are used to label all problems of social conflict and injustice.”
Although the three notions inclusion, democracy and citizenship are not synonymous, their semantic
fields partly overlap. Thus, the first question for any theory of democracy as well as of citizenship is who is
included—included as members of the political community or polity.1 In democratic theory, politically
active and passive actors, voters as well as elected representatives and appointed officials, are in the first
instance citizens. In citizenship theory, a democratic context is usually taken for granted. In this sense,
citizenship is more than mere membership in a polity: Citizenship is inherent to polity-members in a
democracy. Democracy requires rule of law, which is based on effective civil rights. Democratic
representation and participation build also upon political rights. Civil and political rights are constitutive
elements of citizenship.
Moreover, democracy is by definition a highly inclusionary political regime. Inclusion is a key dimension
of democracy that underlines the principles of liberty and civic and political equality for all and finds its
clearest expression in universal suffrage. In this sense, inclusion is requirement (input) and at the same
time achievement (output) of democracy—a double source of its legitimacy. However, fully inclusionary
democracies do not exist, neither theoretically nor empirically. Democracy’s principles, structures and
functions necessarily require moments of exclusion. In representative democracies minors and nonnationals have no voting rights, thus not every resident is a citizen. Electoral thresholds might prevent
small parties from entering parliament. Political parties that are racist and opposed to the democratic
constitution might be banned. External and internal inclusionary/exclusionary boundaries are formally
and factually inherent to democracy. Therefore, even from a normative perspective of the theory of
democracy and citizenship, not every type of exclusion is problematic.
In my Political Science research, I aim to develop a comprehensive qualitative approach to inclusion. With
this objective, I link the notion of inclusion with the theories of democracy and citizenship. Although both
theoretical strands typically examine similar aspects and problems, they frequently do not relate to each
other, offering unconnected but quite symmetric views to common issues. Therefore, my second
theoretical purpose is to integrate democracy and citizenship theory from the perspective of inclusion
1
In this article, I use “political community” and “polity” as synonyms.
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Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
IPSA Congress 2016 - Claudia Zilla
into an innovative framework of analysis and interpretation for civic and political inclusion, which I
simply call democratic inclusion.
The structure of this article is as follows: In section 2, I elaborate on the merits of inclusion as a Social
Sciences’ notion and explain my preliminary understanding of some aspects of the concept. Then, I choose
a double theoretical take: First, in section 3, I relate inclusion to democratic theory. My starting point is a
normative characterization of democracy as based on the principles of liberty and equality that leads to a
procedural definition of democracy which encompasses a civic and a political dimension. Against this
backdrop, I discuss four problems of representative democracy that put the principles of liberty and
equality under pressure and serve at the same time as evaluative dimensions for democratic
inclusiveness. I call them the dilemmas of demos’ boundary, incongruity, disparity and foreclosure. In
section 4 and shifting the theoretical angle, I demarcate the meaning of inclusion from the perspective of
citizenship theory and identify three ways the inclusiveness of citizenship can be altered: I call them
deepening, extension and expansion. In section 5, I combine both theoretical perspectives and develop my
own bridging approach, distinguishing operational dimensions, which allow for the qualitative assessment
of democracy from the perspective of inclusion. Finally, in section 6, I offer a summary of my arguments
and stipulations as well as an outlook for further research on democratic inclusion.
2
Inclusion – an initial conceptual approximation
Inclusion is a multi-dimensional concept that denotes access to a plurality of entitlements and material as
well as immaterial resources in different social systems or societal realms. According to this general and
preliminary definition, the concept leaves initially open the questions of sphere (where), subject (who),
quality (what kind), scope (to what extent) and terms (mode) of inclusion.
In the context of social system theories inspired by Niklas Luhmann (1997: 618), inclusion/exclusion has
been understood as a dichotomy, as a discrete and disjunct differentiation between “in” and “out” or—in
an attenuated version—between “achievement role” and “spectator role” within a system (Stichweh
2000). However, the scholarly and political debates about “full inclusiveness”, “full citizenship” or
“effective inclusion” are based upon the observation that some people might not be unrestrictedly entitled
or might be legally (formally) entitled but structurally limited to (factually) make use of this entitlement.
Or what is the same: They might have (de jure) the right but be (de facto) hindered to exercise it. For this
reason, we can distinguish a sort of gradation or different extents to which people can be included. Thus, it
is more appropriate to consider inclusion and exclusion as two sides of the continuum. At the same time, it
seems evident that in society areas of inclusion might co-exist with areas of exclusion. Certain groups
might experience exclusion in certain social systems but be at the same time well included in others.
Therefore, in contrast to Luhmann’s dichotomist understanding, I conceive inclusion and exclusion as
gradual and overlapping, and mutually non-exclusive phenomena.
If we acknowledge that inclusion is a complex phenomenon that implies taking empirically into account
the fact that its effective realization is only in exceptional cases circumscribed to one single social system,
then we have to analytically conceive (1) inclusion in one specific social system as being interlinked with
the inclusionary situation in other social systems; and consequently (2) social systems as open and
mutually interconnected systems. Accepting these analytical assumptions, we will be able to understand
that, although the lack of inclusion in one system cannot be fully compensated by enhancing inclusion in
another system (irreducibility), inclusion as well as its reverse, exclusion, tends to be an aggregative
phenomenon. In the case of exclusion, a particular vulnerability arises from the interconnectivity between
social systems (spill-over effect). As Talcott Parsons (1965: 1019) puts it, “there is a vicious circle of
cumulative disadvantage”. For this reason, changes in one system can also affect (intensify or attenuate)
deficits of inclusion in other systems.
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Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
IPSA Congress 2016 - Claudia Zilla
Furthermore, inclusion and exclusion are not reducible to a single axis, e.g. class, gender, ethnicity or
(dis)ability.2 By way of illustration, let us assume that the political aim is inclusive representation and that
one criterion for this is a congress that is a miniature of the electorate. The hypothesis underlying this
criterion is that if the congress reflects the composition of the society/electorate, then it acts to represent
the interests of the represented (Manin/Przeworski/Stokes 1999: 32). This corresponds to the distinction
between descriptive and substantive representation intensively discussed by Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
(1972) in her remarkable Book “The Concept of Representation”. Leaving for the moment this debate
aside and from the individual perspective of the citizen, we might consider an indigenous woman
politically well included in terms of representation “as a woman” by a national parliament with 50 percent
of females representatives. But she may not be included in the same extend “as a member of the
indigenous community”, if the number of indigenous representatives in the same parliament is by far
much lower than the indigenous share in the society and the preferences of indigenous people are
systematically not taken into account. The same is valid for a male indigenous citizen, who in a specific
sphere might be privileged against females and disadvantaged against non-indigenous citizens. In this
sense, a citizen might be simultaneously marginalized and privileged by the intersecting structures (Htun/
Ossa 2013: 6) or roles in different realms. Thus, I conceive inclusion/exclusion as an intersectional
phenomenon.3 This conceptual perspective raises the crucial question of which social categories are built
and become relevant for inclusionary claims towards social systems or subsystems, institutions, etc.
In the context of today’s democratic discourse, it has become difficult to politically legitimate exclusion
since inclusion, in the sense of the absence of marginalization, discrimination and oppression, is the
positively connoted term, the imperative or ideal. However, compared to “justice”, inclusion is still a less
value-loaded concept. Inclusion, as a more analytical concept, allows for the understanding of processes of
change not only in different social systems but also in different subsystems or areas of each social system
as well as of the effects of institutional and procedural arrangements. Inclusion is applicable at every
system level: We can ask whether a democracy has become more or less inclusive, or—more specifically—
whether the representative dimension of democratic government has become more or less inclusive or—
even more specifically—whether the electoral system has become more or less inclusive.
Since in democracy (based on the rule of law and the ideal of full citizenship for all), exclusion is generally
not formally and outspokenly prescribed, I refer more often to higher or lower, more or less inclusion.
This does not mean, however, that I understand inclusion teleologically. Inclusion is not a linear and
inevitable process individuals, groups or societies go through, involving a series of progressive stages of
incorporation of citizens into a system of entitlements and resources. This is also true for democracies,
since they do not become necessarily more democratic over time. Instead, individuals and groups can gain
and lose access to entitlements and resources at different levels or in different areas of a single social
system at different points in time. Neither can the issue of inclusion/exclusion be understood as a zero-
2
This work is predicated on the conviction that identities, social roles, etc. are not given but socially constructed, i.e. contingent,
and that human beings ideally should be at most free to choose their own affiliations and self-definitions and therefore be
respected in their individuality. I shall not embark here on the debate whether, for example, skin color and sex have ontological
character or should be understood as merely constructed attributes (Butler 2006). Yet, the elevation of such attributes to the rank
of relevant categories in society, which have cultural, economic, social and political consequences, is undoubtedly a product of
social construction—with strongly palpable implications.
3 “’Women’, rather, is a collection of categories including ‘white woman,’ mestiza women,’ ‘rich woman,’ ‘poor woman’, ‘old
woman,’ ‘lesbian woman,’ and so forth. ‘Indigenous’ is a diverse category encompassing thousands of distinct groups, which in
Latin America include speakers of a few hundred different languages, highland and lowland dwellers, rural and urban residents,
different class backgrounds, and people with varying identities. Far from the premise of politics, the unity and coherence of these
categories is a political achievement. To the extent that either women or indigenous peoples mobilize collectively, it is because of
the political work they have done to overcome the potentially divisive effects of their other differences. […] Intersectionality
implies that due to their diverse social positions, different sectors of marginalized groups may have different interests. Though
some issues may affect all members of a marginalized group, other issue are more relevant or their disadvantaged and/or
advantaged subgroups […]” (Htun/ Ossa 2013: 6f.)
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sum game.4 Therefore, I designate “inclusionary” those tools (decisions, measures, strategies, mechanism,
institutions, etc.), which (intendedly or unintendedly) induce the formal and/or effective incorporation of
diverse people or groups into the circle of those nominally and/or effectively enjoying certain
entitlements and resources. I also call inclusionary those measures that lead to the recognition or
introduction of new entitlements and resources. Inclusionary are also discourses that acknowledge the
need to induce or foster inclusion.
3
Democracy and Inclusion
Democracy as Liberty and Equality
Democracy entails a double meaning: It refers normatively to an ideal and analytically to an empirical
political regime. This article is guided by the conception of democracy as a desirable goal, an ideal,
normatively grounded on the recognition of liberty and equality—and on the promise of actualizing them.
Liberty can be understood in a liberal (negative) sense as non-domination and in a republican (positive)
sense as self-government (Urbinati 2012). In the former negative sense, liberty means the absence of
arbitrary interference, i.e. the protection of rights and freedoms. It also implies rule of law and limitation
of authority: “No one, including the most highly placed official, is above the law” (O’Donnell 2005: 5; also
8). In terms of Max Weber (1980: 125): It means legal rule in which law is set (gesetztes Recht) and even
the superior authority (Vorgesetzte/r) obeys the impersonal legal order. Liberty as non-domination
applies not only with regard to a single ruler but also to a popular majority whose authority is also
constrained by the subjection to the law and the protection of rights and freedoms (of minorities). In the
latter positive sense, liberty means autonomy, the subjection to laws that oneself has made; i.e. “the
principle that all members of a political community whose interests are affected by collective decisions
should have a say in them” (Rueschemeyer 2011: 819). The concepts of constitutionalism and popular
sovereignty usually allude respectively to these two meanings of liberty as non-domination and selfgovernment—and can be seen at the same time as mirror-images to the civic and political elements of
citizenship, i.e. they encompass civil and political rights (more on this in the following chapter).5
Equality, in turn, means civic and political equality, i.e. equality between citizens in terms of civil and
political rights.6 Civic equality underlines the legal equality as civic status, equality before the law. Political
equality is “a condition in which all citizens have equal influence on the collective decision making of a
political community” (Rueschemeyer 2011: 818), the equal consideration of preferences in a political
system. “Not only should all those affected be nominally included in decision-making, but they should be
included on equal terms” (Young 2010: 23).
According to Robert Dahl (2006: 4), two assumptions underline the principle of political equality:
The first is the moral judgment that all human beings are of equal intrinsic worth, that no person is
intrinsically superior to another, and that the good or interest of each person must be given equal
consideration. [The second:] Among adults, no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to
govern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority over the government of the
state.
4
There may be situations where the quantity of citizens with access to entitlements and resources is limited, as there are a fix
number of representatives in most parliaments. But, analytically speaking, this is a matter of parliaments, not of inclusion.
5 Certainly, both understandings of liberty correspond to the tradition of political though. From the perspective of philosophy, for
instance, freedom has been mostly conceived as the opposite of necessity.
6 In the context of democratic theory, most authors refer only to “political equality” as one of the critical dimensions of democracy
and do not mention “civic equality” explicitly. However, they frequently consider it implicitly when speaking of equality before the
law, equality in the access to justice and equality in the realm of civil rights and freedoms. Thus, in order to be conceptually
exhaustive and systematic, I prefer to use the explicit double notion of civic and political equality.
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Defining Inclusion from the Perspective of Democracy and Citizenship Theory
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In line with this, Dieter Rueschemeyer (2011: 819) states that “political equality is an acknowledgment of
the decisively similar dignity of all citizens as human beings who are entitled to the rule of reciprocity.”
According to this definition, civic and political equality are grounded in the equal worth and dignity of all
citizens and transverses both meanings of liberty: non-domination/constitutionalism (equality before the
law) and self-government/popular sovereignty (equal consideration of preferences).
Table 1: Democracy’s Principles
Negative
Sense
Liberty
Positive
Sense
Protections of rights and freedoms
Non-domination
Constitutionalism
Participation in policy making
Self-government
Popular sovereignty
Civic
Equality before the law
Equality
Equal consideration of
preferences
Political
If we accept these understandings, then we have to conclude twofold: First, in the ideal community
politically organized as a democracy and therefore on the basis of liberty and civic and political equality,
all citizens7 enjoy equal rights and chances to participate in the public sphere, to have an impact upon the
definition of common goods and the decision on common goals (self-government). This means that they
have equal opportunity to shape the constraining/enabling collective framework. And within this
framework, they enjoy at the same time equal and greatest possible scope of action to freely choose their
own way of life (non-domination). In this sense, they have a relatively expanded margin for individual or
group based maneuver.
Secondly, the idea of democracy as based on the principles of liberty and of civic and political equality is
necessarily linked to the rule of law and participation; without both of them civil and political rights
cannot be realized.8 In this sense, the notions “liberal democracy” or “constitutional democracy” as well as
“participatory democracy” or “popular democracy” might stress a particular dimension of democracy
(non-domination vs. self-government or—what is equivalent—constitutionalism vs. popular sovereignty)
but the adjectives are strictly speaking redundant.9 Bringing principles, concepts and facts together: A
political regime in which the government seriously restricts participation or rights and freedoms does not
qualify as a democracy. At the same time, no real-existing democracy is run on the basis of full equality of
all society’s members in terms of non-domination and self-government.
Representative Democracy and Majority Rule
Unlike the above mentioned notions of democracy with adjectives (Collier/Levitsky 1997), the
specifications “representative democracy” and “majority rule” are not superfluous, since they constitute
particular concretizations of the democratic principles in large societies. I agree with Dieter Nohlen (2014:
2f.) when he states that, conceptually, at the core of democracy is the inclusion of all members of society
with equal rights into the process of decision making but not a specific mode of inclusion or of decision
7
Doubtless, this raises the central question of who is a citizen, who belongs to society, who is a political community’s member. I
will discuss the aspect of inclusion in/exclusion from the definition of society/citizenry, i.e. of the demos, at a later stage.
8 Although rule of law without democracy is thinkable and it was historically the case for the European states in the 18 th and 19th
century, democracy in turn requires the rule of law.
9 In a similar vein and with a special view on liberty, David Beetham (2005: 32f.) states: “When I began studying political science
it was common to talk of ‘liberal’ democracy as a particular type of democracy, to be contrasted with participatory democracy,
single-party democracy, or Marxist democracy. Remnants of that thinking persist, though a moment’s reflection will show that
this typology is based on a conceptual confusion, for without liberty there can be no democracy. If people are to have any
influence or control over public decision making and decision makers, they must be free to communicate and associate with one
another, to receive accurate information and express divergent opinions, to enjoy freedom of movement, and to be free from
arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. […] So democracy without freedom is a contradiction in terms.” I fully agree with Beetham’s
conceptual remark.
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rule. Because, among other reasons, self-government, i.e. popular sovereignty, can hardly be directly
exercised by a large number of citizens, modern democracies rely (primarily) on representation, which is
an indirect inclusion mode.10 Furthermore, because citizens (and representatives) might have different
and divergent values, ideas and interests—in short: preferences11—and it is not possible to consider all of
them at the same time, modern democracies operate according to majority rule, which elevates the
preferences of the majority to the general will—as one of the possible solutions to the decision question
(Nohlen 2014: 1).12
Modern representative democracies relying on majority rule greatly differ in the grade of application of
this formula. The variance in the implementation of the majority principle becomes manifest, for instance,
in electoral systems based on different decision rules and principles of representation (Nohlen 2014), e.g.
proportional representation vs. plurality. It may also underlie democracy's functioning: In his influential
book “Patterns of Democracy” (2002), Arend Lijphart distinguishes between two basic structural and
functional patterns of democratic regimes, i.e. the majoritarian model and the consensus model. Lijphart
bases his analysis on political-institutional dimensions and concludes with the assessment that consensus
democracy is superior to majoritarian democracy in terms of performance and inclusiveness. Lijphart
(2002: 6) also points out: “There is a surprisingly strong and persistent tendency in political science to
equate democracy solely with majoritarian democracy and to fail to recognize consensus democracy as an
alternative and equally legitimate type”. Thus, we should distinguish between a narrow and a broader
meaning of the concept. In a broader sense, all representative democracies are based upon majority rule
today. In a narrow sense, not all representative democracies operate according to a strict majoritarian
pattern. Moreover, “pure or almost pure majoritarian democracies are actually quite rare […]. Most
democracies have significant or even predominantly consensual traits” (Lijphart 2002: 7).
A Procedural Concept of Democracy
As conceptualized here, both twin principles, liberty (non-domination and self-government) and (civic
and political) equality, are equiprimordial or co-original, i.e. they are both intrinsic to democracy. By
contrast, this is not the case of social and economic equality. Advocates of substantive conceptions of
democracy also consider material equality as one of its defining features. Doubtless, it remains a
democratic challenge to guarantee civic and political equality when significant economic disparities
prevail. For, as Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2011: 820) states, “differences in the distribution of income and
wealth across countries and over time within countries make for significant variations in political
equality.” If economic inequality is not substantially counterbalanced or compensated, then civic and
political equality might be limited (Rueschemeyer 2011: 819). A similar problem arises regarding innate
abilities. For instance, individuals with heterogeneous rhetoric skills or organizational creativity may
differ with regard to their ability to articulate their preferences and, therefore, to their ability to convince
others and advocate their political preferences.
In line with this, John Rawls (1971: 12) distinguishes two specific inequalities: on the one hand, the
unequal (natural) distribution of assets and abilities; on the other hand, the contingency of social
circumstance, e.g. familiar and national precedence. Rawls (ibid.) designates both cases as a “lottery”, i.e. a
question of luck. I conceive both inequalities as extrinsic to democracy. Rather, they constitute inequalities
10
For this reason, “direct democracy” is usually understood as opposite to “representative democracy”.
I prefer to refer to the combination “values, ideas and interest”, since “interests” alone might be understood in a narrow sense
as particularistic and selfish preferences. This may be the case, but it does not have to be. “Values, ideas and interests” can be
summarized as “preferences”, which can lie on different abstraction levels and refer to egoist as well as altruist, individualistic as
well as community oriented conceptions, wishes and demands. At the same time, to be sure, I am not suggesting that interests are
free from values and values are not conditioned by interests.
12 Representation and majority rule are not necessarily connected. One can imagine a direct democracy working on the majority
rule (as realized in the Greek polis) as well as a representative democracy with randomly selected officials, i.e. a “demarchy” or
“lottocracy”.
7
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a democracy has to deal with. In this sense, the equalization of natural talents and of social and economic
situations might be an objective of democratic policy or a performance result (output). Yet, equality of
natural capacity as well as social and economic equality is neither a theoretical requirement nor a
conceptually constitutive feature of democracy. For they may also be realized or striven in a nondemocratic polity; thus, they are not democracy-specific. Or, to put it more clearly with an extreme
example given by Rueschemeyer (2011: 820): Reduced levels of economic inequality might also coincide
with the destruction of democratic equality and liberty (as in the socialist autocracies).
In consonance with this fine distinction, Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino (2005b: xxvii)
conceptualize as editors of the book “Assessing the Quality of Democracy” social rights and socioeconomic
equality as one of the factors that have an impact upon the quality of democracy—but not as a defining
dimension of their procedural concept of democracy:
We come then to a fundamental dilemma: Democracy as political system does not in itself require a
certain set of social or economic policies; rather the democratic process is precisely about the struggle
to determine those policies, and to shape the distribution of benefits across groups and even across
generations. To enjoy political equality, however, citizens must also have some measure of equality in
income, wealth, and status. The more extreme are social and economic inequalities, the more
disproportionate will be the power of those who control vast concentrations of wealth and hence their
ability to make leaders respond to their wishes and interest.
Consequently, Rueschemeyer (2005: 48) asserts in his contribution „Addressing Inequality“ contained in
the same book that “politics must be ‘differentiated’ from the overall structure of power and the system of
social inequality as a whole”. For “[e]ven democracy as minimally conceived is only possible if political
decisions are to some extend separated from the system of class, status, and power” (Rueschemeyer 2005:
59). Integrating and adapting Rueschemeyer’s (2005: 48) double differentiation,13 I develop the following
threefold systematic. From the democratic principle of equality, which is in tension with the impact of
differential economic, cultural and social power, a distinction of processes and structures located in three
different spheres emerges: (1) Processes and structures that advance or diminish equality within the
political sphere (positive example: one person, one vote; negative example: gerrymandering); (2) those
that limit or foster “spillovers” which originate in inequalities in other areas of life and then flow into the
political sphere, i.e. the conversion of socioeconomic into political advantage (positive example: equal
allocation of broadcasting time to all parties and candidates; negative example: no constrains for private
electoral financing);14 and finally (3) those induced by policies that tighten or tackle social and economic
inequality directly beyond the (narrowly conceived) political realm (positive example: gender quotas for
company’s boards in the private economy; negative example: a regressive fiscal system) (cf.
Rueschemeyer’s 2005: 48). It is evident that there is a decreasing consensus on the question whether
politics should actively promote equality along spheres 1, 2 and 3. As Rueschemeyer (2005: 48f.) puts it:
Even if we stay purely within the political realm there are […] objections to advancing political equality
as much as possible. […] Limiting the conversion of assets from other spheres into political advantages
is far more controversial. And objections mount even further against policy proposals to level
differential assets outside the sphere of politics because spillover effects are too difficult to contain.
13
As for Rueschemeyer’s (2005: 48) double differentiation: On the one hand, he distinguishes between processes and structures
that affect inequalities within the political realm from those that alter the inequalities in other areas of life that can enter the
political arena. On the other hand, he separates measures dealing with spillovers of social inequality into the political sphere from
those that tackle social and economic inequality directly.
14 This is for instance the case in the USA, where the decision of the Supreme Court to protect the unlimited spending money in
campaigns sees the broadened freedom of expression as overriding the concern for democratic equality (Rueschemeyer 2005:
49).
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From the perspective of inclusion and in accordance with a procedural understanding of democracy, only
aspects directly related to the political system, i.e. spheres 1 and 2, are of relevance for my framework of
analysis and interpretation. Therefore, as for its constitutive normative basis, neither social and economic
equality nor equality of skills but the existence of civic and political equality between citizens is a
fundamental premise of democracy (Dahl 2006: IX).
Four Dilemmas of Representative Democracy
Conventional representative democracy brings with it two differentiations that compromise the principles
of liberty and equality: On the one hand, a vertical one, between rulers or elected representatives (as well
as appointed officials, i.e. the bureaucracy responsible to them) and the ruled or represented people
(constituencies). Thus, the democratic foundation of representation (only) consists in a relative equality
between representatives and constituencies, since (nearly) everyone has the right to stand as candidate in
elections and become a mandate-holder. Furthermore, representative roles are temporary, i.e. the
hierarchical relation of domination should not be permanent and structural but time limited and
contingent (Borchert 2013: 238). This non-enduring situation fosters the (vertical) accountability and
responsiveness of incumbents towards the constituents.
On the other hand, representative democracy introduces a horizontal differentiation between preferences
which are (strongly) represented or considered in the decision making process and those which are only
weakly represented or not considered at all (Thaa 2007b: 9), due to the fact that, for instance, they have
low support, are in conflict with others, lack organizational potential or stem from marginalized actors
(Waas 2007: 55; Olson 1977). Thus, from the perspective of those citizens whose preferences might not be
included in the process of policy-making but who are nevertheless bound to or affected by political
decisions, representative democracy might resemble heteronomy (Thaa 2013: 108; Zürn 2011).
In this sense, a tension between representation and liberty and equality arises because of the vertical
power gap, i.e. the dilemma of incongruity between representatives and constituents as well as of the
horizontal gap, i.e. the dilemma of disparity between more and less politically influential preferences
(Linden 2007: 61ff.).15 Closely linked to both dilemmas is a double risk of representative democracy that
endangers liberty and equality: the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority, i.e. of the governing elite, the
oligarchy (Michels 1911); and the risk of the tyranny of the majority’s will.
From a diachronic perspective, there also exists a third risk, namely, that today’s majority or ruling
minority deeply constrains the political choices available in the future. This affects, on the one hand, the
equality between generations, i.e. between today’s and tomorrow’s citizens. On the other hand, it restricts
the possibility of learning processes and/or changes of mind.16 Therefore, the inclusive time dimension
15
Monarchies introduce per definition a third and even stronger moment of inequality, which is in tension with democracy, i.e.
the existence of a (non-elected or non-democratically legitimized) “royal family” with far-reaching privileges.
16 In his contribution „An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?“, Immanuel Kant vehemently (1784: 61f.) defends this
normative idea of refraining today from foreclosing future decisions. He derives this aspect of equality between ages and
generations from the question of enlightenment and emancipation, emphasizing the value of learning processes over time: “But
would not a society of clergymen, such as a church synod or a venerable classis (as they call themselves among the Dutch), be
justified in binding one another by oath to a certain unalterable symbol, in order to hold an unremitting superior guardianship
over each of their members, and by this means over their people, and even to make this eternal? I say that this is completely
impossible. Such a contract, concluded for the purpose of closing off forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is utterly
null and void even if it should be confirmed by the highest power, by Imperial Diets, and by the most solemn peace treaties. One
age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place the succeeding age in a situation in which it becomes impossible for it to
broaden its knowledge (particularly such pressing knowledge), to cleanse itself of errors, and generally to progress in
enlightenment. That would be a crime against human nature, whose original destiny consists in this progress; and posterity
would be fully justified to reject these resolutions as concluded in an unauthorized and outrageous manner. The touchstone of
everything that can be concluded as law for the people lies in the question: could a people have imposed such a law upon itself?
Now this would be possible for a specified brief time period, in order to introduce a certain order, as it were, in expectation of
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implies the warranty of optionality, allowing future choice, as well as of reversibility, allowing future
change should. To put it in Dahl’s (2003: 148) normative terms: “No majority should have the right, moral
or constitutional, to foreclose decisions by future majorities.”
The group of reference for the formulation of all these problems and risks of representative democracy is
the political community—but who does belong to it? Who is included? This question concerns the
dilemma of demos’ definition. The boundary problem, identified by Robert Dahl (1971), “alludes to a basic
question: what constitutes ‘a people’ for the purpose of democratic government? Neither empirical nor
normative theories tend to deal with this question, because they normally assume that ‘a people’ already
exists’” (Rovira Kaltwasser 2014: 472). In this context, the term usually means the people living within a
(nation) state having the right to self-government. However, this implies a tautology, because people
cannot be defined by state boundaries since the latter derive from the constitutional power of the people;
it is the people that authorize the establishment of the state (Nässtöm 2003: 808; Gaon 2009: 1). This is
not only logically true but also “in a practical-historical sense: decisions about the terms of any actually
existing democracy cannot themselves have stemmed from democratic processes of decision-making”
(Calder 2011: 186). Not without reason, in contractualist theories, foundational consensual situations are
imaginary or hypothetical, i.e. they are heuristic constructions. Therefore, the idea of popular sovereignty
entails a moment of vagueness leaving space for struggles for the definition of the demos (and its
boundaries). The contentiousness of people’s definition does not exclusively affect foundational situations.
It may rather be an ongoing process with stable as well as accommodation phases.
As can be inferred from the above and with reference to the four dilemmas of representative democracy,
there are four basic (mutually non-excluding) ways or strategies by which a democracy may become more
inclusive:
∎ First, the definition of the demos may be symbolically, politically and legally widened, e.g. by politically
recognizing marginalized groups as full members of society, by lowering the voting age and thus enlarging
the electorate or by incorporating foreigners as new citizens into the polity. Strictly speaking, in many
situations, this strategy may not reduce the inequality between members and non-members of the
political community (since those who remain non-members do remain excluded) but it may reduce the
group of non-members or not recognized members in a society or the degree of their exclusion (for
example, when foreigners are entitled to vote at the local level).
∎ Second, the incongruity dilemma of (vertical) inequality between representatives and constituents and
the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority may be attenuated by introducing power control and power
dispersion mechanisms, i.e. increasing responsiveness, enhancing vertical and horizontal accountability.
∎ Third, the disparity dilemma of (horizontal) inequality between structurally strong and weak, more and
less powerful preferences and the risk of the tyranny of majority’s will may be reduced, e.g. by protecting
minorities, enhancing pluralism, diversifying representation, fostering participation, etc.
∎ Fourth, the risk of future choices’ foreclosure, i.e. the restriction of the political options of future
generations of citizens, the (diachronic) inequality between present and future citizens, may be
ameliorated, for instance, by promoting system openness, preventing the sustained ideologization of the
state according to the political orientation of the current government.
As these four aspects reveal and as the following table summarizes, inclusion has a lot to do with
generating more equality on the basis of liberty, i.e. with reducing power gaps.
something better. […] One man may indeed postpone, for his own person and even then only for a short time, enlightenment in
that which it is incumbent for him to know; but to renounce it, for his own person and even more for posterity, is to violate and to
trample on the sacred rights of mankind.” (Kant 1784; translated by James Schmidt, 61f.).
.
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Table 2: Democracy and Inclusion
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY'S DILEMMAS
Demos boundary
Incongruity
Disparity
Foreclosure
Inequality between polity members and nonmembers
Inequality between representatives/officials and
constituents (tyranny of the ruling minority)
Inequality between strong and weak preferences
(tyranny of the majority)
Inequality between present and future citizens
INCLUSIONARY STRATEGIES
Demos’ widening
Power control and dispersion/
responsiveness, accountability
Minority protection, enhancement of
pluralism and diversity in participation,
representation and policy impact
System openness/ distinction between
current government and enduring state
Thus, (1) widening the demos or the electorate, (2) narrowing the political power gap between rulers and
ruled ones, (3) equalizing chances among citizens of preference articulation, representation and
implementation as well as (4) increasing future political optionality can be seen as four basic ways or
strategies that would make representative democracy more inclusive. Conversely, democracy may
become more exclusive when (1) the demos' conception turns more restrictive, (2) the political power gap
between rulers and ruled citizens widens, (3) the chances of success of preferences become more
asymmetric, and (4) current actors strongly block future preferences and possibilities of change.
4
Citizenship and Inclusion
Citizenship’s Dimensions
Citizenship designates full membership in a democratically organized political community based on the
rule of law. Under legal rule (Weber 1980: 124), citizens are holders of rights—they are not, for instance,
subjects of the crown, but subjects of law.17 From this perspective, citizenship can be conceived as legal
status (Kymlicka/Norman 1994: 353) that bundles a series of rights. With a view to citizenship, inclusion
refers, on the one hand, to the incorporation of people into the ranks of citizens and their access to rights
and entitlements and, on the other hand, to the terms of incorporation and access (Kivisto/Faist 2007:
6f.).
Following Talcott Parsons, I stick to a pluralistic understanding of citizenship. A key aspect in this context
is that “the status of citizenship comes to be institutionalized in terms independent of [….] ascriptive
criteria” (Parsons 1965: 1011) as ethnicity, religion or social class. Full citizenship implies a fundamental
equality of rights in the polity—not equality in all senses, but despite differences. The fact that other
differences remain, turns the process of gaining full citizenship a question of inclusion in a pluralistic
social structure and not of assimilation, i.e. not of becoming as similar as the dominating social group
(Parsons 1965: 1015f.). As Parsons (1965: 1016) puts it: “Full inclusion and multiple role participation are
compatible with the maintenance of distinctive ethnic and/or religious identity”.
In “Citizenship and Social Class” (1950), Thomas H. Marshall offers a remarkable analysis of the tensions
between the principle of equality, which underlies the concept of citizenship, on the one hand, and the
empirical inequalities on which the social class system is based, on the other hand. Elaborating on
citizenship, i.e. the status of full membership in a (national-state) society founded upon the principle of
human equality, Marshall (1992: 8) distinguishes three parts or elements: First, the civic element
composed of the rights necessary for individuals (negative) freedoms (of thought, speech, faith, etc.) as
well as the right to justice. Second, the political element concerns the (positive) rights to participate in the
17
This aspect distinguishes constitutional monarchy from other types of monarchy.
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exercise of political power, as a voter, a member of an institution, an office-holder, etc. Finally, third, the
social element regards the right to have a share in material standards prevailing in the society, the sphere
of economic welfare and social security. Referring to the historic evolution in England, Marshall points out
that these three types of citizenship rights, i.e. civil, political and social rights (and the institutions linked
to them), were first part of the same amalgam but then individualized and developed gradually, one after
another over the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, differentiating state functions and promoting the building of
corresponding institutions on which the three dimensions depend: the courts of justice, the parliaments
and councils as well as the educational system and social services.
Table 3: Marshall’s Citizenship Rights
Civil Rights
Political Rights
Social Rights
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS
Rights for individual (negative) freedoms
(Positive) Rights for political participation
Rights for material share in society
INSTITUTIONS
Courts of justice
Parliaments and councils
Educational system/Social services
As Martin Bulmer and Anthony M. Rees (1996: 272) point out—with special focus on social citizenship—
Marshall's “Citizenship and social class” is also about inclusion and exclusion, even though he does not use
these terms and prefers to talk instead of “equality” and “inequality”. Thus, Marshall’s story of inclusion is
a schematic depiction of the gradual evolution of citizenship. He structures it by a sequence of three
phases that partly overlap on the empirical level, however. Yet, “Marshall was not charting an inevitable
progression to the sunny uplands of the 1950s and a then contemporary version of the end of history”
(Rees 1996: 21). Rather, his distinction of the development of civil, political and social rights should be
seen as a heuristic device. Regarding the methodological status of his typology, Bulmer and Rees (1996b:
270) find that Marshall actually treats “the three concepts each as an ideal type”, i.e.:
the one-sided accentuation of reality in order to understand at an abstract level what are the properties
of a class of events or processes and their workings. Viewed in this light, Marshall's typology of
citizenship may be more comparable to Weber's typologies of action or of authority than to a
specifically historical hypothesis about linear social development.
This view is also shared by Uta Gerhardt (2001: 474) as she states in her book “Idealtypus. Zur
methodischen Begründung der modernen Soziology” [Ideal-type. A Methodic Foundation of Modern
Sociology] that Marshall's threefold model of citizenship is non-arbitrarily based on ideal-type
stipulations.18
Accordingly, inclusion should not be generally understood as a teleological inexorable process towards
full citizenship. Empirically, at least three reasons compel us to be cautious in this respect: First, today, not
only the extension of social but also of civil and political rights is still being discussed in many world
regions—also in Europe. Thus, not even the incorporation of civic and political elements into the notion of
citizenship can be seen as two already completed phases. Second, democratic regressions, i.e. autocratic
tendencies, may lead to exclusionary backslides. New exclusions on the national level may also arise from
developments such as regionalization and globalization. Third, new viewpoints may be considered
transversal to established categories and lead to the acknowledgment of new categories of rights, as it is
the case of the cultural rights (Zilla 2015). However, they may also be classified as (protective) civil rights
like freedom of religion—considering religion also a cultural expression.
Despite all these empirical restrictions and backslashes, the inclusionary expansion of citizenship’s
conceptualization may be twofold: It may concern the number and range of entitled people (extension) as
18 In
the original: “Auch das Modell aus drei bestehender citizenship der modernen Demokratie, das Thomas H. Marshall zunächst
nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg entwickelte und später ausgestaltete, arbeitet unwillkürlich mit idealtypischen Setzungen“
(Gerhardt 2001: 475).
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well as the number and range of recognized or granted entitlements (expansion). This “passive”
perspective corresponds to a “thin” understanding of “citizenship-as-legal-status” (Kymlicka/Norman
1994: 353ff.). From an “active” perspective, the extent and quality of citizenship is a function of citizens'
participation in the community (ibid.). According to this “thick” notion, citizenship is a “desirable-activity”
(ibid.). Pointing to the links between both perspectives and conceptions, Michael Walzer (1989: 217)
states:
Both these expansions are contested; both involve organization and struggle, and so citizenship as
political participation or ruling and citizenship as the receipt of benefits go hand in hand. At least, they
go hand in hand until a full range of benefits is finally provided for a full range of citizens.
Democracies may also diverge in terms of the realization of citizenship (depth), i.e. to the extent that civil,
political and social rights are not only recognized in principle but can also be enjoyed in practice. For,
while all citizens are nominally or legally endowed with extended rights, specific groups may be actually
limited to exercise them. Thus, the distinction between formal inclusion (de jure), on the one hand, and
factual, effective or substantive inclusion (de facto), on the other hand, is extremely relevant. In this line,
Bulmer and Rees (1996b: 275) address the importance of what they call partial citizenship which consists
in the simultaneous combination of inclusionary and exclusionary situations: “There are several groups
that may better be viewed as part in, and part out, of citizenship” (ibid.).
Citizenship and Uneven Rule of Law Application
Citizenship implies entitlements that also concern security—and this goes beyond the right to mental and
physical integrity.19 Citizenship rights are linked to the territory of the individual state that strives to
monopolize coercion (with uneven success). “If the state succeeds in monopolizing coercive power,
democratic equality is protected only if the use of that power is regulated by law and if equality before law
is sufficiently realized to rule out political advantage from differential intimidation” (Rueschemeyer 2005:
53). The tolerance of extralegal realms and informal spheres, selective non-enforcement, pockets of
private coercive power, and state force abuse are further sources of uneven citizenship. It is also the case,
when the law is selectively used against some, while privileged sectors are enjoying exemptions
(O’Donnell 2005: 5), because this represents a discriminatory law application.20 Thus, effective citizenship
requires equal enforcement by sanctions and protection by institutions (Dahrendorf 1996: 34). They are
needed in order to prevent or attenuate the translation of personal, social and economic inequalities into
civic and political inequalities as well as into asymmetric power that allows some people to deny the
citizenship rights to others. In the first case, the aim is to empower all citizens;21 in the latter, to control
19
Based on Marshall, I conceptualize mental and physical integrity as civil rights. See also the right’s list of Diamond/ Morlino
(2005b: xxv): “Essential civil rights include personal liberty, security and privacy; freedom of thought, expression, and
information; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly, association, and organization, including the right to form and join trade
unions and political parties; freedom of movement and residence; and the right to legal defense and due process.” In the same
line, Beetham (2005: 37) counts among the civil rights: “life and security of the person; liberty and freedom of movement;
freedom of thought and expression; freedom of assembly and association; freedom of information; protection against decimation;
rights of vulnerable and disadvantaged groups; and due process rights.”
20 The maxims of two Latin American presidents are paradigmatic for the conception of uneven law application. The one
attributed to the Mexican Benito Juárez (1806-1872): “For my friends everything; for my enemies the full weight of the law” (Para
mis amigos, todo; para mis enemigos, todo el peso de la ley). The other pronounced by the Argentinean Juan Domingo Perón (18951973): “To the friend everything; to the enemy not even justice” (Al amigo, todo; al enemigo, ni justicia). From the time of the
colony stems a telling phrase of the Royal and Supreme Council of the Indies in America, the most important administrative organ
of the Spanish Empire for the continent (and Asia); with regard to the ordinances coming from Spain they used to say: “We obey
the law but do not comply with it” (La ley se acta pero no se cumple).
21 Acknowledging the relevance of empowerment, Talcott Parsons (1965: 1018) states: “The obverse of this is the definition of
the terms on which capacities, as matched with opportunities, can be involved in the process of inclusion. This is a special context
of the problem of ‘qualifying’ for inclusion”.
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power—thus, these tasks are linked not only to political equality but also to liberty. In any case, the
tensions between the democratic principle of political equality and the existing inequalities cannot be
completely eradicated.
Therefore, equalization in terms of civic, political and social inclusion is always a dynamic
counterbalancing based on both, basic arrangements as well as complementary corrective measures—
with democratic theory elaborating more concretely on specific institutional provisions. It is about
minimizing the obstacles to full citizenship rights for all in a democratic context. What exactly those
arrangements and measures ought to be, is a matter of intensive theoretical and political debate—
reaching from orthodox liberal positions which reject any kind of discrimination (including positive
discrimination as affirmative action), over the recognition of minority rights in the context of a liberal
conception of “multicultural citizenship” (Kymlicka 2013), to the case for replacing universal with
“differentiated citizenship” (Young 1995). According to this latter cultural pluralistic view, “members of
certain groups would be incorporated into the political community not only as individuals but also
through the group, and their rights would depend, in part, on their group” (Kymlicka/Norman 1994: 370).
From a liberal pluralistic perspective, in turn, group-differentiated citizenship represents a contradiction
in terms since “citizenship is, by definition, a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights
under the law” (ibid.). From this perspective, inclusion ought to cut the structural link between
disadvantages and categorical grouping. It ought to lead to non-discrimination, to the elimination of any
category defined as inferior in itself (Parsons 1965: 1018; 1039; 1050). Thus, one of the theoretical
divides rests upon the question whether citizenship should transcend or recognize difference, i.e. between
universalist and differentialist conceptions of citizenship. However, even the differentialist positions
legitimate inclusionary claims with recourse to universal values as equality and justice. With Parsons’
(1965: 1022) words: “The ultimate social grounding of the demand for inclusion lies in commitment to the
values which legitimize it.”
In this context, four further aspects of the discussion are worth mentioning here. From a liberal pluralistic
perspective, they can be seen as challenges which “identity politics—defined as claims of subaltern groups
for special recognition as groups” (Wolfe/Klausen 2000: 79)—are confronted with: First, certain formal
attempts of equalizing aim at conferring special rights or resources, i.e. compensatory privileges, to
carriers of attributes, which imply structural disadvantage. Instead of relativizing and de-constructing
those attributes by means of reducing their socio-political relevance, inclusionary strategies may lend
substance to them, politicize them, and induce their reification or naturalization. Second, it remains a
crucial question under which conditions descriptive representation (e.g. women in parliament or bodies
for functional representation of indigenous citizens) leads to substantive representation (e.g. advocacy for
preferences of females or indigenous) (Pitkin 1972). Third, in this sense, the underlining of commonality
with regard to a specific attribute might suggest a general and automatic homogeneity of preferences
under the carriers of this attribute, therefore denying individuality to the members of the structurally
underprivileged group. Fourth, efforts to curtail socio-economic dominance and cultural hegemony may
run up against a central and commonly accepted principle of modern pluralistic democracies, i.e. respect
for the autonomy of different spheres in society (Rueschemeyer 2011: 820).
On an empirical level, most really existing societies relay on a mixed approach when it comes to fostering
inclusion. Since categorical grouping-blindness might be an illusion, inclusion should at least conduce to
the loosening of relevance of those categories for the (universal, i.e. non-differential) realization of rights.
In this line, Parsons (1965: 1050) believes that once categories lose the stigma of inferiority, it is likely
that these will cease to be salient issues. In his view, the pluralist solution is neither one of separatism nor
of assimilation but one of full citizenship combined with the preservation of identity.
Regardless of whether a universalist or a differentialist conception prevails, there are three basic ways or
strategies citizenship can become more inclusive:
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∎ First, (formally) existing civil, political and social rights (de jure) may be deepened by enforcing them,
i.e. by enlarging the sphere of their effective validity (de facto), incorporating citizens and groups into the
circle of those who can effectively enjoy nominally existing rights.
∎ Second, existing civil, political and social rights may be extended by (formally) entitling new social
groups.
∎ Third, citizenship may be expanded by (formally) recognizing new civil, political and social rights—for
all or for certain (minority) groups. Thus, citizenship may be expanded on a universal or differentiated
basis.
Table 4: Citizenship and Inclusion
Deepening
(≠ Erosion)
Extension
(≠ Restriction)
Expansion
(≠ Curtailment)
Enforcement = Enlargement of the sphere of effective validity of (formally) recognized rights
Formal incorporation of new groups into legally acknowledged rights
Official introduction of new rights for all or for certain groups
In the first two cases of deepening and extending citizenship, inclusion fosters at the same time equality
among citizens. Regarding citizenship expansion, it is the introduction of differentiated group rights that
might seek to compensate or counterbalance existing asymmetries. Finally, the important question of who
is to be considered a citizen is implicitly contained in citizenship extension, which corresponds to the
democratic question of defining the demos.
If, on the empirical level, as Peter Kivisto and Thomas Faist (2017: 17) in their book “Citizenship” state:
“There is no reason to assume that the development of citizenship [is] an inexorable historical teleology”
but that it is potentially subject to reversal, then concepts for the comprehension of its devolution are
needed. Thus, I call erosion the reduction of the sphere of effective validity of (formally) recognized rights;
restriction the formal exclusion of some groups from the circle of those who were heretofore officially
entitled with certain rights; and curtailment the official suspension or abolishment of certain rights (for
all).
5
Civic and Political Inclusion
Theoretical Convergence
In the above, I looked at the phenomena of inclusion/exclusion from two different theoretical angles. I
believe the democratic and citizenship perspectives are convergent. In Political Science, however, an
explicit theoretical linkage is still missing. A bridging approach on inclusion/exclusion, as pursued in this
article, should meet at least two goals: First, it should reveal the overlapping fields between democratic
and citizenship theory. Second, it should integrate those aspects that belong specifically to each of both
theories. In either case, the question of inclusion/exclusion shapes and justifies theoretical perspectivity
and analytical selectivity. Therefore, a double take on inclusion/exclusion that combines democratic and
citizenship theory represents “more” than their broadest common denominator and at the same time
“less” than the sum of both. In the end, a heuristic added value should be achieved—under compliance
with logical rigor, theoretical coherence and empirical plausibility.
From a topographic perspective, citizenship theory is at the “bottom” of democratic theory: The
democratic principles of liberty and civic and political equality are grounded in citizenship rights. Nondomination (constitutionalism) and self-government (popular sovereignty) under conditions of civic and
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political equality are realized respectively through the recognition and enforcement of civil and political
rights. In this sense, David Beetham (2005: 36) rightly states: “Draw out any strand of the complex web of
democracy, and you will find it leads to some specific civil or political right, without whose security the
fabric will start to unravel.”
By contrast, this is not true for social rights. I clearly distinguished between the conceptual level of the
definition of democracy, on the one hand, and the empirical level of the propitious conditions for its
realization, on the other hand. Although I acknowledge the distorting impact of economic power upon the
democratic principles of liberty and equality, social rights (conceived by Marshall as the third element of
citizenship), are not included in the concept of democracy as developed in this article. According to the
chosen purely non-material definition, access to material resources and entitlements as well as social and
economic equality is not intrinsic to democracy. Rather, they should be understood as an achievement of
democracy (output) that, of course, may contribute to the effective enjoyment of civil and political rights,
i.e. to democratic quality.
Liberty
Protections of rights and freedoms
Non-domination
Constitutionalism
Participation in policy making
Self-government
Popular sovereignty
Civil rights
< Equality >
Rights
Political rights
Citizenship
Democracy
Table 5: Convergence between Democracy and Citizenship Theory
In line with this distinction and bringing the questions of rights, equality and democracy together,
Beetham (2005: 35f.) explains in his book chapter “Freedom as the Foundation” (of democracy) the
divergent statuses of civil and political rights or civic and political equality, on the one hand, and economic
and social rights or economic and social equality, on the other—from the perspective of democratic
theory:
Moreover, it is increasingly insisted on in human rights circles that civil and political rights should not
be separated from economic and social rights. The logic is the same as that appealed to by philosophers
in discussions about the concept of freedom. If freedom is a good only because of the value that lies in
exercising it, then those who lack the capacity or resources to exercise a given freedom are being
denied the enjoyment of it, even though they may not formally be obstructed from it. In a similar vein,
we could say that exercising or taking advantage of one’s civil and political rights may be conditional
upon one’s education and resources. To ensure equality of civil and political rights, however, does not
require equality of economic and social conditions. What is needed is a floor below which no one is
allowed to fall, plus specific resources such as legal aid; at the top end, there should be regulations to
limit the advantages of the wealthy in access to public office, and to prevent their undue influence over
officeholders and channels of public information. The guarantee of civil and political rights provides an
essential foundation for all the other dimensions of democracy.
In this paragraph, Beetham acknowledges that economic and social equality improve the equal enjoyment
of civil and political rights. However, he considers only civic and political equality as intrinsic to
democracy. For this reason, he concentrates on civil and political rights when assessing democracy
(Beetham 2005: 36-43). Of course, he also admits that it represents a democratic challenge to guarantee
and ensure civic and political equality under conditions of economic and social inequality. Yet, regulations
on party and election campaign financing that limit expenditures and donations (affecting political rights)
as well as low-cost access to justice (affecting civil rights) are some of the provision that may alleviate the
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disparity problem between citizens with asymmetric resources.22 The incongruity problem of unevenness
in the electoral playing field (affecting political rights) due to preferential use of official state resources
(information, funds, etc.) by the ruling party during election campaigns may be addressed by formal
controls as, for instance, an electoral ban, that among others prohibits inauguration events of public works
during election periods. Thus, there exists a series of strategies for enhancing civic and political equality
under conditions of economic and social inequality. They aim to diminish the permeability between both
spheres or—in other words—at “sealing up” the realm of civil and political rights against economic and
social differences.
While citizenship underlies democracy, inclusionary processes consisting in the deepening, extension or
expansion of civil and political rights may require institutional and/or political changes. This is also true
for the opposite, i.e. for exclusionary processes consisting in the erosion, restriction or curtailment of civil
and political rights. Moreover, one single civic or political right may usually be realized through a variety
of stipulations. For instance, the implementation of the voting right entails a series of normative and
institutional requirements. In the case of elections, not only suffrage but also further rights (freedom of
speech, of press, of assembly) are involved.
Thus, we should consider multiple concretization modes of inclusion/exclusion that may affect different
dimensions of democracy and citizenship:
∎ They may concern representative democracy’s four dilemmas, namely demos’ boundary, incongruity,
disparity and foreclosure.
∎ They may alter the depth, extension and expansion of civil and political rights.
By way of illustration, let us have a look at some South American cases: In Uruguay, a law on access to
public information (Ley Nr. 18.381) was promulgated in 2008 and followed by a regulatory decree
(Decreto Reglamentario Nr. 232/010) in 2010. 23 Thus, the right to public information was recognized by
introducing a new civil right that expands citizenship and addresses the incongruity dilemma of
representative democracy since it is an additional mechanism for vertical accountability. Putting this new
law and its regulation into practice, in turn, requires the establishment of further institutions, authorities
or offices—for example for receiving and processing citizenship’s public information requests.
In Argentina, where suffrage has been compulsory for persons between 18 and 70 years, a voluntary
voting right was introduced (Ley Nr. 26.774) in 2012 for 16 and 17 years old citizens. This represents an
extension of an existing political right (hitherto granted only to elderly citizens) and an enlargement of the
electorate that concerns the demos’ boundary as well as the disparity dilemma of representative
democracy, i.e. the unequal consideration of preferences—between younger and older people, in this case.
It should not be inferred from these two examples that civil rights always concern the incongruity and
political rights the disparity dilemma. Yet, there is no systematic behind these combinations. For instance,
in Ecuador (1998) and Venezuela (1999) an article allowing for the revocation of mandate, i.e. a recall
referendum by which the electorate can remove an elected official from office through a direct vote before
his or her term has ended, was legally introduced in the new constitution. This new political right that
22
At this stage, a further clarification is imperative: Stating that social rights are no defining feature of democracy does not imply
advocating for a political position according to which a democratic government should abstain from promoting them or from
correctively intervening in the economy. Thus, a clear distinction between Political Science concept definition and politics is
necessary.
23 These regulations are based on Chapter II, Art. 72 of the Uruguayan Constitution of the Republic by which the list of
constitutionally explicated rights is declared not exhaustive. “La enumeración de derechos, deberes y garantías hecha por la
Constitución, no excluye los otros que son inherentes a la personalidad humana o se derivan de la forma republicana de
gobierno.”
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expands citizenship (since nobody enjoyed this right before) affects the incongruity problem of democracy
providing an additional vertical accountability mechanism.
Of course, in all these cases, an accurate and comprehensive theory-led empirical analysis of inclusion/
exclusion should go beyond the “nominalist” or “formalist” observation that a new law or decree was
enacted. Thus, the “working” or “implementation” of this new norm in its particular context is extremely
important. Moreover, instead of classifying every single politically relevant decision according to this
trilogy, exploring patterns of inclusion/exclusion requires a stronger deductive departing point that
combines aspects of democracy and citizenship theory. As shown in the following table, the four dilemmas
of representative democracy can serve as an initial structuring distinction.
Table 6: Dimensions of civic and political inclusion
DEMOS’ BOUNDARY
INCONGRUITY
DISPARITY
FORECLOSURE
Distinction
between
political contingency and
fundamental structures
Distinction
between
government and state
Civic definition
Vertical accountability/
power control
Civic
status
(identity,
religion, safety, etc.)
Political definition
Horizontal accountability/
power dispersion
Individual and group
participation (impact)
Individual
and
group
representation (impact)
Symbolic definition
Demos’ Boundary
As for the demos’ boundary, a civic, a political and a symbolic dimension can be distinguished. Firstly, the
civic definition of the people is particularly relevant. Who is considered a citizen in terms of the
membership in the political community by birth or naturalization? This question points at what may also
be called nationality or state membership and at the principles underlying it: jus soli (right of soil) vs. jus
sanguinis (right of blood). In the first case, the place of birth is determinant for the right to nationality, in
the latter the descent. In some cases, both may apply simultaneously. In this context, it is also crucial to
consider the requirements resident aliens must fulfill in order to become citizens.
It is equally relevant, secondly, to examine who is also politically included in the demos’ definition. Who is
a member of the electorate? There is a significant overlap between the civic and political concept of
demos. Yet, both groups are not identical. Minors might be citizens, yet without voting rights. Resident
foreigners might be non-citizens but entitled to vote at some level. Besides the questions of nationality
and age, further electoral provisions regarding, for instance, mental health, literacy, membership in the
armed forces, prisoners, etc. might exist. Moreover, not only active voting rights are important in this
context, but also the stipulations around passive voting rights, i.e. the requirements citizens have to fulfill
in order to be admitted as candidates for specific offices. For example: In Argentina, before the
Constitution was reformed in 1995, presidential candidates had to belong to the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church. The abolition of this restriction has indubitably implied an inclusionary achievement—that
reduces disparity (between Catholics and non-Catholics).
Thirdly, how is the demos symbolically constructed? Who is meant by “we”? The answers to these
questions may be found, for instance, in the constitutional text, the discourse of the incumbents and the
self-conceptions of institutions. They may also underline difference or not and may be based in pluralistic
or monolithic conceptions of the demos (diversity vs. homogeneity). On this symbolic level lays for
example the German debate, whether the Islam “belongs” to Germany. It also concerns, for instance, the
question, whether (populist) politicians by referring to “the people” mean the underprivileged citizens or
the own supporters and followers excluding elites or oppositionists.
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The civic, political and symbolic demarcation of the demos may entail the recognition of universal or group
rights and the establishment of specific institutions, affecting the depth, extension and expansion of
citizenship.
Table 7: Some Provisions Affecting the Demos’ Boundary
CIVIC DIMENSION
POLITICAL DIMENSION
SYMBOLIC DIMENSION
Nationality conditions by birth (juis solis, jus sanguinis)
Naturalization requirements
Active voting rights (electorate: age, nationality, condition, etc.)
Passive voting rights (requirements for candidates)
Discursive construction of “we”
Incongruity Dilemma
The incongruity dilemma concerns the inequality or power gap between representatives, on the one hand,
and constituents, on the other hand, as well as the risk of the tyranny of the ruling minority. Today
representative democracy interposes a professional state apparatus (answerable to elected officials)
between rulers and ruled citizens. The existence of such a bureaucracy (Weber 1980: 125f.), i.e. an
appointive civil service (Parsons 1965: 111), as well as of security agents may accentuate the incongruity
dilemma. Thus, the vertical inequality concerns not only the power gap between citizens and elected
officials but also appointed officials, members of the bureaucracy, the military, the police and the
intelligence services. Holding them accountable for committing abuses of civil and political rights
contributes to ameliorate the incongruity dilemma and increases inclusion.
In an exclusionary case, for instance, “politicians may use the law as a ‘political weapon’ against their
political and civic adversaries; and democratically elected leaders may attempt to pack the judiciary
(particularly the constitutional court) with political loyalists” (Diamond/Morlino 2005b: xv). Referring to
a concrete European political system that has often served as a “model of democracy”, the existence of a
non-elected House of Lords (upper chamber) and of a non-elected Head of State (Queen) are exclusionary
aspects of the United Kingdom’s democracy that also aggravate the incongruity problem, since citizens
have no (or very limited and only indirect) control over these institutions. A central question here is to
what extent civic and political stipulations increase/diminish accountability; to what extent accountability
fosters/weakens the validity of civil and political rights—reducing the incongruity problem.
Accountability is a relationship between two sets of persons or organizations in which one is answerable
or responsible to the other in terms of information and actions. Accountability mechanisms are those
which induce and enable power dispersion, power control and the sanction of power abuse (Nohlen 2010:
3); they are key tools for coping with the incongruity dilemma. Political accountability must be
institutionalized if it is to work effectively, i.e. it has to be embedded in a pre-established set of rules
(Schmitter 2005: 19). Some of these rules may be formalized in constitutions, laws or regulations, but they
might also emerge from political praxis.
Accountability can be either vertical or horizontal. Vertical accountability refers to what citizens/electors
(on the bottom) can demand from their officials (on the top). The above-mentioned Latin American
innovations, the right to access public information and recall referendum, are both mechanisms for
vertical—respectively electoral and non-electoral—accountability. Vertical accountability contributes to
the responsiveness of (elected or selected) persons in positions of authority, i.e. their willingness to
consider citizens’ preferences and to abstain from infringing on rights. In elections and recall
referendums, electors may reward or sanction representatives for their decisions and non-decisions
Horizontal accountability, in turn, concerns the relation between government branches and other
institutions. Provisions that enhance or undermine separation of power (e.g. magistrates’ selection mode)
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and reciprocal control (e.g. an ombudsperson’s institutional strength) are especially important in this
context.
Moreover, not only elections, information and institutional monitoring are crucial accountability aspects,
but also rules and mechanisms to prevent, combat and sanction corruption. Political corruption is a social
relation, in which an office-holder (elected representative or appointed authority) acts in official capacity
for personal gain, generating arbitrariness. Political corruption is a form of power abuse. On the other
side, someone is somehow “paying” (1) for exercising a right to which he/ she is formally already entitled,
(2) for getting a privilege that she/he does not own or which is against the law, (3) for making the officer
fulfill his/her duty. In this sense, corruption constitutes an aggravation of the incongruity problem, an
intensification of the inequality between rulers and ruled people; but it also indirectly affects the disparity
problem, since it leads to an uneven treatment of citizens.
Table 8: Some Provisions Affecting the Incongruity Dilemma
VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
ELECTORAL
VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY
NON-ELECTORAL
HORIZONTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Elections
Recall referendums
Freedom of press
Collection, provision and dissemination of objective and independent
information by the state (official statistics)
Access to public information (by citizens)
Prevention, combating and sanctioning of corruption (anti-corruption
provisions)
Prevention, combating and sanctioning of state violence abuse (by members of
security apparatus)
Separation of powers (checks and balances)
Election administration/councils/courts
Audit court/general accounting office
Ombudsperson
Civil jurisdiction for security agents
Disparity Dilemma
The asymmetry of preferences between citizens, i.e. the inequality in the chances of their articulation and
advancement, bears a disparity dilemma. Bringing the citizenship perspective in, it can also be extended to
the uneven (formal or factual) enjoyment of civil and political rights. Thus, the inclusion/exclusion
question here concerns three prominent aspects:
First, civic equity refers to the civic status of individuals and groups along specific criteria as gender,
identity, religion, etc. and the question of parity/disparity between them. The legal recognition or nonrecognition of same-sex marriage, transgender identities, national or group holidays for different religions
(with even/uneven status), a diversity of official languages, among others, fall under the category of an
inclusionary/exclusionary civic status. This is also the case for access to justice (legal equality) and the
right to mental and bodily integrity (security equality).
Second, citizens’ participation concerns the conditions for individual and group based, direct as well as
institutionalized political engagement. Are they even or uneven because of a strong discriminatory bias or
regional marginalization? For instance: Do all citizens have equal access to vote polls? Is vote buying
widely practiced? Do only certain groups get access to policy makers or the permission for public
demonstrations while others are systematically kept away from the centers or decision-making or the
streets? Are diverse sectoral and social organizations involved in consultations and decision-making
processes?
Third, individual and group based representation, as understood here, is restricted to the personal
allocation in elected positions and representative institutions, which—of course—strongly depends on
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the electoral system. Is the electoral system severely biased? Do citizen and groups have equal chances to
be represented? Is there any kind of representation quotas in parliament or for power sharing in
executive branches—if so, for whom and with what effect?
These are only some examples for evaluating inclusion from the perspective of the disparity problem and
with reference to civic status, participation and representation. Certainly, participation and
representation should also be evaluated with regard to their policy impact, e.g. how even/uneven are
individuals’ or groups’ opportunities for shaping or vetoing political decisions and their implementation?
Of course, on the empirical level, participation, representation and policy impact are intertwined
phenomena. Yet, an analytical distinction seems practicable and appropriate to me.
Table 9: Some Provisions Affecting the Disparity Dilemma
CIVIC STATUS
PARTICIPATION
REPRESENTATION
Dealing with diversity: Status of gender, religion, languages etc.
Registration as citizen (documentation/identity registration)
Audit court/general accounting office
Demonstration rights
Interest groups
Sectoral bodies
Presence in elected bodies
Electoral system (bias)
Power sharing mechanisms
Foreclosure Problem
Inclusion/exclusion in terms of the foreclosure/optionality of future decisions is especially difficult to
grasp. The protection and perdurability of the qualities of a democratic regime depend on the rigidity of
several stipulations, e.g. high barriers for constitutional reforms. The dilemma is then: How to conciliate
the needs for system stability and system openness? Furthermore, constitutions do not only set the frame
for the political system but also the socioeconomic order, restraining the scope of economic policy (which
should be an output of political contestation and policy-making). This is the case of the Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, which contains, for instance, provisions on private property, its social
function and its socialization (expropriation with reparation) in certain situations. Thus, it is difficult to
draw the line between stipulations regarding the structural rules of the game on the one hand and
situational contentious politics on the other hand. Easier to identify may be cases where the elected
political force, as the “Chavismo” in Venezuela, coins the state with its own party ideology, building up an
“Estado Chavista” or “Chavista military forces”.
6
Conclusion
In the context of Political Science, I search for a comprehensive framework of analysis and interpretation
that allows for the assessment of democracy from the perspective of inclusion. I this sense, I focused on
democratic inclusion, which I more specifically conceived as civic and political inclusion.
In this article, I first disclosed the general virtues of inclusion as a notion of the Social Sciences and
explained my conception. Then, my theoretical point of departure was a normative understanding of
democracy, based on the twin principles of liberty and equality, i.e. negative liberty (non-domination/
constitutionalism/ protection of rights and freedoms) and positive liberty (self-government/ popular
sovereignty/ participation in policy-making) as well as civic equality (equality before the law) and
political equality (equal consideration of preferences).
This conceptual demarcation led to a procedural definition of democracy that contains a civic and a
political dimension but consequently does not encompass the substantive dimension of socioeconomic
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equality. Rather, differential power based on heterogeneous material resources (as well as personal
talents) constitutes a challenge democracy has to deal with. Against this backdrop, I identified four
dilemmas of representative democracy that compromise the double principles of liberty and equality,
which I called: (1) demos’ boundary, (2) incongruity, (3) disparity, and (4) foreclosure. Then, I elaborate
on citizenship, distinguishing between civil, political and social rights. From this second theoretical angle, I
defined inclusion as the (1) deepening, (2) extension, and (3) expansion of rights.
In a further step, I integrated both theoretical perspectives into framework for analyzing and interpreting
democratic inclusion: (1) The demos’ boundary can be widened in civic, political and symbolic terms. (2)
Vertical accountability (power control) as well as horizontal accountability (power dispersion) reduces
the power gap between rulers and ruled ones (incongruity), (3) equal civic status as well as even
conditions for participation and representation attenuates the asymmetry between influential and
marginalized preferences (disparity). And, finally, (4) the distinction between political contingency and
structural provisions fosters system openness, i.e. future optionality. Modifications in all these four
dimensions may be based on changes regarding the formal recognition of new (civil and political) rights
(expansion), new holders (extension) and the grade of validity/scope of application of civil and political
rights (deepening).
My further academic work shall concentrate on the operationalization of these dimensions of
inclusiveness. It shall elaborate more on the connection between theory and phenomena in order to be
able to identify and choose the right categories that link empirics to the analytical dimensions deduced
from the democratic and citizenship principles.
7
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