On That Which Is Not
Author(s): Samuel C. Wheeler
Source: Synthese, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Jun., 1979), pp. 155-173
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20115447
Accessed: 25/04/2009 14:16
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=springer.
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the
scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that
promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.
http://www.jstor.org
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER
ON THAT WHICH
IS NOT
none of the
that, very probably,
the
world
exist.
In parti
objects
'given'
are
no
as
there
nor, perforce,
cular,
persons,
conceived,
ordinarily
states of them. Since this may conflict with what
any psychological
seems to be thought, the way will be prepared by a sketch of the main
This
paper presents
'middle-sized'
ordinary
theory of reference
that all such counter-common
general argument
false. The point
rational grounds
of ways
I. THE
which
sense
lies behind
the
claims must
be
to destroy
is to begin
the
long digression
est
to the sorites1 arguments which
for resistance
a brief
the sorites arguments,
point. After presenting
of
the main
criticism
of
the
of
presuppositions
ablish
arguments
the
of avoiding
the conclusion
THAT
ARGUMENT
BELIEVE
MOST
OF
is presented.
WHAT
MOST
PEOPLE
IS TRUE
a
two theories
the second
I sketch
of reference,
of the first. I then show how the second theory of reference
the conclusion
that most
beliefs are
'ordinary' common-sense
In this
section
modification
entails
sense is for the most part correct and that
true; that is, that common
what appears to conflict with it either doesn't actually or is false.
A.
What,
their
after
sense.
Theory
object
Reference
determine
we
This
are
i.e. will
concept,
Resemblance
to apply? Our terms have as their extension
of sense.
is a function
that we are
So, given
are using a given
term, what we
by that
by the sense expressed
If the term applies,
its reference.
are
talking
term. The
Exactly
form
of what
how
'features'
I call
or
about
of
the
it is to apply,
are built
into
the
'the resemblance
'senses'
of
fits
whatever
about
talking
when
that
using
internal
by what
that
features
then,
the important
talking about will have
fit the sense of the term. (Imaginary
quotation)
is the basic
reference'.
I: Frege-Russell
is it for a term
all,
when we
anything
term is determined
concept
of Reference
concepts
features
of
theory
are
the
con
Synthese 41 (1979) 155-173. 0039-7857/79/0412-0155 $01.90.
Copyright
?
1979 by D. Reidel
Publishing
Co., Dordrecht,
Holland,
and Boston,
U.S.A.
156
SAMUEL
ceived
and which
features
to belong to the objects
version of this theory.
I has the weakness
Theory
have
way
of
what
determining
C. WHEELER
are part of the sense and
of concepts
the terms apply to vary from version
that
the
to
an empirical
not provide
a term is. What
sense a
it does
sense
so
of
even
has, that is, might well be a private matter,
term-for-a-person
The
when
the sense itself is an objective
relation
entity.
'expression'
a word or thought-component
sense is left to
between
and a particular
some kind of intuitive insight - we know what we mean, when
it is our
own word. More
our
for
the
form
basic
of the
purposes,
importantly,
does not give any guarantee
that we
theory of reference
are talking about anything
at all. What
is to prevent
the natures out
there from diverging
to
in essence
from the senses our terms express
resemblance
such an extent
reference.
that nothing fits our terms? Since the sense expressed
as
to what is outside when
itwere, not clearly connected
is,
in principle
is used, nothing
massive
failure of
prevents
In short, the basic
form of the resemblance
theory of
reference
does
by a word
the term
not provide
a rejoinder
to skepticism
or to metaphy
sical revisionism.
B.
This
Theory
la: Quine-Davidson
theory
overcomes
difficulties
something
by getting
into empirically
available phenomena.
the Quine-Davidson
version of this theory, and
and 'ordinary language' philosophers
that Wittgensteinian
principles
how
about
language
con
a: Quine-Davidson2
Version
If we
Theories
the above
the same
presuppose
virtually
to the world.
nects referentially
which
Resemblance
to sense
analogous
functionally
I will briefly describe
then argue
and British
are
talking
situations.
at all, what
Roughly,
we
our
are talking about
occasion-sentences
is determined
have
a
by what
stimulus-meaning
we
say in
or an
or radically
'outside correlate'
A language
has been translated
as
meaning.
interpreted
far as empirical
data goes when
the appropriate
between
correlations
what
is out there
have been established.
The reference
of a term in
(for us) and the person's
responses
an occasion
sentence
is constrained
correlates.
The constraint
may not
by these outside
be sufficient
to determine
reference,
but at least what
there
is to go on
in hypothesizing
THAT
ON
reference
All
there
WHICH
157
IS NOT
the empirical
is given by the outside
substitute
correlates,
in these outside
is to the 'sense' of a term is manifested
or a culture's
dispositions
person's
or a culture's
of a person's
speech
to use
behavior.
that
term.
i.e. in a
correlates,
senses
in the pattern
look for
So,
(Imaginary
senses.
for Fregean
quotation)
it is
this theory, given that a sentence
is true if and only if what
or interpreted
as obtains, most of what most people
translated
are inclined to say is true. (This holds in general,
for Davidson;
for
On
best
for Quine.)
That
and inter
sentences,
is, translation
nature
the
of
be
Given
that
'charitable'.
must,
reference,
by
pretation
as
same
must
met
the
is
insofar
be
thought
requirements
language-like
to refer, most of what most people
for thought-tokens
in a culture
observation
be true as well.3
think will
Version
b: British
It is somewhat
difficult
to pin down
a 'British'
theory
of reference
in a
to its practitioners,
since so many of the philoso
acceptable
as
and
I
the
later
have
in
such
mind,
Austin,5
phers
Wittgenstein,4
to
the
of
detailed
of
in
favor
tend
eschew
theories
descriptions
Ryle6
form
'ordinary' use of our terms. Since
use of 'refers' or
any technical
reference'
Their
can be called
views
such only
of
they eschew
so
'applies',
via locutions
and
its
theory, they eschew
that their 'theory of
of indirect
relation
discourse.
to
the world,
defense
of com
language
implicit
lead them to the most
however,
uncompromising
sense. According
mon
to their conclusions,
virtually
belief
'built into' language by way of the judgements
every
we
central
learn
in
to bring
learning a language is true. So it is important for my purposes
some
kind of relation with theory la in
into
their theory of reference
its Quine-Davidson
form.
the
from
would
further premise
yield a valid argument
a
the
rules
for
the
violates
that
certain
theory
premise
philosophical
use of a given term or concept or family of concepts
to the conclusion
I think that only a version
that the philosophical
theory is mistaken?
What
of theory la will make
almost all dissolvings
in this tradition.
To argue
that theory
this argument valid and that theory la is behind
and 'analyses of the grammar of
of problems
la is behind
every
such analysis
would
require
158
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER
and argument
for the case of each of the philoso
analysis
in
I
think
it
is
clear,
question.
phers
though, that a theory of essen
to
in
similar
Davidson's
'On
the
Idea of a Conceptual
tially
Very
is implicit
in most
such philosophers'
work. The British
Scheme',7
detailed
some modifications,
and
theory, though, contains
different
of
how
conception
strongly
empirical
is complicated
by a
sense determines
reference.
On
the generalized
'British' theory, ignoring individual differences,
have a sense which
is identified with their use, a complicated
and contextualized
version of 'outside correlate meaning'.
concepts
socialized
use of a term
in which
is, roughly, given by the sort of situation
to the rules of the language.
is to be applied,
according
seems to be the general surrogate
of application',
which
'Correctness
for truth, is determined
the
rules
of the language, which
them
by
The
the
term
seem
to be a function
of what most people
in the language
An application
situations.
of a term is
say in paradigm
community
a
sentence
correct
is
if
if
in fact the
and
what
is
true)
(i.e.
only
is in the set of situations where
situation
the term 'is to be used'.
selves
reasons
I do not fully understand,
these philosophers
to believe
from Quine and Davidson
in not finding reasons
that
use and reference.
some
is 'slack' between
'Rules', possibly
by
normative
results
force, are sufficient alone to give determinate
For
differ
there
subtle
as to
what
is being referred to. This might be regarded as a consequence
of
their strategy for avoiding
the paradoxical
results of an unrestricted
the resemblance
of
of
reference.
theory
application
Suppose
sense
reference
is strictly determined
and
is determined
by sense,
by
sense to
what people
if it makes
say in what circumstances.
Then,
apply
this
to an
isolated
culture
says will
one-person
some extension,
individual,
all, not most,
be true. This is because
of what
this
there
is always
in which
the
the set of situations
given by exactly
person applies the term, which will, by the theory, be what the person
means by the term. Since it is senseless
that a person can be speaking
utterance
he could make would also be a
truths when any alternative
that there can be one-person
linguistic
are
to
declared
be
languages'
'private
impossible.
to get the result
That is, to apply the resemblance
theory of reference
that most of what most people
say is true rather than that anything
truth, it has
communities.
to be
Thus
denied
ON
THAT
WHICH
159
IS NOT
or inter
rule-discovery
a whole
as
A
culture
pretation
so
error
some
that
of
rules
kind
generates
by
practice,
by
majority
individuals
is possible.
Since there can be no private language, and so
that anyone
say is true, the unit of
as a whole.
the culture
could
is made
no
is not
which
reference
makes
ontological
everyone's
no sense.
about
reference,
speculation
in the back
So 'aquiescence
sense.
that makes
relativity
ground language' is the only alternative
On the 'British' theory, reading 'use' for 'sense', truth is a function
the
is a function
of use. Once
of use, and so, reference
again,
so that
correlate of the sense of a term is brought out into the world,
use
meaning
or
plication,
over
determines
a culture
as
correct
a whole,
application.
Thus
correct
ap
is guaranteed.
of theory la, then, reference
is still a function of
if not determined,
is constrained,
by what is there in
a situation
use
a
to
in which
the speaker is disposed
given term. Sense
if not its being, in the outside world. Thus sense and
has its criterion,
On both
sense.
reference
puts
versions
sense
But
limits
on theory la, at least in that each
the other. What
this
distinguishes
a
or
means
I is that what
culture
is
person
are virtually
correlative
on the variation
of
theory from theory
determined
by seeing
what
an expression
is used and
is the case. Then since reference
is true when
to what
making meaning
correspond
is a function of sense, most of what a culture agrees on will
to be true by the very nature of what
it is for a term with
meaning
turn out
a given
to be true of an object.
the above
picture
given
of language and thought and its
the world,
there is a standard
reply to philosophical
doctrines
which
held beliefs
in great numbers:
challenge
widely
'You're misusing
'You're misinterpreting
the
language'. Alternatively,
Now,
relation
to
of this predicate/construction
for English
speakers.'
la is true, the revisionary
and the skeptical
metaphysician
or mis-paraphrasing
must
be misusing
epistemologist
language
because,
by the nature of the case, most of our beliefs must be true.
truth-conditions
If theory
that we are mostly wrong
in a whole
arguments which conclude
area of belief are, provably,
or
invalid
unsound. How
they go wrong
to this theory of reference
take subtle and skillful
may
according
Thus
analysis;
refutations
the
conclusion
include
paradigm
that
case
they
are wrong
arguments,
is foregone.
about
arguments
Such
how
a
160
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER
about when we say a person
has a
arguments
a
terms
of
in
of
arguments
concept,
suspect
analyses
'extending
a
of
idea
the
of
its
use', arguments
range
very
concept beyond
against
scheme, and many others.
conceptual
sense based on supposed
on common
inconsistencies
be
Attacks
is learned,
concept
tween
and common
science
theory
have alternative
associated
equally
are similarly treated by adherents
of
can't be radically wrong, we just
different families of predicates with their
sense
our ordinary
la. Since
descriptions,
beliefs
or different
application-constraints,
correct predicate-systems.
II. THE
DEATH
OF
THE
RESEMBLANCE
MIND-WORLD
and
Kripke8
language
use
of
Putnam9
links up
terms
such
have
as
'refer',
and
that the use
reference
THEORY
OF
RELATIONS
that
shown
to the world
la, then, is self-contradictory.
'use' of a term determines
for different
purposes
the above
not
does
coincide
theory of how
our ordinary
'discussed',
'names',
'about',
with
etc.
Theory
is, the theory that says that our
its meaning
is not the theory of meaning
A
of our idioms of reference
embodies.
That
of our
analysis
So
reference
meaning.
that use
referential
is not
shows
concepts
is not a function of sense, in general, accord
that it is.
'use'
ing to the theory
I should explain how Kripke's
and Putnam's
demonstrations
work.
the intuition we have about what we would
Consider
say in situations
it turned out that, for instance, we had accepted
the sentence
a
was
'Aristotle
who proposed
the paradox of
Megarian
philosopher
the heap and invented
In the appropriate
other fallacies'.
circum
This is a
stances, we would
say we had a false belief about Aristotle.
in which
manifestation
Intuitions
of
about
our
what
use
of
we
think
'about'
is the
or
of
case
the
sense
in such
of
'about'.
situations
are
'would say' in such situations.
about what we
By most
of reference,
such intuitions are the basic data for a theory of
remarks apply to the other
the sense of the term 'about'. Analogous
terms Kripke
referential
and Putnam
discuss.
By the resemblance
intuitions
theories
the relation of aboutness
theory of reference,
sets of ordered
tial relations must be whatever
and
the other
referen
pairs accord with
these
ON
THAT
WHICH
161
IS NOT
terms. But any such relations contain
to apply referential
dispositions
ordered pairs of terms and entities
such that the sense of the term
fit the entity as well
resemblance
theory of
doesn't
as it fits some other
entity. The
to referential
relations
notions
reference
assigns
the resemblance
and entities
theory would
pairs of concepts
not predict. Thus a 'use' analysis of reference
shows that use does not
the
contain
determine
reference.
are in order about
of these results. Kripke,
has shown
that the
example,
names.
his
false
for
'Twin
is
Putnam,
proper
theory
by
are
I
shown
that
and
la
and
has
Earth' examples10
others,
Theory
false of natural kind terms, such as 'water', 'cat', etc. His arguments
Some
remarks
by examples
resemblance
such
as
the scope
the Aristotle
seem to apply to any property-words
which pick out what we regard
we have a case of a term such that we
as real properties. Whenever
but
of our decision
hold that its correct application
is not a matter
things are, we have a case in which our intuitions are in
with
the resemblance
theory of reference.
disagreement
Putnam's
results
and
may not directly apply to terms for
Kripke's
our society chooses
our
are
to say is
that whatever
which
intuitions
rather of how
'was duly elected'
'is a bachelor',
Terms such as 'is married',
to designate
for
the
is
which
resemblance
theory
properties
at
if
all.
In
such
there
cases,
correct,
is,
they designate
properties
correct.
seem
no possibly
fact to pose a danger of
recalcitrant
objective
intuitively,
of a term mistaken.
This is because,
making most of our applications
our
on
to
it
what
that
'defines' these
is
say
facie,
agreement
prima
terms. Kripke's
and Putnam's
cases
in
which
of properties
being is social.
Even for properties
which
not
blance
be
theory may
fail to apply,
social artifacts,
results
are
seem
to be
correct.
seem
social
Putnam
to name
if at all, then, only
whose
properties
artifacts,
uses
the
the resem
example
of
a natural
does not
kind, but
'pediatrician',11 which
rather a kind of socially defined occupation.
'Pediatrician',
though,
a group of people. Thus
does seem to have come to rigidly designate
are not doctors,
if pediatricians
all
it could turn out that pediatricians
turn out
spies and to have
in fact shipping
while
aid,
to be Martian
medical
rendering
forced labor camps.
a pretense
of
just made
little children to Martian
162
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER
From a realistic point of view, the resemblance
theory claims that
all property-terms
have reference
in the way that 'bachelor' and 'duly
an exten
elected'
i.e. by socially deciding
appear to have reference,
sion. Only on an idealistic conception
of the world,
though, could it
that all of our
be claimed
artifacts.
On
a realistic
terms
from our conceptions
determine
its object.
deviate
doesn't
Even
if the resemblance
we
artifact
for kinds
there
view,
are social
and properties
can
out there which
is a world
of it, so that the content
of a conception
theory is right for sentences
using social
don't get the result that truths about the
terms, though,
are guaranteed.
Every
some
definition
reference
world
seems
to require
in its
as
real
such
kinds,
intuitively
'bachelor =df unmarried male person'. Thus there is no guarantee
that
most
of the term are
particular
agreed on applications
universally
a
so
true. 'Person'
is
natural kind term,
that the theory embodied
in
that concept
may
widely
agreed-on
he is a bachelor'
term known
not
not
artifact-term
to
true.
So it may be guaranteed
that most
of the form, 'If A is a male person,
then
are true, given that 'married' is a socially defined
to apply to A. But it will not be guaranteed
in any
be
sentences
that most
sentences
'A is a
of the form,
way
agreed-on
are true. If we are wrong about what it takes to be a person,
bachelor'
turn out that most
it could
of the things we all agree
in calling
are not. If, for instance, a thing has to have a soul to be a
bachelors
social
even
person,
paradigm
involves no such thing, none of our
though our concept
bachelors will be bachelors
if none of them have souls. The
social artifact terms may be guaranteed
involving
true by a 'use' analysis,
but claims about how the world
to such properties
really is with respect
get no such guarantee.
Only
on the view that all terms are social artifacts will any facts about the
hypothetical
to be mostly
world
follow
beliefs
from universal
beliefs.
and Putnam's
results, then, show that in no case can there
Kripke's
be an argument
that reference
is a function of sense. No replacement
theory is established
the negative
result
that the content
of causal
and
and Putnam's
results, however;
by Kripke's
only
that the resemblance
is wrong.
It is true
theory
seems to embody
a kind
of our referential
concepts
theory of reference where
intentional
items. Furthermore,
the caused
various
items are mentalistic
social
phenomena
seem,
ON
THAT
163
IS NOT
WHICH
as conditions
to be built into real reference
in this causal
intuitively,
relation. But apart from a resemblance
theory of reference, we have
no compelling
reason to conclude
that therefore
reference
is some
kind
of
causal
relation.
We
the complexities
theory of reference
intuitions about what refers to what,
An
results
unnoticed
apparently
is that
the
have
certainly
that accommodating
would entail.12
of Kripke's
the purported
If a concept's
is destroyed.
its content both determine
is out
to give our
our varied
when,
consequence
of
invulnerability
ordinary views of men
determined
by making
determined
by whatever
little reason
there when
we
and Putnam's
truth
reference
reference
of
the
is not
and be
use
it, then a concept
mistaken.
'Criterial'
to a theory which may be radically
features of a concept may be mostly
false of what the concept
is true
no
of. Conceptual
will
be
with
that,
very clear
merely
analysis
case.
If
for
what
is
the
the
consequences
replacement
theory for the
resemblance
by now familiar stories
theory is some causal account,
amounts
are available
in which
intuitions,
what
concepts,
Furthermore,
of our concepts.
there
is radical misinformation
of a society.
can be true of one concept
'built into' the
and beliefs
can be true of most
the referent of
On the causal alternative
again, where
a general term is the kind of which
the causal sources of our concept
we could have a situation where
are members,
all special analytic
were
from a resem
false.
contents
of concepts
Apart
empirically
we can be talking about
the real world
blance
theory of reference,
there is
If the resemblance
it all wrong.
theory is wrong,
error.
massive
about
truly
nothing
impossible
is that our terms may not refer to
A more poignant
possibility
if there is in fact no kind out there to
anything. On a causal theory,
and getting
which
nothing
entities.
cases belong,
then we are talking about
baptism
that concept.
with
Similarly
singular terms for fictional
refers to turns out not to be very often
If what
'reference'
all or most
with
instantiated, most of our terms will fail of reference.
or not a causal theory correctly
of
the essence
describes
Whether
a
the
that
the
resemblance
fact
if there is such
reference,
thing,
theory
is wrong
eliminates
impossible.
Massive
arguments
from a better-off
error,
error is
that massive
the major arguments
of course, will need to be supported
by
sense. The fact
than common
standpoint
164
SAMUEL
that we
seem
that
from
possibility,
the case.
arise
to make
standpoint.
that most
I believe
from
C. WHEELER
errors will
massive
to be given an account
that this last
section
have
I argue in the following
of our terms for objects
don't refer, is in fact
the apparent paradoxes
that
can be explained
in terms of a
that our errors
and
of objects'
at
most
the micro-particles
of physics
and
theory
recognizes
as
certain complexes
of them
genuine objects. This is not a skeptical
claim. I am not saying that we are as likely as not to be wrong about
this
'vanishing
that
the existence
very
of and features
in fact mistaken
probably
III.
of ordinary objects.
I argue that we
and that there are no such things.
SORITES
are
ARGUMENTS
are generally
or puzzles.
I
regarded as sophisms
think
is that by the resem
they have been so regarded
are demonstrably
blance theory of reference,
their conclusions
false.
The resemblance
not
the
is
motivation
for
theory
primary
rejecting
Sorites
arguments
the reason
but it is the main
arguments,
is irrational nostalgia. With
sorites
believe,
reason.
The main
the death
of
the
I
motivation,
resemblance
I think it is clear that sorites arguments
are
of reference,
most
for
the
sound,
part.
I use sorites arguments
to make intuitive what I think is plausible on
other grounds.
I think that to be objectively
real requires having an
theory
For an object to have an essence
is for there to be objective
true of it, that is, natural
laws. There appear to be very
while
the laws about medium-sized
good laws about micro-particles
clauses as to be mere
objects are very poor, so full of ceteris paribus
rules of thumb. Since there seems to be little hope of a reduction of
essence.
necessities
medium-sized
there
objects
to complexes
kinds
object
be two unrelated
systems
the worse
laws must go. For
can either
with
elsewhere,131
I begin with
think the medium-sized
of micro-particle
of objective
kinds
reasons
objects
must
I have
kinds,
or the
explained
go.
a pair of premises:
is a real property,
then it is a matter
(a) If a putative property
an object has that property or lacks it.
fact whether
a purported
object exists
object either exists or doesn't
(b) Whether
purported
or not
exist.
is a matter
of
of fact. A
ON
I take
these
to be basic
sorites
relevant
arguments
in turn.
present
A.
state
of ontology,
which
principles
a property. There are two general kinds of
to my purposes
in this section which
I will
'realistic'
it is to be and to have
what
165
IS NOT
WHICH
THAT
Sorites
Property-type
Arguments
tall by growing one micron. By
in the growth of a person
(a) though, at every micron-point
premise
a
he either has the property of being a tall person or lacks it. Unless
No
person who
is not tall can become
can make
the difference
between
having this property
single micron
no
can
a
tall person by continuous
become
and lacking it,
person
between
growth. Since we are very sure that any precise borderline
it
arbitrary,
having this purported property and lacking it is absolutely
seems clear that there is no property of being a tall person. Since it is
up to us, it is not a matter of any fact about the world. Since there is
no property,
nothing
in the range
course,
infinity of properties
real number.
positive
constitutes
properties
no
tall
has
it. There
of cases
of the form
What
are no tall persons. There are, of
seems to arise, an
the question
n is a
'is n meters
in height' where
where
has been
the property
is that no
shown
a tall person.
of being
set of
such
So there are
persons.
or to decide that
help to have three or more truth-values
nor
same
not tall' is a middle
that
'neither tall
fuzziness
category. The
'true' and 'false' and between
'tall' and 'not tall' will
obtains between
It doesn't
occur
between
any
two adjacent
truth-values
and between
any two
the
dimension.
And
this
fuzziness
shows
along
categories
adjacent
that there
is no property
there,
borderline
is correct.
(Sophisticated
dealt with
in the next
considerations
about
if we
are
versions
right that no precise
of alternative
logics are
section.)
is possibly
real in such cases would
be a relation on a
dimension.
In the case of a predicate
such as 'bald', such a relation is
even
not
there.
That
there
is
such a relation would depend
probably
on some kind of ratio of hairs to surface normally
hairy combined
briefly
All that
with
preserve
different
transitivity,
orderings
distribution.
conform
to our
of pairs of men.
No
Several
such
relations might
and give
roughly,
relation would be selected by
intuitions
166
SAMUEL
our
as clearly
that 'balder than' denotes.
So
the relation
'taller than', may not even denote a relation.
can be extended
to substance
sorites
arguments
intuitions
'balder
C. WHEELER
than' unlike
Property-type
terms and count-nouns,
are fuzzy
ties' which
trary. To
as long as there seem to be 'defining proper
are intuitively
arbi
borderlines
and for which
an
that there are no rational agents,
entity
imagine
show
fewer and fewer truths,
less rational, believing
gradually
are harder and harder
to translate without
sounds which
making
in
that become more
and
error,
ways
behaving
attributing
inexplicable
becoming
and more
difficult
in terms of
of agenthood
Analyses
as Den
or
such
interpretation,
explanation
to a sorites-type
of 'agent' as a
evaporation
to rationalize.
success
with
nett's14
lend themselves
intentional
substance-determiner.
I
such as 'tall person',
of paradigm
property-continua
a
we
are
no
sure
line
that
that
have argued elsewhere15
place in which
this as confidence
is objectively
is drawn
right, and have explained
In the case
that no
do not
point which
that there is no real cutoff
laws of nature
This
apply above any
to confidence
amounts
cutoff
apply below.
that it does
point in the nature of things. With persons, our confidence
not matter objectively
what one says is less clear, since a lot hangs on
an entity is called a person.
whether
On
vince
reflection
one
that
though,
the only
the property-sorites
that exist
objects
should con
argument
are ones with a precise
can constitute
essence
the being of a genuine
precise
or
of
real
of
logical subjects. And objects
properties
logical subject
seem to exclude
with precise essences
tables, chairs, etc. It
persons,
of
seems very implausible
that, at a certain point in the elimination
essence.
Only
some drastic change
should
'property' of such objects
an objectively
distinct
take place which made one of those objects
entity, where what kind of thing it was changed.
is that
The problem with generalizing
arguments
property-sorites
the essential
we
for putative
essential
'properties'
we have the right
that
for
thinking
grounds
is
the resemblance
essential
Since
theory of reference
properties.
that we take to be essential may well
the features
however,
wrong,
to
not be. It could turn out, that is, that something
very unimportant
have
to construct
and have
our concept
to have
dimensions
some
of person
is in fact essential
to the nature
of persons.
ON
B.
A more
easily
THAT
WHICH
Sorites
Ungefs
generalizable
sorites
167
IS NOT
Arguments
argument, due to Peter Unger,16
This
sorites.
of taking
consists
is
a
composition/decomposition
in the most favorable
such as a table and extracting
putative object
a
one
atom
at
time.
this kind of sorites,
way
(In
'table-preserving'
one
to be physically
is assumed
such extraction
Surely
possible.)
a
atom cannot make
the difference
between
table being there and
the
there not being a table there. But equally clearly,
tables. So there are no tables. The only principle
is premise
(b) that every
'object' either exists
diminution.
losing
0-atom
tables.
seems
atoms.
But
preserve
tablehood.
the form:
are
tables, then if
then there are
tablehood,
preserves
a single
there are no 0-atom tables and removing
has
argument
an atom most
favorably
atom would
beings.
Such
The
there are no 0-atom
this argument needs
or not, after each
If there
So there are no tables. Tables
are not
can be interpreted
as showing
that where
there
arguments
a complex
to be a table, there is at most
to be thought
of
A sequence
of complexes
of smaller and smaller
size
is
analogous
case also,
to the dimension
is no subset
on which
'taller than'
is defined.
In this
that sequence which
is the object of
a
common
be
there
definable
artificial
sense,
may
though
complex
That there is
object at each point up to the last in the diminution.
even a single relation
'is more
tabloid than' along this sequence
is
be
since
relations
could
defined.
many
questionable,
'acceptable'
there
In the case
almost
of
starts with
of persons, Unger's
argument
a
say that after
everyone would
brain-transplant,
brains, since
he has a new
the brain in the right sort of
body, not a new brain. So, keeping
the
nutrient bath, the extraction without
Now,
replacement
proceeds.
to be part of the person
nutrient bath itself would not be considered
and neither would
further life-support
that might have to be
systems
to the person as the decomposition
progressed. When we are
one
most
to
down
would
atom,
agree that there is
people
eventually
no person
most
there. And
agree that a single atom's
prople would
cannot
turn a non-person
into a person. A composition
addition
attached
version
of the same argument comes up in disputes about abortion.
If
a
a
not
old
but
is
then
is,
egg
person
thirty year
during
a fertilized
168
C. WHEELER
SAMUEL
a person must have come into being. Since
there are probably no persons.
unlikely,
physically
What
it would be for an ordinary object, a person, or any object to
a natural,
to make
reduction
be for some one-atom
exist, would
That is, for an object to exist is for there to be a
difference.
objective
some
interval
one-second
this seems
genuine
law of nature which
at one point
applied
apply at the next point.
this sorites establishes
What
we
conceive
precise
what we
is that ordinary
them do not exist. It is logically
some
but which
objects
possible
sort out
to
failed
and persons as
that there is a
there which
is
complex
entity
are referring to when we seen to refer to something with the
of, for instance, a person. But there seems to be no reason to
of
molecular
qualities
to think not. In any case,
think so and fairly good scientific grounds
not support the pos
does
scheme
the ordinary
certainly
conceptual
an
an
about when
intuitions
since ordinary
tulation of such
entity,
a diminution,
survives
that it always
survives
tiny
namely
object
are what
diminutions,
the sorites
argument
uses
to evaporate
putative
objects.
I believe
is valid, both of the property
that every such argument
that for
type. I believe
type and of the composition/decomposition
most
the
for
and
every
ordinary
properties,
object,
ordinary
nearly
a
a
not
between
the
atom
difference
will
make
that
single
premise
property
being
ordinary
objects
there
or not
is true. Thus
ponse by people
alternative
logics
a set as probabilistic,
on
partial,17 or on multiplying
Probabilistic
membership
seems to require violation
all the same
person
theory,
few
OUT
res
frequent
logics seem to have been the most
at all seriously.
The
take sorites arguments
who
in
I have seen depend either on treating membership
(1) Alternative
while
that very
are real.
IV. WAYS
with
I believe
treating membership
truth-values.
literally,
truth as
literally interpreted by a realist,
such as that no two persons
of principles
can be such that one is a tall
dimensions
in a set,
physical
is not. On
the other
if taken
in a set and
the probabilistic
have exactly
if two persons
set-membership
the same height
THAT
ON
WHICH
169
IS NOT
and are both in the set of tall persons with a probability
of 0.5, then
one may be tall while
the other is not. If physically
indiscriminable
to the same kind, objectively,
individuals must
then prob
belong
no
sense.
makes
literal
of
Some
abilistic set-membership
proponents18
this theory do not take it literally, but rather as a remark about how
an object is above or below. But
many acceptable
arbitrary borderlines
there.
this is to recognize
that there is no property
is a nearly equivalent
to the above objection.
seems to apply more
Partial
set-membership
is immune
theory which
of partial set-membership
orders
than
to real objects
in the world.
An
version
However,
of the above
the notion
to Masonic
properly
object must have an
amount to its extinc
that is, objective
features
losing which
a thing either has it or lacks it. The
for a real property,
tion. Similarly,
notion of being partly in a kind or partly having a certain property
amounts
to the admission
that what we have is a dimension
rather
essence,
can determine
the being of an object. For a
which
or a real property,
either a thing has it or lacks it. Real
are either true or false. More
do
truth-values
likewise,
than an essence
real essence
propositions,
not make sense
The
above
thought
out
reasons.
for the obvious
ontologically
remarks obviously
beg the question
against
I deal with
and elaborate
theories.
these
because
I think
of
reference
briefly,
though,
resemblance
theory
these well
theories
so
a
it is clear that they presuppose
and assume
that realism
is false.
for accepting
these complex
alternatives
is the assurance
the resem
ontological
principles
blance theory gives that our patterns of verbal behavior must be made
true. If reference were a function of societal dispositions
to
mostly
a
we
would
that reference would be probabilistic,
term,
expect
apply
are. Properties
would
be statistical
since response-patterns
social
Furthermore,
to our very
artifacts.
nothing
behavior.
But
the motivation
simple
on a realistic
to do with
what
view,
is out
such probability-distributions
have
our
with
there, only
description
behavior
(This is not to say that a theory of our description
is trivial or useless.
I think Zadeh, Fine and others are dealing with
but not with
of this paper.) Our
the problem
interesting
problems,
apart from the resemblance
theory, can deviate
description-behavior,
from what
massively
be
may
probabilistic,
is the case. Our
but what
to stimuli
in response
a thing has and whether
a
behavior
properties
170
SAMUEL
C. WHEELER
thing of a given kind exists or not is not. When
grounds for thinking ordinary
logic is mistaken,
be accepted. With
the death of the resemblance
there are no rational
its conclusions
should
theory of reference,
ones.
there are no rational grounds
for changing
logic; only nostalgic
we have reached via the
(2) People might respond to the conclusion
are ontologic
sorites arguments with the claim that ordinary objects
the objects
ally primary while
Thus the fact that the essence
terms is taken
micro-particle
not
and
vice-versa.
particles,
where
real
the
are instrumental
of physics
parasites.
of ordinary objects make no sense in
as a mark against
the reality of micro
This
amount
would
essences
were
rather
than atoms.
those
to a super-Aristo
of medium-sized
telianism,
nature of the
with atoms being fictions.
The fundamental
objects,
it. However
world
is just as we perceive
such a theory might go in
the same sorites arguments
detail, essentially
go through with small
chips of tables, for instance,
to the claim
be committed
a theorist would
Such
that, after some minute
chip has been
to exist, even though we
from a table, the table has ceased
are not aware of this and it is not clear from our concept
admittedly
that this is so.
removed
a reactionary
realism must concede,
though,
to exist will be a theoretically
isolated phenomenon,
Such
that this ceasing
in terms of
even
a 'medium-sized
terms. Not only will
object' system of basic scientific
or non-existence
of the table not be connected
with any
even
it will not
be connected
with any laws
laws of particle physics,
the existence
about
which
This
objects.
ordinary
connect
is because
terms
are
there
that we
have
no precise
any evidence
ordinary object
breakoff points
So that there are precise but unknown
seems
to be absolutely
trees
either
unfounded
The
thesis
is not
by
supported
is arbitrary.
every
point
of the very unlawlikeness
because
scientifically
about medium-sized
that look to be forthcoming
scientifically.
hold
intuitions
that
there
is a distinct
terms
of
chairs
vanishing
no
removal,
chip
seems to break
down.
before, you still can.
of objective
The discovery
point
of
the
intuitions
It
breaking
for.
for tables
and
intuitively
because
our
or
is not
supported
of the generalizations
That is, if
objects.
tablehood
connection
necessary
If you could
laws
of an object
or
to dinners
in
to
pull a chair up to the thing
points
seems
to be
impossible
THAT
ON
WHICH
171
IS NOT
in the case of medium-sized
for exactly
this reason. Since the
objects
or
of exactly
the
nonexistent,
discovery
imprecise
when an object has vanished
cannot be made by checking
anything
else. Only the activity of nous, an intuitive apprehension
of essence,
can do this, but nous seems to tell us in this type of case that there is
are either
laws
no
essence.
precise
more ways
the
try to avoid
people might
probably
a
I have been urging is that, apart from
resemblance
conclusion. What
is
there is no reason to think that the conclusion
theory of reference,
are
There
false and therefore to be avoided. Apart from a superficial appearance
to the disappearance
of paradox19 and a negative
emotional
response
of loved ones, nothing blocks acceptance
of the result.
sense to write
in any important
this. I
self-contradictory
success
it rather as a tractarian
ladder. The predictive
of
us
reason
to believe
that the fundamental
every
objects
gives
It is not
regard
physics
are micro-particles.
of
massive
A
leads
reference
errors
little reflection
us
to entertain
on developments
the possibility
in the theory
make
that we
in our
about what
exists. Our
ordinary
judgements
to think that intuitive persons
intuitions
and other
give us reason
middle-sized
objects are not the sort of thing that can be vanished
by
or
an
one
error.
atom
the
of
Thus, by
extracting
inducing
compulsion
are
the sorites arguments, we conclude
not
that persons
and their ilk
and
any real sort of thing at all. Where we seem to see the properties
natural kinds of the ordinary world
there are only fluxing clumps of
and continuous
dimensions.
The conclusion
entails
micro-particles
no persons
and so no 'theory of reference'
whose
results were
used
in the argument.
But this is harmless,
since the
is a reductio ad absurdum of the 'given' world.
argument
In the past, bad science could allow souls, spiritual substances,
etc.,
that
there
are
to be as reasonable
such bizarre
as anything
theories and other
longer any reason
conclusion
reached
to
think
else. The main
point to make about
out is that there is no
tempting ways
one of them is more
in this paper.
there
likely than the
to
is no reason
Logically,
'bold stroke' of accepting
the
adopt a faith or to change
logic. The
conclusion
of sorites arguments
is only emotionally
bold. Philoso
course. Rescues
it is the most plausible
from
phically and rationally,
these
conclusions,
prima
facie,
are
irrational,
amounting
to either
172
C. WHEELER
SAMUEL
blind faith in gods or unitary
accounts
water-molecule-like
the unpleasantness,
University
spirits or blind faith that science will
of personhood.
They are motivated
not the implausibility,
of the conclusion.20
find
by
of Connecticut
NOTES
1
I use
the
term
results,
2
Quine,
not
just
Davidson,
to refer to chain-arguments
in this paper
with
'sorites'
to any chain-argument.
Word
Ch. 2, (M.I.T. Press:
and Object,
W.V.,
Mass.,
Cambridge,
'On the Very
Idea of a Conceptual
Presidential
Donald,
Scheme',
Association,
Philosophical
Proceedings
of the American
'Truth and Meaning',
17, No.
3, 1967.
Synthese
3
This
in Richard
is made most
argument
explicitly
Journal
69, No.
19, 1972, pp. 649-665.
of Philosophy
4
Ludwig,
Philosophical
Investigations,
Wittgenstein,
York,
1953).
5
Austin,
John,
for
instance
'A Plea
for Excuses',
Inc.: Englewood
Hall,
Language
(Prentice
6
for instance
'The Theory
Ryle, Gilbert,
The Chappell
book, Richard
Language.
Cliffs, New
of Meaning'
The
Rorty's
Caton's
Charles
Vol.
47,
Rorty's
1973-74,
'The World
(The Macmillan
in V.C.
Jersey,
in V.C.
paradoxical
1960); and
address
in
pp. 5-20,
and
Well
Lost',
Company:
New
ed., Ordinary
1964), pp. 41-64.
Chappell,
ed., Ordinary
of
Turn,
(University
and Ordinary
Lan
Philosophy
of the
give an adequate
picture
Chappell,
Linguistic
Press:
1967), and
Chicago,
of Illinois Press:
guage,
Urbana,
1963)
(University
British
theory of reference.
7
loc. cit.
Idea of a Conceptual
'On the Very
Scheme',
Davidson,
Donald,
8
and G. Harman,
in D. Davidson
and Necessity',
eds.,
Saul,
Kripke,
'Naming
Semantics
Dordrecht,
Holland,
(D. Reidel:
1972), pp. 253-355.
Languages,
of Natural
9
of Meaning',
inMinnesota
Studies
'The Meaning
in the Philosophy
Putnam,
of
Hilary,
of Minnesota
Vol. 7, (University
Science,
Press,
1975), pp. 131-193.
10
Putnam,
op. cit., p. 139 if.
Hilary,
11
Putnam,
op. cit., p. 163.
Hilary,
12
account
of what Kripke
and Putnam
have
is given
in Sam Wheeler's
This
shown
Chicago
and Vagueness',
'Reference
30 (1975), 367-379.
Synthese
13
loc. cit., p. 375.
'Reference
and Vagueness',
Sam,
Wheeler,
14
and Consciousness
Press: New York,
Content
Daniel,
Dennett,
(Humanities
1969).
15
and Vagueness',
loc. cit.
'Reference
Sam,
Wheeler,
16
'IDo Not Exist', manuscript.
See also 'There Are No Ordinary
Peter,
Unger,
Things'
are
I use
this issue. The arguments
in applying
this sorites
Synthese,
argument-type
condensations
of his arguments.
17
An
is L.A.
Zadeh's
and Approximate
of this alternative
example
'Fuzzy
Logic
No.
Nov.
Memorandum
Research
ERL-M479,
12, 1974.
(Electronics
Reasoning',
of Engineering,
of California,
University
Berkeley).
Laboratory,
College
18
in 'Vagueness,
For example,
Kit Fine
Truth and Logic',
30 (1975), 265-300.
Synthese
19
to reach the conclusion
seem paradoxical
It might
that there are no persons,
since
ON THAT WHICH
there
has
there must
IS NOT
173
seem that
the illusion
that there are persons,
and it would
arisen
apparently
to have that illusion.
I think the best that might be made
of
be real persons
of instants of regions of the Platonic
is that there may be a dimension
flux on
persons
the relation
which
than' can be
than' or 'is more
active
intentionally
personal
status ordinary
and persons
of exactly
what
objects
might
if we can
have when
is a large topic for another
paper. Roughly,
they are not entities
are logical
we
can equally
and computers
that tables
subjects,
imagine mistakenly
The theory of persons
that we are logical subjects.
this paper accommodates
imagine
defined.
full
The
resembles
'is more
account
The
bundle-theory.
of micro-particles,
Hume's
constituents
of
the bundles
are
instantaneous
no
rather than sense
Also,
though,
impressions.
out of it. Thus
from what's
in the bundle
line divides what's
clear ontological
illusory
are
can arise
without
there being
illusions
in 'personal'
which
any entities
regions
states
of complexes
persons.
20
I would
and
like
especially
not exist even
use of
some
at the University
of Connecticut,
the philosophy
department
The paper would
and Jerry Fodor,
for helpful
discussion.
and the
of Peter Unger
view without
the encouragement
the ordinary
to thank
John
on
Troyer
of his arguments
in the composition/decomposition
sorites.