Salafism and Jihadism: An Introduction
Prof. Dr. Susanne Schröter
Goethe University Frankfurt
Being a totalitarian variant of Islam, Salafism is in opposition to democracy, human rights, and the idea of gender
equality. It combines a utopia projected into the past with
modern elements of pop culture and is the fastest-growing
youth movement in many countries including Germany.
Jihadism is the violent variant of Salafism. In simplified
terms, it can be said that all jihadists are Salafists but only
few Salafists ever turn into jihadists.
Definitions: The term Salafism has replaced the terms
“Islamism”, “Islamic fundamentalism”, and “Islamic extremism” which were used in the 20th century. 1 It is derived from the Arab word al-salaf al-salih and refers to the
pious ancestors, the first three generations of Muslims who
lived in the 7th century. Salafis believe that these first Muslims practiced the norms and values of Islam in a particularly “pure” way. That is why these ancestors, and most
specifically the Prophet Muhammad, are viewed as role
models in all matters, including issues of modern life in
the 21st century. One source of knowledge about the ancestors is the Islamic traditions (sunna). The other source of
behavioral instructions is the Qur’an, or rather a selection
of specific verses which are followed to the letter. This
results in grotesque inferences such as the justification of
enslavement and murder of so-called “infidels” (kuffar) by
the terrorist organization “Islamic State”. 2
Non-Salafi Muslims, too, view the sunna and the Qur’an
as sources of reference in contemporary norm conflicts.
Hence, a distinction between conservative Muslims and
Salafists is not always easy. Matters are further complicated by the fact that most Salafists do not want to be classified as Salafists but as Muslims, and that they object to a
distinction between Islam and Islamism, arguing that this
is an attempt to create a schism. Others equate Salafism
with Islam. This also applies to the German Salafists who
view their version of Islam as the “true religion” rather
than a special variant of Islam. The bottom line is that
Salafism is a somewhat nebulous and also confusing term,
because it defies any clear distinction from other variants
of Islam.
The term Jihadism is derived from the Arab word jihad
which means “effort” or “striving”. It is often complemented by the phrase fi sabil allah (“on the road of God”
or “for the sake of God”). Historically, it has its origin in
the war of the Prophet Muhammad against the non-Muslim
inhabitants of Mecca, and was viewed as a legitimate
measure to defend Islam or Muslim territories and to pursue a violent expansion of Islam. Closely associated with
the concept of jihad is the dichotomization of the world
into Territories of War (dar al-harb) and Territories of
Islam (dar al-Islam). In that dualistic logic, jihad was
viewed as a duty of every Muslim, and those dying a martyr’s death “on the road of God” were rewarded by immediate admission to Paradise. This coarse model of differentiation turned out to be quite impracticable in actual political practice. This led to the introduction of the additional
categories of the Territory of Truce (sulh) and the Territory of Agreement (dar al-ahd). The latter term refers to
countries where Muslims can practice their religion without hindrance even though they do not form the government. 3 The distinction between two types of jihad is of
recent origin as well: the greater jihad (jihad al-akbar),
which is about the struggle against one’s own ego or
“weaker self”, and the lesser jihad (jihad al-ashgar), the
actual war against the “infidels” (kuffar).
History: Viewed from a historical perspective, Salafism is
in the tradition of Islamic renewal movements which were
usually responses to political crises. One of the authorities
who are still invoked, and often quoted, by Salafists is Ibn
Tamiyya (1263-1328), a scholar of the Hanbalite school of
law4 who lived at a time when the Muslim world had to
cope with two heavy defeats. In the 13th century the Mongols advanced to West Asia, conquered Baghdad in 1258,
and put an end to the caliphate of the Abbasids. At about
the same time the Muslims were expelled from almost all
regions of Spain by the Catholic forces during the second
1
See Seidensticker, Tilman (2014): Islamismus. Geschichte, Vordenker,
Organisationen. Munich: Beck.
2
As stated in the IS propaganda magazine “Dabiq”,
http://media.clarionproject.org/files/islamic‐state/islamic‐state‐isis‐
magazine‐Issue‐4‐the‐failed‐crusade.pdf.
3
Cf. Heine, Peter (2004): Terror im Namen Allahs. Extremistische Kräfte
im Islam. Bonn, pp. 12-38.
4
The Sunnites acknowledge four major schools of law (madhhab) which
emerged in the 8th and 9th centuries: the Shafiite, Hanbalite, Malikite, and
Hanifite schools.
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phase of the reconquista. Ibn Tamiyya, who joined antiMongol resistance and other political activities, believed
that the renunciation of true faith had internally weakened
the Muslims, and that this was the reason for the defeats.
In his opinion, the only way out of that predicament was to
return to the foundations of Islam, that is, to the Qur’an
and the exemplary life of the Prophet Muhammad (sunna)
as the only legitimate sources of theology and jurisdiction.
Ibn Tamiyya’s version of Islam was a rigid and intolerant
system that did not only condemn Shiites, Christians, and
Jews but also Sufis, and demanded that supposed apostates
be executed.
A second historical root of Salafism goes back to Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). Al-Wahhab,
who was born in what today is Saudi Arabia, was a follower of the Hanbalite school of law, too, and viewed
himself as an intellectual successor of Ibn Tamiyya. He
condemned Arab customs of the time such as the worship
of stones, flowers, and graves, as well as music, dance,
smoking tobacco, and other pleasures. His teachings met
with disconcertment among the population, and he was
repeatedly banished. However, he was able to consolidate
his power through an alliance concluded in 1744 with the
emir Muhammad Ibn Saud. Ibn Saud and al-Wahhab are
the founding fathers of today’s Saudi Arabia, a country
where Wahhabism is state religion and exported to the
whole world at considerable financial expenditure.
Another root of Salafism emerged in Egypt in the 19 th and
early 20th centuries. It is associated with scholars such as
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), Muhammad Abduh
(1849-1905) and the latter’s student Rashid Rida (18651935). They criticized not only the European colonization
of the Orient but also the corrupt Oriental elites, and went
in search of new models of society beyond both western
and orthodox Islamic ideologies. Condemning Muslim
traditions as being corrupted and anti-progressive, they
argued in favor of a return to the Qur’an and sunna. On the
other hand, however, they advocated the advancement of
education and science, the use of modern technologies, and
efforts to overcome foreign rule. Instead of following one
of the four Sunnite schools of law, they counted on the use
of reason (itjtihad). Particularly Rida, who turned to Wahhabism after Abduh’s death, exerted much influence on
later, more radical Islamic thinkers such as Hasan alBanna (1906-1949) who founded the Muslim Brotherhood
in Egypt in 1928. Al-Banna first fought British occupation
of his country, then the western lifestyle of the elites. He
called for a religious renewal of society and the establishment of an Islamic state. Two other influential Islamic
thinkers also made front against the “westernization” of
Muslim societies and called for the creation of an Islamic
state: Sayyid Abdul Aula Maudadi (1903-1979), who
fought British colonial rule in India, and the Muslim
Brother Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who was arrested in the
wake of an assault on Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1954 and
executed in 1966. Like Ibn Tamiyya and al-Wahhab, these
men viewed the jihad as a legitimate means for accomplishing political, social, and religious goals.
Present: Both the Muslim Brothers and their various national split-offs have repeatedly deradicalized themselves
in the course of history, and have successfully run in democratic elections (e.g., in Egypt). The term Salafism is
therefore no longer applied to them. Today, it basically
refers to new radical movements that are less ready to
compromise. Some of these groups are active on a transnational level, such as the Hibz ut-Tahrir, which was founded
in Jerusalem in 1952, and the Tablighi Jamaat established
in India in 1926. Others have only a limited local or regional sphere of activity. For moral or strategic reasons,
some groups object to violence in the current situation.
Others view the jihad as a duty in order to implement
Islam. Scholars such as Joas Wagemakers 5 and Olaf
Farshid6 distinguish three currents of Salafism: quietists, or
purists, who have no political ambitions; political Salafists
who are classified as anti-constitutional yet non-violent in
Germany;7 and jihadists who attempt to accomplish their
goals by means of violence. However, any clear categorization is impossible as there is much interconnection and
mutual support, people can easily move from one faction
to another, and political considerations may result in tactical reserve with regard to tricky issues (e.g., implementation of the shari’a).
Salafism is a rapidly growing movement within Islam, and
it exists in all countries where Sunnite Muslims are living.
Despite its ideology which is uniform – at least in its basic
features – there are national and regional particularities as
to strategies of gaining in influence and targeting the relevant groups of actors. In western countries, Salafist groups
attract marginalized youths with and without migration
background, and explicitly stage themselves as a protest
movement and subculture. In Egypt, where the Salafist
Hizb an-Nur (Party of Light) won almost 28% of the vote,
Salafist organizations have taken over social tasks of the
Cf. Wagemakers, Joas (2005): “Salafistische Strömungen und ihre Sicht
auf al-wala wa-l bara` (Loyalität und Lossagung)”. In: Said, Behnam
T./Hazim Fouad, eds.: Salafismus. Auf der Suche nach dem wahren
Islam. Bonn: Forschungszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 55-79.
6
Cf. Farshid, Olaf (2014): “Salafismus als politische Ideologie”. In: Said,
Behnam T./Hazim Fouad, eds.: Salafismus. Auf der Suche nach dem
wahren Islam. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 160-192.
7
Cf. Farshid 2014, p. 165.
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state, looking after the poor. In countries such as Tunisia
or Indonesia, they push Islamization of society by means
of violent assaults on oppositionists, artists, and religious
minorities. In Iraq, southern Thailand, and Nigeria they
once moved into battle to help disadvantaged minorities
get their rights, but then discredited themselves by committing terrorist and criminal acts. In regions of the world
where the state is either corrupt or has limited influence,
where legal vacuums exist and warlords reside, Islamists
create states within the state. This is the case in Somalia,
Yemen, Libya, parts of Mali and Nigeria, large regions in
central Asia, and even remote parts of Southeast Asia.
These regions are the sites where translational jihadist
fighters find shelter and get training.
Ideology: Salafist ideology is characterized by crude pairs
of opposites (Muslims versus non-Muslims, good versus
evil) and simple behavioral instructions. Salafists are convinced of the superiority of Islam over other world views,
and believe that Allah will sentence all non-Muslims –
called “infidels” (kuffar) – to suffer in eternal hellfire after
death. “Infidels” include Muslims who do not share the
Salafists’ definition of Islam, most notably Shiites, Sufis,
members of the Ahmadiyya, and progressive Muslims.
Salafis hold that God has entrusted them with the task of
proselytizing the kuffar. This is the reason for their untiring missionary work (dawah), including the “Read” campaign in which Salafi men distribute free copies of the
Qur’an in pedestrian zones, trying to attract new members.
While boys of any age are recruited for the dawah, and in
war zones also for the jihad, women are rarely visible in
public, as Salafist ideology forbids them to leave the house
except for very sound reasons.
Salafists purport to emulate the first Muslims in every
respect, and they try to substantiate their ideas and actions
with quotes from the Qur’an or events in the lives of the
Prophet Muhammad and his companions. Particular importance is attached to outward appearance: the anklelength robes (jellabah) and beards of the men, and the
strict concealment of women’s bodies (hijab) including the
face (niqab veil). The conspicuous garments, as well as the
campaigns including prayers at busy downtown places, are
good publicity and attract the attention coveted by the
Salafists. Symbols of their own, a specific subcultural
language using Arab metaphors and phrases, as well as a
specific music (nashid) and aesthetics help to make
Salafism into a global culture with a distinctive recognition
value. Some researchers refer to this phenomenon as “Pop
Jihad”. New media (e.g., YouTube, Facebook, Twitter)
contribute to the global spread of this (youth) culture and
facilitate transnational communication. Salafis film all
their activities and put the films on the Web, regardless of
their content and message – be it the Qur’an giveaway
booth in a German pedestrian zone on Saturdays or a spectacular execution in Iraq. The excessive use of the media
as well as modern weapons and means of transport is in
stark contrast to the staged imitation of 7th-century Muslims; for example, Salafis will refuse using a factory-made
toothbrush and instead use the miswak, a teeth-cleaning
small piece of wood. The Damascus-born political scientist
Bassam Tibi once called that selective appropriation of
western accomplishments the “dream of half-modernity”.8
By this he means the separation of philosophical and
technological modernity, which made it possible to reject
democracy, the separation of state and religion, and the
equality of men and women while at the same time
embracing and using modern technology.
From a historical perspective, the target of Salafist proselytizing and jihadist warfare was the “nearby enemy”, that
is, either the European colonial powers which were to be
expelled from Muslim territory or postcolonial governments denounced as being infidel. Since the end of the 20th
century, however, there has been an increasing expansion
of these activities, and attacks are now being targeted at
the “faraway enemy”, the Western nations. 9 Many jihadist
groups believe that a prophesied end of days is soon to
come, which will result in a global rule of Islam.
Community: The appeal of Salafism is not least due to its
exclusive community structures which are shut off from
the outside world. Those who profess their faith in
Salafism or embrace “true” Islam are immediately welcomed in the Salafist community; they make friends, get a
husband or wife, and have found a new home. The separation from the outside world, sometimes including people’s
family of origin, guarantees that the ranks remain closed.
In addition, there is the feeling of being special and gaining recognition without much effort involved. In many
cases it is sufficient to demonstrate the piety demanded,
and to behave in a loyal way towards the community. In
other cases, however, pressure is built up to persuade
youths to participate in the jihad, or youths compete in
who serves Islam best by means of drastic actions. The
source of the shared ideology including its specific rhetoric
is charismatic preachers whose sermons are listened to
either on the Internet or in local mosques where they are
invited to instruct the congregation. While the Internet
plays an important role in communication and recruit8
Tibi, Bassam (1993): Die fundamentalistische Herausforderung. Der
Islam und die Weltpolitik. Munich: Beck, p. 46.
9
Cf. Keppel, Gilles (2005): Die neuen Kreuzzüge. Die arabische Welt
und die Zukunft des Westens. Munich: Piper, p. 101.
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ment, 10 the assumption that youths become radicalized
exclusively via the Internet is only true in exceptional
cases. As a rule, they use both the online and offline
worlds to get information, keep in touch with others, and
engage in networking. And there is still another reason
why mosques are indispensable: pious male Muslims are
obliged to perform their Friday prayer in a mosque.
Causes: The obvious success of Salafist and jihadist mobilization can only be explained by multiple causes. These
include poverty, unemployment, and lack of perspectives,
as well as social or political marginalization. Urban slums
in the global South are important sites of recruitment. The
same is true, however, of French banlieus, precarized
British suburbs, and hot spots in German cities. Youths
from such neighborhoods, which are rife with criminality
and despair, feel excluded from the majority society, and
discriminated against specifically for being Muslims. Particularly in the western countries, Islam plays an important
role in creating identity. In that process, it often – and in
the case of Salafism, always –recurs to Muslim victim
narratives. German Salafists claim that Muslims are the
“new Jews”, ignoring the rampant anti-Semitism in their
own ranks. In countries where large Muslim minorities are
excluded from development and political participation,
there is fertile soil for Islamist ideologies even in remote
rural regions. A current case in point is Iraq where Sunni
tribes formed alliances with the IS mainly out of opposition to the government which is dominated by Shiites.
Particularly in regions where the state is either corrupt or
unable to assert its monopoly on the use of force, Islamists
have the chance to wage a temporarily successful jihad
and to exert political power. Warlords, militia leaders, and
armed clan chiefs invoke Islam in many parts of Asia and
Africa. They purport to be fighting for justice in the service of God. In economic terms, their power is based on
trade in drugs, arms, and fuel, on kidnappings, racketeering, and compulsory levies. Whenever parts of the population profit from such “economies of violence”, as is the
case in Afghanistan, it is very difficult to effect any changes from outside.
However, socioeconomic marginalization is just one
among several causes of the popularity of Salafism and
Jihadism, whose followers also come from countries where
Sunnites are in power, or from educated and wealthy families. Salafist groups hold out the seeming promise of an
intact community of kindred spirits, and sometimes also of
a surrogate family. The simple normative order of
Salafism with its firm rules is described as appealing as
10
Cf. Steinberg, Guido (2012): Jihadismus und Internet. Eine deutsche
Perspektive. Berlin: SWP.
well. Particularly those who are unstable, who are overwhelmed by the complexity of the modern world and cannot make meaning of their lives, appreciate the clear set of
rules provided by radical Islam, as well as the justification
of those rules by an indisputable divine order. In addition,
Salafism appeals to young people’s emotions, thus being
an alternative to the materialism of the western world
which is perceived as cold. “God has touched my heart” is
a stereotypical reason given by Salafists for their conversion. Initially, one of the reasons for the successful mobilization by the IS was also the desire of young Muslims to
go to the rescue of Syria’s Muslim population which was
beleaguered by Baschar al-Assad. Due to the hypocritical
attitude of western governments, whose foreign politics is
guided by geostrategic rather than ethical principles, young
Salafists often feel that they need to wage jihad in order to
make justice triumph.
Besides religious do-gooders, Jihadism attracts people who
yearn for spaces where they can give free rein to their
inclination for machismo and sadism. They enjoy being
masters over their victims’ life and death, performing gory
executions in front of a camera, and going unpunished for
the rape of girls allotted to them as spoils of war. The cruel
stagings of executions on the Internet have particular appeal to psychopaths.
Has Salafism anything to do with Islam? Representatives of Muslim organizations often claim that Salafism
and Jihadism have nothing to do with Islam. This is not
true. Salafis refer to Qur’an verses and the Islamic traditions, and as a rule use quotes from Islamic primary
sources to justify their actions. Qur’an exegesis is fraught
with various problems, including the choice of passages in
the text. For example, if reference is made to verse 2:191,
“And slay them [the heathen enemies] wherever you find
them”,11 or verse 2:193, “And fight them until there is no
more Fitnah (disbelief and worshipping of others along
with Allah) and (all and every kind of) worship is for Allah (Alone)”, it is possible to justify the killing of Christians, Jews, Shiites, Yazidis, or Ahmadis, and even to
define such murders as acts of religious duty. However, if
verse 5:12 is quoted, “If anyone killed a person (…) it
would be as if he killed all mankind”, or verse 2:256,
“There is no compulsion in religion”, Islam presents itself
as being peaceful and tolerant. Evidence of contradictions
can be found both in the Qur’an and the traditions. All
depends on which passages in the text are cited and how
much importance is attached to them. Progressive scholars
All English translations of Qur’an verses are taken from
http://www.noblequran.com/translation/
11
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such as Mouhanad Khorchide in Germany and Amina
Wadud and Abou El Fadl in the USA try to solve the problem by distinguishing between various types of verses.
They argue that some verses have universal validity because God has established the unalterable ethical principles of Islam in them. Others (including the bellicose verses cited above) were interventions of God in some specific
historical context. As these contexts no longer exist today,
the respective verses have become irrelevant. This historical-critical hermeneutic approach has so far been rejected
by the majority of Muslim scholars; hence, it is still difficult to distinguish between a global mainstream Islam and
its radical variants.
Compiled in February 2015
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