Annex:
Linking National Politics to Europe:
A Possible Scenario
Simon Hix
If, for some reason, this annex is not accompanied by the main pamphlet Linking
National Politics to Europe by Simon Hix, please download a copy from
www.network-europe.net or contact [email protected].
A POSSIBLE SCENARIO
To illustrate how this proposal to hold an indirect election of the Commission President by national
parliaments would work, imagine the following scenario:
In the 2004 Intergovernmental Conference the governments agree, among other things, that the best
way to establish a role for national parliaments in the EU and to increase the legitimacy of the EU is to
introduce an election of the Commission President along the lines set out above. This reform is then
ratified by the national parliaments, who are delighted that they will be able to influence the executive
power and policy agenda of the EU.
In the meantime, six new member states join the EU in the first round of EU enlargement – Poland,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus.
To keep the same term of office as under the previous procedure, the first national parliament election
of the Commission President would be held in 2009, following the European Parliament elections.
The contest is now on!
In early 2009, the transnational party federations – the Party of European Socialists (PES), the centreright European People’s Party (EPP), the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR), and
the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP) – hold party leaders’ summits to discuss their
strategy for the contest. These ‘Euro-parties’ agree that they will each field one candidate, their
member parties will be responsible for collecting the required signatures in their national parliaments
to secure selection, they will co-operate in drafting a manifesto for their candidate, and will co-operate
in organising the campaign across the EU. They will do this by establishing a multi-national campaign
team of senior national party figures.
The PES pick the German Social Democrat Party Prime Minister (whom we shall call “GERHARD”).
He has established a reputation for successfully reforming the German welfare state, tax and
pensions systems without undermining social protection for the more vulnerable members in society.
The EPP choose the Spanish Popular Party Prime Minister (whom we shall call “JOSÉ”). He is the
longest-serving Prime Minister on the centre-right, and is well-known throughout Europe.
The ELDR choose the Belgian-Flemish Liberal Democratic Party Prime Minister (whom we shall call
“GUY”). He has built a reputation as a radical economic reformer, and has transformed the Belgian
economy into one of the fastest growing in Europe.
The EFGP agree to pick the former Finnish leader of the Green Party in the European Parliament
(who we shall call “HEIDI”). She is one of the most prominent Green politicians in Europe, and is
respected beyond Green party circles. Since they sit with the Green MEPs in the European
Parliament, the regionalist parties in the European Free Alliance (such as the Scottish National Party,
the Flemish People’s Union and the various Spanish nationalist parties) agree to support HEIDI.
The parties on the radical left and radical right realise that it will be impossible for them to propose
their own candidate. As Table A shows, they simply do not have enough support in enough
parliaments to meet the requirements. (For the data, I use the actual strength of parties in national
parliaments in January 2002. The strengths of parties in national parliaments would of course be
1
different by 2009). Nevertheless, most of the radical left parties are expected to support a Green
candidate, but agree to wait for the manifestos to be published. In contrast, most leaders on the
extreme right urge their MPs to abstain.
However, realising that all the candidates are likely to be very pro-European, the less Euro-federalist
parties on the centre-right discuss the possibility of fielding a more EU-critical centre-right candidate.
This would produce a split in the EPP ranks. But following a series of negotiations led by the British
and French conservatives, and boosted by some support from parties in the new EU member states
(who are concerned their interests will be ignored in the election), a second centre-right candidate
emerges from the Czech Civic Democratic Party (“VACLAV”). As Table A shows, the more EU-critical
conservative parties command enough support in the national parliaments to secure their nomination
– over five percent of MPs in fourteen of the 21 parliaments.
Following the confirmation of the nominations, the candidates issue their manifestos (see Table B).
The manifestos cover a wide range of issues, but each represents a clear and coherent policy agenda
for the EU – upon which the candidates promise to act if elected. In a rigorous campaign in the
weeks immediately preceding and following the European Parliament elections, all the candidates
visit every national parliament. Some parliaments even decide to hold special committee hearings,
where the MPs can get to know the candidates, and their policies for the EU can be discussed in
more detail.
On the third Monday after the 2009 European Parliament elections the national parliamentary ballots
are held and the Electoral College Votes are allocated. As the results come in, it becomes clear that
no candidate will win an outright majority: 323 of the 644 total ECVs (see Table C). GERHARD
emerges with 255 votes (40 percent), followed by JOSÉ, with 163 votes (25 percent). To many
people’s surprise, VACLAV comes in third, with 107 votes (17 percent). GERHARD and JOSÉ move
forward to a run off election one week later.
In the intervening days, these two candidates try to shore up support from the MPs who did not vote
for them in the first round. To court the green and radical left votes, GERHARD promises more EU
environmental and social regulations and that the EU will fight for environmental and social standards
in world trade. In response, HEIDI backs GERHARD, and the national party leaders of the green
party federation (EFGP) urge their MPs to support GERHARD in the run off.
However, this strategy alienates many of the liberal MPs, who are leaning towards the more free
market policies of JOSÉ. This is reinforced at an ELDR leaders’ summit, where GUY declares his
support for JOSÉ, and most of the national party leaders agree to urge their MPs to back JOSÉ.
However, the leaders of the three ‘social liberal’ parties – the British Liberal Democrats, Danish
Radikale Venstre and Dutch D’66 – decide to break from the ELDR party-line because of their close
relationship with social democratic parties back home, and declare their support for GERHARD.
Finally, in a bid to woo VACLAV’s supporters, and to reconcile the split in the EPP, JOSÉ invites
VACLAV to a private meeting. In a joint declaration, JOSÉ promises not to propose any policies that
would threaten the sovereignty or vital interests of the nation states. In return, VACLAV urges his
supporters to back JOSÉ. The centre-right party family is reunited – which is symbolised by a
declaration in support of JOSÉ by a special summit of EPP and other centre-right national party
leaders.
The run-off election is held. In a tight contest, JOSÉ emerges victorious – with 331 votes to
GERHARD’s 313. JOSÉ won a majority in twelve of the twenty-one parliaments and sizeable support
in the other nine parliaments. In his acceptance speech, JOSÉ promises to govern for all of Europe
and to pursue the moderate policies he has advocated in his campaign, which include the reform of
the EU regulatory system and the protection of the interests of the EU member states.
Following the extensive media coverage of the campaign, the national debates about the elections
and the national parliamentary ballots, Eurobarometer opinion polls show that for the first time most
European citizens know the name of the Commission President. The polls also indicate that a majority
of European citizens have a reasonable idea of the policies the Commission President has promised
to pursue. And, perhaps most importantly, the polls show that these policies are supported by a
significant section of the public in every member state.
Also, to some people’s surprise, despite a majority of centre-left governments in the Council, a centreright candidate won the election for Commission President. But, with the prospect of the next five
years of ‘divided government’ in the EU, Europe’s citizens feel safe in the knowledge that no policies
can be adopted that do not command a broad political consensus.
Finally, in the year following the first contest, under pressure from their media and publics, the
Belgian, Luxembourg and Italian parliaments pass acts to replace parliamentary ballots with popular
direct elections for the Commission President – to be held at the same time as the European
Parliament elections in 2014. Under the rules agreed with the other member states, these popular
votes on the Commission President would not be counted until the day of the ballots in the other
national parliaments.
Table A. The Electors: Political Forces in the National Parliaments of an EU21 (on
01/01/2002)
Member
State
Austria
N
%
Belgium
N
%
Cyprus
N
%
Czech
N
Republic
%
Denmark
N
%
Estonia
N
%
Finland
N
%
France
N
%
Germany
N
%
Greece
N
%
Hungary
N
%
Ireland
N
%
Italy
N
%
Luxembourg N
%
Netherlands N
%
Poland
N
%
Portugal
N
%
Slovenia
N
%
Spain
N
%
Sweden
N
%
United
N
Kingdom
%
Total
N
%
Average
%
Political Forces (no. of MPs and percent)
Radical Green / Left- Social
Conservative
Liberal
Left
Regionalist Democrat
Pro-EU EU-Critical
Radical
Right
0
14
65
0
52
0
52
0.0%
7.7%
35.5%
0.0%
28.4%
0.0%
28.4%
0
28
33
41
32
0
16
0.0%
18.7%
22.0%
27.3%
21.3%
0.0%
10.7%
19
0
5
12
20
3
0
32.2%
0.0%
8.5%
20.3%
33.9%
5.1%
0.0%
24
0
74
0
20
82
0
12.0%
0.0%
37.0%
0.0%
10.0%
41.0%
0.0%
12
4
52
65
0
22
22
6.8%
2.3%
29.4%
36.7%
0.0%
12.4%
12.4%
0
0
17
53
0
31
0
0.0%
0.0%
16.8%
52.5%
0.0%
30.7%
0.0%
20
12
51
60
57
0
0
10.0%
6.0%
25.5%
30.0%
28.5%
0.0%
0.0%
59
7
253
10
98
149
1
10.2%
1.2%
43.8%
1.7%
17.0%
25.8%
0.2%
36
47
298
43
245
0
0
5.4%
7.0%
44.5%
6.4%
36.6%
0.0%
0.0%
17
0
158
0
125
0
0
5.7%
0.0%
52.7%
0.0%
41.7%
0.0%
0.0%
0
0
134
172
17
48
15
0.0%
0.0%
34.7%
44.6%
4.4%
12.4%
3.9%
6
2
17
9
54
78
0
3.6%
1.2%
10.2%
5.4%
32.5%
47.0%
0.0%
21
12
147
87
217
129
4
3.4%
1.9%
23.8%
14.1%
35.2%
20.9%
0.6%
1
5
13
15
26
0
0
1.7%
8.3%
21.7%
25.0%
43.3%
0.0%
0.0%
5
11
45
52
29
8
0
3.3%
7.3%
30.0%
34.7%
19.3%
5.3%
0.0%
0
0
216
0
120
80
44
0.0%
0.0%
47.0%
0.0%
26.1%
17.4%
9.6%
17
2
115
0
81
15
0
7.4%
0.9%
50.0%
0.0%
35.2%
6.5%
0.0%
0
0
25
38
17
10
0
0.0%
0.0%
27.8%
42.2%
18.9%
11.1%
0.0%
8
7
125
20
190
0
0
2.3%
2.0%
35.7%
5.7%
54.3%
0.0%
0.0%
43
16
131
35
0
124
0
12.3%
4.6%
37.5%
10.0%
0.0%
35.5%
0.0%
0
12
422
47
0
178
0
0.0%
1.8%
64.0%
7.1%
0.0%
27.0%
0.0%
288
179
2396
759
1400
957
154
4.7%
2.9%
39.1%
12.4%
22.8%
15.6%
2.5%
5.5%
3.4%
33.2%
17.3%
23.2%
14.2%
3.1%
Source: Elections Around the World – http://www.agora.stm.it/elections/election.htm
Note: * Number of MEPs for each member state under the proposed reform in the Nice Treaty.
Total
MPs
183
No. of
Electoral
College
Votes*
17
150
22
59
6
200
20
177
13
101
6
200
13
577
72
669
99
300
22
386
20
166
12
617
72
60
6
150
25
460
50
230
22
90
7
350
50
349
18
659
72
6133
644
Table B. The Candidates – from Left to Right
Name:
HEIDI
GERHARD
GUY
JOSÉ
VACLAV
Member State:
Finland
Germany
Belgium
Spain
Czech Republic
National Party:
Vihreä Liitto
(Green)
Sozialdemokratische
Partei Deutschlands
(Social Democrat)
Vlaamse liberalen en
democraten
(Liberal)
Partido Popular
(Pro-EU Conservative)
Obèanské Demokratická
Strana
(EU-Critical Conservative)
Member parties of the
European People’s Party
(EPP)
Main centre-right parties in
Czech Republic, UK,
France, Sweden,
Denmark, Ireland and
some radical right parties
Member parties of the
European Liberal,
Democrat and Reform
Party (ELDR)
Sponsors:
Member parties of the
Member parties of the
Party of European
European Federation of
Socialists (PES)
Green Parties (EFGP),
plus most regionalists and
some radical left parties
Main
Manifesto
Promises:
• derogations for small- • abolish some EU social • derogations for small- • allow national
• higher Europe-wide
derogations from all
and medium-sized firms
regulations, and
and medium-sized firms
environment standards
single market rules
from some EU
derogations for small
from some EU
regulations
firms
regulations
• more Europe-wide
social and labour
standards
• policies to force
• common policies to
member states to
combat unemployment
deregulate labour
markets
• open the CAP to the
• replace CAP with
free market, but keep
subsidies for
welfare support for
environmentally friendly
farmers
food production
• policies to encourage
member states to
reform labour markets
• open the CAP to the
• open the CAP to the
free market, but keep
free market, and resome subsidies to
nationalise subsidies to
farmers
farmers
• environment and labour • environment and labour • establish a free trade
area with the US
standards in world trade
standards in world trade
• establish a free trade
area with the US
• no new EU policies, and
give some policies back
to national governments
• abolish the CAP, and
cut all areas of the EU
budget
• establish a free trade
area with the US
• no EU-wide asylum or
• a common, and liberal, • a common, and liberal, • a common, and liberal, • common, and
immigration policies
restrictive, asylum rules
asylum policy
asylum policy
asylum policy
• EU military capacity for • more majority voting on • more majority voting on • more majority voting on • foreign and security
policies to stay with
foreign and security
foreign and security
foreign and security
peace-keeping only
national governments
issues
issues
issues
Table C. The Result (using the party strengths in Table A)
Member
State
Austria
Belgium
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
United Kingdom
Total
Percent
HEIDI
(Green/Left)
1
4
2
3
1
0
2
8
12
1
0
0
3
1
3
0
2
0
2
3
1
49
7.7
Electoral College Votes in the First Round
GUY
JOSÉ
GERHARD
(Liberal)
(Pro-EU
(Social
Conservative)
Democrat)
6
0
5
5
6
5
1
1
2
7
0
2
4
5
0
1
3
0
3
4
4
32
1
12
44
7
36
12
0
9
7
9
1
1
1
4
17
10
26
1
1
3
7
9
5
23
0
13
11
0
8
2
3
1
18
3
27
7
2
0
46
5
0
255
70
163
39.6
10.9
25.3
VACLAV
(EU-Critical
Conservative)
5
2
0
8
3
2
0
19
0
0
3
6
16
0
1
14
1
1
0
6
20
107
16.7
Run-Off
JOSÉ
GERHARD
(Pro-EU
(Social
Conservative)
Democrat)
7
10
10
12
2
4
10
10
7
6
1
5
5
8
39
33
54
45
12
10
7
13
1
11
21
51
2
4
12
13
26
24
12
10
2
5
20
30
10
8
53
19
313
331
48.6
51.4
Total Electoral
College Votes for
each National
Parliament
17
22
6
20
13
6
13
72
99
22
20
12
72
6
25
50
22
7
50
18
72
644
Notes: The largest-remainder method of counting proportional representation is used. I assume that the MPs in each political tradition vote for the candidate
closest to them. So: (1) In the first round, most of the radical left and all the green and left-regionalists vote for HEIDI, the social democrats vote for
GERHARD, the liberals vote for GUY, the pro-EU conservatives vote for JOSÉ, and the EU-critical conservatives and some of the radical right vote for
VACLAV; (2) but, because of their outright opposition to the EU project, MPs on the radical right in France, Belgium, Denmark, Hungary and Poland abstain in
both rounds, as do more extreme parties on the radical left in France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg and Portugal; and (3) in the run-off, the
greens and left-regionalists, social democrats and British LibDems, Dutch D’66 and Danish RV back GERHARD (as these liberal parties are closer to the
socialists than conservatives), and all the conservatives and the rest of the liberals back JOSÉ.
Endnotes
1
The political streams in Table 1 is based on the allocation of national parties to party families in the EU
political space in Hix and Lord (1997), op.cit. (note 20). However, I have made two necessary changes from the
Hix-Lord framework. First, the Conservative/Christian Democrat family is split in two – to reflect how the
European integration ‘cleavage’ splits this family more than any other, and so might very well support different
candidates for Commission President. Second, the Greens have been combined with the more leftist regionalist
parties (‘Left Regionalist’), as they sit together in the European Parliament and have very similar policies on
European integration, and so would most likely support the same candidate for Commission President.