Some Conceptual Thoughts on Migration
ANDREAS DEMUTH
Reproduced from B Agozino (ed) Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Migration
Research (Ashgate Publishing 2000), ISBN 1 84014 557 9, pp. 21-58.
By permission of Ashgate Publishing
© Theoretical and Methodological Issues in Migration Research, Biko Agozino, 2000,
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
The Phenomenon and its Problems
Migration is a complex phenomenon which, next to natural population growth, constitutes the
major contributing factor to a state's demographic development: 45% of the overall population
growth in the more developed regions of the world for 1990-1995 was attributed to net
international migration.1 It is also a global phenomenon which often elicits some heated
arguments centred around immigration numbers which are usually much more tinged by
emotion or propagandists effort than any substantial knowledge. There is a distinct danger
that those who favour immigration may minimise problems and/or numbers, while those
using anti-immigration arguments will exacerbate or overstate numbers or problems.
Migration occurs all over the world, but mostly in the developing world: only some 10% of
'third world’ migration reaches the 'rich countries' of the north.2 Still, more often than not
simple terms are used in lieu of definition, argument, or clear analysis: 'we' - read: the rich
countries - are 'being swamped' with 'economic refugees' whose 'tidal waves' have to be
'curbed'.
Migration is as old as mankind: Taking into consideration that between 1600 and 1850, some
65 million Europeans migrated to destinations on all continents; they too could be called
'economic migrants' - yet they do not have the same stigma attached as today's 'economic
migrants'. Migration has always been a rational method of solving problems: The Europe of the
industrial revolution and of increased hygienic standards found its population exploding as well
as its working population increasingly unemployed. Exporting parts of its population therefore
was for many European countries a very welcome safety valve that allowed for letting off the
combined pressure. Emigration from Europe continued well into this century and into post-war
times (1945-60), where some 7 million left.3 In sum, this leaves the European migration balance
with the rest of the world distinctly in the red. Yet it still smacks of European arrogance that
what 'we' did a good 250 years is supposed to be acceptable, if not even heroic, while this option
with 'us' as the target countries is decried as 'economic refugeeism'.
Migration is never only emigration: wars and civil wars have made this century the century of
the refugee; the recent conflicts in Africa (Rwanda, Zaire,4 Angola, or Liberia) or in SouthEastern Europe (FYU: Bosnia, Kosova) and the CIS (Caucasus: Georgia, Chechnya) are only
some of the most publicised. Internally displaced people (IDPs) are on the rise on account of
ever-rising numbers of inter-ethnic conflicts: while there may globally have been some
estimated 125 million or so international, i.e. transborder migrants, in 1993, roughly 1,000
million migrants, eight times as many, were internal migrants, not including the abovementioned conflicts. In early March 1999, a new UN report on the refugees caused by the
Kosovo conflict pointed out that of the 400,000 IDPs, half remained in Kosovo, and only some
90,000 ethnic Albanians from Kosovo had sought asylum in North-Western Europe.5 By the
end of the month, the situation had changed dramatically, and by mid-1999 over 750,000
Kosovo-Albanian refugees had fled to neighbouring Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania - the
poorest state in Europe housing most of the refugees. Some tens of thousands have been
airlifted out of the area into Western European states, but the majority of the refugees remain in
the region. Other problems that may lead to migration are poverty, hunger and the global
population increase; they have been linked to an enormous rise in rural-urban migration and
consequent rise in urban population and slum dwellings in the developing world - although not
every one in this world would rather live in the country than in a crowded city: for many people
in the developing world, the city represents hope, a possibility for survival which the
countryside clearly does not. An increase in environmental degradation and naturally occurring,
yet increasingly severe environmental disasters (e.g., the hurricane 'Mitch' in Central America in
1998) also will spur migration: already in the early 1990s, some 35% of the entire land mass
was threatened by desertification.6
No one therefore leaves home without very good reasons.7 Neither is migration caused by one
single, utilitaristic thought: enriching the migrant on the back of the host society. Many migrants
reaching Western Europe are presumed to have such ambitions, the only supporting 'evidence'
being their being visibly different. Yet such a simplistic position is all the more dangerous as it
is very catchy, although it does not really explain anything other than how scapegoats can be
created.
Since the first attempt by Ravenstein in 1885, the academic community developed a number
of approaches trying to grapple with the phenomenon more seriously. One such pioneer of postWorld War fame was William Petersen.8 However, there are at least several times as many
approaches as there are disciplines. Economic and legal approaches will have a different view to
historical, politological or sociological approaches, each stressing different aspects of migration.
Other approaches would take a geographical, procedural or causal look at migration. More can
be learned if and when an interdisciplinary approach is taken; this approach has gained
increasing weight in the academia. Although an international phenomenon, linked to and
influenced by a glut of other natural or man-made factors, the field of international relations by
and large ignored matters migratory. In this first part of the article, some of the aforementioned
approaches and also the terminology are discussed before proffering a framework for analysis in
the second part.
The second part sets out a four-phase framework with which migration could be studied in
stages, and from beginning to end. It is not that only the causes of migration or the arrivals are
examined, but both. Any one phase is set in the context of the other three phases. The model is
based on the idea that migration in any shape or form follows a dynamic process which for
analytic purpose may be divided into four phases,: a starting phase; a migration phase, i.e. the
actual travelling phase; an arrival phase; and finally, a sojournal phase. Although this bears
resemblance to a procedural examination, this framework includes and combines several of the
previously mentioned causal, legal and politological approaches in the analysis.
Before the process of migration starts, however, we find a rather protracted decision-making
process which usually does not bear the slightest resemblance to a simple 'if x then y' decision.
Even if the decision is one of life and death, it still is not possible to say that this immediately
tips the balance: why would it be, then, that even in war zones, in the same community, of
equally healthy people, some remain while others go? As Petersen noted, sometimes the basic
problem about migration is not why people migrate out, but rather why not.9 Duress is perceived
differently, and also reacted upon differently, depending on the various circumstances a
potential migrant may face. Also in 'normal' times, some people still hesitate when others have
already left. Migration can be, and has been, a rational solution, but this does not make the
decision-making process any easier.
Thus, the process of migration also includes the dyadic relationship between stayers and
leavers. In a Europe whose population is generally resident since their ancient forebearers
stopped being nomads as a matter of course, migrants for a long time have been regarded as
something extraordinary, and a resident 'deeply rooted' population was the norm. By
consequence, the approach to accepting a migrant into the community is also different,
especially if the problematique of the jus soli vs. jus sanguinis is counted in. What the host
population tends to ignore, especially in regard to non-Western migrants, is that in deciding to
migrate there is something that may have to be left behind (therefore we have also return
migration). This 'something' may be hard to leave, much harder for the arriving migrant than for
an upwardly mobile jet-setting Westerner: a certain patch of land, a place of abode, people,
family, friends - home.
'Home'
'Home' is a term, a concept, an idea, which may describe the place at which a person has lived
for five or for fifty years. It often indirectly comprises a rather diffuse and nebulous feeling of
'home' - where one belongs, or wants to belong. Therefore a distinction must be made between
the actual geographic location of a place where somebody lives and where a person thinks
he/she belongs.10
The term 'home' therefore needs to be looked at with care, all the more because its use cannot
be avoided at times, and because it more often than not is also emotionally charged. Taking into
account legal and other politico-geographic definitions, one may look for a starting point to
tackle the problem of finding a working definition for the present work.
Nomadic people have their home, if any, where they decide to rest for a time, within a large
geographic area in which they move around. In Europe, nomadic people existed but they have
long since settled.11 By settling down the people developed links to a defined geographic area of
land in which they feel 'rooted'. With it came the feeling of having a sanctuary and retreat in
one's 'home': 'my home is my castle". The development would be such that the place where a
person grew up, with all connections and connotations, would be a part of the overall makeup of
the person's identity: cultural links belong to this as much as the somewhat less easy to grapple
question of emotional link to the territory.
The time factor may play an important role: if someone was born at a completely different
place, but moved in early childhood, or only in adolescence, or even during this person's
working life, this will constitute different degrees of attachment. Not many people will still feel
as attached to their birthplace if they left at an early age, and lived several years or even decades
at a different location, surrounded by a different culture. Rather, they may call 'home' their place
of abode, and the more so the longer they have lived in this place: it grows on the person. On the
other hand, this has to be qualified: not on every person, for most of the Tibetans living in exile
in India for some forty years still want to return as soon as the Chinese yoke, as they see it, has
gone.
The stronger the emotional link to the place called 'home' is, the stronger it influences a
decision to migrate in requiring even more pressing grounds to make the decision to actually
leave from 'home'. Conversely, it will influence the view of people living in a given area about
newcomers, finding newcomers potentially more disturbing than others less attached to their
soil.
The degree of linkage or bondage to a given place therefore also explains, at least in part, the
problems occurring when cut or uprooted from the place a person has strong emotional links to.
Here the question of leaving voluntary or by necessity or by force has to be examined, as much
as the duration of being detached from 'home'. Any voluntary move could be cut short by 'home
sickness', the strong wish to return to one's usual place of residence, or to the loved ones; if there
are stronger reasons to stay put, the
desire to return 'home' may become overwhelming. If a person had to leave home by force, the
effects on the psyche of that person will depend on the mental strength and the depth of the link
to 'home' to overcome the ordeal which may be called evacuation, eviction, or, worst,
deportation, depending on the circumstance.
It is important to keep in mind that no one will move light heartedly and without a cause: '[...]
Most people prefer their home countries and will stay if conditions are even barely tolerable'.12
Migration and Typologies
Migration is the action taken by migrants as they move from one geographic point to another
geographic point. There is a difference between internal and international, trans-border
migration, the most tangible of which is especially the legal difference it makes. But also
numbers count: if the estimates reporting some 125 million international migrants globally seem
huge, what of the internal migrants, which estimates put at some 1,000 million?13
In international law, 'migration' means the voluntary movement from A to B, while 'flight'
means involuntary or forced movement, including the trespassing of state borders. Only from
1994 onwards has UNHCR counted 'internally displaced people', IDPs, and thus by default
defined as possessing the same qualities as refugees. Until then, fleeing people would have to
cross a border to be accorded refugee status at all, although their problems, their cause for flight,
would have been identical, irrespective of their staying in Rwanda or fleeing to Zaire.
Changes in defining and thus accepting refugees in a way widened the scope of the mandate
under which UNHCR as the main organisation dealing with refugees and IDPs can offer help.
Therefore it is of great significance that UNHCR has now for some time regarded internal
refugees (IDPs), as well as those fleeing from natural disasters, as 'in need of assistance' and
'peoples of concern to UNHCR'. Yet note that the differentiation in terminology remains: even
though both groups may be equally 'people of concern', refugees cross borders, IDPs do not.
Whatever caused refugees to flee, they have some characteristics in common: '... they are
uprooted, they are homeless, and they lack national protection and status. The refugee is an
involuntary migrant, a victim of politics, war, or national catastrophe.'14 Migration comprises
flight in that it is the overall term including any form of movement for whatever cause. In short:
every refugee is a migrant, but not every migrant is a refugee.
In contrast, state organs, which categorise migration and migrants along judicial,
administrative, political lines, often have a goal or a hidden agenda in using specific criteria. It
does not stretch the imagination why definitions developed or employed by DAU are much
wider than those of the EU or G7 member states. In this context it is highly interesting that
many governments even in the early 1970s found migration of secondary importance, a picture
changing during the late 1970s and early 1980s. In the aftermath of economic recession caused
by the oil crises, many governments changed direction and perception. From then on, European
governments started to increasingly restrict access to their country, not least by restricting the
types of immigrants allowed in.
Categories therefore have their worth as an analytic tool. As opposed to some academic,
judicial, or administrative delineations of such categories, it must be clear that in real life there
are mixtures of migration types, for there rarely is only one reason behind the decision to
migrate. Also, academic categorisation does not per se have other objectives than clearing a path
through a jungle of difficult academic terrain: explain the complicated. Some of the existing
approaches are reviewed in this subchapter, starting with the geography of migration.
The Geography of Migration
In general, differences are made between internal and international migration as well as EastWest and South-North migration; further, there is rural-rural; rural-urban, urban-rural, urbanurban or regional migration. These typological basics have in common that they have a dyadic
relationship: a sending and a receiving community, or a sending and a host country. The
geographical description of the movement as such does not by itself explain the actual
motivations and causes, nor the consequences of migration.
In Euro-centric views migration focuses on reaching the 'West', or the 'North', usually meaning
the industrialised, rich countries in Europe, from the 'East' or 'South'. In this picture, North
America may be partly included, and Australasia oftentimes ignored;. it also ignores that there is
much more south-south migration than south-north: more than 90% of global migration takes
place in the 'developing', non-industrialised, non-European worlds. It also stays there. By
volume and relative share in European migration, arrivals from the non-European countries are
a trickle compared to some movements in Africa and Asia. In addition, in terms of global
overall population figures, international migrants represented only 2.3% of the total population
of the world in 1990.
Internal migration is the movement from one region or area of a given state to another region
or area within this state; this too can be voluntary or forced, depending on the circumstances at
the sending end: establishing a new residence can be the purpose or the effect of migration: It
could mean to cover much more distance than in international migration. Although the
geographical direction may be -northwards, or westwards, this does not mean that a migrant has
to cross an international border: In Brazil, for example, going from Porto Alegre to Recife is a
rather long distance to travel compared to the short stretch to Uruguay's capital, Montevideo.
Yet the former is internal, the latter international migration.
Try leaving Albania for Italy, or moving from Bratislava to Vienna in 1985 - a mere sixty
kilometres in both cases, these distances were probably harder to cover than moving from
Vladivostok or Magadan on the Sea of Ochotsk to Moscow over more than six thousand
kilometres. In the Soviet Union, Magadan to Moscow (or Minsk) would have been internal
migration, and the cultural difference fairly great. At this time, the iron curtain will have created
problems covering the short distance, and it would be international migration, while in the
Bratislava-Vienna case the cultural differences on account of the old Austrian-Hungarian
empire may have been rather small. Coming as he would from the 'East', the migrant then would
also have some additional value in 'yet again' demonstrating the weakness of the other, failing
system. In fact, during the Cold War, Germany had taken a general political decision which
accepted migrants from Eastern Europe by default as politically persecuted.
This is important: for over forty years in post-war migration history, crossing a border would
be a relevant criterion in international law in assessing if not predisposing a migrant's needs,
entitlements and rights; distance not quite.
Typologies of Migration
If academic typologies are tools to explain the complicated, while granting that the causes for
migration are multi-layered and multi-faceted, politico-administrative categorisation is more
often than not objective-driven: fulfill a goal, such as delimiting the number of entries by
limiting the number of accepted entry reasons - witness the establishment of the German
Drittstaatenregelung ('safe third country regulation') which in effect makes it almost impossible
to apply for asylum in Germany: since all surrounding states are deemed 'safe', the applicant
might as well have applied there and will be sent back (it also means that Germany, and the
ever-strengthened Fortress Europe, export their problems to a buffer zone of states surrounding
them).
Yet judicial definitions more often than not have no particular link to the real reasons for
migration or to the problems of migrants; they are, however, very often linked to the wishes or
views of the executive and legislature of a state. Consequently, they have much narrower
approaches to categorising migration issues and their causes than would appear necessary. A
typical example of a typology based on the administrative views mentioned above is that of
Rosemary Rogers:
[...] 1. Legally admitted immigrants who are expected to settle in the host country. [...] 2.
Legally admitted temporary migrants encompasses seasonal migrants, non-seasonal contract
workers who must return home before their contracts are renewed, temporary migrants whose
contracts are renewed in the host countries (such as the 'guestworkers' in western Europe)... 3.
Intracompany transfers, student migrants and similar categories... 4. Illegal (clandestine,
undocumented) migrants... 5. Asylum seekers arc persons who have requested refugee status
in foreign countries...6. Refugees.15
This is a typology based on the assessment of the needs and views of receiving countries
which are usually affluent, Western countries. As opposed to the typology by Rogers, one might
also consider using a typology which bases the categories of migrants on the assessment of their
reasons for migration rather than what reason they are ascribed by the potential host states.16
A migrant, however, may have a totally different perception of his or her personal situation,
feeling a threat or necessity to leave a given place and come to a different country. No matter if
this threat was endangering the migrant's life, if the receiving country has a white list in which
the country the refugee fled from is listed as 'generally safe', any claim for asylum will be more
or less futile and meet with potential disapproval, if not outright rejection. Therefore, there is a
clear need to try and assess the reasons for starting a migration movement, for actually leaving a
place, much more in depth - and from the viewpoint of the migrant, although the hosts' views
clearly do have be taken into account: 'The freedom of migrants stops where the State's
prerogatives start...'17
A Four-Phase Model of Migration
This chapter proffers a model which comprises four phases.18 In this author's view it will serve
as an analytical tool and may help to understand the complexities of migration, some of which
have been examined above. The basic idea is that in the final analysis, migration is the action of
a single individual, for it is only the individual person that will decide to migrate or not. This
may well happen within a group context, or on account of a family council decision. However,
the decision to accept a family council's decision that the second son go to the capital to find
work is that of the second son as much as it is the decision of a potential migrant to join a
migrating crowd of people.19
Therefore, this article is based on the view that to migrate an eventual individual decision is
necessary, whatever the context. It then becomes a process, which may very well happen very
erratically, whose phases may happen much more chaotically than this model may appear to
suggest: as little as there is hardly ever one clear-cut reason for, and type of, migration, neither
is there a regular linear progression within the following four phases of the proffered model.
The model's first phase is the phase in which migration starts; the model looks at the overall
background of the decision to migrate, at the decision-making process which may or may not
lead to migration, and explains how this decision may come about.
The second phase looks at the actual journey, and how this action is determined by factors
such as destination, transport and communication infrastructure, information background,
simply: possibilities of migration. For these days distances are measured more in flight time
than in miles, and the improvements in infrastructure do play a significant role in reaching the
destination. Therefore, this phase also looks at the spatial factors in migration.
The third phase is the phase in which the migrant arrives at a certain destination; it is about the
lock gate he has to pass before being admitted into a count, or just another city, or different
society. This is a very crucial phase which is usually touched upon in different contexts, or on
its own. It is a question of finding a safe haven or being rejected, having to orbit, continue to
flee, or being temporarily admitted. It is at the gated of the lock that the reasons of the arriving
migrant, and especially of the arriving refugee, for migrating and arriving at this particular lock
gate will be scrutinized. Only if successful can the migrant enter the country, or, in the context
of crossing borders, has to illegally enter, bypassing the lock bates, and start the fourth phase of
what in many .a case by now has long since become an odyssey.
The fourth phase is one reflecting the status of the migrant in the new host society in every
aspect: judicial, material / economic, or social, to name but a few. It pertains to the question
whether or not the migrant will have a chance to integrate into the new society, and be included,
or whether they will be excluded.
To give a short example, use the case of the refugees in Zaire: their action was a spontaneous
decision to migrate, i.e., to flee the ethnic persecution and hatred endangering their lives in
Rwanda and Burundi, with little time to react and decide (first phase: starting migration). The
prime concern of the migrants of finding safety dictated following the group; no orderly move
was possible. The shortest way to a safe haven was to cross the border into Tanzania or faired
with every vehicle available, and mostly on foot (second phase: migrating). Although there were
incidents of overwhelmed authorities closing the borders, the sheer mass of people standing on
the other side as well as humanitarian concerns did their share in overcoming the border regimes
(surely nobody had their passports controlled or stamped at the port of entry; this is the third
phase, arriving). Finally having arrived at a place of comparable safety, life in the refugee
camps took on its own dynamic (fourth phase: sojourning). The four phases can now be
examined in some more detail.
First Phase: Starting Off
In this phase, as in all others, the actor is the basis for analysis. The migrating human being
will have a reason, or a combination of reasons, which caused the process to start and the person
to leave his usual place of abode, his home. This process can take place spontaneously,
chaotically and very quickly, yet also planned, orderly and over a long period of time: there are
countless examples for either of the two extremes, although it must not be forgotten that more
often than not more causes than one combine and cause migration; these will be examined
subsequently.
Voluntary and Forced Migration
In general, the question here is whether or not circumstances leave a possibility to choose to
migrate. Voluntary migration, then, generally refers to the action of migrants who have left their
home of their own volitions usually this may come in three different time spans: short-,
medium-, and long-term migration.
Most business travellers may stay at a subsidiary of their firm for a shorter period of time,
maybe one year, and return; this form of short-term migration is increasingly chided by business
executives who prefer other means of communication. Students going abroad for a year, or
academics who have a research project leading them to conduct field work in a different
country, are other examples of voluntary migration: they have alternatives.
Many forms of labour migration are not quite as voluntary: no-one personally forces the
migrants, except that circumstances seem to suggest that trying to find a job abroad may provide
much more money than could be earned by staying. Such migration is often linked to a plan to
return within a certain amount of time: many labour migrants want to support their families,
save up for later, and then return. There are a number of examples for this: Philippina women in
the Gulf states working as house maids or Pakistani men working in the oil fields, but also the
Turks, Yugoslavs, Spaniards, Italians and others who came to Germany as Gastarbeiter, guest
workers. In the revere drought in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia in 1983-1985, over 60% of the
families relied on remittances from family members from abroad.20
These examples also show the problematique to simply allot such people who are commonly
seen as labour migrants to categories such as ‘economic migrants' as soon as they reach the
European shores. At any rate such is the type that it must be called a mixed voluntary and
involuntary migration: many of the Philippina women, for example, have children and family
they have to leave to help support their families. To provide for a good education for their
children, they may have to leave their loved ones, although no-one actually forces them, and
they would possibly make ends meet without leaving. Still, working way below their own good
educational standards, their wages in the Gulf will usually still be several times higher than what
they could earn at home.
Taking Japan's average income in 1990 for comparison (=1), the respective income in
Malaysia was 1/11, in the Philippines 1/33, in Indonesia 1/45, in China 1/75, and in Bangladesh
less than 1/100 of the Japanese average. If a Bangladeshi therefore managed to work in Japan
for two weeks only at only half the average income, he will have earned the equivalent of two
years' income at home.21
Involuntary migration is one that circumstances cause which directly or indirectly do not allow
the potential migrant to remain at his home, but forces him to leave. Here are two main
distinctions: man-made causes and natural causes such as environmental catastrophes. In both
cases, there is no alternative to fleeing without risking to severely endanger life and limb. The
decision is almost taken out of the potential migrant's hands, for the necessity to flee dictates the
action; in a way, the only decision left is when to start, when to leave home: it could be for
good.'
Structural causes involved in involuntary, forced migration are political persecution or the
brutality of civil and ethnic wars,22 including as they do these days, the negative phrase of the
decade: ethnic cleansing. To complete the picture, a special form of involuntary migration is,
literally, forced: deportation, banning, forced resettlement or abduction.
In sum, it could be said that not every migrant is a refugee, but every refugee is a - forced -
migrant. A structural diagramme to follow to help determine the type of migration is presented
in figure 2.2.
Push and pull Factors
Examining push and pull factors is an analytic tool known for quite some time, but more and
more found wanting, and disused. It basically asks for the factors stimulating or influencing the
migration decision, both at the sending and the receiving end. Note that these factors are not
always 'objective' reasons for migration, but actually their subjective perception. So this tool
would usually much more concentrate on the individual migrant and his perception of a certain
situation, while the former chapter on voluntary-involuntary migration more looked in from the
outside, asking whether or not the factors leave a choice at all.
Push factors, then, can be interpreted very differently by two people living at the same place:
although they may live in the same hamlet, one person may find the threat of the marauding
mercenaries asking their victims whether they want the 'short sleeve' or the 'long sleeve' option
so rattling he rather flees his home for some safer place than to risk his hand, or entire lower
arm being cut off by rebels gone mad - as has been the case in Liberia in 1998 and early 1999.
His neighbour may not feel, nor have heard of the danger, or have an elderly parent to care for
so he cannot move, and at any rate decides to stay.
In forced migration, in taking a life-and-death decision, every direction matters that takes the
threatened migrant away from the danger zone: the cause may be a cyclone, a flood wave or
persecution. In all cases, this is the push factor: a situation that is perceived as dangerous,
threatening, or intolerable, and thus pushes the people away from their home. As long as this
wi11 lead from bad to better or good conditions, this is the direction that people may choose.
Push
Type
Pull
Joblessness, bad
Labour migration
New work / job, better
working conditions /
conditions / pay
bad pay
Family ties, separation Chain migration
Family reunification
Non-immigration
Special conditions for
Study and research,
study and research,
special qualifications
research area
abroad, job-related
foreign assignment
‘Economic migration’ Social stability /
Sinking living
affluence, example of
standards / poverty,
rich countries
general situation of
poor countries
Table 2.1: Voluntary Migration: Push and Pull Factors
As the events in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire have shown, borders cannot always stand firm
against arriving migrants, nor should they in such cases as the Rwandan example, where more
than 1.2 mil1ion refugees crossed into Zaire in a matter of days rather than weeks. The decisive
factor was that the safety Zaire offered was a strong incentive to flee there: the safe haven is a
pull factor.
Some of the possible reasons to migrate are given in the tables below, yet in a matrix of pushand pull-factors structured along the voluntary forced migration line which modifies and
combines the old tools.
Push
Political persecution
Religious / ethnic
conflicts, persecution,
xenophobia, human
rights violations
War, mortal danger
Type
Political refugee (GC)
(Political / civil war)
Refugees (GC and de
facto)
Pull
Freedom / survival
Safety and freedom from
persecution, human rights
abuse, or generally from
violent conflicts
(Civil) War refugees (de Safe Haven: survival
facto refugees)
Environmental refugees, Safe Haven: security of
Heavy environmental
nourishments and / or
damage, drought, hunger, refugees from famine
health
health risks
Endangered basic needs / ‘betterment migrants’ / Social stability / securing
poverty
‘economic refugees’
survival
Table 2.2: Forced Migration: Push and Pull Factors
A Simplified Decision-Making Model: To Go or Not to Go?
As opposed to the already mentioned combination of the two standard tools, the push-pull-
dichotomy and the voluntary-forced-dichotomy, a general framework for analysing the
decision-making process resulting in migration or remaining at the place of origin may be
reduced and comprise the following factors: the environment surrounding the potential migrant;
the actual situation in political, economic, or social, terms; especially the potential migrant's
perception and assessment of the actual situation. A framework for this is depicted in Figure 2.2
above; this can be used to determine both the migrant's 'situation' and his 'type'. Note that the
decision-making process as depicted in Figure 3 does not have to lead to starting the migration
process: the situation in which the potential migrant finds himself is scrutinised in the context of
several factors using the available information. This input leads to the decision to go or to stay:
the output, which however does not have to stand forever. As the situation changes, the potential
migrant may change his mind, because new information or resources have become available, or
the situation may be perceived as becoming too dangerous.
Second Phase: Migrating - The Journey
Very often the starting or (at !east temporal) end point are analysed; the horrors which create
refugees are looked at in great detail. Similarly, current or historical migration research either
stopped at the emigrants' embarking on their journey, literally on their boarding the boat or
plane; or it started with their disembarkation. The journey itself does not often get the attention
it should. However, the distance covered as well as the means to cover it do have an impact.
Mass movements like those people fleeing the massacres in Rwanda and Burundi went
anywhere, anyhow, unplanned, as long as it promised to provide a safe haven. An academic
may plan exactly how to go about reaching a conference venue, as is standard procedure in
business travel. But also political refugees from 'the South', who often belong to a middleclass
or higher background, and thus have the necessary means to obtain relevant information
pertaining to their journey to 'the North', show that in the late 1990s, distances covered are
increasingly measured in flight time, and hours, rather than weeks and months.
By way of example, a boat journey from London to New York took 12 days in 1852; today,
travel would be by air, and take some 8 hours or so. More extreme, to cover the distance in the
same ways to Cape Town and Sydney, in 1852 a boat took some 33 and 73 days, respectively.
Today, the distance takes around 12 and 24 hours by air. In this sense, both the global
information and the transport infrastructure have improved drastically, and are relevant to
migration and the decision-making process.
Note that today, long-distance tourism and business travel is commonplace: the Gambia or
South Africa are fairly well-frequented travel destinations from Britain; on the other hand, travel
almost always takes place in a two-way system. Well-tanned holiday-makers, whose arrival and
impact in the 'developing countries' was studied in the Nyerere Commission's report, should also
take their appearance and demonstrated richness into account, reflecting the wealth of the
'North' (or 'West') in the 'South,' and the influence the perception of unlimited resources may
have on potential migrants: of course the impression left will include the idea that those rich
people can't possibly have a problem if that poorer soul came to their country.
In Europe, the migration of Albanians in February-March 1991 to Italy was a well-publicised
case in point: having had no chance to leave the country in forty-five years of almost total
isolation, they still received Italian or Greek TV. It cou1d not come as a surprise that in
consequence, many of those arriving in Italy never had the slightest incling they might cause a
problem in a country they must have expected to be the land of milk and honey.
Third Phase: Arrival, Entry or Rejection
The third phase relates to the arrival of a migrant at a certain point of destination; this could
have been chosen arbitrarily (any point, as long as it is safe), or on purpose (in taking up a job
offer). The arrival phase is of importance in any form of migration, internal or trans-border. For
rural urban migration can meet stiff resistance from the settled city population, driving
newcomers away. On the other hand, an international migrant may have to pass the border
controls and enter the country of his choice: before talking about a phase of sojourn, entry rules
and procedures have to be looked at first. This subchapter will deal mainly with international
migration entry problems, for' ...the concepts employed by countries in their immigration
policies frequently do not correspond to the reality, making it necessary to examine the actual
context' .23
The third phase may be the beginning of the end of the migration process, or force the migrant
to re-enter it; it may a1so lead a desperate migrant to turn illegal and both clandestinely enter
and live in a given country: e.g., some of the Chinese working in the backstreets of San
Francisco's Chinatown are known to have arrived illegal1y. The question of il1egaJity is a very
sensitive issue in the states' politics of immigration.
On the other hand, the issue is also determined by the states' definition of a migrant, and their
policies employed to regulate the movements of people across their border. Illegal migrants,
therefore, are at least in part home-made.
Legal Entries
The traditional interpretation of sovereignty24 of a state over its territory includes the right to
decide whom to allow to reside within its borders, and under what conditions, and, in the first
place, under what conditions people may enter the state. Therefore, it may be a correct analogy
to describe this third phase as something akin to a lock, or a double-gate, where at least the
international migrant is subjected to mainly judicial and political criteria judging the migrant's
reasons for entry. Such criteria will be dependent on a number of factors in the potential host
country: what state the economy and the labour market is in; what government rules the
country, what its general policy line is and how much this is steeped in tradition or opportunism
of the day. Changes in migration trends may therefore cause migration policies to change, but in
the first place, migration policies are a major determinant of migration trends.25
Japan, for example, never really encouraged immigration, not even during the first decades of
the Meiji and their modernisation drive from the late 1860s onwards, when European specialists
were invited to help: settle they did not. Neither then, nor in this century did any Japanese
government actively part from the idea of Nihonljinron, 'being Japanese', whose consequence is
that an integration of any larger group of foreigners is unthinkable. Only for the last few years
before the crash of the Japanese economy, 'guest workers' were accepted.
In Europe, the active encouragement of labour migration during the first two post-war
decades, the invitation of temporary resident workers - Gastarbeiter - ended fairly abruptly:
Switzerland was the first to stop the programmes in 1970, followed by Sweden in 1972,
Germany in 1973, and France in 1974.26 The main reason here was the first oil crisis and its
consequences, not least a rise in European unemployment, which later led to the complete
abandonment of the labour migration programmes. In consequence, the' guest workers' stayed
on, afraid to loose their jobs and not be allowed to return in case they went home to their
families: the next phase of European migration was that of family reunion during the 1970s and
1980s. In the 1990s, the European states increasingly allowed migration within the European
Community, completely freeing it up in the EU's internal market, while at the same time
fortifying the European external border regime in the Schengen and Dublin Conventions.
This clashes with the reality of migration, which starts at point A and finishes at point - B?
This would presume that a migrant could always determine where to head, and where to stop
the movement and settle down again. International law so far provides only for the right to leave
any given state, while only the state of which the migrant has been a citizen may not refuse him
entry. The danger for life and limb sets some of the ordinary international rules out of order: a
trek of some thousand fleeing people will hardly stop to have their passports stamped in
crossing a border, but stampede through.
Yet the right to leave is enshrined several times, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Art. 13) or in such instruments as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil an Political
Rights (Art. 12).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights concedes the right to be a citizen of a country,
to be free to move within that country, not to have a passport of that country withheld, to
leave and re-enter that country at will and without restriction. And then - silence.
Accordingly, we have a right to depart but not to arrive.27
Indeed: the right to entry for any alien would compromise a state's sacrosant sovereignty.
Thus, under international law, no state is obliged to allow aliens into its territory unless certain
conditions are met (refugees fleeing because of conditions covered by the Geneva or other
similar Conventions),28 but on the contrary will draw up entry requirements, while at the same
time generally keeping within the framework of international laws and conventions. So what of
the right to leave if you are an 'illegal' at your foreign point of entry?
Undocumented Entries and Refugees
Illegality is an artificial product, the outcome ex negativo of a law defining this or forbidding
that. Therefore many undocumented migrants become illegal by default and not by fault of their
own. Also, if ever more doors to the 'Fortress Europe' al10wing legal entry are shut and taken
out of service, it is a logical consequence that an increasing number of migrants will become
undocumented, or, 'illegals'. It should not be forgotten that any tourist overstaying his visa,
accidentally or not, will become an illegal (im)migrant, although clearly the actual problem of
undocumented migrants is their entering clandestinely. Connected to this is the escalating
problem of trafficking of migrants.
In the Europe of the 1980s and 1990s, a pattern developed where the northern ECIEU states
(Germany, Benelux, et a1.) have a particularly high number of asylum seekers, while those
EC/EU countries of the southern tier, i.e. Italy, Portugal and Spain as well as Greece, seem to
attract mainly clandestine, 'illegal' immigration. There also seems to be a similar correlation
between migration departing from Eastern Europe, and heading for North-western Europe,
particularly Germany, and migration from 'the South', i.e. the developing countries', heading
'North' via the southern European states.
Generally these and other points enter into the political decision-making process, also
influenced by certain preconceived ideas or assumptions on the host country. To illustrate: for
more than forty years, German politicians have declared that Germany would not be a country
of immigration - although this was contrary to the entire post-war migration history, which
showed that it was.29 In Britain, an assumption was that Britain would be a small and
overcrowded island whose prosperity would attract tidal waves of Third World immigrants that
would undermine this prosperity, rob it blind, as it were, and swamp the country with alien
cultures and traditions. For a traditional country of emigration this is somewhat preposterous to
suggest, but both in Germany and Britain, conservative politicians have done just that, and their
horror scenarios have not been entirely conducive to improving inter-ethnic relations, let alone
support integration. In addition to being host to some inherently racist elites, most Western
countries have a certain and very unofficial list of countries, whose citizens are somewhat more
welcome than others: some others may be welcome outsiders (e.g., Japanese or Americans),
especially if they are non-immigrating company executives.
Consider the politics of immigration. With Great Britain being an island, entering the country
illegally is not quite that easy as compared to crossing a land border. Most of the small number
of 'illegals', then, seem to have been migrants in breach of the rules of entry. Yet since
immigration control is a very popular theme with the voters and the media, it pays politically to
be 'tough' on 'illegal immigrants.' Among the measures that governments may choose to
implement in fighting undocumented migrants are increased border patrols, identity checks
inside the country near the borders, workplace inspections, employer sanctions, repatriation, and
airline penalties.
Witness the recent case of a few dozen Roma arriving in Dover allegedly causing havoc there:
this is a country with a population of some 59 million and a GNP of US$ 19,600 per capita. Yet
nobody is much concerned about, nor tries any comparison with, what havoc might be caused
by the more than 500,000 refugees from the 1998 civil war in Liberia, a country of 2.8 million
and a GNP of below US$ 785. These refugees fled to neighbouring Guinea, a country of some
6.8 million inhabitants with a GNP of US$ 560.
Since most countries are party to the 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol, refugees
and de-facto refugees have certain possibilities to bypass ordinary entry procedures, but even in
their case, at least in the Europe of the 1990s, ever-stricter conditions for recognition as
Convention or de-facto refugees, or asylum seekers, have been introduced.30
Consequently, not many politicians would make a case for immigration, although arguments
pointing to the economic advantages, the capital investment brought by immigrants, the
expansion or provision of muchneeded labour (such as the nurses issue in Great Britain), or the
international contacts and trade linked to this issue are usually disregarded if not ignored. Antiimmigration and immigration control sentiments have more salience in public.31 They are also
often much more simply put, much less complex than the positive facts of immigration. This
was one of the reasons for the success of the BNP in the London Docklands some time ago.32
It appears that some people would like to stop immigration completely, and build a wall
around their country, or failing that, around the EU. This will hardly be possible; illegal
immigration cannot be stopped like this. In addition, there are quite a number of people actually
interested its not being stopped: although there will hardly be anyone to admit it, 'illegals' from
North Africa rind work in the Spanish agricultural areas, saving the land owners a wealth of
money. Also, trafficking is a highly lucrative business that mafia clans have been quick to spot
and include in their activities.
Yet even though undocumented in-migrants have to work in scorchingly hot glass houses, or
at 45° Centigrade out in the fields; even though they only work for about 2,500 Pesetas a day,
and thus are clearly exploited, what with receiving only half their actual due, they still do the
work. Unemployment is estimated to be at around 60% in Morocco, the youth being particularly
hard hit, and 2,500 Pesetas a day it ten times as much as they could earn at home. Therefore,
some of the landowners probably even think they may be doing some good work, when all there
is to it is that they gain serious money with the exploitation of undocumented migrants.
Many of these people were trafficked by gangs and had to sell their houses or amass large
debts: the journey to Spain may cost between 100,000 and 500,000 Pesetas. Other cases of
trafficking to Europe are reported from the Adriatic, especially from Albania. More horrific than
the examples of agricultural labour, many of the women trafficked from ex-Yugoslavia and
Albania are brutalised and used as sex workers.33
Least of all the racist argument along the lines that immigration might serve to corrupt any
'British stock' or 'German blood', or any other 'pure race', should not be a reason to stop inmigration in any country in the world. The purity of blood is a terrible, nonsensical illusion. The
German Carl Zuckmayer put it very aptly in his' The Devil's General', written during the last
war in his American exile.
[General Harras:] Now try to think of your ancestors - since the birth of Christ. There was
a Roman field sergeant, a dark bloke, as dark as a ripe olive, he taught a blonde girl Latin.
And then a Jewish spice trader came into the family; now he was a quiet man. Before
marrying he became a Christian, and founded the Catholic tradition in the family. And
then, a Greek medic came or a Celtic legionary,..., a Swedish rider, a Napoleonic soldier
or a deserting Cosack, a rafter from the Black Forest or a wandering miller from Alsace,
..., a Magyar, a Pandur, an Officer from Vienna, a French actor or a Bohemian musician:
all those have lived on the Rhine, tussled, boozed, sung, and made children. And Goethe,
he came from the same mould, and Beethoven and this Gutenberg and Mathias
Grunewald and - ah, just take a peek in a dictionary! They were the best, my dear chap!
The best in the world! And why? 'Coz the peoples have blended together. Admixed, like
the water from sources, brooks and rivers, so they become a great, large, and lively
stream.34
Fourth Phase: Staying Abroad: Sojourn, Transition, and Settlement Between
Inclusion and Exclusion
In this phase, the lock has been passed, migration comes to a halt, the migrant settles down.
The migrant's background, the cause for migration and his intentions, is important in relation to
the duration he may stay in the host country; the same is true for the conditions of his residence,
both in terms of what the state authorities require the migrant to do or not to do, and the actual
place of abode. In particular, the interaction between the immigrant and the host community has
to be looked at, as it may have a very different quality compared to the relationship the inmigrant has with the host state authorities.
As with immigration, some political groups and parties like to be seen to be 'tough' with
foreigners who have to 'integrate' (read: do everything like we do, whoever the 'we' might be) to
be accepted. Not quite as many people are as concerned with equal treatment of in-migrants,
sojourning aliens, or actual immigrants as with their 'correct' behaviour. The rhetoric of
toughness on 'them' is not by far heard towards those people who felt encouraged to cause the
death of people like Stephen Lawrence or the Turks who lived in the house. burnt down in
Solingen.
Types of Immigration
Since again there are multiple factors determining form and duration of the residence period, it
may be apposite to try and present four non-static types of immigration:
• Permanent Immigration: This type comprises not only the well-known historical
European migration to the US, to Argentina, or to the Russian Empire of Catherine
the Great, in search of a new life, and used to populate vast unsettled regions to
develop their natural resources. Although not that sizeable in number, European
emigration with the concrete aim of settling in a different country continues until
today: from Germany, some 600,000 people have emigrated to the US from 1950
through 1990, representing the largest group of Americans born outside the US.35
The only other states allowing significant numbers of immigrants to permanently
settle are Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, although they have revised their
conditions for entry, putting more emphasis on migrants' skills. The migrants'
integration into the local community is possible and likely.
• Semi-Permanent Immigration: This type may reflect medium- to long-term migration
with a view to e.g. taking up a certain post that necessitates a prolonged stay in a
given host country; a return is planned and takes place after the termination of a
contract. Still, a certain integration into the host country and the local community
takes place> and may include learning the local language.
• De-facto Permanent Immigration: This type includes people who had every
intention to return to their home country after a predetermined' period of time, but
somehow got stuck and postponed their return several times over, until they more or
less decided to stay. In this 'century of the refugee', many incidents occurred where
refugees had to stay much longer than just temporarily in their host countries, so that
they indirectly moved to the this category of de-facto permanent immigration: both
they and the migrant who got stuck will have an unclear vision of returning home,
but with continued residence, settling down and increasing integration, the date
when the suitcases are completely unpacked comes closer.
• Due to the background and circumstances of their immigration, contact of this group
to the local community is only sparse, and may develop only much later than in the
above category; language knowledge may be much worse than with second- or third
•
generations who may after a time be born in the host country: a case in point are the
Turks in Germany, many of whom came on a temporary working contract and have
stayed at times for over 30 years. Many of their second and third generation children
feel increasingly rooted, or were born, in Germany, and have no intention of
'returning' to Turkey which is not their home at al1.36 This also applies to the
'guestworkers' in Belgium, France, Switzerland and Austria, where de-facto
immigration led to de-facto integration with continued stay; Belgium and
Switzerland made naturalisation easier.
Non-Immigration: the migrant, or refugee, resides only for a fixed period of time in
the host country. For instance, a student will stay for a year at a foreign university to
study a language, or deal with a particular research project, after which he usually
returns. In the case of refugees, their period is usually predetermined by the
conditions at their place of origin: refugees per se have the right, but in most cases
also the wish, to stay in their host country only as long as they need a safe haven,
and to return as soon as possible.
With regard to the interaction between a host society and a residing migrant there are,
following the migration model outlined above, several possibilities. These are varying
by degree, in that they depend on the intensity of contact between guest and hosts on
the one hand, and their readiness to accept or tolerate each other's potentially diverging
ways, if not exactly take them over. Again, there are two extreme poles: in this case,
inclusion and exclusion.
Inclusion vs. Exclusion
Starting from the dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion, there are different modes of
incorporation,37 which arouse different responses by the native population, depending on the
prevalent view on the question of its 'national identity' and its emotional content or charge. This
is often based on the old idea of 'a nation' being bound by blood (thus the jus sanguinis for
citizenship) to the soil of the land: everybody else is an 'alien'. The jus soli turns this around:
rather than crying, 'why can't these immigrants be more like us?'38 the law says, 'you are part of
us because you are born here, no matter what your ethnic origin'.
As the above example from Carl Zuckmayer's Devil's General reminds us, the idea of a 'purity
of blood' behind the jus sanguinis not only looks distinctly unreal, but also would not exactly
help integrate non-natives: on the contrary, while jus soli is inherently inclusive, jus sanguinis is
inherently exclusive. Naturalisation and Citizenship based on the jus soli would therefore appear
to be much more conducive to integration. But inclusion and exclusion are not solely based on a
migrant's citizenship.
Exclusion could result from the settling migrant isolating himself, having e.g. only the goal of
making as much money as possible, and working day and night to achieve this, which leaves
little chance for interaction with the host community. Also, immigrants may choose to isolate
themselves, e.g. as a consequence of a culture shock, or as a precaution against it. They may
choose to stay within their own ethnic community, should it exist, and only later venture out to
make contact with the host society: recent Irish or German arrivals in the 19th century migration
to the US are a typical example. Their own ethnic community may thus function as an important
buffer against the culture shock, providing for a safety net should the interaction with the host
society develop problems. In such cases, but also in general, an ethnic community wi11 also act
as a facilitator, teaching where to do what and with whom. This is, however, not without its
dangers, as it may also be over-protective and instill a false idea of the native community in the
recently arrived in-migrant.
Conversely, a migrant may have a fairly open attitude, and wanting to get into close contact
with the host community feels rejected, sent into an unwanted ghettoisation. This may well have
a serious impact on even the most positive outlook on life, let alone on people with a fairly dim
view of their present situation: a refugee having just about managed to safe his life who feels
not only rejected but actually threatened by the host community will suffer doubly. Of course,
many other forms of exclusion, and much more subtle ones, exist.
Complete inclusion of migrants would of course be ideal. Yet here, too, there are differences
in the process of both the host society and the in migrant coming closer: as has been shown
above, there may be different types of immigration, which are dependent on the migrant's
original attitude on entering the host country. This will reflect on the migrant's attitude towards
the host society, and what strategy to choose in his interaction with it. Conversely, the host
society's ideas about immigrants, will playa major part in this two-way process.
Some standard types of this process are adaptation, acculturation, integration, or
assimilation.39 They reflect various degrees of common action whose main features in short are
these: if we talk of adaptation, it is mostly the action of the in-migrant (M) who has to adapt to
the norms of the host society (H). With acculturation, the in-migrant takes over much of the
host society's cultural traits and values. These two processes are closer to a one-way action of
(M), moving towards (H), which may be more or less neutral or slightly positive disposed
towards (M).
The opposite of this one-way action is assimilation, which in its short and functionalist
meaning is understood to mean that the host society (H) dictates the terms under which the inmigrant (M) may live in the country: 'do it like us, son, or else.'
Integration, then, is the most positive form of the process, in that it entails a common, mutual
interest in coming closer together, with the host society allowing for and actively helping the
migrant to settle down and feel 'at home', as much as this is possible. The migrant himself will
then
Unfortunately, the politics of immigration, which not only regulate access to the country, but
additionally the conditions under which aliens may sojourn in the country, makes much use of
the word 'integration', but on account of political pressures from groups disinclined to favour
either immigration or the integration of immigrants, does not put very much action behind it.
The following table is an effort to synthesise the above-mentioned array of analytical
categories; it is worth emphasising that as with all other models presented in this article, in real
life, as it were, combinations, or less sharply distinct categories, will occur.
Term
In-Migrant
Action
Host Society
Exclusion
Ghettoisation
+
H→M
–
Self-Isolation
–
M←H
+–
Inclusion
Adaptation
+
M→H
+–
Acculturation
+
M→H
+–
Integration
+
M↔H
+
Assimilation
– (+)
M←H
–+
Table 2.3: Interaction Between In-Migrants and Host Society
Some Final Remarks and Observations
Within the confines of this article, much had to be left out 0': discussed only superficially. The
role of international organisations in migration has at best been touched upon. Yet it should at
least be pointed out that apart from UNHCR, 10M, ILO, but also the EU or the Council of
Europe deal with migration issues.40 Questions of population developments, population
programmes and population monitoring are definitely linked to the same area.41 Much greater a
problem may develop from the fact that environmental migration may increase in the near
future. Latest reports suggest that by 2025, within the time of a mere generation, there may be
severe water shortages affecting roughly 20% of the entire global population - this could mean
that more than 1.6 billion people will not have access to safe drinking water.
In all of the above cases, one of the main problems of assessing (international) migration is
missing data, which results in a number of problems. Not only is forecasting made difficult.
Politically much more dangerous is the effect that inflated numbers may be used to generate a
picture of a country or region being swamped by tidal waves of poor migrants from outside.
This is a mainly European and Western picture also used in some states of the US or in
Australia running contrary to available ample evidence that internal migration in many countries
and region of the world is much greater than the comparative trickle of migration coming e.g. to
'the West'.
Also, such migrants from poor regions of the world as arrive in 'the North' or 'the West' are at
least middle-class by the standards of their country of origin, and not the poor people as they are
publicised: the 'actual' poor in those countries wi11 not have the resources to even contemplate
international migration to Europe. Then again, there is international migration to Europe, and it
is slowly increasing. In fact, almost 88% of the European population's growth rate in 1990-1995
was caused by international migration. Sti1l, this is much less a problem than some politicians
would like it to appear. International migration' ...has always been a function of the changing
political, economic and social context in which it is discussed' .42
In addition, note that hardly any comprehensive migration policy exists; around the globe,
most countries have policies of immigration, policies dealing with foreigners who have entered
the country, readmission policies for undocumented migrants, and policies dealing with asylum
seekers and/or refugees. A comprehensive policy spanning a11 four areas does not exist. Surely
this is one of the key problems of international migration, as is the related one to address the
causes of migration.
Another problem in assessing international migration is supposed to be a lack of a
comprehensive theory which may serve to explain this phenomenon. Although this article will
hardly present more than a first attempt at formulating a framework for analysis, it wi11
hopefu11y serve to provide one possibility to find a way through a rather complex matter and
help to understand at least some of the aspects of what is comprised in the term, 'migration'.
Notes:
1 UN Secretary General: Concise report on world population monitoring, 1997: international migration and
development. Report of the Secretary General to the UN's Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, 24-28 Feb. 1997, Doc. E/CN/.9/1997!2, 24 Dec. 1996; also at
gopher://gopher.undp.org: 70/00/ungophers/popi n/unpopcorn/30thsess/official/consis2e, 17 March 1999,
Section IIB, at para 20.
2 Cf. Table 9 in Hania Zlotnik: 'International Migration 1965-1990: An Overview', in: Population and
Development Review, 24(3), 1998, pp. 429-468, at pp. 450-451.
3 Piet C. Emmer: 'Migration und Expansion: Die europäische koloniale Vergangenheit und die interkontinentale
Völkerwanderung', in: Walter Kalin Rupert Moser (Eds.): Migrationen aus der Dritten Welt. Ursachen Wirkungen – Handlungsmöglichkeiten, Berne etc.: Haupt, 3rd, updated and expanded edition, 1993, pp. 31-40.
4 The former Zaire is now called the Democratic Republic of the Congo, headed by L. Kabila; the name Zaire is
retained for this article without in any way wanting to express a preference for any of the former regimes in
Zaire.
5 Note that most of the figures are problematic in that statistical evidence may be missing and estimates are used
instead, especially with regard to refugee numbers. Also in terms of 'ordinary' forms of migration, problems
assessing the numbers of migrants exist, in that statistics may be partial or context-dependent. For a most
comprehensive overview of the problems, but also of the available figures, cf. Hania Zlotnik: 'International
Migration 1965-1990: An Overview', in: Population and Development Review, 24(3), 1998, pp. 429-468.
6 Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden (Ed.): Globale Trends 93/94. Daten zur Weltentwicklung, Frankfurt: Fischer,
1993, p. 122; p. 14.
7 Cf. Rob Breen: 'The most difficult choice [Afghanistan: The Unending Crisis], in: Refugees, (J08), URL:
www.unhcr.ch/pubs/rm108/rmI0807.htm. 31 Jan 1998.
8 William Petersen: 'A General Typology of Migration', in: American Sociological Review, 23(3), 1958, pp. 256266; this work was reprinted in Robin Cohen (Ed.): Theories of Migration, Cheltenham I Brookfield, Vt.:
Edward Elgar, 1996, pp. 3-D, which is generally recommended.
9 Petersen, pp. 258, 291 as reprinted in Cohen, pp. 5, 8 (note 8).
10 Cf. Ludger Kuhnhardt: Die Flilchtlingsfrage als Weltordnungsproblem. Massenwanderung in Geschichte und
Politik, Wien: Brau Müller,
11 The case of the Romani / gypsies being an exception in that while some have been forced to settle, like e.g. in
Romania, some others would still 'travel' as their ordinary way of life - e.g. in Britain.
12 Doris Meissner: 'Managing Migrations', in: Foreign Policy (1992)86, pp.66-83,atp.72.
13 IOM: Overview of Migration. Migration Management Training Programme, [Geneva:) 10M, 1995, pp. 10, 18.
14 Louise Holborn: 'Refugees, 1: World Problems', in: IESS, London: Crowell Collier/Macmillan/Free Press,
1968, Vol. 13., p. 362. IS
15 Rosemarie Rogers: 'The Politics of Migration in the Contemporary World', in: International Migration (30),
1992, Special Issue: Migration and Health in the 1990s, pp. 33-55, here: p. 34-5.
16 In view of the limited space available, this is not a review of existing migration theory. For an excellent review,
by now a standard work in its own right, cf. Douglas S. Massey et al. 'Theries of International Migration: A
Review and Appraisal', in: Population and Development Review, 19(3), 1993, pp. 431-466. Further cf. Aristide
R. Zolberg: 'The Next Waves: Migration Theory for a Changing World', in: IMR 23(3), pp. 403-430. A major
edited work by Robin Cohen offers 27 theorists, including Petersen, Massey et al (as above), Weiner, Widgren,
and Zolberg, dealing with the topic: Robin Cohen (Ed.): T1leories of Migration, Cheltenham I Brookfield, Vt.:
Edward Elgar, 1996. In German cf. e.g. Klaus 1. Bade I Michael Bommes: 'Migration Ethnizität - Konflikt', in:
Klaus J. Bade (Ed.): Migration - EthnizitätKonflikt, Osnabrück: Universitätsverlag Rasch, 1996, pp. 11-40.
17 Hania Zlotnik: 'The Concept of Intemational Migration as Reflected in Data Collection Systems', in: IMR
21(4).1987, pp. 925-946, at p. 942.
18 An earlier, German version has been published in: Andreas Demuth (ed.): Neue Ost-West-Wanderungen nach
dem Fall de Eisernen Vorhangs?, Munster: Lit, 1994, pp. 3-33. An extended version is planned for late 1999.
19 On historical migration cf. Leslie Page Moch: Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650,
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992. This book has almost an overload of examples
at the beginning, which then peter out towards the end.
20 Sally E. Findley: 'Does Drought Increase Migration? A Study of Migration from Rural Mali During the 19831985 Drought, in: IMR 28(3), 1994, pp. 539-553, at p. 553.
21 Dietrich Thranhardt: 'Die weltweiten Wanderungsprozesse in komparativer Sicht', in: Andreas Demuth (Ed.):
Neue Ost- WestWanderungell nach dem Fall de Eisemen Vorhangs?, Münster: Lit, 1994, pp. 34-59, at p. 41.
22 Choucri and North have counted some 141 wars for the period 19451991, among which where 35 'international'
wars, 16 wars of decolonisation, and 90 civil wars; they left some estimated 28 million dead, more than the
combined population of Belgium and the Netherlands. Nazli Choucri / Robert C. North: 'Population and
(In)Security: National Perspectives and Global Imperatives', in: David B. Dewitt (Ed.): Building a new global
order: emerging trends in international security, Don Mills: OUP, 1993, pp. 229-256.
23 This statement by Mary Kritz from 1987 still seems fairly accurate. Mary M. Kritz: 'International Migration
Policies: Conceptual Problems', in: IMR 21(4), 1987, pp. 947-964, at p. 947.
24 On the issue of sovereignty, cf. Daniel Philpott: 'Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History', in: Journal of
International Affairs, 48 (2), 1995, pp. 355-368; on German legal writing on this term cf. e.g. Reinhold
Zippelius: Allgemeine Staatslehre (Politikwissenschaft). Ein Studienbuch, Munich: Beck, 9th ed., 1985, ch. III:
'Besonderheiten der staatlichen Gemeinschaft', pp. 46-87, in particular subchs. §9 II, III, pp. 53-60, and § 1°
I,U, pp. 62-67. On the history of the concept of sovereignty, cf. e.g. Francis H. Hinsley: Sovereignty,
Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2 ed., 1989. 25 UN Secretary General: Concise report On world population
monitoring. 1997: international migration and development, para 35.
26 Cf. Thränhardt, pp. 34, 38,49.
27 Bob Sutcliffe: 'Run, but there is no refuge', in: T7ze Independent, 18JuI.1994,p.15.
28 Of course the abolition of border controls within a given territory, such as the members of the European
Schengen Treaty states, will by default make this entry control close to impossible. Also geographical factors
playa significant role in the control of borders: in theory, they should be impermeable against i11egal or
undocumented immigration, but as e.g. the Albanian-Greek border through the sometimes rather difficult and
inaccessible mountain range shows, in praxi this is not quite the case. The same applies to other mountain
ranges, e.g. on the Afghan-Pakistan border, or to thousands of kilometres of coastline, which makes a state like
Italy, despite all measures to the contrary, a country which can be entered relatively easily.
29 The fact that between 1987 and 1993 some 1.7 million ethnic Germans entered Germany was usually not
interpreted as immigration: although the Germans had left in the time of Catherine the Great several hundred
years ago, they would still be regarded as 'returning home', and on account of German law (Art. 116 of the
Grundgesetz) be regarded as Germans.
30 A very valuable book allowing for the comparison of 16 European countries is by Fabrice Liebaut / Jane
Hughes (Eds.): Legal and social conditions for asylum seekers and refugees in western European countries,
[Copenhagen?:] Danish Refugee Council, 1997. Also at URL: www.drc.dk/pub/Legsoc/menu.html. 16 March
1999. In the same vein, cf. Nina Lassen / Jane Hughes (Eds.): 'Safe third country' policies in European
countries,
[Copenhagen?:]
Danish
Refugee
Council,
1997;
also
at
URL:
www.drk.dkleng/pub/safe3rdlmenu.htrnl. 16 March 1999 (data is from late 1996).
31 Cf. e.g. Zig Layton-Henry: 'Britain: The Would-be Zero-Immigration Country', in: Wayne A. Cornelius I Philip
L. Martin I James F. Hollifield (Eds.): Controlling Immigration. A Global Perspective, Stanford: Stanford UP,
1994, pp. 273-295.
32 In a local by-election in Milwall, Tower Hamlets, London, on 16 Sep 1993, a BNP councillor was elected on an
unashamedly racist ticket. Cf. Paul Anderson: 'Springtime for Hitler', in: New Statesman and Society, 18 Feb.
1994.
33 J Emma Daly: 'Hundreds of would-be immigrants, desperate to escape poverty in Africa, drown while trying to
cross the Strait to Spain', in: The Observer, 23 Aug. 1998, p. 18, reprinted in 10M-News, (3), 1998, pp. 1, 11.
Also cf. 10M: Trafficking in Migration Newssheet, Nr. 16, Sep. 1997; 10M: Trafficking ill Women to Italy for
Sexual Exploitation, Genf: 10M Migration Information Programme, Juni 1996, URL:
www.iom.int/iomlpublic...s/mip_italy_traff_eng.htm#arrival. 19. Jan. 1999. ,
34 Translated and slightly abridged by the author from Carl Zuckmayer: Des Teufels General. Drama in drei
Akten, Frankfurt: Fischer, 12th imprint, 1982, pp. 65-66. The general theme of this last subchapter is taken up
by Beate Winkler (Ed.): Zukunftsangst Einwanderung, Beck: München, 1992.
35 Thranhardt, p. 36.
36 Dietrich Thranhardt: 'Aus Gastarbeitem werden europäische Bürger - deutsche Erfahrungen mit der
Arbeitskraftemigration', in: Christoph Butterwegge / Siegfried Jager (Hgg.): Europa gegen den Rest der Welt?
Flüchtlingsbewegungen - Einwanderung - Asylpolitik, Köln: Bund-Verlag, 1993, S. 68 - 84. In a 1989 survey,
only 11% of the respondents intended to 'return home'.
37 Cf. Aristide R. Zolberg: 'Modes of Incorporation: Toward a Comparative Framework', Ms.; also in: Veit M.
Bader (Ed.): Citizenship and Exclusion: Crossing Boundaries of Disciplines and Countries, London:
Macmillan, 1997.
38 Cf. the article by Ari Zolberg: 'Why can't those immigrants be more like us?', Ms. (Majestic. 195).
39 John W. Berry: 'Acculturation and Adaptation in a New Society', in: International Migration 30 (1992), Special
Issue: Migration and Health in the 1990s, pp. 69-84. Also cf. idem: 'Acculturation and Psychological
Adaptation', in: Klaus Bade (Ed.): Migration Ethnizität - Konflikt, pp. 171-186. Dieter Oberndörfer:
'Assimilation, Multikulturalismus oder kultureller Pluralismus -zum Gegensatz zwischen kollektiver
Nationalkultur und kultureller Freiheit der Republik' in: Klaus Bade (Ed.): Migration - Ethnizitat - KonfIikt,
pp. 127-147. On the Chicago School on assimilation, cf. Richard Alba: 'How relevant is assimilation?', in:
IMIS-Beitrtige, (4), Oct. 1996, also at: URL: www.imis.uos.de (for download).
40 For a fuller treatment of international organisations' work in this field, cf. the report by the UN Secretary
General: Activities of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations in the area of international
migration. Report of the Secretary General to the UN's Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Population and Development, Thirtieth Session, 24-28 Feb. 1997, Doc. E/CN/.9/1997/5, 10 Jan. 1997; also at
gopher://gopher.undp.org: 70/00/ungophers/popin/unpopcorn/30thsess/official/activ5eg, 17 March 1999 (entire
URL: in one line).
41 Already in 1993 did the UN Fund for Population Activities, UNFP A, devote a special issue of its world
population report to migration issues and the linkages to demographic developments.
42 UN Secretary General: Concise report on world population monitoring, 1997: international migration and
development, para. II.