Original Article
Rationality and deliberative democracy:
A constructive critique of John Dryzek’s
democratic theory
Adrian Blau
Politics, School of Social Sciences, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, UK.
E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract John Dryzek’s justification of deliberative democracy rests on a critique
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of instrumental rationality and a defence of Habermas’s idea of communicative
rationality. I question each stage of Dryzek’s theory. It defines instrumental
rationality broadly but only criticises narrow applications of it. It conflates communicative rationality with Habermas’s idea of ‘discourse’ – the real motor of
Dryzek’s democratic theory. Deliberative democracy can be better defended by
avoiding overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality, by altering the emphasis on
communicative rationality, and by focusing more on different models of politics
than different models of rationality. Dryzek’s theory can thus present deliberative
democracy as a better means to better ends – a more powerful and more positive
position.
Contemporary Political Theory (2010) 0, 000–000. doi:10.1057/cpt.2010.3
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This article is a constructive critique of John Dryzek’s democratic theory –
‘discursive democracy’. Dryzek is a prominent exponent of Habermas and an
influential deliberative democrat. Using Habermas’s ideas, Dryzek attacks
elitist politics and defends deliberative policy making by citizens. This argument is very important: too often, we treat ‘public policy’ as something done
for but not by the public.
However, discursive democracy is weakened by its account of rationality.
Dryzek’s theory links elitist politics to instrumental rationality, and deliberative democracy to ‘communicative rationality’. In my opinion, this critique of
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Introduction
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Keywords: communicative rationality; critical theory; deliberative democracy;
democracy; Habermas; instrumental rationality
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instrumental rationality is overstated, this defence of communicative rationality is mis-stated, and this justification of deliberative democracy should
be restated.
Instead of trying to show that different models of politics are based on
different types of rationality, discursive democrats could accept instrumental
rationality. Indeed, they can say that discursive democracy is more instrumentally rational than elitist politics. That makes Dryzek’s democratic theory
more powerful and more positive. My article is thus both critical and
constructive. I aim to be ‘creative and enabling, not just chastening and
constraining’, in Dryzek’s words (1996, p. 10).
My argument runs as follows. After explaining Dryzek’s importance, I
examine his strategy of criticising instrumental rationality (the ability to choose
good means to ends) and defending communicative rationality (the rationality
of sincere discussion, roughly). I suggest that his theory makes overstated
criticisms of instrumental rationality: although instrumental rationality is
always defined broadly, narrow applications or conceptions of it are then
criticised. Discursive democracy needs instrumental rationality.
I then address communicative rationality. This idea of Habermas is not
normative enough for discursive democracy. Communicative rationality is only
mildly normative; it is about understanding more than legitimacy. Dryzek’s
theory needs Habermas’s idea of ‘discourse’, which should not be confused
with communicative rationality.
This entails a different justification of deliberative democracy. Because the
different types of rationality apply in both elitist and deliberative democracy,
there are no straight lines from a theory of rationality to a model of politics.
Dryzek’s normative conclusions need not change but his theory should become
more empirical: the different rationalities, he can argue, are simply more
prominent in deliberative democracy.
I conclude by suggesting that Dryzek’s theory should focus more on
different models of politics than different models of rationality. Deliberative
democracy can be defended as a better means to better ends. Overall, this
modified account of rationality strengthens rather than weakens Dryzek’s
democratic aims.
Note that I talk of ‘elitist’ politics, which is not Dryzek’s term, as shorthand
for the model of politics which he criticises – administrative, technocratic,
hierarchical, competitive, dominated by bureaucrats and politicians, and
driven by self-interest. For ease of argument I talk of an elitist/deliberative
dichotomy, but reality is obviously more complex. I follow Dryzek in sidestepping Habermas’s distinction between strategic and instrumental rationality, and in talking about both simply as ‘instrumental’.
Finally, two points need emphasising if I am to avoid misinterpretation.
First, we must distinguish narrow and broad notions of instrumental
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rationality. One way of reading Dryzek’s opposition to instrumental rationality
is that it is part of a broader desire for a world where people control their own
destinies rather than being governed by economic incentives, for example. This,
though, is not a criticism of instrumental rationality as Dryzek himself defines
it – broadly. It is a criticism of a narrower, Frankfurt-School notion of instrumental rationality. If that is how some readers want to define instrumental
rationality, they should also say whether they reject the broader notion, as
defined by Dryzek and many social scientists. That task is much harder, as I
explain below.
Second, I should emphasise what I am not saying about rationality and
norms. I am not denouncing arguments like the one cited above – Dryzek’s
opposition to a world dominated by economics – but I do deny that instrumental rationality is to blame. I am not pretending that well-rounded moral or
political theories can make do with instrumental rationality alone, merely that
it deserves much more support than Dryzek’s theory gives it. I am not rejecting
Dryzek’s model of democracy, merely the way it is derived from his account of
rationality.
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Why Dryzek?
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Dryzek is important in his own right and as an influential exponent of
Habermas. Even before Habermas championed deliberative democracy in
Between Facts and Norms, Dryzek’s book Discursive Democracy (1990a) had
used Habermasian ideas to produce one of the earliest extensive accounts
of deliberative democracy. This book and Dryzek’s well-known paper on
public choice theory (1992) are his most important critiques of instrumental
rationality. His later works, especially Deliberative Democracy and Beyond
(2000) and Deliberative Global Politics (2006a), remain concerned about
instrumental rationality, and again draw on Habermas inventively, especially
as regards environmental policy and global democracy. But these latter books
are less Habermasian, perhaps reflecting his ‘lament’ at Habermas’s ‘defection’
from radical to liberal (2000, pp. 8, 27; see also Dryzek, 2001).
This helps to explain Dryzek’s importance. Not only is he one of the core
deliberative democrats, but his shunning of liberal, state-centred deliberative
democracy distinguishes him from most other core deliberative democrats,
including Habermas. Dryzek has also addressed more concrete questions of
institutional design than Habermas and most of his followers; rationality is
crucial here (Dryzek, 1990a, pp. 29–56).
Rationality is thus central to Dryzek’s significance, putting him at the
forefront of three key shifts in democratic theory: from aggregative to deliberative democracy, one of the most striking developments in political theory in the
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last 25 years; from elitist to radical politics; and from abstract to concrete,
practical democratic theory.
Dryzek has had considerable impact across politics more widely. His book
Discursive Democracy was as much about public policy as political theory, and
he remains influential in public policy (Gottweis, 2006, pp. 472–473). He is one
of the best known representatives of postpositivist public policy (deLeon, 2006,
p. 51). The arguments discussed here have had some effect on rational choice,
social choice and public choice theorists (Mackie, 2005, p. 7).
Dryzek has even been influential outside of politics, especially in planning
studies, where he has helped to stimulate the surprisingly large literature
inspired by Habermas and critical theory (see Lauria and Wagner, 2006).
I cannot gauge Dryzek’s exact impact here, but many planning theorists echo
the errors criticised in this article (Blau, 2007). With certain modifications,
my arguments apply to these writers too – as well as to critical theorists in
international relations (Risse, 2004, pp. 294–300), management studies
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000, pp. 90–93), and philosophy of social science
(Potter, 2000, pp. 113–114, 238). While Dryzek’s work is my primary focus,
then, my criticisms have wider resonance.
Therefore, Dryzek’s theory needs challenging. We should correct its misportrayal of Habermas and its misrepresentation of instrumental rationality,
for three reasons: because of Dryzek’s particular importance to deliberative
democratic theory; because of his significance in political theory, in politics
more widely, and outside of politics; and because some problems with his
theory are found in the work of other critical theorists.
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The Critique of Instrumental Rationality
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Dryzek’s critique of instrumental rationality is strongly influenced by
Habermas, and by Habermas’s teachers, Adorno and Horkheimer, who presented modernity as being dominated by science, technology and instrumental
rationality. On this view, the Enlightenment and modern society were not
seeing the progress and emancipation promised by reason, but the increasing
advance of an instrumental form of reason, resulting in domination,
authoritarianism and the Enlightenment’s self-destruction.
Habermas challenges Adorno and Horkheimer’s account of instrumental
rationality for ‘oversimplify[ing] its image of modernity so astoundingly’
(PDM, pp. 112–113). Their overly pessimistic critique led Habermas to explore
a broader, communicative idea of rationality. Despite these disagreements, all
of these critical theorists stress the normative dangers of limiting rationality
to the choice of means to ends set by other people, or set by markets
(Finlayson, 2005, pp. 4–75).
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A common strategy in Dryzek’s work is to contrast instrumental and
communicative rationality, criticise instrumental rationality, and defend
communicative rationality. But these criticisms of instrumental rationality, I
suggest, are based on a fallacy. They define instrumental rationality broadly,
but then criticise narrow applications of it – choices of bad means, or the
pursuit of bad ends. These important criticisms are correct. But we can still
defend instrumental rationality without committing such errors.
I will briefly expand on this. Dryzek’s writings often contrast two types of
rationality only, for example in discussing Habermas on modernity’s ‘two sorts
of reason’, instrumental and communicative.1 The instrumental/communicative
distinction, writes Dryzek (1992, p. 400), is ‘central’ for Habermas. Of course,
Dryzek never says that there are only two types of rationality, and sometimes
discusses more (for example 1990a, p. 9). But Dryzek usually implies that the
main options are instrumental and communicative rationality; and by criticising
instrumental rationality, he points us towards communicative rationality.
At least nine times, Dryzek’s writings define instrumental rationality
broadly: ‘the capacity to devise, select and effect good means to clarified and
consistent ends’.2 This is fairly standard (for example Elster, 1983, pp. 1–15).
The problem is that after defining instrumental rationality broadly, Dryzek’s
theory usually criticises narrow conceptions or applications of instrumental
rationality. I will consider three such criticisms: instrumental rationality is (a)
anti-democratic, (b) bad at dealing with complex problems, and (c) misused by
some social choice theorists.
Instrumental rationality as anti-democratic
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Dryzek’s theory holds that instrumental rationality ‘represses individuals’ and
is ‘antidemocratic y insofar as bureaucratization entails the concentration of
political power’, as instrumental rationality provides ‘justification and
organizing principles for bureaucracy’ (1990a, pp. 4–5). This is a form of
Weberian syllogism: bureaucracy is the epitome of instrumental rationality;
bureaucracy is anti-democratic; therefore instrumental rationality is antidemocratic.
But consider again Dryzek’s own definition of instrumental rationality.
Defined broadly, instrumental rationality cannot be the basic problem. Instrumental rationality is not inherently anti-democratic or repressive. There is
nothing anti-democratic and repressive about seeking good means to ends
unless the chosen means or ends are anti-democratic and repressive.
Instrumental rationality can serve democratic and non-repressive purposes,
or anti-democratic and repressive purposes. The problem, rather, is when
bureaucracies serve anti-democratic ends and choose repressive means.
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Yet this is a criticism of bureaucracy, not instrumental rationality.
Discursive democrats can legitimately say that bureaucratic decision making,
whose guiding principle is instrumental rationality, violates political equality
and may infringe citizen interests. This criticises some applications of instrumental rationality without suggesting that instrumental rationality ‘represses
individuals’. It is true that some applications of instrumental rationality – some
means or some ends – repress individuals. It is quite another thing to say that
instrumental rationality does so.
It is not surprising, then, that Dryzek’s theory implicitly uses instrumental
rationality in a non-repressive way, asking whether bureaucracies are ‘the best
means for dealing with any given level of complexity’ (2006a, p. 141; see also
2000, p. 173). If the answer is ‘no’, we should seek better means. Otherwise we
are not instrumentally rational.
Dryzek’s opponents are let off the hook here. Some instrumental rationalists
are overly tied to bureaucracy, seeing it as the purest embodiment of
instrumental rationality. They can be accused of inconsistency: if they really
want instrumental rationality, and if bureaucracy is not always a good means,
they should look beyond bureaucracy.
My suggestions thus strengthen, not weaken, discursive democracy. By
diluting their critique of instrumental rationality, discursive democrats can
make the same normative arguments – criticising bureaucracy, defending
deliberative politics – without trying to rebut something which everyone needs.
Discursive democrats get extra critical bite too, by accusing some instrumental
rationalists of forgetting its requirements.
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Complexity
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The narrow view of instrumental rationality is most explicit in Dryzek’s
important account of complexity:
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Instrumental rationality – and the political institutions in which it is
manifested – is ineffective when confronted with complex social problems. Instrumental rationality goes hand in hand with an analytic
sensibility, the idea that complex phenomena are best understood through
intelligent disaggregation into their component parts. These parts should
then be apprehended – and any problematic aspects of them resolved
instrumentally – in piecemeal fashion. y For the sake of brevity I shall
often use ‘instrumental rationality’ as short-hand for ‘instrumental-analytic
rationality’. (Dryzek, 1990a, pp. 5–6, 222, emphasis altered; see also 1990a,
pp. 57–76; 2006a, pp. 140–142)
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This rightly questions the capacity of traditional decision-making bodies
to tackle complex problems. Many writers are too optimistic about human
abilities and neglect the boundedness of our instrumental rationality. Every
politician should read Dryzek, Hayek, Lindblom or Simon, and ask how well
elitist methods solve complex problems. Dryzek encourages us to consider
deliberative alternatives: more holistic, less disaggregative methods could
improve problem-solving.
Again, though, instrumental rationality itself is not the problem. Note first
the comment that ‘instrumental rationality’ actually means something
narrower, an instrumental-analytic type of rationality that uses disaggregative,
piecemeal methods. This raises the question of whether we should worry about
forms of instrumental rationality that use non-disaggregative, holistic methods.
And Dryzek’s theory clearly treats holistic methods as superior when facing
complex social problems. Therefore, by definition – indeed, by the definition in
Dryzek’s own work – his theory cannot be criticising instrumental rationality
itself, merely one application of it.
Dryzek’s position is not entirely clear when he writes that instrumental
rationality ‘goes hand in hand’ with a disaggregative approach. Does this imply
a necessary relationship, with instrumental rationality committing us to a
disaggregative approach? Or is it simply the case that instrumental rationalists
often happen to take disaggregative approaches in practice? In one place
Dryzek implies a necessary connection: instrumental rationality ‘requires
breaking such [complex] problems down into simpler components’ (2005, p. 84;
emphasis added). I prefer a softer stance. There is no reason why seeking the
best means to an end requires a disaggregative approach. Indeed, when
disaggregative approaches are bad at tackling complexity, they are not
instrumentally rational (unless all other ways are worse). If we knew that
holistic approaches are better at solving complex social problems, we would
not be instrumentally rational to advocate disaggregation. Deliberative
democracy may be instrumentally rational – a better means to our ends.
Dryzek’s theory again invokes instrumental rationality like this, asking
whether bureaucracies are ‘the best means for dealing with any given level
of complexity’, as noted above, and suggesting that discursive democracy
‘contains means for coping with highly complex social problems’ (2006a,
p. 141; 1996, p. 146). If discursive democracy is better than bureaucracy
in this respect, instrumental rationality requires the former, other things being
equal.
Dryzek’s opponents get another let-off here. Instrumental rationalists with
disaggregative approaches arguably use bad means to reach their ends. If these
writers really are instrumentally rational, they must consider alternatives. Their
fallacy would be clearer when faced with Dryzek’s original, broad definition
of instrumental rationality. Logically, the problem cannot be instrumental
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rationality, merely one particular application of it whose prevalence Dryzek
legitimately queries.
Public/social choice theory
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A different kind of criticism appears in Dryzek’s (1992) important critique of
the Virginia and Rochester schools of public/social choice theory, associated
especially with James Buchanan and William Riker, respectively (compare
Dryzek and List, 2003). Dryzek’s model of democracy challenges these writers’
parched and pessimistic models of politics.
For most Virginia theorists ‘it is self-interest y that does the bulk of the
damage’. Their gloomy conclusions about politics reflect their assumption of
egoistic ends, ‘not y the simple fact of the instrumental nature of this pursuit’
(1992, p. 406). Dryzek is not claiming that instrumental rationality is inherently
egoistic, a view he rightly rejects elsewhere (2000, p. 32; Dryzek and List, 2003,
p. 3). Indeed, his concern seems to be that Virginia theorists err by assuming
self-interest, not instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality aimed at
ends based on collective interests would produce more palatable models of
politics. That is a viable criticism of much Virginian public choice theory (one
exception being Brennan and Hamlin, 2000, pp. 6–10).
But the equivalent distinction is not made when criticising Rochester social
choice theorists. Here, ‘instrumental rationality and non-cognitivism do the
damage’. For Dryzek, ‘non-cognitivism’ means that values and preferences are
not rationally assessable. (This is a misnomer. Non-cognitivism is the metaethical view that moral judgements are not claims about moral truths; this
says nothing about assessing values rationally. But I will retain Dryzek’s
terminology here.) His point is that even if individuals sought common rather
than selfish interests, we would still get the paradoxes and voting cycles that
Rikerians see as inherent to democracy. Rochester theorists should stop
assuming non-cognitivism, otherwise political actors ‘cannot escape these
problems by subjecting their preferences to rational scrutiny and possible
adjustment in the interests of determinate collective choices’ (1992, p. 406).
It is not clear why Rochester theorists are criticised for assuming noncognitivism and instrumental rationality, rather than non-cognitivism alone. If
the problem for Virginia theorists is that self-interest corrupts instrumental
rationality, then the problem for Rochester theorists is that non-cognitivism
stupefies it. In neither case is instrumental rationality itself the problem.
Instrumental rationality produces good or bad effects depending on what
it is tied to.
Dryzek’s argument still has force: politics does not have to be as Buchanan
or Riker depict it. Values can be non-egoistic and can change rationally.
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Nonetheless, these criticisms involve what instrumental rationality is tied to,
not instrumental rationality itself. That is probably the main message of
Dryzek’s 1992 paper. But unwary readers may read it as attacking instrumental
rationality itself, not only because of the argument just cited but also because
the paper starts by criticising ‘instrumental rationalization’, an empirical thesis
about the rise of instrumental rationality (1992, pp. 399–400).
Summary
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Is Communicative Rationality Normative Enough?
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Dryzek’s defence of deliberative democracy starts with broad definitions of
instrumental rationality broadly, as the ability to choose good means to ends.
But the ensuing criticisms involve narrow applications of it (bureaucracy,
disaggregative approaches) or the ideas some people link it to (self-interest,
non-cognitivism). These arguments, although important, should not make us
reject instrumental rationality. The same applies to a criticism that I have left
out for reasons of space: the domination of instrumental rationality, as Adorno
and Horkheimer assert, and as some readings of Habermas’s system/lifeworld
argument suggest (Blau, 2010a). I would add that many critics and adherents
of instrumental rationality are wrong to suppose that instrumental rationality
must involve purely technical/efficiency-based means (Blau, 2010b).
Dryzek’s position does not reject instrumental rationality entirely. We will
find ourselves, he writes, ‘flirting with instrumental rationality (which, when
all is said and done, is often unavoidable)’ (1994, p. 169). But it should be
restricted to ‘a subordinate domain’ (1990a, pp. 9, 14, 218). This seems too
negative, especially compared to the view that ‘instrumental and communicative attitudes can coexist; the choice is seldom a matter of one or the other
but rather of the proportions in which the two shall be combined’ (1990a,
pp. 20–21).
Dryzek’s theory of democracy will be stronger, not weaker, if it does not
target instrumental rationality itself, if it distinguishes between appropriate and
inappropriate applications, and if it reproaches writers who claim to want good
means to ends but simply presuppose elitist politics.
I now turn from instrumental to communicative rationality. After explaining
what communicative rationality means, I show that it does not adequately
support discursive democracy.
Habermas repeatedly identifies rationality in general, and communicative
rationality in particular, with the ability to give reasons or good reasons.3 For
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Habermas, a good communicative reason is one which is genuinely accepted as
empirically true, subjectively sincere or normatively right. Habermas means
that when we communicate we refer to one or more of three worlds: objective
facts, personal feelings and social norms. A discussion is communicatively
rational to the extent that all communicators genuinely agree that propositions
are, respectively, true, sincere and right. If one participant tries to get a
proposition accepted non-genuinely, say by coercion or bribery, this is strategic
not communicative rationality.4
In Habermas’s first extended example of communicative rationality, an older
worker on a building-site tells a younger worker to buy him a drink (TCA2,
pp. 121–123). (As we will see, this example undermines Dryzek’s stance on
communicative rationality.) The older worker makes implicit or explicit
references to subjective feelings (‘I’m thirsty’), empirical facts (‘a shop is
nearby’), and social norms (‘I outrank you, so you should do what I say’).
The normative claim is central for us. ‘The informal group hierarchy of the
workers on the construction site is the normative framework in which the one
is allowed to tell the other to do something’, writes Habermas (TCA2, p. 121;
emphasis removed). If the young worker is unaware of this norm, he may not
see why the older worker is telling him to get a beer. ‘I’m not thirsty’, he may
say. Once told that his own thirst is irrelevant, and that older workers can
instruct younger ones, he has a ‘Gestalt-switch’, understanding the situation in
the same way as the older worker (TCA2, p. 122). Now he sees the norm and
fully understands this part of the request. Communicative rationality applies to
the extent that the two workers can understand and agree with these implicit or
explicit claims about the worlds of facts, feelings and norms. My account here
is standard and differs in only minor ways from that of writers like Simone
Chambers (1996, pp. 90–97, 119, 132–133).
Despite certain ambiguities in Dryzek’s account of communicative
rationality (Blau, 2007), there is no doubting its Habermasian nature. Dryzek’s
work repeatedly links communicative rationality to Habermas and describes it
in undeniably Habermasian terms.5 But crucially, communicative rationality as
understood by Habermas is too narrow.
To explain this, I address four core values of discursive democracy. Like
most deliberative democrats, Dryzek wants policy making by citizens who are
(i) autonomous and (ii) open-minded, focusing on (iii) common interests under
(iv) inclusive conditions. Decision makers should decide autonomously, free
from deception, self-deception and domination.6 Decision makers should be
open-minded and reflective, choosing according to the force of the better
argument.7 Generalisable interests, not self-interest, should drive discussion.8
And there should be minimal barriers to participation by competent individuals or their randomly chosen representatives.9 (Dryzek’s other prescriptions,
like transnational governance, do not affect my argument.)
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However, communicative rationality as Habermas depicts it primarily
involves understanding and agreement. It does not involve deliberation about
disputed ends, or choices between them. When Habermas writes that
communicative rationality includes the assumption that normative statements
are ‘valid’, he means that (a) the norm applies to communicators, and (b) they
accept it.10 In the building-site example, the older worker (a) has an informal
right to instruct the young one (TCA2, pp. 121–122). If the young worker (b)
accepts this hierarchical norm, he can understand the request, and communicative rationality is achieved in this respect.
Therefore, communicative rationality is about accepting claims to truth,
rightness and sincerity, not about whether something is true, right or sincere
(TCA1, p. 302; MCCA, pp. 58–59). The point of communicative rationality is
‘to establish and renew interpersonal relations’ (TCA1, p. 308), not to justify
them through argument. Its aim is the mutual ‘recognition’ of norms (MCCA,
p. 58), not their defence. ‘We must distinguish between the social fact that a
norm is intersubjectively recognised and its worthiness to be recognised. There
may be good reasons to consider the validity claim raised in a socially accepted
norm to be unjustified’ (MCCA, p. 61; emphasis added). (Note that my account
largely sidesteps communicative rationality’s sociological function: coordinating actions and binding individuals as they recognise shared norms. See for
example TCA2, p. 86.)
Communicative rationality, then, is at most only mildly normative. Some
communication is entirely non-normative (OPC, pp. 326–327), as with
empirical validity-claims like ‘it is raining now’ (TCA1, p. 313). And
communicatively rational discussions which do involve norms merely justify
claims according to existing norms, as with the construction worker who
simply appealed to a pre-given norm. Deliberative democracy needs a stronger
form of rationality – one which can question existing norms, and if necessary,
change or replace them.
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Discourse and communicative rationality
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If communicative rationality does not settle disagreements about norms, what
does? The key is Habermas’s idea of ‘discourse’.11 We can think about the
difference between communicative rationality and discourse as follows.
Communicative rationality involves factual claims about norms, discourse
involves normative claims about norms. Communicative rationality involves
claims about which norms do apply, discourse involves claims about which
norms should apply. Communicative rationality involves claims like ‘older
workers are allowed to tell younger workers what to do’, discourse involves
claims like ‘older workers should be allowed to tell younger workers what to do’.
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(Discourse can also be about facts but for this article I address normative
discourse only, and deal primarily with moral rather than ethical discourse.)
Communicative rationality involves understanding for the sake of action,
whereas participants in discourse are ‘relieved of the pressure of action’ (TCA1,
p. 25; MCCA, p. 87; BFN, p. 228) as they try to work out what is right.
My account here is standard, following writers like Thomas McCarthy
(1978, pp. 288–292, 306–314, 323–327), Simone Chambers (1996, pp. 95–101),
Gordon Finlayson (2005, p. 323), and James Bohman and William Rehg (2007,
Section 3).
Discourse starts when there is a ‘lack of a normative consensus’ (TJ, p. 256;
emphasis added). In discourse, the issue is also what the norm should be – ‘the
rightness of y a norm itself’ (TCA1, p. 334) – regardless of what the current
norm is. Habermas recognises that communicative action is ‘precarious’ and
can easily turn into discourse (BFN, p. 21; OPC, p. 236), as ‘participants
continue their communicative action in a reflexive attitude’ (MCCA, p. 67;
emphasis added). But he is at pains to emphasise the ‘strict distinction’ between unreflective communicative action and reflective discourse (RC, p. 235)
and insists that ‘we can’t equate communicative action with argumentation’
(PF, p. 111).
Therefore, communicative rationality necessarily entails the ‘anticipation
and presupposition’ of discourse (TP, p. 19; CES, pp. 3–4; MCCA, p. 88; PF,
pp. 111–112). When someone makes a validity claim, she presupposes that she
may have to justify or ‘redeem’ that claim in discourse (MCCA, pp. 58–59).
But just because A can lead to B does not mean A is B. Similarly, discourse
includes communicative rationality: for example, participants in a free-speech
discourse might discuss whether certain expressions offend them, subjectively.
But just because B includes A does not mean that B is A.
In discourse, the requirements for rationality are far stricter than in simple
communicative action. ‘Valid statements [in discourse] must admit of
justification by appeal to reasons that could convince anyone irrespective of
time or place’, writes Habermas (JA, p. 52). This requires inclusiveness, equal
opportunity for communication, sincerity and non-coercion – assumptions that
should motivate participants even when they know that not all assumptions are
met (TJ, pp. 106–107; TIO, p. 44). This produces such principles as the
universalisation principle: roughly, in moral discourse everyone affected should
accept a norm.12
Discourse and ‘discursive’ democracy
What does this mean for Dryzek’s democratic theory? Autonomy is the only
one of its four core democratic values that follows from communicative
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rationality. An individual must genuinely agree with what is decided. If the
older worker coerces the younger one to get a beer, this is strategic interaction
not communicative action (OPC, pp. 218, 221–222).
Open-mindedness only has a limited role in communicative rationality.
Communicators must be open to Gestalt-switches: if the young worker cannot
recognise the background norm, communicative agreement is impossible. But
deliberative democracy requires a stronger form of open-mindedness –
opinions shifting according to the force of the better argument. We should
discuss the pros and cons of issues, rather than simply accepting or rejecting
current norms on the basis of ‘cultural taken-for-grantedness’.13
Common interests are not a necessary part of communicative rationality. In
the building-site example, the main interest is the older worker’s, and the
younger worker has a subsidiary interest in fitting in. These are not common
interests, though. Indeed, lifeworld norms can be patriarchal and repressive
(Fraser, 1995, pp. 24, 35–36; see also Dryzek, 1992, p. 401). Moral discourse,
with its universalisation principle, would not permit patriarchal repression, yet
communicative rationality does. Dryzek’s position is that communicative
rationality ‘can pertain to the generation of normative judgments’ (1990a,
p. 14). But communicative rationality does not itself generate norms: it
confirms or rejects existing norms. Nor should we say that in communicative
rationality, a norm can be justified ‘on the grounds that its adoption by all
individuals would produce felicitous consequences’ (1990a, pp. 14–15). This is
part of discourse, not communicative rationality itself.
Inclusion is not required by communicative rationality either. If the older
worker had asked the young one to get beer for all workers on the building site,
the young worker would not need to discuss this with each worker to
understand what was required. Dryzek’s position is that communicative
rationality requires inclusion (1990a, p. 15). But only discourse requires this. It
is not wrong to say that ‘[c]ommunicatively rationalized discourse requires y
that there be no barriers to competent participation’ (1990a, p. 72; emphasis
added). But communicative rationality need not be mentioned here.
In sum, communicative rationality is primarily about understanding
and agreement, with at most a mildly normative justification. And even the
understanding involved in communicative rationality is too narrow for
Dryzek’s democratic theory. Communicative rationality, we are told, involves
‘the reflective understanding of competent actors’ (Dryzek 1990a, p. 14). But
for Habermas, reflection comes in discourse, not necessarily in communicative
rationality. It is incidental to communicative rationality whether someone who
accepts oppressive lifeworld norms has reflected on their legitimacy – just as
instrumental rationality can aim at repressive or non-repressive ends, as
explained earlier. Ironically, Dryzek’s position now presents an ‘expansion of
communicative rationality beyond Habermas’s own narrow and unnecessary
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emphasis on argument’ (2006b, p. 196). But the argument involved in
communicative rationality is at most a simple yes/no affair as discussants
raise validity claims about facts, feelings and norms; and these claims might
only be implicit. Deep-seated argument belongs to discourse.
Dryzek’s theory thus appears to equate discursive and communicative
rationality. The ‘precursor’ to communicative rationality is the ideal speech
situation (Dryzek, 1995, p. 104; 1990b, p. 102), but Habermas mostly restricts
this to discourse.14 The same applies to ‘the ideal discursive community of
communicative rationality’ (Dryzek, 1994, p. 165), which actually belongs to
discourse. ‘Under communicative rationality, the only power exercised is y
‘‘the forceless force of the better argument’’ ’ (Dryzek, 2000, p. 171), but again
this involves discourse only. My account here is standard (for example
McCarthy, 1978, pp. 306–310). Of course, many others blur discourse and
communicative rationality (for example Risse, 2004, pp. 294–296). Indeed I too
used to do this (Blau, 2007).
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I now return to instrumental rationality. What is its place in deliberative
democracy? How does it relate to communicative and discursive rationality?
And what are the implications for Dryzek’s defence of deliberative democracy?
Instrumental rationality and deliberative democracy
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Instrumental rationality helps us pick good means to ends, which is obviously
useful in deliberative democracy. Dryzek’s comments on bureaucracy and on
complexity, above, even suggest that deliberative democracy is better than
elitist politics for choosing means. This is instrumental rationality’s biggest
contribution to deliberative democracy.
Crucially, though, instrumental rationality also helps us pick ends. Dryzek’s
stance is that communicative rationality lets us choose ends whereas
instrumental rationality does not (1990a, pp. 14, 115; see also 1987, p. 201).
But instrumental rationality has a role here: as Herbert Simon notes (1983,
pp. 7–8, 11), we can ask if proposed ends are good means to other ends that we
value. Habermas accepts a similar view (TCA1, TCA2, pp. 170, 172; BFN,
pp. 159–161, 180, 186–188; JA, pp. 2–3, 10–11, 63). Discourse ethics involves
some instrumental considerations: we must ask if our goals are feasible and if
they have undesirable knock-on consequences (Chambers, 1996, pp. 90–91,
100, 188; Rehg, 1994, pp. 48–49, 239). Therefore, instrumental rationality can
make a small contribution to choosing ends. And as just noted, communicative
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Discursive rationality can settle instrumental disputes. It is not only
communicative rationality which presupposes discourse: Habermas now
implies this for instrumental rationality too, in discussing ‘pragmatic’ claims
about means to ends (BFN, pp. 160, 163; JA, pp. 10–11). Habermas talks of
discursive rationality binding the three other types of rationality – epistemic,
teleological and communicative, which involve knowledge, action and speech,
respectively (OPC, p. 309). Therefore, when we make instrumental/pragmatic/
teleological claims about good means to ends, we imply that these claims can
be justified discursively. And we have just seen that discourse ethics may
include instrumental reasoning.
Oddly, most Habermas-influenced thinkers continue to talk as if instrumental rationality is opposed to communicative or discursive rationality.
Habermas’s early work pointed in this direction (Blau, 2010a). But critics of
instrumental rationality should now address Habermas’s new position. Nor
should they depict modernity in terms of just two types of reason: when we
move from Habermas’s sociological project to his political one, communicative
rationality is not as important as discursive rationality, especially its ethical
and moral applications. These get most emphasis in Habermas’s post-1990
writings, about which Dryzek says little (two exceptions being Dryzek 2001,
2005, pp. 82, 87). Instrumental and discursive rationality are more closely
linked than many writers imply.
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rationality plays no direct part in choosing disputed ends; communicative
rationality can even be conservative if communicators simply accept existing
norms. Dryzek’s theory presents instrumental rationality as conservative
(2006a, p. 113), but this link is not necessary: we can seek means to
conservative or radical ends.
Instrumental rationality helps not only during but also before deliberative
democracy. Consider Innes and Booher’s (1999) Habermasian analysis of how
role-playing games foster empathy, helping people from different backgrounds
to debate policies open-mindedly. Innes and Booher do not see this as
instrumental rationality, but their arguments imply that role-playing games are
a good means to discursive rationality.
From rationality to politics?
The most important message of this article involves how we justify deliberative
democracy. Dryzek’s position implies that different ideas of rationality
necessarily entail different models of politics. Instrumental-analytic rationality
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leads straight to elitist, bureaucratic politics, whereas communicative/
discursive rationality requires inclusive deliberation. As instrumental-analytic
rationality is so flawed compared to its communicative/discursive counterpart,
the answer must be deliberative democracy. Dryzek’s theory is not presented
quite like this, but this seems to be its essence – that there are direct, necessary
links between ideas of rationality and models of democracy.
However, we have seen that instrumental rationality also applies before and
during deliberative democracy: instrumental rationality helps us design
deliberative institutions and practices, and deliberative democracy may itself
be a better means to reaching ends than elitist politics. Crucially, moreover,
communicative rationality must exist in some elitist situations. Habermas
insists that communicative rationality applies whenever two or more people
communicate with the aim of reaching understanding and autonomous
agreement, as Dryzek recognises (1990a, p. 37). Communicative rationality
must thus apply in elitist politics where deliberators seek genuine agreement.
(Clearly, they often do not.) Communicative rationality’s compatibility with
hierarchy is evident in Habermas’s examples of flight attendants giving orders
to passengers, and older workers giving orders to young workers (TCA1,
pp. 300–301; TCA2, pp. 121–123; see too Chambers, 1996, pp. 95–96).
This implies the following conclusion: instrumental, communicative and
discursive rationality almost certainly exist in both elitist and deliberative
politics. We have seen that instrumental and communicative can be found in
elitist and deliberative politics. It follows that discourse too can apply in both
cases, if two or more people disagree about some factual or normative claim
and want genuine agreement. They must present arguments that could convince
anyone irrespective of time or place, even if not all such people are included
(JA, p. 52).
Crucially, if each type of rationality can apply in both elitist and deliberative politics, Dryzek’s defence of deliberative democracy is called into
question. One answer is that deliberative politics is more likely to see
each type of rationality, and in higher amounts. On this view, deliberative
democracy is more instrumentally rational, especially for complex problems; more discursively rational, owing to the greater likelihood of inclusion,
open-mindedness and the pursuit of common interests; and more communicatively rational, because individuals are more likely to seek genuine
understanding and agreement, rather than career-advancement or partisan
point-scoring, say.
This argument is more empirical. It requires us to examine not only
theoretical ideas about rationality and deliberative democracy but also the
burgeoning empirical literature on the strengths and weaknesses of deliberative
democracy in practice. Empirical arguments are riskier: elitist politics will work
better than deliberative politics in some situations. But the revised account of
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rationality offered here points inevitably to a more empirical defence of
deliberative democracy.
Therefore, there is no straight line between a model of rationality and a
model of politics. Once we recognise the true nature of instrumental, communicative and discursive rationality, we need a different justification of
deliberative democracy.
Earlier, I noted that Dryzek’s work on rationality put him at the forefront of
three key shifts in democratic theory. My arguments here challenge his theory
in each respect. First, its account of rationality does not itself justify
deliberative over aggregative democracy. The account in this article may be
a better way forward. Second, discursive democracy’s preference for radical
over elitist politics is weakened when we see that elitism is not necessarily
linked to instrumental rationality, nor radical politics to communicative/
discursive rationality. Third, discursive democracy is ultimately defended too
abstractly: a more grounded approach is still needed if we are to justify its
superiority in terms of instrumental, communicative and discursive rationality.
Overstated criticisms of instrumental rationality thus weaken Dryzek’s
theory of deliberative democracy, whether the theory is couched in terms of
communicative rationality or, preferably, discourse. Criticising instrumental
rationality so vigorously understates its use in deliberative democracy. And
when defences of communicative rationality are so closely linked to a critique
of instrumental rationality, the latter’s failure undermines the former. It would
be safer to loosen the two parts of the argument, downplay communicative
rationality and make discourse central.
Therefore, discursive democrats can still defend autonomous, open-minded,
inclusive deliberation aimed at common interests. This position, amended
according to the arguments presented here, can now use terms that are truer to
the original source, which support Dryzek’s preferred term (‘discursive’
democracy), and which have stronger theoretical foundations.
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Dryzek’s theory of deliberative democracy challenges writers who focus
overly on instrumental rationality, neglecting communicative rationality. But
Dryzek’s account makes the equivalent error, lauding communicative
rationality and underrating its instrumental cousin. We are urged to ‘overturn’
instrumental rationality, and watch communicative rationality rising from ‘the
ruins of instrumental rationality’ (1993, p. 214; 1990a, p. ix). By dropping these
overstatements, and theorising the instrumental/communicative relationship
differently, Dryzek’s defence of democracy can get new critical leverage over
instrumental rationalists who choose bad means to their ends.
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Deliberative democracy should be supported for improving, not avoiding,
the application of instrumental rationality: deliberative democracy helps us
choose not only better ends but also better means. This argument is about
different models of politics, not different models of rationality. Rather than
implying that different ideas of rationality necessarily entail different models of
politics, Dryzekian deliberative democracy can be defended as a better way of
manifesting instrumental, communicative and discursive rationality. This
argument also clarifies issues for future research: what models of politics in
general, and what particular institutions, procedures and individual dispositions, allow us to choose better means to better ends?
Dryzek’s argument can be this: deliberative democracy is a better means to
better ends. That important position can be defended better and assessed more
accurately with the account of rationality in this article. In short, communicative rationality has much less relevance for deliberative democracy than
Dryzek’s theory suggests – and instrumental rationality has much more.
Abrreviations
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Abbreviations of Habermas’s work, with original German and translated
English dates in brackets: AR: A Reply, in Honneth and Joas (ed.),
Communicative Action (1986/1991); ASI: Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews
(1978–1984/1986); BFN: Between Facts and Norms (1992/1996); CES:
Communication and the Evolution of Society (1976/1979); JA: Justification
and Application (1990–1991, 1993); LC: Legitimation Crisis (1973/1976);
MCCA: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (1983/1990); OPC:
On the Pragmatics of Communication (1976–1996/1998); PDM: The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1985/1987); PF: The Past as Future (1991/1994);
RC: A reply to my critics, in Thompson and Held (ed.), Habermas: Critical
Debates (1982); ST: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1962/
1989); TCA: The Theory of Communicative Action, Vols 1 and 2 (1981/1984,
1987); TIO: The Inclusion of the Other (1996/1998); TJ: Truth and Justification
(1999/2003); TP: Theory and Practice (various/1974); TRS: Toward a Rational
Society (1968/1971). In the text, references are given in chronological order
where possible. (Some collections of essays have diverse dates.)
Acknowledgements
For comments and criticisms on earlier versions of parts of this article,
I thank Sorin Baiasu, Kimberley Brownlee, Jonathan Davies, John Dryzek,
Alan Hamlin, John Meadowcroft, Mick Moran, Peter Niesen, John Parkinson,
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Jon Quong, Nick Turnbull and my referees. I am especially grateful to John
Dryzek for his detailed and gracious response to my criticisms in a much earlier
version of this article. Versions of this article or parts of it were given at the
Political Theory conference, Manchester Metropolitan University, 6–8
September 2006; a MANCEPT (Manchester Centre for Political Theory)
seminar, University of Manchester, 2 May 2007; the Interpretation in Policy
Analysis annual conference, Amsterdam, 29 May – 1 June 2007; and the ECPR
General Conference, Pisa, 6–8 September 2007. I thank participants at these
events for their comments.
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1 Dryzek (1992, pp. 406–407). See also Dryzek (1987, pp. 200–205; 1990a, pp. 3–21; 1992, pp.
400–401, 406–409; 1994, pp. 160–165; 1995, pp. 111–115; 1998, pp. 589–590; 2000, pp. 21–22).
2 Dryzek (1992, p. 400; 1996, p. 93; 1997, p. 164; 1998, p. 589; 2000, p. 22; 2006a, p. 113). For
slightly different definitions, see Dryzek (1987, p. 200; 1990a, pp. 3–4; 1994, p. 172).
3 TCA1, pp. 9, 11, 15, 17, 22, 115–116; PMT, p. 102; OPC, pp. 188, 220, 312; JA, pp. 52–53; BFN,
pp. 119–120; TJ, pp. 94–95; see also Chambers (1996, pp. 90–91, 101, 119, 132–133). (See above
for abbreviations of Habermas’s works.)
4 CES, pp. 1–5, 65–68; TCA1, pp. 38–39, 99–104, 285–287, 295–309; TCA2, pp. 120–126; MCCA,
pp. 58, 133–137; AR, pp. 241–242, 291; JA, p. 81; OPC, pp. 217–222, 293–301, 315–329.
5 Dryzek (1990a, pp. 14–15; 1992, pp. 406–407; 1994, p. 165; 1996, pp. 107–108; 1998, p. 589;
2000, pp. 21–22; 2006b, p. 196).
6 Dryzek (1990a, pp. 14–15; 1993, p. 228; 1994, p. 165; 1996, pp. 107–108; 2000, p. 22; 2006b,
p. 196). Note that Dryzek talks of autonomy differently (2006a, p. 85).
7 Dryzek (1990a, p. 15; 1992, pp. 406–409; 1996, p. 146; 2000, pp. 1–2, 21; 2006a, pp. 84–87,
113–115).
8 Dryzek (1987, p. 212; 1990a, p. 54; 1992, pp. 401, 408–411; 2000, p. 169).
9 Dryzek (1990a, p. 15, 72–73; 1993, p. 228–229).
10 CES, pp. 3–4; TCA1, pp. 15–16, 88. I use ‘norm’ more loosely and broadly than Habermas,
who talks also of value orientations, rules, institutions, conventions, habits and practices
(TJ, p. 103).
11 TP, pp. 18–19; CES, pp. 4, 64, 209; TCA1, pp. 17–20, 42, 334; MCCA, pp. 59, 65–68, 86–94,
201–203; AR, pp. 227, 248–249; RC, p. 272; JA, pp. 10–16, 51–53, 56–60; PF, pp. 111–112;
BFN, p. 228; TIO, p. 44; TJ, pp. 102–109, 253–255.
12 RC, pp. 256–257; MCCA, pp. 65–68, 86–93; JA, pp. 32–33; TIO, p. 42; TJ, p. 104.
13 RC, p. 272; see also TCA1, TCA2, p. 335, PDM, p. 298, MCCA, p. 135.
14 TP, p. 19; LC, pp. 105–108; RC, pp. 235, 246, 272; TCA1, pp. 26, 42; MCCA, pp. 88, 202;
PDM, p. 323; JA, pp. 53, 57; PF, pp. 111–112; BFN, pp. 15–16, 161–162, 228, 322–323; TJ,
pp. 86–87, 101–102, 105. Exceptions are ST, pp. 36, 54; ASI, p. 90; TCA2, pp. 1–2.
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Date submitted: 8 September 2009
Date accepted: 4 November 2009
r 2010 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1470-8914
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