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Chapter- I
Introduction and Methodology
Statement of Problem.
Conceptual Framework.
Objectives.
Methodology.
Limitation of the study.
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1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.1 Statement of the Problem
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Relation between India and Nepal are centuries old. Nepal is our
next door neighbour and has been closely linked with India
geographically, economically and culturally. Though India is much larger
than Nepal in many respects viz. population, territory, economic
development, this should not in any way mislead one regarding Nepal’s
importance to India whose vital security perception are to a great extent
linked to Nepal. In fact ever since modern Nepal was established in the
late 18th century India’s security perceptions in its northern frontier have
been linked to Nepal. Nepal is a land-locked country surrounded on three
sides by India in the south and by Tibetan region of China in the north.
Indo-Nepalese borders are not separated by any natural barrier and in
fact there is free movement of people and goods. But to the north, where
Nepal is bordered by Tibetan region of China, there are 28 passes on the
Sino-Nepal boundary. Of these passes three important routes are open
throughout the year. Threat perceptions to India do not directly arise from
Nepal but as have been summarized by Padmaja Murthy in her article in
Strategic Analysis, they arise from:
(1) The possibility that through Nepal’s northern border any power
(emphasis on China) upon entering Nepal, can easily access the
Indian mainland since Indo-Nepal border are not separated by any
natural barrier and in this sense open.
(2) That Nepal which is not stable politically and economically would
be more vulnerable to such an eventuality, and this would
consequently result in the Indian mainland also being exposed.
(3) That Nepal may adopt policies (internally and externally) which
would be detrimental to the security interests of India.
These security concerns of India are also centuries old. The British India
perceived a threat from Nepal when the latter was following an
expansionist policy (beginning from 1767) under Prithvi Narayan Shah.
The British at that time were consolidating their rule in northern India. In
order to check the Nepalese, the British fought a war with them in which
they were successful and the result of the war was the conclusion of the
treaty of Sugauli in December 1815, according to which the British took
control of the plains and limited the freedom of Nepalese. The British
were fearful that the expansionist policy of the Nepalese towards Tibet
would bring the Chinese to the door steps of British India and they would
have a common border with China, resulting in border disputes, which
the British did not want to have.
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Another important treaty was concluded by British India with Nepal
in view of the forward policy of Chinese claiming Nepal. The treaty was
concluded in 1923. The treaty recognized Nepal’s independence, both
internal and external. The aim of the British was not to control Nepal, but
to ensure that India’s security interests are not compromised in the wake
of the Chinese claims.
There was no change in Indian policy when India became
independent. Articulating India’s concerns, Nehru said in Parliament on
Dec 6, 1950, “Our interest in the internal conditions of Nepal becomes
still more acute and personal, if I may say so, because of the
developments across our borders, because of the developments in
China and Tibet, to be frank and regardless of our feelings about Nepal,
we are interested in our own country’s security in our country’s border.
Now so far as the Himalayas are concerned, they lie on the other side of
Nepal, mostly, not this side. Therefore, the principal barrier to India lies
on the other side of Nepal and we are not going to tolerate any person
coming over that barrier. Therefore, much as we appreciate the
independence of Nepal, we can not risk our own security by anything
going wrong in Nepal which permits either that barrier to be crossed or
otherwise weaken our frontiers”.
The present study whose title is “Indo-Nepal Relations and China
Since 1990”, undertakes to study the centuries old Indo-Nepal relations
in respect of China particularly after 1990 when the first democratic
constitution was promulgated in Nepal.
1.2 Conceptual Framework:
Nepal is basically a feudal and plural society and as a nation rather
a late comer on the global stage. Primarily her foreign policy is described
as that of non-alignment. The objective behind this policy was not simply
to keep out of world war politics, but also to maintain an order of a
balance between India and China; the two most important neighbors of
Nepal. As a land-locked, poor and developing country, the main thrusts
of her bilateral relations have been particularly in the economic field.
The present study is mainly focused since 1990. Therefore, it is
important to analyse the internal politics of Nepal. Since the promulgation
of the first democratic constitution in 1990, establishment of a workable
democratic system in Nepal has been an enormously difficult task. In the
first general elections held in May 1991, Nepali Congress (NC) and the
United Marxist Leninist Communist Party (UML) shared most of the
votes. The leader of the Nepali Congress, G. P. Koirala became the
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Prime Minister. But factionalism soon engulfed the NC in which Koirala,
Ganesh Man Singh, the party supreme leader and K. P. Bhattarai, the
party president sought to distribute power among their supporters. G. P.
Koirala finding it difficult to implement policies and programmes of the
government resigned and called for mid-term elections in 1994.
The mid-term general election in November 1994 gave no party a
clear majority. The UML secured 89 seats while the Nepali Congress
secured 83 seats. Significantly, the National Democratic Party (NDP),
formed by politicians from the former Panchayat era, won 20 seats. Man
Mohan Adhikari of the UML formed the former Panchayat with the
support of small parties like the Nepal Majdoor Kisan Party and
Communist Party of Nepal (Masal). Nepal, thus, became the first
constitutional monarchy. But the government collapsed within a few
months. Thereafter, with splits emerging in all the major parties, a series
of four coalition government came to power before next general elections
were called in 1999. This time, the NC got a clear majority of 113 seats.
K. P. Bhattarai became the Prime Minister. But due to factionalism within
the NC, he was replaced by G. P. Koirala in early 2000 and later by the
leader of the younger generation in the party, Sher Bahadur Deuba in
July 2001.
By this time, the Maoist ‘people war’ which was launched in 1996
had assumed grave proportions. The Maoist used terror tactics to spread
their influence in the rural areas and taken effective control on
administration in five districts. In the early years of Maoist movement,
Nepalese politicians belonging to the leftist camp displayed a fraternal
resistance to taking any harsh measures toward the Maoists. The
CPN/ML, the third largest political party in Nepal, openly endorsed the
aims of the CPN (Maoist) even while disapproving of its working style.
The major ruling party, the NC beset with internal problems could not
take concrete action to deal with the Maoist problem.
The Maoist insurgency added confusion in the democratic politics
of Nepal that was already reeling under factionalism which ultimately led
to a constitutional crisis. In May 2002, the Deuba government
recommended the dissolution of the parliament but found it difficult to
hold elections because of the Maoist insurgency. King Gyanendra seized
this opportunity and invoked Article 127 of the constitution to dismiss the
prime minister and his cabinet for “incompetence” in October 2002. He
nominated Lokendra Bahadur Chand , leader of royalist Rashtriya
Prajatantra Party (RPP), to head a nine-member interim government with
a mandate to restore law and order, hold mid-term elections and
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elections to the local bodies which were dissolved in July, solve Maoist
insurgency, implement development works and stop the economy sliding
further downhill.
Major political parties which were critical of the king’s action did not
participate in the interim government. In March 2003, the mainstream
forces in Nepal formed an alliance and finalised an eighteen point
common minimum programme and launched a movement against the
monarchic takeover. Since then, a tripartite power struggle has
dominated in Nepali politics, between the king, the mainstream political
parties and the Maoist. Monarchy, backed by the Royal Nepal Army, is
seeking to resume the role in the national polity that it enjoyed before the
1990 constitution came into effect which circumscribed its power. The
mainstream political parties are demanding a return to constitutional
government through the restoration of the dissolved parliament or the
creation of an all party government. The Maoist remains adamant in their
demand for the creation of a constituent assembly to draft a drastically
revised constitution by abolishing monarchy and declaring Nepal a
sovereign Republic. The democratic politics in Nepal being extremely
factionalised successive governments in Nepal found it difficult to
implement policies and programmes. One result of this was that the rate
of economic growth was modest, but it did not match the rate at which
population grew. The massive unemployment and illiteracy in a society
that had an ethnically and religiously fragmented population provided a
fertile ground for the emergence of Maoist movement in Nepal.
Characterising the states as a semi-feudal organizations, the
Maoist held it responsible for the prevailing socio-economic ills within the
country. They have also projected India and US as the imperialist powers
trying to subvert the interests of the people of Nepal by aligning with the
rightist forces within Nepal. Among other demands, they have asked for
the revocation of the treaty of Peace and Friendship signed with India in
1950, controlling and systematising the open border, discontinuation of
Gorkha recruitment in the Indian armed forces and preventing the
cultural imperialism through Hindi films and magazines.
By the end of the year 2000, the Maoists were active in over two
thirds of the 75 districts of Nepal. They had setup “People’s Government”
in five districts of western Nepal. In the areas under their control, the
Maoist did local policing, settled local disputes, collected levies from the
people and even set up banks.
The government of Nepal had used forces, persuasion and
negotiation to tackle the Maoist problem. Since March 2001, several
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rounds of peace negotiation were held between the government and the
Maoist. But due to irreconcilable differences and mutual suspicion, these
efforts made no progress. Terror and violence by the insurgents
continued and the security forces have stepped up counter insurgency
operations. According to official sources, by early 2004, the fight against
the eight year Maoist insurgency had claimed nearly 8000 lives on both
sides including 2,800 security force personnel. Finally Nepal has become
a Republic with Communist Government in the country in 2008. Under
these geo-strategic and political compulsions Nepal’s importance in
India’s security has enhanced due to its changed scenario.
Similarly India’s relation with its neighbours did not remain
untouched by the changing global politics, its security perceptions
remained unchanged. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War shifted the focus of international actors from geo-politics
to geo-economics in which no particular nation asserts supremacy. India
and China also opened their doors to foreign investors and globalised
their economies and responded favorably to each other to improve their
relationship. Bilateral negotiations took place in 1988 and 1992 when
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President R. Venkatraman visited China
respectively and in 1992 when Li Peng visited India. As a step to
normalise their relationship both governments agreed for Army-to-Army
contacts such as exchange of troops posted along the border1. In the
eight meeting of the Joint Working Group in August 1995, both countries
agreed to disengage their Military posts at the Sumdurung Chu Valley in
the eastern sector of India. Hence the conventional threat from to the
China to the Indian security does not exist at the moment, but this does
not diminish the strategic importance of Nepal mainly because geopolitics cannot be negated for the sake of geo-economics.
In cognisance with its security threats and perceptions, India had
sent a draft proposal to Nepal in March 1990 which dealt with provisions
relating to social, political issues. Part II of the proposal dealing with
defence cooperation stated that India would provide arms, ammunition,
military training and assistance in the raising of additional units of the
Royal Nepal Army. Article IV of Part II made it binding on Nepal to
consult India before entering into any military alliance with a third country
on import of arms, ammunitions or military training. Probably India
desired to restrict Nepal procuring arms from China in 1988 which was
considered by India to be against the spirit of the 1950 Treaty and 1965
1
Thapaliyal Sangeeta: Nepal in India’s Security Parameters, Strategic Analysis, December 1995, Pg. 1200.
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Agreement. The draft treaty was in conformity with the 1950 Treaty and
1965 Agreement which made India the primary supplier of arms to
Nepal2.
Though the draft proposal did not come into effect, India and Nepal
once again discussed Indian security concerns in 1990 during the visit of
Nepalese Prime Minister K. P. Bhattarai to New Delhi. In the Joint
Communiqué signed on June 10, both countries agreed to respect each
other’s security concerns and pledged not to allow any activities on their
soil directed against the other. Once again, it was agreed to have “prior
consultations with a view to reaching mutual agreement on such
defence-related matters which in the view of either country could pose a
threat to its security”. By accepting the security concerns of India, an
implicit assurance was elicited from Nepal that it would not use a policy
of equidistance, violating Indian security interests, and this included not
granting the Chinese projects in the Terai and importing arms from
China. In an interview, Bhattarai had assured that Nepal would take care
of the security concerns of India and “we shall not allow Nepal to be base
for anything”. The change of government in Nepal did not bring about a
change in its perception of Indian security concerns3.
The terrorism in India roped in Nepal when the terrorist and
criminals from India started taking refuge on the Nepalese soil. Besides
the Kashmiri and Sikh militants, other insurgent groups such as the
Bodos and United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) have also been
reported to use Nepal as a sanctuary, often with the help of the Pakistan
Embassy.
1.3 Objectives:
The objectives of this study are to establish(a) Though India is larger than Nepal in many respects viz.
population, territory, economic development, this should not in
any mislead one regarding Nepal’s importance to India. Ever
since modern Nepal was established in the 18th century, India’s
security perceptions in its northern frontier have been linked to
Nepal.
(b) To examine the extent to which economic relations have been
used as an instrument by India to meet its security interests
which are linked to Nepal.
2
3
Ibid. Pg. 1200.
Thapaliyal Sangeeta: Nepal in India’s Security Parameters, Strategic Analysis, December 1995, Pg. 1201.
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(c) To establish that threat perceptions to India do not directly arise
from Nepal. They arise from Nepal’s northern border that is
China which can easily access the Indian mainland since IndoNepal borders are not separated by any natural barrier.
Therefore, it is important for India that Nepal is stable politically
and economically and China is a main factor in any Indo-Nepal
relations.
1.4 Methodology:
The methodology adopted for this study is empirical and analytical
based on historical facts. Different bilateral agreements and treaties
signed between British India and Nepal and India and Nepal and also
China and Nepal are the basis of this study. Indian Parliamentary
debates, research articles, newspapers, reports, autobiographies and
books have been consulted for the completion of this work. A
questionnaire was also mailed to important person, academicians and
embassies of India-Nepal and China. However, in view of the poor
response from the concerned people it was not considered for this study.
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1.5 Limitations of the Study:
In 1951, the two countries decided to establish border check-posts
along Nepal’s border with Tibet, manned jointly by the Nepalese Army
personnel and Indian wireless operators. This enabled the Government
of India to receive intelligence reports regarding military activities in the
north. In 1952 keeping in view the internal and external threats to Nepal,
the modernisation of the disorganized and ill-equipped Nepalese Army
was considered necessary. Following Nepal’s request, an Indian Military
Mission (IMM) was deputed to Nepal in 1952 to train and modernize the
Nepalese Army4.
However these measures failed to evoke any enthusiasm from
Nepal, which resented such direct involvement, particularly after
maintaining a policy of isolation for over a hundred years during which it
even did not allow the British entry beyond a certain point, secondly,
there were the discontented political elements who were unhappy at
India’s involvement in the political events and decisions, and all this led
to a lot of bitterness.
A new phase in the relations began with the death of king
Tribhuvan in 1955. Till 1990, when the democratic revolution took place,
4
Murthy Padmaja: India and Nepal: Security and Economic Dimensions, Strategic Analysis, December 1999,
Pg. 1534.
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a singular contradiction running through Indo-Nepal relations was the
desire of the monarchy to wield power and the belief in India that only a
democratic government would give Nepal stability. This contradiction led
Nepal to dilute the spirit behind the treaty of 1950, and build new
linkages5. Even though after some time India supported the monarchy
and the panchayati regime that Nepal introduced, the suspicions
continued.
In this direction, in 1958 the IMM was downgraded and reorganized
as the Indian Military Training and Advisory Group (IMTAG). However,
with elections being held and the Nepalese Congress coming to power,
convergences were once again visible not only in the political arena but
also in the economic field. In 1960, the Treaty of Trade and Transit was
concluded, whose provisions indicated towards a free trade area and
also additional facilities for transit. However, the dismissal of the
democratic government by king Mahendra drew sharp criticism from
India, this was resented by Nepal, and a threat was perceived from India
itself. The regime’s security was equated with state security. Thus, a
divergence was witnessed, which only increased with Nepal developing
ties with China and Pakistan6.
Nepal soon established closed cordial relations with China and
later with Pakistan. King Mahendra successfully used the China card to
extract concessions from India. From a historical perspective, the use of
the China card by Nepal was not completely a new move. Even while
dealing with British India the rulers of Nepal had kept the China card
open. As for China, its relation with Nepal assumed importance in the
context of the former’s interests in Tibet. Further, with China’s
differences arising with India, close relations with Nepal were welcome.
China gave aid to Nepal as part of its policy. Later, it built the
Kathmandu-Kodari road whose construction started in 1963 and was
completed in 1965. The road provided a direct strategic connection
between China and Nepal via the difficult Tibetan route. If Nepal could
not resist an attack through this road, the Indian heartland would be
easily accessible through the open Indo-Nepal borders. For India, these
developments were a cause of grave concern.
The changing security concerns with Indo-Sino differences and the
war of 1962, led India to reassess its policy towards Nepal. The 1962,
war disproved the long-held belief that the Himalayas were impregnable.
5
6
Ibid, 1532.
Ibid, 1535.
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In the change of stand, India approved Nepal’s panchayati system, in
1965, the arms agreements between the two countries regarding supply
of arms was concluded. One of the clause spelt out that in the event of
any shortfalls in the supply of arms and equipments by the government
of India to Nepal, the government of the USA and UK would furnish
some defence assistance in order to supplements the assistance from
India. In this sense, India’s role as a supplier of arms to Nepal was
emphasised. In other words, it meant restating the link in the mutual
security concerns of transit procedures which Nepal had been asking for.
Thus, India sought convergance on the security front by strengthening
ties in the economic area. These moves, however, were not successful.
Problems again arose in August 1970, when Nepal further diluted
mutual security concerns when it asked India to withdraw personnel at
the Nepal-Tibet checkposts and the IMTAG. The divergence in security
issues coincided with divergences in the economic arena too. Problems
arose over the renewal of the Treaty of Trade and Transit, which expired
on October 31. Later Nepal, accused India of a blockade which the latter
denied. India held that the differences were due to Nepal’s persistent
demand for a land route to trade with Pakistan, and certain policies
which caused harm to Indian trade; and the Nepalese demanded two
separate treaties on Trade and Transit, maintaining that while transit was
of a permanent nature, trade interest differed from time to time. India did
not agree to this. A single treaty was finally concluded on August 31,
1971, after a year a serious differences.
In 1972, King Birendra succeeded to the throne and in 1975, he
propounded the Zone of Peace proposal which was again an attempt to
dilute mutual security convergences. The Janata Party government
attempted to develop a close relationship and it agreed to two separate
treaties- one on trade and the other on transit, in 1978. An agreement to
control unauthorised trade was also concluded. Nepal had always
wanted two separate treaties-one on trade and the other on transit,
saying that while transit was of permanent importance, trade interest
changed from time to time. However, Nepal’s attitude towards India did
not change7.
In 1988, a complete dilution of the 1950 treaty took place, when
Nepal bought arms from China which included anti-aircraft guns and
medium range SSM besides AK-49 assault rifles etc. that entered in
7
Bhasin Avtar Singh (Ed): Nepal’s Relations with India and China, Documents 1947-1992, Vol. II, SIBAEXIM, Delhi, 1994, Pg. 733.
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Nepal through the Kathmandu-Kodari road. Immediately, problems over
renewable of the Trade and Transit treaties arose. There were other
problems also and India conveyed to Nepal that it would discuss a single
Treaty of Trade and Transit. Differences which began over the trade
issue slowly covered the entire gamut of bilateral relations. Trade was
carried on a most favored nation (MFN) basis, and the trade and transit
points which numbered 15 and 22 respectively were reduced to two.
There was, however, no sign of a solution to the problem, and IndoNepal relation touched an all tine low. When the trade and transit
problems in Indo-Nepal relations appeared in 1988-89, Beijing made it
clear to Nepal that they cannot compensate for all the losses which
Nepal had incurred due to, what Nepalese called economic blockade
imposed by India.