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REGIONAL COMMAND CAPITAL (RC-C)
HUMAN TERRAIN ANALYSIS TEAM (HTAT) AF-30
EMPOWERING AFGHAN WOMEN:
LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD OR
MISSION CREEP?
Farzana Nabi-Amanullah, Ph.D.
02 March 2012
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS & TERMS
2-3
INTRODUCTION
4
HISTORY
King Abdur Rahman Khan – The “Iron Amir” (1880 – 1901)
King Habibullah Khan (1901 – 1919)
King Amanullah Khan – The Reformer of Reformers (1919 – 1929)
King Nadir Shah (1929 – 1933)
King Zahir Shah (1933 – 1973)
Daud Khan & the PDPA (1973 – 1978)
The Soviets & the Taliban (1979 – 2001)
2001 and Beyond
4-16
4-5
5
5-8
7-8
8-10
10-12
11-16
16-17
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (SCRs)
17-18
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN (NAPWA)
18
ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (EVAW)
18-20
AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (AIHRC)
20-22
MINISTRY OF WOMEN’S AFFAIRS (MoWA)
22-26
MAJOR ISSUES FACING AFGHAN WOMEN PRESENTLY
Being Born Female
Early Marriage
Forced Marriages: Baad, Baadal & Honor Killings
Bride Price
Widowhood
Moral Crimes
Women’s Shelters
Human Trafficking
Health & Maternal Mortality
Education
26-45
27
27-28
28-32
32-33
33-35
35-39
39-40
40-41
41-43
43-45
CONCLUSION
45-48
SOURCES OF INTEREST
49
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ACRONYMS & TERMS
AAN
AIHRC
AMS
ANP
APARP
AWN
CEDAW
CSC
CSO
DOAW
DoWA
DPVSV
EU
EVAW
FRU
GAPS
GIRoA
MDG
MLSAMD
MoD
MoE
MoF
MoI
MoJ
MoPH
MoWA
NAP
NAPWA
NGO
NPP
OHCHR
PDPA
PHR
RPP
SCR
TFR
TVPA
UN
UNAMA
WGC
WGO
WHO
WRPU
Afghanistan Analysts Network
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
Afghanistan Mortality Survey
Afghanistan National Police
Afghan Peace and Reintegration Plan
Afghan Women Network
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
Child Support Centers
Central Statistics Organization
Democratic Organization of Afghan Women
Department of Women’s Affairs
Department for the Propagation of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice
European Union
Elimination of Violence Against Women
Family Response Units
Gender Action for Peace and Security
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Millennium Development Goal
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
Ministry of Defense
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Interior
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Public Health
Ministry of Women’s Affairs
National Action Plan
National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan
Non-governmental Organization
National Priority Program
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
Physicians for Human Rights
Residential Parenting Program
Security Council Resolution
Total Fertility Rate
Trafficking Victims Protection Act
United Nations
United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
Women’s General Council
Women’s Grand Organization
World Health Organization
Women’s Rights Protection Unit
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Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Niswan (Organization for Women’s Protection) – an organization
established by King Amanullah’s sister, Kobra, that advocated on behalf of women.
Baad – utilization of girls to settle debts or disputes of feuding or rival families.
Baadal – exchange marriages
Ershad-e-Niswan (Guidance for Women) – the first women’s magazine established by Queen
Soraya Tarzi-Amanullah.
Fatyah – mourning ritual usually held in mosques as well as in homes.
Ijab-o-Qabool – mutual consent (in the context of marriage).
Jarideh Zanan – the only woman-run newspaper in Afghanistan that was shut down by King
Nadir Shah in the 1930s.
Jirga – community council
Khalqi – radical faction of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) headed by
Hafizullah Amin and Nur Muhammad Taraki.
Khan – leader or elder, generally in reference to a tribe or community.
Mahram – close male relative
Mawr – dowry
Mujahideen – holy warriors
Nanawati – forgiveness
Nikkah – Islamic marriage
Parchami – “middle-of-the-road” faction of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
headed by Babrak Karmal.
Poar (or Qhoon) – blood money
Purdah – literary means “curtain” and refers to keeping women behind closed quarters,
out of sight of others, especially men.
Siraj al’Akhbar (The Lamp of the News) – the first Afghan bi-weekly newspaper established by
the intellectual Mahmud Beg Tarzi.
Zina – adultery
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“Any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden.
The citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.”
Article 22 of Afghanistan Constitution, 20041
INTRODUCTION
Contrary to popular belief, Afghan women enjoyed more rights and freedoms in the
1920s than they do today. Their plight under the Taliban came to the attention of the
international community after the seminal events of September 11, 2001. Before this,
very few people understood the atrocities inflicted upon them by the mujahideen (holy
warriors) and most notably the Taliban. This frame of reference has led most to believe
that Afghan women have always been oppressed and have never known freedoms
afforded those in countries where women have the right to vote; make choices about
whom to marry; and what career opportunities to pursue. This is a myth that needs to
be dispelled, and attempts at leveling the playing field should not be couched in
misguided arguments that situate the West as saviors and Islam as antithetical to
women’s rights – both of which result in backlash by conservatives and provide fodder
for extremists.
At times, some Westerners2 forget their own tortuous progress towards women’s
equality, and even though women in developed countries enjoy degrees of equality,
some would define this as imprisonment in a proverbial golden cage that objectifies
them. Secondly, the Western “equality yardstick” used to judge others reflects a lack of
cultural understanding leading to a definition that situates non-Westerners as inferior.
The following report attempts to trace the history of women in Afghanistan along the
backdrop of socio-economic, political and religious conditions that have defined their
standing within Afghan society. Specifically, three significant periods have been
instrumental in shaping their status: the first in the 1920s during King Amanullah Khan’s
reign; the second during the leadership of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan
(PDPA) in the 1970s; and the third being the most recent attempt by the U.S.-backed
Karzai regime from 2001 onward. Attention is also drawn to the understanding of
women’s equality in a local context as well as the rural-urban divide that goes beyond
gender issues. Finally, the status of women in present-day Afghanistan is highlighted in
the context of the issues they contend with on a daily basis such as early and forced
marriages, moral crimes, trafficking, widowhood and education.
HISTORY
King Abdur Rahman Khan – The “Iron Amir” (1880 – 1901)
The commencement of reforms in support of women occurred under the ruling of the
“Iron Amir” – King Abdur Rahman Khan (1880-1901). Considered to be the first of the
1
The Constitution of Afghanistan (2004). Available online:
http://www.afghanembassy.com.pl/cms/uploads/images/Constitution/The%20Constitution.pdf.
Retrieved 10 February 2012.
2
Refers to those from developed countries such as the United States, England, Australia, Canada, etc.
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major reformers, he came into power at the time of the second withdrawal of the
British from Afghanistan. While he was known as a tyrannical ruler who attempted to
form a centralized government and state-sponsored military, his social reforms
concerning women are credited to the influence of his wife, Queen Bobo Jan – a liberalminded woman who challenged the conventional norms and practices of her time.
Queen Bobo engaged in political discussions alongside her husband, accompanied him
on his missions to other nations, and was the first Afghan queen to appear in public
without a veil. As a result of her influence, King Abdur Rahman raised the age of
marriage,3 gave women the right to divorce under certain circumstances such as cruelty,
and enabled them to inherit property.4 He was also instrumental in creating an
extensive legal system that included the establishment of Shari’a courts; a tax system as
a mechanism of generating revenue; and a postal system – which he did primarily to spy
on those he did not trust.
King Habibullah Khan (1901 – 1919)
King Abdur Rahman’s son, Habibullah Khan (1901-19) continued his father’s socioeconomic and political reforms, with his most significant contributions in the realm of
education. For example, King Habibullah established the all-boys school Habibia in 1903;
the Royal Military College (1904-06); and tapped the Ottoman Empire for assistance
given their successful adoption of Western technology while preserving their cultural
and religious identity. Additionally, he was successful in bringing academics from various
countries to teach in Afghan schools and colleges, encouraged individuals to study
abroad, and convinced Afghans living abroad to return to their homeland.
King Amanullah Khan – The Reformer of Reformers (1919 – 1929)
While the birth of “modern monarchies” is attributed to King Abdur Rahman (18801901), it was his grandson Amanullah Khan (1919-29) who became king after the
assassination of his father (King Habibullah). King Amanullah, who is popularly referred
to as the “reformer of reformers,” implemented a full-fledged attempt at modernization
centered on liberating women from tribal cultural norms. Among other things, he
reorganized the monarchy in the context of a constitutional framework by revising the
constitution of Afghanistan in 1923;5 prohibited polygamy; abolished the purdah;6
campaigned against the veil; increased educational opportunities for girls; raised the
legal age of marriage (18 for women and 21 for men); and instituted a 1924
constitutional decree that eliminated the bride price and gave women the freedom to
choose their spouses.
3
The exact age is difficult to determine given that documents confirming this information are difficult to
locate.
4
Kakar, H.K. (1979). Government and Society in Afghanistan: The Reign of Amir Abdur al-Rahman Khan.
Austin: University of Texas Press.
5
The first Afghanistan constitution was established in the 1890s by King Abdur Rahman Khan.
6
Literary means “curtain” and refers to keeping women behind closed quarters, or out of the sight of
others, especially men.
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Following in his grandfather’s (King Abdur Rahman’s) footsteps, King Amanullah also
established modern banking, tax, and court systems – the latter of which was to be
based on secular penal, commercial and civil codes rather than Shari’a. He went on to
establish guarantees of civil rights; develop a national identity card system; institute a
legislative body responsible for enforcing legal codes; forbid the practice of “blood
money;” and prohibit nepotism and privileges afforded to royal family members and
tribal leaders.7 While his father established the first all-boys school, King Amanullah
established the first all-girls school in 1921 and appointed the first minister of education
in 1922. Additionally, during his reign the number of primary and secondary schools
increased, and adult education centers and vocational schools were established in
Kabul. He also sent boys and girls abroad to Turkey, France and Germany for higher
education.8
King Amanullah’s wife, Queen Soraya (1899-1968) was also a staunch advocate of civil
rights, and women’s rights in particular. Queen Soraya was Mahmud Beg Tarzi’s
daughter, an influential intellectual who was persuaded to return to Afghanistan by King
Habibullah Khan. Tarzi’s interpretation of Islam had a modern bent and, like his
daughter, he advocated for equal treatment of the sexes – going as far as to posit that
their inclusion was an asset to Afghanistan. Serving as King Amanullah’s Foreign
Minister, Tarzi pushed for modernization such as Western dress, abolishing the purdah,
and calling for drastic military reform by supplanting old-world conservative generals
with progressive ones. Tarzi was also the pioneering editor of the first Afghan bi-weekly
newspaper, Siraj al’Akhbar (The Lamp of News), which had a section called Celebrating
the Women of the World.9
Queen Soraya was born and raised in Damascus, Syria and was educated by her father
and socialized in “western and modern values,” which had a tremendous influence on
her ideas about a woman’s place in society. The Tarzi family was exiled to Syria based on
their liberal views, but invited back by King Amanullah’s father. Queen Soraya
established the first woman’s magazine, Ershad-e-Niswan (Guidance for Women). In a
speech delivered in 1926 on the 7th anniversary of Afghanistan’s independence from the
British, the Queen addressed her audience by first removing her veil, and then stating
that:
“It [Independence] belongs to all of us and that is why we celebrate it. Do you
think, however, that our nation from the outset needs only men to serve it?
Women should also take their part as women did in the early years of our nation
and Islam. From their examples we must learn that we must all contribute
toward the development of our nation and that this cannot be done without
7
Poullada, L.B. (1973). Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press.
8
Samady, S.R. (2007). Education and Scientific Training for Sustainable Development of Afghanistan.
Available online: http://eslus.com/articles/Afghanistan%20Ed.pdf. Retrieved 01 February 2012.
9
Poullada, L.B. (1973). Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press.
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being equipped with knowledge. So we should all attempt to acquire as much
knowledge as possible, in order that we may render our services to society in the
manner of the women of early Islam.”10
The wives of other government heads followed suit and removed their veils. In 1928,
Queen Soraya was also influential in persuading the government to send 15 female
students to Turkey for higher education. Like her father, the Queen advocated strongly
on behalf of women and their involvement in nation-building, and her advocacy was not
limited to Kabul – she wanted rural women to be included into the fold even though this
was not successful.11 King Amanullah’s sister, Kobra Amanullah, was also a pioneering
liberal who engaged in advocacy on behalf of women. She established an organization
intended to give voice to oppressed women called Anjuman-e-Himayat-e-Niswan
(Organization for Women’s Protection).
In 1927-28, the King and Queen toured Europe and were warmly welcomed by the
French, Britons, and Germans. They were even given honorary degrees from Oxford
University. Photos of their interactions with other royals made it back to Afghanistan,
and when the conservatives viewed pictures of the Queen without a veil, interacting
with foreign men, and having her hand kissed by them, it was taken as a sort of
“betrayal of Afghan culture, religion and ‘honor’ of women.”12 Some assert that this was
a ploy on the part of the British to destabilize Afghanistan given that they did not look
upon the Tarzi family favorably. Having returned from their European tour, the King and
Queen were treated with hostility and eventually forced out of Afghanistan13 in a tribal
insurrection in November 1928 led by Bacha-i-Saqqao.14
King Amanullah did not want to incite civil war, so he and the Queen voluntarily went
into exile in Italy and later Switzerland. King Amanullah is thought by many to have been
way ahead of his time and his final reform of ending arranged marriages via decree was
seen by conservative tribal folk to be a step too far, and was considered by some to
have been instrumental in the demise of his monarchy and eventual ousting in 1929.15
However, others attribute his regime’s demise to “radical” political and military reforms
such as the attempt to play the British Raj against the Soviet Union and the radical
10
In Dupree, N.H. (1986). Women of Afghanistan. Stiftung-Foundation.
Her Majesty Queen Soraya Tarzi. Available online:
http://www.tarzi.net/people/historical/SorayaTarzi.html. Retrieved 08 February 2012.
12
Ibid.
13
Her Majesty Queen Soraya Tarzi. Available online:
http://www.tarzi.net/people/historical/SorayaTarzi.html. Retrieved 08 February 2012.
14
His real name was Habibullah Kalakani and he was a “Tajik bandit” that was eventually executed in
November 1929.
15
Ahmed-Ghosh, H. (1993). A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future. Journal of
International Women Studies, 4(3); pp. 1-14.
11
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change to national army conscription: supplanting his grandfather’s hasht nafari system
with the pishk system.16
King Nadir Shah (1929 – 1933)
Garnering enough tribal support, Nadir Shah (1929-33), the former minister of war, was
able to take over Kabul with the assistance of the British – eventually becoming king.
Backed by the British, King Nadir ended King Amanullah’s efforts at modernization,
allying himself with conservative religious elements of society. He was intent on
handling tribal leaders and their rural communities gently. King Nadir of the
Musahiban17 family did nothing to agitate tribal leaders and aside from responding to
frequent in-fighting, he left them to rule their own tribes. However, previous reforms
had resulted in educated groups in urban sectors that came to demand more political
participation and modernization. This did not faze King Nadir whose main objective was
to maintain balanced state-tribal power. He accomplished this by favoring Pashtuns over
other ethnicities, and while he shut down the only woman-run newspaper, Jarideh
Zanan, he did establish a few girls’ schools in urban areas. In 1930, there were 13
primary and secondary schools with 53 teachers and 1,590 pupils.18
King Zahir Shah (1933 – 1973)
Four years after seizing power, King Nadir was assassinated by a teenage boy at a
graduation ceremony leaving his son, Mohammad Zahir (1933-73), to take over at the
age of 18. Although King Zahir Shah was of the younger Musahiban generation, his
approach to modernization in the four decades he reigned was slow and steady, with
Kabul being a testing ground where modernization efforts took place before they were
implemented elsewhere. King Zahir Shah, like his father, did not want to create waves
and agitate tribal leaders, which explains why it took his regime three decades to
implement social reforms. During his reign, schools were established and women’s
participation in the labor force increased, though there were still stark differences
between women in rural areas and those in urban areas. Those in the latter became
doctors, teachers and nurses, while most in the former were still held to tribal customs.
His cousin, Daud Khan (1953-63), who served as Prime Minister, was instrumental in
implementing social reforms that enabled women to enter the labor force.
By the 1940s, there were 324 schools, 1,990 teachers and 60,000 pupils – 900 of which
were girls. In 1941, a secondary school for females was established in Kabul. The
education system increased considerably in the 1950s, and by 1956 there were about
16
The hasht nafari system required 1 in 8 males over the age of 18 to serve in the army; while the new
system, pishk, was supposed to be more egalitarian, where every male between the ages of 17 – 20 had
an equal chance of being drafted, and everyone over the age of 15 was to be taxed as a way to finance
the army. The former system was snubbed by tribal chiefs and Pashtuns in particular.
17
A branch of the royal family in Afghanistan.
18
Poullada, L.B. (1973). Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press.
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126,000 students enrolled in school. Girls’ schools also increased in seven provinces (out
of a total of 29 at that time).19
In 1959 women were allowed to do away with the veil, with members of the royal family
and wives of senior officials appearing at public functions without them. While this did
not cause uproar in Kabul, it did trigger a revolt that resulted in the death of 60 people
in Kandahar that the government was eventually able to suppress.20 Additionally, in
1963 there was a proposal made by the government to allow women to hold separate
fatyahs (mourning rituals) in Kabul mosques, which was construed by U.S. officials as a
“…desire to continue the process of feminine emancipation begun under former Prime
Minister Daud.”21
The adoption of the 1964 Constitution22 was significant for women given that it was the
first time in Afghanistan’s history that they were granted the right to vote and take part
in political institutions such as becoming members of Parliament. The constitution also
permitted free speech, civil rights and universal suffrage, with the first elections held in
1965. Around 15 to 20 percent of urban women were said to have voted during these
elections. A declassified U.S. document from the same year (1965) relays information
about municipal elections held in Jalalabad and Kunduz as “trial runs” where women
were encouraged to vote. If successful, as the document stipulates, the “recent reform
measures must be maintained…assuring women the right to vote.”23 This “experiment in
democracy” was seen as a positive indicator of further modernization. The 1964
Constitution also enabled political groups to form, mostly inspired by regional and
international movements. For example, the mid-1960s witnessed the formation of leftist
and religious-oriented groups in Afghanistan – the former advocating liberalism, the
latter calling for more religiosity.
In 1965, the Democratic Organization of Afghan Women (DOAW) was established,
working to end illiteracy, bride prices and forced marriages. Another little known fact
was the invitation extended by the National Federation of Chinese Women to five
“prominent” Afghan women in 1966. The delegation was invited for a three-week visit
to China to “observe women’s organizations and schools.” The declassified U.S.
document states that this gesture on the part of China “reflects continuing Chicom24 [sic]
19
Samady, S.R. (2007). Education and Scientific Training for Sustainable Development of Afghanistan.
Available online: http://eslus.com/articles/Afghanistan%20Ed.pdf. Retrieved 13 January 2012.
20
Qazi, Abdullah (2011). The Plight of the Afghan Woman. Afghanistan Online. Available online:
http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/afghanwomenhistory.html. Retrieved 10 February 2012.
21
Wolf, P. (2011). Afghanistan: Experiment in Democracy. Documents from the U.S. National Archives,
1961-1973. Available online: http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/afghanistan.htm. Retrieved 10
February 2011.
22
The first constitution was established in the 1890s, with revisions in 1923, 1964, 1976, 1987, 1990 and
2004.
23
Department of State (1965). Municipal Elections Slated as Trial Runs. Memo from the Embassy in Kabul
by Ashford, H.J., then Counselor of Embassy for Political Affairs. Available online:
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/ashford3april1965.htm. Retrieved 10 February 2012.
24
Chicom is short for Chinese communists.
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campaign to woo Afghans with cultural exchange.”25 In another first for Afghan women,
in 1972 Zohra Yusuf Daoud was crowned Miss Afghanistan, but unlike beauty pageants
in other countries, the one in Afghanistan did not include a swimsuit competition.26
Daud Khan & the PDPA (1973 – 1978)
In the early-1970s, Afghanistan’s educated urbanites were growing restless, asserting
their left leanings. The Afghan people were angry with the lack of social and economic
developments, not to mention King Zahir Shah’s nepotistic tendencies. In 1973, Daud
Khan (1973-78) staged a coup d’etat while King Zahir Shah was abroad, and declared
Afghanistan a republic with himself as president. The PDPA, which was established in
1965, was a pro-Soviet group that not only had support from citizens but even more
from military officers who were the direct beneficiaries of aid from the U.S.S.R. During
the mid-1970s, the PDPA broke off into two factions: the radical Khalqis headed by
Hafizullah Amin and Nur Muhammad Taraki; and the middle-of-the-road Parchamis
headed by Babrak Karmal.27 Daud Khan aligned himself with the latter.
Within a couple of years of becoming president, Daud Khan started to turn against his
own supporters and the Soviets, seeking instead to improve relations with the U.S., Iran,
Pakistan and Egypt. His regime was unstable due to various internal and external
factors, and over the course of four years, the president had five different prime
ministers. Daud Khan’s efforts to contain the active communist movements within
Afghanistan coupled with the unexpected nepotism he displayed (e.g., appointing his
family members to high government positions) led to the Saur Revolution on April 28,
1978, where both factions of the PDPA launched a coup that resulted in his
assassination and the killing of most of his family.28 They marked this success by
changing the name of the country from the Republic of Afghanistan to the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan shortly thereafter.
In the wake of the revolution, the radical Khalqi faction of the PDPA was successful in
installing Nur Muhammad Taraki and wasted no time in implementing a top-down
reform agenda. With respect to women’s rights, Daud Khan advocated the prohibition
of the veil and the expansion of women’s rights and freedoms, though this was largely
confined to those residing in urban areas such as Kabul. While governmental decrees
applied to women living in rural areas, no information or research exists on their status
at that time. However, the understanding is that despite legal rights, they continued to
be oppressed and “treated as property.”29 In the context of economic production, rural
25
Department of State (1966). Incoming Telegram. Memo from the Embassy in Kabul relaying sociopolitical information. Available online: http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/weeka10mar1966.jpg.
Retrieved 10 February 2012.
26
Qazi, Abdullah (2011). The Plight of the Afghan Woman. Afghanistan Online. Available online:
http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/afghanwomenhistory.html. Retrieved 10 February 2012.
27
Arnold, A. (1983). Afghanistan’s Two-Party Communism: Parcham and Khalq. Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
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Afghan women played a role that was limited to processing dried goods such as fruit,
embroidering, and producing rugs. While many worked outside the home, this was
primarily out of necessity – just as it is the case today.
As with previous attempts by others, the PDPA was intent on state-building, rapid
centralization and modernization as well as ending the stronghold of tribal leaders. Just
as before, they experienced tremendous opposition from rural factions that wanted
nothing to do with what they considered to be radical reforms. The PDPA attempted to
impose their socio-political ideology on unwilling Afghans, at times doing so violently.
Their new socialist agenda promoted an atheistic state that obliged men to cut their
beards and banned women from wearing burqas. Moreover, they initially closed
mosques and banned attendance (but later opened them in the 1980s in order to win
support); banned the practice of bride price and forced marriages; raised the age of
marriage; and set up literacy programs and advocated for education of men and
women. While urbanites supported modernization, they did not support the Soviet
occupation.30 Increasing opposition left the PDPA fractured and unable to stabilize the
country due to internal strife, opposition from tribal militias, foreign interference, and
eventually, the sudden withdrawal of financing by the Soviets. On December 26, 1979,
the Soviets – not entirely satisfied with the way the PDPA was handling things – invaded
Afghanistan.31
Contrary to popular perceptions, the issue of the advancement of women's rights has
often been central to the modernization efforts of various Afghan governments, most
notably in the years between the reign of King Abdur Rahman (late 19th-century) and
the assassination of Daud Khan (late 20th-century). However, external and internal
factors, such as outside interference by global powers, domestic resistance from rural
factions, and the dominance of economic and security issues has complicated efforts to
extend freedoms beyond the limited successes seen in urban areas. Because of these
mitigating factors, it would be a mistake to write off past attempts to institute reforms
of women's rights. True reform in this area is not possible without a strong central
government, but unfortunately political power plays among and between royal family
members and foreigners; the inability to develop a unified army; and religious struggles
initiated by those who conflated secularism with atheism have prevented the
emergence of one.
The top-down approach of reform instituted for women most likely did not sit well with
those in rural areas, and more than anything, was viewed as an attempt on the part of
those in power to do away with tribal cultural traditions and supplant them with
Western (read secular) ones. On the other hand, the PDPA – while utilizing a similar
mechanism of instituting reforms – also empowered Afghan women to push for equality
at a grassroots level. This bottom-up approach eventually worked against the PDPA and
the Soviets because when it became clear that there was an attempt to replace Afghan
30
31
Halliday, F. (1980). War and Revolution in Afghanistan. New Left Review, 1(119); pp. 20-41.
Ibid.
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cultural and religious norms and practices with Soviet traditions, women sided with
resistance movements.
The Soviets & the Taliban (1979 – 2001)
Aided by the Soviet Union, the PDPA was successful in holding on to power in some
cities, however this angered many Afghans who were not supportive of an extreme
leftist agenda and resulted in the formation of radical Islamic groups bent on resisting
the PDPA. The interference of outsiders added to the instability of Afghanistan, as did
the inability of any one group to gain dominance. For instance, Pakistan’s thenpresident, Zia al-Haq, supported the Pashtuns and allowed them sanctuary in his
country. Iran’s Khomeini encouraged and provided aid to Shias; and China, the U.S., and
Saudi Arabia supported those who were anti-PDPA – primarily due to their opposition to
the Soviets. Tribal militia groups were also finding ideological backing by pro-Islamist
figures from urban regions such as Ahmad Shah Masood, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.32
Recognizing that defeating the mujahideen in purely military terms was not an option
the Soviet-backed PDPA began reaching out to tribes under a new president,
Muhammad Najibullah, who attempted to make amends under his policy of National
Reconciliation. This changed the dynamic militarily, with President Najibullah beginning
to rely on tribal militia forces by redirecting military supplies to these groups.33 “By the
late 1980s, both pro-government and pro-mujahideen tribal fighting groups were
transformed into well-funded and well-equipped militias, and the old rural authorities of
tribal khan and village elder were first reinforced, and then supplanted, but a new type
of leadership, that of militia commanders and warlords.”34 Ultimately, this did not bode
well for President Najibullah whose regime collapsed when aid was cut by the Soviets,
and he was pressured by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to step down.35 A group of warlords
were brought to the forefront, including Dostum, Hekmatyar and Masood.
The position of women during the Soviet invasion was a delicate balancing act of relying
on a foreign invader to safeguard gains but not supporting them entirely. Women
enjoyed participating in the labor force – mainly as doctors, teachers, and judges. In
1984, Khatol Muhammadzai became the first female paratrooper in the Afghan army.36
Some Afghan women served as members of the PDPA’s Central Committee, however
their participation was symbolic with no real power to effect change. While some
women found it refreshing that traditional views held by Afghan males were being
32
Giustozzi, A. (1999). War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 1978-1992. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
33
Ibid.
34
Cronin, S. (2011). Building and Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army: A Historical Perspective. The Journal of
Military History, 75; p. 555.
35
When Kabul was captured by the Taliban in 1996; they found Najibullah in a U.N. compound where he
was taking refuge, and executed him.
36
st
She would later become the 1 female General in the Afghan National Army (ANA), and currently works
at Afghanistan’s Ministry of Defense (MoD).
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challenged, others were beginning to lose respect for Afghan communists given their
dependence on the Soviet Union for legitimacy. When it came time to take a stand, they
eventually sided with those who resisted the Soviets, and played a significant role
against the occupiers. Demonstrations were held by high school and university women.
For instance in April 1980, a high school student known only as Nahid, mobilized other
youth to participate in a mass demonstration against the Soviets in Kabul. Sadly, she was
killed and is recognized today as a “symbol of patriotism.”37 Additionally, women
provided aid to refugees and families of those who were on the frontlines of the SovietAfghan war in the form of food, lodging, education and health care.38 The participation
of women in humanitarian aid solidified their empowerment and involvement in
organizing at the grassroots level, even though they risked losing their lives.
The decade-long invasion of the Soviets forced millions of Afghans to flee into
neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Iran as well abroad to Europe, the U.S. and
Canada. In addition to serious human rights violations, millions of Afghans were killed,
their homes were destroyed, and the government arrested those who opposed them. In
1986, Amnesty International reported on the state of political prisoners who were
detained for merely exercising their freedom to demonstrate peacefully. Women who
were imprisoned testified to “being forced to witness the torture of male prisoners.”39
After the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989 and the fall of the pro-Soviet government,
Afghanistan was left in shambles. The central government and its institutions of the
late-19th and mid-20th centuries were not as strong enough to have an effect on most
Afghans, and their temporary collapse and reconstruction were barely felt. However, by
the late-20th century the role of the Afghan state was much more significant in the lives
of Afghans, and with its collapse, the people were forced to rely on militia leaders,
warlords, and tribal khans for security and other provisions. Most of the educated
Afghans – mainly residing in urban areas – fled in the late-1980s and early-1990s and
most of the military that remained joined militias.
By 1992, Afghanistan was essentially without a state government and formal military. A
perfect storm ensued: tons of weapons, loads of cash and multiple factions vying for
localized power and wealth at the expense of peace. Militia leaders did not possess the
vision to be concerned with anything other than holding on to power. Rape and sexual
abuse of women were used to weaken the opponent and shame communities. Women
37
Qazi, Abdullah (2011). The Plight of the Afghan Woman. Afghanistan Online. Available online:
http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/afghanwomenhistory.html. Retrieved 10 February 2012.
38
Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men’s Power Struggles. (1999). Amnesty International. Available
online: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/c80434b3-e035-11dd-865ad728958ca30a/asa110111999en.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
39
Ibid. p. 3.
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were taken at whim by mujahideen commanders and fighters for sexual purposes,
leading some to commit suicide in order to avert such an atrocious fate.40
Under the Rabbani regime (1992-1996), women were still allowed to attend school and
work, with women comprising half of the labor force in Kabul. During Rabbani’s reign,
however, Hekmatyar41 became Prime Minister (1993-1994) and as a mechanism of
strengthening the government against the Taliban, he curtailed some of the freedoms of
women, but enabled them to work and go to school.42
The Taliban took control of Kabul from the warlords on September 29, 1996, and for a
time, the lawlessness and violence subsided.43 They were initially a welcome relief from
the feuding warlords, but in time, they would prove to unleash havoc on Afghans and
attempt to institute a form of Islam that was as extreme in its restrictions on women as
the PDPA was in its insistence on their emancipation. The Taliban entered the picture in
1994 and by 1996 ruled over 80 percent of Afghanistan. Their intent was to establish an
Islamic government based on their interpretation of Shari’a Law.44 While some Taliban
were at one time mujahideen fighters, most were young Afghan males who attended
madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan primarily run by an extremely conservative
religio-political party called the Jamiat-e Ulama-e Islam Pakistan. The Talibans’ hostile
takeover of Afghanistan went primarily unchallenged and resulted in strict punishment
for crimes such as murder, theft, adultery, and gambling. The brutality of the Taliban
was barbaric and included public executions of murderers and adulterers, and
amputation of limbs for robbery. Their barbarism towards women was even more
atrocious: women were relegated to nothing more than property; could not work or
study; and had to be covered in public wearing burkas. In addition, all forms of
entertainment were outlawed, including listening to music, watching television, playing
chess, cockfighting and kite-flying. Paintings containing pictures of people and animals
were also prohibited and/or destroyed.45
The restrictions placed on women were initially couched in the context of security and
protection. However, once the Taliban captured Kabul, the rules became more
stringent, with militants given the power to implement summary justice. Peoples’ basic
freedoms were stripped and brutal restrictions were placed on women, resulting in an
atmosphere of fear that kept all in line. Women were not allowed to leave their homes
40
Amnesty International (1999). Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men’s Power Struggles. Available
online: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/c80434b3-e035-11dd-865ad728958ca30a/asa110111999en.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
41
Hekmatyar also served as Prime Minister of the Northern Alliance from 1996–1997.
42
Qazi, Abdullah (2011). The Plight of the Afghan Woman. Afghanistan Online. Available online:
http://www.afghan-web.com/woman/afghanwomenhistory.html. Retrieved 10 February 2012.
43
Rashid, A. (2001). Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords. London, England: Pan Books.
44
Refers to the moral code or Islam’s religious law. The primary sources it derives from are the Qur’an and
the Sunnah, or the sayings and examples of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
45
During my visit to Kabul in 2002, I went to the National Gallery and found paintings depicting people and
animals completely destroyed.
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without a male escort; females who were at one time teachers and doctors were forced
to resort to begging and prostitution to provide for their families’ needs. Based on
historical data, women under Taliban rule were subjected to the worst treatment than
at any other point in Afghan history.46
The Taliban had the most deleterious impact on women in the areas of education and
healthcare. In the context of education, girls were restricted from attending school and
in the context of healthcare, women were not allowed to be examined by male health
practitioners, nor were most women allowed to practice medicine. Additionally, “a
number of home visit mid-wife and widow’s health schemes [were] shut down…” and
“attempts…to centralize women’s hospital services in Kabul…”47 would have further
restricted women’s access to healthcare. The attempt at centralizing healthcare services
for women was met with protests from the international community, particularly aid
agencies, which led to a policy reversal by the Taliban regime.48
The Taliban also established the Department for the Propagation of Virtue and the
Suppression of Vice (DPVSV) sending out “religious police” to enforce arbitrary
punishments, which often took the form of public beatings. As a 1998 report by
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) states, “It is difficult to find another government or
would-be government in the world that has deliberately created such poverty by
arbitrarily depriving half the population under its control of jobs, schooling, mobility,
and health care. Such restrictions are literally life threatening to women and to their
children.”49
While the Taliban inflicted cruel punishment on the Afghan population, particularly
women, what is often missed or glossed over is that some did not accept their
oppression, but quietly and invisibly resisted. One major mechanism of resistance was
establishment of secret schools. Women, particularly those who were educated as
teachers and doctors, were very much concerned about the future of their children.
These women especially felt the need to do something and often turned their living
quarters into home-based education centers. This was not limited to Kabul – there were
home-based education centers in Balkh, Nangarhar, and Herat. Obviously, the
establishment of schools for girls was prohibited by the Taliban, but local communities
justified attendance by cloaking it as religious education. However, girls were being
taught more than just religion. They were being taught to read and write and in most
46
Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men’s Power Struggles. (1999). Amnesty International. Available
online: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ASA11/011/1999/en/c80434b3-e035-11dd-865ad728958ca30a/asa110111999en.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
47
Ibid. p. 5.
48
See the following report for a detailed account of the lives of Afghan women under Taliban rule: The
Taliban’s War on Women: A Health and Human Rights Crisis in Afghanistan. (1998). Physicians For Human
Rights (PHR). Boston & Washington, DC. Available online:
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/rossrights/docs/reports/taliban.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
49
Ibid. p. 3
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cases were exposed to science and literature.50 Support of Afghan men in local
communities was instrumental in propagating these efforts, again, not only in urban
areas but in rural ones as well.
Within a span of two decades, Afghan women experienced two different realities set at
opposite ends of a spectrum: one that attempted to liberate them, albeit at times
forcefully, and included a doing away with traditional (read antiquated) values and
customs (i.e., pro-Soviet PDPA); and another that sought to strip them of every ounce of
dignity and freedom, confining them to their homes like caged animals (i.e., Taliban).
What also occurred during this time is that the gulf between the experiences of urban
and rural women decreased, with the former understanding much more clearly the
realities of the latter. Thus educated urban women were able to empathize much more
with their rural counterparts who may not have had the privilege of experiencing some
of the rights and freedoms enjoyed by them.
2001 and Beyond
The plight of Afghan women came to the West’s attention after the attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York City on September 11, 2001. Having found refuge in
Taliban-ridden Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden claimed responsibility for the atrocious
acts, and a result, most of the world’s eyes became fixated on a poor, antiquated
country. Initial attempts at overthrowing the Taliban included empowering the Northern
Alliance with money and armament without having to commit (U.S.) troops. But with
the killing of Ahmad Shah Masood (the most prominent leader of the Northern Alliance)
just two days before the seminal events of 9/11 and the revitalization of local militias;
troop commitment became inevitable. Attempts at forming a central government with
Hamid Karzai as president did not exclude warlords. On the contrary, they were an
important part of the new government.51
Before 9/11 very few people understood the atrocities inflicted upon Afghans and
women in particular by the mujahideen and most notably the Taliban. Immediately after
9/11, the United Nations (UN) held a conference in Bonn, Germany that brought
prominent Afghans and powerful political and military figures together to begin the hard
work of Afghanistan’s reconstruction. This resulted in what is known as the Bonn
Agreement in December 2001. Afghan women also participated as did Afghans from the
diaspora community. Among other things, the Agreement stipulated some significant
provisions concerning women, and human rights in general. The Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)52 was borne of the Agreement, which
led to the establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA).
50
Nemat-Ashraf, O. (2011). Afghan Women at the Crossroads: Agents of Peace or Its Victims? The Century
Foundation. Washington, DC.
51
Bhatia, M. & Sedra, M. (2008). Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict. London, England: Routledge.
52
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission’s (AIHRC) official website:
http://www.aihrc.org.af/en.
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Efforts to institute national organizations to address human rights, and women’s rights
specifically should be lauded. However, how efficacious they have been in achieving and
maintaining basic civil liberties is another issue altogether.
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS (SCR)
Before delving into a discussion about organizations and provisions established to
protect Afghan women, it is important to understand some of the UN Security Council
mandates that have been instrumental in the proliferation of women’s rights in
Afghanistan (and beyond). The first, which is specific to Afghanistan is Resolution 1974
and stipulates the following:
“To assist in the full implementation of the fundamental freedoms and human
rights provisions of the Afghan Constitution and international treaties to which
Afghanistan is a State party, in particular those regarding the full enjoyment by
women of their human rights.”
As Table 1 indicates, there are five other resolutions – the first of which is Security
Council Resolution (SCR) 1325 enacted in 2000 mandating “…equal participation and full
involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”
Additionally, it stipulates protection from gender-based violence against women and
girls, specifically in regards to the police and judiciary. This resolution represents a postCold War shift that places greater emphasis on the socio-cultural and political facets of
violence. SCRs 1820, 1888 and 1889 provide further guidance on the implementation of
SCR 1325. More specifically, SCR 1820 and SCR 1888 focus on “rape and sexual violence
against women in conflict,” while SCR 1889 focuses on the “participation agenda in SCR
1325.”53 Finally, SCR 1960, which is the newest resolution, focuses on accountability for
sexual violence against women.
53
CARE International (2010). From Resolution To Reality: Lessons Learned From Afghanistan, Nepal and
Uganda on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Governance. United Kingdom. p. 3.
Available online: http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-ReportWomen-Peace-Participation.pdf. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
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TABLE 1. UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON WOMEN, PEACE & SECURITY54
RESOLUTION
1325
1820
1888
1889
1960
DESCRIPTION
First SCR to link women’s experiences of conflict to the maintenance of
international peace and security.
First SCR resolution to recognize conflict-related sexual violence as a tactic of
warfare and a matter of international peace and security, requiring
peacekeeping, justice, services and peace negotiation response.
Strengthens tools for implementing 1820 through assigning high-level
leadership, building judicial response expertise, strengthening service
provision, and building reporting mechanisms.
Addresses women’s exclusion from early recovery and peace-building and
lack of adequate planning and funding for their needs.
Provides an accountability system for addressing conflict-related sexual
violence, including by listing perpetrators and establishing monitoring,
analysis, and reporting arrangements.
YEAR
PRESENTED BY
2000
NAMIBIA
2008
USA
2009
USA
2009
VIETNAM
2010
USA
NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR WOMEN OF AFGHANISTAN (NAPWA)
The National Action Plan for Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA 2008-2018) was initially
introduced in 2007 and approved by GIRoA in 2008. It focuses on six areas that are
thought to be critical in prioritizing the improvement of women’s standing in
Afghanistan. These include: security; health; education; legal protection and human
rights; leadership and political participation; and economy, work and poverty. NAPWA’s
goals align with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Constitution, and the
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).55
NAPWA’s implementation is a “benchmark” under the auspices of Afghanistan’s
Compact 21. At the Kabul Conference (2010), National Priority Program (NPP) capacity
development was prioritized in order to “accelerate” the implementation of NAPWA.
Given that Afghanistan is a “signatory to CEDAW” it was required to present its first
report to the CEDAW committee, which has yet to be accomplished. “On the formal
side, there have been many promises but few enactments.”56
ELIMINATION OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN (EVAW)
The Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) law originated in 2003 as a
commission under the auspices of MoWA. It was considered a “landmark” provision that
was finally enacted into law in 2009 and recognized as the first major step in ending
injustices against women. Prevention and prosecution of violence directed at women is
advocated under EVAW, in addition to “fighting against customs, traditions and
54
For details on the SCRs, see the following poster: http://www.unifem.org/campaigns/1325plus10/wpcontent/uploads/2010/05/FourCommitments_Poster_en.pdf. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
55
For a detailed list of GIRoA’s “commitments to women,” see Appendix 2 of the following report: Gender
Review Report (2011). Royal Norwegian Embassy Afghanistan. Oslo, Norway. Available online:
http://zunia.org/uploads/media/knowledge/Gender%20Review%20Afghanistan1311142594.pdf.
Retrieved 15 February 2012.
56
Ibid. p. 16.
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practices that cause violence against women contrary to the religion of Islam.”57 Under
Article 5 of EVAW,58 the following acts constitute violence against women:
• Abuse
• Baad (utilization of females to settle debts or disputes)
• Beating
• Causing disability or injury
• Defamation of character (damaging the reputation of a victim)
• Denial of inheritance rights
• Denial of right to education
• Denial of work and access to health services
• Forced drug addiction
• Forced isolation
• Forced labor
• Forced prostitution
• Forced marriage
• Forcing a female to commit self-immolation
• Harassment or persecution
• Intimidation or humiliation
• Marriage before the legal age (16 years of age for females ; 18 for males)
• Marriage to more than one wife (without observing Article 86 of the Civil Code)
• Prohibiting the choice of a husband
• Rape
• Selling and buying women for the purpose of, or under pretext, of marriage
Since the inception of EVAW Law, 28 provinces in Afghanistan have established a
Commission for the Prevention of Violence Against Women in an effort to support its
implementation. According to the most recent report issued by UNAMA/OHCHR, only
16 of the 28 established commissions are “functioning and meeting regularly.”59 EVAW
Law also calls upon the Afghan National Police (ANP) to protect women by enforcing
and charging perpetrators of domestic violence; registering complaints of abuse; and
57
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
58
At the time of this report, the original EVAW Articles could not be located due to broken links on
MoWA’s website. Therefore, the following document was used as a reference for the aforementioned
provisions of EVAW: Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of
Violence Against Women in Afghanistan. (2010). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
(UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available
online: http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf. Retrieved
18 February 2012.
59
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
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keeping MoWA in the loop regarding its actions. Additionally, police departments that
have established Family Response Units (FRUs) staffed with females are more likely to
take the complaints of women seriously, and in turn, women are more likely to submit
their complaints. Currently, there are 148 FRU offices across Afghanistan with 355
investigators.60
EVAW Law also established the High Commission for the Prevention of Violence Against
Women. Chaired by the Minister of MoWA, the Commission members include the
Deputy Attorney General and Deputy Ministers from various ministries.61 In June 2010,
the Commission called for the establishment of an office in every province of
Afghanistan.
AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (AIHRC)
Established by decree by the Chairman of the Interim Administration on June 6, 2002,
AIHRC is an independent organization responsible for monitoring the activities of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and its affiliated agencies as
well as ensuring the implementation of the law as it pertains to human rights.62 It is
headquartered in Kabul with eight regional offices and six provincial ones.63 It receives
funding from the international community, and while it does not distinguish between
the rights of men, women and children – the nature of Afghan society has made it
inevitable not to focus more on women, with their Women’s Rights Protection Unit
(WRPU) as one of six program areas.64 The Director of AIHRC is Dr. Sima Samar.
In its Annual Report (2010/2011), AIHRC lays out its Four-Year Strategic and Action Plan
(2010-2013) in an effort to fulfill its “constitutional mandate of promoting, protecting
and monitoring human rights…”65 The Action Plan outlines five objectives: leadership,
education, empowerment, advocacy, monitoring and investigation. However, AIHRC
faced major challenges in thoroughly implementing its plans and reaching its objectives.
The first was budgetary constraints, which made it difficult to pay its staff and also led to
the suspension of programs. The second is hampering by GIRoA:
60
Ibid.
Interior, Justice, Information and Culture, Public Health, Higher Education, Education, Labor, Social
Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, and Hajj and Religious Affairs. Additionally one member from each of the
following organizations is also included: AIHRC; Head of the Special Family Court; and Head of the
Afghanistan Independent Bar Association.
62
The establishment of AIRHC aligns with Resolution 134-48 of the 1993 UN General Assembly, Paris
Principles, and Article 58 of Afghanistan’s constitution.
63
The eight regional offices are located in Bamyan, Gardez, Herat, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz and
Mazar-e-Sharif; while the six provincial offices are located in Badakhshan, Daykundi, Ghor, Helmand,
Maimana and Uruzgan.
64
The others include the following: Human Rights Education Unit (HREU); Children’s Rights Protection Unit
(CRPU); Monitoring and Investigation Unit (M&IU); Transitional Justice Unit (TJU); and Unit Protecting the
Rights of Persons with Disability (PWDU).
65
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). Annual Report (2010/2011). p. 2 Available
online: http://www.aihrc.org.af/media/files/Reports/Annual%20Reports/inside.pdf. Retrieved 14
February 2012.
61
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“…the government’s lack of interest and political will in promotion of human
rights, rampant and widespread corruption, especially in judicial organs, and
abuse of power, lack of rule of law and continuation of culture of impunity
remained as major obstacles the AIHRC had to face.”66
The inability to implement much-needed programs – whether directly or inadvertently –
resulted in increases in violence against women and children, with 2010 as the
“deadliest year” resulting in the deaths of 2,45967 civilians. Moreover, between March
2010 and March 2011, there were 2,299 cases of violence perpetrated against women,
but only 26 percent (594 cases) of cases in 28 provinces were opened for investigation
by prosecutors.68
AIHRC sought to increase individuals’ understanding of human rights by hosting 243
workshops and 589 “awareness raising meetings.” They were also successful in
“institutionalizing” human rights in schools, religious centers, teacher training centers,
judicial training centers, police training centers and military training centers – even
opening a human rights study center at Herat University. Moreover, 1,661 “monitoring
missions” to women’s prisons and detention centers were conducted leading to the
discovery that 434 individuals (379 men and 55 women) “had been illegally imprisoned
or detained”69 but were freed as a result of AIHRC’s work. Similar missions were
conducted at juvenile detention centers wherein it was discovered that 114 children
(102 boys and 12 girls) were illegally detained, but freed as a result of AIHRC.
Despite some criticism of AIHRC being politicized,70 it is still among the most respected
organizations working on behalf of the Afghan citizenry. However, the organization is at
risk of being weakened. In December 23, 2011, President Karzai refused to extend the
appointments of three commissioners thought to be very effective in uncovering
injustices and for being too critical of GIRoA.71 Additionally, GIRoA and the international
community have held off on releasing a scathing report that exposes war crimes
committed by some of those who occupy high positions in GIRoA.72 The main issue
66
Ibid. p. 3
Most likely this is a direct result of the war, however, AIHRC did not make this clear in their report.
68
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
69
Ibid. p. 8
70
Nemat-Ashraf, O. (2011). Afghan Women at the Crossroads: Agents of Peace or Its Victims? The Century
Foundation. Washington, DC.
71
The three individuals include: Nader Nadery, Fahim Hakim and Mauwali Ghulam Muhammad Gharib.
While these three have not been officially fired, GIRoA’s spokesperson has stated that they want “fresh
people” at AIHRC. Moreover, GIRoA has not appointed a replacement for a fourth member, Hamida
Barmaki, who was killed along with her family in a suicide bombing in Kabul in January 2011.
72
This is referred to as a “mapping report” and its release has been delayed several times for fear of
rocking the proverbial “unstable Afghan boat.” For details, see Ruttig, T. (2011). Another Blow to Justice:
67
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appears to be the power to appoint and change commissioners. This process has not
been without its challenges, and international donors and human rights activists feared
that this would turn into a political football. Upon drafting the Law on the Structures,
Duties and Mandates of AIHRC in 2005, Article 7 gave the president the right to make
appointments. It appears that the fears of those who felt that AIHRC’s effectiveness
could be compromised have, to some extent, been realized. The media’s attention on
this issue resulted in outcry from concerned citizens and activists, leading to a meeting
with President Karzai. However, a press release regarding the meeting led to partial
disclosure of what was discussed. It also attempted to redirect attention from who gets
to make appointments to concern over foreign interference due to financing of AIHRC
by international donors.73
MINISTRY OF WOMEN’S AFFAIRS (MoWA)
The roots of MoWA can be traced as far back as 1943 during King Zahir Shah’s reign,
when a group of 20 women established the Women’s Grand Organization (WGO) in
Kabul in an effort to give voice to women and provide a place where they could train
and be educated. Two years later (1945), King Amanullah’s sister, Bibi Zainab, was able
to purchase land and provide a location for WGO, and built a kindergarten, school,
offices, and cinema. In 1963, WGO was incorporated under the auspices of the Ministry
of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA) and referred to as the Women’s Association
continuing its activities until 1978 wherein another organization, the Women’s General
Council (WGC), was formed. In 1986 the Women’s Association changed its name again
to the Women’s Central Club and was subsumed under the WGC, continuing its activities
until 1991. The WGC engaged in socio-political activities and was successful in
establishing branches at the provincial level. Under the mujahideen, the WGO was
restored (1991) and so was the Women’s Association (1994). The Taliban surprisingly
did not abolish the Association or the WGO, but combined them under one umbrella
organization and put men in charge. Post-2001, MoWA was formed based on the Bonn
Conference agreements and became a part of the Interim Administration’s executive
branch. MoWA’s strategy also shifted: from charitable work to policymaking, and it has
established Departments for Women’s Affairs (DoWAs) at the provincial level.74 The
current minister of MoWA is Dr. Hussn Bannu Ghazanfar.
MoWA’s website lists their activities and accomplishments, but access is not currently
available due to broken links; all of the links to publications on their “Resources”
webpage were also broken at the time of the writing of this report.75 The goal of MoWA
is to ensure that all supports and services provided by agencies do not discriminate
Three Commissioners Fired From the AIHRC. Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN). Available online:
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2384. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
73
Kouvo, S. (2012). What Next for the AIHRC (2): Civil Society Responses. Afghanistan Analyst Network
(AAN). Available online: http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2457. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
74
Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). Introduction to MoWA. Available online:
http://mowa.gov.af/en/page/1332. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
75
Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA). Resources. Available online: http://mowa.gov.af/en/page/1348.
Retrieved 14 February 2012.
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against women, but instead promote their rights – thus mainstreaming gender equity.
Some76 posit that MoWA’s top posts are not occupied by professionals who have the
capacity to succeed in advocating on behalf of women. While MoWA’s laws are
intended to protect women, enhance their political representation, and fight for their
rights, so far they have not been able to meet their objectives. This is validated by a
recent joint report by the United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)
and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) wherein it calls upon
MoWA and other agencies that work on behalf of women’s rights to increase their
efforts in enforcing EVAW. However, even with the aforementioned incidents of
violence against women reported by AIHRC (2,299), the UN’s report states that
“…comprehensive official statistics on the number of cases of violence against women in
Afghanistan are not available and most incidents are unreported.”77
In a CARE International (2010) report in which women from Afghanistan, Nepal and
Uganda shared their views on justice and women’s rights, Afghan women activists
expressed their lack of confidence in MoWA. They also expressed concern that no
national action plan (NAP) existed for the implementation of SCR 1325, resulting in
efforts that are “scattered and ad hoc.” MoWA officials, however, are not keen on the
NAP, highlighting that a NAPWA already exists to fill the gap and that the participation
of women in the Regional Peace Jirga (2008) and Consultative Peace Jirga (2010) was
accomplished without SCR 1325 NAP. As a result, many advocates for women’s rights
assert that “MoWA is an obstacle rather than a solution,” explaining that the:
“…stance of MoWA on women[‘s] rights is very weak and pro the discriminatory
attitude of the government overall. When we wanted to demonstrate on the Shia
Law, the MoWA leadership was not supportive and stopped its staff from even
attending the demonstrations.”78
Moreover, the consensus of Afghan women was that MoWA did not possess “adequate
skills, mechanisms and authority” to meets its objective of gender equity. Perhaps
MoWA’s weakness stems not only from the fact that Afghanistan’s male-dominated
government and ministries are not able or willing to take the issue of women’s rights
seriously, but that some in higher echelons of GIRoA responsible for advocating on
behalf of women are more concerned about maintaining their posts than they are with
going against the proverbial grain. The British historian Lord Acton once said that
“power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” This sentiment
76
Nemat-Ashraf, O. (2011). Afghan Women at the Crossroads: Agents of Peace or Its Victims? The Century
Foundation. Washington, DC.
77
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. p. 1. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
78
CARE International (2010). From Resolution To Reality: Lessons Learned From Afghanistan, Nepal and
Uganda on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Governance. United Kingdom. p. 11.
Available online: http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-ReportWomen-Peace-Participation.pdf. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
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applies sometimes to those who gain powerful positions, leaving them to lose sight of
the fact that with power comes responsibility.
The efforts of women activists did not stop with the aforementioned actions that have
influenced Afghan policy. Shortly before the Kabul Conference was held in July 2010,
women’s organizations and activists gathered 300 women from all around Afghanistan
and initiated their own two-day conference – spearheaded by the Afghan Women
Network (AWN). Their conference, referred to as the Women’s Movement from the First
Women’s Council to Kabul Conference, drew the attention of GIRoA and called on
government officials to implement their obligatory commitments to gender equity
under the auspices of the SCRs, EVAW, NAPWA, ANDS79 and the Constitution.
At the Kabul Conference, a presentation was made on the Afghan Peace and
Reintegration Plan (APARP), which was originally introduced at the London Conference
in January 2010. There was one woman representative at the Kabul Conference, but
AWN was vocal and garnered a lot of media attention outside the conference, relaying
their concerns about the exclusion of women in APARP. Even though the High Peace
Council that was inaugurated in October 2010 includes 10 women panelists (compared
to 60 men), the role of women appears to be more or less symbolic, and Afghan women
fear that negotiations between government officials, the Taliban and Pakistani
Intelligence can easily lead to their rights being “…negotiated away in behind-the-scenes
dealings.”80
In an interview with Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), AIHRC Commissioner Dr.
Soraya Rahim Sobhrang provided her views on the status of women in Afghanistan a
decade after the U.S.-led invasion. Dr. Sobhrang argues that before the 1979-Soviet
invasion, the situation for women was “better than today…everyone was able to work
wherever he or she wanted… Nobody told us how to dress or whom to marry.” When
asked if women in villages had the same freedoms, she said “Yes, in the villages the
women wore the chador (head scarf), but this was tradition and not imposed – not like
today.” While she went on to say that the situation for women during the time of the
Taliban was “worse than under the mujahideen,” she added that the latter also imposed
restrictions on women such as banning high-heel shoes, which were thought to make
too much noise and attract attention and distract men. While she admitted that things
are better than they were under the Taliban, she posited that “we [women] are not
satisfied that things have become better than before [pre-Taliban]…things are still not
where they should be” due to the “play of political forces.” She went on to assert that
there are people in GIRoA “who are not really convinced about democracy and equality.
79
Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) contains a Gender Equity Cross-Cutting Strategy
(AGE-CCS).
80
CARE International (2010). From Resolution To Reality: Lessons Learned From Afghanistan, Nepal and
Uganda on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding and Post-Conflict Governance. United Kingdom. p. 10.
Available online: http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-ReportWomen-Peace-Participation.pdf. Retrieved 14 February 2012.
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They only have been forced to pretend when facing the international community that
they support gender politics.”81
Dr. Sobhrang agreed that much had been accomplished in the context of policies and
laws governing women’s rights, but sadly, this was “only on paper.” While some
progress has been made in major cities like Kabul, most of it is still symbolic and
according to her, as long as:
“…corruption is rampant…warlords and commanders stand at the top of the
state…the culture of impunity continues to exist…as long as outside Kabul neither
security nor government authority exists…girls are not able to attend
school…women and children are trafficked, forced marriages flourish, sexual
harassment peaks and the number of self-immolations and suicides is growing
and the future looks bleak, women’s rights all will be neglected.”82
She was also critical of the U.S.-led invasion given that the Americans have not kept
some of their promises. She claimed that Afghans supported the intervention of
foreigners for the first time in history because it was in the name of “democracy,
freedom and security – and in the name of women’s rights.” Again, she purported that
much of it was “on paper” – a symbolic gesture that has no weight, with the true litmus
test being when US-led forces eventually withdraw (2014). When donor countries cease
to continue their monetary support, the very organizations set up to assist the people
and women in particular will likely close down. Dr. Sobhrang asserted that democracy
has been rolled back in recent years and politicians who advocate on behalf of a
democratic society have had to censor themselves for fear of being targeted and killed
by conservatives. Her concluding remarks should serve as a wake-up call for those who
are fixated on withdrawal in 2014 without regard to how the population will fare:
“Because no one knows how the situation will continue, everybody just thinks
about himself and how to loot and fill one’s own pockets. Hopelessness spreads
amongst the population; often families sell their property to send sons or
daughters abroad. We have our past experience and are afraid that this can be
repeated.”83
An October 2011 rare survey of 1,000 Afghan women by the non-governmental
organization (NGO) Action Aid revealed that while 86 percent were concerned about the
return of a “Taliban-style government,” 72 percent felt that their lives were “better now
than they were 10 years ago.” Additionally, 37 percent felt that Afghanistan would
become worse if international forces withdrew in 2014. Of those who were concerned
81
Ruttig, T. (2011). Women’s Rights After 2001: Progress, But Much of It on Paper Only. Afghanistan
Analysts Network (AAN). Available online: http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2114. Retrieved 16
February 2012.
82
Ibid.
83
Ibid.
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about the return of a Taliban-style regime, one in five stated that their main concern
was whether their daughters would be able to continue their education.84
Fawzia Koofi, who became a Member of Parliament in 2005 and the first female deputy
speaker in 2010, is more hopeful about the future of Afghan women. MP Koofi is quite
ambitious and feels that the “silent majority of people” in Afghanistan are ready for a
female president. She asserts that “…Afghanistan needs new leaders, because the same
people have been ruling the country for centuries and decades. But the people have
changed.” In the short time she has served as MP, she has faced two assassination
attempts. Her family has also suffered greatly, with her father and brothers killed at the
hands of the Taliban, and her husband dying in a Taliban prison after contracting
tuberculosis. Despite so many tragedies she retains her conviction, but nonetheless
admits that the imminent withdrawal of the US and its allied forces will leave the Afghan
people with an “uncertain fate,” with women likely to suffer most.85
“Traditionally, the Afghan society is patriarchal in its nature, and women often are considered the
‘property’ of men; they are father’s child when born, brother’s sister when grown up, husband’s wife when
86
married and son’s mother when old.”
MAJOR ISSUES FACING AFGHAN WOMEN PRESENTLY
Even though Afghan women have made strides in the past decade and their
circumstances are better than what they faced under the Taliban, there is still much
work to be done to turn symbolic socio-political gestures into tangible achievements.
Some may argue that it takes time to bring about social and cultural change, with future
generations reaping the benefits of what the current brave activists are trying to
achieve. But history shows that current struggles to achieve gender equity were not
borne in a vacuum and culture is not stagnant. Attempts to give Afghan women more
rights and freedoms – in particular in the 1920s, 1970s and in the present – attest to this
fact. Unfortunately, every step forward appears to be accompanied by several steps
backward, as evidenced by media headlines about forced marriages, severe abuse,
suicide, self-immolation and trafficking.
As mentioned earlier, comprehensive official statistics concerning cases of violence and
abuse are not available and most incidents likely go unreported. While citing instances
that make the headlines is beyond the scope of this report, some are highlighted in this
report in order to showcase the major challenges Afghan women still face in present84
A Just Peace: The Legacy of War for the Women of Afghanistan.(2011). Action Aid. London, England.
Available online: http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/a_just_peace.pdf. Retrieved 17 February 2012.
85
Fawzia Koofi Targets Afghan Presidency As Fight for Women’s Rights Continues (17 February 2012). The
Guardian. Available online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/feb/17/fawzia-koofi-targets-afghanpresidency. Retrieved 19 February 2012.
86
Excerpt from the following report: Trafficking in Person in Afghanistan – Field Survey Report. (2008).
International Organization for Migration (IOM). Available online:
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/activities/countries/docs/afghanistan/iom_re
port_trafficking_afghanistan.pdf. Retrieved 22 February 2012.
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day Afghanistan in an effort to provide a glimpse of how heinously they continue to be
treated.
Being Born Female
In some patriarchal and/or developing countries, giving birth to a girl is not a blessing
but a curse. In Afghanistan, this is sometimes still the case, particularly in rural regions
where if a girl is not killed or given away at birth, she may be given to a rival family or
tribe to settle a debt (baad) – a practice that is most often practiced by Pashtuns as part
of the code of Pashtunwali.87 A female’s worth is only half of a male’s, ensuring her a
bleak fate. On average, the life of a person in Afghanistan and a female’s in particular,
does not hold much value.
Recounting her birth, MP Koofi tells a story of her mother leaving her out in the sun to
die, ashamed that she had given birth to yet another girl. Young girls who are handed
over to rival or feuding families are treated more severely, particularly when they
themselves end up giving birth to girls.88 In one case of brutality exposed in late January
2012, a young mother in Kunduz Province was strangled to death by her husband and
mother-in-law allegedly for giving birth to a girl. This was 18-year-old Storai’s third baby
girl – a circumstance that led to her torture and eventual death, which her mother-inlaw attempted to pass off as a suicide.89
In another act of senseless cruelty, a five-year-old little girl, Fazila, was murdered at the
hands of a 40-year-old man in Saripul Province. He kidnapped and attempted to rape
her, and when she resisted, he choked her to death. When Fazila’s mother went to
search for her the following day, she found Fazila’s lifeless body in the murderer’s home.
The murderer accepted responsibility for his actions and was arrested, but as often
happens in cases such as this, justice was eventually denied. According to the Director of
Women’s Affairs in Saripul, six cases of rape had been reported in the same year (2009),
however, this is most likely a fraction of the actual incidents of such a heinous crime.90
Early Marriage
According to Afghan Civil Law, which was enacted in 1977, Article 70 states that:
“marriage shall not be considered adequate until the male reaches the age of 18
and a female the age of 16.”
87
Afghan Girls Are Penalized for Elders Crimes. (17 February 2012). The New York Times. Available online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/world/asia/in-baad-afghan-girls-are-penalized-for-elderscrimes.html?pagewanted=1&ref=general&src=me. Retrieved 18 February 2012.
88
Ibid.
89
Bowley, G. (30 January 2012). Afghan Kin Are Accused of Killing for Not Bearing A Son. The New York
Times. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/asia/afghan-kin-accused-of-killingwoman-who-failed-to-have-son.html. Retrieved 18 February 2012.
90
Five-Year-Old Girl Was Murdered in Saripul Province of Afghanistan. (30 September 2009). Revolutionary
Association of Women of Afghanistan (RAWA). Available online:
http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2009/09/30/five-years-old-girl-was-murdered-in-saripul-province-ofafghanistan.html. Retrieved 16 February 2012.
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Moreover, Article 71 states that:
“(1) Where the girl does not complete the age provided under Article 70 of this
law, the marriage may be concluded only through her father or the competent
court. (2) The marriage of a minor girl whose age is less than 15 shall never be
permissible.”91
Even though a legal age of marriage is stipulated, child brides as young as seven are not
unheard of due to the lack of regulation and enforcement of laws. Girls are married off
to older men especially by those in rural areas; those who are poor and view females as
a financial burden; and/or to settle a debt. Trading girls – and sometimes boys – to
settle debts is something that “farm families” might be forced to do. Their daughters
may be given to drug smugglers to repay debts incurred as a result of their opium crops
being destroyed by GIRoA; generally these child brides are referred to as opium brides.92
Families, on the other hand, may justify the marriage of young girls as a mechanism of
protecting the family’s honor by ensuring that a girl is married off as a virgin. Tying
family honor to a girl’s actions is a heavy burden to place on a child. While it is very
Western to advocate for her individuality, the very act of placing such a burden on a girl
strips her of dignity and shows how resistant to change these cultural practices are that
benefit men and serve to maintain a stranglehold on females.
Forced Marriages: Baad, Baadal & Honor Killings
Forced marriages imply that consent is not given by one or both of the prospective
spouses, and includes baad and baadal (exchange marriages).93 Forced marriages can
also be harmful to men and boys given that they may not have the right to choose their
spouses freely. However, boys are not used to settle disputes or debts (baad); they can
at times object to their parents’ choice of prospective brides; and can take a second wife
if they are not pleased with their first one. Additionally, men and boys are not generally
subjected to domestic violence and mistreatment by in-laws.
It is estimated that 57 percent of girls who marry are under the age of 16, and 70 to 80
percent are forced into marriage.94 Forced marriages deprive girls of basic rights and
educational opportunities.95 Marriage during childhood negatively impacts girls on
multiple levels. For instance, they do not develop normally psychologically or physically;
91
GIRoA’s Ministry of Justice (MoJ) does not have the Civil Law posted on their website. However, it can be
found in its entirety on the following website: Civil Law of the Republic of Afghanistan (Civil Code).
http://www.asianlii.org/af/legis/laws/clotroacogn353p1977010513551015a650/. Retrieved 18 February
2012.
92
Khan, A. (03 January 2012). Afghanistan’s Opium Brides: Who Is Working on the Issue? Frontline.
Available online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/afghanistan-pakistan/opiumbrides/afghanistans-opium-brides-who-is-working-on-the-issue/. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
93
Articles 3(4), 25 and 26 of EVAW Law, and Article 517 of the Penal Code, as well as Shari’a Law prohibit
baad and baadal.
94
UNIFEM Afghanistan (2008). The Situation of Women in Afghanistan. UNIFEM Afghanistan Fact Sheet.
Available online: http://afghanistan.unifem.org/media/pubs/08/factsheet.html. Retrieved 18 February
2012.
95
Walther, C. (2010). Forced and Early Marriages Still Common for Girls in Afghanistan. UNICEF.
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they are deprived of education; are more susceptible to diseases and maternal
mortality;96 and subjected to abuse and maltreatment.97 They are stripped of their
childhood – something no child should be denied. Even though the Afghan constitution
makes clear that all Afghan citizens have a right to education,98 and Article 5 of EVAW
stipulates that denying education to girls constitutes a form of violence, some contend
that Afghan Civil Law can be interpreted to forbid married girls from attending school99 –
most likely out of fear of “tainting” the minds of single girls with discussions of sex.
While the author was not able to find the Article or statute in Civil Law that makes this
clear, interviews with local Afghans conducted by UNAMA/OHCHR have pointed out
that this does indeed occur. Parents often take their daughter out of school once she is
married, fearing that parents of single girls will protest the presence of married girls in
school whom they feel may encourage others to engage in sexual activity.
This is what Americans call a “double whammy” – the occurrence of two unfortunate
events or circumstances. To be forced into marriage then denied the right to an
education illustrates that Afghanistan has indeed not made much progress in the
context of women rights.100
According to EVAW,101 forced marriage is considered a form of violence against women,
with multiple Articles prohibiting its practice, these include:
96
For example, obstetric fistula occurs when the vagina, rectum and bladder tear during childbirth given
that a young girl has not developed sufficiently to deliver a child. If left untreated, obstetric fistula can
become a chronic condition that results in “lifelong leakage” of urine and feces.
97
Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against Women
in Afghanistan. (2010). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf. Retrieved 18
February 2012.
98
Articles 3, 17, 43 and particularly 44, which is specific to women and nomads.
99
Marriage Spells The End of Learning. Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA).
29 November 2003. Available online: http://www.rawa.org/marriage.htm. Retrieved 18 February 2012.
100
Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against
Women in Afghanistan. (2010). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf. Retrieved 18
February 2012.
101
At the time of this report, the original EVAW Articles could not be located due to broken links on
MoWA’s website. Therefore, the following document was used as a reference for the provisions of EVAW
Law: Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against
Women in Afghanistan. (2010). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf. Retrieved 18
February 2012.
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Article 24:
“A person who sells a woman for the purpose or under the pretext of
marriage, or purchases a woman or act as an intermediary in the process,
the perpetrators shall, depending on the circumstance, be sentenced to
long-term imprisonment not exceeding 10 years.”
Article 26:
“If a person gets a woman engaged or married who has reached the legal
marriage age without her consent, the perpetrator shall, depending on
the circumstances, be sentenced to medium-term imprisonment not less
than two-years, and the engagement and marriage is invalid, according
to the provision of the law.”
Article 27:
“If a person prohibits marriage of a woman, the offender shall, depending
on the circumstances, be convicted to short-term imprisonment.”
Article 517:
“A person who gives in marriage a widow, or a girl who is eighteen years
or older, contrary to her will or consent, he or she shall be sentenced in
view of the circumstances to short-term imprisonment.” (Penal Code)
Shari’a Law also calls for the consent of both parties who wish to marry. Mutual consent
(ijab-o-qabool) is required whether the woman is a virgin, widowed or divorced.
Moreover, the bride and groom have the right to define the condition of the contractual
arrangement, which is usually done via the nikkah, or Islamic marriage. Generally, the
groom stipulates an amount to be paid to the bride should the marriage end, in addition
to giving the bride dowry (mawr).
The case of Sahar Gul, a 15-year-old who was beaten, tortured, had her fingernails and
hair and chunks of flesh pulled out with pliers, illustrates the type of treatment some
girls endure. Gul was also locked in a toilet by her husband and in-laws for refusing to
become a prostitute. Like other child brides, she was married off at the age of 14 to a
30-year-old in early 2011, and when her parents were unable to reach her for months,
they contacted police. The police in Baghlan Province rescued her from a “dark,
windowless room,” arresting her sister- and mother-in-law although they have not been
able to locate her husband and father-in-law.102 Sahar Gul remains in a Kabul hospital,
still recovering from her injuries.103
The case of Sadat from Herat Province also illustrates domestic violence suffered at the
hands of her husband and in-laws as well as the inability of the justice system to take
her requests seriously. Married at 15, she assumed she would have a happy life but
claims that her husband and father-in-law would beat her for no reason. In her attempts
102
Wyatt, C. (29 December 2011). Afghan Girl’s ‘Horrifying Abuse’ Exposed By Video. BBC News Asia.
Available online: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16356247. Retrieved 16 February 2012.
103
Mahmodi, M.M. (25 January 2012). Afghanistan’s Terrorized Women. Straits Times Commentary.
Available online: http://www.straitstimes.com/Project_Syndicate/Story/STIStory_759160.html. Retrieved
16 February 2012.
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to seek help, she was instead accused of lying by the prosecutor and told she would be
imprisoned if she persisted. From her hospital bed in Herat, she stated that “I have
knocked any door to get rid of violence but all of my complaints have fallen on deaf
ears.” Isolated and helpless she felt she had no choice but self-immolation “to get rid of
violence and insult” – setting herself on fire and incurring burns on 80 percent of her
body.104
Article 21 of EVAW focuses on self-immolation and suicides:
“If a woman is forced to self-immolation or committing suicide or use of
poisonous chemicals, the perpetrator shall, in case of injury or infirmity, be
sentenced to medium-term imprisonment, or long-term imprisonment not
exceeding 10 years, in case of death of the victim.”
The Holy Qur’an also forbids self-inflicted harm: “And cast not yourselves to perdition
with your own hands, and do good.”105
In a case illustrating baad, Bibi Aisha – who appeared on the cover of Time magazine in
2010 – had her nose and both ears cut off by her husband. Now 19, Aisha and her sister
were given to a Taliban fighter in Oruzgan Province to settle a dispute where her uncle
had killed the relative of her soon-to-be husband. When she reached puberty, she was
married but given that her husband was in hiding a lot of the time, she and her sister
endured abuse at the hands of her in-laws – “housed with…livestock and used as slaves,
frequently beaten as punishment for their uncle’s crime.” While she managed to escape
her husband found her in Kandahar a year later, and dragged her back to Oruzgan and
on an isolated mountainside, cut her nose and ears. According to Pashtun culture, if a
wife shames her husband by her “misdeeds” it is said that he has lost his nose, thus his
punishment of Aisha was thought to be in-kind.106
As mentioned earlier, tying family honor to a girl’s actions is a heavy burden to place on
a child. Honor killing is not a practice confined to Afghanistan, it takes place all around
the world and in countries like the U.S. and Canada perpetrators of such crimes are
generally held responsible.107 In Afghanistan however it appears to be a socially104
Haleem, A. & Xin, C (17 February 2012). Afghan Bride Burns Herself in Protest of Domestic Violence.
Xinhua as reported on RAWA. Available online: http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2012/02/17/afghanbride-burns-herself-in-protest-of-domestic-violence.html. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
105
Holy Qur’an – Al-Baqara, 2:195.
106
Girl’s Nose Cut Off for Fleeing Taliban Husband. (6 August 2010). The Time of India Bangalore. Available
online:
http://epaper.timesofindia.com/Repository/ml.asp?Ref=VE9JQkcvMjAxMC8wOC8wNiNBcjAyMjAw.
Retrieved 18 February 2012.
107
This is the case of Mohammad Shafia, his wife Tooba Yahya, and their son Hamed who killed their three
daughters and Shafia’s first wife in Montreal, Canada in 2009. In January 2012, the verdict was
st
announced. For details, see Shafia Jury Finds All Guilty of 1 -Degree Murder. (29 January 2012). Canadian
Broadcasting Channel. Available online:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2012/01/29/shafia-sunday.html. Retrieved 21 February
2012.
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acceptable practice that supposedly restores the honor of a family whose female
member has transgressed.
Afghanistan’s Penal Code,108 specifically Articles 394 – 397 address murder, however
when it comes to honor killings, the crime is mitigated. Article 398 articulates the
following:
“A person, defending his honor, who sees his spouse, or another of his close
relations, in the act of committing adultery or being in the same bed with
another and immediately kills or injures one or both of them shall be exempted
from punishment for laceration and murder but shall be imprisoned for a period
not exceeding two years as a “Tazeeri” punishment.”
According to EVAW Law, Article 22 stipulates that:
(1) If a person beats a woman, the offender shall, depending on the
circumstances, be punished according to Article 407 – 410 of the Penal Code,
considering the mitigating and aggravating conditions of the crime.
(2) If the acts under paragraph one of this Article results in the death of victim,
the offender shall, depending on the circumstance, be sentenced according to
Article 395 – 399 of the Penal Code.
EVAW Law does not include a separate category for honor crimes and given that the
Penal Code (Article 398) mitigates punishment for crimes such as zina or adultery as
long as the killing is not premeditated, a loophole exists, allowing honor killings to take
place. Perhaps this is a major reason why honor killings are accepted and/or justified,
however, early marriage, baad and baadal also run rampant even though there are laws
prohibiting these practices.
According to Shari’a Law, and in specific Qur’an suras (chapters), killing is forbidden.109
While extramarital relationships (for both men and women) are forbidden in Islam,
certain criteria must be adhered to. For example in the case of zina, there need to be
four witnesses to the act of sexual intercourse, and false witness or vigilantism is
prohibited.
Bride Price
King Amanullah instituted a 1924 constitutional decree that eliminated the bride price
and gave females the freedom to choose their spouses. In 1965, the DOAW was
established to help end forced marriages and the bride price, among other oppressive
practices. Finally in the 1980s, the PDPA banned, among other things, the bride price. It
is quite ironic that as devalued as females are in Afghan society, the cost of their hand in
marriage can be quite steep – averaging $2,000 to $50,000 (US). The bride price is
108
Afghanistan Penal Code – English. Available online: http://aceproject.org/eroen/regions/asia/AF/Penal%20Code%20Eng.pdf/at_download/file. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
109
Holy Qur’an – Sura 5:32; Sura 6:151; and Sura 17:33.
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considered to be a harmful traditional practice because it often leads to early or forced
marriage, the selling of girls to the highest bidder, and a high incidence of domestic
abuse – most often triggered by resentment on the part of the husband and/or his
family for having to pay a hefty price. In general, the female may have to “work off” the
debt incurred by the husband by taking on all or most of the domestic responsibilities in
the home; endure physical and/or psychological abuse; and/or be forced into
prostitution – essentially becoming the family slave.110
Some parents may be so desperate and poverty-stricken that the bride price can be
viewed as a lucrative opportunity, and at times the prospective husband may promise to
provide long-term financial support to the prospective bride’s family. In speaking to
close to a dozen young Afghan males who work at Regional Command Capital (RC-C) as
interpreters, restaurant workers, and cleaners, the author found that several are
engaged to be married but have not yet been able to acquire the bride price, which
averages $10,000 (US), or are working multiple jobs to pay off the incurred debt. For
young men to have to work multiple jobs and struggle for years to pay debts sends the
message that education is not as important as marriage and unless you have money,
you cannot marry. While there are no constitutional or national laws or statutes
prohibiting the bride price, it is an antiquated, harmful, and persistent practice that
commodifies women and girls and perpetuates the notion that they are property to be
traded and sold.
Widowhood
Widows too are subjected to forced marriages. According to UNAMA, there are at least
700,000 Afghan widows.111 The suffering of widows multiplies given that they are at risk
of losing their inheritance (if any exists in the first place);112 giving up their children;
and/or being forced to remarry. Most are illiterate and unskilled, leaving very few
options. Often the only alternatives are begging, or entering the informal labor sector
(e.g., domestic work, prostitution). Refusal to marry, or be taken in by their deceased
husband’s male relative has landed some in prison, supposedly for their own
protection.113 If they are lucky enough to keep their children, the children also suffer –
110
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 22 February 2012.
111
Afghanistan Marks First-Ever International Widow’s Day. (23 June 2011). United National Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ItemID=14183&ctl=Details&mid=1882&tabid=1783. Retrieved
21 February 2012.
112
Articles 33 and 34 of EVAW Law address this and deem it illegal to deny a widow her inheritance.
Likewise, Shari’a Law also stipulates that a widow shall receive one-fourth of her husband’s total wealth if
he has no children, and one-eighth if he has children.
113
Gaps In Our Knowledge: Widows In Armed Conflict. Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS). (08
July 2009). Available online:
http://www.gaps-uk.org/img_uploaded/Widows%20in%20armed%20conflict_080709_final.pdf. Retrieved
21 February 2012.
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often having to leave school in order to support the family. Moreover, female children
may be forced to enter early marriages as a means of being “rescued.” Gender Action
for Peace and Security (GAPS)114 estimates that there are 70,000 “impoverished” widows
in Kabul alone, with 37,000 children on the streets whose mothers are widowed.115
Recently, Afghanistan celebrated the first ever International Widows’ Day on June 23,
2011.116 While these kinds of events help draw attention to the plight of the most
vulnerable, the goal should be to move beyond “celebrations” towards tangible
programs that create change. In a patriarchal society like Afghanistan, widowhood is not
considered a badge of honor but a stigma. It is so detrimental that such women are
generally forced to stick together for protection and support. For example, in Mir Ali
about 75 kilometers south of Herat City, there is a small village known as the “village of
widows”117 where 800 families reside with no male-headed households. The booming
narcotics industry with neighboring Iran has claimed husbands, fathers, brothers and
sons who have either been killed or imprisoned, leaving female-headed households to
provide for their children.118
In an eastern neighborhood in Kabul, 1,000+ widows have built their “mud hovels” by
hand and have claimed the hill as their own – Tapaye Zanabad (literally, the hill that
women built).119 As one widow explains:
“Once you become a widow and live alone, people are strange toward you. They
say a lot of bad things. Other women get worried you might try to marry their
husbands. They talk behind your back. It’s Afghanistan; it’s full of negativity. We
feel more comfortable when we’re around other widows.”
Most of the women at Tapaye Zanabad do not have regular employment and purport to
receive an annual stipend of $130 from GIRoA. While literacy programs and incomegenerating initiatives (e.g., sewing classes, carpet weaving)120 are sometimes offered by
a plethora of aid organizations, these important programs do not necessarily address
114
Ibid.
Ibid.
116
Afghanistan Marks First-Ever International Widow’s Day. (23 June 2011). United National Assistance
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA). Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?ItemID=14183&ctl=Details&mid=1882&tabid=1783. Retrieved
21 February 2012.
117
The Village of Widows (23 July 2009). Available online:
http://www.trcb.com/news/Afghanistan/General/The-Village-of-Widows-13434.htm. Retrieved 21
February 2012.
118
Ibid.
119
Afghan Widows Form Community on Kabul Hill, 15 August 2011. Washington Post. Available online:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-widows-form-community-on-kabulhill/2011/08/02/gIQA35KtFJ_story.html. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
120
Weaving Hope for Afghan Widows. (2008). United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Available online: http://www.usaid.gov/stories/afghanistan/cs_afg_weavers.html. Retrieved 20
February 2012.
115
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empowerment issues and “access to justice.”121 Wider promotion of the role of widows
in the reconstruction of their local communities, and nation at large, must be the goal.
Thus the trajectory of future generations is significantly dependent on whether women,
especially widows, are included into the redevelopment fold. While steps have been
taken in Kabul, Helmand presents a whole new frontier – but there is hope.
One such case in point is the story of 25-year-old Fatima, a widow who was assisted by
USAID in setting up her own business in Helmand.122 While tending sheep, she was also
provided funding to open her own “ladies’ home store” where she sells shampoo, soaps,
face cream, cooking ingredients and cleaning products. In lieu of marrying a relative of
her deceased husband, she says, “I am happy because USAID has made life a lot easier
for me and I do not need to get married.”
While divorce is culturally taboo and frowned-upon in Afghanistan, if women find
themselves in abusive marriages they are allowed by law to leave their husbands.
However, in practice, this is often not the case. On the other hand, if a male seeks to
end his marriage he can do so by simply stating to his wife three times “I divorce you.”
While Afghanistan is a male-dominated society where most women are unable to
exercise their rights, it is generally not acknowledged that Islam guarantees women the
right to divorce for substantive reasons. Divorce, especially for females, is a mark of
shame. It is not unheard of for men to divorce their wives for their inability to bear
children, nor is it unheard for women to be killed if they choose to leave abusive
marriages. Again, the unfortunate alternatives to an abusive marriage include suicide,
self-immolation or running away. Those who run away and are caught are generally
imprisoned for their “crime” and have to face the possibility of never seeing their
children again.123
Moral Crimes
It is estimated that 304 Afghan women have been held in prisons since 2007, the
majority imprisoned with their children, for committing moral crimes such as running
away from abusive husbands, refusing to marry, marrying without the consent of their
family, and/or rape. Most are charged with zina.124 In a case that made headline news in
December 2011, Gul Naz was raped but was charged with adultery and imprisoned. As if
things could not get worse, she was mandated to marry her accuser. However, due to
121
Gaps In Our Knowledge: Widows In Armed Conflict. Gender Action for Peace and Security (GAPS). (08
July 2009). Available online:
http://www.gaps-uk.org/img_uploaded/Widows%20in%20armed%20conflict_080709_final.pdf. Retrieved
21 February 2012.
122
Widow Sets Up Business (25 September 2011). United States Agency for International Development
(USAID). Available online: http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/article/2420. Retrieved 19 February 2012.
123
Motlagh, J. (2010). Feeling Violent Husbands Puts Afghan Women in Jail. Time – World. Available online:
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2039564,00.html. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
124
The Death Row Widows of Kabul. (20 October 2011). The Independent. Available online:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-death-row-widows-of-kabul-2372975.html.
Retrieved 20 February 2012.
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outcry from the international community, President Karzai pardoned her and she was
no longer required to do so.125 Another thing that prompted GIRoA to act was a
documentary film illustrating the atrocious reality of Gul Naz and other Afghan women
being imprisoned for moral crimes – illustrating their atrocious realities. However, the
European Union (EU) banned the film most likely out of concern for offending its host
nation, and to a lesser extent, for exposing the women depicted in the film to more
harm by their respective communities.126
Approval Number 572, a directive by the High Council of the Supreme Court of
Afghanistan defines a woman “running away” as either a punishable or non-punishable
moral crime. Initially, the courts have to ascertain whether the female is single or
married; the intent of running away; and where she runs away – to a relative’s or
stranger’s home. If she runs away to a former’s residence who can meet the definition
of a mahram (close male relative) or an institute of justice, then the case is not
considered criminal under the auspices of Shari’a Law. However, if she ends up at a
stranger’s home – even if the reasons for running away are to escape abuse – she is
criminally negligent leaving her susceptible to punishment.127 But as case after case has
shown, she is in danger either way. If she is not found to have committed a moral crime,
she may be sent home where she will most likely be subjected to more abuse. If she is
found guilty of committing a moral crime, she will most likely spend unnecessary time in
jail and when the time comes for her to go home her abusive husband will most likely
subject her to further abuse for shaming him and his family, if he does not kill her
instead.
Some Afghan women in prisons are on death row because they had no choice other
than to kill their abusive husbands. In the case of 57-year-old Gul Guncha, who killed her
husband by clubbing him to death with a metal pole, her cries fell on deaf ears. She says
that one day she just “snapped” after enduring years of violence at the hands of her
husband. She claims that he raped their seven-year-old daughter and married her to an
“old man” who also raped her. He also sold their two-and-a-half-year-old girl for
200,000 Afghanis ($4,052), and attempted to sell their baby girl. In her own words,
Guncha states that:
"There was only violence in my house, no happiness. I was just tired of my life…I
beat him with an iron rod to the head. Suddenly he fell to the ground but I didn't
125
Rubin, A.J. (01 December 2011). For Afghan Woman, Justice Runs into Unforgiving Wall of Custom. The
New York Times. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/world/asia/for-afghan-womanjustice-runs-into-the-static-wall-of-custom.html?_r=2&pagewanted=all. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
126
The filmmaker’s is Clementine Malpas and the name of the documentary is In-Justice: The Story of
Afghan Women in Jail.
127
Harmful Traditional Practices and Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence Against
Women in Afghanistan. (2010). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of
the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://unama.unmissions.org/Portals/UNAMA/Publication/HTP%20REPORT_ENG.pdf. Retrieved 18
February 2012.
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think he would die. Then the next day the prosecutors came to my house and
took me to jail."128
In the United States – and perhaps in other countries – Guncha would have found
sympathy and leniency within the legal system under the auspices of the battered
woman’s syndrome.129 But in Afghanistan, no such thing exists – Gulcha was sentenced
to death by “primary and secondary courts” waiting another seven years for the
Supreme Court to tell her that her case was dismissed only to have to wait and see what
the provincial court will decide.130
Two other women’s cases, 40-year-old Sayeed Begum and 52-year-old Aysha Khalil are
just as tragic. The former was given the death penalty on account of being accused by
her current husband of plotting to kill her former husband. She was asked to pay a bribe
of $3,000 (148,074 Afghanis) to the primary court judge for leniency but she did not
have the money to do so. In the latter case, Khalil states that she was accused by her
brother-in-law of killing her husband after she refused to marry him. She says she was
“forced to sign a false confession.” All three women went on hunger strikes, and at
present, it is not known what has resulted. If President Karzai does not pardon them, it
is likely that they will spend upwards of 25 years in jail before they are executed.
According to the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) there are a total of five Afghan women on
death row.131
Most women who are imprisoned have their children with them who are inadvertently
punished for their mothers’ so-called moral crimes.132 According to Afghanistan’s Law on
Prisons and Detention Centers,133 children up to age seven can stay in prison with their
mothers.
128
The Death Row Widows of Kabul. (20 October 2011). The Independent. Available online:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-death-row-widows-of-kabul-2372975.html.
Retrieved 20 February 2012.
129
Identified and coined by Lenore E. Walker in 1979, battered woman syndrome (BWS) refers to repeated
symptoms and signs of fear and the perception that the individual cannot escape their circumstances
(helplessness). While men are victims of domestic violence, most often, it is women who are victimized.
The repeated pattern leaves the woman to believe that she may deserve the beatings and/or that her
partner will eventually change; unfortunately the violence tends to escalate and may lead to either the
victim or perpetrator ending up dead. Recently, BWS has been defined as a “subcategory” of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). For more information, see the work of L.E. Walker.
130
The Death Row Widows of Kabul. (20 October 2011). The Independent. Available online:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/the-death-row-widows-of-kabul-2372975.html.
Retrieved 20 February 2012.
131
Ibid.
132
Day, K. (03 December 2011). Babies Behind Bars. The Guardian. Available online:
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/12/03/babies-behind-bars.html. Retrieved 20 February
2012.
133
Law on Prisons and Detention Centers (Unofficial Translation. (2010). Available online:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Government_of_Afghanistan_LAW_ON_PRISONS_AND_
DETENTION_CENTERS_2010.pdf. Retrieved 21 February 2012.
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Article 56:
(1) The Government shall provide facilities to the children in a specific
place up to the age of seven years that are [living] with their parents in
the prisons in such a way that their parents can visit them on a daily
bases [sic].
(2) The children after the age of seven years and in case of duration of
their parents’ imprisonment shall be transferred to the nursery
established by the Government. Staying of children with their father
according to the above requirements will be just allowed when their
father is the only caretaker of his children.
While it is good that mothers can keep their children with them, the idea of children
being raised in prison should be cause for international outcry. The law stipulates that
children, if their fathers or other relatives are not available to care for them, become
wards of the State, but most children remain in prison with their mothers beyond the
age of seven. Child Support Centers (CSCs), which were established in 2009, are
specifically set up to house children whose mothers are imprisoned. Currently, CSCs
exist in Kabul, Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz, but even these facilities do not have the
capacity to house all of the children of imprisoned mothers, and if most end up being
raised in prison, where they will most likely grow up to become “future criminals.” In
rare instances, mothers have made the heart-wrenching decision of selling their children
so they do not grow up in prison.134
In most women’s prisons in the U.S., inmates are not allowed to keep their children
behind bars, and some that do allow it under the auspices of the Residential Parenting
Program (RPP) believe that it is in the best interest of the young child. Offenders who
are allowed to keep their children are those whose crimes are not considered serious
and thus they are confined to minimum security units serving relatively short sentences
(three to five years).135 The same issue that persists in the U.S. is burgeoning in
Afghanistan: the phenomenon of cyclical criminality. Children whose parents are
imprisoned in the U.S., especially their mothers, are more likely to become criminals.
Afghanistan appears to be heading down the same path, first by imprisoning women for
moral crimes and secondly for punishing innocent children who have to endure being
raised in prison, bounced around from shelter to shelter, and/or being given to relatives
who most likely do not want them and may treat them harshly.136
134
Kouvo, S. (14 October 2011). Mothers Behind Bars: What About The Children? Afghanistan Analysts
Network (AAN). Available online:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Government_of_Afghanistan_LAW_ON_PRISONS_AND_
DETENTION_CENTERS_2010.pdf. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
135
Luck, M. (16 February 2012). Born Behind Bars: Inmates Raising Children in Prison. KXLY. Available
online: http://www.kxly.com/news/26871100/detail.html. Retrieved 20 February 2012.
136
Kouvo, S. (14 October 2011). Mothers Behind Bars: What About The Children? Afghanistan Analysts
Network (AAN). Available online:
http://www.unodc.org/documents/afghanistan//Government_of_Afghanistan_LAW_ON_PRISONS_AND_
DETENTION_CENTERS_2010.pdf. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
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It is important to mention that the Ministry of Interior (MoI)137 and MoJ138 websites were
perused for information on crime statistics, and number of jails and prisons. Neither of
the websites had any information posted at the time of the writing of this report –
either the links to web pages and reports are broken or they are “under construction.”
Similarly, Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Organization (CSO) website was perused in
order to find information on the number of prisons, inmates and crimes. The only
information available was on crime, and based on their annual report (2010-11) – with
information provided by the MoI – it appears that crime decreased slightly (7,010) from
the previous year (7,164).139 The most frequently-occurring crime was “theft” (1,341)
followed by “beating” (1,163), “injury” (1,052) and “murder” (983). Not surprisingly,
“adultery” (247) is also on the list.140
Women’s Shelters
If women are lucky enough not to end up imprisoned for running away from abusive
husbands and in-laws, they end up in shelters. In early 2011, women’s shelters came
under attack by GIRoA, with calls for an investigation of them as suspected covers for
“drug dens” and “brothels.” Succumbing to conservative pressure, GIRoA threatened to
bring them under their jurisdiction with Afghan police serving as security. Advocates
reacted by claiming that it was another ploy by GIRoA to restrict women’s rights and
eventually hand women back to their abusive husbands and families. The minister of
MoWA also had some harsh words, but did not direct her criticism toward GIRoA, and
instead chastised the international community for spending millions on a “handful of
women” and only being concerned about money.141 In late 2011, mounting pressure and
(negative) media attention caused by activists led the Council of Ministers to approve
the Regulation on Women’s Protection Centers on September 5, 2011. This first-of-itskind regulation made clear the significance of shelters for women and set operational
standards as well as rights for its residents.
The initial investigation that led to suspicion of shelters as prostitution schemes was
prompted by a news report. The claim was not based on evidence, and unfortunately,
caused turmoil for those residing in these safe homes, who felt as if their only outlet of
safety was being threatened. Currently there are over a dozen women’s shelters across
Afghanistan, and just like the ones in the U.S. and elsewhere, their locations are almost
137
Ministry of Interior (MoI). Women Children and Human Rights. Available online:
http://moi.gov.af/en/page/5765. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
138
Ministry of Justice (MoJ). Juvenile and Rehab Centers. Available online:
http://moj.gov.af/en/page/1698. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
139
Central Statistics Organization (CSO). Crime Statistics By Type 2010-11. Available online:
http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/4-43(1).pdf. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
140
No further information is provided in terms of what constitutes “murder” and “injury” for example.
However, it is a safe to assume that those committing “adultery” are all women who are imprisoned and
serving time for moral crimes.
141
Afghan Women Fear Losing Safe Houses. (18 February 2011). BBC News – South Asia. Available online:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12496381. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
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always a secret. 142 Women For Afghan Women, a nonprofit organization that has set a
goal of establishing a women’s shelter and family guidance center in each of the 34
provinces in Afghanistan, offers its residence vocational, literacy and life skills classes.
Women can stay in the shelter anywhere from two weeks to two years, and are able to
meet with their lawyers as well as their families for mediation and counseling. Their
children are able to attend school and for most, “this is the first time they have been
able to rest and feel somewhat human.”143
Human Trafficking
Human trafficking or trafficking in persons enslaves about 27 million people across the
globe and is a criminal industry that generates about $30 billion annually.144 Based on
the U.S. State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons Report,145 human trafficking
involves holding a person in “compelled service,” with the Trafficking Victims Protection
Act (TVPA) delineating its major forms as: forced labor; sex trafficking; bonded labor;
debt bondage among migrant laborers; involuntary domestic servitude; forced child
labor; child soldiers; and child sex trafficking.
According to the U.S. State Department’s report, Afghanistan is a “source, transit, and
destination country” for human trafficking where women, men and children are
involved in sex trafficking and forced labor. It is estimated that 40 percent are transited
to countries such as Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia, while 60 percent are trafficked
inside the country. Although actual figures are not known given “weak governmental
capacity,” most of the victims are children, with boys at a higher risk for “forced labor,
commercial sexual exploitation, and forced drug smuggling.” GIRoA was criticized in the
report for not showing evidence of “increasing efforts” to combat trafficking, in addition
to failing to convict and/or prosecute perpetrators under its 2008 law, instead punishing
victims by imprisoning them for prostitution or adultery.146
In a 2011 report on human trafficking by AIHRC,147 457 victims and 1,871 other
individuals (N = 2,328) were interviewed in 20 provinces over a span of six months.
AIHRC’s report contradicts the U.S. State Department’s in that the former identifies
142
Lawrence, Q. (26 September 2011). Afghan Women Fight Back, Preserve Shelters. National Public Radio
(NPR). Available online: http://www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140709134/afghan-women-fight-back-preserveshelters. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
143
Women For Afghan Women – Shelters. Available online:
http://www.womenforafghanwomen.org/index.php/shelters?wg_view=contentalbum&wg_album=56334
73718850062657&wg_page=2. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
144
For in-depth information on human trafficking, see http://humantrafficking.org/. Retrieved 25 February
2012.
145
Trafficking in Persons Report 2011. United States Department of State. Available online:
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/index.htm. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
146
Ibid.
147
Summary Report on Investigation of Causes and Factors of Trafficking in Women and Children. (2011).
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). Available online:
http://aihrc.org/2010_eng/Eng_pages/Reports/Thematic/Executive_Summary_Human_Trafficking_Repor
t1390_Final_English.pdf. Retrieved on 25 February 2012.
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women and girls as more likely the victims of trafficking than boys. Even though there
are methodological flaws in AIHRC’s report, it does provide a snapshot of what is taking
place in Afghanistan’s provinces, while the U.S. State Department’s report provides an
overall picture that is not necessarily rooted in what is taken place within specific
communities.
The major findings of AIHRC’s report include the following:
• Most of the victims were considered “vulnerable people.”
• Fifty-four percent were deprived of parental support.
• Most of the victims were women who were forced to marry, with 81 percent
married before the age of 18.
• Poverty and unemployment were the most significant factors in trafficking in
persons, with 58 percent of victims’ families not having any income.
• Thirty-five percent of victims were deceived into trafficking; 31 percent via coercion;
22.5 percent consented to trafficking; and 12 percent via parental or spousal
consent.
• Forty-five percent of trafficking cases included girls; 38 percent included women;
and about 19 percent included boys.
According to AIHRC’s report, perpetrators are often not prosecuted, with 17 percent of
victims reporting an arrest of the offender and only 13 percent reporting punishment of
the offender. Offenders include powerful locals, the Taliban and other opposition
groups, as well as domestic and international organized crime groups.
Health & Maternal Mortality
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), maternal mortality is defined as
“the death of a woman while pregnant or within 42 days of termination of pregnancy,
regardless of the duration and site of the pregnancy, from any cause related to or
aggravated by the pregnancy or its management but not from accidental or incidental
causes.”148 In developing countries, the incidence of maternal mortality is higher given
that most deliveries occur at home or in non-institutional settings. In Afghanistan, while
recent estimates are available regarding the causes of maternal mortality, in previous
decades no such data was available.
Risk factors for maternal death include lack of access to economic resources,
empowerment, education, and healthcare. High physical workload and poor nutrition
are also contributing factors.149 In a first of its kind, the Afghanistan Mortality Survey
(AMS) conducted in 2010 sampled 24,032 households (175,079 individuals) in all
provinces, with 47,848 (27%) women between the ages of 12 to 49 participating. The
objective was to “produce representative estimates of indicators for the country”
148
World Health Statistics. (2010). World Health Organization (WHO). Available online:
http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS10_Full.pdf. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
149
Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010. Afghan Public Health Institute, Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).
Available online: http://measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR248/FR248.pdf. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
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covering 87 percent of the population – 84 percent in rural areas and 98 percent in
urban areas.150
As emphasized earlier, major socio-economic and health issues for Afghan women are
“adolescent pregnancy and motherhood.” According to AMS (2010), rural women have
children four years earlier than urban women, with the latter twice as likely to use
“modern contraception” methods (i.e., the birth control pill, injections). According to
CSO (2011), available health data indicate that birth control pills and injections are the
two most frequently used methods of family planning.151 Based on AMS (2010) results,
half of the women surveyed also sought antenatal care (ANC), with “lack of money”
(50%) and “facility and transportation problems” (48%) as the major reasons why ANC
was not sought.152
According to the WHO (2010) overall maternal deaths have decreased from 2001
estimates: 1,600 (per 100,000 live births) to 1,400 in 2010 – even though this still places
Afghanistan as one of the worst places for pregnant women and children.153
Afghanistan’s Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) set a goal of reducing maternal mortality
by 15 percent by 2010 (1,360 deaths per 100,000 births), with a further reduction of 21
percent by 2013 (1,264 deaths per 100,000 births). Nonetheless, it is estimated that
every 30 minutes a mother dies during childbirth, and 22 children under five years of
age and 15 children under the age of one die every hour.154 While things appear to be
improving for women in the context of maternal mortality, there is still much work to be
done. Moreover, at the expense of sounding negative, it is also important to recognize
that socio-demographic information on the Afghan population and the establishment of
baseline statistics has only been tracked in the last few years. Thus, whether or not
improvements have taken place will become more evident in the coming years.
One major condition that plagues some Afghan women is known as obstetric fistula,
where the vagina, rectum and bladder tear during childbirth in girls who have not
developed sufficiently to deliver a child. If left untreated, obstetric fistula can become a
chronic condition that results in “lifelong leakage” of urine and feces. It is not unheard
for women suffering with obstetric fistula to be abandoned and/or divorced by their
husbands who view it as an “incurable disease.” According to the MoPH, about 300
women have been treated for obstetric fistula at Malalai Maternity Hospital in Kabul.
Thus it is condition that can be corrected with a simple operation that some women, or
150
Ibid. p. 9
N = 978,713; Users of Family Planning by Method (2010-11). Central Statistics Organization (CSO).
Available online: http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/5-12.pdf, Retrieved 25 February 2012.
152
Ibid. p. 67
153
World Health Statistics. (2010). World Health Organization (WHO). Available online:
http://www.who.int/whosis/whostat/EN_WHS10_Full.pdf. Retrieved 24 February 2012.
154
Ministry of Public Health Annual Report 1387 (2009). Ministry of Public Health (MoPH). Available online:
http://moph.gov.af/Content/Media/Documents/HNSS-Report-ENG-v4-1281220101156987.pdf. Retrieved
24 February 2012.
151
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their husbands, cannot or will not pay for. Doctors cite “early marriage, frequent births”
and treatment by untrained professionals as causes.155
Article 35 of EVAW Law stipulates the following in the context of medical care and
education:
“If a person prohibits a woman from the right to education, work and access to
medical services or use of other rights stipulated in the law, he shall, depending
on the circumstances, be convicted to short-term imprisonment not exceeding six
months.”
Education
Three Articles of Afghanistan’s Constitution make it clear that education is the right of
all its citizens, in particular Article 44.
Article 3:
“The citizens of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan have equal rights to
education without any kind of discrimination.”
Article 43:
“Education is the right of all citizens of Afghanistan, which shall be
offered up to the B.A. level in the state educational institutes free of
charge by the state. To expand balanced education as well as to provide
mandatory intermediate education throughout Afghanistan, the state
shall design and implement effective programs and prepare the ground
for teaching mother tongues in areas where they are spoken.”
Article 44:
“The State shall devise and implement effective programs for the
balancing and promoting of education for women, improving of
education of nomads and elimination of illiteracy in the country.”
According to CSO (2011), of the 7.1 million children enrolled in government general
education schools (1st–12th grade), 38 percent are girls. More specifically, of the 5.1
million enrolled in primary education (up to 6th grade), 2 million (39%) are girls. There
are 1,447,042 students attending middle/lower secondary education (7th–9th grade) out
of which 498,600 (34.5%) are females. Of the total students (541,691) enrolled in higher
secondary education (10th–12th grade), 163,999 (30%) are female. Finally, of the total
number of students (63,837) enrolled in government universities, 12,465 (19.5%) are
female.156 While females also participate in literacy programs and vocational training,
males outnumber females considerably in the realm of education.157
155
Salehi, Z. (19 December 2011). Women Suffering From Fistula Face Divorces. Pajhwok Afghan News.
Available online: http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2011/12/19/women-suffering-fistula-face-divorces.
Retrieved 26 February 2012.
156
Education Structure of the Statistics Yearbook (2010-2011). Central Statistics Organization (CSO).
Available online: http://cso.gov.af/en/page/4846. Retrieved 23 February 2012.
157
Delineation of the education system is beyond the scope of this report. The author’s previous report
covers the education system in Afghanistan and is available upon request.
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Based on the situation that the Ministry of Education (MoE) inherited in 2002,
tremendous strides have been made not only in increasing school enrollment, but
increasing female participation. However, the literacy rate for the entire population
averages 28.1 percent and only 12.6 percent among females. In their most recent (2011)
survey of Afghan people (N = 6,348)158 across all provinces of Afghanistan, The Asia
Foundation found that 85 percent of participants supported educational equality for
women. Seventy-nine percent believed that women should be “allowed to stand up for
their individual rights,” however support for women working outside the home fell from
71 percent in 2006 to 62 percent in 2011. The “biggest problem faced by women” was
“education and/or illiteracy.”159
In the area of education, AMS (2010) found that 76 percent of women did not have an
education, with total educational level decreasing with age. Those residing in rural areas
(86%) were more likely not to have an education compared to those residing in urban
areas (50%). Thus younger women were more likely to be educated than older women,
highlighting some accomplishments of GIRoA’s initiatives to help girls access
education.160 AMS (2010) also found that the total fertility rate (TFR) varied significantly
across education. Fertility increased rapidly from 2.8 children for a woman with higher
education to 5.3 children for a woman with no education.
As previously mentioned, the status of females within Afghan society coupled with early
marriage most often serve as insurmountable obstacles that can be somewhat
overcome with access to education. Marrying girls off at an early age to protect the
family’s honor forces them to drop out of school (if they were attending in the first
place); bear children when they themselves have barely reached adolescence; and
stymies their life’s potential to the point that making up for early deprivations becomes
more and more difficult and lends itself to negative cyclical patterns passed on from one
generation to another.
Based on CSO’s (2011)161 latest figures, Afghanistan’s total population is 24,485,600,
with the ratio of males (51%) to females (49%) relatively equal. The majority (51%) of
the population is between 15 to 64 years of age, with 6,313,726 (26%) males and
5,979,633 (25%) females. The largest (9%) subgroup is the 15 to 19 age group, with
1,225,322 (5%) males and 1,094,444 (4.5%) females. The next largest group (46%) is
between 0 to 14 years of age, with 5,683,533 (23%) males and 5,606,071 (23%) females.
The largest (19%) subgroup is the 0 to 4 age group, with 2,326,110 (9.5%) males and
2,455,684 (9.9%) females. The smallest group (~4%) is age 65 years or older (males =
158
Out of total of 6,348 respondents, 4,983 (78%) were from rural regions and 1,365 (22%) were from
urban regions. Additionally, 43 percent were female and 57 percent were male.
159
Afghanistan in 2011: A Survey of the Afghan People. The Asia Foundation. Available online:
http://www.asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/TAF2011AGSurvey.pdf. Retrieved 15 February 2012.
160
Afghanistan Mortality Survey 2010. Afghan Public Health Institute, Ministry of Public Health (MoPH).
Available online: http://measuredhs.com/pubs/pdf/FR248/FR248.pdf. Retrieved 25 February 2012.
161
For more information, see the following chart on CSO’s website: http://cso.gov.af/Content/files/21.pdf.
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527,441; females = 375,196). Thus, CSO’s (2011) ratio of males-to-females is also
relatively equal across all age categories.
A closer examination of the population of females, and the percentage of those who are
enrolled in school, results in a mixed picture. Based on the aforementioned statistics on
school enrollees, if there are a total of 2.5 million girls enrolled in government primary
and lower secondary schools and the total population of females between the ages of 5
to 14 is 3,150,387, it means that about 79 percent of girls are attending school with
650,387 (21%) not attending. These percentages, if correct, paint a bright picture
compared to the Taliban years, and reveals that much progress has been achieved in
educating young girls. On the other hand, if the population of females between the ages
of 15 to 19 is 1,094,444 and there are only 163,999 (15%) females enrolled in
government higher secondary schools, it means that 930,445 (85%) are not attending.162
This does not indicate much progress and reinforces the information highlighted
throughout this report on females being taken out of school or being forced to stop
attending as a result of early and forced marriages, and the inability for them to
continue their education after marriage and childbearing due to antiquated cultural
practices.
CONCLUSION
In a controversial poll of 213 experts including aid workers, policymakers, development
specialists, health workers, and academics from around the world, participants were
asked to name the “most dangerous countries for women” in six key areas: sexual
violence; harmful practices rooted in culture, religion and/or tradition; health threats;
non-sexual violence; human trafficking; and lack of access to economic resources.
Afghanistan topped the list of the five163 most dangerous places for women, coming in
first in the categories of health, lack of access to economic resources, and non-sexual
violence.164 Given that a decade has passed since the fall of the Taliban, it is safe to say
that some symbolic progress has been achieved, but to assert that real progress has
been made is to mask the fact that an uphill battle still ensues for Afghan women.
Even with establishment of the landmark EVAW Law, Afghanistan still has a lot of work
to do to ensure that women are aware of their rights, and that laws are implemented
appropriately and consistently. To reiterate, between March 2010 and March 2011,
2,299 cases of violence were perpetrated against Afghan women, but only 594 cases
162
Even if one takes into consideration private schools, the number is miniscule compared to public ones.
For instance, based on CSO (2011) statistics there are 11 private primary schools compared to 5,571
public ones; 38 middle/lower secondary private schools compared to 3,815 public ones; and 187 higher
secondary private schools compared to 3,416 public ones. Overall, there are a total of 7.1 million students
in public schools versus 38,369 in private ones. Thus even if private school students are taken into
consideration, the number of females enrolled in higher secondary education is bleak.
163
The others countries were the Democratic Republic of Congo, Pakistan, India and Somalia.
164
The World’s Five Most Dangerous Countries for Women. (2011) Thomson Reuters Foundation. Available
online: http://www.trust.org/documents/womens-rights/resources/2011WomenPollResults.pdf.
Retrieved 16 February 2012.
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(26%) in 28 provinces were opened for investigation by prosecutors.165 GIRoA has a
responsibility to see to it that Provincial Governors, police, prosecutors, and ministries
understand and adhere to EVAW statutes. MoWA and the High Commission need to
provide more guidance to provincial-level Commissions and include women activists and
civil organizations in their meetings so that they can exchange information: the
provincial-level Commissions can inform the High Commission on what is taking place
within communities; and the High Commission can disseminate instructions on how best
to handle challenges faced in implementing EVAW Law. The Supreme Court, MoJ, MoI,
and Attorney General all have the responsibility of making sure that women’s rights are
being protected by proper implementation of EVAW Law. The Ministry of Finance (MoF)
should be charged with providing adequate funding to ensure that public service
announcements take place and that MoWA as well as provincial Commissions have the
necessary resources to carry out their responsibilities. Finally, donor countries and
organizations should pay closer attention to how funds are spent and require agencies
receiving funding to abide by EVAW Laws.
Without the support of GIRoA and other government agencies such as the ANP and
courts, adherence to recently-implemented laws will only have taken place on paper.
Some argue that adherence to constitutional, criminal and civil laws in all of Afghanistan
is not possible, especially in Pashtun-dominated regions that prefer instead to live by
the code of Pashtunwali, which centers on the following:
• Nang or honor;
• Badal, or revenge which is tied to honor and upholds the idea of “an eye for an eye;”
• Protection of sexual propriety – thought to be of utmost importance;
• Purdah, or the seclusion of women;
• Melmastia, or hospitality – loyalty to family, friends and allies; and
• Protection to whoever seeks it as long as they are in a Pashtun’s home.166
Dispute resolution is often handled by tribal elders and leaders (khans), with decisions
effecting communities arrived at during jirgas (community councils). Additionally,
criminal law in the context of Pashtun norms is not based on (Western) retributive
justice where the offender or perpetrator is sent to prison. Rather, Pashtun criminal law
is based on the idea of restorative justice, where the offender is required to pay blood
money (poar or khoon), and ask to be forgiven (nanawati).167 Given that most of the
population of Afghanistan lives in rural areas and Pashtuns are the dominant ethnic
group, it is safe to assume that jirgas are preferred or encouraged over formal courts,
165
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 13 February 2012.
166
Saikal, A. (2006). Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival. London & New York: I.B.
Taubris.
167
For a delineation of customary laws, see The Customary Laws of Afghanistan. (2004). International
Legal Foundation. Available online: http://theilf.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/reports-ilfacustomary-laws.pdf. Retrieved 26 February 2012.
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and mediation is often enforced in domestic violence cases.168 Thus, securing the rights
of women will entail supplanting ancient customary traditions and practices, which most
residing in the rural areas may resist. Obviously, women residing in urban areas have a
greater chance of exercising their freedoms and rights, but this too is dependent on
whether or not the powers-that-be respect laws such as EVAW and fight against
injustices, as opposed to being more concerned about not rocking the proverbial
political boat.
The fact that there was only one female representative at the Kabul Conference where
APARP was introduced and discussed showcases the fragility of the status of women.
One major mechanism of achieving and maintaining women’s rights is participation in
the peace and reconstruction process. If women are excluded from the Taliban
bargaining table, and their gains are negotiated away, what has been achieved thus far
would have been for naught. It would defeat the purpose of the decade-long struggle,
and in some ways, we would be saying that we give up, we do not care, we are more
concerned about our exit strategy, and women’s rights are not important. Moreover,
the author – who is not alone in this – happens to be a skeptic when it comes to the idea
of reintegration and reconciliation, believing instead that insurgents are biding their
time and have no problem deceiving US and ISAF into believing that they (read Taliban)
are reformed and ready to side with GIRoA – an entity they view as a Western puppet
that they hope to destroy the first chance they get.169
One major factor in determining the progress of women's rights in Afghanistan is
culture. Rightly or wrongly, the fight for women's rights has become a political football
and a proxy for the tension between Western powers and the emerging post-Taliban
Afghan society. While some in the international community unselfishly and
sympathetically attempted to shed light on the plight of Afghan women shortly after
9/11, others did so in a selfish and patronizing way that forced some potential Afghan
allies to retreat to pre-existing cultural norms. At the risk of pitting the East and West
against each other, it must be acknowledged that the metrics and timetable that
constitute progress for women from a Western perspective are most likely different
from what it constitutes from an Eastern perspective. While the advancement of
women's rights in Afghanistan to universally-accepted standards should remain the goal,
both the means through which this is done as well as the expected timeframe must be
consistent with modern Afghan culture. A simplistic view of women's freedom that
dwells on external factors such as the hijab (headscarf) or burka must be weighed
against the perspective of Afghan women's advocates who make dress secondary to
more immediate needs such as the freedom to live without fear and oppression and the
168
A Long Way To Go: Implementation of the Elimination of Violence Against Women Law in Afghanistan.
(2011). United Nation’s Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR). Kabul, Afghanistan. Available online:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/AF/UNAMA_Nov2011.pdf. Retrieved 22 February 2012.
169
Farmer, B. (11 February 2012). The Truth About Taliban ‘Reintegration’. The Telegraph. Available online:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9076121/The-truth-about-Talibanreintegration.html. Retrieved 18 February 2012.
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right to be respected as a human being that deserves the same economic and cultural
opportunities available to men.
The women’s suffrage170 movement in the U.S., for example, was instrumental in
securing voting rights for women under the auspices of the 19th Amendment. However,
this took place in 1920 even though women were fighting for their rights as early as the
18th century.171 In some instances, American women still have not broken the proverbial
glass ceiling.172
The Afghanistan of my mother’s and grandmothers’ generations enjoyed more
freedoms than those afforded Afghan women today. I was privileged enough to have
been raised in America, which even with its challenges, provided me opportunities that I
could not have ever dreamed about had I been raised in Afghanistan. I often wonder
what kind of life I would have had – would I have survived the invasion of the Soviets
and the brutality of the Taliban? Would I have been married at a young age? How much
education would I have been able to pursue? Would my parents have survived? What
about my brother? These questions occupy my mind daily. While some locals may
dismiss me as a “foreign Afghan” who does not understand because I did not have to
endure the atrocities inflicted upon my fellow Afghans, the plight of Afghan women, and
the population as a whole are my concern.
Local Afghan women assure me that things have indeed improved since the time of the
Taliban. Women are going to school, have become MPs, police officers, army soldiers,
and pilots; some have gained international notoriety for writing books about their
experiences; and others still have gained recognition for establishing NGOs to assist
other Afghan women. All of these spell achievement. Nonetheless, the fear that the
gains they have made up to this point will be lost if GIRoA does not do more to enforce
women’s rights is never far away. While it is primarily their responsibility to hold on to
the gains, it is just as much our responsibility to support them in their struggle.
170
Refers to the right of women to run for political office, and most importantly, to vote.
Under British rule in the Massachusetts Colony, Lydia Chapin Taft was the first woman to vote in
Colonial America in 1756. In New Jersey, under the state constitution (1776), women who owned
property could vote, but married women whose husbands actually owned property did not qualify,
leaving widows and single women as the only ones who qualified. However in 1807 women lost the right
to vote in New Jersey along with Blacks and “aliens.” In the Pictairn Islands women were granted voting
rights in 1838, and in Turkey, women gained the right to vote in national elections in 1934.
171
Sweden is thought to be the “first independent nation” to have granted women conditional voting rights
(1718 and 1771) followed by New Zealand in 1893. For a timeline of women’s suffrage, see Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_women%27s_suffrage. Retrieved 07 February 2012.
172
This is a Western metaphor that is generally used in the context of economics, where women are not
able to circumvent barriers that keep them from attaining high-level career positions based on their
gender. See Cotter, D.A., Hermsen J.M., Ovadia, S. & Vanneman, R. (2001). The Glass Ceiling Effect. Social
Forces, 80(2), pp. 655–81.
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SOURCES OF INTEREST
Action Aid International
www.actionaid.org
Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)
http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=1
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)
http://www.aihrc.org.af/en
List of NGOs & International Humanitarian Organizations Operating in Afghanistan
http://afghanistan-analyst.org/ngo.aspx
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH)
http://moph.gov.af/en
Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MoWA)
http://mowa.gov.af/en
AFGHAN WOMEN FOCUSED NGOs
Afghan Women Mission
http://www.afghanwomensmission.org/
Afghanistan Midwifery Project
http://afghanmidwiferyproject.org/
Canadian Women for Women in Afghanistan
http://www.cw4wafghan.ca/
Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan (HAWCA)
http://www.hawca.org/main/index.php
Medica Mondiale
http://www.medicamondiale.org/index.php?id=7&L=1
Shuhada
http://www.shuhada.org.af/
Voice of Women Organization (VWO)
http://vwo.org.af/
Women For Afghan Women
http://www.womenforafghanwomen.org/
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IMPORTANT DATES
March 8th – International Women’s Day
June 23rd – First-ever International Widows’ Day
November 25th – UN Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women
POC:
Farzana Nabi-Amanullah, Ph.D.
Social Scientist, GS-14
HTAT AF-30
Regional Command Capital (RCC)
Camp Warehouse, Kabul, AFG
UNC: [email protected]
SECRET: [email protected]
Special thanks to Larry Miller, Research Manager (HTAT AF-30), for editorial assistance
as well as locating some of the supporting materials for this report.
HTS_AF30_12-004-001_FP_Women_In_Afghanistan_20120302_UNCLAS.pdf
UNCLASSIFIED
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