George Bush and the 102d Congress:
The Impact of Public and “Private” Veto
Threats on Policy Outcomes
RICHARD S. CONLEY
University of Florida
Using archival data uncovered at the George Bush Presidential Library in College
Station, Texas, this article develops a typology of veto threats and compares the effect of “private”
and “public” veto threats on policy outcomes in the 102d Congress (1991-1992) by legislative significance. The results suggest that formal models of veto threats have overstated the centrality of public rhetoric for an effective strategy. Private veto threats issued outside the public
eye halted a host of minor legislation to which Bush objected. Veto threats that started off
behind the scenes, only to be made public later, served as early signals that frequently won the
president concessions on routine bills. By contrast, public threats on highly salient legislation
were most likely to yield vetoes and inter-branch confrontation.
Introduction
Changing institutional and electoral dynamics in Congress in the last several
decades have placed greater limitations on presidents’ ability to influence roll call outcomes. Presidents’ floor success rates have been a casualty of the interaction of split-party
control of the presidency and Congress, or “divided government,” with heightened intraparty cohesion on Capitol Hill (Fleisher and Bond 2000). Recent presidents who have
confronted assertive opposition majorities in Congress have adapted to these conditions
Richard S. Conley is assistant professor of political science at the University of Florida and coordinator of
political science studies in Aix-en-Provence, France. His research focuses on the presidency and presidential-congressional
relations. He is author of The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government: A Post-War Assessment (Texas
A&M University Press, 2002), and editor of Reassessing the Reagan Presidency (University Press of America,
2003) and Transforming the American Polity: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism (forthcoming,
Prentice-Hall). He is currently working on a book that compares presidential politics in the U.S. and France.
AUTHOR’S NOTE: The author gratefully acknowledges funding provided by the College of Liberal Arts and
Sciences, University of Florida, for this research. He thanks Rebecca Deen, Lawrence Dodd, Samuel Hoff, Samuel Kernell,
Jeffrey Peake, and the anonymous reviewers of Presidential Studies Quarterly for helpful comments and advice on
earlier drafts of this article.
Presidential Studies Quarterly 33, no. 4 (December)
© 2003 Center for the Study of the Presidency
730
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
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by turning to a powerful tool in the bargaining process: the veto. Although critics may
contend that “frequent use of the veto is difficult to reconcile with the Neustadtian
imperative to govern by persuasion” (McKay 1994, 449), presidents’ veto success was
exceptional in the closing decade of the twentieth century. President George Bush sustained 28 of the 29 regular vetoes he cast from 1989 to 1992. Similarly, only one of Bill
Clinton’s 36 regular vetoes was successfully challenged in Congress from 1995 to 2000.
Scholars have consequently taken a renewed interest not only in presidents’ ability
to halt legislation through the veto power but also in their strategic use of implied vetoes
to mold policy outcomes. Chief executives’ success in wresting concessions from Congress through veto threats is a central test of legislative influence (Wayne 1978; Watson
1993; Deen and Arnold 2002). Emerging scholarship on this aspect of presidential
behavior has been based largely on veto threats that are issued publicly (Cameron 2000).
As Bond, Fleisher, and Krutz (1996, 134) remind us, however, public veto threats may
not constitute a representative sample of the actual signals presidents employ. Presidents
may have incentives to issue veto threats privately or behind the scenes in order to escape
public and media scrutiny and avoid confrontation with Congress.
With the benefit of archival data uncovered at the George Bush Presidential Library
in College Station, Texas, this article compares the effects of “private” and “public” veto
threats on executive-legislative bargaining and policy outcomes in the 102d Congress
(1991-1992). Archival research revealed 82 veto threats that were initially issued by the
Bush administration outside the public eye. Thirty-nine of these threats were never publicly disclosed in media sources. The other 43 threats were later made public. This subset
of veto threats is distinguishable from the 162 veto threats that were initially reported
in the national media and for which no archival documentation was uncovered.
This article develops a typology of veto threats and compares the impact of Bush’s
threats on legislative outcomes according to the policy significance of bills. The results
of the analysis do not so much dispute formal models of veto threats that emphasize the
importance of the president’s public rhetoric as they show such models to be incomplete.
Private veto threats “killed” a host of minor legislation to which Bush objected. Veto
threats that started off privately and served as early signals to the Democratic majority,
only to be made public via “inside the beltway” reporting later, led to a high probability of executive-legislative compromise on ordinary bills such as appropriations measures. Consistent with Cameron’s (2000) analysis, however, public threats on the most
salient legislation, such as Mayhew’s (1991) “landmark” bills, were most likely to result
in vetoes and inter-branch confrontation. Indeed, public threats on important legislation
often led to “blame game” politics between the White House and Capitol Hill in the
102d Congress.
The analysis progresses in four stages. The first section contrasts an “insider”
approach to veto threats with the assumptions of formal theories of veto threats that
accentuate the necessity of “going public” (Kernell 1997). The second section provides
an overview of the archival data and methods employed. The empirical analysis of Bush’s
veto threats across sub-categories follows. The concluding section considers the linkage
between public and private threats for presidential strategy and theories of veto
bargaining.
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Public Threats, Private Threats, and Bush’s Strategy
Formal models of veto threats tend to stress the importance of public rhetoric for
an effective veto threat strategy. Presidents are most often compelled to make a public
threat on highly salient legislation with priority status to the president and/or the
congressional majority. Such public threats bolster the credibility of the president’s
commitment in the eyes of members of Congress. However, from a purely logistical
standpoint, presidents may not have the time or resources to publicize veto threats on
all bills. They may have pragmatic reasons for avoiding the politics of confrontation that
a public strategy may sometimes engender, especially if a private threat can have the
effect of tabling the legislation or exacting policy concessions. Formal models of veto
threats do not take into account that presidents may choose such an insider strategy to
legislative bargaining on an important subset of bills.
The “commitment” model suggests that the effectiveness of veto threats turns on
the president’s public strategy. Ingberman and Yao (1991) contend that because presidents cannot credibly threaten to veto any bill they prefer to the status quo, they must
search for an alternative means to gain advantage over Congress. Going public with a
commitment to veto a bill if select provisions are included or excluded can give the president some proposal power. Presidents can therefore bluff and threaten to veto bills they
might otherwise accept (see McCarty 1997). “The effect of political rhetoric,” Charles
Cameron (2000, 196) posits, “is to constrain the speaker so he can’t retreat from his position without paying a steep price.” Reneging on a veto threat might entail electoral
retaliation or cost the president in the court of public opinion. These factors enhance the
credibility and sincerity of the veto threat from the standpoint of the congressional
majority.
The “coordination” model of veto threats developed by Matthews (1989) emphasizes the link between presidential rhetoric and congressional uncertainty about the
president’s policy preferences as key to success. The basic premise is that Congress has
incomplete information on which bills the president may prefer to the status quo. Congress does not know whether the president is an accommodator who will accept the
majority’s ideal point, or whether he is a compromiser with whom the majority must
negotiate. If Congress believes the president will ultimately accept the policies it passes,
veto threats are simply “cheap talk.” However, if Congress is uncertain about what the
president will accept, the majority will meet the president’s demands as far as possible
to circumvent a veto. In this scenario, it is assumed that the majority wants to pass the
policy and is not interested in setting up a veto showdown with the president. The key
to the power of the president’s threat is his “policy reputation” in Congress. Matthews
(1989) and Cameron (2000) argue that the president’s rhetoric gives legislators an estimation of his position as an accommodator or compromiser.
Both the commitment and coordination models of veto threats de-emphasize
congressional incentives to engage in “strategic disagreement” (Gilmour 1995) or blame
game politics (Groseclose and McCarty 2001) by intentionally provoking vetoes.
Cameron (2000, 195), however, finds some evidence of such congressional behavior in
election years. And earlier empirical research has shown that congressional leaders often
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
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do have electoral incentives to force the president to veto legislation and challenge those
vetoes with override attempts (Rohde and Simon 1985; Woolley 1991). Failed override
attempts may be used by the majority in the attempt to raise public consciousness of an
issue, discredit the president, and build electoral support (Conley and Kreppel 2001).
Presidents must consider these scenarios as they worry about making good on their
veto threats. Blame game politics and the possibility of successful overrides that could
prove costly on policy grounds or damage their public image may provide chief executives with incentives to avoid publicly committing to every veto threat. Going public,
as Kernell (1997) posits, violates the spirit of bargaining. A public strategy may backfire for a president with low public approval. Appealing over the heads of members of
Congress may risk exacerbating cross-pressures on legislators. Legislators and leaders who
meet the president’s demands may appear manipulated. These legislators may fall under
party and/or constituency pressure to choose conflict with the White House over cooperation, especially on high-profile, controversial policy issues.
These circumstances may compel the White House to pursue a low-key negotiating strategy, particularly on more routine legislative matters. The sheer number of policy
issues that traverse the president’s desk renders it unlikely that he will choose to expend
vital political capital and make a public commitment on all of them. Signaling veto
threats out of public view may facilitate inter-branch compromise. By relaying informational cues to congressional leaders behind the scenes, the president enables them to
act autonomously—or at least allow them to appear to do so. An insider strategy can
give the president and leaders in Congress more options for reciprocal exchange and compromise without drawing close media or constituency scrutiny, which can provide more
opportunities for “face saving” on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. Most critically, the
electoral fortunes of members depend on producing concrete legislative results of which
they can boast to their constituents. Gridlock and failed overrides do not meet constituency demands.
Prior studies based on archival research stress that presidents do choose an insider
strategy over going public on much legislative business. Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson sought to build congressional support “quietly” because they thought their
chances for success on some issues were greater when they eschewed public posturing
(Covington 1987). Eisenhower often pursued low-key negotiation with leaders of both
parties in what Greenstein (1982) calls a “hidden hand” strategy on a range of policies.
Gerald Ford avoided public campaigns against Democrats’ attempts to override his
numerous vetoes on hot button issues from 1975 to 1976, choosing instead to work
closely with his party’s leadership organization in the House, outside of public view, to
solidify support (Conley 2002a). In a similar vein, Arnold and Deen (2002) discovered
that about a fourth of all of Ford’s veto threats in the 94th Congress were private.
George Bush, the 102d Congress, and Veto Threats
A legislative strategy that comprised a mixture of public and private veto threats
befits the context of the second half of Bush’s term. From a policy perspective, Bush was
more interested in keeping Democratic activism in Congress at bay than pursuing an
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agenda for change (Sinclair 2000). The veto had been a powerful instrument in the 101st
Congress to block initiatives to which the administration objected, frequently confounding the majority. As Steve Gunderson (R-WI) noted, “When he (Bush) talks veto,
people take it seriously” (Hook 1991). The president had been able to make his vetoes
“stick”: all nine attempted overrides failed between 1989 and 1990. Democratic leaders
realized that party unity typically foreclosed the possibility of successful overrides,
forcing them to pay close attention to Bush’s threats and only selectively challenge him.
And the administration was careful to insure that “veto strength” remained strong among
the Republican minority in Congress on roll call outcomes.1
Bush’s stance toward Congress after the midterm elections of 1990 all but assured
that veto bargaining would remain front and center in the legislative dance between the
branches. Referencing the administration’s favored contours of legislative activity in the
102d Congress, White House Chief of Staff John Sununu noted “There’s not a single
piece of legislation that needs to be passed in the next two years for this president. In
fact, if Congress wants to come together, adjourn, and leave, it’s all right with us” (quoted
in Duffy and Goodgame 1992, 70-71).
Bush nevertheless had incentives to avoid over-publicizing veto threats. While his
predecessor, Ronald Reagan, was considered a master of political rhetoric, Bush’s presidency has been dubbed “anti-rhetorical” (Rozell 1998). Bush was uncomfortable in the
camera’s eye and suffered a major defeat in 1990 when he “went public.” His televised
speech on the 1990 budget accord had the effect of rallying public opinion against the
bipartisan agreement he brokered (Sinclair 1991), and may well have tempered his future
willingness to make irrevocable public commitments. Moreover, negative press coverage
and accusations of “rule by veto” threatened to complicate his reelection effort in 1992.
When possible, Bush needed to find a mechanism to send early signals to Congress, avoid
imbroglios with the Democratic majority, and selectively commit on policy issues of
greatest importance to him. His success in this endeavor through a combination of
private and public vetoes is the subject of the analysis in the next sections.
Data and Method
The analysis begins with 82 detailed veto threats for the 102d Congress uncovered
in the archival holdings at the George Bush Presidential Library in the summer of 2000.
These threats were issued from the Office of Management and Budget or the White
House legislative affairs staff via letters to Democratic committee chairs, often with a
Statement of Administration Policy (SAP) attached. The letters and SAPs specifically
1. In his analysis of key votes in the 101st Congress, Frederick McClure, Bush’s Capitol Hill liaison,
noted that the president’s position prevailed outright on only 17 of 44 bills prioritized by the administration (White House “key votes”). McClure further pointed out that Bush had vetoed and been challenged
with an override on seven of the bills, and each override attempt failed in one or the other chamber. Finally,
the passage coalitions of 13 other bills subject to senior advisors’ veto threats all demonstrated “veto
strength” (McClure 1990). Cohesion among Republicans suggested that the president had the 33% + 1 vote
on all bills to successfully ward off an override challenge. For a more detailed analysis of Bush’s strategy on
key votes in the 101st Congress, see Conley (2002b).
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 735
outlined provisions of the bill to which the administration objected. The letters requested
that the committee chair delete the provisions or incorporate new language before reporting the bill out of committee. Copies of the letters were typically distributed to the
ranking Republican on the committee, and occasionally to other Democratic and Republican leaders. Over 90 percent of these veto threats were directed at legislation under
consideration in the House of Representatives, and suggest which policy issues drew the
closest White House attention.
The 82 veto threats uncovered in the archives were compared with a total of 205
veto threats that were reported in the searchable archives of Congressional Quarterly Weekly
Report and the Associated Press (AP) wire.2 This comparison revealed that 39 of the threats
discovered in the archives were “purely private”—they were not reported in national
media sources. The other 43 threats represent an intermediate category of “private-topublic” threats. The veto threats started out quietly, but were later reported in either or
both of the media sources.3 Nineteen of the 43 private-to-public threats were reported
only in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report and were never picked up by the AP
wire. Sixteen of these threats dealt with appropriations measures. This subset of bills
is significant, then, insofar as the president’s public commitment was limited to
inside-the-beltway sources. The balance of veto threats (n = 162) was “purely public.”
These threats were reported in the national media but no archival documentation was
discovered.4
Each type of veto threat was classified according to legislative significance using a
variant of Cameron’s (2000, 38-39) schema. The “highly salient” category comprises bills
on Mayhew’s (1991) list of landmark measures that passed, as well as proposed measures
that received six or more pages in the body of Congressional Quarterly’s yearly almanac and
were mentioned in the New York Times annual legislative roundup in 1991 and 1992
(Clymer 1991a; Clymer 1992a).5 “Ordinary” legislation includes bills mentioned in the
annual summary section or that received six or more pages in the body of Congressional
Quarterly’s yearly almanac. “Minor” bills were classified as those measures not mentioned
in Congressional Quarterly’s annual summary section or that received less than six pages
of coverage.
For each type of veto threat, the final disposition of the bill was ascertained using
the THOMAS legislative information database of the Library of Congress.6 For threatened legislation that passed or was vetoed (including pocket vetoes), the provisions to
which the president objected (as reported in White House memos or in the media) were
compared with final provisions to determine whether the congressional majority conceded to Bush’s provisos. For legislation that passed or resulted in a veto and/or a challenge to a veto, this method provides a benchmark of the president’s ability to wrest
2. The author thanks Samuel Kernell for providing this list of public veto threats.
3. Based on available archival documentation, private threats were issued before the administration
“went public” or the threat was identified by media sources.
4. Across categories, the veto threats in the analysis match on discrete House and Senate bills.
5. The author is grateful to David R. Mayhew for sharing the list of landmark bills from 1991 to
1996 by personal communication.
6. http://thomas.loc.gov
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
TABLE 1
Veto Threats and Legislation Introduced in the 102d Congress
Public threat
Private-to-public threat
Private threat
Highly Salient
(n = 27)
Ordinary
(n = 84)
Minor
(n = 11,885)
11
(40.7%)
4
(14.8%)
0
39
(46.4%)
23
(27.4%)
2
(2.4%)
112
(0.01%)
16
(<0.01%)
37
(<0.01%)
TABLE 2
Veto Threats by Type and Legislative Significance, 102d Congress
Public
(n = 162)
Private-to-public
(n = 43)
Private
(n = 39)
Highly Salient
Ordinary
Minor
11
(6.8%)
4
(9.3%)
0
39
(24.1%)
23
(53.5%)
2
(5.1%)
112
(69.1%)
16
(37.2%)
37
(94.9%)
concessions from the congressional majority and is an appropriate test of the efficacy of
veto threats.
Analysis
The frequency of veto threats in the 102d Congress may be examined from several
perspectives according to the policy significance of bills. Table 1 arrays the probabilities
that highly salient, ordinary, and minor legislation was subject to a veto threat relative
to the entirety of legislation proposed in the 102d Congress (n of bills = 11,996). Table
2 presents the frequency of types of veto threats by legislative significance for only those
bills that were threatened from 1991 to 1992 (n of bills = 244).
Table 1 shows that less than 1 percent of all minor bills in the 102d Congress were
actually threatened. There are many more minor bills introduced in a given congressional session relative to the other categories. Yet, among threatened legislation, minor
bills were disproportionately represented (Table 2). Of the 162 public threats issued, 69
percent were on trivial legislation. Thirty-seven of 39 (95%) private threats were also
on minor bills.
As a percentage of total bills introduced in Congress, ordinary legislation was most
likely to be the subject of veto threats. Table 1 shows that of the 84 ordinary measures
introduced in the 102d Congress, more than three quarters were subject to a veto threat.
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 737
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that among threatened legislation, ordinary legislation drew nearly a quarter of all public threats and over half of the private-to-public
threats. Many of these threats were on appropriations bills. Consistent with Bush’s pledge
at the 1992 Republican National Convention to veto any bill that exceeded his budget
recommendations, archival records showed steadfast White House concern with annual
appropriations measures winding through Congress that year.
Highly salient legislation was most likely to receive threats in the public realm.
Table 1 shows that two fifths of the bills introduced from 1991 to 1992 received purely
public threats, including each of the landmark bills that Mayhew (1991) counts for the
102d Congress (Surface Transportation Act, Civil Rights Act, Omnibus Energy Act,
Cable Television Re-regulation, and California water policy reform). Another sixth of
bills were subject to private-to-public threats. Table 2 shows that among the 244 threatened bills, however, highly salient legislation comprised less than 7 percent and 10
percent of all public and private-to-public threats, respectively.
Table 3 classifies the final disposition of threatened bills by policy significance. The
data show that not a single bill on which Bush issued a private veto threat passed or was
vetoed. The 100 percent “kill rate” for private veto threats is just over 14 percent higher
than for minor bills on which the president issued public threats, and a test of proportions shows significance at p < .02. Nearly two thirds of private veto threats resulted in
the failure of bills that had passed the House but were never taken up by the Senate.
Private veto threats were thus remarkable in that they were slightly more effective in
halting mostly minor legislation compared to public threats. This finding is at odds with
the tenets of formal models that stress the importance of going public for veto threats
to be effective. Presidents apparently do not need to make the same kind of commitment on an important sub-category of legislation to gain the majority’s acquiescence.
Several important overall differences between purely public and private-to-public
veto threats also emerge from the data in Table 3. Casting aside policy significance of
the bills momentarily to examine aggregate results, private-to-public threats were somewhat more likely to result in passed bills and vetoed bills. Only a fifth (20.9%) of public
threats resulted in passed bills, whereas just over a third (34.9%) of private-to-public
threats yielded passed bills. The 14 percent difference is significant at p < .06. Only 6.2
percent of publicly threatened bills were vetoed, whereas 14 percent of private-to-public
threats resulted in vetoes. This 7.8 percent difference is significant at p < .10.
Why do private-to-public threats appear as a particularly volatile set of legislation?
The qualification is that most of these threats were directed at ordinary legislation. The
vast majority of bills that were subject to private-to-public threats and passed were
appropriations measures that had to pass to keep executive departments in operation and
avoid a government shutdown. The White House often tried to keep negotiations quiet,
and discussion of veto threats remained largely inside the beltway. Bush was quite successful in wresting concessions from the Democratic majority on these measures: all 16
evidenced compromise on spending levels or the deletion of objectionable language or
policy “riders.” The president made good on his threats to veto such legislation in the
absence of compromise, and other issues tended to draw closer national media attention.
Two of the seven vetoed bills in the private-to-public category contained language con-
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
TABLE 3
Final Disposition of Bills by Threat Type and Policy Significance,
102d Congress
Public threat
Highly salient issue
(n = 11)
Public threat
Ordinary measure
(n = 39)
Public threat
Minor measure
(n = 112)
Private-to-public threat
Highly salient issue
(n = 4)
Private-to-public threat
Ordinary measure
(n = 23)
Private-to-public threat
Minor measure
(n = 16)
Private threat
Highly salient issue
Private threat
Ordinary measure
(n = 2)
Private threat
Minor measure
(n = 37)
Passed
Vetoed
Died
4
(36.4%)
4
(36.4%)
3
(27.3%)
14
(35.9%)
6
(15.4%)
19
(48.7%)
16
(14.3%)
0
96
(85.7%)
3
(75.0%)
1
(25.0%)
0
11
(47.8%)
5
(21.7%)
7
(30.4%)
1
(6.3%)
0
15
(93.7%)
0
0
0
0
0
2
(100%)
0
0
37
(100%)
cerning abortion (National Institutes of Health and appropriations for the District of
Columbia), while the other five bills concerned issues such as most-favored nation (MFN)
trade status for China and “motor voter” legislation to which the president objected.
Consistent with Cameron’s (2000) contention, highly salient policy issues were
most likely to be at the center of inter-branch confrontation. In the 102d Congress such
bills were most often publicly threatened, and had a nearly equal chance of passing, being
vetoed, or dying. Vetoed bills in this category were highly susceptible to blame game
politics. Two of the vetoed bills (H.R. 2707 and S323) involved the hot button issue of
abortion, which sharply divided the White House and the Democratic majority. The
other two vetoes involved cable television re-regulation and emergency unemployment
compensation. All four of these vetoes were challenged in one or the other chamber of
Congress. The cable re-regulation bill (discussed below) was the only successful override
of Bush’s presidency.
In sum, the Bush White House was quite successful in exacting concessions from
the congressional majority; otherwise, the president made good on his veto threats. The
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 739
common thread among vetoed bills is the absence of congressional compromise. All
vetoed bills were highly salient or ordinary legislation on which the congressional majority retained objectionable language—from abortion riders to family leave. On these bills,
the president staked out a public position and followed through on his commitment.
For passed bills, Bush maintained a solid record of winning concessions across categories.
In all but two cases there is evidence of congressional compromise based on archival data
or White House statements reported in the media. Bush backed down on objections to
the second version of unemployment compensation benefits in 1992 and provisions in
an environmental bill (discussed below). Moreover, there is a noticeable lack of “veto
chains” for non-appropriations-related legislation in the 102d Congress. As the next sections clarify, Democrats dropped objectionable policy riders from several vetoed appropriations measures. The majority did not attempt to re-pass motor voter registration
legislation, family leave, or tax measures that had been vetoed and/or had been subject
to failed override attempts.
The summary data in Tables 1-3 paint a more nuanced picture of Bush’s veto threat
strategy. The data show that Bush was often able to kill minor bills through a combination of public and private threats. He relied on public threats to bolster the credibility of his commitment to negotiate highly salient measures, and he employed a strategy
of private-to-public threats on much ordinary legislation such as appropriations measures. The next subsection provides a closer, comparative bill analysis. The analysis accents
how public and private-to-public threats that failed and resulted in a veto were often
prone to blame game politics between the branches. For much routine legislation that
passed, Bush’s early signals were quite effective in winning concessions from Congress.
The compromises struck by dint of Bush’s veto threats often yielded bipartisan support
for measures. On highly salient measures that passed, Bush’s record was more mixed.
These outcomes were often uncomfortable compromises that caused some consternation
for the White House in terms of credit claiming.
Veto Threats and Bills that Became Law
For highly salient legislation that received public or private-to-public veto threats
and ultimately passed, a common thread was Bush’s disagreements with Democrats on
funding levels. In some instances, such as the supplemental disaster appropriations bill
and the 1991 transportation bill, the White House narrowly averted high-profile confrontation between the branches but won concessions. In yet others, such as the 1991
Civil Rights Act and the extension of unemployment benefits in 1992, controversy overshadowed Bush’s ability to claim credit for policy accomplishments. Let us examine the
circumstances surrounding these highly salient bills and then turn attention to the role
of public-to-private threats in shaping ordinary legislation.
On the supplemental aid bill (H.R. 5132) aimed at flood-stricken Chicago and
riot-torn Los Angeles, Bush had pocket vetoed an earlier package. His threat to House
Appropriations Chair Jamie Whitten was successful in cutting a considerable number of
“add ons” when the bill reached the Senate (Kieffer, June 2, 1992). Some Democrats
wanted to shirk compromise and challenge Bush to a veto with the objective of making
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
him look insensitive in an election year. A week after the letter to Whitten, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Director Richard Darman and White House Chief of
Staff Samuel Skinner went public about the size of the bill. Democrats ultimately yielded
because they wanted to get funds to affected urban areas without the delay a veto would
cause. Leon Panetta, Chairman of the House Budget Committee, remarked that “this is
one where it’s better to work out a compromise with the administration” (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1992, 582).
In a similar vein, Bush wound up threatening to veto highway legislation in 1991
over costs. He made a far-reaching proposal to improve the nation’s highway transit
system in which he stressed improvements for the interstate system at a cost of $105
billion. But with the economy dipping, Bush and Transportation Secretary Skinner soon
lost control of the congressional agenda. “In the next few months, an even more radical
plan from the Senate—coupled with a gas-tax increase proposal in the House—pushed
Skinner into a strategy of negotiating with lawmakers mostly through veto threats”
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1991, 138). The veto threats produced a qualified
victory. When the final bill passed, Skinner claimed the administration had been successful in securing funding and new incentives for highways. But the bill contained a
number of congressional pet projects to which the president was opposed.
Bush’s veto threat strategy and prior vetoes complicated his ability to claim credit
for several other landmark measures. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 passed only after a
veto of a similar bill in the previous congressional session. In his veto message, Bush
cited that bill for putative quotas for the hiring of minorities. In the second round of
negotiations, Bush warned again about quotas and offered his own bill, which would
have placed more of the burden on employees to prove discrimination. The Democratic
bill did just the opposite by shifting the burden of proof to employers to defend hiring
practices. Bush tried to make the best of the civil rights bill, saying “We worked out in
a spirit of compromise a negotiated settlement where I can say to the American people,
this is not a quota bill” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1991, 256). But the signing
ceremony turned out to be an uncomfortable, if not embarrassing, event for the president. Bush’s counsel, C. Boyden Gray, wrote a draft signing statement that would have
used the occasion to direct government agencies to terminate affirmative action programs. The leak of the draft statement infuriated Democrats and civil rights activists.
The controversy prompted Bush to profess his support for affirmative action while simultaneously suggesting that the wording of the legislation be interpreted narrowly (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1991, 261).
Bush’s only clear capitulation to the Democratic majority on a landmark measure
after a private-to-public veto threat concerned the unemployment benefits extension of
1992 (H.R. 5260). Bush had blocked two prior bills in 1991, and there had been a
private veto threat on H.R. 4727 in 1992, a predecessor to H.R. 5260 (Howard, June
2, 1992). Bush tried to keep the threat quiet, arguing to the House Rules Committee
that H.R. 5260 violated pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rules and undertook permanent
changes to the unemployment compensation program without sufficient review. Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin, who appeared before the Senate Finance Committee, “repeatedly frustrated lawmakers by offering to negotiate an unemployment bill behind closed
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 741
doors rather than describing the administration’s position in public” (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1992, 348). As new unemployment figures continued to paint a bleak
portrait of the economy, Bush was in a vulnerable position—and the Democratic majority knew it. Rather than risk a veto of a popular measure, Bush backed down and signed
the bill.
Bush won more clear-cut compromises and concessions on much ordinary legislation, including appropriations measures that were the focus of many of the private-topublic threats in the 102d Congress. Early signals usually prompted Democrats to cede
ground on spending. In 1992, Bush vowed to veto bills that exceeded his budget
requests. The final appropriations bills for fiscal year (FY) 1993 were, in fact, very close
to Bush’s requests. But attributing success to Bush’s blanket, public threat leads to wrong
conclusions and belies the actual modus operandi of inter-branch negotiation. Democrats, if they were aware of Bush’s statement, largely ignored it and wrote bills that far
exceeded his budget guidelines. These bills also included a host of other provisions to
which the administration later objected, which were not part of the president’s general
policy statement. Only after a series of threats that began privately did the Democratic
majority ultimately comply with many—but not all—of the president’s provisos. It was
obviously not practical for Bush and his advisors to build a public case on every provision to which they objected.
Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations (H.R. 5677)
drew administration protests on the issues of abortion, the removal of budget “firewalls,”
and overall spending levels. The veto threat issued to Robert Byrd, Chairman of the
Senate Appropriations Committee, emphasized the president’s commitment to veto
domestic or defense spending bills that exceeded his FY 1993 budget proposal and
offered “suggestions that would lead to the development of a bill that the President could
sign” (Kieffer, September 8, 1992). The administration was most concerned with potential amendments to the House bill that would expand federal funding of abortion programs and shift $3.8 billion in defense funds to domestic programs in the bill. The latter
provision would have violated budget “firewalls” that prohibited the transfer of defense
funds to discretionary domestic programs. The letter urged the Senate Appropriations
Committee to shift spending to the president’s priority programs. The abortion provisions were dropped and congressional leaders reduced the cost of the bill to meet Bush’s
budget targets (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 651). The tradeoff was that language championed by the administration on the Low Income Home Energy Assistance
Program (LIHEAP), Medicare, and education initiatives was not re-tooled to the president’s satisfaction. The legislation passed on a bipartisan basis in the House, and by
voice vote in the Senate. Presidential intervention regarding the abortion issue and
spending levels helped produce a bill with which conservative Republicans were more
comfortable.7
Similar dynamics of compromise were evident on a host of other threatened appropriations bills. Timing sometimes worked to the president’s advantage. Veto threats com7. Interestingly, Bush opposed the bill’s passage in the House, presumably to register his continuing
protest to spending.
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
bined with members’ urgency to return to their districts to campaign in 1992, to hamper
Democrats’ desire to confront the president and force a delay in adjournment (Calio,
September 18, 1992; September 27, 1992). Significant inter-branch accommodation was
evident on such bills as military construction (H.R. 5428) and Treasury and postal (H.R.
5488). On H.R. 5428, the administration won concessions in conference from House
Appropriations Chair Whitten to restore funds for military base closures and pare down
other spending in the bill to the president’s request of $8.3 billion, and compromise on
his request for NATO infrastructure funds (Calio, September 4, 1992). A bicameral
White House strategy was evident on the Treasury and postal appropriations measure.
After threatening the bill, the administration successfully lobbied the Senate to drop a
House provision prohibiting funds to be used for the Quayle Council on Competitiveness. Outlays were reduced by $200 million to comply with the president’s budget
(Kieffer, September 8, 1992). The caveat was that Bush yielded on restrictions placed
on political activities of the director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the
“drug czar.”
Bush was arguably most successful in wresting concessions on abortion language
in a diverse set of appropriations measures. Congress complied fully with Bush’s concerns on H.R. 5368 (foreign operations appropriations) by excising language that would
have overturned the “Mexico City policy” of withholding Agency for International
Development (AID) funds to organizations that support abortion as part of family planning overseas (Kieffer, October 1, 1992).
Bush compromised on spending levels in the FY 1993 defense bill to win the deletion of abortion language. The administration issued veto threats both to the House
Rules Committee on H.R. 5504 and to the House Appropriations Committee on the
authorizing legislation (H.R. 5006). The initial threat targeted an amendment to liberalize abortions on military facilities. The veto threat also outlined a number of defense
projects funded at levels below what the president had requested, as well as other projects opposed by the administration (Calio, June 3, 1992). The abortion language was
dropped, and the president compromised on funding for the Strategic Defense Initiative
and several other programs (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 483). The president’s advisors later urged House Appropriations Chair Whitten to “avoid a protracted
debate with the Administration” over the issue of abortions at military facilities in the
spending bill as the committee considered re-inserting new abortion language (Calio,
June 30, 1992). The administration stood on firm and consistent ground: the prior year’s
Defense appropriations bill had drawn a similar veto threat. The provision was ultimately
dropped, and the final bill passed both chambers on a bipartisan basis.
The disaster relief bill (H.R. 5620), which began as a supplemental Defense appropriations bill, also became embroiled in abortion controversy. The legislation was transformed into an aid bill following a typhoon in Guam and hurricanes in Hawaii and the
southeastern United States. In a Statement of Administration Policy, the president’s advisors clarified opposition to a section of the bill added by the Senate that permitted Title
X funds to be used for abortion counseling—in effect, a repeal of the “gag rule.” The
administration also objected to regulations on contractors for federally funded projects
and the deletion of funds for the re-building of Homestead Air Force Base in south
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 743
Florida (Calio, September 15, 1992). The president was successful in excising the abortion language from the bill, and the labor regulations were also deleted in conference
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 583). Congressional Democrats met Bush
halfway, and the administration settled for a compromise on funding for Homestead Air
Force Base and several other Defense programs. The approaching elections compelled
Congress and the administration to complete work on the bill quickly, and it passed by
voice votes in both chambers without further controversy.
Finally, Bush won concessions on several bills that he argued challenged the
president’s authority as commander-in-chief. On H.R. 4990 (Jobs through Export Act
of 1992, passed in lieu of S. 2403), the administration directed a veto threat to Dante
Fascell, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (Calio, May 27, 1992).
The administration opposed a Senate amendment to Title V of the recission bill that
would have placed restrictions on the president’s ability to direct foreign aid. The amendment was deleted from consideration in the final bill. Democrats’ concessions to the president’s demands, and Republicans’ pressure on appropriators to reduce spending, paved
the way for bipartisan passage of the bill in both the House and Senate (Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1992, 587-588).
Bush also objected to provisions in the energy and water appropriations bill (H.R.
5373) that allegedly infringed on his constitutional authority. The White House turned
attention to the Senate on the issues of super collider research and a ban on nuclear testing
(Kieffer, July 30, 1992). The administration commended Senate Appropriations Committee Chair Robert Byrd for reinstating funding for the super collider, which the House
had dropped. However, a House provision for a one-year complete ban on nuclear testing,
following unilateral decisions by France and Russia to halt testing, drew stringent objection from the administration. Louisiana Senator Bennett Johnston worked out details
of compromise wording of the bill with the administration (Congressional Quarterly
Almanac 1992, 659-668). Though the moratorium on testing remained, provisions were
included for the president to authorize new tests if he deemed them in the national interest, notwithstanding a joint resolution of disapproval once he notified Congress of his
intent to resume testing.
Failed Veto Threats, Override Attempts, and Blame Game Politics
Despite a number of successful efforts to negotiate with the congressional majority quietly and intensively on a host of appropriations measures, Bush faced many other
policy issues on which Democrats were unwilling to compromise and were prepared to
provoke a veto. On private-to-public as well as purely public threats, the majority leadership gambled that strategic disagreement with the president would raise public consciousness of policy issues and yield electoral advantage. In total, ten purely public veto
threats and six private-to-public threats did not win the White House policy concessions from the majority leadership on Capitol Hill—the threats failed, and Bush
followed through on his pledge to wield the veto pen.
Bush faced a roughly proportionate number of challenges on legislation he vetoed
that had been threatened in a purely public or private-to-public venue. Of the ten bills
744
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
that he had publicly threatened to veto and did, Democrats attempted overrides on six.
Only the cable television re-regulation bill (S 12) succeeded. On the six vetoed bills that
had received private-to-public threats, Democrats unsuccessfully challenged the president four times. In those cases, the congressional majority had denied Bush’s objections
and the bills passed along party line votes, all but assuring override attempts would fail.
Passage of the legislation, however, was not the immediate objective. The failed override attempts were a type of public statement or “position taking” (Conley and Kreppel
2001) by the Democratic leadership aimed at discrediting Bush and building electoral
support as the 1992 elections neared.
Whereas Democrats had made important concessions to Bush on a number of
appropriations measures by deleting abortion language, they used select vetoed bills to
take a public stand in support of abortion rights. It is no coincidence that two of the
four publicly threatened bills (H.R. 2707, S323) that were vetoed and challenged were
highly salient measures that concerned the so-called gag rule. In 1991 Bush vetoed H.R.
2707, the appropriations bill for Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education,
because of language that enabled doctors to discuss abortion with patients in federally
funded family planning clinics. The override vote, which failed by 12 votes in the House,
marked the beginning of a frequently visceral debate between members and the administration. By attaching the abortion counseling language to a popular appropriations bill,
Democrats insured that the bill would receive widespread attention. As California Democrat Nancy Pelosi contended, “This vote today is not about who controls a woman’s body.
It is about who controls a woman’s mind” (Clymer 1991b). Democrats ultimately yielded
on the abortion language and re-passed the 1991 appropriations bill. But a year later,
they again challenged Bush in the form of a Senate bill that directed the Secretary of
Health and Human Services to lift restrictions on discussing abortion in federally funded
clinics. Some Democrats, like Henry Waxman of California, attempted to frame the issue
as one of “free speech” between doctors and patients. Others, like Jolene Unsoeld of
Washington, argued that Bush was hypocritical—arguing for less government regulation, except in the case of women (Clymer 1992b). Although the Senate overrode Bush’s
veto by a rather comfortable margin, the House sustained it by ten votes—roughly the
same margin as the 1991 vote.
Another ordinary measure, fetal tissue research (H.R. 2507), had been the subject
of private-to-public threat. Bush threatened the bill in committee, but Democratic
leaders pressed the issue of fetal tissue research in the National Institutes of Health
reauthorization bill. Their objective was to compel Bush to veto a popular, if ethically
complex, measure. Democrat Henry Waxman, the bill’s sponsor, contended that the president would have to tell Americans with life-threatening diseases that “research will be
stopped that will hold promise for them” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 395).
The conference report on the bill had passed along partisan lines in the House, and the
override in that chamber failed by a wide margin.
Other challenges to vetoed bills followed a similar pattern. Democrats wanted to
stake out a public position for political gain. Failed overrides on family leave (S 5) and
motor voter legislation (S 250) set the stage for passage of the bills under Bill Clinton,
who supported both measures during the 1992 presidential campaign. The voter regis-
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 745
tration measure drew a veto threat on the basis of the cost of the bill, concerns about
fraud, and procedural issues (Calio, June 10, 1992). Clinton called Bush’s veto of the
motor voter bill “nothing less than a slap in the face to American democracy” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 77). Bush’s earlier 1992 veto of a House bill restricting MFN status for China, and an unsuccessful override of that bill, did not deter
Democrats from drafting a second bill, H.R. 5318, as an explicit means to protest the
administration’s policies. Republican leaders contended the China bill was “a political
gesture aimed more at embarrassing Bush than pressuring the Chinese government” on
human rights issues (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 160). The administration
issued a veto threat to the Senate, arguing that renewing MFN status was “based on the
principle that engagement with China offers the best hope for democratic reform” (Calio,
August 6, 1992). The veto threat did not dissuade either chamber from approving the
bill. The House voted to override Bush’s veto by a large margin, but consistent with
dynamics on the earlier bill, the Senate sustained by a substantial margin.
The override attempt of the Economic Growth Acceleration Act of 1992 (H.R.
4210) represents a highly unusual case in which the Republican minority sought to play
the public game and turn Bush’s veto into political advantage. Republicans forced an
override vote in order to denounce the Democratic bill and paint the majority leadership as autocratic. After Democrats rejected the administration’s stimulus proposal, the
majority’s bill drew a veto threat for provisions exempting outlays from PAYGO requirements and imposing permanent tax increases on upper income families. The administration urged the House Rules Committee to “allow Republicans a fair and equal
opportunity to amend and debate the bill on the House floor” (Calio, February 24, 1992).
The Republican alternative was defeated in committee and Rules failed to agree to any
Republican amendments. Democrats “hoped to force Bush to choose between denying
the middle class a tax break or raising taxes on the well-to-do—something he vowed not
to repeat after signing a tax increase in 1990” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992,
133). The final legislation was adopted along strict party lines in the House, with
only a single Republican voting in favor. Republicans pressed for an override vote to
embarrass the Democratic leadership, and they succeeded. Enough Democrats defected
from their original support for the measure that the override vote did not even muster a
majority.
It is ironic that the only successful congressional override of Bush’s 46 vetoes
was particularly damaging, coming as it did on the eve of the 1992 presidential election. Bush’s veto threat of legislation pitched by Democrats as a consumer protection
bill fell on deaf ears. Bush vetoed the Senate-inspired bill to re-regulate the cable
television industry (S 12) in October 1992, lambasting it as “special interest” legislation that would damage both consumers and investment in the telecommunications industry. Yet the president’s political capital had waned to such a degree by 1992
as the economy sunk further into recession that he could not persuade enough Republicans to stick by his position. Democrats stressed the bipartisan nature of the bill, which
drew the support of GOP leadership and passed with the support of majorities of both
parties in both the House and Senate. By large margins, both chambers subsequently
overrode the veto. As James A. Thurber noted after the vote, “On this particular bill
746
| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
(Bush) had very little to trade with, other than loyalty to the party and loyalty to him.
And he didn’t get it” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 171). The failure of the
threat on the cable television bill and the dynamics of the successful override, however,
were the clear exception—and not the rule—in the 102d Congress as throughout Bush’s
term.
Measures Threatened and Halted
Private veto threats were most effective in halting legislation in its tracks—often
between chambers. Of the 39 measures that were threatened and failed, 25 (64%) passed
the House but were never taken up in the Senate. Technical issues and partisan conflict
contributed to the failure of this set of bills. Nineteen of the minor bills were special
tax measures that had been passed by a voice vote under suspension of the rules in the
House (see Congressional Record, July 27, 1992). Some of the measures were rolled into
a catch-all bill (H.R. 2735) by Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski that also
passed by voice vote in the House (Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1992, 150). The
special interest measures drew veto threats from the administration on policy grounds
either because they did not meet PAYGO scoring requirements, which mandated offsetting budget cuts for new spending or tax exemptions, or because provisions were
judged to be too administratively complex (Calio, August 3, 1992). The Senate never
took up the measures at the end of the legislative session.
Minor bills that received public or private-to-public threats are distinguishable by
the point at which they died in the legislative process. Whereas nearly two thirds of
private veto threats killed legislation after passage by the House, just over half of all
other minor bills expired in committee or were reported and never received floor action.
Most bills die in committee, and veto threats on minor as well as ordinary bills had a
reinforcing effect.
Across categories of policy significance, there are fewer common threads to threatened legislation that expired. Ordinary legislation ranged from crime control to arms
exports. Highly salient measures dealt with banking or environmental issues. Approximately half of these bills died in committee, and another third died after passage by one
chamber.
Conclusions
This case study of executive-legislative relations in the 102d Congress has developed a more subtle classification of veto threats and tested how implied vetoes affected
policy outcomes across categories of legislative significance. The analysis has shown that
“going public” was not the vehicle for the president’s communication of veto threats
to the Democratic majority on much legislation from 1991 to 1992. Contrary to prior
research that has emphasized the importance of public rhetoric for an effective veto threat
strategy, this study has accented the complexity of behind-the-scenes negotiation. The
real-world circumstances surrounding veto bargaining in the second half of Bush’s term
Conley / GEORGE BUSH AND THE 102d CONGRESS
| 747
often comprised signaling outside of public view—or at least much of it took place
outside of media scrutiny.
The president was successful in different ways when he employed different types
of threats. Private threats were as effective as public threats in tabling minor legislation.
Threats that started out quietly and were reported inside the beltway were standard
operating procedure for most routine appropriations measures, and Bush won notable
concessions for bills that passed. A nuanced interpretation suggests that highly salient
legislation was the most difficult for the White House to negotiate. Veto threats failed
often on this set of bills, and Democrats were most willing to provoke confrontation
and cast such confrontation into the media spotlight. Although Bush was successful in
halting all override attempts save one, he had a more difficult time claiming credit for
the salient bills that passed and on which he was able to wrest concessions.
The analysis casts doubt on elements of the commitment model of veto threats and
raises a key question. Either the White House did not go to great lengths to publicize
the threats, or national media sources did not judge the threats on the legislation to be
newsworthy. If presidents do not need to “go public” on an important subset of threats,
why are quiet threats effective in tabling bills and securing concessions on much ordinary legislation? If the national media were not paying attention and the public was not
informed of the threats, why did they have credibility?
A few hypotheses are reasonable at this juncture. The efficacy of private and privateto-public veto threats may have much to do with the interconnection between the
president’s “policy reputation” and the structure of voting coalitions in Congress. The
congressional majority’s judgment of the president’s willingness to carry out veto threats
may be heavily influenced by those cases of high-profile, public conflict that serve to convince the majority of his sincerity. Such an interpretation is consistent not only with elements of the coordination model (see Cameron 2000) but also with Neustadt’s (1960)
emphasis on the president’s reputation within the Washington policy community.
Even if the president does not publicly commit to veto legislation, his standing
among key actors inside the beltway who care most about select policy issues may convince congressional leaders of his commitment. “Repeat play” between the branches on
vetoed bills and failed overrides may force congressional leaders to more carefully consider which bills to challenge, make concessions on, or simply drop in light of their own
time and resource constraints. The structure of voting coalitions in Congress may reinforce these considerations. With the rise of greater intra-party cohesion and more narrow
party margins on Capitol Hill since the late 1980s, override challenges are far less likely
to succeed compared to earlier decades when legislative coalitions were more fluid.
More definitive models about the basis for successful, quiet threats obviously await
further archival research and systematic analysis for other presidents. The availability of
new data sources on the Internet may make it possible to keep closer track of veto threats
and test and refine the typology developed here. Since 1997 (105th Congress), the Office
of Management and Budget has made Statements of Administration Policy available
on its web site.8 Examining veto threats in these documents may facilitate distinctions
8. http://www.whitehouse.gov/legislative/omb
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| PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY / December 2003
between public and private threats before archival material becomes available. Such
research promises to extend our understanding of presidential strategy and success at a
time when implied vetoes have come to play an enhanced role in legislative bargaining
between the branches.
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