Tuomas Rasanen and Simo Laakkonen
Cold Warand theEnvironment:
The Role of Finlandin International
PoliticsintheBalticSea Region
Environmental
COLD WAR,HISTORY,AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The Convention
on the Protection
oftheMarineEnvironmentofthe BalticSea Area signedin 1974 inHelsinkiis The relationshipbetweenthe Cold War and environmental
environmental
probablythe most important
agreement politicshas receivedattentionalso in the Baltic Sea region.
consummatedintheBalticSea region.Thisarticleis the Severalresearchers
have arguedthat Cold War competition
first
studythatexploresthehistory
ofthisagreement,
also graduallytranslated
intoBalticSea cooperation(6-12). In this
knownas the HelsinkiConvention,by using primary studywe willexaminethiscomplexand contestedprocessfrom
sources are the archives thepointof viewof theHelsinkiConvention.
archivalsources. The principal
forForeignAffairs
ofFinland.We examine
oftheMinistry
on the role of Finlandin internaOur studyconcentrates
theroleofFinlandintheprocessthatledtothesigningof tionalenvironmental
politicsin theBalticSea region.The role
fromthe perspectiveof interna- of Finlandin theSecondWorldWar and subsequently
the HelsinkiConvention
in Cold
on Finnish, War Europewas unique.In the Second WorldWar, Finland
tionalpolitics.The studyfocuses primarily
Swedish,and Sovietstate-levelpartiesfromthe end of was one of only threeEuropean countriesinvolvedin the
the 1960s to 1974. We show that Cold War politics conflictthatwerenot occupiedby a foreignpower(theothers
and contentsofthe werethe SovietUnion and GreatBritain).As a resultof the
affectedinseveralways negotiations
HelsinkiConvention.
We also arguethattheSovietUnion
to the Soviet
environmental
issues as Second WorldWar, Finlandhad to cede land
used theemerginginternational
remaineda sovereignstate with a capitalist
but
it
Union,
a newtoolofpowerpolitics.
economyand a democraticsocial system.On theotherhand,
Finland,whichhad a populationof fourmillionafterthe
withthe
SecondWorldWar, developeda uniquerelationship
INTRODUCTION
SovietUnion,withwhichFinlandhad morethan 1000km of
Finlandconformed
relations,
In Spring1974,whentheice coveringtheBalticSea had notyet landand sea border.In itsforeign
to
in
so
far
as
benefited
Finlandas well.
Soviet
positions
they
of the seven states
melted,the government
representatives
Finnish
But
on
the
other
the
looked
hand,
political
leadership
of
aroundtheBalticSea convenedin Helsinki,at theinitiative
when
the
other
for
human
violations
were
way,
example,
rights
the Finnish Government,to sign the Conventionon the
All
committed
the
the
an
unusual
by
superpower
(13,
14).
same,
of theMarineEnvironment
of theBalticSea Area,
Protection
was established
betweentheCommunist
relationship
also knownas theHelsinkiConvention
(1). The objectiveofthe interactive
and
the
of Finland in
Soviet
Union
capitalist
democracy
HelsinkiConventionwas graduallyto resolvethe pollution
Europeacrossfrontlinesin theCold War,and both
problemaffecting
theBalticSea; concernsabout thedegrada- Northern
This special
were replacedby optimism partiesstroveto benefitfromthe relationship.
tion of the marineenvironment
relationship
between
the
Soviet
Union
and
Finland
mustbe
about thefuture(2).
taken
into
account
when
the
role
of
in
Finland
is
explored
The HelsinkiConventionqualifiesas a uniqueachievement
environmental
in
international
the
Baltic
Sea
politics
region.
in itstime.It was thefirstmultilateral
convention
signedduring
Our studyfocuseson the Baltic Sea, whichis one of the
the Cold War era by membersof two mutuallycompeting
alliances:theNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization
and regionalseas of the world.The Baltic Sea turnedout to be
military
to pollutionbecauseit is fairlyshallowand has poor
the WarsawPact. Of the sevensignatories,
three(the Soviet sensitive
withtheAtlanticOcean and becausetheice that
water
exchange
Union,Poland,and theGermanDemocraticRepublic[GDR])
the
covers
Baltic
Sea duringthelongwinter
strain
putsa further
weremembersof theWarsawPact,two (theFederalRepublic
of Germany[FRG] and Denmark)belongedto NATO, and on the ecosystem.In theend, the pollutionof the BalticSea
environmental
Finland and Swedenwereconsideredpoliticallyneutral.The becameperhapsthemostseriousinternational
in one way or another
Europe,affecting
HelsinkiConventionwas a generalconvention
thatcoveredall problemin Northern
thepollutantsknownat thetimeand almostall ofthesea area; the populationof more than 80 millionpeople livingin the
as such,it was the firstof its kind in the world(3, 4). The Baltic Sea basin. Even the vigorous national actions of
HelsinkiConventionwas later used as a model for other individualstateswerenotenoughto protectthesea. However,
an effective
formarineprotection
system
was easier
international
environmental
conventions,
includingthe Con- establishing
ventionforthe Protectionof the Mediterranean
Sea against said than done, for in orderto curb emissions,cooperation
betweenthestateswas necessary
in politically
dividedNorthern
Pollution(5, 6).
Thisarticleexaminestheprocessthatledto thesigning
ofthe Europe(Fig. 1).
ofBalticSea pollutionand itsprevention
has not
Helsinki Conventionfrom the perspectiveof international The history
period
politics.Our objectiveis to demonstrate
thatthe convention been adequatelystudied.In particular,the important
not only aimed to protectthe environment,
has not beengiventhe
but also had a precedingthehistoric1974convention
itdeserves;
itis precisely
thisperiodthatis thefocusof
politicaldimensionthat determinedthe framework
for the attention
and thecontentsof theconvention.
drafting
We maintainthat our study.In recentyears,the environmental
historyof the
the political nature of the Helsinki Conventionwas an Baltic Sea has begun to be exploredby investigating
the
motivefortheparticipating
important
countriesand above all emergenceof pollutionproblemsin the sea areas of coastal
forFinland,whichled theprocess.
citiesaroundtheBalticSea at theend of the 19thcentury
and
AmbioVol. 36, No. 2-3, April2007
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229
National
border
Union
ofa Republic
oftheSoviet
Border
- Border
ofterritorial
waters
-'
[j
Warsaw
Pact
NATO
countries
Non-aligned
FINLAND
SWEDEN
0
focuseson
respectto the Convention.This briefpresentation
state-level
partiesfromtheend of the1960sto 1974,noton the
otherpoliticalpartiesor the socioecologicalprocessesbehind
theHelsinkiConvention(30).
on historical
analysisofprimary
The studyis basedprimarily
sources.The principalsourceswe haveused in theresearchare
forForeignAffairsof Finland.A
thearchivesof theMinistry
significant
partofthisarchivalmaterialconsistsofexchangesof
informationbetweenleading Finnish politiciansand civil
used
whichhave not beenpreviously
servantsof theMinistry,
in historicalresearch.Much of the materialwas confidential
The researchmaterialprovidesa fairlycompreuntilrecently.
but also of
of not onlyFinnishviewpoints
hensivedescription
politicsheld by otherstatesin
theviewsabout environmental
by the Soviet Union and
the Baltic Sea region,particularly
Sweden. This article is the firststudy that explores the
signed
oftheHelsinkiConvention
international
politicalhistory
in 1974.
PROTECTIONOF THE BALTICSEA
ENVIRONMENTAL
POLITICS
AND INTERNATIONAL
In 1970,EuropecelebratedtheEuropeanNatureConservation
in
werealso reflected
Year. Concernsabout the environment
in theWest,wheregovernments
international
politics,especially
wantedto projectan imageof havinga responsibleenvironmentalagenda. Environmental
policy,whichhad previously
now beganto
playeda marginalrolein publicadministration,
to thepublicpressurebut
be perceived
as a meansofresponding
also of buildingup cooperationand cultivatinga positive
international
reputation.Finlandgraduallybegan to compete
environmental
Sweden in the area of international
against
Figure1. The Cold WardividedtheBalticSea inthepost-warperiod.
Threesocialist states were membersof the WarsawPact, the FRG politics(31, 32).
and Denmarkbelonged to NATO,and Finlandand Sweden were
The deterioration
ofthestateoftheBalticSea was naturally
consideredas politicallyneutral.Because of Soviet pressurethe thebasicpremisethatcreatedtheneedto developinternational
territorial
waters,on the average 12 nauticalmilesfromrespective
Buta variety
ofpurelypoliticalfactorsencouraged
coastline, were not included in the contents of the Helsinki cooperation.
Convention.
of
thesignificance
to takethelead and highlighted
governments
of theBalticSea forFinland,in
cooperationon theprotection
was used
protection
particular.Cooperationon environmental
to fostertrustbetweencountriesthat belongedto opposing
ofwaterprotection
(15-18).The history
duringthe20thcentury
as such,could
protection,
alliances,forenvironmental
military
Onlyin Sweden
policyat thenationallevelhas beenneglected.
not be deemed to involve questionablemotivesfrom the
in
of nationaldebateon waterprotection
has thedevelopment
of international
politics(7, 33, 34). Consequently,
perspective
beeninvestigated
theearly20thcentury
(19). Withregardto the thepromotionof environmental
was seen as useful
protection
has been to boththeEasternand Westernblocs.
former
socialiststatesin theBalticSea region,research
thatexaminethegeneraltrendsof
limitedto somepublications
In practice,thestatesaroundtheBalticSea had engagedin
environmentalmanagementand environmentallegislation environmental
cooperationevenbeforetheysignedtheHelsinki
mainlyin recenthistory(for exceptionssee publications20- Convention.In 1968,Finlandand theSovietUnion agreedon
23). However,anothertopicof researchthathas receivedeven scientific
and technological
cooperationrelatingto theGulfof
thannationalwaterprotection
policyis interna- Finland,and both partieswere apparentlycontentwiththis
less attention
tional marineprotectionpolicy in the period precedingthe cooperation(35-36). Some yearslater,Swedenand theSoviet
HelsinkiConventionof 1974(24).
to the
Unionengagedin similarresearchcooperationpertaining
worked
BalticSea. Finlandand Swedenhad also traditionally
MATERIALSAND METHODS
on environmental
issues,althoughthetwo
extensively
together
countriesdid not sign actual agreementon cooperation
Of particularinterestfromthe viewpointof the historyof
until1972.
theBalticSea environment
regarding
environmental
politicsin theBalticSea regionis thehypothesis
politicalcircumstances
accordingto whichthe international
createdbytheCold Warplayeda rolein theprocessthatled to SwedishInitiativeand theGermanQuestion
the signingof the HelsinkiConvention.This hypothesishas AftertheSecondWorldWar,theBalticSea becamea politically
in severalstudiesbutit has notbeenstudiedin dividedarea.As a result,
beensuggested
intheregion,
thetwoneutralcountries
depth so far (7, 8, 25-29). In our studythis hypothesisis Finlandand Sweden,weretheonlyonesthatcouldtakethelead
documentation in intergovernmental
unpublished
examinedwiththehelpof hitherto
on cooperationrelatedto the
negotiations
of area withoutprovokingpoliticalconflictsbetweenthe superon thehistory
and archivalmaterial.Our studyconcentrates
on an powers(Fig. 1).
theoriginsof theHelsinkiConventionand particularly
It advocatedan agreement
empiricalexaminationof the viewsof partiesthatplayedan
Swedentook thefirstinitiative.
politics with betweenthestatesaroundtheBalticSea to protectit fromoil
essentialrole in internationalenvironmental
U
230
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AmbioVol. 36,No. 2-3, April2007
discharges
fromships.However,meetings
heldin 1969and 1970 FirstFinnishAttempt
in Visby,Sweden,resultedonlyin two separateprotocolsthat
At thebeginning
of 1971,theFinnishGovernment
believedthat
stressed
theimportance
in matters
ofjointefforts
to the
relating
for
preparations
the
Convention
on
the
Protection
of the
environmental
oftheBalticSea and thatwerehoped
protection
Marine
Environment
of
the
Baltic
Sea
Area
should
begin
to serve as bedrock for possible futureagreement.No
immediately,
becauseit seemedthattheinternational
political
internationalagreementwas signed because the NATO
obstaclescouldbe overcome(42, 43). The Germanquestion,in
countriesin the regionfeltunable to endorsean agreement
was headingfora resolution:in January1971,the
particular,
withall the neighboring
governments.
This, in turn,was a
leadersof GDR and FRG, WilliStophand WillyBrandt,had
conditionsetby theSovietUnion,Poland,and theGDR (36).
initiated
on thenormalization
ofrelations
negotiations
between
In practice,theVisbymeetings
madeit clearthattheWestdid
thetwo countries.Significant
had also been made in
progress
notacceptthegovernment
of GDR as a contracting
party(37).
theborderdisputebetweentheGermaniesand Poland,which
The underlying
issuewas thedivisionof Germany.During
had led to a formalrecognition
oftheOder-Neisse
linebyFRG
theCold War GDR and FRG did not officially
recognizeeach
in December1970(44, 45).
other,and theirallies did not recognizethe existenceof the
The idea of an international
conference
on thepollutionof
opposing state. This deadlock, known as the "German
theBalticSea was realizedin thespringof 1971.Duringa visit
question,"also hinderedprotectionof the Baltic Sea, forthe
to Moscow, FinnishPresidentUrho Kekkonenexpressedhis
signingofinternational
cooperative
agreements
requiredthatall
to hostsucha conference,
country's
willingness
and theSoviet
partiesbe recognized
as sovereign
states.WhereasFRG would
primeminister
AlexeyKosygingave thegreenlightto theidea
not recognizeGDR, the SovietUnion set theparticipation
of
(40). Finlandwantedto takea cautiousapproachand started
by
GDR as a conditionfor signingany conventionon internasoundingout theviewsof Swedenand Denmark,whichwere
tionalenvironmental
protection
(37-38).
considered
as politically
lesssensitive
thanothercountries
inthe
The attitudesof the Finnish and Swedish governmentsregion.In consultationsthat took
place in July1971, both
on the Germanquestion.Sweden,along withother Swedenand Denmarkreiterated
differed
theirpreviousposition:the
Westerncountries,
had officially
FRG at theend of initiative
recognized
was welcomein principle,
but GDR could not be a
the1940s,butithad notrecognized
GDR. Finland,in contrast, party to an intergovernmental
convention.However, the
had notrecognized
eitherstate,so theFinnishGovernment
was consultations
concludedwithan agreement
thatFinlandwould
able to promotecooperationon environmental
protection extenda generalconferenceinvitationto all Baltic coastal
withoutthe disadvantagefacedby the Swedes.On the other states.Preparations
fortheconference
wouldtaketime,and the
hand,boththeWestand theEast had somereservations
about Germanquestionwouldperhapsbe resolvedin themeantime,
Finnishneutrality.
The Westsaw Finlandas beingflrmly
in the in a mannerthatwould be satisfactory
to everyoneinvolved
Soviet sphereof influence,which raised doubts about the (46). An unofficial
invitation
was immediately
issuedin Summer
ultimateaims of Finland.The Easternfactionfeltthatthings 1971 afterthe meetingof the representatives
of Finland,
wereas theyshouldbe; all theyaskedFinlandto do was to stop Sweden,and Denmark.Laterin the same autumnthematter
its neutralstatus(39). Indeed,the keydifferencewas made publicin Ottawaduringpreparatory
emphasizing
consultations
betweenFinlandand Swedenwas Finland'sgood relationswith forthefirstUnitedNations(UN) Conference
on theHuman
theSovietUnion.BecauseSwedenappearedto theEasternbloc Environment.
The invitation
was repeatedalso in Stockholm
in
as being partial on the German question,the initiativein 1972duringtheUN conference
(47-49).
establishing
cooperationon theenvironmental
protection
ofthe
At the same time, pressureto promoteenvironmental
BalticSea shifted
fromtheSwedishGovernment
to theFinns. protectionwas growing,especiallyafterthe media became
Soon aftertheVisbymeetings,
officialsin theMinistry
for awareofplansfortheHelsinkiconference.
Moreover,alarming
ForeignAffairsof Finlandbeganto generateideas fora more headlineson thedeterioration
of themarinearea circulatedin
comprehensive
conventionon theprotection
of theBalticSea thepress,suchas "Lifebeginning
to fadein theBalticSea" (50).
environment.
The FinnsbelievedthattheSovietUnionwould The mediasenta clearmessageto thedecisionmakers:
thestates
look morefavorably
on initiatives
takenby Finlandthanthose aroundtheBalticSea had to worktogether
againstpollutionor
takenbySweden(40). Afterall,itwas commonknowledge
after else theywouldhavenothingto save (51).
the VisbymeetingsthatSwedenwould not signan intergov- The LegalDepartment
oftheMinistry
forForeignAffairs
of
ernmental
in whichGDR was a contracting
agreement
party, Finlandwas lookingforalternatives
to circumvent
theGerman
whereas Finland was prepared to enter into "[...] any problem.One oftheideaswas to enterintoa nongovernmental
multilateral
if [other]countriesare also capable of agreement
agreement,
betweenexpertorganizations.
Anotheridea thatwas
enteringinto it" (41). For as long as the Germanquestion put forwardwas to sign severalmultilateral
agreements
that
caused frictionbetweenthe Baltic coastal states, Finland wouldhavethesamecontents.
Theseproposals,amongothers,
remainedthemostacceptablechoiceto convenean intergov- wererejected,but one alternative
was developedfurther.
This
ernmental
conference
on theprotection
of theBalticSea.
involvedthe signingof trilateral
agreements
betweenSweden
Thanksto cooperationon theenvironment,
Finlandcould and Finlandand theSovietUnion(46).
presentitselfas a peace-makerbetweenthe statesaroundthe
The idea of trilateral
cooperationbetweenFinland,Sweden,
BalticSea and strengthen
itspolicyof neutrality
and itsroleas and the Soviet Union was initiallysuggestedby marine
an activeinternational
player.The Finnshoped thatenviron- researchers.BilateralresearchcooperationbetweenFinland
mentalcooperationwouldlaterhave a positiveimpacton the and theSovietUnion had functioned
well.Thisled in 1970to
organization
oftheConference
on Security
and Cooperationin discussionon extending
thecooperationto includea thirdstate.
Europe(CSCE), in whichbothEasternand WesternEuropean The Ministryfor Foreign Affairsalso began to chart
countries
wereexpectedto participate.
Initiallyon theproposal opportunities
for cooperation,because concertedeffortsbeof theSovietUnion,Finlandbeganto plan theorganization
of tween Sweden,Finland, and the Soviet Union to compile
the CSCE in 1969. Finland's highest leaders rated the researchknowledge
to be usedin marineprotection
wouldhave
organization
oftheCSCE, alongwiththenurturing
ofrelations constituted
a significant
stepin therightdirection
(52-54). The
withtheSovietUnion,as themostimportant
international
goal coastal area belongingto Sweden,Finland,and the Soviet
of Finnishforeign
policyat thetime.
Union coveredfour-fifths
of theBalticcoastalline,and at the
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231
/
-
The preliminary
agreementto arrangean international
conferenceto
promotethe protectionof the Baltic Sea was made betweenthe
Presidentof Finland,UrhoKekkonen,and theSovietPremierAlexei
Kosygin in Moscow in 1971. This pictureillustrating
the good
relationsbetweenthetwoleaderswas takenduringa fieldtripinthe
Caucasus Mountains 2 years earlier. Photo: The Archive of
PresidentUrhoKekkonen.
The main aim of Finland's foreignpolicy was to arrange the
Conferenceon Securityand Cooperation in Europe. President
GeraldFordand GeneralSecretaryLeonid Brezhnevmetin a good
atmosphereduringthe CSCE conferenceheld in Helsinkiin 1975.
The days of pioneeringinternational
environmental
cooperation
were,however,countedwhendetentecame to an end in late 1970s.
Photo: The Archiveof PresidentUrhoKekkonen.
timeit was thoughtthatmostof the pollutionderivingfrom
humanactivitiesand endingup in the Baltic Sea came from
thesestates.The resolution
ofenvironmental
problemscouldbe
addressedthrough
trilateral
cooperationuntilpoliticalconflicts
had beensettledand a morecomprehensive
couldbe
agreement
reached.It was hoped that the trilateralcooperationwould
encourageotherstatesto graduallyjoin the cooperationon
marineprotection,
whichwould lead to a conventionon the
of themarineenvironment
protection
of theBalticSea, signed
by all theBalticcoastalstates(55, 56).
BalticSea would promotea resolutionto theGDR question.
Finland was tryingto strikea balance in these conflicting
circumstances.
Accordingto the consensusin Finland, "the
matterat stakeis the degradationof the Baltic Sea, not the
German question" (60). But the German question was
nevertheless
part of the international
politicalcircumstances
of theBalticSea area, and it could not be ignored.The Soviet
Union demandedthat Finland unilaterally
recognizeGDR,
whereastheFinnsfearedthatsucha decisionmightbringabout
retaliation
fromtheWesternpowers.FRG letit be understood
thatifFinlandwereto recognizeGDR underpressurefromthe
The SovietUnionand theGermanQuestion
SovietUnion,thiswouldnotonlyjeopardizeFinland'sposition
The projectoutlinedby the FinnishGovernment
receiveda as the designatedhost of the Conferenceon Securityand
Finland
positiveinitialresponsefromthe Soviet Union and Sweden. Cooperationin Europe,butit wouldalso compromise
as
a
host
of
any
subsequent
multilateral
conference
The
(61).
However,the Soviet representatives
stressedin no uncertain
refusedto yieldto Sovietdemands.
terms that if the Finnish proposal included the idea of FinnishGovernment
At thebeginning
of 1972,somepeoplecontinuedto holdout
trilateral
intergovernmental
theSovietUnionwould
agreements
reject the initiative.In contrast,the Soviets could accept hope thatthe precariousstateof the Baltic Sea environment
on
research cooperation between authorities,but even this wouldbe discussedin Stockholmat thefirstUN Conference
in June1972.However,shortly
before
should involvethe opportunity
for otherstates theHumanEnvironment
arrangement
the conference
was due to begin,the Easternbloc countries
to signon at a laterdate (55, 57).
in the
Based on the initialdiscussions,Finlandwas preparedto statedthatbecauseGDR was notallowedto participate
to
theywouldnot be sendingtheirrepresentatives
a tightschedule,buttheprojectmetwith conference,
pushahead following
the
resistance.
WhenAke Wihtol,theDeputyDirector-General
of Stockholm(25). As theSovietUnionand Polandboycotted
it was impossibleto effectively
address
the Ministryfor Foreign Affairs,put forwardthe above- Stockholmconference,
mentioned
proposalforcooperationto theSovietambassador the BalticSea issue. The failureof the Stockholmconference
An intergovernmental
in Helsinki,he was metwitha cool response.The ambassador added weightto the Finnishinitiative.
deemedthe Finnishproposalto be an attemptto circumvent conferencebetweenthe Baltic Sea states,as suggestedby
on the horizonto
politicalrealitiesand accusedthe Finnsof wantingto initiate Finland,was now the only opportunity
of theBalticSea.
withouttheparticipation
of all the Balticcoastal promoteprotection
negotiations
Finnishpatiencewas rewardedwhenFRG reported,
at the
states(58). Despite the reluctanceof the Sovietambassador,
Finlanddecidedto submitan initiative
to theSovietUnionon end of October1972,thata resolution
to theGermanquestion
trilateral
cooperation.In April1972,theSovietUnionissuedits was close at hand. The final breakthrough
came quickly
on 7 November1972,the representatives
response:theparticipation
of GDR was a necessaryprecondi- afterward:
of FRG
tionfortheresolution
ofanyinternational
affairs
relating
to the and GDR announcedthat theyhad reachedagreementon
fundamental
issues. The two countriessignedthe agreement
protection
of theBalticSea environment
(59).
The Sovietenvironmental
policyconcerning
the BalticSea knownas theBasic Treatyon 21~December1972in whichFRG
was tiedin withtheGermanquestion.Since 1969,the Soviet finallyrecognizedGDR as an independentstate (45). The
Unionhad triedto persuadeFinlandto recognizeGDR, hoping resolutionof theGermanquestionremovedthemostdifficult
that otherWesterncountrieswould followsuit (43). It was obstacleto international
cooperationon theprotection
of the
hoped thata multilateral
agreementon the protectionof the BalticSea.
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AmbioVol. 36, No. 2-3, April2007
known sources of pollution should be included in the
convention,
Germany,forits part,suggestedthattheconvenOnce the politicaldeadlock seemed to be broken,Finland tion be limitedto the preventionof oil
pollution(75-77).
immediatelysent an officialconferenceinvitationvia its Evidently,
therewas no unanimity
as to the contentsof the
embassiesto all the statesaroundthe BalticSea. The reason convention
on theprotection
of theBalticSea at thispoint.
thepreparations
forFinlandto hurry
oftheconference
was that
ofthetext
Finlanddecidedto go aheadwiththepreparation
thattheconference
Finnishofficials
feared,quiterightly,
could of theconvention
and theexpertmeetingwas held,as planned,
be assignedto someothercountry,
as no agreement
had been
in Helsinkibetween28 May 1973 and 2 June 1973. The
oftheconference.
reachedas to thehostcountry
Becauseofthe
differences
and conflictsthat had surfacedearlierwere also
competitionbetweenFinland and Sweden in the field of
discussedat the meeting.Finland'srepresentative
Paul Gusinternational
environmental
policy,Finnswereafraidthatthe
tafssonthoughtthat FRG's reluctantattitudetoward the
Swedeswould succeedin takingoverthe conference
arrange- conferencebecame
clearlyevidentfromthe conductof the
ments.Therewerealso rumorsthatin bilateralconsultations
Germanrepresentatives.
Gustafssonsuspected,however,that
withSweden,Poland had expressedits interestin arranging
therepresentatives
had beenforbidden
to thwarttheplansfor
sucha conference
(62, 63).
the conference,if the other coastal states were favorably
Finlandcouldnotaffordto lose theadvantageoffered
byits
to theidea.The SovietUnionfavoredtheorganization
neutrality
policy(64, 65). The Ministryfor ForeignAffairs disposed
of
the
conference
and emphasizedthe importanceof the
fearedthatFinland"wouldlose itscurrent
politicaledgeas the
convention
to
the
On the otherhand, the Soviet
country.
case of the two Germanieshas been settledforgood and the
Union
also
insisted
that
sea
the
area within12 nauticalmiles
otherNordic countrieshave establisheddiplomaticties with
from
respective
coastline
should
not be included in the
GDR. (...) In thissituationSweden,forexample,would be
of
geographical
the
but instead,each
coverage
convention,
morecompetitive
as a conference
thanks
to its greater
host,
wouldbe independently
formonitoring
and
responsible
resources" (66). Diplomats spoke thus openly about the country
protective
action
in
its
internal
waters
(78,
79).
competitionbetween the two countries for obtaining a
Finlandoffered
once again to hosttheDiplomaticConferenvironmental
significant
conference.
ence
the
on
Protection
oftheMarineEnvironment
oftheBaltic
Afterthe treatybetweenFRG and GDR had been signed
would
agreedthattheconference
Finland'sinitiative
graduallystartedadvancingin theBalticSea Sea Area,and theparticipants
states.The fear of losingthe conferenceto Swedenproved be held in early 1974. At the same time, a preparatory
unfounded
whenSweden,alongwithDenmarkand GDR, was committeewas established,and its firstmeetingwas set for
the firstBaltic Sea countryto announceits willingnessto November1973. Finland agreed to preparea draftof the
in a conference
participate
hostedbyFinland(67). As forFRG, conventiontexton the basis of suggestionsfromall Baltic
the SovietUnion,and Poland, all threehesitantly
waitedfor coastalstates(80, 81).
The draftwas finishedby the beginningof Octoberand
each other'sresponsesto the conferenceinvitation.Poland
of the coastal stateswere
waitedfor the Soviet Union's acceptance,the Soviet Union commentsby the representatives
almost
unanimously
positive
The
(82).
onlycontroversial
issue
waitedforFRG's acceptance,and FRG was stillhesitantabout
remained
the
inclusion
of
territorial
in
waters
the
geographical
an
cosigning agreementwithGDR, despitethe Basic Treaty
coverageof theconvention.
In bilateralconsultations,
Finland
thathad beenconcludedbetweenthetwocountries(68).
waters
Eventhoughsuchuncertainty
prevailedand theresponsesof and Swedenhad agreedthattheinclusionof territorial
in the prevention
of pollution
somecoastal statesweredelayed,Finlandstarteddrafting
the was of the utmostimportance
textoftheconvention,
as ithad agreedwithSweden,Denmark, (83). The SovietUnion,foritspart,helditsgroundand insisted
waterswerenotto be includedin theconvention
and theSovietUnionthatFinnishexpertswouldforma Baltic thatterritorial
Sea commission
to drawup a draftof theconvention
text(69). (84). In the end, the SovietUnion had its way; the security
At the same time, these countrieshad agreed about the considerationsof a superpowersupersededenvironmental
and thusthe Sovietcoast remainedclosed for
of an expertmeetingin late May and earlyJune considerations
arrangement
outsiders.
1973(70).
The textof theconvention
graduallybeganto takeitsfinal
In the course of Spring 1973 those countriesthat had
previouslybeen hesitantabout the conferencegave their shape. In the consultationsbetweenthe coastal statesonly
anyamendments
to theconvention
acceptanceto thearrangement
of theexpertmeeting.Poland's Swedenand FRG suggested
responsecame in earlyMarch,FRG respondedin late March, textproper.The focus of discussionon the conventionhad
and theSovietUnion's finalresponsecame as late as 15 May shiftedfromproblemsof international
politicsto issues of
1973,onlytwoweeksbeforetheexpertmeetingwas scheduled environmental
protection.
But, accordingto some comments,
to takeplace (71-73). Thus,thecontracting
to createan extensive
generalagreement
partieswerefinally theefforts
in whichall
of theBalticSea statescould takepartleftthepossibilities
knownin Summer1973.
of
further
environmental
protection
fartoo meager(85, 86). The
text of the Conventionon the Protectionof the Marine
Contentsof theConvention
Environment
of the Baltic Sea Area was almostfinishedin
Shortlybeforethe expertmeeting,alarmingrumorsreached Autumn1973. The textwas thenhanded over to the legal
Finland. In contactsbetweenmarineresearchers,
Finns had authorities
forfinalpolishing,and by Februarytheguidelines
beenled to understand
thatthesocialistcountries
werewilling approved by all states had been formulatedinto a single
to promote bilateral environmentalprotection,but that document.The meetingof thelegalauthorities
finallydaredto
multilateral
agreements
would be out of the question.Also, announcethe long-awaitednews:"each participant
statewill
the socialistcountriesopposed the idea that the convention signtheconvention
aftertheconference"
(87, 88).
would includeinformation
on pollutantsdischargedinto the
sea. Accordingto them,demandsforsuch information
were
of theHelsinkiConvention
equivalent to industrialespionage, for which reason the Implementation
conventionshouldconcentrate
on airbornepollutantsand the The long and complex process leading to the Helsinki
pollutiondrifting
intotheBalticSea fromtheNorthSea (74). Conventionwas broughtto a close in 1974.At theend of the
Althoughthe Baltic Sea commissionhad suggestedthat all conference
held in Helsinkibetween18 March 1974 and 22
Finland'sChancesof HostingtheConferenceUncertain
Ambio Vol. 36, No. 2-3, April 2007
? Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2007
http://www.ambio.kva.se
233
March 1974,theFinnishForeignTrade MinisterJermuLaine
was able to proposeto the representatives
of the Baltic Sea
statesthattheinternational
Convention
on theProtection
ofthe
LL3a=~Fi
MarineEnvironment
of the BalticSea Area be approved.All
the states concerned were unanimous in approving the
L4aF2
.
LL11..
JF4convention
(89). Aftercarefulpreparation,
theconvention
was
finalized,and the signatoriescould join forcesin seeking
LL1I =F5
solutionsto the environmental
problemsplaguingthe Baltic
Sea. The principle
ofbuildingtrustbetweenstateswas notedin
theconvention:
"Awarenessof thesignificance
of intergovern-Figure2. The area forenvironmental
studies was strictly
limitedin
mentalcooperationin theprotection
ofthemarineenvironmentthe BalticSea regionbytheCold War.Thisfigureshows howinthe
late 1980s the monitoringstations used by HELCOM were still
oftheBalticSea as an integral
partofthepeacefulcooperation situatedonlyinthecentraland westernpartsoftheGulfof Finland.
and mutualunderstanding
betweenthenationsof Europe"(1). HELCOM1990.
As thecontentsof theconvention
had beenworkedintoan
extensivegeneralagreementcoveringall known sources of
pollution,bothfromland and ships,and theentiresea area in regionhad been resolved,powerpoliticsstillprevailedover
question,it was the firstof its kind in the world. But the environmental
politics.
conventionwas onlya preludeto practicalcooperation.The
Nevertheless,the recommendations
of HELCOM were
Helsinkiconference
established
theBalticMarineEnvironment foundedon the constantly
worrisomestateof the BalticSea,
ProtectionCommission(HelsinkiCommission[HELCOM]), the prestigeof governments,
and growinginterest
in environwhichwas to startoperationsonce all sevensignatories
had mentalcooperation.Afterthefallof theSovietUnionand the
ratifiedtheconvention.
Whilethe ratification
was in process, re-independence
of the BalticStates,the HelsinkiConvention
thecommission
was to be substituted
by an interim
protection was revisedand re-ratified
in 1992 (91). Thanks to wide
whichwas assignedwiththetask of establishing international
commission,
theamountofenvironmental
cooperation,
toxins,
commonprocedures,
and criteria
forthelaunching
practices,
of in particular,
in theBalticSea graduallystarteddecreasing.
concreteprotective
actions.International
cooperationinmarine
protection
requiredassessingand harmonizing
thescientific
and
CONCLUSIONS
technological
practicesofthesignatory
whichproved
countries,
to be a demandingtaskin sucha dividedarea,bothpolitically In Spring1974,the statesalong the shoresof the BalticSea
and culturally,
as theBalticSea. For example,debatesdragged could be contentabout thejoint achievement
of theEast and
on foryearsoverthetermsofreference
oftheconvention,
such West. Finlandwas twiceas pleased;afterall, the convention
as the definition
of "pollution"(7). Finallyby 1980 all the was theresultofyearsof hardworkby Finnishpoliticiansand
coastal states had ratifiedthe convention,and thus the officials who proved able to overcome Sweden in the
Conventionon the Protectionof the MarineEnvironment
of competition
forinternational
environmental
agreements.
HowtheBalticSea Area officially
enteredintoforce.
ever,themostsignificant
achievement
oftheHelsinkiConvenThe delay in ratifying
the conventionmay also have been tionwas thatenvironmental
cooperationbetweentheBalticSea
caused in partby Cold War tensionsin international
politics. statesrose to a new level,for the conventionwas the first
Because Denmarkand the FGR had becomemembersof the multilateralagreementbetweenmembersof two competing
European Community,they were not entitledto accede military
alliances.
to internationalagreementswith respectto
independently
theconvention
Underlying
weretheCold War and political
mattersalreadycoveredby EuropeanCommunity
legislation. rivalry
exploiting
environmental
concernsabouttheBalticSea.
Because the EC had issued an agreement
concerning
marine The SovietUnion propagatedon a generallevelforenvironpollutionin 1976, it had a privilegeto join the Helsinki mentalpoliticsto showitscooperativeness
also in theBalticSea
Convention.
However,theexistence
ofthisprivilege
was denied region(7). The HelsinkiConvention
was also advocatedbythe
bytheSovietUnionbecauseitdidnotwishto recognizetheEC SovietUnion,which,however,
mainlyuseditto putpressure
on
as a subjectof international
law. Eventually
Denmarkand the theotherBalticSea statesto recognizeGDR. Hence,it maybe
FRG ratifiedtheconvention
independently
fromtheEC (90). argued that the Soviet Union at firstused the emerging
To a certainextent,
thisincident
anticipated
thecurrent
friction international
environmental
issues as a new tool of power
betweenHELCOM and theEuropeanUnionin theBalticSea politics.
region.
Swedenhad initiatedefforts
to workout an international
The delicatebackground
ofinternational
politicsbehindthe agreement
fortheprotection
oftheBalticSea, buthad failedas
HelsinkiConventionwas reflected
in restrictions
of authority, it wouldnot recognizeGDR. The firstUN Conference
on the
too. Above all, the decisions of HELCOM were only Human Environment,
hostedby Swedenin 1972,failedpartly
nonbindingrecommendations.
HELCOM responsibleforthe forthe same reason:the SovietUnion and the otherEastern
implementationof the convention did not turn into a bloccountries
boycotted
theconference.
Therefore
theinitiative
supranational
organizationon thedividedsea area thatcould fora convention
on theprotection
oftheBalticSea shifted
from
have obligatedthe contracting
partiesto engagein protective Swedento Finland,whichin theinternational
political"playactions. Moreover, questions of responsibilitywere not offs"remainedtheonlycountryin theBalticSea area credible
adequatelytakeninto accountwhenthe conventiontextwas enoughto negotiatewithboth the East and the West. The
drafted.From a regionalperspective,the conventionwas promotionof the protection
of the BalticSea also suitedthe
restricted
mostby the Sovietdemand,based on the national agenda of the politicalleadershipof Finland,whichrealized
security
doctrineof theSovietUnion,notto includeterritorial thatenvironmental
issuescouldbe usedto further
thecountry's
watersin thecontentsoftheconvention.
As a consequence,
the main diplomaticobjective,whichwas hostingthe Conference
authority
of theHELCOM did notextendto thecoastalzone, on Securityand Cooperation in Europe. Environmental
whichwas themostpollutedarea (see Fig. 2). Even afterthe cooperationbroughtthe Easternand Westernblocs closerto
difficult
international
politicalissuesrelatedto the BalticSea each otherand thuspaved theway fora greaterpoliticalend,
234
? RoyalSwedishAcademyof Sciences2007
http://www.ambio.kva.se
AmbioVol. 36,No. 2-3, April2007
the stabilizationof the politicalsituationin all of Northern 23.
Europe.
The Cold War and international
environmental
politics 24.
crossedpathsin exceptionally
at the 25.
favorablecircumstances
of the 1970s,forat the time,a processof political
beginning
detentewas well underwayin the Baltic Sea region. In 26.
it was fortunatethat the negotiationsthat led to
hindsight,
27.
the signingof the HelsinkiConventiontook place precisely
then.For thefirsttimein international
theclimateof
relations,
28.
detenteculminated
in concreteenvironmental
cooperation(Fig.
2). ButthentheHelsinkiConventionalso pavedthewayforan
of international
improvement
relationsin theBalticSea region 29.
30.
in general.However,themid-1970scould be characterized
as a
ofdetentein Europe.Afterthatitwas clearthatboth 31.
watershed
the spiritand momentum
of detentewerebeginning
to falter
becauseof theSovietattackon Afghanistan
and newconflicts 32.
on othercontinents
(92, 93). Fortunately
theHelsinkiConven- 33.
tioncreatednewenvironmental
policyinstitutions
in theBaltic 34.
Sea regionthatensuredthecontinuation
of marineprotection.
We concludethattherelationbetweentheCold War and the 35.
environment
was reciprocal.On theone hand,theenvironment
was one of thenew actorsand issuesthatcalledintoquestion
36.
themeaningfulness
of theCold War itself.On theotherhand, 37.
the gradualrelaxationof Cold War tensionsenabledinterna38.
tionalenvironmental
politicsto emerge.Therefore
environmen-39.
tal policies not only reflectedthe state of international
40.
environment
and politicalorder,but also shaped them by
requiringnew collective action to protect the common 41.
42.
environment,
in thiscase theBalticSea.
References and Notes
1. FinalActoftheDiplomaticConference
on theProtection
oftheMarineEnvironment
of
theBalticSea Area (hereafter
referred
to as HelsinkiConvention),
22 March1974.
2. See newspaperse.g., Hufvudstadbladet
(Helsinki),23 March 1974; Uusi Suomi
(hereafter
US, Helsinki),24 March 1974;HelsinginSanomat(Helsinki),23 October
1974.
3. Contentsof theconvention,
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4. Ehlers,P. 1994.The BalticSea area:convention
on theprotection
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28 May 1971,MFA, 71b,7.
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theGulfofFinland,2 April1968,Archives
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ofMarineResearch
(FIMR), theGulfofFinlandworking
group,folder1. The agreement
on scientific
and
technological
was signedby Finlandand theSovietUnionin 1955.
cooperation
TravelreportsbyArvoHarjula,6 October1969and 6 October1970,MFA, 71b,26.
Memorandum
byArvoHarjulaand ArvoKarjalainen,
24 September
1969,MFA, 71b,
26.
Memorandum
2 April1969,MFA, 71b,26.
byPaul Gustafsson,
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Glees, A. 1996. ReinventingGermany.German Political Developmentsince 1945. Berg
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71b, 10.
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29 March1971,MFA, 71b,7.
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43. President
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year,theMinistry
forForeignAffairs
also
understood
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See ArvoHarjula'stravelreport,
6 October1970,MFA, 71b,26.
NewspaperTurunSanomat(hereafter
TS, Turku,),11June1971.
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of Finland,Ministry
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7
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1971,National
Archivesof Finland,Ministry
ofTradeand Industry,
57/570/1971.
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24 November1971,MFA, 71b,7.
Explanatory
memorandum
by Blomstedt,
27 December1971,MFA, 71b,7.
Notesby Blomstedt
of a telephonediscussionwithMyrsten,
Directorof theSwedish
ForeignService,15 December1971,MFA, 71b,7.
Memorandum
byAkeWihtol,22 December1971,MFA, 71b,7.
TranslationintoFinnishof theSovietresponseto theFinnishinitiative
on trilateral
7 April1972,MFA, 71b,7.
cooperation,
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22 September
1972,MFA, 71b, 10.
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FinnishEmbassyinWarsaw,24 January
1973,MFA 71b,11.
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byBlomstedt,
20 September
1972,MFA, 71b, 10.
Korhonen'snotesof a meeting
heldat theMFA, 5 October1972,MFA, 71b, 10.
ofan internal
Memorandum
meeting
at theMFA, 20 September
1972.MFA, 71b,6.
Memorandum
by Blomstedt,
30 January
1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum
byGylling,
27 February1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
letters
to theFinnishEmbassiesaroundtheBalticSea, MFA, 71b, 11.
Blomstedt's
copyof a secrettelegraph,
2 March1973,MFA, 71b,10.
Blomstedt:
Copyofa lettersentas a secrettelegraph
bytheFinnishEmbassyin Warsaw,3 March
1973,MFA, 71b,11.
LetterbytheFinnishEmbassyin Bonnto theMFA, 21 March1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum
byGustafsson,
15 May 1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Hela's letterto Gustafsson,
16 May 1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum
bytheBalticSea commission,
12 February1973,MFA, 71b,11.
Blomstedt's
correspondence
to I.M. Behnke,Denmark'sAmbassadorto Helsinki,29
March1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Notesfromthemeeting
oftheMFA LegalDepartment,
30 March1973,MFA, 71b,11.
NotesbyHolgerRotkirch
of theexpertmeeting,
28 May 1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum
by Gustafsson,
5 June1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum,
4 June1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
Memorandum
byGustafsson,
11June1973,MFA, 71b, 10.
(C Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences 2007
http://www.ambio.kva.se
235
of negotiationsbetweenthe Baltic Sea statesheld in London in
82. Communication
on 8 October
Organization
Maritime
oftheInternational
withtheconference
connection
1973,MFA, 71b, 12.
28 June1973,MFA, 71b, 11.
byUntoTurunen,
83. Memorandum
byFinland,3 November
prepared
tothedraftoftheconvention
84. SovietUnions'response
1973,MFA, 71b, 12.
31 October1973,MFA,
forNatureConservation,
85. Statement
bytheFinnishAssociation
71b, 12.
bytheFinnishNationalBoardofWaters,2 November1973,MFA, 71b,12.
86. Statement
15 November1973,MFA, 71b, 12:
byGustafsson,
87. Memorandum
byPerttiHarvola,28 February1974,MFA, 71b,6.
88. Memorandum
Jermu
Laine,22 March1974,MFA, 71b,6.
89. AddressbyMinister
GermanYearbookof
90. Boczek,B.A. 1981.The BalticSea: a studyin marineregionalism.
International
Law 23, 196-230.
ofHELCOM see theorganization's
and documents
91. HELCOM 2006. For theactivities
internet
pages(www.helcom.fi).
In: Reviewing
in perspective.
points:fetente
J.M. 1998.Ironiesand turning
92. Hanhimaki,
Theory.Westad, O.A. (ed). Oxford
the Cold War. Approaches,Interpretations,
Press,Oxford,UK, pp. 326-327.
University
Relationsin theShadowof
93. Nelson,K. 1995.TheMakingofDetente.Soviet-American
p. 147.
Press,Baltimore,
JohnsHopkinsUniversity
Vietnam.
coordinatedby the
94. Our studywas supportedby the BIREME researchprogramme
of
Academyof Finland,by the Networkfor EuropeanStudiesof the University
Helsinki,and by the FinnishCulturalFoundation.We wish to thankPhD Frank
forrevising
thelanguageand MA Salla Jokelafordrawingthemap.
Fullenwider
236
at
Tuomas Rasanen is a Ph.D. researcherin generalhistory
ofTurku,Finland.He has
University
ofHistory,
theDepartment
studied the politicalhistoryof the HelsinkiConventionby
archivalsourcesinFinland,Sweden,and Germany.
examining
20014
His address: General History,Departmentof History,
ofTurku,Finland.
University
E-mail:[email protected]
Simo Laakkonen is a senior researcherin environmental
University
ofSocial Science History,
at theDepartment
history
of Helsinki.He has directeda researchprojectsupportedby
the BalticSea Research Programthathas also examinedthe
politicsinthe BalticSea
environmental
ofinternational
history
region before 1974. His address: Departmentof Social
P.O. Box 54,
Economicand Social History,
Science History,
of Helsinki,Finland.
00014 University
? helsinki.fi
E-mail:simo.laakkonen
? RoyalSwedishAcademyof Sciences2007
http://www.ambio.kva.se
AmbioVol. 36, No. 2-3, April2007