Non-proliferation community,
Do we really speak the same language?
R. Chatelus, W. Janssens, Q. Michel, A. Viski, F. Sevini, C. Charatsis
Nuclear Security Unit
Institute for Transuranium Elements,
European Commission Joint Research Centre,
Via Fermi
I - 21027 Ispra (Va), Italy
Abstract:
The non-proliferation community, with its many different stakeholders, has issues with a number of
terms and concepts which have different meanings, not only in different national languages but also
for scientists, diplomats, engineers, law enforcement people, IAEA safeguards staff, and many others.
The consequences are not only relevant for translators and seminar participants. This confusion of
terms may create misunderstandings with legal, diplomatic and operational consequences. A number
of terms, used because of their meaning in English are “false friends” in other languages, i.e. they are
used because they sound close, but their meaning may be different. The nuances may be about the fact
that they cover a narrower, broader, or slightly different concept in another national or professional
language. The emblematic example is the English word control, written the same way in many
languages but with different connotations. Other examples include terms which have a precise legal
definition for some communities whereas other stakeholder see it as generic terms (e.g. technology,
transit); terms that are not explicit but have different implicit contents related to the context like
outreach or declaration; terms which are distinct in one language but translated into one word in
others like specially and especially designed; terms which cover different realities for different work
communities like counter-proliferation, analysis; terms which are widely used and hardly defined
anywhere like dual-use; or terms which refer to a specific legal or moral reference framework which
is not always explicated like illegal, legitimate. This paper will explore issues related to some of these
terms used in Western languages, and argue the necessity to take into account these sometimes subtle
language differences, realizing the difficulties they may create for practitioners of non-proliferation.
Improvements might include revising official reference documents like glossaries or other agreed
sources.
Introduction:
A famous French author once wrote that One can always state with clarity what is well
thought out, and the words to say it shall flow with ease 1, meaning that there can be no clarity
and ease in stating or presenting something without clarity in the mind. There is certainly a lot
of wisdom in this statement, typical of the European age of Enlightment and 17 th century
French. But in the world of non-proliferation, we can observe many instances where terms are
not clearly defined, or not clear for everybody, or clearly meaning something different for
different people. We can try to determine precise, universal and unambiguous definitions.
Alternatively, we may want to take the problem from a linguistic point of view,
acknowledging and taking into account language differences. Language from that perspective
is not limited to national languages, but shall also include professional languages,
terminologies and jargons. It is all the more important that the non-proliferation world is
international by nature and very heterogeneous by structure. These language gaps are both a
cause and a consequence of misunderstandings between communities involved in nonproliferation. We will first briefly look at possible explanations for such differences. We’ll
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then describe the various types of language gaps and illustrate them with few examples
predominantly in French and English. Finally we will consider the sometimes very concrete
consequences of communication challenges that the non-proliferation community faces, and
conclude on the necessity to improve cultural awareness within the non-proliferation
community as a whole. Our focus in this paper will be on the vocabulary used in the area of
strategic trade control and IAEA Safeguards
1. The origin of language challenges in the non-proliferation community:
First, despite the existence of official languages in international documents and institutions,
we must recognize that most of the non–proliferation concepts were forged in English.
Therefore, when it comes to national languages, the potential difficulties lie essentially
between a concept expressed in English and the way it can be captured in other languages.
It is also possible that translations suffer from the fact that the subject is relatively marginal in
national policies, concerns few people and is quite technical, and that translation issues are
less discussed than in other areas. This might be one explanation for the use of translation
false friends like the English word control translated into contrôle in French even if the
meaning is different in the two languages (See paragraph below about the word control).
But aside from national language differences, we must acknowledge the coexistence of
different work cultures and professional languages. International agreements and documents
often include definitions but this is not sufficient to mitigate the risk of misunderstanding.
Terms are defined only when negotiators felt they were important enough to be defined or
when they were aware of potential ambiguities. This may leave some gaps. Moreover,
international negotiators may be unaware of all the different meanings if not legal definitions,
of the words they are using (see examples of export, transit and transshipment below).
The non-proliferation world is extremely diverse in terms of people’s backgrounds. It includes
engineers, scientists, lawyers, law enforcement people, political scientists, and other
professions of the private and public sector. To this, we must add the diversity of specialized
communities involved in the different aspects of non-proliferation: IAEA Safeguards, export
control, diplomatic circles, border control services, industry, defense or intelligence, each
having its own work culture, terminology and jargon.
It is noticeable that these different stakeholders are sometimes quite isolated from each other
and don’t always communicate well. A good example is certain Safeguards Additional
Protocol export reporting2. In a number of countries they would involve the national State
System for Accounting and Control (SSAC) reporting to the IAEA, the export licensing
authority delivering export licenses on transactions to be reported and, customs providing
records of exports effectively taking place. These three communities have very different work
cultures and do not typically work together, sometimes even hardly knowing each other. The
result may be misunderstandings of the information circulated and eventually reported to the
IAEA (see example below about the term export).
Language issues are too many to be all listed. We will rather go through categories of
challenges that non-proliferation practitioners may encounter and illustrate them by few
examples from French and English. Of course, many other examples could be picked up and
should be discussed, including issues between European and non-European languages where
many challenges likely remain to be brought up.
We propose to classify language issues in 6 categories:
1- Terms understood or defined differently in different communities or
languages;
2- Terms understood in their general sense in some communities whereas
they are precisely (sometimes legally) defined in another;
3- False friends;
4- Concepts and distinctions specific to a language which doesn’t exist in
another;
5- General terms with specific meanings in specific contexts;
6- Terms widely used but hardly defined.
2. Language challenges and examples
2.1. Terms understood or defined differently in different communities or languages.
Practitioners of non-proliferation, including the authors of this paper, are regularly surprised
by the way others may understand terms which they use daily.
For example, a quick search in Google on the words open source will almost exclusively
return results related to open source software. But in the specific context of Safeguards, open
source refers to information generally available to the public from external sources, such as
scientific literature; official information; information issued by public organizations,
commercial companies and the news media; and commercial satellite images 3. Indeed, a
search in the same search engine, associating open source with Safeguards returns results
along these lines (and to a lesser extent about open source intelligence as practiced by private
and public organizations).
The difference of understanding may extend to contradictory legal definitions. Such is the
case with the word export for example. On the one hand, several Safeguards documents use
the word export4. There is not much to find in terms of definition in Safeguards official
documents except in the Safeguards glossary5 which states that imports and exports are
international transfers of nuclear material subject to IAEA Safeguards into and out of a State.
[…]. By extension to other exports to be reported 6, this means transfers in and out of the
political boundaries of a State. On the other hand, customs and trade international
instruments7, as well as most national customs codes, are quite consistent in defining export as
the act of taking out any good from the customs territory8. This means that by default, customs
exports records exclude inter-alia movements out of a free zones and transfers between States
within a customs union9, but they includes movements between customs territories within a
State10. We can foresee here the potential challenge when an SSAC report to the IAEA on the
basis of export licenses and export control laws refers to the customs codes definition of
exports11. This issue must be specifically addressed in legal texts and clarified between
national stakeholders. It represents also an ideal case to be taken up in guidelines and best
practices where the scope or reporting will determine the “best way” in which the terms needs
to be understood.
We cannot conclude this paragraph without mentioning the case or re-export. For the US
regulation and most of the export control community, a re-export is the forwarding of a
shipment subject to controls in the originating country. But for the EU Customs Code, it is the
end of a customs special procedure (e.g. temporary import, storage in customs warehouse,
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transit, etc…) and for the UN Statistical Office establishing world import-export statistics, it
is the fact of sending a previously imported shipment back to original exporter…
2.2. Terms understood in their general sense in some communities whereas they are
precisely (sometimes legally) defined in another.
Professional communities may not have the same need to be precise with certain terms.
Transit and transshipments are good examples. The common understanding, often heard in the
non-proliferation community, is that they are logistic operations: transit is the movement of
commodities through a country without changing means of transportation and transshipment
refers to the movement of goods from one means of transportation to another. This relatively
vague and implicit definition may be sufficient from a broad perspective, like in UN Security
Council Resolution 154012. But customs and licensing authorities need a much more precise
legal definition for enforcement and control. For Customs, transit is already defined as a
procedure. It is generally a Customs procedure under which goods are transported under
Customs control from one Customs office to another 13, i.e. allowing the movement of goods
through the customs territory between a customs point of entry and a customs point of exit
without being imported14. Unfortunately, in several instances, the general understanding
seems to have prevailed over the existing customs definition, probably by lack of awareness
of customs processes, creating legal difficulties for export control implementers.
Another example is technology which is defined in export regimes as information. It is
specific information required for the “development”, “production”, or “use” of any item
contained in the [export control] list15. But non-specialists (very often involved in the political
decision making process or the public reporting) may understand it in a more general sense,
i.e as products. The UN Statistical office defines it as: high-technology exports are products
with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific
instruments, and electrical machinery.
Transfer (international) is another example: it is used in a generic sense in IAEA Safeguards
agreements, but in the European Union, context, it refers to the movements of goods between
Member States of the European Union (which are not technically export/imports, because
they don’t move out of the European united customs territory).
2.3. False friends (a.k.a. false cognates)
False friends are amongst the trickiest language challenges of non-proliferation16. These
words are similar in different languages but have a different meaning. The word control may
be the most emblematic. In English, control refers to ability or power to influence or direct
people behaviour or the course of events 17. Hence, export control, refers to the legal
provisions and administrative system allowing governments to authorize or not certain
exports. Translation in many languages would use a similar term, e.g. contrôle aux
exportations in French. The problem is that in French as in many other languages, contrôle
doesn’t refer to power or ability, it refers to action: verifying somebody’s or something’s status
or situation with regard to a norm 18. For example a contrôle douanier is a customs check in
English, not a customs control.
Amongst other dangerous false friends we could mention safety and security. They are
carefully distinguished in English but may be translated in one word in some other languages.
In French, sécurité covers part of what is defined as safety in English. In Russian, the term
Bezopasnost covers both concepts19.
2.4. Concepts or distinctions specific to a language which doesn’t exist in another
Aside from safety and security we just mentioned, the use of specially and especially is an
interesting case. These terms are used in the non-proliferation context to define items which
have no other use than the one specified (by contrast with dual use items for example or items
capable of as some export control regimes define them). For example, items listed in the
Annex II of the AP are defined as especially designed or prepared - EDP, although one
explanatory note mentions the term specially designed. The choice of one or the other term in
WMD export control lists seem to have been consciously made, at least in their English
versions of several export control regimes. It has probably been extensively discussed because
the EDP nature of items has legal implications and its determination is not trivial. But in some
other languages, this distinction is irrelevant because there is only one word covers the two
English terms. Fig.1 below show extracts of the English and French version of art. 5.9.1.(c) of
the Model AP.
Fig.1
Enforcement is another English concept-word which has no translation in some other
languages, at least in Latin languages like Spanish or French. It may be translated with
different words depending on the context.
2.5. General terms with specific meanings in specific contexts
It is also important to recall that we are using general terms with a meaning that might be very
specific in our work environment. Safeguards is one of these. There are probably few people
outside the nuclear Safeguards community that would associate this word with nuclear
matters and even if they do, it is unlikely that they appreciate the multidisciplinary nature of
it19
For the word outreach, we can find specific meanings in different contexts within the nonproliferation world. The IAEA talks about outreach to describe actions taken to promote the
implementation of Safeguards agreements and additional protocols, meaning outreach in the
sense of communication and awareness raising. But it also uses the word outreach in the
IAEA procurement outreach programme designed to get voluntary support of Member States
on safeguards relevant procurement attempts. A third use of the word outreach relates to
export control capacity building programmes of the EU and the US.
2.6. terms widely used but hardly defined
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We will illustrate this last category of language challenge will the much discussed expression
dual use. The term dual use can be found quite often in legal documents (UNSCR/1540
resolution, UN General Assembly resolutions, Wassenaar Arrangement, export control
regulations), scientific literature or press media, but it is rarely well defined. The EU
regulation20 defines dual use items as items, including software and technology, which can be
used for both civil and military purposes, and shall include all goods which can be used for
both non-explosive uses and assisting in any way in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. The Wassenaar arrangement defines them as goods and
technologies which are critical for indigenous military capabilities. A number of countries
also provide their own definition of dual use items. These definitions are different but
moreover, none of them accurately describe the items that are listed for control. People
working on information related to dual use items, like safeguards analysts and inspectors
working on proliferation indicators, may encounter the term with yet other meanings. The
table below (Fig.2) summarizes various understandings of dual use.
Fig 2.:
Community
Military industry
Proliferation
analysts
Nuclear nonproliferation
community
Other nonproliferation
communities
Export control
community
Meaning
Dual use items may be items developed using technology taken from
the civilian market,
i.e. not related to controls or proliferation
Dual use items may mean items indicative of nuclear or military enduse activity, although other uses are possible,
I.e. medium strength indicators that are technically relevant, regardless
of controls that may apply to their export
Dual use items may be items which can be used for nuclear or nonnuclear applications,
i.e. listed items that are not especially designed or prepared for a
specific nuclear use
Dual use items may be listed items which can be used for military or
civilian purposes,
e.g. excluding civilian nuclear technologies
Dual use items may be listed items subject to an export permit as per
national export control regulations,
i.e. anything on control lists such as the EU Dual Use regulation
3. Dealing with consequences
Questions of language that we briefly illustrated are not just to be considered for academic
reasons. They can have very concrete consequences. We can mention and illustrate a few.
Misunderstandings may occur in training and awareness activities, like when experts of the
export control community use the word control in their training to non-English speaking
border control officers.
Difficulties may arise in diplomatic discussion or public communication, when terms are
misunderstood. In a recent case, a ministry was opposed to export control on dual use items,
because it didn’t understand the need to limit the use of civilian technologies in by the
military industry. The reason was that people working there were only familiar with the
military industry definition mentioned above.
We have a similar situation with the confusion between safety and security: it might have an
impact on the perception of state policies by the public.
Consequences may also be legal. For example, misunderstandings about transit are probably
at the origin of a legal contradiction between definitions of transit in the EU dual use
regulation and in the EU Customs code, thereby hindering some aspects of export control
implementation.
In the area of Safeguards, it takes knowledge and awareness to understand whether States
declare exports according to the IAEA definition or just take export control and customs
records not necessarily covering transfers of items manufactured in Free zones.
Safeguards information analysts and inspectors must interpret correctly what is meant by dual
use in information they examine. A piece of information in the press about a transfer of dual
use item, even associated with the word nuclear may well not be safeguards relevant,
depending on the author’s understanding of dual use.
Conclusion:
Many other examples of language issues and of their consequences could be described in this
article, and it should not take tremendous effort for members of our non-proliferation
community to find some of them.
Awareness, curiosity, cooperation, team work are not just buzz words from that perspective.
They are professional necessities to tackle the truly cultural challenge that languages represent
in the non-proliferation world.
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1[1] Free translation of Nicolas Boileau (1636-1711), Canto I, l. 153 : “Ce que l'on conçoit bien
s'énonce clairement, Et les mots pour le dire arrivent aisément»
2[] Non-nuclear material and equipment listed in Annex II of the Model Additional Protocol (IAEA ref.
INFCIRC/540 (Corr.)) which exports must be reported according to article 2.a.ix.(a) of the Protocol.
These items are also often controlled in national export control systems following trigger list guidelines
of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (IAEA ref. INFCIRC 254/Rev 12/Part.1).
3[] IAEA safeguards glossary, 2001, Nuclear security series n°3
4[] E.g. Comprehensive Safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153), additional protocols (INFCIRC/540),
Safeguards Glossary (ibid)
5[] IAEA safeguards glossary, 2001, Nuclear security series n°3
6[] Including AP Annex II non-nuclear material and equipment
7[] E.g. World Trade Organizations, Free Trade Agreements, World Trade Organization or the Revised
Kyoto Convention.
8[] Specific Annex C, Chapter 1 of The Revised Kyoto Convention of the simplification and
Harmonization of customs procedures
9[] Like the European Union or between Switzerland and Lichtenstein
10[] E.g. overseas territories or territories with special status like Hong Kong in PRC.
11[] R. CHATELUS, A Little Customs Glossary for IAEA Safeguards: Customs Procedures and Concepts
that Matter for the Implementation of Modern Safeguards, European Safeguards Association - ESARDA
Bulletin p80, June 2012
12[] UNSCR/1540 (2004)
13[] The Revised Kyoto Convention of the simplification and Harmonization of customs procedures
14[ ] A good example is the International Road Transit convention better known as T.I.R. (from the
French acronym) and which can be seen displayed in the back of many trucks
15[] NSG Guidelines, Nuclear Suppliers Group. Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use
Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology, INFCIRC/254/Rev.10/Part 2, 2010.
16[] See Oxford Language Dictionaries Online, difficulties in French,
http://www.oxfordlanguagedictionaries.com/Public/PublicResources.html?direction=b-fren&sp=S/oldo/resources/fr/Difficulties-in-French-fr.html
17[] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ :
18[] Action de contrôler quelque chose ou quelqu’un, de vérifier leur situation ou leur état au regard
d’une norme (http://www.larousse.fr)
19[] DR. I. KHRIPUNOV, Nuclear and Radiation “Bezopasnost” in Russia’s Nuclear Sector:
Semantics, Scope, Programmatic Activity, and Implications for MPC&A (non-published).
[19] A. BRAUNEGGER-GUELICH, J.M. CRETE, C. GARIAZZO, W. A. M. JANSSENS, P.
PEERANI, S. WARD, Need for Strengthening Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Safeguards Education to
Prepare the Next Generation of Experts, Symposium on International Safeguards, Vienna, 20-24
October 2014