DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES No. 9460 RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS Luis Garicano and Luis Rayo INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ABCD www.cepr.org Available online at: www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP9460.asp www.ssrn.com/xxx/xxx/xxx ISSN 0265-8003 RELATIONAL KNOWLEDGE TRANSFERS Luis Garicano, London School of Economics and CEPR Luis Rayo, London School of Economics Discussion Paper No. 9460 May 2013 Centre for Economic Policy Research 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ, UK Tel: (44 20) 7183 8801, Fax: (44 20) 7183 8820 Email: [email protected], Website: www.cepr.org This Discussion Paper is issued under the auspices of the Centre’s research programme in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION. Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the Centre for Economic Policy Research. Research disseminated by CEPR may include views on policy, but the Centre itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Centre for Economic Policy Research was established in 1983 as an educational charity, to promote independent analysis and public discussion of open economies and the relations among them. It is pluralist and nonpartisan, bringing economic research to bear on the analysis of medium- and long-run policy questions. These Discussion Papers often represent preliminary or incomplete work, circulated to encourage discussion and comment. Citation and use of such a paper should take account of its provisional character. Copyright: Luis Garicano and Luis Rayo CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9460 May 2013 ABSTRACT Relational Knowledge Transfers* An expert must train a novice. The novice initially has no cash, so he can only pay the expert with the accumulated surplus from his production. At any time, the novice can leave the relationship with his acquired knowledge and produce on his own. The sole reason he does not is the prospect of learning in future periods. The profit-maximizing relationship is structured as an apprenticeship, in which all production generated during training is used to compensate the expert. Knowledge transfer takes a simple form. In the first period, the expert gifts the novice a positive level of knowledge, which is independent of the players' discount rate. After that, the novice's total value of knowledge grows at the players' discount rate until all knowledge has been transferred. The inefficiencies that arise from this contract are caused by the expert's artificially slowing down the rate of knowledge transfer rather than by her reducing the total amount of knowledge eventually transferred. We show that these inefficiencies are larger the more patient the players are. Finally, we study the impact of knowledge externalities across players. JEL Classification: c73, j24 and l14 Keywords: general human capital, knowledge, relational contracts and skills Luis Garicano Center for Economic Performance London School for Economics (LSE) Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Luis Rayo Department of Management London School of Economics Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] For further Discussion Papers by this author see: For further Discussion Papers by this author see: www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=145086 www.cepr.org/pubs/new-dps/dplist.asp?authorid=163971 *We thank Steve Tadelis and participants at the 2013 meeting of the NBER Working Group on Organizational Economics for valuable suggestions. Submitted 23 April 2013 Figure 1: Optimal duration with externalities (level curves): Level curves are a function of ! (the externality) and " (the discount factor). Lighter areas correspond to longer durations. " ! Figure 2: Optimal duration with specific knowledge (level curves) Level curves are a function of # (degree of generality of knowledge) and " (the discount factor). Lighter areas correspond to longer durations. " #
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