The European Neighbourhood Policy
(ENP) and the Modes of EU ‘External
Governance’
Work in progress: Do not quote!
Dr. Stefan Gänzle
Assistant Professor (DAAD)
University of British Columbia
Institute for European Studies/Political Science
179 C. K. Choi, 1855 West Mall
Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z2
[email protected]
________________________________________________________________________
Abstract: In this paper I argue that the ‘governance approach’ in EU studies is wellequipped to explain the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a
form of ‘externalization of EU governance’ or ‘external governance’. In May 2004, the
EU enlarged to encompass ten new member states and thus acquired a new neighbourhood, notably in Eastern Europe. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova now share a
common border with the EU. Since 2001/02, the EU has been developing the ENP to
cope with the challenges resulting from this new political landscape, and as such, the
ENP is now the primary instrument through which EU governance is externalized. With
the exception of Belarus and Russia, the European Union’s Eastern neighbours are intent
on acquiring EU membership in the near future. The EU, in turn, is keen on maintaining
its Eastern borders safe and secure from external risks such as illegal migration, environmental degradation and economic crisis. In order to meet these objectives, the EU
promotes democratic and economic reforms in the countries located along its Eastern
border and in doing so strives to foster political stability and security in the wider
Europe. Although ENP policy instruments promote closer mutual relations below EU
membership, they entail a dynamic which may bring neighbouring countries closer to EU
membership.
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I. Introduction
The 2004 enlargement towards countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean1 pushed the European Union (EU)2 much closer towards a ‘new neighbourhood’ –
in particular in Eastern Europe. Concomitantly to the conclusion of its most recent round
of expansion, the EU began to flesh out its ‘European Neighbourhood Policy’ (ENP) in
2001 with the objective outlined in December 2002 by European Commission President
Romano Prodi of creating a “ring of friends surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea”. Hence, Algeria, Israel, the
Palestinian Authority, Armenia, Jordan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Ukraine,
Egypt, Moldova, Georgia, Morocco have been promoted to the rank of ‘ENP partner’
countries.3 Building into the framework of the EU development and enlargement policies
and practices, the ENP aims at enhancing the EU’s overall relationship with these
neighbouring countries at both a collective and individual level.
Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been confronted with the tremendous
task of redefining its relationship with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. So far,
the EU has pursued a gradual, differentiated and incremental rapprochement prior to ultimate inclusion. According to Karen E. Smith, the history between the EU and Central
and Eastern Europe can be interpreted as the “EU coping with the exclusion/inclusion
dilemma by eventually choosing inclusion” (2005: 57). With the ‘big bang’ enlargement
1
The new EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe are Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia; Malta and Cyprus are the new members from the Mediterranean.
2
In general, I use the term EU to refer to the European Union after the introduction of the Maastricht
Treaty. ‘European Community (EC)’ specifically refers to the first pillar of the European Union or the time
prior to the Treaty of Maastricht.
3
Because of their weak democratic records, Libya and Belarus, however, have not yet been admitted to the
ENP.
2
of 2004, bringing10 new member-states into the EU, inclusion, clearly won out over exclusion. Even with the completion of this most recent expansion, there are still several
states queuing for EU accession: Bulgaria and Romania will join in 2007 albeit under a
special monitoring regime; Croatia and Turkey started the process of negotiations with
the EU in October 2005; the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia acquired candidate
status in December 2005. Furthermore, all countries of the Western Balkans – including
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro – will have a membership perspective provided that they meet their obligations set out by the EU Stabilization Agreements. With the unfolding of ENP, the European Union and its member states have resolved to create an intermediate stage oscillating between the binary of inclusion and exclusion. It was with the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ in 2003/04 that
the EU proposed the category of a ‘special relationship’ to be shared with its immediate
neighbours. Ultimately, the category implies that bilateral relations would remain well
below the level of fully-fledged membership. Art. I-57 of the ‘European Constitution’
stipulates:
“1. The Union shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries,
aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on
the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations based on
cooperation.
2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the Union may conclude specific agreements
with the countries concerned. These agreements may contain reciprocal rights and
obligations as well as the possibility of undertaking activities jointly. Their implementation shall be the subject of periodic consultation.”
Many of the objectives expressed in Art I-57 ultimately became part of ENP. Yet, another
element is important to understand the particular associational dynamics enshrined in
ENP. In 2002, the Russian government decided not to become a part of the ENP; instead,
3
the Russian government insisted on developing a ‘strategic partnership’ with the EU in its
own right (Gänzle 2007a, 2007b; Hughes 2007). This decision provided an unintended
‘enlargement twist’ to ENP as it brought countries in Eastern Europe together which by
and large all share the goal of EU membership.4 Both the EU and Russia have agreed
upon the creation of the so-called ‘Common Spaces’ (encompassing economic cooperation as well as cooperation in the fields of external and internal security, plus education
and research) on the EU-Russia summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003.
The literature
The scholarly literature dealing with EU enlargement and the ENP is turning into a subdiscipline of European integration studies. Although this means that there are many empirically driven studies available, it also implies that some of the research became rather
insular, disenfranchised from comparative approaches in the field of EU external relations/foreign policy. Many ENP studies have focussed on the EU’s ability to provide an
‘external incentive’ model – albeit below the level of membership and thus without relying on the ‘membership carrot’ to induce transformative change in a partner country (see
Schimmelfennig/Sedelmeier 2004, 2005). While some have been sceptical with regards
to the transformative power which the EU may ultimately deploy in its neighbourhood
policy without waiving the membership carrot (Schimmelfennig 2005), others who understand the EU’s policies as oscillating between inclusion and exclusion as an effort to
regulate Europe’s changing political order have welcomed the ENP as ‘significant progress’ (Dannreuther 2004: 185; Lavanex 2004).
4
One should not ignore though that the ENP did not meet with the high aspirations of the Ukrainian government in 2004. Contrary to Moldova, Ukraine was always eager to acquire an EU membership option
since the early 1990s.
4
Another strand of research has sought to apply the concept of ‘external governance’ or ‘externalization of EU governance’ (Friis/Murphy 1999; Filtenborg et al 2002;
Gänzle 2002; Lavanex 2004; Schimmelfennig/Wagner 2004; M. E. Smith 2007) in order
to address issues of the EU’s role in international affairs. Although terms such as government and governance are used interchangeably in the North American academic environment, the latter has been applied by ‘European’ scholars to describe multi-level and
multi-actor constellations within the European Union’s fragmented political system
(Marks and Hooghe 2001; Kohler-Koch/Jachtenfuchs 2003). The term makes an implicit
claim suggesting that modes of internal governance are similar or at least comparable to
the ones employed by the EU vis-à-vis the ‘world outside’. As the concept of ‘boundaries’ has come to play a key role in the social sciences – it has been associated with research on cognition, social and collective identity, cultural capital, cultural membership,
racial and ethnic group positioning, and immigration to mention only a few of the most
visible examples (Michèle Lamont/Virág Molnár 2002: 167-195) – some scholars have
applied this concept to capture the dynamic of the EU’s changing role in Europe’s political order after the end of the Cold War (Smith 1996, 2000; Friis/Murphy 1999, Filtenborg
et al 2002; Lavanex 2004).
EU external governance and political order
David Plotke defines ‘political order’ as “a durable mode of organizing and exercising
political power […] with distinct institutions, policies, and discourses” (1996: 1). Hence,
‘order’, which appears to be the consistent and normal way politics ‘works’, is produced
by “a regular, predictable, and interconnected pattern of institutional and ideological ar-
5
rangements that structure political life in a given place at a given time (Lieberman 2002:
702). Markus Jachtenfuchs, Thomas Diez and Sabine Jung emphasize the role of “normative ideas about legitimate political order” (emphasis added), which they call “polity
ideas” (1998: 410). While these ‘polity-ideas’ refer to the many facets of its internal system of multilevel governance, the European Union is also compelled to likewise establish
a ‘political order’ in relation to the outside world, particularly with the countries in its
immediate vicinity.
Governance, as used in this context, can be defined as ‘a system of rules’ with the
ultimate objective of establishing legitimate ‘order’ for a political space. The concept
posits that those problems and challenges that are outside of the scope of a state’s regulatory capacity need to be solved collectively, involving other states as well as non-state
actors at various (multi-level governance) or somewhat more specified (global governance, European governance) levels. Governance entails that state-like activities not only
be confined to states, but also be generated beyond the level of the nation-state in a dynamic interplay comprising various actors and institutions. Consequently, governance is
not confined to territories – in sharp contrast to the domestic action of state governments.
Instead, it focuses much more on political spaces construed by political activities and cooperation. Michael Zürn places ‘governance’ in a continuum stretching from governance
by government (state-centric), governance with government (mixed-actor constellations)
to governance without government (societal self-regulation) (cit in Tömmel 2006: 7).
Thus governance focuses on the establishment of a ‘system of rule’ amongst these actors
ultimately providing a script for sustainable co-ordination and legitimacy of their activities and outputs. Due to the protracted nature of the EU’s internal decision-making style,
6
EU governance tends to mirror internal patterns of decision- and policy-making. In a nutshell, the EU attempts to externalize its own system of governance beyond its external
borders (Friis/Murphy: 215; Gänzle 2002), or bluntly put, to make its immediate vicinity
more like itself. Consequently, EU governance eases interaction (thus reducing transaction costs), manages expectations with regards to the scope and scale of a relationship
(ultimately controlling adjustment costs for the EU) and maximizes EU influence on policy-making processes in those third countries.
The governance approach, however, tends to ignore the importance of structural
power, which is particularly evident when it comes to governing the EU’s immediate vicinity. This weakness is somewhat addressed by differentiating between soft and hard
governance as two distinct varieties of governance generated by the EU (Friis/Murphy
1999: 214f). Soft governance is not restricted to formal interaction, thus it may be fostered by the evolution of EU-inspired ‘European’ norms and values which are not necessarily limited to the realm of the member-states. In fact a set of core values, such as democracy, rule of law, market economy, need to be adopted well before entering the EU
family of nations, such as it is entailed in Article 6 (1) TEU. Soft governance is complemented by hard governance, which emphasizes the role of governing through negotiations. It mirrors the EU’s role as a negotiation system (Schmidt 1997), which entails various distinctive features, such as a bargaining, path dependent and non-strategic decisionmaking style, tentatively producing sub-optimal outcomes. Clearly, when the EU negotiates with the immediate vicinity the mode of governance is hierarchical, placing the EU
in the position of patron. How can we study the European Union’s relations with its immediate vicinity from a governance perspective? The governance approach draws our at-
7
tention to the inherent dynamics of Europe’s political order and provides a theoretically
informed guide to understanding the oscillation of the EU’s politics between inclusion
and exclusion. This paper takes as a base premise that EU regulatory policies are of critical importance to the emergence of governance patterns between the EU and its
‘neighbourhood’ (Knill/Pischelt/Bauer 2007: 3).5 Furthermore, drawing on Scharpf
(2001, 2002), Benz (2005), Tömmel (2007) and Knill/Pischelt/Bauer (2007), I differentiate the following modes of governance approach in the EU’s interaction with ‘its’ ENP
countries: compliance, negotiation, competition and coordination.
(1) Compliance: Governance by compliance requires legally binding European
rules to be implemented at the domestic level (direct effect), conceding national veto
players only marginal room for discretion. European law (directives and regulations) is
aimed at fostering equal conditions for the European common market – hence they are
present in the policies of ‘positive integration’. As a vast body of literature in Europeanization research has demonstrated, member states’ bureaucracies tend to be reluctant to
fully comply with the requirements set by the European Union (logic of persistence).
Unless domestic structures and mindsets do not ‘fit’ (‘goodness to fit’) prima facie, bureaucracies and policy-makers may attempt to formally adopt, while only superficially
implementing new EU rules.
Research on accession countries in turn suggest that bureaucracies are willing to
comply with EU-spurred compliance as long as the adjustment costs are justifiable with
regards to the domestic public. As for ‘third countries’, it seems to be clear that the potential impact of compliance-driven modes of governance will be rather limited – unless
5
Knill/Bauer/Pischelt 2007 distinguish between compliance, competition and communication.
8
there is large support for closer EU integration within both the wider public and economic and political elites.
(2) Negotiation: The EU system of governance can be grasped as a ‘negotiation
system’. This particular mode of governance is geared towards the allocation of values,
norms and decisions in both hierarchical structures as well as non-hierarchical settings
involving various actors from the EU, the national and regional as well as non-EU level.
The principle of partnership governing the EU’s structural policies is a case at hand for
‘non-hierarchical’ relations. Although power resources may vary, the ultimate objective
of the actors is to achieve successful conclusion of negotiations.
(3) Competition: Competition is a mode of governance stipulating adjustments in
order to ensure the proper functioning of the Internal Market or even the larger scope of
European integration. In order to achieve particular policy objectives more effectively or
to increase their competitiveness, member states are forced to adjust domestic institutional arrangements and structures in order to cope with pressure stemming from European integration and ‘Europeanization’. It is safe to assume that ENP countries are highly
interested in securing participation in the single market. Hence the Commission’s promise to provide these countries with ‘a stake in the Internal Market’ is of key importance.
Countries, such as Ukraine and Moldova, are keen on expanding trade relations with the
EU as well as engaging into a relatively ‘free’ movement of workers, goods and services.
However, they are also likely to prevent the imposition of rules that impair their economic freedom.
(4) Coordination: Although coordination may occur in various ways, it always includes some form of voluntarism. Actors may coordinate based on voluntary agreements,
9
bench-marking, persuasion and communication with the objective of establishing convergence between different view points, practices etc. This particular mode of governance
aims at supporting national bureaucrats and policy-makers with models of ‘best practices’
and concepts to be applied to policy problems. The central rationality behind this approach is to provide policy processes with overall legitimacy. With regards to the ENP
countries, I assume that the legitimacy-driven approach is likely to be the key element
supporting the medium- to long-term impact of the European Union. In this paper I proceed in the following manner: In section II, I briefly sketch out the development of the
European Neighbourhood Policy. In section III, I scrutinize the policy content of ENP.
Against this backdrop, I explore in section IV which modes of governance prevail in the
European Neighbourhood Policy.
II. The Making of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
The ‘extension’ of its regulatory scope and influence – and hence its ‘external governance’ – is a decisive feature of every system of regional integration. From the 1950s until
the late 1980s, the European Community (EC) was only one of several models of political and economic integration in Europe. For example, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) was conceived of by European states such as the UK, which explicitly did
not wish to subscribe to the EC’s far-reaching regional integration scheme – politically
and economically – in terms of policies and decision-making style. While the alternative
model in this particular case was set up ‘outside’ the EC, the perspective changed considerably in the wake of the Cold War’s end, marking the general recognition of the EC/EU
10
as Europe’s central institution for bringing West and East together. In this light, the
European Economic Area (EEA) created in 1989 aimed at providing an alternative and
differentiated model of smooth integration into the EC/EU, which came primarily from
‘inside’ the Community itself. Without offering any sort of participation in the lawmaking process, the European Economic Area (EEA) extended the single market to those
countries that were members of the EFTA. Yet, by this time it was already clear that a
number of EFTA countries, such as Austria, Sweden and Finland, were about to apply for
or had already applied for full-fledged membership in the EU, while at the same time a
number of the remaining EFTA countries were considering doing the same and were
closely associated with various policies of the European Union.6 Hence after the end of
the Cold War, the EU had established itself as the dominant form of both economic and
political integration scheme in Europe.
In dealing with its immediate vicinity, the EC/EU devised three basic, sometimes
interlinking models throughout the 1990s.
1) Comprehensive, all-inclusive models of pan-European cooperation (such as the
‘European confederation’ and – to a lesser extent – the Europe Conference);
2) Differentiated approaches of gradual and conditional integration of individual
countries7 into the EC/EU (based on so-called Europe Agreements) or cooperation/integration with the EC/EU (based on the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements); and
6
In the case of Switzerland, there are a number of bilateral agreements on place covering Switzerland’s
relations with the EU.
7
This country approach encouraged at the same time various forms of sub-regional cooperation (Visegrad
states of Poland, Hungary, the Czech and the Slovak Republics; Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS);
Black Sea cooperation, etc.).
11
3) Geographically focused approaches of EU foreign policy, external relations and
regional policy involving the EU and specific non-EU countries (particularly in
the context of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership (“Barcelona process”), the
Northern Dimension initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).
From Development Policy to the European Neighbourhood Policy
Without exploring EU development policy in much depth here, suffice it to say that the
European Union’s engagement in the so-called Third World has provided many ‘blue
prints’ and lessons to how Europeans approach providing assistance to third countries.
Hence, some of the most central features, objectives and principles of the European
Neighbourhood Policy are deeply rooted in the EU’s longstanding engagement in development policy. The EC’s relations with the Third World are as old as the Community itself and date back to the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Successive treaty reforms and enlargement have certainly altered some of the EU’s objectives and directions
of development policy. Art. 181a of the EC Treaty holds that the Community’s development policy shall foster the sustainable economic and social development of the developing world, assist these countries in the smooth integration into the global economy and
combat poverty in the developing countries. Since the 1980s the European Community
tented to make some of its development assistance conditional upon the fulfilment of basic requirement in terms of democratic standards and good governance (K. E. Smith
1998, 2001). In terms of the overall character of the policy, Martin Holland (2002: 1) is
12
certainly right to describe the EU’s engagement with the Third World as a “policy patchwork”.8
As early as January 1990, French President François Mitterrand tabled the idea of
establishing a European Confederation providing links between all European states – including the Soviet Union (Weisenfeld 1991, 1993: 356ff.). Ultimately, this idea would
have brought the EC very close to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE), which at that time was preparing negotiations for the Charter of Paris (November 1990). In April 1991, the European Commissioner for External Relations, Frans Andriessen, suggested creating the status of ‘affiliated members’ who were supposed to
have a voice, but no vote in a number of specified areas, such as foreign policy, transport,
environment, monetary affairs and research (cit. in K. E. Smith 1998). In June 1992, the
European Commission sketched out the idea of a ‘European Political Area’ which would
provide a forum for regular meetings of EU member-states and associated countries from
Central and Eastern Europe. One year later, in June 1993, this suggestion developed into
the Copenhagen European Council’s initiative to create the ‘structured dialogue’, a
“framework for discussions on all areas of EU business” (Smith 2005: 761). Concomitantly, the EU fleshed out a similar, but less ambitious policy vis-à-vis those countries of
Eastern Europe that were likely – for various reasons – to be left out of the enlargement
process for the foreseeable future, specifically Russia and Ukraine. Most important in this
regard were the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements signed in 1994, and the launch
of Common Strategies in 1999. While both agreements set-out a plethora of interinstitutional relations and called upon Russia and Ukraine to pursue political and eco8
Ulrich Sedelmeier has used the term ‘composite policy’ to describe enlargement as a “a broad policy
framework that draws on policies in a broad range of issue areas” (Sedelmeier 2005: 402).
13
nomic reforms, none of them created a perspective for the relationship that once might
transcend the creation of a common market with the European Union.
In 1997, during the run-up to the launch of the 2004 accession negotiations, the
European Union decided to upgrade the structured dialogue to a ‘European Conference’,
thereby including countries such as Switzerland, Iceland, Turkey and Norway in the
process. European conferences involved regular meeting of heads of state and government to discuss a wide range of policy issues which were of mutual interest. The conferences were primarily offered in order to mollify Turkey for not being considered as a
candidate for EU enlargement at the Luxembourg EU summit; yet, for a number of years,
Turkey refused to participate. At the Göteborg European Council of June 2001, the EU
member states decided to invite Ukraine, Moldova, and Russia as well as the countries of
Western Balkans to the European Conference. Yet, running short of any political decision-making capacities, the European Conference largely remained an exercise in symbolic politics which did not yield any major success.
The so-called Northern Dimension Initiative offered yet another approach. It was
launched by the Finnish government in 1997 in order to raise EU-wide awareness of the
particular (environmental) needs and concerns of Northern Europe and its immediate vicinity (Russia, the ‘Baltic States’ and Poland). Similar to the European Conference, albeit
limited in its geographical scope, Finland and Denmark organized Northern Dimension
conferences involving Russia in the context of a ‘partnership approach’; yet, neither the
Northern Dimension conferences nor the European Conference itself allowed non-EU
members a seat at the decision-making table.
14
Although ENP is best grasped as an offspring of the EU’s development policy as
well as dual track approach in terms of managing Eastern enlargement since the early
1990s, the first concrete steps were taken following a letter from the UK foreign minister
to the then Spanish Presidency of the European Union in January 2002. In this document
British Foreign Minister Jack Straw suggested to offer Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova
“clear and practical incentives” for proceeding with political and economic reform. Furthermore, his proposal included granting these countries the status of “special neighbour”
based on a firm commitment to democratic governance and free market principles. At this
stage, the countries of the Southern Mediterranean area were not addressed as potential
candidates for such an inclusive approach. Meeting with the same resistance of Southern
Mediterranean EU members that had brought to life the ‘Barcelona process’ in 1995 (to
parallel Eastern enlargement) the geographical scope of the new policy was quickly
broadened to include both Russia and Southern Mediterranean rim. In December 2002,
the European Council of Copenhagen approved of the idea in principle. It is against this
backdrop that the European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana in December
2003, declared that “building security in our neighbourhood” (European Security Strategy 2003:7) is one of the three strategic objectives of the EU. With regards to Eastern
Europe, the Strategy affirms that “[i]t is not in our interest that enlargement should create
new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political
cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We
should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region.”
15
III. Principles, Objectives and Instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy
In May 2004, the European Commission published its Strategy Paper on the European
Neighbourhood Policy. In this document, the Commission laid out the principles and objectives that would govern all future ENP partnerships. The ENP aims at “sharing the
benefits of the EU’s enlargement in 2004 with neighbouring countries in strengthening
stability, security and well-being for all concerned” in order to “prevent the emergence of
new dividing lines in Europe” (European Commission 2003: 4). Clearly, at the time of
enlargement some East European leaders had qualified the establishment of Schengenborders as ‘future paper curtains’.
Throughout the process of drafting the European Neighbourhood Policy, a normative tone was added:
The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new memberstates, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the regional
and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political
stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions
in our shared environment (European Commission 2003: 3).
ENP aims at addressing these concerns and hopes, and ultimately to contribute towards
greater regional security. In December 2002, Commission President Romano Prodi declared: “We have to be prepared to offer more than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter” (Prodi 2002). ENP offers its partner countries the
‘chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation – albeit below the membership level. Prodi emphasized
that the “aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and stan-
16
dards which define the very essence of the European Union” In March 2003, the European Commission asserted that the EU’s neighbors should be offered the prospect of “a
stake in the EU’s Internal Market” (European Commission 2003: 4).
The European Neighbourhood Policy rests upon several key principles: First, the
ENP subscribes to a conservative institutional approach as it is built into the existing
framework of the EU’s bilateral relations with a respective ENP partner country. Thereby
the European Union avoids duplicating existing institutional structures. The Partnership
and Cooperation Agreements (which were developed in the first half of the 1990s to
serve the NIS), as well as the more classical Association Agreements with the Mediterranean countries, provide the platform on which ENP may develop. Ultimately, this is also
a commitment to a strict and differentiated bilateralism in terms of inter-institutional relations despite the fact that ENP also encourages its neighbouring countries to engage in
sub-regional cooperation. Second, the Commission has declared that ENP constitutes a
case for “joint ownership” of the institutions and of the process in general – albeit this
ownership is “based on the awareness of shared values and common interests”. Although
the European Union does not explicitly state that the normative model is to be taken from
the EU itself, it is clear that ENP countries are expected to converge towards the normative model of the Union. This is clearly due to the internal constraints of EU governance,
which make it extremely difficult to unpack agreements that have been painstakingly developed for the 15 member-states that made up the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement.
Furthermore, the EU reiterates what is already part of the PCAs. For example, in the case
of Ukraine, the PCA affirms that Ukraine needs to approximate its existing and future
17
legislation to that of the Community.9 The PCAs that entered into force in 1998 were
only agreed to for an initial period of ten years. Therefore the strong focus on these legal
documents make more likely that the PCAs will be renewed in order to avoid another
lengthy discussion and ratification process for new treaties.10 Third, the ENP sets up a
procedure for monitoring the success as well as shortcomings of agreements made under
ENP.
Following this comprehensive step towards achieving the overarching policy
goals of ENP, the European Commission refined its existing country strategies. The ENP
is being reshaped in order to be compatible with the existing framework of relationships
between the EU and its neighbours. Each country strategy paper subsequently supplies a
strategic framework for the period 2002-2006. Furthermore, these strategy papers set out
EU cooperation goals and policy responses as well as identifying areas for cooperation
which are defined as key priorities. In addition, the country strategy papers provide an
assessment of the partner countries’ policy agendas and political and socio-economic
situations. Attached to the strategy is information about “the EU response in more detail,
highlighting programme objectives, expected results and conditionality in the priority
fields of co-operation for the period 2002-2004” (EU/Jordan 2002: 2).
The primary objective of the strategy papers was to define the scope and modes of
cooperation, underpinned by financial aspects. Concomitantly, the European Commission
drew up its first set of country reports. In May 2004, country reports were published on
9
See European Union, Partnership and Cooperation of the European Communities and their Member States
and Ukraine, OJ 1998 L49/3, p. 41: “The Parties recognize that an important condition for strengthening
the economic links between Ukraine and the Community is the approximation of Ukraine’s existing and
future legislation to that of the Community. Ukraine shall endeavor to ensure that its legislation will be
gradually made compatible with that of the Community.”
10
See Article 101 of the PCA with Ukraine, which stipulates: “This Agreement is concluded for an initial
period of ten years. The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party
gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement six months before it expires.”
18
the first seven of the ENP countries which have Association or Partnership Agreements
with the EU in force. A further five country reports were published in March 2005 on the
next set of countries to be included in the policy (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), as
well as with those countries whose Agreements had already come into force (Egypt and
Lebanon). These reports provide an outline of the political, economic and social situation
in the ENP countries. They also provide the space for future assessments on the achievements of each of the EU’s partner countries. The Commission announced that the first
assessment would be released in 2006, to be followed by another round of country reports
in 2007.
The next stage in the development of ENP saw the conclusion of ENP Action
Plans with each of the countries. In June 2004, the Council of the EU endorsed the Commission’s proposal: “Action plans should be comprehensive but at the same time identify
clearly a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform. Action
plans should also contribute, where possible, to regional cooperation” (Council of the
ERU 2004). Subsequently, a wide range of other areas have been emphasized. They
jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform by means of short and mediumterm priorities (between 3 and 5 years). They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, cooperation in sectors (such as
transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) as well
as a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health).
The incentives the EU offers in return for progress on relevant reforms are greater inte-
19
gration into European programs and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market
access.
Finally, the implementation of mutual commitments and objectives agreed upon
in the action plans are subject to regular monitoring by the European Commission and the
partner country. In addition, the European Commission is expected to issue periodic reports commenting on progress as well as shortcomings. This procedure clearly reinforces
elements of conditionality by offering reviews of the relationship in exchange for compliance with jointly agreed commitments. According to the Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, his country aims at “under-promising, but over-delivering” 11 on the terms
of its objectives set in the Action Plan.
Currently, EU assistance to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy is channelled through various geographical programs.12 In October 2004, the
European Commission proposed an increase in funding for the ENP to almost
15 bil-
lion. This is conceived as a part of the reform of EU assistance instruments that will be
replaced by a simplified structure and a single instrument – the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This will be a much more flexible and ‘policy-driven
instrument’ designed to target sustainable development and approximation of EU policies
and standards, as well as supporting the agreed to priorities in the ENP Action Plans. One
of its most innovative features is that it entails “a radical simplification to the current
situation where cross-border cooperation at the external EU border is hampered by inter11
Author’s interview with Kostiantyn Yelisieiev, Deputy Head of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, Brussels,
May 30, 2005.
12
These programs include TACIS (for its eastern neighbours and Russia) and MEDA (for its southern
Mediterranean neighbours), as well as thematic programmes such as European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR). The budgetary period covering 2000-2006) releases funds of approximately
5.3 billion for MEDA and 3.1 billion for TACIS; in addition the European Investment Bank lends approximately 2 billion to MEDA beneficiary countries and 500 million to TACIS beneficiary countries.
20
faces between internal and external funding instruments operating through different
rules” (European Commission 2004: 3). This means that cross-border cooperation with
non-EU countries will be considerably eased along the EU’s external land and sea borders in the east and in the south, putting partners under the same funding regime and instruments. The EU hopes to substantiate its goal of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe as a result of these changes.
ENPI also envisages extending forms of technical assistance to partner countries
that had previously been used in the process of the CEECs rapprochement towards the
EU, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term twinning arrangements with EU member-states’ administrations (national, regional or local),
as well as participation in Community programs and agencies. Moreover, the Commission expects that the priorities identified in the action plans, which are agreed to with the
authorities of the country, will have a ‘lighthouse effect’ in terms of guiding the programming of other assistance programs from other donor countries and institutions. After
painstakingly difficult negotiations on the financial perspectives for the years 2007-2013,
a compromise was reached at the European Council in December 2005. The Council determined that the EU’s external action – including Pre-accession, Stability, Development
Cooperation and Economic Cooperation, ENP, Humanitarian aid and Macro-financial
assistance – would receive approximately 50 billion Euro from 2007-13. Out of this
budget, only 10.5 billion Euro were assigned to ENP.
21
IV. Modes of Governance in the European Neighbourhood Policy
Entrenched in the path-dependent evolution of practices in the EU’s development and
enlargement ‘policies’, the European Neighbourhood Policy can be perceived as an externalization of EU governance. Yet, which modes of governance have prevailed thus far
in this process? Again, the externalization of EU governance does not provide for a stable
EU exposure of the countries concerned. ENP countries may – for a number of reasons –
opt to (temporarily) withdraw from the EU’s expanded orbit of governance. Furthermore,
modes of governance tend to unfold simultaneously as we will see from the investigation
below.
Compliance
Without the prospect of future membership at hand, it is certainly correct to assume that
compliance is not the strongest feature of ENP. Ultimately, the level of compliance in the
European Neighbourhood Policy is underpinned by domestic conditions in each of the
partner countries and the interest of each individual government in subscribing to these
goals. The prospect of eventual membership is definitely the key to determining the success of externally-driven reforms in the economic and political sphere. It is for these reason that Commission officials argue that “successful participation in the ENP requires
that the pace of convergence to the EU and the internal process of economic reform are
matched” (Dodini/Fanitini 2006: 530). Still, the ENP entails various elements and instruments to make ‘compliance’ an attractive policy goal for the partner countries: First,
the PCAs and Association Agreements contain ‘human rights clauses’ which make the
provision of financial assistance conditional upon the fulfilment of human rights stan-
22
dards (however, the implementation of these clauses has been subject to criticism from
various NGO groups (Kelley 2006: 46). Second, the PCA with Ukraine, for example, explicitly mandates that the country must ensure the approximation of its economic legislation towards EU standards (Article 55). Similar to the practice in enlargement policies,
the ENP sets up monitoring procedures (regular reports) that scrutinizes progress and
shortcomings in various policy sectors.
Negotiation
In general, the power relationship between the European Union and each individual ENP
partner country is hierarchical and highly asymmetrical with the EU in a much stronger
position. From a realist perspective, the relationship is determined by the ENP countries’
dependency on EU markets in term of trade and investments. In the aftermath of the latest
EU enlargement, the European Union became the most important export and import market for Ukraine and Moldova. However, the establishment of ENP has added a new dynamic to various formal and informal settings for bilateral negotiations, increasing ‘embeddedness’ of ENP countries in processes of EU governance. Through the set-up of action plans and monitoring exercises, negotiations between these countries and the EU are
much more goal-driven than they had previously been.
Most of the achievements in recent EU-Ukraine relations for instance, such as the
opening of negotiations on visa facilitation and readmission agreements, are pursued in a
highly hierarchical manner though, where Ukraine ultimately is required to adjust towards EU expectations and standards. In turn, Russia (to give the example of a non-ENP
23
neighbouring country) draws advantage from the fact that Europe and the EU in particular are highly dependant on its energy supplies.
The EU would like to see its neighbours adopt values such as the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights and minority rights in accordance with the norms
and standards (political pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect for the rights of
persons belonging to national minorities, non discrimination on grounds of gender, and
on political, religious and ethnic ground) set forth by the OSCE and the Council of
Europe (as in the case of Ukraine). The ENP Action Plan encourages a wide range of initiatives in interregional and cross-border cooperation arrangements involving the subnational level(s), targeting public health, fostering local democracy and civil society as
well as building strong national education programs. To summarize: Negotiations between the EU and ENP partner countries reiterate the enlargement practice of onedimensional, hierarchical negotiations ultimately favouring EU positions.
Competition
ENP aimed at the establishment of two frameworks for competition: a first one between
the ENP countries themselves, and second one between the EU and the ENP countries.
The first one subscribes to a long standing (‘declaratory’) EU foreign policy practice
which is to frame regional or sub-regional cooperation (in virtually every part of the
world) as a primary stepping stone towards closer relations with the European Union. The
formation of Central European Free Trade Area or Visegrad group of states, comprising
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, founded in the early 1990s, very
much owe their approach to this EU foreign policy goal. Similarly, the European
24
Neighbourhood Policy was built into a comprehensive framework inspired from the allinclusive approach of the so-called European Conference. An example for the second approach is the establishment of “a policy dialogue between EU and Ukrainian authorities
in the field of education and training” (EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2004: 39). The Action
Plan encourages Ukraine to fully subscribe to the objectives of the Bologna process in
Higher Education, to ensure the compatibility of the Ukrainian university system with
that of EU member-states. Ukraine joined the ‘Bologna club’ together with the other
Eastern ENP countries Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova in May 2005. The
Bologna club may be interpreted as a way to increase non-compliance-driven benchmarking efforts and mutual learning processes within and outside the European Union.
Coordination
Since the establishment of the European Neighbourhood Policy, there has been a significant increase of ‘networks’ (Lavanex 2004) seeking to facilitate and improve coordination amongst the participating partners. One of the key mechanisms for driving EUinspired external reform resides with the “perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a
significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and the
possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs” (EU/Ukraine Action Plan 2004: 2) Yet it is not only the ENP country which will
benefit from closer forms of inclusion in EU programs and policies – in the case of
Ukraine, the EU aims at getting access to the country’s Antonov fleet in order to cope
with its weak capabilities vis-à-vis its airlift capabilities and to boost its credibility in
25
terms of ESDP. Thus, the success of ENP ultimately will depend on the stakes both partners hold in this process.
The EU is particularly interested in securing peace and stability at its periphery.
Hence ENP is also framed in terms of conflict prevention policy. Both Georgia and
Moldova have expressed hopes that the European Union and ENP would play a pivotal
role in resolving some of the conflicts in their territories (Cameron 2006: 5; Gänzle
2007c). The ENP Action Plans agreed to in 2005 make clear reference to conflict prevention. Likewise, the ENP Country Strategy Papers feature references to territorial disputes
and call for a ‘shared responsibility’ for conflict settlement. Similarly, the Action Plans
with Israel, Jordon, Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia all mention a ‘shared responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution;’ conflict
resolution also figures highly in Action Plans that were in the process of negotiation at
the beginning of 2006. Clearly, there is a long history of this approach in the efforts of
the EU to play a (significant) role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. So far, the
‘ENP approach’ to conflict resolution has yet to yield tangible results.
When the Council of the EU decided to include the Caucasian Republics in the
ENP, conflict prevention had to occupy the top of the agenda. Armenia, Azerbaijan and
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh represent symbols of Europe’s ‘frozen conflicts’. As the
EU and the partner countries are currently preparing the Action Plans, it remains to be
seen what kind of results the ENP will be capable of generating in this particular region.
After a controversial debate among the member-states, the EU Border Assistance
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was set up in November 2005 under the lead of the
European Commission. Although it is an advisory, small scale, technical body with no
26
executive powers, it provides training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials,
reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective customs controls and border surveillance.
Ultimately, it is designed to contribute to building confidence and strengthening cross
border cooperation, particularly with a view to resolving the ‘frozen conflict’ in Transnistria.
V. Conclusion
The end of the Cold War and the EU’s enlargement of 2004 have pushed the EU into a
pivotal role in terms of reshaping the political order in Europe. By externalizing EU governance, the European Union incrementally and conditionally includes external actors in
its policy-making processes as well as making them parts of its policies. I have argued
here that this strategy was intentional, but at the same time path-dependent. It needs to be
matched by the readiness of key actors at both levels – the supranational and the national
– in order to engage the outsiders’ willingness to comply with the EU-set rules of the
game and to seek a stake in European integration. The process as such is by no means
irreversible; in fact, with regards to the Eastern ENP countries, a major domestic political
change or a U-turn of Russian foreign policy is likely to immediately impact the EU’s
relationship with its neighbourhood.
‘External governance’ is distinct from the EU’s internal structure of multi-level
governance. Hence ‘external governance’ cannot avoid the question which the governance approach in EU studies has neglected so far by simply ignoring “questions of political power” (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 258). Throughout each mode of governance perceptible
27
the EU is a rule-shaping and dominant position. Towards the backdrop of this analysis, it
seems that coordination is the most effective tool at the EU’s hand.
Hence the governance approach is well-equipped to account for some of the inherent dynamics of the European Neighbourhood Policy. More importantly, it develops
the intellectual toolkit necessary to understand the politics of inclusion and exclusion,
which is central to Europe’s new political order.
(17/10/06)
28
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