TWO STATES OR ONE, OR IN BETWEEN?
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL
STRUCTURES ON COLLECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION AND CONFLICT. A
COMPARISON OF NORTHERN IRELAND
AND ISRAEL PALESTINE
Jennifer Todd
IBIS Discussion Paper
No. 3
TWO STATES OR ONE, OR IN BETWEEN?
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES ON
COLLECTIVE IDENTIFICATION AND CONFLICT.
A COMPARISON OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND
ISRAEL PALESTINE
Jennifer Todd
No. 3 in the Discussion Series: Patterns of Conflict Resolution
Institute for British—Irish Studies
University College Dublin
IBIS Discussion Paper
No. 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Two States or One, Conference, Osgoode Law School, June 2009. Breaking Patterns of
Conflict research project, conducted with John Coakley at University College Dublin and
funded by the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences.
ABSTRACT
TWO STATES OR ONE, OR IN BETWEEN?
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES ON COLLECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION AND CONFLICT.
A COMPARISON OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND ISRAEL PALESTINE
Despite the very different international and regional context, Northern Ireland
provides a useful comparison and model for discussion of conflict resolution in
Israel/Palestine. This article explores the interaction of political structures and
collective identification, showing that some state configurations incentivise zero
sum aims and ideas and constitute conflicts as intractable, while others encourage
the change of aims and strategies which permits political compromise. It explores
the timing, conditions and directions of such change in Northern Ireland, arguing
that it was crucially conditioned by changing power relations - an equalisation
process - and that it took very different forms for different groups and subgroups
depending on their access to social opportunities and resources. Given this
ongoing change, the relative success of the 1998 settlement is a function not just of
its guarantees and structures, but also of its iterative character, holding open
different possible futures for changing populations. Israel/Palestine is in a very
different situation. But it too is dynamic. By showing how one- and two-state models
of conflict resolution are likely to affect collective identification and political aims, we
can show how each needs to be qualified to hold open different possible futures for
changing populations.
BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION
Jennifer Todd is Director of the Institute for British Irish Studies, School of Politics
and International relations, University College Dublin. She has published
extensively on Northern Ireland politics and on comparative ethnic conflict.
IBIS DISCUSSION PAPERS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
TWO STATES OR ONE, OR IN BETWEEN?
THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL STRUCTURES ON COLLECTIVE
IDENTIFICATION AND CONFLICT.
A COMPARISON OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND ISRAEL PALESTINE
INTRODUCTION
Some ―ethnic‖ conflicts are long lasting, intractable, and mobilise whole
populations. They can occur in rich and formally democratic states; indeed the very
democratic aims of the diverse populations may increase conflict. Northern Ireland
was the site of such a conflict, and Israel/Palestine still is. This article examines the
impact of different strategies for resolving such conflicts: institutionalising
autonomy, or institutionalising power sharing, or institutionalising a complex model
able to provide both?1 There is an extensive literature on the design and the
dangers of such institutions.2 There is also a growing comparative and quantitative
literature testing out which institutions have been most successful in ending
violence and/or in stabilising new political institutions in intra-state conflicts over the
last half century.3 But there is another set of questions which are not answered in
this literature: how does political restructuring affect popular oppositions, identities
and aims? How does it affect the distinction between the communities, the extent of
zero-sum beliefs, the degree of tolerance of violence? To address these questions,
we need over-time in-case comparisons, prior to cross-case comparisons.
The questions are politically important because popular identities and beliefs are
central to the stability of democratic settlements. Institutions and constitutions are
only as good as the way they function. Communal coordination patterns can
―convert‖ formally democratic institutions into instruments of ethno-religious
dominance, or institutionalised ethno-religious quotas into ways of overcoming
divisions. Much of the literature on appropriate forms of settlements focuses on
security safeguards, protection of rights and distribution of resources (military and
political).4 But even when institutions meet the best security, rights and equality
standards, how will they be taken by the once-opposed populations? Will they
encourage individuals to move away from oppositional understandings,
particularistic values and identities that demean their opponents? If not, the best of
institutions can reproduce conflict, and the implementation of the best of
agreements be delayed until it is too late.
In this article, I tackle the broad question, how do different types of state institutions
affect public attitudes and identities. I take as case studies two conflicts - Northern
Ireland and Israel/Palestine. The specific question for Israel/Palestine has been
clearly posed: one state or two?5 Does a two-state resolution in Israel/Palestine
eternalise division, or create the high fences that make for good neighbours? Does
a one-state resolution allow a blurring of boundaries or will it re-ignite conflict and
violence? Both models, and in-between, have been tried in Ireland and Northern
Ireland. I use the Northern Irish case to explore how different institutional structures
affect public attitudes and identities, whether they make communal boundaries
more or less permeable, and public attitudes and identities more or less exclusivist.
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Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine are at once very similar and very different
forms of conflict.6 The most important contrast, and the one that explains the very
different course of conflict and settlement, lies in the role of the British state in
Northern Ireland as the overarching power holder in a stable region, of which
Northern Ireland with its protagonists is but a small part. This contrasts sharply with
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, situated in an unstable region with the overarching
regional power holder, Israel, one of the protagonists.7 Further the ―age‖ of the
conflict is radically different: in Northern Ireland it stretches back four centuries to
colonial plantation and dispossession, in Israel for less than one century.
There are also marked similarities. In each case, the conflict has colonial origins:
state-promoted dispossession and population transfer, severe horizontal
inequalities between the populations and state repression of protest. 8 Thus whole
populations are involved in conflict, not simply organisations or militant groups.
Both conflicts have taken place in rich formally democratic states, where both
populations adhere to democratic values. Thus popular and democratic legitimacy
becomes an important criterion of successful settlement.9 Both conflicts are
complex, with the issues at stake and the precise aims of parties changing over
time. In each case, the clarity of communal boundaries disguises the ethnoreligious and political diversity and complexity of aims and interests within each of
the opposed populations.10 In each case we have a complexly determined conflict
where a ―structural bind‖—the fact that the rights of the dominated population are
incompatible with the security of the dominant—forges very disparate sub-groups
into solidarity and polarised confrontation. In each case there has been at once
extreme polarisation, and deep internal divisions within each polarised population.
In each case, therefore, one criterion for a successful settlement is that it permits a
loosening of group solidarity so that subgroup diversity can be expressed and
greater inter-group permeability can occur.11
Particularly relevant to this article, radically different models of conflict resolution
have been proposed at different stages in each conflict. At time of writing (July
2011) a ―two-state‖ road map remains the most likely way forward in Israel
Palestine.12 However significant minorities—from Hamas to some religiously
fundamentalist Jews to radicals in both communities—prefer a one-state resolution,
although they differ on its structure.13 (Northern) Ireland, in turn, provides over-time
comparisons between different state forms and their effects on conflict: the
integrative (one-state) Union of 1801; the complex one-state model proposed by
Home Rule advocates in the late 19th century; the two-state partition settlement of
1920/21; the contemporary complex mixed model put in place in 1998 which has
aspects of a one-state settlement (Protestants and Catholics, unionists and
nationalists co-govern on the basis of equality in Northern Ireland) and aspects of a
two-state settlement (the 1920 partition of the island remains, but the role of the
British and Irish states in Northern Ireland is reconfigured, and there are clear
democratic procedures whereby unification could occur).
In the first part of this paper, I sketch the succession of state forms in
Ireland/Northern Ireland over the last two centuries, showing how each different
incentives to identity formation for the populations. In the second part of the paper, I
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show how the current conflict resolution model in Northern Ireland has affected
popular identities and aims. In the final section of the paper I return to the
comparison and ask how far we can expect similar or different effects of
comparable state structures in Israel/Palestine.
CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND IN SUCCESSIVE POLITICAL REGIMES
Conflict in Northern Ireland has its origins in the early 17th century dispossession of
Catholic and Gaelic Irish landowners in North East Ireland and the plantation of
Protestants from England and Scotland on this land. This followed a series of
earlier smaller plantations on the island, and was in turn followed by the political
and legal augmentation of Protestant dominance. The result was an island-wide,
structurally based conflict of interest between two culturally-defined populations (a
minority of Protestants and a majority of Catholics), in which the English (later
British) state played a central role by upholding Protestant power and depending on
it for local administration.14 This system of relationships was reproduced through
the interests it generated in security (for Protestants), stability (for the state) and
redress (for Catholics) and it persisted in what later became Northern Ireland until
close to the end of the twentieth century.15
The form of conflict that ensued, however, was crucially affected by political
structures. In the late eighteenth century as penal restrictions on Catholics were
eased and as Presbyterians and radicals, particularly in the North, chafed under
Protestant Ascendency rule (by Church of Ireland landowners), a United Irishmen
revolutionary movement emerged. Although quickly repressed—in a process that
produced several Catholic massacres in the Southeast of the island, reinforcing
Protestant insecurityi—t provoked the British state to push through an Act of Union
(1801).
Union created a one-state regime which would have permitted the alleviation of
remaining restrictions on Catholics without endangering Protestants (a minority on
the island, but now a majority in the United Kingdom). The failure to grant Catholic
political rights immediately after the Union, however, produced mass Catholic
mobilization and incipient nationalism. Once nationalist mobilization strengthened,
intensified by the impoverishment of most of Ireland under the Union, the prospects
of integration into the British state were much diminished. The demands of most
19th century Irish nationalists were moderate (Home Rule, that is the devolution of
power within the wider British empire) but once articulated, even a radical land
reform programme which commenced in 1870 failed in its aim to ―kill Home Rule
with kindness‖.
The Protestant-dominated North-east was the only region of the island to
industrialise and benefit economically from Union, and there local ethno-religious
antagonisms were residual.16 This gave a structural basis for Protestant resistance
to Home Rule. Still, a significant minority of Protestants supported Home Rule into
the twentieth century, despite intimidation by unionists.17 Swiftly-granted Home
Rule for Ireland together with suitable guarantees for the Protestant minority could
have produced a complex one-state settlement (a devolved government in Ireland
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within a looser British federation). Instead, delay and increasing British
Conservative support for partition massively encouraged mobilization, intimidation
and arming of Ulster unionists and, slightly later, of Irish nationalists. 18 It also
massively increased communal polarization, with latent local ethno-religious
rivalries now organized by rival nationalist organizations, and the prospect of a
―compromise‖ Home Rule settlement ruled out by both.19 As mobilization proceeded
in the early twentieth century, ethnic, religious and political distinctions were forged
into a coincidence.20 Ulster unionists, homogenously Protestant, won a partition
settlement which institutionalized their local demographic dominance as two thirds
of the population in six of the thirty two counties of Ireland. That region was granted
devolved status within the United Kingdom. Irish nationalists in the rest of the island
(now waging a war of independence) had to accept dominion status within the
empire.21 Partition in 1920-1 is often said to have confirmed rather than created
division. If so, that division had only very recently become so politicized and
polarized as to be unsurpassable. The autonomy granted nationalists fell far short
of their aspirations and provoked a civil war. It was, however, just enough to detach
Irish political leaders and populace from practical concern over Northern Ireland at
least until violence re-emerged in 1969.22
Partition—the two state solution—provided a state for each ethno-religious
population and each state was used to dig division deeper, in nation-building
enterprises, in institutionalising confessionalism, and—in the North—in using state
resources clientelistically to secure Protestant unity.23 That there was discrimination
and increasing communal inequality in Northern Ireland between 1921 and 1972 is
well attested.24 What is less recognized is that there were systemic institutional
incentives for this. From the formation of Northern Ireland in 1921, only Protestants
and unionists could be relied upon to defend the state. The threat to that state was
not primarily a product of nationalist size, strength or organisation, inside or outside
Northern Ireland. It was a threat based on the possibility of constitutional change,
given that the settlement had been enforced on a minority inside and majority
outside and on the uncertainty of the British alliance. The form of settlement meant
that no amount of detachment on the part of the Southern state or weakness on the
part of Catholics in Northern Ireland would reassure unionists. Unionists relied on
themselves to defend the state, excluding those of more uncertain political loyalty:
the more they pulled together to defend it, the easier it was to see the state as
simply another resource for Protestant interests. A structural bind, whereby the
Protestant quest for security precluded equality for Catholics, thus reproducing
nationalist opposition and unionist solidarity, was built into the new Northern
Ireland.
Partition also had another effect. It massively increased the importance of
sovereignty in Northern Ireland. Unionists needed the British state to protect them
against a Catholic dominated society in the South, and they identified with the
British state for a whole range of reasons—economic, religious, moral—which are
not reducible simply to ethnic origin or national solidarity.25
Protestants and Catholics had always had their distinct, only partially intersecting,
networks and organizations, but partition institutionalized this in Northern Ireland. It
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provided a taken-for-granted British context, institutions and loyalties even for
apolitical Protestants. It gave even apolitical Catholics no reason in principle to
support the state even when, in practice, they were willing to work with and within it.
After World War II, when Protestant liberals and Catholic moderates had increased
in numbers and in public prominence, these underlying differences in basic
conceptions of legitimacy remained.26 These were not residues of the more distant
past (although they too existed) but products of the existing state configuration. As
tensions escalated and violence began after 1968, these radically opposed
assumptions drove even liberals and moderates towards their own extremists.
The two-state solution worked in Northern Ireland while Northern Catholics were
acquiescent, focusing their activities around church and church-centred activities
(Catholic controlled schools and hospitals, Gaelic games, drama and cultural
activities in the church hall, cultural nationalism). It broke down not because of
nationalism but because Catholics (with some radical Protestants) mobilized for
equality in Northern Ireland. This provoked divisions between unionist liberals (at
the time the majority in government and in the Protestant population) and unionist
ultras (with a strong presence in the party and in the security forces). 27 The unionist
government strove to keep the unionist alliance. In the process it radicalized
moderate and pragmatic civil rights supporters, turning them into nationalists and
republicans, it gave insufficient leadership to its own liberals, and in the end it lost
control even of its own ultra supporters. If the British army had not intervened at
unionist behest in August 1969, there would likely have been a re-partition with
even more massive population movements and deaths than occurred in 1969-70.28
Even at this stage, if a more serious reform initiative and engagement of civil rights
supporters and the still substantial numbers of liberal unionists had been pushed
forward, a restructured Northern Ireland might still have been possible. But when
the British state eventually took over direct rule in 1972, it had already positioned
itself and its army on the unionist side and now faced an organized terrorist
campaign, backed, implicitly or explicitly, by a significant minority of the Catholic
population.
As is well known, British governance brought neither political settlement nor the end
of violence for the best part of a quarter century.29 Most certainly the ongoing
violence polarized the communities further.30 However the failure to reach
compromise settlement was as much a product of lack of incentives as it was of
political extremism. The failure of the complex consociational ―Sunningdale‖
settlement of 1973-4 was a product not simply of the unionist public’s unwillingness
to share power or to countenance North-South institutions, but also of the British
failure to confront the Ulster Workers’ Council Strike before it gained mass
Protestant support.31 It was commonplace from the mid 1970s into the 1990s to
emphasise the intractability of the conflict because of the radically incompatible
aims and attitudes of the actors.32 As we now know, these aims and attitudes were
much less fixed than they appeared. They had sufficiently moderated by 1998 to
allow an agreed settlement, and by 2011 to allow its stabilization. How did this
come about?
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The answer lies in a process of restructuration of Northern Ireland - at once socioeconomic and political. This gave Catholics and nationalists the resources and
incentives to participate in shared government. It removed unionist and Protestant
resources to resist it, and provided incentives for them to accept it. The process
was initiated by the Irish government, and only slowly accepted by the British
following on the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985.33 From the Fair Employment Act of
1989 to the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, fair employment legislation ensured that
Catholics moved from a significantly disadvantaged position in employment and
unemployment, to close to proportionate levels in, for example, the higher civil
service, in management and the higher professions and in higher education (see
table one).34
Table One Catholic position 1970s—2000s35
1970s
36.8
(1971)
2000s
44
(2001)
Catholic % of
managerial
employment
16
(1971)
39
(2001)
Catholic % of top
(asst. Secretary)
civil service jobs
Catholic % of high
deputy principal
and above jobs
% Catholic share
of those with
degree
qualification or
higher
8.4
(1973)
40
(2010)
17
>40
27.4
(1971)
46.2
(2001)
Catholic
percentage of
population
Inequalities remained. Even in the 2000s: Catholics remained significantly more
likely to be unemployed than Protestants, and were disproportionately present in
the most marginalized quarter of the population.36 But the gross communal
manifestations of economic inequality had been reformed.
Equally, public culture began to change. After the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985,
the presence of the Irish state in policy discussions changed the options and policy
repertoires on the agenda, even if they did not immediately change British policy
decisions. The presence of increasing numbers of nationalists nominated onto
public bodies by the Irish state changed the public culture by bringing nationalist
perspectives on all matters for the first time into public parity with unionist
perspectives. In the meantime, British-Irish partnership was generalized to all
conflict-management initiatives in Northern Ireland.
This gave the context for the complex governance structure, which the two states,
in dialogue with the political parties and paramilitaries, slowly elaborated. As
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outlined in The Good Friday Agreement of 1998, it involved a consociational
Northern Ireland devolved Assembly, which could take increasing powers (including
by 2010, policing and justice); institutionalised transnational North-South linkages in
a North-South Council and implementation bodies which could (with agreement)
grow as far as de facto institutional integration; continued British-Irish oversight
through an intergovernmental conference and weak provision for integration within
the wider archipelago in a British-Irish Council.37 It allowed the creation of
exemplary forms of North-South institutions which, although relatively minor in
terms of funding and actual achievement,38 were a major step in modelling how
integration on the island of Ireland might proceed and in creating an official culture
open to integration. It extended the equalization process, bringing reform of policing
and criminal justice, and further measures to ―mainstream‖ equality in all policy
areas. It brought a promise (yet fully to be achieved) of harmonization of equality
measures and rights in both jurisdictions. It provided constitutional recognition of
those who wished to be Irish or British or both. This was less than nationalists had
desired, but it was seen by the Irish government as a preparatory step to ensure
that—should there eventually be a vote for Irish unity—it could be brought about
smoothly and without disruption. At the same time, the mapping of a possible path
to Irish unity allowed a constitutional guarantee—by both governments—that there
would be a change from British to Irish sovereignty when and only when it was so
voted by a majority in each jurisdiction on the island. Given the demographic
balance and divided constitutional preferences among Catholics, this means that
Irish unity would come about in the middle term only if a section of Protestants
voted for it.
This (i) opened way to future constitutional change, thus part-satisfying nationalists,
while ensuring that that change would only be by majority consent in Northern
Ireland, thus giving unionists a significant level of security; (ii) it gave nationalists
new avenues for influence on policy, within strong constraints of equality and rights
(iii) it changed the character of sovereignty, not formally, but in terms of its impact—
British sovereignty in Northern Ireland became an increasingly formal concept
consistent with radical distancing of policy, culture and norms from the mainland
United Kingdom model; (iv) it gave a gradualist route to functional Irish integration,
through the layering effect of the new North-South institutions.
All of this has very radically changed the shape of Northern Ireland. Brian Feeney
wrote that even moderate nationalists in the SDLP would only sign up to the new
Northern Ireland if it were no longer Northern Ireland.39 Unionist Peter Weir
complained that the ―dimmer switch‖ was constantly being applied to Britishness.40
If, constitutionally, this remains Northern Ireland under British sovereignty, politically
and experientially, it is a Northern Ireland as much open to and ruled by nationalists
as by unionists. The national character of Northern Ireland has changed, and may
change farther, long before constitutional change is likely.41 The 2011 elections—
with their poor turnout betokening a lack of public interest, and the overwhelming
support from voters for the power-sharing parties and rejection of the antiagreement Traditional Unionist Voice—shows that the mass public has accepted
this situation at least for the middle term.
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Changing public identities and attitudes in Northern Ireland.
Restructuring has produced shifts in attitudes and identities. The survey data give
us an overall picture of the changes. Catholics, now able to assert their nationalism
and more likely than before to assert an Irish identity, are also less likely to prefer a
united Ireland.42
Figure One: Constitutional preferences of Catholics in Northern Ireland
70
60
United Ireland
50
United Kingdom
40
Other
30
No preference/dk
20
10
10
20
08
20
06
20
04
20
02
20
98
19
90
19
19
68
0
Sources: Rose, 1971; Smith and Chambers, 1991; Social Attitudes Surveys; Life and Times
surveys.
Protestants have no new desire for a united Ireland (only 4% prefer it as a
constitutional option) but they have a much greater sense that they could live with a
democratically achieved united Ireland. So, for example, in the 1980s well over half
of Protestants predicted violence in the event of a united Ireland; since 1998,
around half of Protestants say they could live with a united Ireland achieved
democratically, although they would not like it, a quarter would welcome it and only
a fifth would find it almost impossible to accept.43
There has also been change in perceptions and identity. Individuals are now less
likely to identify as nationalist or unionist, and more likely to identify as neither.
Figure 2: Self-identification as nationalist, unionist, or neither. Life and Times surveys
50
40
unionist
30
nationalist
20
neither
10
0
1998
2002
2006
2010
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Even while both populations are sceptical that full equality has been achieved, they
do not feel discriminated against. In 2003 (the last time the question was asked in
the Life and Times surveys) only about 15% of Catholics thought Protestants were
treated better than themselves.44 Half of Protestants, when asked in 2003, thought
that Protestants and Catholics were treated equally and only about 10% of
Protestants thought that Catholics were treated better than Protestants in Northern
Ireland.45
The mood of the Catholic public has been described as ―buoyant‖.46 This has been
correlated with an increasing assertion of Irish identity particularly among the
young.47 But the wider values and aims associated with the assertion of Irish
identity have changed. The desire for a united Ireland has declined over ten years
even while the Sinn Féin vote has risen (see figure one above). The political
distinction between republicans and nationalists has decreased: now those who
vote Sinn Féin may not want a united Ireland, or at least not want one immediately;
sons and daughters of ―constitutional nationalists‖ vote republican without sharing
either the social profile or the beliefs of republicans of the 1980s. 48 Nationalists, and
young nationalists in particular, have seen the changes as confirming and allowing
them to assert their Irish identity, and at the same time freeing them to decide
whether or not they actually want constitutional change.49
TABLE TWO: SELF-REPORTED IDENTITY: NORTHERN IRELAND50
British
Protestant
Catholic
Irish
Protestant
Catholic
Northern
Irish
Protestant
Catholic
Ulster
Protestant
Catholic
1968
1978
1986
1989
1994
1998
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2010
39
15
67
15
65
9
68
10
71
10
67
8
72
9
65
9
75
10
66
8
74
12
65
8
63
11
61
9
57
8
61
8
20
76
8
69
3
61
3
60
3
62
3
65
3
59
2
62
3
62
2
63
3
61
5
60
3
61
4
62
4
61
4
58
Not
asked
Not
asked
11
20
16
25
15
28
18
24
15
28
19
23
14
25
22
25
17
25
24
29
26
23
27
23
32
25
28
25
32
5
20
6
14
1
10
2
11
0
10
0
7
1
9
1
6
1
8
0
5
0
5
1
7
0
5
1
6
1
5
1
Meanwhile Catholics are increasingly willing to see a British element in their
identity. Table Three shows an increasing Catholic acceptance of a British
dimension to their identity, a trend confirmed by the community relations identity
modules of 1999 and 2007, and by the fact that the respondents themselves
believed that their parents would have been much more likely (58%) to say ―Irish
only‖.51
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Table Three: Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think of themselves first
as Irish. Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?52
%
Catholic
Protestant
No religion
Irish not British
43
0
7
More Irish than British
32
4
23
Equally Irish and British
14
18
22
More British than Irish
4
40
26
British not Irish
1
35
14
Other
6
2
8
Don't know
1
0
0
One change is clear from the data: identity packages are significantly more varied
than in the past. The cluster of strongly Irish identified republican supporters who
want a united Ireland immediately and are deeply alienated from Northern Ireland
may still exist, but both Irish identifiers and Sinn Fein supporters now also include
individuals with a much wider range of attitudes and aims, thus diffusing the political
impact of the older cluster. The Catholic population’s self-reported identity and
views are still sharply contrasted with those of Protestants, but now within the
Catholic population it is more difficult to predict politics from identity, or even identity
from politics. The one segment where the older dynamic remains is among the
most marginalized sections of the Catholic population some of whom have become
recruits for dissident republicans.
There has been significant change too among Protestants. By the mid 2000s,
qualitative research showed many Protestants seeing that change is inevitable, and
reprioritising the elements of their identity accordingly. They remain ―British‖ but
British identity for many is becoming increasingly thin, purely official, a political sign
rather than a culturally rich identity.53 The 2007 Life and Times survey (Table 3
above) shows only a minority of the Protestant population who see themselves as
―British only‖.54 Young Protestants increasingly opt for a Northern Irish
identification.55 For this wide and internally diverse group of Protestants, a cultural
threshold is being crossed, as they opt away from a ―national‖ notion of Britishness.
At the same time, radical divisions have emerged within the Protestant population
between those who do and those who don’t feel confident, support the new order,
want to make things work. In the early 2000s about a third of Protestants felt their
culture unprotected, and felt that they were underdogs.56 A third of Protestants in
2003 believed equality laws protected Catholics at the expense of Protestants. 57
Protestant dissatisfaction was at its height in 2003, and has since moderated with
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the DUP’s entry into government in 2007. Still, however, even by 2011 there is
considerable tension within the Protestant working class, as was seen in the July
2011 rioting in East Belfast.
These intra-community distinctions are interrelated with changing resources and
opportunities. Qualitative research has shown constant reflection and questioning in
the 2000s.58 Yet if all groups are reassessing their previous identifications and
ideals, not all have the resources to change them or the opportunities to benefit
therefrom. Predictably, change has been greatest and most diverse amongst the
Protestant population, whose expectations were most challenged and whose
habitual modes of response proved inappropriate in the new order.
Some Protestants have changed quite radically: the quarter of Protestants who
would welcome a united Ireland, the fifth who have moved to a sense of themselves
as equally Irish and British; the fifth who remained in support of the Good Friday
Agreement through the crises of the 2000s. This group—including the business
elite, peace workers, ecumenists, many sportspeople and journalists, and
spreading to small business, and sections of the younger generation—have a
strong interest in developing a working new Northern Ireland open to the South and
have the resources to develop these linkages in relative safety.59 Significantly,
professionals are less evident in this group: teachers, academics, doctors and
lawyers tend to find their career paths within their own state, and there has been
relatively little harmonization or integration of standards and opportunities,
particularly in the crucial field of education.
Large sections of the Protestant population have privatized politically. The new
politics may not have been altogether to their choosing, but they will live with it.
They have disengaged from politics, and some also from British identity, but they
have not disengaged from their own professional networks or from their own
community. Particularly in the working class, quite extensive rethinking has
coexisted with a behavioural acceptance of communal norms, and an unwillingness
to venture too far from them in public.60 For these people, if there is going to be
political change, they will change together as a community: this is the message of
the political plumping for the Democratic Unionist Party as a ―tribune party‖.61 It is
also the message of the unexpected local plumping in Protestant East Belfast for
the cross-community Alliance candidate, Naomi Long, in the 2010 Westminster
elections. Now that structural change is all but complete, there is little indication at
time of writing (Summer 2011) during a major Irish and Eurozone economic crisis
that the community will plump for more radical change.
Economic pain is also evident throughout the United Kingdom and particularly in
the still economically depressed Northern Ireland, and it is particularly problematic
for the unskilled working class. Amongst the worst off are the working class male
Protestant youth who lack educational qualifications and face a future of
unemployment or partial employment. This leaves a constituency for resistance to
change. At present, those willing to resist are limited in numbers and in overt
support, although vocal and organised. But the potential support among the young
unemployed has been clear in the rioting and violence in June-July 2011.
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As expected, identity change has been less extreme among Catholics and
nationalists, whose expectations have been fulfilled and whose identities have been
confirmed in the new order. Change is a matter of moderation of aims and of
willingness to try to come to terms with Protestants and unionists within the new
socio-political structures. Irish identity is asserted more strongly than before,
particularly among the young. For the middle class, professional and business
groups, and for those with stable employment, the present situation allows stability,
full and equal self-expression, and as much linkage with the Irish state as they may
want. Figure One shows that a majority of the population are satisfied with this. For
the moment at least, nationalism has both strengthened and moderated, focusing
on cultural expression within Northern Ireland. This moderation may be temporary.
The young are not just more likely to assert a strong Irish identity, but also more
likely to voice support for a united Ireland.62 Indeed recent studies of youth opinions
suggest that sectarian attitudes and aims are overt among the young.63
As in the Protestant population, there has been considerable political
disengagement among Catholics. Even more than Protestants, however, they have
maintained a level of communal solidarity, plumping for the strong ―tribune‖ party,
Sinn Féin. Given the recurrent crises of implementation of the Good Friday
Agreement, which could well have ended their advance towards equality in social,
cultural and political position, even those who have no strong constitutional views
have been unwilling to allow any possibility of fallback. And, parallel to Protestants,
in the most marginalized Catholic areas, the youth remain a potential support base
for republican dissidents.
In summary, the wider population is divided in its stance towards the new order, not
primarily on ethno-religious but on sectional-class lines. There is a vocal and
influential segment of liberals and moderates (a minority of Protestants and a larger
section of Catholics) pushing forward the new political agenda and open to
increasing North-South and internal Northern Ireland integration. Among them,
there is increasing permeability of boundaries. There is a smaller, equally vocal and
much more dangerous marginalized minority resisting the new order and willing to
attack one another. Meanwhile much of the population of Northern Ireland,
Protestant and Catholic, are becoming depoliticised, waiting to see how politics
develops, and unwilling to take a stand separate from their own community. These
communities remain as separate and as opposed as before. Indeed private
rethinking coexists with increasing segregation, where the temptation within each
community is to press clientelistically for resources for themselves. The big
question is whether and how the British, Irish and/or Northern Irish governments
can stimulate more momentum for change in what is evidently a dangerous
division.64 One of the wild cards is precisely the cross-border one: the increasing
permeability of the state border is one way that the antagonistic balance in Northern
Ireland itself may be offset, and further change stimulated. Institutional integration
both at professional level (in education) would have an important effect, although it
is also important to find ways to benefit the most marginalized.
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CHANGING ENTRENCHED OPPOSITIONS? PROSPECTS FOR ISRAEL
PALESTINE
In Israel-Palestine there is plenty of evidence of shifting identifications, particularly
but not exclusively in the period of state and nation building. 65 There is also
considerable evidence that the political economy of Israel impacts on internal Israeli
divisions and self-identifications, thrusting lower class Israelis into competition with
Palestinians.66 Equally, the pressures towards politicization for the Palestinian
citizens of Israel come in large part from the ascriptions of identity by Jewish
Israelis.67 Meanwhile the increasingly Islamist character of Palestinian national
identity, particularly in Gaza, and the related shift in religious assumptions to allow
for nationalist mobilization have been documented.68 In addition, the variation in
type and tolerance of violence with changing political circumstances and
opportunities has been shown.69 There has, however, been relatively little
opportunity to study how different regimes affect political attitudes and identities.
Thus the discussion that follows constructs plausible scenarios, based on the
processes identified in Northern Ireland.
The two state model
The partition of Ireland exacerbated the underlying long term conflict of interests
between Protestant and Catholic and created a tight structural bind where unionist
security was incompatible with nationalist rights: unionists—even the liberals—were
unwilling to threaten the security of the state, and nationalistsi—n part because
equality was so thoroughly denied under unionist rule—were slow to define goals
short of a Catholic dominated united Ireland.
Partition has already taken place in Israel Palestine, with only limited autonomy and
territory for Palestinians. It has already produced serious problems: the cutting of
existing economic linkages and impoverishment of Palestinians; a rush to Israeli
settlement in the Palestinian territories with the related security problems; mutual
attacks with radically asymmetric numbers of casualties; and more generally a
structural bind where Israeli politicians are slow to accord rights to Palestinians
because of the security threat, and many Palestinians see no prospect of justice
while the Israeli state exists. A two state model with greater powers and territory for
the Palestinian state and a clear division of authority between the states would
clearly advance the position of Palestinians. As in the Irish Free State, it would give
a potential for autonomous development although this would depend also on
developing an economic infrastructure where it is presently very weak, and
employment traditionally found by movement into Israel.
A two state model would also have advantages for Israel. On the model of the
partition of Ireland, it would allow Palestinians within their own state to detach from
concern with Israel, at once decreasing the threat to the state and increasing
international legitimacy (and thus regional security). However the economies of
Israel/Palestine may be less conducive to a two-state solution than the (relatively
separate) economies of mainly agricultural Ireland and the industrial Northeast in
the early 20th century. The situation for Palestinians is also significantly more
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extreme than it was for Irish nationalists in the Irish state: the Irish had lost ―a part
of their nation‖, but not the part they themselves had lived in or particularly
identified with. Palestinians lost the land they had lived in, and so the question of
the right of return is likely to remain practically (rather than simply theoretically)
important unless and until they have adequate life-chances and conditions in their
present situation. Thus the economic and political viability of a Palestinian state is
an absolutely critical question, even before we begin to talk of the critical political
issue of Israeli settlers or other issues of security in the region.
Of course in Northern Ireland, even with Southern detachment, unionist insecurity
remained and led to systematic repression and disadvantaging of the nationalist
minority. Equally, the position of the Palestinian minority in Israel would remain
problematic: if the existence of the state remains at risk, those committed to the
state are unlikely to incorporate those whose commitment to it is in doubt. The
strong position of Ultras within Israel has worked against reform and has meant that
it is difficult to maintain even a practical acceptance of the state by Palestinians.
Even if an economically and politically viable Palestinian state were to be achieved,
and the demands on Israel by Palestinians radically decreased, it is far from certain
that reformers within Israel (without strong international support) would have
enough strength to enact a progressive reform programme to remove the many
constraints—economic, social and political—on Palestinian citizens.
A two state model would give Palestinians the key resource of a state from which to
negotiate. The Irish experience shows the importance of a state—even a small and
weak one—in driving the constitutional and restructuring processes in Northern
Ireland and in bringing in international actors (in this case the US) to guarantee the
settlement.70 Israel is unwilling to accept such an increase in Palestinian power and
there is a real danger that it would pre-emptively strike against an assertive
Palestinian state. It is in principle possible to build in and constrain the effects of
power change within a two state model, as the structure of governance in
contemporary Northern Ireland illustrates. But this was achieved through long
negotiations between the Irish and British governments, it was initially imposed
upon unionists rather than agreed by them, and that it functioned at all was
because the two governments had a strong interest that it not fail. 71 Maney et al
point out that the equivalent of such an Anglo-Irish process in Israel/Palestine
would be something like a US-EU process (involving two guarantors of the
immediate protagonists), once again emphasizing the need for a strong
international role if a viable settlement is to be reached.72
From two states to one? Restructuring the state
Post-1998 Northern Ireland shows how acceptance of a shared state is possible,
even one long defined as illegitimate by nationalists. Two interrelated aspects were
involved. The first was that this is a state under British sovereignty with agreed
procedures which would allow a move to Irish sovereignty in the future, while rights
of individuals and groups would be guaranteed equivalent under either sovereignty.
For Israel/Palestine, the direct parallel would be an Israeli state (for greater Israel)
that could become a Palestinian state under specified conditions, with no change in
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the rights of individuals and groups. However a more thoroughly binational, jointauthority Israel/Palestine state might be deemed more appropriate.
The second is that nationalist acceptance of Northern Ireland was premised on a
thorough restructuring of power relations and institutions within it, so that it would
be ―no longer Northern Ireland‖. If we generalize this to Israel/Palestine, the effect is
very radical. It would mean equalization of economic opportunity and condition
through Israel, the West Bank and Gaza with strong affirmative action policies and
targeted investment in the most deprived areas, and targeted training and
education for the most deprived communities. It would require consociational
government between Palestinians and Israelis with some form of weighted voting or
bloc vetoes. It would involve public affirmation of parity of esteem through the range
of public and educational institutions. It would require a radical restructuring of the
security forces to permit a threshold level of Palestinian participation, so that they
have ―the confidence of all parts of the community‖.73 The Northern Ireland case
suggests that such a route can pay off before full equality of condition is reached,
and thus the potential dangers of having to enforce ethno-national equality into
perpetuity can be bypassed.
This scenario has Israelis—like unionists—standing to lose not their state but its
distinctive character, their advantageous position with respect to regional
resources, and—as a by-product—their previous self-understandings. Unionists did
not move here voluntarily, even for the sake of peace. They did it because they
were pushed by the British government, with threat of worse if they did not move.
The result has been much better than they had feared: their state remains, British
sovereignty remains, there are more guarantees that they cannot be submerged in
a state antipathetic to their values, there is less violence, there are new
opportunities for advance. For Israelis, the benefits of such a scenario would be
major: a more secure peace, and a deradicalisation of Palestinian opposition. For
Palestinians too, the benefits would be massive both materially and morally. 74
Clearly a number of different quasi-federal situations within a one-state model could
apply, with agreed conditions of movement towards a unitary state or towards a two
state model. This would move closer to the complex mixed model, advocated by
Wolff and others, involving both power-sharing and autonomy.75 But central to the
success of such a model would have to be strong equalizing policies: otherwise
Palestinians would have neither the benefit of a state of their own nor the benefits
of equalization, and would have little incentive to accept this for longer than they
had to.
Prospects for agreement?
The discussion above purposively leaves out the problem of violence. Stopping
violence in Northern Ireland required the constitutional and restructuring processes,
in parallel to security policies, and with implicit promises of inclusion of militants in
the political process. There is reason to believe a similar process would be effective
in Israel/Palestine. There is strong evidence that the type and intensity of
Palestinian violence varies with the political opportunities on offer and that it is
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subject to popular constraints as well as aided by popular support.76 Of course
complex issues of sequencing and security guarantees would be necessary for
both sides but given the will, these are not insuperable hurdles.
This points to the other crucially important factor in hindering agreement: the
massive power superiority of Israel over any putative Palestine. 77 Agreement
occurred in Northern Ireland in 1998 only after unionists had lost the power
unilaterally to veto it. As they lost power and faced an agreement which they had
not desired, unionists changed their views and expectations: one-time rejectionists
became leaders of shared governance. Very similar complexities of motivation and
multiplex identities exist on the Israeli side and there is no reason to doubt that a
similar shift would be possible if such a change of circumstances occurred. There is
every reason to expect that large sections of Israelis, like most unionists, would try
to prevent its occurrence.
Here, however, it is necessary to take a longer view. There were lost opportunities
in the Northern Ireland conflict before unionist power was eroded. In the 1960s,
quicker reform by the liberal leadership of Unionism (strengthened where
necessary by British resolve) would have permitted a quite different track of
resolution, one involving inclusion of nationalists and civil rights activists prior to the
politicization, radicalisation and arming of the 1969-71 period. In 1973-4, more
determined action by the British government in support of the Sunningdale
Agreement—a less far-reaching form of complex power-sharing than was enacted
in 1998—could have kept alive political options considerably more in unionists’
interests than the one they eventually had to accept.78 The Northern Ireland case
shows that there were several possible paths to stability, all involving inclusion, but
to different degrees and with different timescales. If it is unrealistic to put the 1998
model forward for the Israel-Palestine case, these earlier initiatives give different,
less radical options.
In all of the cases, however, iteration is central. The built-in prospect of revision in
the future when power relations change, and credible guarantees for future as well
as present minorities, are as important for the presently powerful as for the
presently powerless. One of the great benefits of that mixed bag known as
―complex power-sharing‖ is that it leaves open opportunities to change the
elements and reprioritize the institutions as needs change.
None of this is possible without external actors bolstering the liberal voice in Israel
and partially balancing the power asymmetry. The US had a different relation to
Northern Ireland (where it acted to even-up the power imbalance, at times
countering the regional power of the UK) than it does in the Middle East, where it
has functioned as guarantor to the regional power, Israel. 79 Whether or not the US
can change its role, depends in part on the actual prospects of a settlement. One of
the lessons from Northern Ireland is that strategists from the (relatively powerless)
Irish state were thinking out the necessary conditions of conflict resolution (taking
account of the views of the still less powerful nationalists in Northern Ireland) long
before it became a real possibility, and introducing these alternative frames of
understanding to the British government.80 When windows of opportunity began to
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open, the two governments were ready to broker peace and to involve international
actors to even up the power asymmetries that might have precluded settlement.81
In this respect, exploration of the logic of the different models of settlement is
important, even when the real conditions of achieving them may not yet exist.
1
Stefan Wolff, ―Complex Power Sharing and the Centrality of Territorial Self-governance in
Contemporary Conflict Settlements‖ Ethnopolitics 2009 9 (1) 27-45, p. 29 defines it as ―:a
practice of conflict settlement that has a form of self-governance regime at its heart, but
whose overall institutional design includes a range of further mechanisms for the
accommodation of ethnic diversity in divided societies. It is the result of the implementation
of a self-governance regime whose success as an approach to conflict settlement requires
a relatively complex institutional structure that cannot be reduced to autonomy/(ethno)federalism, (traditional) models of power sharing or power dividing‖. See also Caroline
Hartzell, and Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the
Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars. (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University
Press. 2007), World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security and
Development. (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2011). Stefan Wolff and Karl Cordell,
―Power Sharing‖ in K.Cordell and S. Wolff, (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Ethnic Conflict
(London, Routledge, 2010).
2
For example, John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict:
Consociational Engagements (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004) John Coakley (ed.),
Pathways from Ethnic Conflict: Institutional Redesign in Divided Societies (London:
Routledge. 2010), Philip G Roeder ―Ethnofederalism and the Mismanagement of
Conflicting Nationalisms‖, Regional & Federal Studies 19(2) 2009, pp 203-219. Andrew
Reynolds, Designing Democracy in a Dangerous World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011).
3
, Stedman, S. J., Rothchild D. & Cousens E. (eds.) Ending Civil Wars: The
Implementation of Peace Agreements. (Boulder: Co, Sage Publishers 2002). Lynne
Rienner. Mattes, M. and Savun, B., ―Information, Agreement Design, and the Durability of
Civil War Settlements‖, American Journal of Political Science, 54(2): (2010) pp511–524.
Anna K Jarstad, and Desirée Nilsson, ―From Words to Deeds: The Implementation of
Power-Sharing Pacts in Peace Accords‖, Conflict Management and Peace Science 25(3)
(2008) pp206-223, World Bank, Development Report, 2011 (See note 1).
4
Walter, B. ―The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement‖, International Organization 51(3):
(1997) pp335-64., Stedman et al, Ending Civil Wars,(See note 3) Hartzell and Hoddie,
Crafting Peace, (See note 1).
5
For analysis of the peace initiatives and the arguments, see Sumantra Bose, Contested
Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka, (Cambridge, MA; Harvard
University Press, 2007, pp 268-289 and particularly 286-9).
6
Of the many comparisons, see H. Giliomee and J. Gagiano, The Elusive Search for
Peace: Socuth Africa - Israel - Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford UP. 1990) Ian S. Lustick,
Unsettled States Disputed Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the
West Bank-Gaza, (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1995) C. Jung , E. Lust-Okar and I.
Shapiro ―Problems and prospects for democratic settlements: South Africa as a model for
the Middle East and Northern Ireland‖, Politics and Society 33.2 (2005), 277-326; George
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Maney, Ibtisam Ibrahim, Gareth Higgins and Hanna Herzog ―The Past's Promise: Lessons
from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East‖, Journal of Peace
Research 43.2 (2006) 167-180 D. H. Akenson, Gods Peoples: Covenant and Land in
South Africa, Israel and Ulster. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992.) Adrian Guelke, ―Political
comparisons: from Johannesburg to Jerusalem‖, pp. 367-376 in M. Cox, A. Guelke and F.
Stephen, eds, A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement. 2nd edition.
(Manchester University Press, 2006) Guy Ben Porat, Global liberalism, local populism:
peace and conflict in Israel/Palestine and Northern Ireland (Syracuse : Syracuse
University Press. 2006), Guy Ben Porat, (ed.), The failure of the middle east peace
process. A comparative analysis of peace implementation in Israel/Palestine, Northern
Ireland and South Africa, (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). The recent important
articles by Maney et al and Jung et al take a short term focus on negotiations and
implementation processes. This article takes a longer term perspective.
7
See Maney et al, “Past’s Promise”, (See note 6).
8
On horizontal inequalities, Stewart, F., (ed.) Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict:
Understanding Group Violence in Multiethnic Societies. (London: Palgrave, 2008).
9
Jung et al, “Problems and prospects” (See note 6).
10
Ruane, J. and Todd, J. Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland : Power, Conflict,
Emancipation. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996) Jennifer Todd, ―Symbolic
complexity and political division: the role of religion in Northern Ireland‖, pp. 85-102 in J.
Todd and J. Ruane, eds, Ethnicity and Religion: Intersections and Comparisons, (London,
Routledge, 2010) J. Ruane, ―Ethnicity, religion and peoplehood: Protestants in France and
in Ireland‖, pp. 121-136 in J. Todd and J. Ruane, (eds) Ethnicity and Religion:
Intersections and Comparisons, (London, Routledge, 2010); Y Shenhav,. The Arab Jews
(Stanford: Stanford University Press 2006); Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in
Palestine : The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories
(Princeton : Princeton University Press 2007).
Maney et al use this criterion (See note 6)—overcoming zero-sum identities and
attitudes—as an important mark of successful settlement.
11
12
Bose, Contested Lands,(See note 6) pp186-9, gives an informed argument for this
model. For a critical view of both models by a historian, see Benny Morris, One State, Two
States : Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict, (Yale University Press, 2009).
13
For example, Ali Abunimah, One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian
Impasse (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006). Gary Sussman, ―The Challenge to the
Two-State
Solution‖,
in
Middle
East
Report
MER231,
Summer
2004,
www.merip.org/mer/mer231/challenge-two-state-solution accessed 21 July 2011.
14
For the detailed processes involved, see, N Canny, Making Ireland British, 1580-1650.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2001) T Barnard, The Kingdom of Ireland, 1641-1760.
(London: Palgrave 2004).
15
This is the argument of Ruane and Todd, Dynamics of Conflict. See note 10.
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16
Frank Wright, Two Lands on One Soil: Ulster Politics before Home Rule. (Dublin: Gill
and Macmillan, 1996).
17
James Loughlin, ―The Irish Protestant Home Rule Association and nationalist politics,
1886-1893‖, Irish Historical Studies XXIV (1985).
18
Ian Lustick sees the moment which defined subsequent relations as March 1914 when
the British government did not assert its authority over officers in the military camp of the
Curragh who refused to march on Ulster : Ian S. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disputed
Lands: (See note 6).
19
Brendan O’Leary makes the argument forcibly in ―Debating partition: evaluating the
standard justifications‖, pp. 140-157 in K. Cordell and S. Wolff, eds, Routledge Handbook
of Ethnic Conflict (See note 1).
20
Still one of the best accounts is given by Peter Gibbon, The Origins of Ulster Unionism:
The Formation of Popular Protestant Politics and Ideology in Nineteenth Century Ireland
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975) pp. 112-140.
21
Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question: The Anglo-Irish Settlement and its
Undoing 1912-1972 (London: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 115-140, 171-189.
22
C. O’Halloran, Partition and the Limits of Irish Nationalism: An Ideology under Stress
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987).
23
Scholars from different perspectives converge in this judgement. Patrick Buckland, The
Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921-39. (Dublin, Gill
and Macmillan, 1979), Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson, Northern Ireland
1921-2001: Political Forces and Social Classes, (London: Serif, 2002). Graham Walker, A
History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest, Pragmatism, Pessimism, (Manchester:
Manchester UP, 2004) for example, pp. 67, 101.
24
J. H. Whyte, ―How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime?‖, in Tom
Gallagher and James O'Connell, eds., Contemporary Irish Studies, (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1983). Ruane and Todd, Dynamics of Conflict in Northern
Ireland, (See note 10) pp. 116-131, 150-157, 178-186.
25
See also Todd, ―Symbolic Complexity‖ (See note 10).
26
On the flexibility in both camps, see J. Whyte, Interpreting Northern Ireland. (Oxford:
Clarendon 1991), pp.77-79; M. Mulholland, Northern Ireland at the Crossroads: Ulster
Unionism in the O’Neill Years 1960-1969, (Basingstoke UK: Macmillan 2000). On the
different perspectives, see J. Todd, ―Two Traditions in Unionist Political Culture‖, Irish
Political Studies, vol 2, 1987 pp. 1-26. And J Todd ―Northern Irish Nationalist Political
Culture‖, Irish Political Studies, volume 5, 1990 pp. 31-44.
27
If we take O’Neillites as ―liberals‖ they were a majority of unionists in the 1969 election. If
we take a more stringent definition of liberal as those willing to restructure state and party,
unionist liberals were certainly a minority. See Andrew Gailey, Crying in the Wilderness:
Jack Sayers A Liberal Editor in Ulster 1939-69 (Belfast, Institute of Irish Studies, 1995) .
The earliest survey in Northern Ireland, in 1967, has a significant minority of Protestants
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(over 40%) preferring more contact with the South, Rose’s different questions have just
over 20% of the Protestant population with this view, and 52% as Ultras. See John Whyte
(See note 27), Interpreting Northern Ireland, pp. 77-8. Richard Rose, Governing Without
Consensus,: An Irish Perspective, (London: Faber and Faber, 1972).
28
John Darby estimates that over 3,500 families were intimidated from their homes in
August and September 1969, the large majority Catholic J. Darby, Intimidation and the
Control of Conflict in Northern Ireland, (Dublin Gill and Macmillan, 1986, p. 58.) On the
difficulties of repartition given the intermingling of populations, see Liam Kennedy, Two
Ulsters: A case for repartition, (Belfast, 1986).
29
For more detailed discussion why settlement was possible in 1998 not before see
variously, Ruane and Todd, ―Path dependence in settlement processes: Explaining
settlement in Northern Ireland‖ Political Studies, 55 , 2, (2007) pp442-458 ; Ruane and
Todd, ―Patterns of Conflict Resolution: What made the difference between failure and
success in settlement initiatives in Northern Ireland?‖, IBIS discussion paper, 2011,
www.ucd.ie/ibis/publications.
30
On the polarisation of attitudes, see Whyte, Interpeting Northern Ireland, (See note 26)
pp. 78-93.
31
Ruane and Todd, ―Patterns of Conflict Resolution‖(see note29). Michael Kerr, Imposing
Power-sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and Lebanon. (Dublin: Irish
Academic Press 2006).
32
For example, H. Giliomee ―The elusive search for peace‖, pp. 219-317 in Giliomee and
Gagiano, The Elusive Search for Peace (See note 6).
33
J. Todd, ―Institutional change and conflict regulation: the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985
and the mechanisms of change in Northern Ireland‖ West European Politics 34 (4) 2011
(July).
34
Aungier, Smith and Chambers, For a discussion of the reform process, see B. Osborne
and I. Shuttleworth, eds., Fair Employment in Northern Ireland : A Generation On.
(Belfast : Blackstaff, 2004). See also Gallagher et al, Fair Shares ; Fair Enough. For an
overview of the processes, see Todd and Ruane, ―Beyond inequality? Assessing the
impact of fair employment, affirmative action and equality measures on conflict in Northern
Ireland‖, in F. Stewart, G. Brown and A. Langer, eds., TITLE TO FOLLOW, Palgrave
Macmillan, forthcoming 2011/12.
35
The data summarised here are from the censuses of 1971 and 2001, and from Fair
Employment Agency, Report of an Investigation by the Fair Employment Agency for
Northern Ireland in to the Non-Industrial Northern Ireland Civil Service, Belfast, FEA,
December 1983, table XVI and the NISRC Equality Statistics for the Northern Ireland Civil
Service, Department of Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland, 2011. R. Osborne,
Religion and the Labour Market, pp. 65-87 in R. D. Osborne and I. Shuttleworth, eds., Fair
Employment in Northern Ireland: A Generation On, (Belfsat Blackstaff), 2004, p.82.
36
Paddy Hillyard, Demi Patsios and Fiona Semillon, ―A daughter to ELSI—NILSI : A
Northern Ireland Standard of Living Index or Problematising Wealth in the Analysis of
Inequality and Material Well-being‖ Social Policy and Society, 6.1 81-98, 2007.
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37
For discussion of the different levels of the Good Friday Agreement see McGarry and
O’Leary, 2004 (See note 2), J. Coakley, B. Laffan and J. Todd, (eds.), Renovation or
Revolution: New Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom. (Dublin: UCD Press
2005).
38
John Coakley, ―The North-South relationship: Implementing the Agreement‖, pp.110131
in J. Coakley, B. Laffan and J. Todd, (eds.), Renovation or Revolution: New
Territorial Politics in Ireland and the United Kingdom. (Dublin: UCD Press 2005).
39
40
Brian Feeney, opinion column, 22.08.01 Irish News.
Reported Irish Times, O3.05.00.
41
For example, in 2003 (the only time the question was asked) over half of those sampled
agreed that Northern Ireland was a more nationalist place than it had been ten years
previously, while only 9% agreed it was a more unionist place.
42
There remains some uncertainty about just how much change has occurred since an
additional option (the United Kingdom with power-sharing devolution) was offered
respondents from 2007. Consistently, Catholics have been likely to prefer a United Ireland
to the United Kingdom in a straight choice, but when more complex sets of options are
offered, the preferences for a united Ireland decrease. See Ruane and Todd, Dynamics
of Conflict, (see note 19), pp.66-7.
43
S See for example, D. J. Smith and G. Chambers, Inequality in Northern Ireland.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 96 and the politics module, Northern Ireland
Life and Times, (www.ark.ac.uk/nilt politics module, 1998-2010), accessed 11 July 2011.
44
Over half thought they were treated equally, and the rest said ―it depends‖.
45
Most of the rest responded ―it depends‖.
46
Joanne Hughes ―Attitudes towards equality in Northern Ireland: evidence of progress?‖,
pp 166-183 in Bob Osborne and Ian Shuttleworth, eds., Fair Employment in Northern
Ireland: A generation on. (Belfast, Blackstaff, 2004), p. 172.
47
The Young life and times survey (2007-2010) has consistently around 80% of 16 year
olds self-reporting as Irish www.ark.ac.uk/ylt.
48
Republican supporters in the 1970s and 1980s were disproportionately working class
and unemployed, and disproportionately likely to want a united Ireland immediately (Ruane
and Todd, Dynamics of Conflict, pp. 73-4, see note 10).
49
This was a recurrent theme in interviews in a recent research project. See J.Todd,
―Identity shift in settlement processes: the Northern Ireland case‖ in Guy Ben Porat, ed.,
The failure of the middle east peace process. A comparative analysis of peace
implementation in Israel/Palestine, Northern Ireland and South Africa, (See note 6).
50
Sources: R. Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective (London: Faber
& Faber, 1971): Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland; D. J.
Smith, Equality and Inequality in Northern Ireland (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1987);
K. Trew, ―National Identity‖ in R. Breen, P. Devine and L. Dowds, editors, ―Social Attitudes
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IBIS DISCUSSION PAPERS
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
in Northern Ireland: The Fifth Report‖ (Belfast, Appletree, 1996): 140-52; Life and Times,
(Northern Ireland ) 1997–2002. Life and Times Survey, website, (community relations
module, identity) <http:// http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/.
51
Life and Times, identity module, 2007 : the 1999 Life and Times community module
which asked respondents if they had a strong or weak sense of British/Irish/Northern Irish
identity or none at all) showed a third of Catholic respondents with at least a weak sense
of British identity and over 60% none at all.
52
Life and Times, Identity module, 2007, www.ark.ac.uk/nilt.
53
C. Mitchell and J. Todd ―Between the devil and the deep blue sea. Nationality, power
and symbolic trade-offs among evangelical Protestants in Northern Ireland‖, Nations and
Nationalism, 13 (4), 2007 ; J. Todd, N. Rougier, T. O’Keefe, L. Canas Bottos,
―Protestants, minorities and the remaking of ethno-religious identity in Ireland‖, National
Identities, vol 11, no. 1 2009.
54
This was a clear reduction from the half who saw no Irish element in their identity in
1999, and a perceived change from their parents’ attitudes, which respondents estimated
at 60% ―British only‖.
55
Over 40% of 16 year old Protestants in Young Life and Times,
2007-10
(www.ark.ac.uk/ylt identity module) self-defined as Northern Irish, compared to less than a
third of adults.
56
While initially it was the skilled working class who most opposed the agreement,
support fell off quickest among the unskilled, and least among the professionalmanagerial sector).
57
A quarter had no views, and almost a third disagreed.
58
J. Todd, T. O’Keefe, N. Rougier, L. Cañás Bottos, ―Fluid or frozen: Choice and Change
in Ethno-National Identification in Contemporary Northern Ireland‖, Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics 12 (3-4) 2006. G Ganiel, Evangelicalism and Conflict in Northern Ireland (London,
Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
59
For descriptions, see variously Ben Porat, Global Liberalism (note 6); Todd, ―Identity
shift‖ 2008 (note 48); Gladys Ganiel, Ethno-religious change in Northern Ireland &
Zimbabwe: A Comparative Study of how Religious Havens can have Ethnic Significance,
Ethnopolitics, 9.2; Mitchell and Todd, ―Between the devil and the deep blue sea‖ (see note
50).
60
J.Todd et al, ―Protestant minorities‖ (See note 50).
61
Mitchell, P., Evans, G., O’Leary, B. ―Extremist outbidding in ethnic party systems is not
inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland‖, Political Studies 57(3):2009 pp 397-421.
62
www.ark.ac.uk/ylt accessed 11 july 2011.
63
K. McLaughlin, K. Trew and O/ T. Muldoon. ―Religion Ethnicity And Group Identity: Irish
Adolescents’ Views‖ Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 12: (2006) 599–616.
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PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
64
The recent Northern Ireland consultation document, Cohesion Integration and Sharing,
and although this document has now been shelved, no alternative strategy has emerged
at time of writing (July 2011).
65
Shenhav, Y. (2006) The Arab Jews (See note 10).
66
G. Shafir, Y. Peled, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship Cambridge
(Cambridge University Press 2002).
67
Hanna Herzog, ―Both an Arab and a woman: gendered, racialised experiences of
female Palestinian citizens of Israel―, Social Identities, 10.1, 2004. 53-82.
68
Lybarger, Loren D. Identity and Religion in Palestine : The Struggle between Islamism
and Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton : Princeton University Press,
2007). Gerber, H. ―The Muslim Umma and the formation of Middle Eastern nationalisms‖,
pp. 209-220 in A. S. Leoussi and S. Grosby, eds., Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism:
History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press 2007).
69
Clauset, A., Heger, L., Young, M. and Gleditsch, K. S. ―The strategic calculus of
terrorism: Substitution and competition in the Israel-Palestine conflict‖, Cooperation and
Conflict, 45 (1) (2010) 6-33.
70
Ruane and Todd, ―Path dependence in settlement processes‖, (see note 29).
71
Todd ―Institutional Change and Conflict Regulation‖, 2011, (See note 33).
72
Maney et al, ―The past’s promise‖, pp. 195-6 (See note 6).
73
The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland, A New
Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland, (London, HMSO, 1999), Hartzell and Hoddie,
Crafting Peace, argue that such ―power sharing‖ in the police and army is likely to bring
success in settlement initiatives.
74
It could even be argued that this model constitutionally squares the circle, giving both
the ―right of return‖ and greater Israel. In parallel to the constitutional squaring of the
circle in the Good Friday Agreement (which gives self-determination AND British
sovereignty).
75
Wolff, ―Complex power-sharing‖ (See note 1).
76
Clauset et al, ―Strategic calculus‖ (See note 66); Jung et al, ―Probems and prospects‖
(See note 6).
77
See Maney et al ―Past’s promise‖, pp.186 ff, for the difficulties this poses. (See note 6).
78
Kenneth Bloomfield, A Tragedy of Errors: The Government and Misgovernment of
Northern Ireland, Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 2007, pp. 234-8.
79
Maney et al, ―The Past’s promise‖, p. 192 (See note 6).
80
Todd ―Institutional change and Conflict Regulation‖, 2011 (See note 33).
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81
PATTERNS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
Ruane and Todd, ―Path Dependence in Settlement Processes‖, 2007 (See note 29).
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