Katharina Hoffmann
Centre for Russian and East European Studies
University of Birmingham, UK
[email protected]
Paper presented at the 4th ECPR Graduate Conference, Jacobs University Bremen,
04-06 July 2012
Draft version. Please, do not quote without permission of the author.
1. Introduction
External democracy promotion, its theoretical mechanisms and best practices gained momentum in
the debates of scholars and practitioners with the so-called wave of transition (Huntington 1991)
that affected socialist Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Core international actors like the U.S. and EU
committed themselves to regime change and liberal state-building in post-socialist states and
beyond. The outcome, however, appears to lag far behind the ambitions. Post-Soviet transformation
states tend to consolidate non-democratic, often authoritarian regimes. The cascading effect of the
colour revolutions in early 2000s and the Arab spring in 2010 was less sweeping than hoped. Many
authoritarian regimes were capable to prevent such events. Even in those state that were subject to
these ‘revolutions’ the event turned out not necessarily to be an irreversible step towards
democracy. In that light, sources of regime stability in an internationally democracy demanding
environment deserve increasing attention. Grasping mechanisms of domestic regime preservation
appears to be a necessary condition for enhancing the debate on democracy promotion. In contrast
to coercive mechanisms and strategies of economic co-optation the capabilities of authoritarian
states to create legitimacy by ideational means or persuasion are far less considered (Finkel and
Brudny 2012). Therefore this paper asks: How are regime-challenging effects of (external) democracy
promotion averted by non-coercive means? How can a belief-system be created that gains stronger
support than democratic norms of rule?
A contribution to answering these questions will be made by an explorative case study on Azerbaijan,
a country that is characterized by a stable authoritarian regime and was not hit by any kind of ‘colour
revolution’ so far. The analysis will focus on regime-supportive narratives prevalent among statebureaucrats and analyst (close to and in distance to government). These narratives reflect constraints
to the persuasive power of democratic norms among certain societal groups in contemporary
Azerbaijan. They further indicate mechanisms and relevance of persuasion in creating support for the
ruling elite. Azerbaijan qualifies as especially intriguing case: the authoritarian regime does not only
of necessity face democracy promotion efforts but is eager to actively engage its ruling elite and
other parts of the society in exchange and cooperation with Western democracies. Despite
substantial familiarization of different societal groups with democratic norms and practices the
current regime managed to consolidate authoritarian practices without having been significantly
challenged so far. The immediate effects of democratic socialization appear hence to be rather low.
Semi-structured expert interviews as well as background talks conducted with state-bureaucrats and
local analysts in 2011 and 2012 serve as primary data basis of the reconstructive analysis. Evidence
for the fundament of continuing support for the authoritarian regime is, hence, provided on
discursive level only. This is not more than a proxy for actor’s actual practices and behaviour.
However, following interpretivist approaches this paper considers narrations as based on beliefs that
shape social interaction by impacting on an individual’s preferences.
The example of Azerbaijan shows that ideational persuasion is a crucial factor for creating and
perpetuating regime support in societies under authoritarian rules that face substantial and diverse
democracy promotion strategies. By reference to the unique historical situation of the society
support for prevailing practices of rule as superior to democratic rule can be generated. In the case of
the newly independent Azerbaijan the core regime-supportive narratives rely on the conflict over
Nagorno-Karabakh, the primacy of sovereignty and concepts of policy-making processes. Economic
2
persuasion and coercion are not absent in the strategy of regime preservation. However, ideational
persuasion constitutes a necessary condition for the success of economic persuasion and coercion
strategies. Backed by this ideational regime support and efficient polity institutions the ruling elites
are able to satisfy democratization demands from abroad by formal rather than de facto reforms.
This argument will be developed by the following proceeding: In a first step the argument will be
framed theoretically, the analytical approach will be reasoned and the empirical design outlined.
Section three and four will characterise the context for regime support by sketching the
manifestation of authoritarian practices in Azerbaijan and the dimension of international democracy
promotion and socialization Azerbaijan is subject to. In section five core elements of regimesupportive narratives will be mapped out. Attention will be devoted to reconstructing how the
elements relate to each other. The conclusion will discuss opportunities and limitations for external
democracy promotion that result from the strength of ideational support of the regime.
2. Ideational Dimension of Regime Support - Theoretical Argument and Empirical Approach
Two strands of literature need consideration for developing a conceptual frame and empirical
approach for studying the research question: literature on regime1 legitimacy and on external
democracy promotion. In both debates a variety of mechanisms is spelled out including coercive
measures. Coercive measures for maintaining regime legitimacy are first and foremost violent
suppression of opposition forces and various forms of political and economic pressure or co-optation
(Linz 2000,p. 160, Way 2008,p. 65). The range of coercive measures for regime change includes
military intervention and non-violent leverage or conditionality and, indirectly via opposition
support, linkage (Levitsky and Way 2006,p. 383). Besides these a non-coercive ideational dimension
is present in theories on the two phenomena. Already at early stages the debate concerning external
sources of democratization ascribed relevance to the phenomenon of ‘contagion’ through
geographic proximity, international exemplification and economic attractiveness (Elkin 2011,
Pridham 1997, Whitehead 1999). With a stronger focus on democratization tools and the
conceptualisation of the European Union as norm-driven actor ‘inspiration’ or ‘norm diffusion’ were
discussed as mechanism that contribute to altering preferences of actors on macro- and micro-level
of target societies (Jakoby 2006,p. 628, Manners 2002). Especially, in the light of limited impact of
democratization efforts in countries with little geographic proximity to democratizing international
actors hope is given to ‘democratic socialization’ on micro-level via functional cooperation (Freyburg
2011, Greenhill 2010, Schimmelfennig and Lavenex 2011). This argument basically relies on the
interpretivist assumption that norms shape an individual’s behaviour and can be altered through
social interaction(Blumer 1969).
Recent literature tends to attribute socializing power mainly to liberal democratic norms and
regimes. In the context of external democracy promotion non-democratic norms are implicitly
considered as inferior (Elkin 2011,p. 1657) or potential ‘authoritarian socialization’ is simply
neglected due to concentration on democratization tools. Only few authors, e.g. (Finkel and Brudny
2012) recently called for more attention to non-coercive aspects of regime support. This focus leads
back to Weber’s concept of rule. Here ‘rule’ is inseparably from its legitimacy. Only legitimacy,
1
The term ‘regime’ is used to emphasize the relevance of non-formal institutions. It is conceived as ‘as basic
patterns in the organization, exercise, and transfer of government decision-making power.’(Higley and Burton
1989,p. 18)
3
conceptualised as the willingness to show obedience, accredited by different parts of the society
generates the chance to successfully implement rule. One aspect of legitimacy is the belief in
legitimacy which is related to coercive and economic co-optation strategies but can be analytically
isolated (Weber 1968,p. 212). Belief in legitimacy is ultimately a matter of the perception of
individual actors but can be created and substantiated in common sets of ideas. The ideal-typical
concept of authoritarian regimes presents violent coercive means as ultimate not basic source for
legitimacy in an authoritarian regime. Non-coercive aspects are pretty relevant (Linz 2000). It can
hence be assumed that socialization efforts are taking place within an authoritarian regime as well
and may generate legitimacy among state bureaucrats and wider society. Socialization is here
conceived as process directed towards influencing behaviour through internalization of constitutive
beliefs and practices of the sender (Greenhill 2010,p. 130). In an international environment of regime
change demands two competing processes of socialization can be assumed: international democratic
socialization (Schimmelfennig 2000) and domestic socialization into the authoritarian regime. With
reference to parsimonious democracy (Dahl 1989) definitions participation and accountability are
considered to characterize democratic rule. Limited participation, top-down decision-making and
absence of legal or de facto accountability are by contrast constitutive elements of authoritarian rule
(Linz 2000,p. 161). With regard to internalization the following variation can be theoretically
reasoned: a) one concept of regime may overrule the other concept, b) democratic and authoritarian
concepts of rule can be conciliated in the legitimacy belief.
The crucial factor for highlighting the ideational dimension of regime legitimacy is, hence,
internalization of the varying concepts of rule into citizens’ belief in regime legitimacy. Concerning
regime stability both the legitimacy beliefs of state bureaucrats and ordinary citizens are significant.
For the following reasons the paper will, however, strongly focus on state bureaucrats. In
authoritarian regimes state bureaucrats are mainly implementing government decisions and
translating them into lower levels of the society (Eisenstadt 1973). They are hence crucial for
ensuring persistence of regime legitimacy by showing obedience to the ruler and ensuring belief in
legitimacy among the wider society. Research on the ‘colour revolutions’ convincingly argued that
the wider society in authoritarian regimes is hardly able to provoke an overthrow of the government
without support of stakeholders from within the administration or circles close to the ruling
elite(Hale 2006, Way 2005). Apart from that, of major interest are groups that are most often subject
to ‘democratic socialization’. These are state bureaucrats and educational elites.
Empirical approach
Evidence of internalized belief systems is hard to identify. Patterns of belief are argued to be
reflected in an individual’s narration and can be explored on the basis of research interviews (Warren
2001). In societies where an official rhetoric or ideology dominates the public discourse it is rather
hard to distinguish between internalized and adopted attitudes, though. The empirical findings based
on about 15 semi-structured interviews and background talks with state bureaucrats, members of
the educational elite, namely analysts close and in distance to governmental circles are therefore less
considered to reveal the degree of internalization of democratic and authoritarian concepts of rule.
Rather they spell out how the competing influence of democratic and authoritarian concepts is dealt
with, how the diverging concepts are accommodated and how consistently they are integrated into
the narration. This does not allow for conclusions of the capacity of such narrative to persist and
4
maintain regime support. It exemplifies, however, on which narratives of concepts of rule the Aliyev
regime was supported at minimum during the period of studies.
The interview questions concerned matters of international cooperation with inter alia EU and U.S.
but never asked directly for concepts of legitimacy of rule or attitudes towards democratic practices.
Narratives on legitimacy of democratic or authoritarian practices of rule were, hence, introduced by
the interviewee. This limits the bias often produced by the interviewee’s intention to answer
questions according to interviewer’s perceived expectations rather than to the individual’s
perception. The relevance of voiced concepts of governance in the regime supporting narrative
within the state administration was assessed according to the quantity of appearance in different
interviews and the interviewee’s position in the administrative structures. The higher ranking an
interviewee was the more influential the narratives were considered. Presumably the individual is in
a powerful position to spread the ideas among subordinates. Triangulation through interviews and
background talks with members of different groups of the society, including talks with random
ordinary citizens, and through within-interview comparison aimed at ensuring the quality of the
analysis (Flick 2007,p. 41, Kvale 2007). Since the majority of interviewees asked for anonymity the
interviewees will be presented according to their group affiliation (state bureaucrat/analyst).
3. Context: Characteristics of the Authoritarian Regime in Azerbaijan
The study starts from the assumption that ideal-typical democratic rule and patterns that determine
practices of rule in present-day Azerbaijan strongly diverge. An overview of characteristics of the
regime under President Ilham Aliyev shall be given to spell out the degree of divergence. This can be
done best by focusing on the role of the president, the de facto function of the legislative body and
participation of the wider society. First of all, however, an introduction to the key points of statebuilding after 1991 will sketch the background of regime consolidation.
A constitutive aspect of the Azerbaijani state-building process fuelled by the collapse of the Soviet
Union in the late 1980s is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The strongly Armenian populated NagornoKarabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR) demanded administrative integration into the Armenian SSR
since the early 1980s. In 1992 Nagorno-Karabakh responded to Azerbaijan’s move into independence
by declaring the independent Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. Incidences of violence both in NagornoKarabakh and other regions of Azerbaijan accompanied the conflict since the late 1980s and turned
into war activities in 1991. A ceasefire agreement in 1994 stopped large-scale violence but has not
been turned into a final solution yet. The status quo consists of the independence seeking ‘Republic
of Nagorno-Karabakh’ that comprises seven districts beyond territory of the former NKAR and
belongs to the territory of Azerbaijan according to international law. Until 2012 Nagorno-Karabakh
has not been recognised by a single state but managed to develop into relatively stable a ‘de facto
state’ (Blakkisrud and Kolsto 2012). What is often described as ‘frozen conflict’ features
manifestations of active conflict in the involved societies until today (Smolnik 2012,p. 155). These are
first of all the 25-30 casualties at the ‘line of contact’. Mediated consequences of the conflict,
identified by Smolnik for Nagorno-Karabakh as high militarization and strong militarized social
consciousness, can in parts be observed in Azerbaijan as well. Here the protracted conflict leads to
ever-expanding state military expenditures amounting to 14, 8% of the total state budget in 20112.
2
Today.AZ, 12 October 2011. Azerbaijan accounts for world-largest real percentage increase of military
spending of 89% in 2011. SIPRI (2012) Background Paper on SIPRI military expenditure data 2011.
5
Apart from that the idea of readiness to reintegrate the secessionist territories even by military
means is perpetuated in the public discourse. Azerbaijan as well shapes all international cooperation
activities according to the priority of restoration of the country’s territorial integrity.
A first attempt of consolidating statehood by establishing the state’s monopoly of legitimate use of
force, triggering off economic development through market reforms and initiating democratic
reforms was made by the government of the Azerbaijan Popular Front (APF) under President
Elchibey (1992-1993). The government managed to launch significant economic reforms but failed to
accommodate core military and political actors. In consequence it was overthrown in a coup d’état.
This paved the way to power for the former leader of the Azerbaijani SSR, Heydar Aliyev, who was
elected president in 1994. Under Heydar Aliyev the newly independent country re-gained stability
and increased economic prosperity at the expense of democratic reforms. In his presidency from
1994-2003 Heydar Aliyev successfully consolidated authoritarian rule based on informal personal ties
of loyalty which were substantiated not at least through a purposeful overlay between power and
access to economic resources (Guliyev 2005). The regime was as stable as to allow a smooth
installation of his son, Ilham Aliyev, as successor in his office of president. Ilham Aliyev consolidated
his power by following his father’s practices of rule and altering the composition of ruling elite circles
slightly (Cornell 2011,p. 113, Radnitz 2012). He, however, is considered to still substantially rely on
his father’s circles that are not unambiguously loyal to him.3 The outcome of the following
parliamentary elections in 2005 were contested and led to riots in Baku. These were violently
cracked down by police forces and did not develop dynamics comparable to colour revolutions in
other post-socialist countries. Arguably, the ruling elite devoted attention to the sources of the Arab
spring developments in 20104 as they did in response to the colour revolutions (Gahramanova
2009,p. 786). However, again comparable challenges from below failed to materialize, which conveys
the impression of a rather stable regime5.
While using different terms scholars basically agree that the political regime in Azerbaijan since 1994
can be described as hybrid regime with predominant authoritarian characteristics and few mainly
formal democratic elements (Cornell 2011,p. 123, Heinrich 2010). As indicated above the core
feature of the regime is the prominence of personalized ties. Policy making, implementation and law
enforcement is organised along these personal ties (Alieva 2000,p. 21-3, Rasizade 2004,p. 139-48).
This substantially impacts on the function of formal polity institutions and bodies. Impersonal
rational-bureaucratic institutions in state administration are not absent but exist rather in areas of
low priority. The anchor of this system is the President who is able to decide over the positioning of
loyalists in core posts but at the same time is to a certain degree dependent on crucial members of
the political and economic elite. An amendment to the constitution in 2002 that lifted restrictions on
the number of terms an individual is allowed to take over presidency contributes to the stabilisation
of such personalised regime. Ilham Aliyev is accordingly widely referred to as the one person who
accounts for the major decisions in the majority of political and economic domains in consultation
with a few powerful individuals mainly at the presidential administration6. The president’s role might
3
Interview with independent analyst in 2011
An independent analyst described the anti-corruption campaigns launched by Aliyev in spring 2011 as
purposeful attempt to re-ensure popular support.
5
The minor riots that took place in 2011 and 2012 in Baku and cities in the regions, like Quba in March 2012
(Today.Az, 12 March 2012) did not develop larger dynamics.
6
Four independent analysts, analyst close to government
4
6
well be overestimated due to the lack of transparency in decision making. However, the narrative
gives reflection to the perception that institutionalized channels for articulation of interests are
almost absent.
In consequence of the absence of deliberative decision making the parliament de facto hardly takes
its constitutionally ascribed function in the legislative process but mainly acts as ‘rubber-stamp’.
Under Heydar Aliyev some limited influence of the parliament manifested itself in the rare but
existing practice of rejecting draft legislations in the first reading followed by consultations of core
actors in the parliament with the president or his team. Apart from that certain scope for critical
public debates on draft laws and mediated channels of influence of opposition members through
backstage discussion with influential members of the ruling party are described7. Such practices are
said to be absent under Ilham Aliyev. The relevance of a seat in parliament in terms of participation is
today put as increasing the access to public media. Voicing recommendation through these channels
before a decision is taken is perceived as only chance to influence the policy making process. After a
draft law is submitted hardly any scope of influence is seen8.
Scope of participation for Azerbaijani people via elections is hence rather limited and even weaker
when it comes to non-governmental advocacy. Civil society organisations do exist and as do state
programmes for funding civil society projects. Fuelled by demands of international actors like the EU,
exchange between governmental and non-governmental actors is given a limited organisational
basis. The impact of such interaction is, however, perceived as limited. This is one the one hand again
a matter of limited impact of state-bureaucrats in policy formulation. On the other hand the attitude
of civil servants towards NGOs is perceived as rather pejorative and non-cooperative9.
Communication channels of independent think tank with state administration and members of
government are described as largely dependent on personal ties10. Restrictions for political NGOs and
independent journalists are continuously growing since 2003 as the freedom house index shows
(Freedom House 2011). The absence of civil society participation in policy making is reflected in the
strategies of state budget spending. The logic of re-distribution of oil and gas rents follows logics of
stabilizing loyalties in the ruling elite rather than logics of broad-scale increase of welfare }(Franke et
al. 2009, O'Lear 2007). Huge gaps between the infrastructural and economic development in the
capital Baku, larger cities in the district and the rural area exist as well as in the small centre of Baku
and the larger surrounding quarters. Overall, observable practices of rule in Azerbaijan under
President Aliyev are hence characterized by absence of transparency, limited participation and hence
very limited accountability.
4. Context: Dimensions of External Democracy Promotion in Azerbaijan
The analysis of the political regime in present-day Azerbaijan highlights the contradiction between
dominant practices of rule and the concept of democratic rule. Accordingly, the ruling elite can be
expected to have limited interest in successful democracy promotion. Nevertheless, the two Aliyevs
opted for strong cooperation with international actors the foreign policy of which in parts value
7
Interview with former member of parliament (1995-200x)
Two interviews with current members of parliament of different opposition parties. They described their
individual motivation of having run in the parliamentary elections but considered the description of scope of
influence as applicable to members of the ruling party ‘New Azerbaijani Party’ as well.
9
Two interviews with representatives of NGOs in the social sector
10
Assessment by three independent analysts
8
7
driven. These are mainly the U.S., EU and EU member states. Intensive cooperation with these actors
is considered as remedy from economic decline and regional dependency and hence unavoidable.
Azerbaijan’s way out of the deep economic crises in the early 1990s into continuing rapid economic
growth after 1996 is based on the rents from oil and increasingly gas exports (Spatharou 2002).
Economic and political independence from Russia is a crucial condition for Azerbaijan’s scope of
action in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, since Russia is a close ally of Armenia (Kjærnet 2010).
Against this background readiness to cooperation with Western actors was a necessity even at the
risk of increasing un-desired democracy promoting influences.
A short mapping of the different external democracy promotion tools present in Azerbaijan shall
indicate potential democratic socialization channels. The exemplifying excursus shall be restricted to
the U.S. and EU governmental and non-governmental democracy promotion. In the period of 1992 to
2011 the U.S. government assigned approximately 197 Mio USD to support of democratic reform in
Azerbaijan. Projects predominantly concern technical assistance for reforms in various areas of state
administration (Nichol 2011). Since 2009 the U.S. rhetoric towards Azerbaijan is increasingly marked
by severe criticism concerning the human rights situation in the country. This approach hardly
triggers comprehensive reforms in Azerbaijan. However, the U.S. managed more than other
international players to establish certain leverage in this regard as the sudden release of a political
prisoner prior to the visit of U.S. state secretary Clinton in June 201211.
EU instruments for promoting democratic rule in Azerbaijan are incorporated in the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), into force since 1999, the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights and since 2004 the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy/Eastern Partnership. Instruments
include democracy promotion through functional cooperation via technical assistance (TAIEX) and
institution-to-institution cooperation (Twinning). Negotiations of the EU-Azerbaijan Association
Agreement are since 2010 an additional forum for democratic socialization of bureaucrats from
various ministries and state agencies. Azerbaijan is open to such EU instruments but described as
rather reluctant partner when it comes to legal reforms (Freyburg et al. 2009, Simao 2012, Wolczuk
2011). Nevertheless, technical assistance to the parliament for harmonizing legislation was accepted.
A member of the opposition assessed the impact as constraint but still valuable. The number of
twinning programmes is relatively weak as compared to other ENP states like Ukraine and Moldova12.
Other arenas of international negotiations are the Interparliamentary assemblies of regional and
international organisations like OSCE, Council of Europe.
In addition European and American non-governmental organisations and media agencies support
democratic development through capacity building in the civil society in Azerbaijan. A core target
group here are young people in the regions. The tolerance for such activities deteriorated
significantly after 2009. The core international media devoted to monitoring human rights situation
and domestic rule, BBC, Voice of America and Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty are banned from the
country13. In the same wave governmental monitoring of international support to Azerbaijani NGOs
11
04 June 2012, RFE/RL, Azerbaijani Activist Released on Eve of Clinton Visit.
For more information see www.twinning.az
13
BBC News, 30 December 2008, Azeri Ban of Foreign Broadcasts.
12
8
was strengthened and scope of activities of foreign based NGOs substantially restricted14. This
hampers but not prevents the activities of foreign-based NGOs in Azerbaijan.
In a nutshell, Azerbaijan’s attitude towards external democracy promoting programmes is marked by
a nolens volens acceptance and attempts to keep the interaction limited. At the same time, the
Azerbaijani leadership launched its own programme for exchange with Western societies. With the
intention to strengthen the transfer of know-how from more advanced countries President Aliyev
initiated in 2006 a programme funding higher education of annually several hundreds of Azerbaijani
students abroad, including the U.S., Canada and E.U. countries (Ismailzade 2007). Access to such
scholarship is said to be significantly eased up by certain proximity to circles of the ruling elite and
stipends agree to work a period for the government upon their return15. Hence, certain selection
practices are in place to prevent negative effects of such exchange. However, the programme
comprises a significant part of the future elite. Rhetorical openness to the international community,
intensive international cooperation and societal exchange not only at student level leads to a
situation framed by an interlocutor as paradox of an open and free society that is restricted by the
authoritarian regime.
5. Discursive Elements of Regime Legitimacy: Framing of the ‘Aliyev Regime’
State bureaucrats, including those involved in EU or U.S. cooperation, often denote the current
regime in Azerbaijan as ‘authoritarian’ or with ‘authoritarian characteristics’. This notion does not
bear a negative connotation but is framed as indubitable necessity. ‘Can you choose something else
for this region, for this period of history?’16 Support for this assumption tends to weaken according to
the distance from government circles. Interviewees with stronger distance to government circles
framed the acceptance of authoritarian restrictions rather as necessity to be suffered on the way to
long-term prosperity of the nation. These quite diverging interpretations by state bureaucrats and
individuals in distance to governmental structures build their argument on a shared fundament: the
framing of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The problematic of the conflict appears not only to be
highly present in daily talks about the state and society. It provides core narratives of legitimacy of
the ruling elite and serves as umbrella for accommodation defection tendencies or criticism on
different societal areas. For providing support of this argument main aspects of the conflict narrative
will be spelled out in the following. A next step will highlight how four core categories that inform the
narrative of overall policy priorities relate to the conflict narrative. The four categories in focus are:
sovereignty, stability, international positioning and economic development. Finally, it will be
explored how the conflict-based narrative of policy priorities is translated into narratives of
‘adequate governance’.
The resolution of the conflict was by the majority of interlocutors17 presented as highest priority for
the society. This narrative is supported or perpetuated in the permanent featuring of conflict-related
issues and the cultural heritage of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijani public media. ‘Conflict
resolution’ is considered to have a single meaning, namely the restoration of the territorial integrity
including a return of refugees to their areas of origin. The right of self-determination of people, here
14
Jessica Powley Hayden: Azerbaijan: NGO Amendments Put Civil Society at Risk, Eurasianet.org, 16 June 2009.
This rule is, however, not in all cases applied.
16
Interview with higher ranking ministerial official
17
Exceptions were found among interlocutors who consider themselves as active part of the nonparliamentarian opposition.
15
9
the Karabakh-Armenians, is rejected as invalid argument.18 Here the official line is hence widely
reproduced even by individuals in distance to government structures. Equally widespread is the
perception of the Azerbaijani people as the actual victim in this conflict. State bureaucrats often
widen the framing as victim that unjustifiably hardly receives the necessary international recognition.
Even among individuals who are not concerned with policy making the somewhat stereotypical
phrase ‘What can you do without territorial integrity?’ was frequently voiced. In more concrete
terms the situation of the about 600.00019 refugees and internally displaces persons was expressed
as main concern followed by the lost cultural heritage and the casualties at the ‘line of contact’.
All these aspects are inter alia argued to retard economic development. According to the
governmental rhetoric the high numbers of refugees that need to be supplied create a major
burden20. High military spending fuelled by the unsettled conflict was mentioned by interlocutors
regardless of their position. State bureaucrats point out the problematic of accounting for the
implementation of international agreements in a situation of limited control over the territory and
major conflicts with a neighbouring state, Armenia. Limited control is perceived as providing security
threats and hampering security related international agreements21. Non-relations with Armenia are
argued to render regional and international trade agreements problematic or even impossible22.
Individuals with ties to refugees or to individuals who emigrated from Nagorno-Karabakh before the
conflict often emphasize the region’s character as ‘home region’ or region of ancestors. Access to this
region gains importance23. There are hence various lines of argument on which support for conflict
resolution as highest priority is created among both state bureaucrats, interviewees close to the
ruling elite circles and beyond. Such narratives stand out in their frequency which is, however,
influenced as well by public media.
Four categories indicate conditions are dominantly mentioned as paving the way to conflict
resolution and mark the policy preference system. A first condition for restoring Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity is framed as unmitigated sovereignty, regional and international independence.
The state’s power is associated with consolidated independence in both economy and hard security.
Major attention is paid to relations with Russia. Strategic ranging between reducing unfavourable
dependencies on Russia and increasing Russian trust in and dependence on Azerbaijan is perceived
as cost-intensive. However, it is necessary in order to foil Russian support of Armenia or at least to
constrain the Armenia-prone policy of Russia. The maxim is to consolidate the relations with Russia
and other regional actors based on self-reliance and avoiding new dependence on other
18
Analysts describe conflict resolution on high political level as stalled due to the clashing approaches of
territorial integrity and self-determination rights of people. Undefined prioritisation and reluctance to fuel the
conflict leads in case of the EU and EU member states to non-voicing of priority.
19
According to (International Crisis Group 2012)
20
For a critical assessment of the government’s approach towards the refugees and instrumentalisation of their
existence see (Kjaernet 2010)
21
Interviews at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior
22
Interviews at the Ministry of Economic Development and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
23
Two interlocutors who were raised in Baku but spent a great deal of time in the parents’ place of origin in
Nagorno-Karabakh referred to themselves as refugees. This self-description was made on the argument that
they lost access to places of their childhood, kinship and to the graves of their ancestors.
10
nternational actors24. Given the still young statehood sovereignty is not to be compromised. This
tenor prevails as well negotiations with reform-promoting actors, like U.S. and EU.25
International cooperation leads to the second condition: a consolidated high-ranking international
position. As mentioned above one of the perceived major obstacles towards successful conflictresolution by internationally monitored negotiations is the failure of international actors to recognise
Azerbaijan as ‘victim of Armenian aggression’26. Section 907 of the 1992 Freedom Support Act
democrats the US support of Armenia in the first place, by ruling out major foreign assistance until
Azerbaijan lifted any blockades or coercive means against Armenia. The section was lifted in 2002 in
recognition of Azerbaijan’s commitment to the anti-terrorism coalition that to reconsideration of the
situation in Nagorno-Karabakh (King and Pomper 2006). The EU is perceived as rather volatile in the
conflict assessment and avoiding assignment of guild. This situation is often framed as a result of
Armenia’s supposedly stronger soft power by which Armenia persuades the world of their ‘truth’.27
At the same time especially state bureaucrats voice their dissatisfaction with the low awareness of
the international community of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. EU engagement is considered rather
weak (Simao 2012) and even France and the U.S. that are part of the official mediating mechanism,
the Minsk-Group, are said to ‘have forgotten about the conflict.’28 Limited international awareness
not only of the conflict but the country in general is as well a topic among individuals beyond state
administration who made experiences abroad29. Remedy for these short-comings is perceived lie in
consolidated energy dependencies of international actors to Azerbaijan, leading positions in
international and regional organisations and visibility in international sport and cultural events.
A third condition prevailing in the narratives is domestic political stability. It is referred to as
impacting on Azerbaijan’s ability to (re-)act on conflict developments. Beyond that it influences the
capacity to strengthen Azerbaijan’s international position. However, preference for political stability
reflected in the narrative of all interlocutors is related to the individual experiences of instability in
the period of transition to independence and the years of war (1991-4). While political instability is
associated with economic decline and poverty political stability stands for prosperity. Not only once,
talk about political stability or change was framed by memories about queuing for bread in the early
1990s.30 Finally, an adequate redirection of economic capacities is crucial. As indicated above
Azerbaijan’s power as energy supplier is framed as key to international recognition. Apart from that
oil and gas rents generate the necessary budget for military build-up. Demands to direct spending to
economic and infrastructural development of the regions, higher education and salaries are
frequently voiced, especially among individuals in distance to government circles. However, the
24
Interviews at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government related analysts, members of parliament.
Interviews at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
26
Three interviews at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two interviews with government related think tanks and
background talk with independent analyst.
27
The persuasive power of Armenia, not at least referred to the large diaspora, is considered as extremely
incisive based on the argument that they even manage to distract international attention from the application
of international law. From Azerbaijani point of view international law unambiguously devotes priority to
territorial integrity.
28
Interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
29
Background talks with random young people who had the occasion to participate in short-term study
programmes abroad.
30
Background talks with young people in Baku.
25
11
narratives reflect a tendency to support a prioritization of the first two aspects vis-à-vis broader
welfare growth.
The umbrella ‘Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’ and the four conditions of conflict resolution inform a
specific concept of governance. The core of this concept is constructed around the aspect of
knowledge. In its basic lines the narrative reads as follows. Political participation requires knowledge
in any case. In a conflict situation specific knowledge is needed. This demand is caused by the
complex mediate and immediate involvement of regional and international actors and the plenty
security threats the weakened state faces. The knowledge needs to go beyond natural immediate
desires of the people and follow strategic targets. These targets roughly equal the identified four
conditions in the presented hierarchy. Not only strategic calculations but personal experiences and
detailed familiarization with processes on international level constitute the required knowledge. At
the same time experience of dealing with domestic actors is important. Overall, the narrative reflects
an appreciation of personalized relations vis-à-vis non-personal institutions or structural dimensions
in domestic and international politics.
In consequence, capabilities of the people, organised civil society, parliamentarians and even
government representatives are widely framed as low. Lack of strategic knowledge and experience
might rather hamper prospects of conflict resolution and is thus risky. The only two individuals with
strategic wisdom and substantial domestic and international experience are Heydar and Ilham Aliyev.
Repeated rhetoric questions were: ‘Who should do a better job than Aliyev? He knows his people at
home and abroad. Who knows the country better?’ Reference was made to the fact that Heydar
Aliyev led the country almost since independence and transferred his knowledge to his son. Ilham
Aliyev gathered international experience in various positions and rules the country for nearly ten
years now. This uniqueness builds an image of the president’s sanctity. With regard to both Heydar
and Ilham this sanctity narrative is built on their successes. Heydar managed to accommodate
conflicting powers in the country, negotiate an effective peace agreement with Armenia and lay the
foundations of Azerbaijan’s role as international energy supplier. Even members of opposition circles
happen to refer to Heydar Aliyev as ‘wise politician’31. Ilham Aliyev maintained internal stability,
economic growth and increased the country’s international standing. While Ilham Aliyev has a few
achievements on his account his sanctity is still substantially based on his father. Especially, since not
much progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was made32. These achievements appear to create
trust in the president and allow widening the sanctity-image beyond his presidential duties33. Trust in
the strategic wisdom of the president is inter alia reflected statements like: ‘He will not forget to give
us our political rights when it is time.’ Such expressions can be heard most likely by interlocutors
close to circles of the ruling elite. With regard to actors like state bureaucrats, members of
parliament and civil society strong mistrust in their capacity to take adequate decisions is often
states. Despite all meaningful decisions are usually ascribed to the president causes for
31
Interview with opposition member of parliament 1995-2000, interview with head of an NGO
This is nicely illustrated by the iconography of the president and his father at billboards or promotional films
in Baku and the region. The tendency that Ilham Aliyev is not presented on his own but as follower or partner
of his father increases outside Baku in the regions.
33
In June 2012 the parliament passed two laws that ensure the president’s and his family’s immunity from
prosecution for any decisions and action made during his presidency. See: RFERL, 25 June 2012, Azerbaijani
Parliament Moves Shield to Aliyev, Family from Scrutiny. This law may not have found widespread support but
did not trigger meaningful protests.
32
12
mismanagement and policy failure is often drawn back to state bureaucrats. ‘It is not the fault of the
president but of people in some ministries. It is a petty that he has to deal with them.’34 Among state
bureaucrats such perception is fuelled by the competition between the individual ministries35. Even
state bureaucrats or members of parliament who emphasized their expertise during the interview
devaluated their capacity to contribute in concrete policy making. They stated to lack information in
the wider area of domestic and international politics to be able to contribute to decision making36.
Trust in the president’s capacities regardless of the structural dimension is as well presented in the
belief in the effectiveness of the various ‘presidential programmes’. The presidential initiative to
abolish petty corruption among state bureaucrats, law enforcement bodies and in the medical
systems in 2011 was widely presented as effective since it was ordered top-down. Respect to this
initiative and enforcement measures reportedly led to a decrease of corruption in the first weeks.
However, the president’s reluctance to fulfil his promise to meaningfully increase salaries later
‘revealed’ structural constraints to the president’s capacities.37
This concept of adequate governance serves as basis for the acceptance of downgrading policies with
immediate domestic impact vis-à-vis the country’s long-term strategy. This can be illustrated by a
quote regarding the approach towards the EU. ‘Even if I am usually pro Europeanization, if I see that
tomorrow Russia and Armenia will use it against us, I am already against this direction.’38 Two
examples shall illustrate the support for the priority of the international standing of the country vis-àvis domestic development. Firstly, one interviewee framed the president’s sever repression of nongovernmental opposition to large parts as symbolic action directed towards the international
community. Such ignorance of democratic values shows the president’s capacity to act without or
against the consensus of Western actors. Secondly, the majority of interlocutors appeared to accept
the neglect or protraction of regional infrastructural projects in favour of initiatives with potentially
international outreach. While the relocation of funds for the improvement of water supply to the
Eurovision song contest created fuelled strong criticism among opposition activists quite a few
interlocutors did not share the assessment39. This is supported by the government’s strategy to keep
the low living standards continuously at a minimum stage. ‘There are no shifts, so people say, it is not
too bad and keep quite.’40 Presidential initiatives on social development issues appear to increase
the trust in the president’s willingness to ensure welfare. What is often critically considered as
‘mitigating losses of the vulnerable population segments in order to avoid […] tensions’ (Luecke and
Trofimenko 2008,p. 151) occurs in the narratives not only of state bureaucrats the president’s
welfare development strategy.
Prevailing narratives concerning the legitimacy of the Aliyev regime are significantly shaped by the
widely agreed priority of conflict resolution. Unmitigated independence, improved international
standing, domestic stability and conflict resolution oriented economic policy are accepted as
conditions for conflict resolutions that deserve priority. Restrictions of political participation rights,
34
Interview with government related analyst, interview with state bureaucrat at Ministry of External Affairs
Interviews with independent analysts
36
Interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Economic Development and with current member of
parliament
37
Interview with independent analyst with ties to employees in the medical sector, background talk with
employee in medical sector
38
Opposition member of parliament
39
Background talk with young people, interview with two state bureaucrats
40
Independent analyst
35
13
the tendency to neglect or postpone infrastructural development of the regions are often framed as
unavoidable commitments to be made on the way to the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. The conflict-issue can be assumed to provide a powerful base given the emotional relation
to this topic by a large part of the Azerbaijani people. While the specific historical situation is argued
to require authoritarian rule the notion of democracy is not entirely absent in the narrative. This will
be outlined in the following section.
6. Discursive Elements of Regime Legitimacy: Framing ‘Democracy’
In an environment with various channels of intended and diffuse democracy promotion the
accommodation of the conflicting external democratic and domestic authoritarian concepts of rule is
crucial. Framing concepts of rule as contingent in space and time is a core argument here. According
to the above outlined concept of ‘adequate governance’ state bureaucrats widely argue that
democratic rule is no option given the challenges of conflict resolution and statehood consolidation.
Lower ranking state bureaucrats and individuals close to ruling elite circles with experiences abroad
tend to generally acknowledge core benefits of a democratic regime. An adoption of main concepts
of democracy is presented as ultimate aim. Fuelled by on-going national identity-building, it is,
however, argued that the concept of democratic rule needs to be adjusted to the historical and
cultural local specifics. These are described as standing with ‘one leg in Europe and with one leg in
Asia.’41 In any case, Azerbaijan is referred to as young country that is suffering at the moment and
can hardly make strong progress towards democracy. A higher ranking state official roughly uses the
formula of democracy as long-term gain. Here democracy is, however, first of all framed as colonizing
tool of U.S. and EU. Democracy is promoted abroad for creating an environment ‘in which they can
swim better’. It is paraphrased as attempt to impose a certain model of management to partners in
order to avoid frictional losses in international cooperation. Any ideational dimension of democracy
is neglected and the desire for democracy promotion perceived as fuelled by non-flexibility and
dominance.
An obvious divide between valuation of democracy and of experiences with actors in democracy
promotion programmes shapes narratives of lower state bureaucrats as well. Firstly, the perceived
American affinity to Armenia and European preference to avoid a clear-cut positioning is discrediting
the democracies. Inter alia the strong emphasize on rule of law in the democracy promoting context
and the perceived neglect of international law in the Nagorno-Karabakh context is interpreted as
double standard42. EU representatives are often described as unreasonably dominant and unwilling
to compromise. The sense of being considered as inferior by democratic partners pervades in the
description of various international forums. It is perceived as non-recognition of Azerbaijan’s
sovereignty and hence limits the pervasiveness of democratic concepts43.
Finally, while potential advantage is accredited to democratic rule, the necessary regime change is
framed predominantly negatively. As discussed above consensus exists concerning the fear of
instability. Democratic change is associated with severe instability based on two arguments. Firstly, in
the first years of sever crisis and war the democratic movement APF failed to stabilize the country
politically and economically. The only experience of allegedly democratic rule came along with
41
Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Interview at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, background talk with staff of judicial bodies
43
Interview at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, State Migration Service and a government related think tank
42
14
deterioration in several regards. This negative image is, secondly, supported by the events of the
Arab spring. Agreement to actively prevent such destabilizing processes is based for avoiding damage
to conflict resolution.
Again the primacy of conflict resolution but as well the experience of economic hardship that marked
the transition period of the 1990s serve as core factors to discredit democratic change vis-à-vis
existing authoritarian rule. So far they appear as intervening factor in democratic socialization. As
long as the identified dominant narrative on legitimacy of domestic authoritarian rule in the current
regime is not disrupted their persuasiveness is stronger than arguments in favour of democratic
change.
7. Conclusion
The paper aimed at contributing to the debate on the persistence of authoritarian regimes in an
increasingly democracy demanding environment. Of central interest was the often neglected
capacity of ideational persuasion in authoritarian states. The analysis touched the question of
effectiveness of external democracy promotion indirectly by studying narratives on democracy and
the current regime that prevail among state bureaucrats and members of the educational elite
(prone and in distance to the ruling elite). Qualitative interviews with the selected target groups
provide crucial narratives for two reasons. Firstly, both groups are often subject to democratic
socialization in course of democracy promotion projects and education abroad. Secondly, both
groups are vital actors when it comes to political regime persistence or change. Analysis was guided
by the question: ‘How belief-systems are created that gain stronger support than democratic norms
of rule?’ It pointed at two directions: mapping-out core elements of regime supportive narratives in
the country under scrutiny and identifying the underlying logic of accommodating the clashing
concepts of governance. With Azerbaijan an intriguing case was selected that is largely open to
influences from democratic societies but managed to consolidate authoritarian rule while other
countries in the region faced colour revolutions.
Theoretical reasoning suggested finding one concept of regime overruling the other or a conciliation
of democratic and authoritarian concepts in the legitimacy belief. Empirical evidence revealed that
both logics are present in the narrative of ‘adequate governance’ which indicates legitimacy belief.
Democracy is, especially among those, who spent a longer period in democratic states, as widely
positive. Establishing a democratic Azerbaijan is mentioned as ultimate goal. Several aspects,
however, constrain the persuasiveness of ‘democratic rule’. These are a perceived ‘habit of
superiority’ of officials from democratic countries, perceived cultural inadequateness and the fear of
instability through democratic change. The core argument by which democratic advantages and
authoritarian restrains are accommodated is the specific historical situation in Azerbaijan. Here, the
secessionist conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, an Armenian populated entity on the territory of
Azerbaijan, plays a primary role. The primacy of conflict-resolution which is declared by the president
and widely supported serves as umbrella that integrates conflicting perceptions of rule, generates
belief in legitimacy of the authoritarian regime and reconciles dissatisfaction domestic
developments. Personal experiences and emotional attachment increase the bonding power of the
conflict issue. Support for the non-democratic Aliyev regime is built on the argument that democratic
rule would put the conflict-resolution process at risk. Leading the country to conflict-resolution
requires strategic wisdom, personal experiences in international and domestic arena and
15
comprehensive knowledge on developments. It is further argued that expedient strategic action may
diverge from immediate desires of less knowledgeable actors. This leads to the acceptance of
delayed social-economic development. Trust in the president’s ambitions to establish broad welfare
when allowed by the conflict situation rounds off the narrative.
The importance of the unresolved secessionist conflict in the narratives on legitimacy of the current
regime in Azerbaijan points to the conclusion that the persistence of the status-quo in NagornoKarabakh is of main interest to the ruling elite. Is the conflict situation entirely settled stronger
demands for democratic rule can be expected, since a core element preventing internalization of
democracy preferences would be absent. While the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a distinct to
Azerbaijan, reference to the specific historical situation for constructive belief in legitimacy of nondemocratic regimes is transferable to other states. Further comparative research on the impact of
‘authoritarian socialization’ vis-à-vis ‘democratic socialization’ may deepen the knowledge of
persistence and constraints of such phenomenon and enhance the debate on external democracy
promotion and regime stability.
16
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