The Current Demographic Characteristics
of the South Asian Presence in Britain:
an analysis of the results of the 2001 Census
Roger Ballard
Director
Centre for Applied South Asian Studies
University of Manchester
1
INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1
2
THE OVERALL DEMOGRAPHIC PICTURE ...................................................... 1
2.1
Bangladeshis in the UK.......................................................................................................................... 2
2.2
The Pakistanis......................................................................................................................................... 3
2.3
The Indians ............................................................................................................................................. 4
2.4
Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Comparative Perspective................................................... 6
3
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION IN THE UK .............................................................. 7
4
THE REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE SOUTH ASIAN PRESENCE .......... 9
4.1
The Indians and Pakistanis ................................................................................................................. 10
4.2
The Bangladeshis and the Chinese...................................................................................................... 10
4.3
Religious dimensions of spatial diversity within the Indian population .......................................... 11
4.4
The concentration South Asian communities in specific Local Authorities .................................... 12
5
WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN FROM ALL THIS?........................ 12
6
STATISTICAL APPENDICES........................................................................... 15
Tables
Table 1 The Growth of the South Asian presence in the UK 1961 – 2001............................................. 1
Table 2 Percentage distribution of members of each ethnic group by religious affiliation.................... 7
Table 3 Percentage distribution of those affiliated to each major religion by ethnic group ................. 9
Table 4 Local authorities with highest percentage of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi residents ... 13
Table 5 Regional Distribution of the Population of England and Wales by Ethnic Group .................. 15
Table 6 Relative size of the Ethnic Groups identified in the 2001 Census, by Region.......................... 15
Table 7 Regional distribution (%) of each of the Ethnic Groups identified in the 2001 Census .......... 16
Table 8 Regional Distribution of the South Asian population of England by Religion ........................ 16
Figures
Figure 1 Age Distribution of Bangladeshi population of UK 2001 ........................................................ 2
Figure 2 Comparison between expected and actual UK Bangladeshi population in 2001 .................. 3
Figure 3 Age Distribution of Pakistani population of the UK 2001 ....................................................... 3
Figure 4 Comparison between expected and actual UK Pakistani population in 2001 ........................ 4
Figure 5 Age Distribution of the Indian population of the UK 2001...................................................... 5
Figure 6 Comparison between expected and actual UK Indian population in 2001............................ 5
Figure 7 Regional distribution of (i) the White and (ii) the Asian population....................................... 9
Figure 8 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian and (ii) the Pakistani population .............................. 10
Figure 9 Regional distribution of (i) the Bangladeshi and (ii) the Chinese population ....................... 11
Figure 10 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian Hindu and (ii) the Indian Sikh population ............. 11
Figure 11 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian Muslim and (ii) the Indian Christian population .... 12
The demographic characteristics of the South Asian presence in Britain
1
Introduction
Not only does the decennial Census provide by far the most accurate source of statistical data
on the population of the UK as a whole, but the exercise conducted in April 2001 included a
significant additional dimension: all respondents were asked to identify their religious
affiliation. The data so generated is particularly useful when it comes to the analysis of the
social and demographic characteristics of Britain’s South Asian population because it allows
us to further disaggregate the three ‘ethnic group’ categories introduced in the 1991 Census.
Whilst our ability to divide this section of the population into three ethno-national categories
– Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi – has undoubtedly been extremely helpful, it would be
quite wrong to assume that any of these categories is internally homogeneous. In other words
there was clear downside to the categories used in 1991: this simple tripartite division
obscured all manner of highly significant patterns of regional, linguistic and religious
variation within each such ‘group’.
With this in mind the results of the 2001 Census not only update our existing knowledge of
the demographic character of the South Asian presence in Britain by a further decade, but
also to explore religious differentiation amongst its members in a reasonably systematic way.
Hence this paper has three complementary objectives
•
•
•
2
To present an overall account of the ethno-religious and demographic characteristics
of Britain’s South Asian population as revealed by the most recent Census.
To explore the differential spatial distribution of currently identifiable ethno-religious
components this section of the population by region and by local authority within the
UK.
To provide a brief account of population dynamics of each of the currently
identifiable ethno-religious components this section of the population by comparing
the results of the 2001 Census with those of the 1991 exercise.
The overall demographic picture
As between 1991 and 2001, Britain’s South Asian population grew from a total of rather less
than one and a half million to just over two million. This pattern of growth was particularly
marked amongst the Bangladeshis – whose numbers grew by 74% during the decade – and
the Pakistanis and the Pakistanis (57%). By contrast the Indian population grew by a
considerably more modest rate of 24% during this period, whilst the population of UK as a
whole was effectively stable.
Ethno-national origins
1961
1971
1981
1991
2001
India
Pakistan
Bangladesh
East Africa
Total South Asian population
81,400
24,900
—
—
106,300
240,730
127,565
—
44,860
413,155
673,704
295,461
64,562
181,321
1,215,048
823,821
449,646
157,881
—
1,431,348
1,028,539
706,752
275,250
—
2,010,541
2.52%
3.04%
4.00%
% of South Asians in UK population
0.23%
0.85%
Table 1 The Growth of the South Asian presence in the UK 1961 – 2001
2
Changes in population size in any given locality are the outcome of the combined impact of
two processes: of differences between the number of births as opposed to deaths, and also as
between in-migrants and out-migrants. Whilst the Census provides no direct measure of
either of these processes, it is relatively easy establish their relative impact by examining
population distributions across the age spectrum. In most relatively recently established
migrant populations there is a marked skew towards the younger end of the age spectrum, and
this most certainly applies in the case of the South Asian presence in Britain.
2.1
Bangladeshis in the UK
This skew towards the youthful end of the spectrum is particularly dramatic in the case of the
Bangladeshi population. There are two main reasons why this is so. Firstly Bengali migrants
(the vast majority of whom are from Sylhet district) reunited their families in the UK much
more tardily than did any other segment of the South Asian population; and secondly their
fertility rate (>4.0) was and remains high. Hence even if there was no further immigration
from Sylhet, the data in Figure 1 shows that for straightforward demographic reasons we can
expect further rapid increases in this section of the population in years to come: if all the age
cohorts up to the age of 70 or so come to include around 35,000 persons – as is to be
expected if other factors remain equal – it follows that this population will eventually
stabilise at around half a million. Such an estimate is based on two provisos: that fertility will
in future be at a level no greater than replacement rate, and that the population will not be
augmented by further immigration. Neither proviso currently holds good. Whilst fertility
rates amongst Sylheti women do appear to be falling, they are still considerably higher than
replacement rates; meanwhile further immigration from Bangladesh still proceeds apace.
40,000
35,000
30,000
Males
25,000
Females
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
0-4
5-9
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
40 44
45 49
50 54
Age Group
55 59
60 64
65 69
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
90
and
over
Figure 1 Age Distribution of Bangladeshi population of UK 2001
The extent to which population growth which has recently been precipitated by further
immigration is illustrated in Figure 2, which compares the ‘expected’ Bangladeshi population
in 2001 (i.e. the 1991 Census results ‘time shifted’ forward by a decade) with the population
as actually observed in 2001. There is clearly an excess in every cohort up to the age of 50,
and this grows particularly large in every cohort up to the age of 35. Given that ‘primary
migration’ of adult male workers with no prior connection with the UK has long since come
to a halt, the observed increase can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly to family reunion
(especially in the case of those aged under 20 and over 40 in 1991); and secondly to the
arrival of Sylheti-born spouses arriving to join their partners in the UK. The first source is by
definition self-limiting; however as long as the latter trend continues, the arrival of further
3
settlers on the brink of fertility will necessarily precipitate a yet higher level of population
growth. Given the combined impact of high (although now declining) levels of fertility in this
section of the population, together with the continued inflow of immigrant spouses, it follows
that the level at which the Bangladeshi population in the UK eventually stabilises is likely to
be significantly in excess of half a million.
40,000
35,000
30,000
'Time shifted' 1991 Population
25,000
2001 Census data
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
04
59
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
40 44
45 49
50 54
55 59
60 64
65 69
Age group in 2001
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
e shifted' 1991 Population
-
90+
Figure 2 Comparison between expected and actual UK Bangladeshi population in 2001
2.2
The Pakistanis
The data set out in Figure 3 follow a very similar pattern to that displayed in Figure 1, except
that this time the sharp drop-off in numbers does not begin until the 30-34 year old age
cohort. This reflects the fact that family reunion amongst the Pakistanis became the norm at
least a decade earlier than it did amongst the Bangladeshis, so in their case family reunion is
now effectively complete. However the scale of the Pakistani presence in the UK is
substantially larger, so if we perform the ‘other things being equal calculation’ for the
Pakistanis, we arrive at predicted ultimate population size of around 1.2 million, provided
that fertility rates fall to no more than replacement level, and that any excess of immigration
of emigration is rapidly eliminated.
90,000
80,000
70,000
Males
60,000
Females
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0-4
5-9
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
40 44
45 49
50 54
Age Group
Figure 3 Age Distribution of Pakistani population of the UK 2001
55 59
60 64
65 69
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
90
and
over
4
Accurate data about current levels of fertility within the UK South Asian population are hard
to come by. However as far as I have been able to determine whilst fertility rates amongst
Pakistanis in the UK are now running at a lower level than in Pakistan (where they reach one
of the highest levels in the contemporary world), the speed with which fertility rates amongst
UK-based Pakistanis are declining is less sharp than amongst their Bangladeshi counterparts.
If so, raised levels of fertility amongst Pakistani women can be expected continue to boost
population growth in this section of the South Asian population at least for the immediate
future. Nor is that all: there are good reasons to suppose that an excess of immigration over
emigration will further reinforce this trend for some time to come.
90,000
80,000
70,000
'Time shifted' 1991 Population
60,000
2001 Census data
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
04
59
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
Age group in 2001
40 44
45 49
50 54
55 59
60 64
65 69
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
90+
e shifted' 1991 Population
10,000
Figure 4 Comparison between expected and actual UK Pakistani population in 2001
Whilst pattern which emerges in Figure 4 may appear at first glance to be very similar to that
in Figure 2, close inspection reveals some significant differences. Whilst the ‘population
excess’ is particularly strongly marked 25-29 and 30-34 age cohorts, it falls off amongst
school-age cohorts, as well as amongst the over forties. This reflects the high frequency with
which young people based in the UK are marrying Pakistan-based spouses. This preference,
particularly if it continues, can once again be expected to add significantly to long-term
population growth.
2.3
The Indians
As even the most cursory glance at Figure 5 will confirm, the demographic characteristics of
the Indian population differ strikingly from those we have noted amongst the Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis. Nevertheless begin by noting the parallels before exploring the differences.
One parallel is clear enough: the sharp decline in numbers towards the upper end of the age
spectrum. Whilst this is precisely what we should expect to find in the case of a relatively
recently settled immigrant population, the effect is rather less marked amongst the Indians.
Firstly a substantial proportion of the Indian population found its way to the UK by way of
East Africa, and given that they also arrived as refugees from Africanisation, many arrived in
the UK as complete families, rather than as young male workers seeking to establish a
foothold on their own account. Secondly direct migrants from India brought their wives and
children to join them in the UK much more rapidly than did their Indian and Pakistani
counterparts. The result is plain to see: amongst the Indians, even the retiree age cohorts have
5
begun to be significantly populated – in sharp contrast to current patterns amongst the
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.
120,000
Males
100,000
Females
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
0-4
5-9
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
40 44
45 49
50 54
55 59
60 64
65 69
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
Age Group
90
and
over
Figure 5 Age Distribution of the Indian population of the UK 2001
But whilst there are manifest parallels across the board at the upper end of the age spectrum,
the steady decline in the scale of the age cohorts at the younger end of the scale amongst the
Indians stands in exceptionally sharp contrast to the patterns which we have examined so far.
How, then, is this to be explained? Whilst there are now strong indications that levels of
fertility amongst Indian women are currently in sharp decline, just as they are amongst the
Chinese, that is by no means the whole picture, as a careful consideration of the patterns in
Figure 6 reveal.
100,000
90,000
'Time shifted' 1991 Population
80,000
70,000
2001 Census data
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
04
59
10 14
15 19
20 24
25 29
30 34
35 39
Age group in 2001
40 44
45 49
50 54
55 59
60 64
65 69
70 74
75 79
80 84
85 89
90+
Figure 6 Comparison between expected and actual UK Indian population in 2001
Two features stand out in Figure 6. Firstly the familiar pattern of population excess is now
much more tightly concentrated in the age-cohorts between 20 and 39, and secondly the
histograms reveals a deficiency as between the observed and expected population in all age
cohorts greater than 55. Whilst part of this deficiency can undoubtedly be explained in terms
of the natural cull of mortality, my own first-hand observations of developments within UK
resident Indians’ families, together with a comparison of the results of the 1981 and 1991
Census, suggest that these unexpected patterns are the consequence a further highly
6
significant development: namely that in many parts of the age spectrum the level of
emigration from the UK amongst ethnic Indians now exceeds the volume of immigration.
But if that is the case, to what destination are such onward migrants departing? Putting
together qualitative data from a variety of sources (for I have not been able to identify source
which would provide a reliable quantitative means of measuring this outflow) I would
suggest that the outflow is two-fold. Whilst a small number of elderly settlers have
undoubtedly begun to fulfil their long-cherished dreams of returning to Gujarat or Punjab to
enjoy their years of retirement, this ‘back-home’ outflow has clearly been dwarfed into
insignificance by an onward movement across the Atlantic to the United States and Canada.
The driving force behind this movement is quite clear. Not only do transnational networks
provide a direct link with settlers of similar regional and caste origins as themselves who
have taken up residence in North America, but members of the younger British-educated
generation are becoming increasingly aware that professional salaries in the US and Canada
are considerably higher than those in the UK, whilst the handicaps imposed by the constraints
of ethnic exclusionism are considerably less severe.
As has already been indicated, there currently appears to be no way of making an accurate
estimate of the scale of this outflow. However if my own rule of thumb of 10,000 per annum
is anywhere near the mark, the annual departure of such a large number of people will
undoubtedly have had a far-reaching impact on the demographic characteristics of the UK’s
Indian population, even if it has been roughly matched – at least in terms of overall numbers
– by a parallel inflow from India. But even though continued immigration may consequently
be no less significant amongst the Indians than amongst the Pakistanis and Bangladeshis,
there are good reasons to suppose that it is now rather different in character. In their case the
process of family reunion has long since been complete, and their proclivity to recruit
spouses from South Asia is now very much lower than amongst their Pakistani and
Bangladeshi counterparts. This appears to leave two further possible sources of population
growth. Firstly a substantial increase in the number of illegitimate entrants whose status has
been regularised, and secondly an even more substantial rise in the inflow of newcomers
whose professional qualifications were such that they were granted leave to remain without
demur.
As should by now be obvious, the Census only reports observed outcomes. However accurate
this data may be, the figures provide no direct explanation of how these outcomes came
about. Hence a more informed analysis of the demographic characteristics of the Indian
population – as well of its likely patterns of future growth – will have to wait on the
availability of better data than is currently available.
2.4
Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Comparative Perspective
Nevertheless there is one point which the results of the 2001 Census very clearly confirm: the
Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi components of Britain’s South Asian populations differ
from one another in all sorts of very significant ways. Moreover since the founding members
of all three populations arrived in the UK more than half a century ago, we are now far
enough down the track to be reasonably confident that these patterns of differentiation are
likely to be a permanent feature of the South Asian presence in the UK. This is certainly not
to suggest that currently observable trends are fixed in stone, such that they can used to make
confident extrapolations into the far-distant future; however it is to insist that there are good
reasons to expect that members of each of the many distinct groups of which the South Asian
presence is composed can be expected to follow their own distinctive trajectories of
7
adaptation, and that their convergence into a singly homogeneous pan-Asian patterns of
behaviour is consequently most unlikely.
With this in mind it is worth remembering that whilst the labels Indian, Pakistani and
Bangladeshi are undoubtedly helpful at the first level of approximation, these categories are
by definition artefacts of the questions posed in the Census itself. Even if they are indeed
‘pretty good approximations’, and hence a great deal better than nothing, such homogenising
categories frequently obscure a great deal of highly significant internal differentiation. Of the
three, the category Bangladeshi is by far the most homogeneous, if only because the
overwhelming majority of those who fall within it are not only Muslims by religion, but
originate from specific parts of Sylhet District in the far north-west of Bangladesh. By
contrast members of UK’s Pakistani population are drawn from several spatially,
linguistically and culturally distinctive regions, whilst in the Indian case religious differences
add a further dimension to all these forms of differentiation. Whilst the Census questions
have as yet not provided respondents with an opportunity identify themselves in terms of
their linguistic heritage (which is also an excellent proxy for regional origins) the 2001
Census has at least provided us with an opportunity to explore the religious affiliations of all
Census respondents, and hence to cross-reference the South Asian data in terms of both
ethnic and religious variables.
3
Religious affiliation in the UK
By its very nature the Religion question has generated just as complex data sets as those
generated by the Ethnic Group question, and the outcome becomes yet more complex when
the Religion and Ethnic Group variables are themselves cross-referenced (see Tables 5 - 8 in
the statistical appendix). We therefore need to approach the data step by step if we are not to
get lost in its intricacies.
White
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Other Asian
Mixed Asian
Black Caribbean
Mixed Caribbean
Black African
Mixed African
Chinese
Christian
75.7
4.9
1.1
0.5
13.4
44.0
73.8
60.7
68.9
56.4
57.4
Jewish
0.5
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.3
0.4
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.2
0.1
Buddhist
0.1
0.2
0.0
0.1
4.8
1.0
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.6
40.2
Muslim
0.4
12.7
92.0
92.5
37.3
16.1
0.8
0.6
20.0
13.3
0.9
Hindu
0.0
45.0
0.1
0.6
26.8
1.9
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
Sikh
0.0
29.1
0.0
0.0
6.2
1.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.1
Others, none,
not stated
23.3
8.1
6.7
6.3
11.1
35.6
24.9
38.2
10.7
29.2
1.1
Table 2 Percentage distribution of members of each ethnic group by religious affiliation
In this respect Table 2 is quite straightforward: it merely cross-references Religion against
Ethnic Group in the population as a whole. As most observers would no doubt have expected,
members of the White majority overwhelmingly identified themselves as Christian, or failing
that answered the question in such a way as to fall into the final unspecific column; very
small minorities (less than 1% in each case) identified themselves as Jewish, Muslim or
Buddhist. Turning next to the three major South Asian ethnic categories, it is worth noting
that in comparison with members of the indigenous majority, a far lower proportion of British
South Asians are uncertain and/or unconcerned about their religious affiliation. Amongst
8
other things this serves to suggest that in diaspora no less than in South Asia itself, religion is
still remains just as important a vehicle for collective identification as does (culturally
grounded) ethnicity.
Stepping down a level to look at specific patterns of differentiation within each ethnic
category, Hindus are clearly the predominant group amongst the Indians, since they make up
just under half of the total, followed by the Sikhs at just under a third. However what the
Census reveals for the first time is that 12.7% of the British Indian population are Muslims.
By way of commentary it is worth mentioning that my experience suggests that the historical
roots of the great majority of Indian Muslims in the UK lie in Gujarat, and also that a very
large proportion of them made their way to the UK via East Africa. Last but not least the
Census also reveals the presence of a small Christian minority amongst the Indians.
By contrast with Britain’s Indian population, both the Pakistanis and the Bangladeshis are far
more religiously homogeneous: in each case 92% identified themselves as Muslim. To be
sure the presence of Christian, Hindu and Buddhist minorities within their midst should not
be overlooked, but the scale of that presence is so small that it hardly even provides a leaven
to what are otherwise appear to be completely homogeneous population categories.
Nevertheless it should never be forgotten that Census data is by definition an artefact of the
questions asked, and consequently the appearance of homogeneity can easily be far more
apparent than real. Hence whilst it is well known that the Pakistani social order is currently
riven by severe tensions between Sunnis and Shi’as, and that amongst the Sunnis tensions
between followers of the relatively laid-back Barelwi tradition and the much more
authoritarian Deobandis are escalating almost by the day, the Census is entirely silent on such
matters. Similarly because the Census made no efforts to differentiate between the regional
components of the Pakistani presence (e.g. Punjabis, Pothoharis and Pathans), its results
cannot shed any light on these increasingly important sources of differentiation within what
the data represents as a nominally homogeneous ‘Pakistani’ ethnic category. However as we
saw earlier, this caveat applies much less strongly to the Bangladeshis. At least as afar as I
am aware, the overwhelming majority of Bangladeshis in the UK hail from a restricted
number of Thanas lining the Kushyara and Surma rivers in the central parts of Sylhet District.
Whilst I have included the remainder of the data set out in Table 2 largely for interest’s sake,
it is nevertheless worth commenting on some further issues which are of relevance in this
context. In the first place the spread of data associated with ‘Other Asians’ suggests that a
significant proportion of those who identified themselves in this way are probably of South
Asian ancestry. However since both ‘Other’ and ‘Mixed’ are necessarily rag-bag categories,
once can never be certain about any such estimates. With this caveat in mind, the fact that
16.1% of those who identified themselves as being of mixed White and Asian ancestry also
identified themselves as Muslim may indicate that a higher proportion of Muslim immigrants
have had children with White partners than is or was is the case amongst Hindus and Sikhs.
Despite great deal of effort on the part of ONS to explore the extent of ethnic admixture, the
Census is an extremely blunt instrument on the basis of which to seek to explore such
matters. As for the remainder of the ethnic groups identified in the Census, all but the Black
Africans and the Chinese display high levels of affiliation to Christianity; but whilst the
Black Africans display a moderate level of commitment to Islam, the Chinese display almost
as high a level of commitment to the Buddhist tradition as they do to Christianity.
However as well as looking at the proportion of followers of different religious traditions
found within any given ethnic tradition, it is equally illuminating to consider the ways in
9
which the followers of any given religious traditions are distributed by ethnicity – as I have
done in the figures set out in Table 3. The patterns revealed in first two columns are very
straightforward: in statistical terms the vast majority of Christians and Jews in the UK are
members of the White majority. Turning next to followers of the Buddhist tradition in the
UK, rather more than a third are drawn from the white majority, and just under a quarter are
Chinese; only a tiny proportion of South Asians identified themselves as Buddhists.
White
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Other Asian
Mixed Asian
Black Caribbean
Mixed Caribbean
Black African
Mixed African
Chinese
Christian
96.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
1.1
0.4
0.9
0.1
0.1
Jewish
96.8
0.3
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.0
Buddhist
38.8
1.3
0.1
0.1
8.1
1.3
0.7
0.4
0.2
0.3
23.7
Muslim
11.6
8.5
42.5
16.8
5.8
2.0
0.3
0.1
6.2
0.7
0.0
Hindu
1.3
84.5
0.1
0.3
11.7
0.6
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.0
0.0
Sikh
2.1
91.5
0.1
0.0
4.6
0.6
0.0
0.0
0.1
0.0
0.0
Table 3 Percentage distribution of those affiliated to each major religion by ethnic group
However what is also striking is the of all the religious traditions identified by the Census,
UK’s Muslim population displays by far the largest degree of ethnic diversity, since its
followers make a significant showing in every row in Table 3. By contrast the Hindus, and
even more so the Sikhs, are overwhelmingly concentrated amongst those who identified their
ethnicity as Indian.
4
The Regional Distribution of the South Asian presence
Over an above these complex patterns of internal diversity, the South Asian presence in
Britain is very far from being homogeneously distributed across the UK in spatial terms.
Whilst I have set out the numerical data which indicates both the extent and the character of
these diversities in Appendix 1, it is always extremely difficult to make much sense of what
is going on in the midst of such complex numerical matrices. Hence in the interests of
clarifying my exegesis the argument that follows takes the form of a commentary on a series
of graphical representations of the patterns which can be derived from this data.
Inner London,
1,396,753, 3%
Outer London,
2,891,108, 6%
South East,
7,304,678, 17%
Wales, 2,786,605, 6%
South West,
4,701,602, 10%
North East,
2,425,592, 5%
East of England,
4,927,343, 11%
Wales, 21,984, 1%
South West, 27,939,
1%
Inner London,
257,344, 13%
Outer London,
476,291, 24%
North West,
6,203,043, 14%
Yorkshire and
Humberside,
4,551,394, 10%
East of England,
108,328, 5%
North West, 215,190,
11%
West Midlands,
4,537,892, 10%
East Midlands,
3,807,731, 8%
North East, 30,397,
1%
Yorkshire and
Humberside, 210,153,
10%
East Midlands,
157,098, 8%
South East, 163,097,
8%
Figure 7 Regional distribution of (i) the White and (ii) the Asian population
West Midlands,
364,642, 18%
10
As the Pie charts in Figure 7 clearly demonstrate, the residential pattern of the Asian
population at large still differs strikingly from that found amongst the White majority: the
Asian population (in the right hand chart) is disproportionately heavily concentrated in
London (both inner and outer) and in the West Midlands, whilst being even more markedly
under-represented in Wales, the South West and the North East. This pattern of spatial
distribution is of long standing, and very largely reflects the way in which the demand for
additional labour was disproportionately concentrated in London and the industrial centres of
the West Midlands during the period when mass migration was taking place the best part of
forty years ago. However just as has been observed with respect to demographic issues,
patterns of spatial distribution also differ quite markedly as between different sub-sections of
the South Asian presence.
4.1
The Indians and Pakistanis
Wales, 8,261, 1%
Inner London, 85,471,
8%
South West, 16,394,
2%
North East, 10,156,
1%
East of England,
51,035, 5%
North West, 72,219,
7%
Outer London,
351,522, 33%
South East, 89,219,
9%
Yorkshire and
Humberside, 51,493,
5%
Wales, 8,287, 1%
Inner London, 43,559,
6%
South West, 6,729,
1%
Outer London, 99,190,
14%
North West, 116,968,
16%
South East, 58,520,
8%
East Midlands,
122,346, 12%
West Midlands,
178,691, 17%
North East, 14,074,
2%
East of England,
38,790, 5%
Yorkshire and
Humberside, 146,330,
20%
West Midlands,
154,550, 23%
East Midlands,
27,829, 4%
Figure 8 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian and (ii) the Pakistani population
Given that between them the Indians and Pakistanis make up by far the greater part of the
South Asian presence in Britain, it is worth beginning our exploration of internal diversity by
considering the differences between them. As the charts in Figure 8 reveal, these are very
substantial, for whilst the Indian population is much more heavily represented London, and
especially in outer London, as well as the east Midlands, Pakistanis are disprortionately
concentrated in the West Midlands, in Yorkshire and Humberside and the North West. Once
again this makes historical sense: when mass migration was at its peak Pakistanis – and most
especially those from Mirpur – displayed a disproportionate tendency to seek employment in
heavy engineering factories in the West Midlands, as well as in the textile towns on both
sides of the Pennines. Meanwhile the salience of the Indian presence in the East Midlands is
best understood as a consequence of the ‘Leicester phenomenon’, which will be discussed in
further detail later.
4.2
The Bangladeshis and the Chinese
The Bangladeshis display a different pattern yet again, with almost half their numbers
concentrated in inner London, where they are yet further concentrated – as we shall see later
– in the Borough of Tower Hamlets. Yet despite their current heavy concentration in a single
location, there are good reasons to suppose that the Bangladeshis are in some respects one of
the most spatially mobile components of the South Asian presence in Britain. If a similar
mapping exercise had been carried out in the 1960s and 70s, the Bangladeshis would have
shown up much more prominently in the same areas into which the Pakistanis were then
moving in such numbers – the West Midlands and the Pennine region. But when the
recession struck in the early 1980s a large proportion of the men who had settled in these
areas moved down to rejoin the Sylheti ethnic colony in Tower Hamlets. Accomodation in
11
the area was extremely tight (but as single men, that didn’t matter too much, they simply
shared) but jobs were still relatively plentiful.
Wales, 5,436, 2%
Inner London, 128,314,
47%
South West, 4,816, 2%
Wales, 6,267, 3%
North East, 6,167, 2%
East of England, 18,503,
7%
South West, 12,722,
6%
North East, 6,048, 3%
Inner London, 38,918,
17%
East of England,
20,385, 9%
North West, 26,003, 9%
Yorkshire and
Humberside, 12,330, 4%
Outer London, 41,283,
17%
North West, 26,887,
12%
Yorkshire and
Humberside, 12,340,
5%
East Midlands, 6,923,
2%
West Midlands, 31,401,
11%
Outer London, 25,579,
9%
South East, 15,358, 5%
East Midlands,
12,910, 6%
South East, 33,089,
15%
West Midlands,
16,099, 7%
Figure 9 Regional distribution of (i) the Bangladeshi and (ii) the Chinese population
But if industrial recession in the north precipitated a substantial rush south during the 1980s,
the steady expansion of the Indian restaurant trade – which is very largely owned and manned
by Sylhetis – has had, as might be expected, quite the opposite effect. The other major group
of ethnic restaurateurs in the UK are the Chinese, and as Figure 9 (ii) shows, they display the
least degree of out-of-the-ordinary spatial concentration of all of Britain’s minorities. In my
view the reasons for this is quite straightforward: it is not so much that the Chinese are
committed assimilationists, but in the process of filling up all the available niches in the
market they have spread out relatively evenly across the length and breadth of the UK. If one
loks carefully at Figure 9 (i) from this perspective, there are signs that the Bangladeshis have
already begun to follow in their footsteps.
4.3
Religious dimensions of spatial diversity within the Indian population
If the three members of the ethno-national components of the South Asian population are
spatially distributed around the UK’s major regions in strikingly varied way, the opportunity
to disaggregate the Indian population which the 2001 Census has made available reveals
some even more striking variations. Whilst Figure 10 (i) shows that amongst Britain’s
Indians, the Hindu population is disproportionately concentrated in Outer London, and to a
slightly lesser extent in the East Midlands. By contrast the Sikhs are disproportionately
concentrated in the West Midlands, whilst also making a significant showing in Yorkshire
and Humberside.
SouthWest, 6,672 ,
1%
Inner London, 39,452
, 9%
SouthWest, 3,880 ,
1%
North East, 3,831 ,
1%
East of England,
26,701 , 6%
North East, 4,376 ,
1%
Inner London, 12,615
, 4%
North West, 24,769 ,
Outer London, 82,558
5%
, 28%
Yorks and
Humberside, 13,901
3%
Outer London,
194,565 , 42%
South East, 36,219 ,
8%
Yorks and
Humberside, 17,055 ,
6%
East Midlands,
30,348 , 10%
East Midlands,
63,014 , 14%
West Midlands,
52,973 , 11%
East of England,
11,981 , 4%
North West, 5,343 ,
2%
South East, 34,601 ,
12%
Figure 10 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian Hindu and (ii) the Indian Sikh population
West Midlands,
96,960 , 32%
12
Turning to Figure 11 (i) we encounter yet another pattern, since over a quarter of Britain’s
Indian Muslim population turn out to be living in the North West of England, so much so that
they make up half of the region’s Indian population; and whilst significantly less well
represented in London than other components of the Indian population, they also show up
strongly in the East Midlands.
SouthWest, 2,293 ,
2%
Inner London, 16,757
, 13%
Outer London, 23,740
, 18%
South East, 3,443 ,
3%
West Midlands,
10,775 , 8%
North East, 406 , 0%
East of England,
3,141 , 2%
North West, 34,994 ,
27%
SouthWest, 1,735 ,
3%
Inner London, 7,154 ,
14%
North East, 644 , 1%
East of England,
3,966 , 8%
North West, 1,966 ,
4%
Yorks and
Humberside, 1,437 ,
3%
East Midlands, 2,203
, 4%
West Midlands, 4,690
, 9%
Yorks and
Humberside, 15,499 ,
12%
East Midlands,
20,050 , 15%
Outer London, 18,642
, 38%
South East, 7,439 ,
16%
Figure 11 Regional distribution of (i) the Indian Muslim and (ii) the Indian Christian population
For the sake of completeness I have also taken the opportunity to set out the data for the
spatial distribution of the Indian Christians in Figure 11 (ii), whose patterns of residence is
not greatly dissimilar to that found amongst the Sikhs, but for a considerably heavier degree
of concentration in Outer London. A considerable degree of congruence between the two
groups makes a great deal of intuitive sense: both populations are overwhelmingly drawn
from the Jullundur Doab region in Indian Punjab, but whilst the Sikhs are overwhelmingly
drawn from families whose ancestral occupations were either as farmers or Craftsmen, the
majority of the majority of Christian converts were drawn from so-called ‘untouchable’
castes whose members principal occupation was as landless day-labourers for Sikh farmers.
Parallel streams of chain migration ensured that members of both groups tended to settle
down at similar destinations once they reached the UK.
4.4
The concentration South Asian communities in specific Local Authorities
As should by now be quite clear, the further one disaggregates the Census data on Britain’s
minority populations, the more diversity one discovers: this tendency continues right down to
the smallest unit if analysis deployed in the Census, the electoral ward. The reasons for this
are quite obvious. In a plural society it follows that members of specific communities will
tend cluster together in residential terms at every level of analysis, so much so that mapping
exercises become an ever more complex task the finer the degree of resolution one brings to
the task. Hence by way of conclusion I have approached the issue from the other end of the
telescope. Table 4 simply lists the 30 English Local Authorities in which Indians, Pakistanis
and Bangladeshis form the highest proportion of the local population. Whilst it would be easy
enough to extend the list by providing the figures for all the remaining 120 Authorities.
However by aim in this report has been to provide a judicious selection of figures from the
huge quantities of data which the 2001 Census – just like all its predecessors – has thrown up.
5
What conclusions can be drawn from all this?
In my view the most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this initial examination of the Data
is that the strategies of adaptation being pursued by different component of the South Asian
presence in Britain remain so diverse that each must still be understood on its own terms.
13
Hence if one considers the Local Authorities which appear in the upper regions of Table 4, it
is swiftly apparent that they have little in common beyond playing host to a substantial South
Asian. Whilst all are urban, they are located in the North and South as well as the Midlands;
whilst some are prosperous, others poverty-stricken; some are heavily industrialised, others
are not.
Indians
Local Authority
Pakistanis
% of local
population
Local Authority
Bangladeshis
% of local
population
Local Authority
% of local
population
Leicester
25.73
Bradford
14.54
Tower Hamlets
33.43
Harrow
21.91
Slough
12.06
Newham
8.80
Brent
18.46
Birmingham
10.65
Camden
6.35
Hounslow
17.34
Luton
9.23
Oldham
4.52
Ealing
16.53
Blackburn
8.74
Luton
4.14
Slough
14.04
Newham
8.46
City of London
3.84
Redbridge
13.96
Waltham Forest
7.92
Hackney
2.94
Wolverhampton
12.32
Rochdale
7.71
Westminster
2.76
Newham
12.14
Kirklees
6.83
Islington
2.41
Blackburn
10.66
Oldham
6.33
Birmingham
2.13
Hillingdon
9.56
Redbridge
6.24
Redbridge
1.77
Sandwell
9.14
Manchester
5.88
Southwark
1.49
Barnet
8.62
Calderdale
4.91
Haringey
1.37
Coventry
8.04
Peterborough
4.47
Portsmouth
1.35
Croydon
6.43
Hounslow
4.30
Enfield
1.29
Bolton
6.08
Brent
4.03
Rochdale
1.26
Birmingham
5.71
Derby
3.96
Sandwell
1.21
Walsall
5.43
Ealing
3.75
Tameside
1.17
Greenwich
4.38
Walsall
3.68
Bradford
1.06
Merton
4.28
Nottingham
3.64
Newcastle
1.00
Luton
4.09
Middlesbrough
3.59
Waltham Forest
0.99
Kirklees
4.07
Buckinghamshire
3.14
Walsall
0.99
Enfield
3.98
Sheffield
3.09
Manchester
0.93
Derby
3.84
Bury
3.04
Merton
0.91
Hackney
3.76
Sandwell
2.95
Lambeth
0.81
Kingston on Thames
3.61
Reading
2.68
Kensington and Chelsea
0.72
Waltham Forest
3.51
Stoke-on-Trent
2.64
Leicester
0.69
Westminster
3.12
Bolton
2.49
North Lincolnshire
0.67
Leicestershire
3.04
Merton
2.40
Hammersmith and Fulham
0.61
Table 4 Local authorities with highest percentage of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi residents
If, however we turn the picture around to explore these mysterious patterns of distribution
from the migrants’ perspective, the reasons for the location of these ‘hotspots’ spring into
focus: they still reflect the points at which pioneer migrants established their initial
bridgeheads when they first arrived in Britain half a century or more ago. Sylheti seamen’s
cafés on the London dockside led to the settlement in Tower Hamlets; Pakistani seamen
14
drafted to work in wartime munitions factories led to the settlements in Birmingham and
Bradford; Gujaratis who had moved directly from India to establish themselves in Leicester
became a magnet for further settlement when their relatives who had emigrated to East Africa
found themselves faced with expulsion; Wolf’s Rubber factory in Southall precipitated the
initial Sikh settlement in Ealing, whilst Punjabi Pakistanis took jobs on the Mars Bar
production lines just down the road in Slough – and so on and so forth. In matters of
migration, history invariably casts a very long shadow.
Moreover the effects of this kind if ethno-specific networking can be observed in many other
spheres of activity. Whilst commitment to the family’s ancestral home base invariably fades
sharply amongst those born overseas, it takes well over half a century for the first generation
of migrants to pass away. So until that occurs every such network will contain a powerful
constituency of elders with a strong sense of commitment to their overseas roots. However
those roots are rarely, if even, conceived of as lying in grand and abstract edifices such as
‘India’, Pakistan’ and ‘Bangladesh’: rather they are much more tightly focused on their
families, villages and regions of origin, with the result that developments in Kashmir, Punjab,
Gujarat and Sylhet (as the case may be) usually mark the outer limits of their emotional
concerns. Hence Godhra and its aftermath matters greatly to Gujaratis, but is little known to
others; Operation Bluestar is still etched in the minds of Indian Punjabis, as is the
consequences of the construction of Mangla Dam for the Mirpuris, so much so that it is one
of the principal reasons why they now prefer to identify themselves as Kashmiri. It is also
worth remembering that such concerns are less parochial than they seem: it is only the vast
scale of the nation-states into which post-Imperial India crystallised that renders these
loyalties ‘regional’ rather than ‘national’.
However once all this is borne in mind they throw new perspective on developments in the
UK: the observation the grassroots tensions between Hindus and Muslims are currently
particularly intense in South Asian settlements up and down the Ribble valley comes as less
surprise when we realise that this is in substantial part a Gujarati phenomenon. In just the
same vein Pakistanis from Mirpur tend to have very different views on the ways in which the
Kashmir dispute should be resolved as compared with those favoured by their Punjabi fellow
countrymen. But it is not just with respect to issues and developments in South Asia that
members of each of these many networks display differing perspectives and priorities. The
same is true with respect to members of these many networks responses to the patterns of
opportunities and obstacles which they have encountered in the UK. Although such matters
are beyond the scope of this Report, the results of the Census also serve to confirm that
different components of the South Asian population are continuing to pursue ever more
divergent strategies of adaptation and mobility in every observable sphere of socio-economic
activity.
To turn the kaleidoscope one last time, lists such as those set out in Table 4 certainly provide
a convenient means of identifying those Local Authorities in which ethnic plurality stands out
with particular prominence, and hence the localities in which the challenges to social policy
thrown up by these developments stand in most urgent need of examination and resolution.
However as this paper has repeatedly emphasised, our current condition of plurality is
anything but uni-dimensional. If one’s sole yardstick of comparison is grounded in the
premises of the white majority, all South Asians may appear to have a great deal in common;
however a less myopic inspection of current developments swiftly reveals South Asians differ
amongst themselves quite as much as they do with respect to their non-South Asian fellow
citizens. In these circumstances one size will most certainly not fit all.
15
6
Statistical Appendices
White
British
White
Irish
White
Other
5,996
2,413
White/
Asian
Other
mixed
5,001
4,251
Indian
8,261
Pakistani
Bangla
deshi
8,287
5,436
Other
Asian
3,464
Carib
bean
2,597
Black
African
3,727
Other
Black
745
Chinese
6,267
Other
2,786,605
North East
2,425,592
8,682
21,142
2,783
1,741
4,733
2,971
10,156
14,074
6,167
3,185
927
2,597
429
6,048
4,215
North West
6,203,043
77,499
74,953
22,119
9,853
17,223
13,344
72,219
116,968
26,003
14,685
20,422
15,912
5,303
26,887
13,331
West Midlands
Yorks
and
Humberside
4,537,892
73,136
63,268
39,782
3,683
18,160
11,600
178,691
154,550
31,401
20,931
82,282
11,985
9,765
16,099
14,083
4,551,394
32,735
57,134
18,187
4,094
14,218
8,496
51,493
146,330
12,330
12,333
21,308
9,625
3,329
12,340
9,487
East of England
4,927,343
61,208
136,452
19,882
6,109
17,385
14,608
51,035
38,790
18,503
13,424
26,199
16,968
5,297
20,385
14,552
East Midlands
3,807,731
35,478
57,171
20,658
3,426
11,176
7,881
122,346
27,829
6,923
11,815
26,684
9,165
3,628
12,910
7,353
South East
7,304,678
82,405
221,906
23,742
9,493
29,977
22,567
89,219
58,520
15,358
23,518
27,452
24,582
4,880
33,089
29,259
Outer London
2,891,108
127,324
268,166
35,073
15,847
36,293
31,192
351,522
99,190
25,579
96,041
153,576
150,242
24,581
41,283
58,960
South West
4,701,602
32,484
81,230
13,343
3,917
11,198
8,913
16,394
6,729
4,816
4,861
12,405
6,171
2,344
12,722
9,305
All regions
37,211
White/
Black
African
Wales
Inner London
17,689
White/
Caribbean
5,135
1,396,753
93,164
326,688
35,855
18,335
23,651
29,865
85,471
43,559
128,314
37,017
189,991
228,691
35,768
38,918
54,074
45,533,741
641,804
1,345,321
237,420
78,911
189,015
155,688
1,036,807
714,826
280,830
241,274
563,843
479,665
96,069
226,948
219,754
Table 5 Regional Distribution of the Population of England and Wales by Ethnic Group
White
British
White
Irish
White
Other
White/
Caribbean
White/
Black
African
White/
Asian
Other
mixed
Indian
Pakistani
Bangla
deshi
Other
Asian
Carib
bean
Black
African
Other
Black
Chinese
Other
Wales
95.99
0.61
1.28
0.21
0.08
0.17
0.15
0.28
0.29
0.19
0.12
0.09
0.13
0.03
0.22
0.18
North East
96.43
0.35
0.84
0.11
0.07
0.19
0.12
0.40
0.56
0.25
0.13
0.04
0.10
0.02
0.24
0.17
North West
92.17
1.15
1.11
0.33
0.15
0.26
0.20
1.07
1.74
0.39
0.22
0.30
0.24
0.08
0.40
0.20
West Midlands
Yorkshire and
Humberside
86.15
1.39
1.20
0.76
0.07
0.34
0.22
3.39
2.93
0.60
0.40
1.56
0.23
0.19
0.31
0.27
91.67
0.66
1.15
0.37
0.08
0.29
0.17
1.04
2.95
0.25
0.25
0.43
0.19
0.07
0.25
0.19
East of England
91.45
1.14
2.53
0.37
0.11
0.32
0.27
0.95
0.72
0.34
0.25
0.49
0.31
0.10
0.38
0.27
East Midlands
91.26
0.85
1.37
0.50
0.08
0.27
0.19
2.93
0.67
0.17
0.28
0.64
0.22
0.09
0.31
0.18
South East
91.30
1.03
2.77
0.30
0.12
0.37
0.28
1.12
0.73
0.19
0.29
0.34
0.31
0.06
0.41
0.37
Outer London
65.62
2.89
6.09
0.80
0.36
0.82
0.71
7.98
2.25
0.58
2.18
3.49
3.41
0.56
0.94
1.34
South West
95.40
0.66
1.65
0.27
0.08
0.23
0.18
0.33
0.14
0.10
0.10
0.25
0.13
0.05
0.26
0.19
Inner London
50.50
3.37
11.81
1.30
0.66
0.86
1.08
3.09
1.57
4.64
1.34
6.87
8.27
1.29
1.41
1.95
All regions
87.49
1.23
2.59
0.46
0.15
0.36
0.30
1.99
1.37
0.54
0.46
1.08
0.92
0.18
0.44
0.42
Table 6 Relative size of the Ethnic Groups identified in the 2001 Census, by Region
16
White
British
White
Irish
White
Other
White/
Caribbean
White/
Black
African
White/
Asian
Other
mixed
Indian
Pakistani
Bangla
deshi
Other
Asian
Carib
bean
Black
African
Other
Black
Chinese
Other
Wales
6.12
2.76
2.77
2.53
3.06
2.65
2.73
0.80
1.16
1.94
1.44
0.46
0.78
0.78
2.76
North East
5.33
1.35
1.57
1.17
2.21
2.50
1.91
0.98
1.97
2.20
1.32
0.16
0.54
0.45
2.66
1.92
North West
13.62
12.08
5.57
9.32
12.49
9.11
8.57
6.97
16.36
9.26
6.09
3.62
3.32
5.52
11.85
6.07
9.97
11.40
4.70
16.76
4.67
9.61
7.45
17.23
21.62
11.18
8.68
14.59
2.50
10.16
7.09
6.41
10.00
5.10
4.25
7.66
5.19
7.52
5.46
4.97
20.47
4.39
5.11
3.78
2.01
3.47
5.44
4.32
10.82
9.54
10.14
8.37
7.74
9.20
9.38
4.92
5.43
6.59
5.56
4.65
3.54
5.51
8.98
6.62
West Midlands
Yorkshire and
Humberside
East of
England
East Midlands
South East
Outer London
South West
Inner London
2.34
8.36
5.53
4.25
8.70
4.34
5.91
5.06
11.80
3.89
2.47
4.90
4.73
1.91
3.78
5.69
3.35
16.04
12.84
16.49
10.00
12.03
15.86
14.50
8.61
8.19
5.47
9.75
4.87
5.12
5.08
14.58
13.31
26.83
6.35
19.84
19.93
14.77
20.08
19.20
20.03
33.90
13.88
9.11
39.81
27.24
31.32
25.59
18.19
10.33
5.06
6.04
5.62
4.96
5.92
5.72
1.58
0.94
1.71
2.01
2.20
1.29
2.44
5.61
4.23
3.07
14.52
24.28
15.10
23.24
12.51
19.18
8.24
6.09
45.69
15.34
33.70
47.68
37.23
17.15
24.61
Table 7 Regional distribution (%) of each of the Ethnic Groups identified in the 2001 Census
Christian
South West
North East
East of England
North West
Yorkshire and
Humberside
East Midlands
West Midlands
South East
Outer London
Inner London
England
Hindu
Indian
Muslim
Sikh
Christian
Hindu
Pakistani
Muslim
Sikh
Christian
Bangladeshi
Hindu
Muslim
Sikh
1,735
644
3,966
1,966
6,672
3,831
26,701
24,769
2,293
406
3,141
34,994
3,880
4,376
11,981
5,343
556
197
580
1,140
8
12
32
48
5,577
12,912
35,324
108,466
4
3
22
29
142
48
183
121
8
26
76
231
4,200
5,586
16,995
24,182
0
3
7
6
1,437
2,203
4,690
7,439
18,642
7,154
50,652
13,901
63,014
52,973
36,219
194,565
39,452
466,597
15,499
20,050
10,775
3,443
23,740
16,757
131,662
17,055
30,348
96,960
34,601
82,558
12,615
301,295
647
359
617
1,058
1,536
756
7,819
35
36
65
43
191
70
547
133,990
25,644
144,348
53,602
91,471
39,182
657,680
52
24
103
33
54
19
346
68
46
104
198
187
235
1,395
140
81
132
73
312
607
1,693
11,111
6,428
29,069
14,202
23,532
119,399
259,710
3
5
17
7
4
61
113
Table 8 Regional Distribution of the South Asian population of England by Religion