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Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
DEFENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE
NATO AND THE FUTURE ROLE OF
NAVAL POWER
DRAFT REPORT*
Madeleine MOON (United Kingdom)
Rapporteur
Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence
Capabilities
www.nato-pa.int
*
14 April 2016
Until this document has been approved by the Security and Defence Committee, it represents only the
views of the Rapporteur.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................... 1
II.
NEW MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ...................................................................... 1
A.
WHAT ROLE FOR THE NAVY IN SECURITY? ........................................................... 2
B.
NAVAL POWER AND THE ALLIANCE WRIT LARGE ................................................. 2
C.
NATO’S MARITIME SECURITY AREAS OF OPERATION AND CONCERN ............... 3
III.
CURRENT TRENDS IN NAVAL POWER .............................................................................. 3
A.
LARGE ALLIED NAVAL FORCES TODAY................................................................... 4
B.
EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM....................................................................... 4
C.
STRATEGIC NAVAL COMPETITION ON THE RISE – RUSSIA AND CHINA .............. 4
1.
RUSSIA ............................................................................................................... 4
2.
CHINA ................................................................................................................. 5
D.
HIGH SEAS COMPETITION WILL CHALLENGE GLOBAL NORMS ........................... 5
IV.
NATO’S CURRENT MARITIME COMMAND STRUCTURE AND AVAILABLE
ASSETS ................................................................................................................................ 5
V.
THE ALLIED MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE WALES SUMMIT: MARITIME AS
KEY ENABLER IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ............................. 6
A.
TOWARD THE NEW ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY (AMS)................................. 6
B.
THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF NATO CORE TASKS .............................................. 7
C.
OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR – EXEMPLIFYING THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE NEW AMS ...................................................................................................... 7
D.
THE WALES SUMMIT MARITIME PROVISIONS – ENABLING THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND REACH OF THE AMS ......................................................... 8
E.
NEW MOMENTUM – ERI AND LARGE POWER BUY-IN ............................................ 8
VI.
CURRENT NATO MARITIME OPERATIONS ........................................................................ 9
A.
NATO’S MARITIME MISSION IN THE AEGEAN ........................................................ 10
VII.
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................... 11
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 13
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I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
NATO is a maritime alliance. The transatlantic link is, in its most concrete manifestation, a
deep blue ocean serving as a vital medium of exchange between Europe and North America. The
role of maritime in NATO, however, often takes a back seat in Allies’ immediate thinking about
near and long-term threats as well as opportunities for the Alliance. This is understandable, given
the more visible role that land and air power have played throughout most of the Alliance’s history
and its recent operations.
2.
Command of the seas is, however, increasingly indispensable to Allied security. Not only to
preserve the vital transatlantic sea lanes of communication, but also to preserve Alliance freedom
of movement and credibility along its eastern and southern flanks. The core pillar of NATO’s
strategic nuclear deterrence is guaranteed by its naval forces, and it plays a pivotal role in
signalling Alliance resolve vis-à-vis its deterrence posture in the seas along its northern, eastern,
and southern flanks.
3.
The importance of Allied maritime power expands well beyond the roles of deterrence and
collective defence however, as it is a key instrument in the promotion and protection of political,
economic, and diplomatic interests as well. In an era of increasing strategic competition, NATO
member states’ maritime forces will be instrumental to the protection and projection of Alliance
interests.
4.
Individually and collectively, Allied maritime forces are expected to perform a range of tasks
from deterrence and collective defence, crisis response (including complex humanitarian
missions), cooperative security, and maritime security. The principal areas where NATO’s potential
conflicts and crises will play out in the near and likely long-term future are all accessible by sea,
and in the event of potential operations, maritime forces will be essential enablers of Allied forces’
power projection. This is a tall order in an era of declining naval budgets and ever-increasing price
tags for modern warships.
5.
The reality today is that NATO member states’ navies are decreasing in size and, along with
it, capability. Only two countries, other than the United States, maintain full spectrum navies, and
three others have high-level capabilities in specific areas. Only 20 of the Alliance’s 28 member
states have standing naval forces. Given the clear importance of maritime capabilities to nationaland, therefore, Alliance-level power, it is time for NATO member states to take a new look at
investments in their navies at home as well as their contributions to the Alliance more broadly.
6.
This report will examine the importance of the maritime environment today and the growing
security threats facing it. It will examine the role of naval power today and break down the
expectations of NATO’s maritime forces as indicated in the Alliance Maritime Strategy and in the
wake of the Wales Summit. In addition to an overview of NATO’s current maritime forces and
operations, it will look to future trends in Allied navies as they seek to uphold the expanding
responsibilities given to them. It will review the new momentum given to maritime via larger Allied
power investment in naval capabilities in the Alliance. The report will conclude with several interim
considerations.
II.
NEW MARITIME SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
7.
The interests of all NATO member states today are, to varying degrees, both local and
global. The role of the sea as avenue, arena, and area in the global expansion of interests cannot
be understated. In many respects control of the seas drives not only global economic interests, but
also global norms.
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8.
Today, a full 95% of global tradable goods by volume and about 80% of global hydrocarbons
are transported by sea. In addition, 95% of internet traffic and communications move through well
over 200 undersea cables (Parry, 2014). Finally, a full 80% of marine traffic passes through eight
critical choke points, three of which are critical to NATO – the Bosphorus Straits, the Strait of
Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal (Parry, 2014).
9.
In parallel, the threat to sea transit is clearly rising with the volume and value of transiting
goods: a fact proven by the ebb and flow of seaborne piracy at various global choke points over
the last couple decades. Further, global population shifts are demonstrating a trend that the 21 st
century and beyond will be urban, littoral, and connected – already approximately 80% of the
world’s population lives within 60 miles of a coastline, and a full 75% of the world’s major cities are
littoral (Kilcullen, 2012).
10. The rapid rise in scope and scale of all forms of trafficking over water routes by organised
criminal networks also threatens essential external and internal security interests of all Allies. The
potential for terrorist acts against Allied assets at sea is growing, as are the chances for the use of
international sea transit in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, the
potential devastating effects of climate will mostly likely first be seaborne, riding atop the waves of
the rising seas.
A.
WHAT ROLE FOR THE NAVY IN SECURITY?
11. NATO member states’ naval capacities, both individually and collectively, provide three
essential tasks in the protection of Allied interests at sea and on land. These are maritime
security, manoeuvre, and power projection. Robust maritime security is essential for the
freedom of use of sea lanes of communication for trade and transit. Naval manoeuvre at sea
implies the deployment of maritime assets when and where desired. Finally, naval power
projection is essential to protect assets at sea and affect the outcome of events on land through
the enabling of joint operations by bringing air, land, and sea assets to bear in a conflict. In
addition to enabling the fight, naval assets can serve to deny maritime access to competitors by
providing mobile anti-access/area denial capabilities.
12. The benefits of all three of these are clear to the protection and projection of Allied interests,
but also to the deterrence of potential enemies or competitors. The strategic and tactical value of
the greater freedom of action in the maritime realm cannot be understated. Power at sea is
fundamental for NATO power at all levels.
B.
NAVAL POWER AND THE ALLIANCE WRIT LARGE
13. As a political-military alliance imbued with the combined national power of 28 member
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states , NATO’s naval power serves as an essential enabler of deterrence posture, political will
and determination, economic prosperity, and global diplomacy.
14. Deterrence - As NATO seeks to adapt and reaffirm its deterrence posture in the 21 st century
against an array of security challenges emanating from state and non-state actors, the ability to
manoeuvre freely on the high seas and in potentially contested water spaces is fundamental. A
strong naval force can signal Alliance credibility and strength of purpose in the Baltic, Black, and
Mediterranean Seas without the danger of tripping the more closely patrolled land and air frontiers
of the eastern territories. It can also patrol and interdict international water spaces to shut down
the potential trafficking of illicit, arms, substances, and, in the case of the Mediterranean today,
people.
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Montenegro will join the Alliance in 2016, thereby making the total number of Allies 29.
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15. Political – A strong navy signals political credibility and commitment. The ability to send
strong naval fleets into the seas around the Alliance for exercises, presence, and manoeuvres
demonstrates clearly to competitors that the Alliance will not be cowed by new demonstrations of
power and will defend Alliance territory under the Article 5 commitment.
16. Economic – As noted above, the benefits of maintaining free passage on the world’s seas
and through geographic chokepoints is vital. Use of sea lanes of communication for the transit of
goods and services globally is growing at an annual rate of 4.7%, thereby only increasing its role
as the principal avenue for economic exchange (Parry, 2014). All member states have a clear role
in maintaining free passage and freedom of action on all major sea lanes, particularly keeping the
transatlantic space open to Alliance member state commerce and transit.
17. Diplomatic – Navies have long been diplomatic ambassadors through port calls to both
Allied, partner, and even non-partner nations. Perhaps more importantly, however, strong naval
capabilities and presence globally are essential to upholding the global norms of behaviour to
which the Alliance strongly adheres. This is essential in an era where external powers, such as
Russia, seek to upend global security norms through actions such as the annexation of territory
belonging to another sovereign state.
C.
NATO’S MARITIME SECURITY AREAS OF OPERATION AND CONCERN
18. First, NATO’s maritime interests are broad. Alliance strategic sea interests expand well
beyond the vital link of the Atlantic Ocean between the United States and Canada and their
European Allies. In addition, NATO is also a clear Pacific power by way of the interests and
important roles played in the Asia Pacific by the United States Navy in concert with its regional
allies, particularly Japan and Korea. Though the Alliance continues to deny it, there is a clear
growing role for NATO in the Arctic as it continues to open up to year-round use as an area of
transit and exploitation, and as Russia continues to militarise the region.
19. Second, and most importantly today, NATO maritime forces are increasingly focusing on
several key bodies of water. NATO maritime situational awareness and presence is most pressing
in the seas along its eastern flank from the North and Arctic Seas, down to the Baltic, Black, and
Mediterranean Seas. The importance of the Alliance’s ability to manoeuvre and command these
bodies of water has figured importantly from the launching of NATO’s post-9/11 Mediterranean
operation through the execution of Operation Unified Protector and this was stressed in the 2014
Wales Summit Declaration, and are on display today in the operation in the Aegean.
III.
CURRENT TRENDS IN NAVAL POWER
20. The Alliance has its most ambitious maritime agenda since the Cold War, but it is facing the
range of tasks it assigned itself in the AMS (Alliance Maritime Strategy) in an era of broadly
declining maritime investment across the Alliance. In line with the general trend of defence budget
cuts, the Alliance’s principal naval powers have not been spared. The reality is Alliance naval
fleets are shrinking.
21. Two principal factors contribute to the downsizing of Allied fleets. First, much like their
counterpart services, navy budgets have been devastated by the cuts started after the Cold War
as part of the ‘peace dividend’ and accelerated in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,
which continues to plague many of the Alliance’s European member states. In addition, however, it
is clear that the perception of an increasingly secure environment drove legislators to look to the
defence sector for cuts when economic times became increasingly difficult.
22. Though fleets are clearly getting smaller, the ships built today are far more capable than
their predecessors. While this is certainly a bonus for the abilities of Allied navies to perform their
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core tasks, it is coming at a significant price, as new ships are proving much more expensive. The
increasing price tag of new naval high performance and power platforms is straining the ability of
any country, outside of the United States, to maintain full spectrum fleets.
A.
LARGE ALLIED NAVAL FORCES TODAY
23. It is no secret that in the maritime domain, much like the others, the Alliance is multi-tiered,
as far as capabilities are concerned. The United States Navy is far and away the largest with a
full-spectrum navy, larger than the size of at least its 15 closest competitors combined, and
operating with a truly global reach. After the United States, only Britain and France maintain full
spectrum fleets, and just barely, at that. Germany, Italy, and Spain maintain capable fleets with
clear strengths in some arenas, but have abandoned the idea of paying for full spectrum fleets.
Other Allies’ fleets drop off in size and capability precipitously after these six fleets.
24. Both France and the United Kingdom maintain their strategic nuclear submarine fleets (each
with four SSBNs – Ballistic Missile Submarines), but the strains of maintaining these forces today
is palpable. The UK’s Royal Navy has declined by over a third since 2000, and the current plan is
to maintain a surface fleet of only 19 major combatant ships. The United Kingdom is moving
forward with the construction of two new aircraft carriers and is debating the funding for the
replacement of its ageing strategic nuclear deterrent subs. Under clear budgetary constraints, both
France and Britain continue to maintain full spectrum naval fleets of approximately the same size.
The question remains as to how much longer either will be able to sustain them.
25. The German, Italian, and Spanish navies maintain some real capabilities for their respective
fleets, but none has the ambition to enlarge their current fleet size or expand their capabilities.
Germany and Spain continue to maintain and develop destroyers, frigates, and other amphibious
ships, as well as a number of tactical submarines.
B.
EXAMPLE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM
26. From 2010 to 2015, the Royal Navy saw a 33% decline in the number of carrier/amphibious
ships, a 17% decline in submarines, and another 17% decline in destroyers and frigates. The
Royal Navy fleet that met the challenge of the Falkland Islands War 33 years ago was bigger than
the entire standing Royal Navy fleet today. At the time, the UK had three operational aircraft
carriers (versus none today; though two are under construction), patrol aviation (versus none
today), and a significant number more of frigates and destroyers (Kuehn, 2015). A series of
budget cuts have dwindled the UK Navy down to 30,000 personnel. Measures taken over the
summer of 2015, however, have at least frozen cuts to the Royal Navy, and there is momentum
gathering to reinvest.
C.
STRATEGIC NAVAL COMPETITION ON THE RISE – RUSSIA AND CHINA
27. Strategic competition on the high seas will be an important feature of the 21st century
security environment. Both Russia and China have placed significant focus on building new
modern fleets with significant anti-access/area denial capabilities. Both nations have also made
sea power projection a priority in their most recent defence strategies.
1.
RUSSIA
28. Revamping the navy has been a centrepiece of Russia’s State Armament Plan (SAP), which
pledges a major overhaul of all Russian armed forces over the decade from 2011-2021. While
significantly smaller than the naval forces of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Navy will focus on
capabilities that will make it a significantly and qualitatively different force than it has been in the
decades since the end of the Cold War (Gorenburg, 2015). The Russian Navy intends to pursue
tradition missions such as strategic deterrence, power projection, as well as sea denial and
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control, and coastal defence. The principal focus of the 2015 Maritime Doctrine is on Russian
capabilities in both the Arctic and Atlantic Oceans (Novichkov, 2015).
29. Russian naval investment will consume approximately 26% of the SAP. Major new naval
assets to be commissioned are: eight new strategic submarines, seven new multi-role submarines,
six to ten new diesel electric submarines, and 50 new surface combat ships (mainly frigates and
corvettes) (IISS, 2016). Strategic nuclear deterrence will remain the number one mission of the
Russian Navy, and the construction of Russian nuclear submarines has received top priority, and
is therefore insulated from recent cuts made to other programmes as a result of the economic
squeeze placed on Russia under the international sanctions regimes and the declining price of oil
(IISS, 2016; Stratfor, 2016).
30. In addition Russia’s naval air arm is receiving significant upgrading and reinforcement.
MiG-29K combat aircraft, for example, will be attached to the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier group.
The regiments of the shore-based based fighters and attack aircraft will be updated with Su-30SM
multi-role fighter; by 2020 the Russian Navy will receive more than 50. Russia also fields a fleet of
40 nuclear powered icebreakers (Judson, 2015).
2.
CHINA
31. The 2014 Chinese Defence White Paper notes the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN)
attention to power projection and ability to protect assets on the open seas. Under the current
budgeting scheme, the navy and air force continue to receive the majority of new investment in
equipment. In 2016, the PLAN has almost fully modernized its surface action groups. The white
paper notes particular attention to readiness for “maritime military struggle and maritime
preparation for military struggle” (IISS, 2016). In the drive toward modernisation the PLAN fleet
has seen the development of several classes of surface and subsurface combatant vessels.
32.
The Chinese shipbuilding industry also has at least four active nuclear and conventional
submarine programmes in process; R&D foci are on the development of new capable aircraft
carriers, destroyers, corvettes, and a class of amphibious ships. Steadily, Chinese shipbuilders are
also reducing their reliance on imported foreign (particularly Russian) technologies. Chinese
anti-access/area denial abilities are also on the rise in parallel to fleet modernisation (IISS, 2016).
D.
HIGH SEAS COMPETITION WILL CHALLENGE GLOBAL NORMS
33. In the face of this new level of competition, NATO member states need to be aware of the
importance of reinforcing and maintaining global norms on the high seas and those related to the
access and exploitation of water spaces. The West was able to shape the defining measure of
norms in the maritime arena in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS).
Recent actions by both Russia in the Arctic and China in the South China Sea are challenging the
credibility and, therefore, the viability of UNCLOS.
IV.
NATO’S CURRENT MARITIME COMMAND STRUCTURE AND AVAILABLE ASSETS2
34. The transition out of the Cold War saw significant changes in the organisation of the
Alliance’s posture and mindset.3 In terms of maritime command and control, the Alliance winnowed
2
3
The following section on NATO Maritime Command and its current assets is derived from author
interviews and publicly available information accessed at http://www.mc.nato.int/Pages/home.aspx.
NATO post-Cold War transition in terms of force posture and, therefore, deterrence capabilities is
outlined in greater detail in the DSC General Report [037 DSC 16 E] on the NATO PA Defence and
Security Committee’s expectations in the run-up to the Warsaw Summit in July.
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its headquarters responsible for maritime training, planning, and operations from five to one.
Today’s Allied Maritime Command5 is located in Northwood, UK and it reports to Allied Joint Force
Command, Brunssum.
35. NATO has Standing Naval Forces (SNF) providing the Alliance with a permanent rotating
multinational naval presence. The SNF consists of the Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs),
made up by the SNMG1 and the SNMG2, and the Standing NATO Mine Countermeasures Groups
(SNMCMG1 and SNMCMG2). The SNF carry out exercises, manoeuvres and port visits, but can
also be deployed swiftly in times of crisis. All four groups are integrated into the NATO Response
Force (NRF), the Alliance’s rapid-reaction force.
36. SNMG1 consists of four to six destroyers and frigates at any given time, with the Royal
Netherlands Navy, the German Navy, the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy each
contributing one ship on a permanent basis. Periodically, ships from the navies of Denmark,
Belgium, Norway, Poland, Italy, Portugal and Spain contribute to the SNF. The forces operate and
train as a group, providing day-to-day verification of current NATO maritime operations. The force
commander and the staff are appointed for one year, with the force commander rotating among
the participating countries. In peacetime the force primarily exercises in the eastern Atlantic.
37. SNMG2 is the NATO standing maritime Immediate Reaction Force. As with SNMG1,
NATO’s contributing countries provide the maritime group with their naval units on a rotational
basis as the Command rotates among them. The composition varies but it principally consists of
four to eight destroyer or frigate ships and countries normally contributing include Germany,
Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
38. Both SNMG1 and SNMG2 are permanently available to NATO to perform various tasks from
exercises to operational missions. They help to establish Alliance presence, demonstrate
solidarity, conduct diplomatic visits to different countries and support partner engagement.
39. NATO’s SNMCMG1 (six ships) and SNMCMG2 (five ships) are multinational forces primarily
engaged in the search for and disposal of mines threatening maritime passages in NATO’s area of
operations. They are both assets in the NATO NRF. They can deploy at short notice and are often
the first assets to enter an operational theatre in order to clear the passage for the maritime fleet
seeking to enter the area. An example of the effectiveness of the NATO mine countermeasures
groups is demonstrated by the SNMCMG1’s location and dismantling of 229 explosives in the
Baltic region (SHAPE, 2015).
V.
THE ALLIED MARITIME STRATEGY AND THE WALES SUMMIT: MARITIME AS KEY
ENABLER IN THE NEW EUROPEAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
A.
TOWARD THE NEW ALLIANCE MARITIME STRATEGY (AMS)
40. The deployments in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks drove the adaptation of the
Alliance’s overarching strategic concept as well as its maritime strategy. Though published later,
the AMS was developed in parallel to the 2010 Strategic Concept announced by the Alliance at the
Lisbon Summit that year and aligns broadly with its central tenets (Smith-Windsor, 2013). The
4
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The most recent command change came after the decision taken at the NATO 2010 Summit in Lisbon
to streamline the command structure of the Alliance from eleven major headquarters to seven, which
led to the deactivation of Allied Maritime Command, Naples and making MARCOM the only NATO
maritime HQ.
The Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence Capabilities intends to visit NATO MARCOM in
September and has invited its Commander, Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone, to address the delegation at
the Annual Session in Istanbul, Turkey in November.
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publication of the 2011 AMS was a significant upgrade from the original strategy which dates back
to 1984.
41. The 2010 Strategic Concept notes the growing complexity of the international security
environment and its potential effects on NATO Allies. The concept centres on the dangers of
WMD proliferation, terrorism, conflict and its regional consequences (such as failed states and
ungoverned spaces), as well as the growing menaces of all forms of trafficking, threats to critical
infrastructure protection, energy and transit security, and the constraints of limited natural
resources and climate change. While the Strategic Concept does not actually mention the
maritime or naval aspects of the evolving security environment specifically, there is a clear
maritime component to virtually every near and long-term threat it highlights.
42. The principal outcome of the Strategic Concept was the highlighting of three core tasks the
Alliance must take on as it seeks to acquire the necessary capabilities to confront and mitigate the
dangers of the challenges it faces – deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, and
cooperative security. The 2011 AMS notes the three core NATO tasks, but adds a fourth, maritime
security.
B.
THE MARITIME DIMENSION OF NATO CORE TASKS
43. NATO maritime forces provide essential elements to all of the Strategic Concept’s core
tasks. Deterrence and collective defence anticipate: sea-based strategic nuclear deterrence by
the three NATO nuclear powers (United States, United Kingdom and France), sea-based ballistic
missile defence, and the above-mentioned conventional assets to defend assets at sea, guarantee
freedom of manoeuvre, project power, and facilitate amphibious reach. Maritime crisis
management includes the provision of expeditionary capabilities, sea control and denial, logistical
support for amphibious operations (strike and ashore), embargo and no-fly zone enforcement,
humanitarian assistance, counterterrorism, and non-combat evacuation (Smith-Windsor, 2013).
Cooperative security entails partner capacity building, training, joint exercising, and naval
diplomacy. Maritime security denotes the support of maritime situational awareness (above and
below the surface), protection of sea lanes of communication and critical infrastructure, maritime
interdiction capacity (countering WMD, terrorism, and trafficking).
44. Attention to port security as a facet of maritime security should not be understood as less
important than the security of assets on the high seas. Port security is an essential link between
domestic and international security as ports serve as a multi-directional bridge between the two.
Following the trends noted above, the volume of goods shipped through 20-foot equivalent units
(container boxes) is simply massive today, with the top 20 EU ports seeing 77.7 million boxes pass
through its ports, and 49.5 million through the top 18 ports in North America (Barnard, 2016).
Knowing what is passing through ports inside of these boxes is a challenge at all levels, with
unknown shipping traffic posing a threat of the highest level.
C.
OPERATION UNIFIED PROTECTOR – EXEMPLIFYING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
NEW AMS
45. Almost simultaneous with the publication of the AMS NATO forces took over responsibility
for the UNSCR 1973-mandated mission in Libya, under the moniker Operation Unified Protector
(OUP). UNSCR 1973 authorized the imposition of an arms embargo, a no-fly zone, and the use of
all necessary measures (short of occupation) to protect the civilian population deemed to be under
threat from the Ghaddafi regime. At its most intense tempo, OUP included 21 Allied maritime
assets (including aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships, submarines, and
supply ships) enabling an air campaign, enforcing the embargo via blockade and interdiction
measures, the provision of a humanitarian sea corridor for the supply of relief aid, and amphibious
support. The operation demonstrated that the demands upon maritime forces in a crisis response
situation require a wide spectrum of capabilities (Smith-Windsor, 2013).
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D.
THE WALES SUMMIT MARITIME PROVISIONS – ENABLING THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND REACH OF THE AMS
46. This committee has been particularly focused on the rapid evolution of the European security
environment since the 2014 events triggering renewed attention to the eastern and southern flanks
– Russia’s annexation of Crimea and intervention in Ukraine and the rapid rise of Daesh6 in Syria
and Iraq, increasing the mixed migration flow into Europe and raising justified concerns about
increased terrorism at home. The Wales Summit in 2014 made an attempt to adapt the alliance to
the increasingly complex and dangerous security environment – particularly through the Readiness
Action Plan and the Defence Spending Pledge.
47. Renewing attention to NATO and member states’ maritime resources figures prominently in
the Wales Summit Declaration as well (NATO, 2014). First, it notes Alliance assurance measures
in the eastern part of the Alliance will include continuous air, land, and maritime presence,
providing “the fundamental baseline requirement for assurance and deterrence, and are flexible
and scalable in response to the evolving security situation.” Second, it also notes that an important
element of the VJTF (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force) will be the availability of maritime
forces. Third, the declaration notes that NATO will enhance its Standing Naval Forces, as a means
of improving maritime situational awareness and MARCOM’s ability to engage in full spectrum
operations – which led to the inclusion of the call for Allies to ensure their maritime forces meet the
guidelines for “deployability and sustainability”.
48. The Wales Declaration also underlines the rapidly expanding geopolitical and economic
importance of the maritime domain; the increased use of which presents new, myriad challenges
in the security arena. As such, the declaration calls for the intensification and expansion of the
AMS. Doing so, it continues, would contribute further to NATO core tasks, as well as its capacity
for maritime security. To get there, NATO notes that it will “reinvigorate NATO’s Standing Naval
Forces by making their composition and the duration of national contributions more flexible and, in
principle, no longer using them for protracted operations or operations with low-end tasks.”
Another objective is achieving better cooperation and coordination with the EU, which published a
Maritime Security Strategy in 2014, as the organisations have considerable overlap in interests in
the maritime domain.
49. The call for the reinvigoration of the Standing Naval Forces was the result of a declining level
of commitment from the Allies. Over the last decade the SNF was often used for operations to
which the member states were not prepared to contribute the necessary maritime capabilities
(surface, submarine, and air). By no longer using the SNF for protracted operations or low-end
tasks, the SNF will have more readily available resources to fulfil core tasks.
E.
NEW MOMENTUM – ERI AND LARGE POWER BUY-IN
50. As the Defence and Security Committee General Report on the defence aspects of the
Warsaw Summit notes well, the rapid evolution of the security environment has pushed many to
call for even more from NATO Allies, particularly European member states, to contribute to the
efforts needed to accomplish core tasks. The reason for such calls being the perception that
current force posture and available resources are not sufficient to deter and defend NATO Allies
adequately against the range of threats they face.
51. This sentiment applies to the maritime domain as well. A problem with the current
contribution scheme to NATO maritime is that there is a clear lack of larger power buy-in. The tide,
however, does appear to be changing in favour of larger powers signalling their interest in
investing in NATO maritime contribution. In 2016, the United Kingdom doubled its maritime
support to NATO. For the first time since 2010, the United Kingdom is contributing to SNMG1. The
6
Arabic acronym of the terrorist organisation “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria”
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United Kingdom will donate three Mine Sweepers to SNMCMG1, programmed to cover the Baltic,
North Atlantic, North, and Mediterranean Seas. As UK MoD stated: “2016 will see a particular
focus on the Baltic Region with our ships sent there as part of the Maritime Group, the Mine
Counter Measure Group, and the Baltops exercise.” (Mehta, 2016)
52. The announcement by the United Kingdom came shortly on the heels of the United States’
announcement to quadruple the European Reassurance Initiative (DoD ERI, 2016). The FY2017
ERI budget proposal plans to allocate an additional $86.3 million to US Navy contributions to
Europe, particularly along the eastern flank of the Alliance. As part of its assurance package, the
US Navy will maintain its heightened level of engagements in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean
Seas, particularly focusing on joint exercises. The US Navy will also invest in the upgrading of its
communications systems in the region, and increase investments in its Theater Anti-Submarine
Warfare (TASW) capabilities. Finally, it will invest in its Keflavik Airfield facilities in Iceland to
accommodate more P-8A aircraft, which are instrumental to the conduct of anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), shipping interdiction, and ELINT (electronic intelligence)
gathering (DoD ERI, 2016).
53. In addition, NATO’s maritime forces are in line with the significant increased tempo of
exercises announced at the Wales Summit. Particular attention is being paid to joint operational
capabilities. Already in 2016, SNMG2 and the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle have
conducted exercises in the Mediterranean. Many other exercises will take place in the Baltic,
Black, and North Seas in the coming months. As former MARCOM Commander Peter Hudson
noted: “NATO’s true maritime power lies in the ability of the Standing Forces to rapidly join with
high readiness, high capability national task groups, such as the Charles De Gaulle carrier strike
group, to deliver strategic effect” (NATO MARCOM, 2016). NATO will also use the UK’s October
2016 Joint Warrior exercise in Northern Scotland and in the North Atlantic to train and certify the
NRF’s maritime and air components for their 2017 commitments.
VI.
CURRENT NATO MARITIME OPERATIONS
54. NATO’s longest running current maritime operation is Operation Active Endeavour (OAE),
which began on 4 October 2001 as one of the eight different responses to the terrorist attacks of
9/11 against the United States and has adapted continuously to meet the evolving security risks in
the Mediterranean. Since its beginning, the operation has hailed over 124,000 merchant ships,
escorted several hundred, and boarded over 170 suspicious vessels.
55. The Alliance decided to transition OAE to a Maritime Security Operation (MSO) in July 2015,
giving it the authorisation to perform seven different tasks. These are supporting situational
awareness, maintaining freedom of navigation, conducting interdiction operations, combatting the
proliferation of WMD, protecting Allied critical infrastructure, supporting maritime counter-terrorism
operations, and contributing to maritime security capacity building. Counterterrorism tasks will
likely grow as non-state armed groups continue to expand their abilities and desire to use the seas
as avenues and arenas for their activities, from transfer of weaponry to direct attacks on critical
infrastructure such as seaborne vessels or standing infrastructure such as oil rigs. Further, it is
well known that Al Qaeda has been trying for more than 15 years to acquire a nuclear weapon or
nuclear material to construct a dirty bomb. The impact of such a group acquiring such material is a
challenge to port security and high seas interdiction capabilities. As Graham Allison, Director of
Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs notes, “A nuclear
attack on the U.S. is far more likely to arrive in a cargo container than on the tip of a missile.”
(Nadler, et al., 2012)
56. The evolving dynamics of the operation remain subject to the ongoing approval of the NAC
(North Atlantic Council), but the changing role of OAE is an excellent example of the adaptability
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and enabling role of maritime assets in addressing the evolving security environment. NATO’s
patrolling of the Mediterranean has grown in importance over the past decade, conceived of as
counterterrorist operation the OAE has evolved to allow NATO not only to build a better maritime
picture in the area, but it has also given the Alliance valuable experience in conducting multilateral
maritime operations in the growing complexity of today’s security environment.
57. In addition, NATO continues to maintain Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) since August
2009, which engages NATO warships and aircraft off the Horn of Africa in international counter
piracy efforts as well as capacity-building efforts with regional governments. OOS is mandated by
the UNSCR, and is operating with the consent of the Somali authorities to take action in the waters
off its coast to halt maritime piracy. The resounding success of the mission is clear as there were
18 recorded hijacks and 67 attacks in 2009, while the last recorded incidents were in 2013 with
one attack and only two disruptions. The operation was extended by the NAC in June 2014 until
the end of 2016 (NATO MARCOM, 2016).
A.
NATO’S MARITIME MISSION IN THE AEGEAN
58. Most recently, NATO authorised the deployment of a maritime mission in the Aegean Sea in
response to the growing mixed migration crisis. The most popular migrant route shifted from the
central Mediterranean to the eastern Mediterranean over the course of 2015, bringing with it an
even higher volume of refugees and economic migrants seeking entry into the European Union.
With this push to cross the Aegean, the death toll from drowning approached 1,000 over the year,
with 91 recorded in the first three weeks of January 2016 alone (IOM, 2016).
59. On 8 February 2016, NATO took the swift decision to deploy ships to the Aegean Sea to
support Greece, Turkey, and the EU’s border agency FRONTEX to disrupt the uncontrolled mixed
migration flows, with particular attention paid to the criminal networks enabling and profiting from
human trafficking. The decision to deploy maritime assets was rapid and demonstrated the degree
to which the Alliance was repositioning itself to respond to internal as well as external security
challenges of the new security environment.
60. On 9 February 2016, NATO SACEUR General Breedlove ordered three warships from
SNMG2, already deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean, to begin patrols in the Aegean Sea. The
multinational force, consisting of ships from Canada, Germany, Greece and Turkey, expanded the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) mission to Greek and Turkish territorial
waters. NATO’s ability to operate in Turkish territorial waters – the origin for mixed migration traffic
headed toward the EU – gives it a key advantage over previous EU efforts, which were limited to
international waters (Zhukov, 2016). NATO activities in Turkish and Greek territorial waters are
carried out in consultation and coordination with both Greece and Turkey who have agreed to
cooperate on the issue (Barnes, 2016).
61. NATO is ideally suited to facilitate closer cooperation between Greece and Turkey as both
are NATO Allies, but only Greece is a member of the EU. To prevent any potential
misunderstandings, Greek and Turkish forces do not operate in each other’s territorial waters and
airspace (Stoltenberg, 2016).
62. SNMG2’s ISR activities provide critical information to the Greek and Turkish coastguards as
well as to FRONTEX. The SNMG2 is not authorised to stop refugee ships, but rather to deter
human trafficking networks through its presence.
63. The limited scope of the mandate, however, might decrease SNMG2’s impact. The main
obstacle to an expanded NATO mission in the Aegean is political will, not military might (Zhukov,
2016). The SNMG2 has proven through exercises that it would be capable of taking on a more
robust mandate. With the new mission, NATO faces a challenge to put the newly coined 360
degrees security vision into practice.
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VII.
INTERIM CONCLUSIONS
64. Strong naval forces in the Alliance, working in concert can and will serve as key protectors of
Allied interests and essential enablers of Allied power. The new momentum flowing toward
NATO’s maritime assets and naval readiness is on target for the coming challenges to the
European security environment; almost all of which have a maritime component to them.
65. Equipping the current forces must remain a focus for all Alliance member states. Renewed
attention to European member state naval capabilities can serve as a kind of American
Reassurance Initiative to assuage Washington’s concerns that its transatlantic allies continue to
fail to invest sufficiently in their defence institutions. The following are interim points of
consideration for NATO member state parliamentarians.
66. Greater NATO-EU Maritime Cooperation: There is much overlap between NATO’s 2011
AMS and the EU’s 2014 Maritime Security Strategy. There continues to be much discussion about
pairing NATO-EU maritime assets to defend common interests in the seas surrounding Europe
and beyond, but relatively little concrete action. Though this may change in the wake of the EU
‘global strategy’ publication in June 2016, partnering with NATO in areas of common concern
would be a good start; particularly taking on some of the lower-end tasks that NATO forces will no
longer focus on as it shifts the role of the SNF in maritime strategy.
67. Reforming Existing Operations: The maintenance of Operation Active Endeavor in the
Mediterranean is essential, but it needs to adapt even more to the realities of the rapidly evolving
security environment, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean.
68. Autonomous Vessels and Future Naval Fleets – Much like the advent and adoption of
RPAs (Remotely Piloted Aircraft - drones) as valuable ISR and strike platforms for air forces,
autonomous underwater vehicles will soon become the norm for naval forces. NATO’s Center for
Maritime Research and Experimentation considers autonomous underwater vehicles as critical
enablers for future naval forces, playing important roles in tasks such as mine counter measures
and even anti-submarine warfare. The real immediate benefits are more likely to be in the arenas
of mine detection and search and rescue capacities, rather than hunting down strategic nuclear
forces.
69. The benefits of autonomous underwater vehicles are clear. First, they are, on the whole
cheaper to build and operate, and often faster than traditional vessels. Second, and perhaps most
importantly, they keep the man out of the minefield, but in the operational loop. NATO
Parliamentarians should consider encouraging the expansion of research and incorporation of
autonomous naval vessels into their fleets, as they reverse the crippling trend of ever-more
expensive platforms and can likely save lives in times of conflict.
70. Continued Allied Buy-In – The examples set by the increasing naval contributions of the
larger powers in the Alliance, particularly the US’s European Reassurance Initiative commitments
and the new contributions of the UK to MARCOM’s efforts, should serve as a signal to other more
powerful member states that the time to focus on NATO’s standing naval forces is now. Large
power contribution to the SNF can and will serve as a signal to the United States that European
powers are serious about their future security and are willing to invest in it today. Further, they can
serve as essential leaders for all other member states seeking to work with NATO. Focusing on
contributing to NATO’s maritime assets on hand will also endow the VJTF with the follow-on
capacity necessary to be the deterrent force all Allies want it to be.
71. Port Security Equals Alliance Security – As noted above, the threat to NATO member
states domestic security is high in an era when the volume and pace of sea trade is constantly
growing. Defence matters involved with attention to port security are clear; this means that thinking
about and working towards greater defence is not just a matter for Defence Ministries, but also it
involves the private sector as the losses from a potential attack will affect them directly as well. As
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such, greater effort should be made to bring in the private sector to help find the necessary
technological and best practices fixes to address the gaps in knowledge about what is flowing in
and out of Allied ports.
72. Readiness for New Challenges – There are many challenges that will lie ahead in the
arena of maritime security and readiness. Thinking creatively now about new forms of resilience is
important. For example, NATO member state parliamentarians could question their own home
navies about the percentage of their domestic Merchant Marine fleets that could be repurposed
quickly in a time of crisis. Another point for consideration would be the amount of ice-enabled hull
ships NATO has available as it is clear that operations, exercises, and shipping in the High North
will likely increase as Arctic ice coverage recedes due to global warming.
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