Hemisphere Backgrounder: February 2016
Colombian Peace Negotiations: the Long Road to Resolution1
CCA Fellow: Stephen J. Randall FRSC*
With the deadline looming for an agreement between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the
FARC negotiators it is timely to recall the torturous course that peace negotiations have taken in Colombia
and the issues which remain. Critical as it is to bring the current negotiations to a successful conclusion,
there are few who believe that this agreement alone will resolve the long history of violence and criminal
activity, the massive challenge of the millions of displaced persons, land restitution and the meaningful
reintegration of combatants into mainstream Colombian society.
This is not to deny that peace with FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) has massive
symbolic and substantive importance in moving the country toward a more stable and equitable society.
The following short article traces the evolution of the insurgent groups, the decades of conflict and the
halting steps toward resolution.
The Historical Background:
Peace negotiations with Colombia’s main insurgent groups- FARC-EP (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia- People’s Army), ELN (National Liberation Army), EPL (People’s Liberation Army), M-19
(19th of April Movement) - have a lengthy history. Of the four main guerrilla groups, FARC and the ELN
remain active. The ELN remains outside the peace negotiations, as do some of the FARC fronts.
Colombian insurgent groups emerged in the context of the Cold War, the Cuban and Chinese Revolutions
and the domestic Colombian political dynamic generated by the lengthy and violent civil war, La
Violencia, in the late 1940s and 1950s. FARC, the ELN and EPL all emerged in the 1960s. FARC was
established as a Marxist-Leninist movement dedicated to agrarianism and anti-imperialism. It was and has
remained a peasant movement although in the course of its history it also developed strong urban cells.
The ELN was founded on the basis of a blend of liberation theology, hence the importance of radical
Roman Catholic priests in the movement, and Marxist ideology. The smallest of the main insurgent groups,
the EPL, was an offshoot of the tiny Colombian Communist Party. At least for part of its history it adhered
to a Maoist philosophy. M-19, in contrast, emerged in the early 1970s in the aftermath of the widely
regarded fraudulent election of 1970 which witnessed the defeat of the followers of former military
1
Note: Information in this article is drawn in large part from my book, Colombia-United States Relations since 1974 (Bogota:
Random House, 2016)
Hemisphere Background Series: February 2016
president, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. More urban than rural, M-19’s leaders espoused a mixture of socialism
and populism. By the early 1980s it was second in numbers only to FARC.
Except for a brief period of U.S.-supported counter-insurgency in the early 1960s, and until cocaine altered
the entire political and economic dynamic in the country starting in the late 1970s, insurgent membership
was small. Their movements were isolated and contained or even ignored. The emergence of the Medellin
narcotics Cartel under Pablo Escobar and the Cali Cartel under the Rodriguez Orejuela brothers and the
expansion of coca growing, processing and global export revolutionized the funding sources for insurgent
groups.
The insurgents also significantly stepped up their military operations. In the course of the 1980s and 1990s
FARC came to dominate the countryside with Colombian security forces focused more on a strategy of
containment than offense. M-19 engaged in a dramatic hostage taking at the Embassy of the Dominican
Republic in Bogotá in 1980 and in 1985 seized the Palace of Justice. During the military siege of the Court
building that followed, most members of the Supreme Court, many staff and the insurgents were killed.
By the early 1980s both U.S. and Colombian officials had begun to talk of a NARC-FARC connection.
The Failure of Political Integration in the 1980s:
FARC had no political wing until the 1980s when, encouraged by the openness of the Belisario Betancur
government to negotiations, it joined a coalition of insurgents, which included the ADO (Movimiento de
Autodefensas Obrera), two demobilized fronts of the ELN, and the Communist Party to establish the
Patriotic Union Party. The party platform was not especially revolutionary, in spite of the vitriolic and
violent response that its formation sparked on the right. It advocated an economy independent of global
capitalism, agrarian reform and the nationalization of natural resources. Its candidates demonstrated
considerable electoral appeal at the municipal and departmental levels and to some extent at the national
level, but its leaders, candidates and supporters were targeted by right wing death squads. As a result, the
party was abandoned shortly after the 1990 elections.
The experience of the UP in the 1980s continues to feed FARC’s and other insurgent’s suspicions about
meaningful negotiations and the willingness of traditional conservative elites to accept the left into the
mainstream of Colombian political life. Jacobo Arbenz, for instance, was considered the main intellectual
leader of the UP in the 1980s and he has been an important figure in current peace negotiations.
Negotiations with the EPL during the administration of Virgilio Barco at the end of the 1980s led to the
demobilization of a number of its members in 1991. The main group remained active and concentrated in
the northwest Urabá region. The subsequent administration of Cesár Gaviria also briefly pursued
negotiations with FARC and other groups following the violence marred 1990 presidential election which
witnessed the narco assassination of Luis Carlos Galán, the Liberal candidate whom Gaviria replaced.
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In the early 1990s the insurgent alliance, the Simon Bolivar Coordinating Group, composed of FARC, the
ELN, and the EPL, continued their primary strategy to maintain their rural enclaves, engage in hit and run
tactics against military and police forces, disrupt oil pipeline and electrical facilities, kidnap and extort
those with the capacity to pay, and engage in terrorist actions in the cities.
By the 1990s, FARC had shown considerable growth since the 1970s, with 49 Fronts operating throughout
the country and the ELN with 34. In the course of the decade FARC established its presence in an estimated
57% of all Colombian municipalities. In 1991 Gaviria initiated talks with the guerrillas in an effort to
reduce violence while promising some of the smaller groups which had demobilized assistance with social
reintegration. The administration pressed the active guerrilla groups for cease-fire terms, a cessation of
attacks on military and civilian targets and a movement toward disarmament. After a year of frustration in
pursuit of a policy of accommodation the administration ended talks and moved to the offensive.
Failure of Peace Negotiations and increased militarization:
For the balance of the decade the security situation continued to deteriorate along with severe economic
challenges. Paramilitary operations against the left, FARC kidnappings and killings, further displacement
of rural people, and the tainted presidency of Ernesto Samper had the country reeling by the time Andrés
Pastrana gained the presidency in 1998. There had been no progress on peace negotiations during the
Samper presidency (1994-98), although the ELN agreed to discussions under German mediator Werner
Mauss. They refused to meet with Colombian government representatives.
Pastrana in contrast came to office with a firm commitment to engage in serious negotiations with FARC.
That ambition quickly ran up against the reality of FARC’s strength. Pastrana met with FARC leader
Manuel Marulanda while president-elect and indicated in his inaugural address that he would be seeking
negotiation.
Yet only two days after his inauguration the Colombian military suffered one of its most humiliating
defeats at the hands of FARC at the military and national police base at Miraflores in Guaviare department.
The massive FARC attack involving some 1200 FARC combatants killed thirty police and soldiers,
wounded more than fifty and 100 were taken prisoner. In a simultaneous attack near a displaced persons
camp in Antioquia, FARC used a high pressure pump to spray gasoline on soldiers before setting them on
fire with grenades. The message was clear: FARC would negotiate from a position of strength.
Pastrana persisted and against considerable political and military opposition embraced the FARC request
to establish a demilitarized zone to facilitate negotiations. Once established the zone was massive,
comprising some 42,000 square kilometers of territory in the southeastern departments of Meta and
Caquetá.
The zone remained in place until February 2002, accomplishing nothing in terms of advancing peace, but
leaving FARC with a free hand to tax the local population, recruit and train more combatants, engage in
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narcotics trafficking, and seek legitimate belligerent status internationally. Throughout what passed for
negotiations FARC leaders consistently argued they would not engage in a cease fire let alone surrender
weapons as long as the paramilitaries operated with seeming impunity.
International Support for Peace:
Supporters of negotiated peace nonetheless persisted. In April 2001 delegates from twenty-three countries,
including Canada, Cuba, Mexico, France, Italy, Switzerland and Venezuela, accepted an invitation to
participate in a discussion in the demilitarized zone and to establish a commission to facilitate future
negotiations.
In January 2002, shortly before the end of the zone, FARC representatives met in the presence of
representatives of the International Facilitating Commission, the United States and the Roman Catholic
Church. All parties agreed that a negotiated political settlement was the desired path to peace. Yet, by that
time the U.S-Colombian Plan Colombia was in place and by the end of the Pastrana administration the
first of the military provisions under the Plan were arriving in the country.
Although the Plan included funding for justice reform, alternative crop programs, social and economic
assistance to address the challenge of the displaced, the bulk of the billions of dollars in US assistance
over the next decade was targeted at both counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency operations. The alQaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on 9/11 significantly altered the U.S. role. FARC and the ELN
were now designated terrorist organizations and funding that had previously only been available for the
counter-narcotics programs could now be used against the insurgents.
‘Mano Dura’ Under Uribe:
Militarization of the conflict under Plan Colombia dominated the administration of Alvaro Uribe Vélez.
At the outset, his administration offered conditional amnesty to FARC, the ELN and for the first time to
the AUC (United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia), the umbrella paramilitary organization. The Uribe
administration also held discussions with the ELN though Mexican facilitator Andrés Valencia, but there
was no resolution, and the ELN continued to reject a ceasefire. The conditional amnesty offer had little
appeal to the guerrillas, but over the next few years an estimated 30,000 paramilitaries demobilized under
the provisions of the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, which complemented previous legislation providing
for the demobilization of illegal armed groups.
Although focused on the demobilization of paramilitary groups, the provisions of and experience with the
Peace and Justice Law are instructive in terms of what can be expected from current negotiations with
FARC. The legislation rejected any general amnesty, providing instead a transitional justice process
facilitating the trial, conviction and sentencing of paramilitary leaders for crimes committed. The
legislation also established CNRR (the National Commission for Reparations and Reconciliation),
indicative of the need to ensure that victims of violence had the right to redress.
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While the administration was implementing the demobilization of the main paramilitary groups it
intensified its military operations against FARC, in the process establishing a state presence in areas of the
country long neglected by the state. In the course of the eight years during which Uribe held office FARC’s
leadership cadre was severely weakened by targeted killings and sustained military campaigns amidst
widespread concerns over human rights violations and the further displacement of rural and small town
people by the violence.
Focused Negotiations under Santos:
With FARC weakened militarily and increasingly marginalized by the end of the Uribe presidency, the
circumstances thus seemed conducive to renewed negotiations when Juan Manuel Santos, Uribe’s heir
designate, was elected President in 2010. Although initial indications were that Santos would simply
follow the program established by Uribe, Santos instead shifted the focus from a military defeat of FARC
to a negotiated settlement, a shift in emphasis which alienated Uribe, who has run a very public and angry
campaign against the negotiations.
By mid-2012 Santos had appointed his negotiating team, led by former vice-president Humberto de la
Calle, which met initially in Oslo, Norway and subsequently in Havana. The more than thirty rounds of
negotiations since then have been challenging, marred by ongoing FARC attacks in spite of repeated
commitments to a cease fire. The Colombian military has also continued to bomb FARC positions, except
for a brief halt in early 2015 and a more successful one that began in mid-2015.
Negotiators have nonetheless reached tentative agreements on agrarian reform, with a commitment to
address rural poverty and curb landholding inequality, cooperation on controlling narcotics trafficking and
the right of demobilized FARC members to participate fully in democratic politics once the peace
agreement has been concluded. That agreement includes a guarantee of security for members of any
political party which may be formed, an effort to avoid what had happened to the Patriotic Union Party in
the 1980s.
By early 2016 there was a commitment to establish a Truth Commission to determine responsibility for
war crimes. Those who fully confess to crimes would receive non-prison sentences of two to eight years
during which they would have restricted liberty and would perform acts of reparation to victims. The
parties also agreed to establish a tripartite monitoring and verification group composed of the Colombian
government, FARC and an international component under the UN. The UN Security Council passed a
resolution to that effect in early 2016, committing to a twelve-month monitoring mission to verify the
definitive bilateral ceasefire and cessation of hostilities.
Challenges Which Remain:
The post-conflict status of FARC members has remained a critical obstacle to a final agreement. There is
widespread opposition in Colombian society to a complete amnesty for FARC leaders and scepticism
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about what “restricted liberty” will mean in practice. As a reflection of that sentiment in December 2014
thousands of citizens marched through the streets of Bogotá in opposition to any general amnesty for those
who have engaged for years in killing, kidnapping, extortion and other crimes.
FARC leaders, who have for decades portrayed themselves as an armed political movement seeking justice
for those Colombians they claim to represent, have resisted being treated as criminals, and they have been
slow to apologize to those who have been victimized by their violence. They have expressed opposition
to overly harsh legal penalties within Colombia as well as strong opposition to the possibility of extradition
to the United States.
A number of U.S. extradition requests remain outstanding, including for at least one of the current
negotiators. FARC leaders look to the experience of former FARC leader Ricardo Palmera, alias Simón
Trinidad, who is currently serving a sixty-year prison term in a maximum security facility in Colorado.
FARC has consistently demanded his release without success. Nor has the U.S. government committed to
removing the terrorist designation from FARC.
Equally disturbing is the concern that FARC negotiators cannot control all of their Fronts. FARC’s First
Front in southern Colombia has indicated they will not adhere to any agreement, and there is concern that
other Fronts that are closely tied to the narcotics industry will remain active. Among those former guerrillas
and paramilitaries who demobilized over the past decade recidivism is estimated at 24%. Without
meaningful alternative employment opportunities for demobilized insurgents, the majority of whom have
known no other life for the past decades, maintaining peace will be a challenge.
These concerns aside, the conclusion of a formal peace agreement between Colombian authorities and
FARC-EP after a half century of conflict has tremendous symbolic and substantive importance as one step
in the challenging process of moving the country toward a resolution of longstanding political, economic
and social inequalities. The peace agreement will be a beginning not an end to addressing those challenges.
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* Stephen J. Randall, FRSC, (PhD Toronto 1972), is Professor Emeritus and Faculty Professor at the University of Calgary. He served as Dean,
Faculty of Social Sciences (1994-2006) at the University. He was director the Latin American Research Centre (2010-14) He held previous
appointments at McGill University and the University of Toronto. He is an elected Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, a Senior Fellow in the
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary and a Fellow of the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History. He
was a member of the editorial board of the Latin American Research Review (2004-2009), and co-editor of International Journal of the Canadian
Institute for International Affairs. He is a member of the Board of the Canadian Council for the Americas-Alberta.
In recognition of his work on Colombian history and foreign policy he holds the National Order of Merit, Grand Cross, and the Order of San Carlos
from the Foreign Ministry of Colombia. In 2012 he received the Lifetime Public Service Award from the Canadian Council for the Americas.
Randall has served with the United Nations, Organization of American States and Carter Center in international election supervision in the Caribbean,
Latin America and Southeast Asia.
His Latin American focused books include: The Diplomacy of Modernization: The United States and Colombia, 1920-1940 (1977); Hegemony and
Interdependence: Colombia and the United States (1992); An International History of the Caribbean Basin (1998, with Graeme S. Mount); the
authorized biography of Alfonso López Michelsen, President of Colombia (1974-1978), (2007). His study of Colombian-United States relations
since 1974, Not Just About Drugs, will be published by Random House Colombia in Spanish in 2016.
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