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Original: English
NATO Parliamentary Assembly
SUB-COMMITTEE ON
FUTURE SECURITY AND DEFENCE CAPABILITIES
MISSION REPORT
LORIENT, BREST, MARSEILLE AND
PARIS, FRANCE
6 – 9 JULY 2015
www.nato-pa.int
21 September 2015
This Mission Report is presented for information only and does not represent the official view of the
Assembly. This report was prepared by Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee.
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I.
INTRODUCTION
1.
Over the last few years, France has significantly increased its role as a provider of
international peace and security. France’s new leadership role in international security is evident
not only from its growing footprint as the leader of counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, but
also through its increased efforts in global peace operations with its Allies and partner nations. A
recent spate of domestic terrorist attacks in France, however, only underscores the increasing
realities of today’s security environment, which increasingly finds both domestic and international
security concerns interlinked.
2.
France is a stalwart NATO Ally; even exemplar for its commitment to maintaining
full-spectrum operational capacity in an era of significant declines in defence spending and
readiness throughout Europe. Today, France views the transatlantic security community as a
principal pillar of its future security. Though eager to be a real contributor to the future of the
Alliance, France also needs the support of allies and partners as its deals with an increasingly
complex security reality at home and abroad. France’s ability to respond to its increasing domestic
security challenges and its international responsibilities will likely be determinant of both its near as
well as long-term security.
3.
In light of the above, a delegation from the Sub-Committee on Future Security and Defence
Capabilities (DSCFC) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly visited France from 6-9 July 2015 to
better understand the country’s armed forces and current defence and security policies. Led by
DSCFC Chairman, Raymond Knops (Netherlands), and Defence Committee Chairperson,
Nicole Ameline (France), the delegation consisted of legislators from eight different NATO member
states. The parliamentary mission included visits to military bases in Lorient, Brest, and Marseille,
as well as a slate of high-level meetings with French officials in Paris.
4.
This mission report will progress thematically. First, it will engage with the changed, complex
security environment France is trying to manage both at home and abroad. It will then move on to
ends, ways, and means discussion of France’s current political priorities and the resources being
made available to achieve these goals. France’s understanding of Alliance priorities resonated
clearly throughout the parliamentary mission; they will feature prominently. Finally, a discussion of
France’s ability to maintain its desired strategic independence in an era wherein Allies are
increasingly finding themselves interdependent will conclude the report.
II.
FRANCE’S RAPIDLY EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
5.
2015 has been a challenging year for France. In January, the country was rocked by
coordinated violent terrorist attacks, rattling domestic perceptions of peace and security in free and
open democratic societies. The slaughter of many innocent civilians in the beginning of the year
has been followed by several other failed large-scale attacks on not only civilians, but also on
military and state institutions as well as other high-value industrial and civilian sites. The changing
tenor of the domestic security environment has come on top of a more activist France at the
international security level.
6.
Since the turn of the century, it has become increasingly clear that the international security
environment is achieving a never before seen level of complexity. The distributed nature of the
21st century landscape poses all NATO member states with a spectrum of threats: running from the
state to the non-state, in and out of the kinetic and cyber realms, in a morphing international
system plagued by failing states and ‘contested zones’, and increased competition for scarce
resources – all within a changing climate. As a strong power in the Alliance with a complicated
historical legacy and a current international power with global interests, France views itself as
imbued with a relatively unique role in the international security system: the maintenance of its own
vital interests, while also being a significant contributor to the security of its allies and partners.
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7.
The changing, dynamic security environment is having a dual effect on France’s security
thinking; this idea was reinforced by almost every speaker during a slate of meetings at the
Assemblée nationale and was a central message of the parliamentary mission. First, it has
reinforced the notion that domestic security is increasingly interlinked with international security.
Second, France as well as other member states needed to use the events of the last several years
to spur a much-needed re-investment in their transatlantic security bond via increased defence
investments and multilateral training efforts. Both of these points were particularly stressed by
Guillaume Schlumberger, Director for Defence Strategy, Counter Proliferation and Strategic
Foresight at the Defence Ministry, who stated: “France has made its choice, it is completely
invested in transatlantic security as a critical axis upon which our security will turn.”
8.
Hélène Duchêne, Director of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, encapsulated France’s security zeitgeist by stating: “Today, there is a greater
awareness of security issues than ever before. There is a common feeling that if we do not take
care of security, security will take care of us. No country is particularly well-equipped to handle the
security challenges lashing at the gates of Europe alone.” During his remarks,
Major General Grégoire de Saint-Quentin, Commander of French Special Forces, stated that:
“The new security dynamic – particularly the threat of terrorism – has dispersed the ability to
commit high-levels of violence. As a result states are finding it increasingly challenging to
guarantee security for their populations.” As such, all states, he noted would be faced with
increasingly complex and diverse terrorism threats.
A. STEPPING UP ITS ROLE IN THE GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM
9.
For several years, France has been stepping up its contribution to the global fight on
terrorism. It has become the de facto leader in the Sahel as a result of its willingness to take on a
broad area of responsibility. Clearly, France’s drive to assume operational control over large
swathes of its former colonial empire in the area, denotes an understanding that it feels both it is
within its interests and duty bound to help bring peace and stability to the region. In addition,
France has been a stalwart supporter of the US-led campaign against ISIS in both Iraq and Syria.
10. As a result of its increased international security footprint, many voices have been raised in
France noting that the rise in domestic terrorism was clear blowback for its policies. When
questioned about this by different members of the delegation, there seemed to be a clear
consensus among French officials that, despite a degree of blowback, the only way forward for
French security was through increased engagement at both the international and domestic levels.
The reason for such an understanding, it became clear, was that, despite efforts by French
intellectuals, pundits, and politicians to paint it as such, the rise in domestic security threats is not
unique to France. France faces the same complex security environment as many other states
within the Alliance and, in addition to maintaining a full spectrum of capabilities, reinforcing Alliance
solidarity, capabilities, and interoperability is the only way forward. No state, no matter how
powerful, is capable of handling all of today’s security challenges alone.
11. As such, insight into how France is responding to the challenges imposed upon in served as
a framework for the parliamentary visit.
III.
TAKING ACTION AT HOME AND ABROAD
12. A quick answer to the above question is: France is reconfiguring and strengthening its
internal security services and increasing its role as a provider of international peace and security.
After a number of years of steady declines in spending on its armed forces, France has done an
about-face in 2015. An April adjustment to its proposed defense spending for the next five years
will increase spending by 3.8 billion Euros. In addition and concurrent with the visit of the DSCFC
delegation, both houses of French parliament voted through a relatively ambitious military
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programming law (Loi de Progammation militaire) that will give the necessary legal framework to
set into action an ambitious asset acquisition programme and institutional restructuring as a means
of lending greater dynamism to French defence institutions tasked with an increasingly complex
security environment.
13. A particular focus of France’s spending increase and internal restructuring centers on the
honing agility and adeptness in responding to not only short-term threats and crises, but also to the
long-term challenges that the country and its allies can expect over the horizon. A renewed
programme of domestic security reinforcement in the wake of a spate of domestic terrorist attacks
this year is a first priority. To get there, domestic intelligence institutions will be strengthened and
resourced to increase manpower for analysis and data collection (both on the ground human
intelligence and various technologically-enabled data collection). In addition, intelligence agencies
will benefit from new Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platform acquisition to
expand the breadth and depth of its perspective and understanding.
14. Guillaume Schlumberger underscored these points to the group by noting that, “the January
attacks reinforced the understanding of the link between domestic threats and the necessity for
external action. France is responding to terrorist actions in Africa and the Middle East and working
to stabilize the homefront as well.” Schlumberger also noted that there is also a collective security
question facing the Alliance [NATO]: “France is doing its part to help by lending ISR assets, moving
hard military assets to the eastern flank, and clearly still has nuclear capabilities as well.”
Schlumberger stated that France is working to attain the means to defend French and Alliance
interests, noting that recent trends to reduce the number of armed forces had been stopped and, to
a degree, reversed. He continued by stating that France’s defence budget will rise to over
34 billion Euros by 2019; of which 19 billion Euros will be dedicated to new equipment purchases.
He concluded that the French Defence Ministry understood the need for a stronger NATO Alliance,
and that “France is happy to see that many Allies are taking the same steps to reinvest in defence
as well.”
A. THE GROWING BURDEN OF EXTERNAL OPERATIONS
15. The evolving international security environment has made it increasingly difficult for France to
sustain its relatively extensive external operations (OPEX). France currently commits a significant
number of its forces abroad for a variety of missions from counterterrorism in the Sahel to peace
and stability operations with its international partners in many other corners of the globe. To date,
France leads or has committed forces in West Africa across the Sahel and into Central Africa,
along the Horn of Africa, in the Middle East, and significant presences in the Atlantic, Indian, and
Pacific Oceans. France has approximately 7,000 military personnel deployed in OPEX, another
28,000 French forces on permanent rotation among France’s global air, land, and sea bases, and
another 7,000 activated for Operation Sentinelle, a domestic counterterrorism operation. Still,
civilian defence experts reminded the delegation that France’s OPEX expenditures had been
affected greatly by the unpredictability of international events, noting that the Defence Ministry had
set aside 450 million Euros for OPEX in 2014, when the real price tag came out to
1,2 billion Euros.
16. As the delegation learned from Lieutenant General Eric Margail, Commander French Rapid
Reaction Corps, France’s military efforts in Africa in particular have required significant investment
in new OPEX capacities. The French have honed their ability for rapid response, and understood
the need for increased ISR capabilities. Logistical capability is still being reviewed and new
investment in heavy lift capacity is also underway.
17. LtGen Margail continued by noting that, “the menace of international jihadism is encroaching
European territory and it is increasingly difficult to defend against it.” As General de Saint-Quentin
stated, “the threat of terrorism is forcing a renewed look at force agility in particular, what formula
will work best to be able to maneuver fire and manpower quickly and effectively where it is needed
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is the order of the day.” Both Generals noted that France is one of the few nations in the world
today that has such a high level of operational experience. France’s rapid response capacity
remains exemplary, the example of France’s response in Central Africa in 24 hours was cited as a
clear success of this capability. A key element to France’s rapid response capacity is due to a
renewed focus on its Special Forces.
B. FRENCH SOF TODAY
18. The role of Special Operational Forces (SOF) in today’s security environment cannot be
underestimated. Special Forces are the spearhead of any modern force, providing the on-theground intelligence in difficult-to-reach areas and the ability for rapid and precise operations, if
necessary. In addition, the delegation learned, that French Special Forces provide value far
beyond their kinetic operations abilities, as they work closely with Allies and partners to provide
critical training and assistance, as well as crucial intelligence capacities. As Major General SaintQuentin stated: “The ability of SOF to respond quickly and with the appropriate tactics is vital in
today’s threat environment. SOF is based on anticipation and the ability to integrate players with
the best intelligence for close, effective coordination – we see it as a three-level partnership
between the services, domestic defence institutions, and Allies.” As the delegation discussed
learned from Saint-Quentin, this is the best defence for the national interests of all of the Allies.
19. When discussing the example of the campaign against Daesh in Syria and Iraq,
Saint-Quentin noted that, in order to weaken the armed group on all sides, the Allied effort required
the high-levels of cooperation that the NATO SOF network provides for effective intelligence,
cooperation with local forces on the ground, and precision strike capabilities. As he stated, “the
NATO SOF community understand each other and has the same vision – by our size and vision,
we function at a plug and play level.” When asked by a member of the delegation what still needed
to be done to hone the capacities of the French SOF even further, Saint-Quentin stated that the
ability to deploy command and control capabilities to any area quickly could still be improved. In
addition, he said that the SOF toolkit still needed more lift capacity, fine-tuned ISR technologies,
aerial refueling among others to build out its operational toolkit.
20. The delegation was able to have first-hand experience with the French SOF during its visit
where it was briefed on various aspect of French SOF and then was given a static and dynamic
demonstration of various capabilities.
IV.
FRANCE IN NATO
21. All of the military interlocutors with whom the delegation interacted stated that interoperability
is key to the future. They underscored France’s significant experience in working with Allies
already, and noted that it had been an essential key to their success in OPEX. Prepositioning and
rapidity of deployment to command and control to maintaining the full spectrum of capabilities
remain essential to the future of France’s military forces, and French forces’ abilities would be
multiplied through closer partnership with Allies.
22. France is a founding member of NATO and was initially the host of its institutions, but France
decided to leave the integrated military facility in 1966 for “reasons of national sovereignty.” France
officially returned to the NATO Command Structure in April 2009, but with certain conditions
attached such as: independence vis-à-vis operations, remaining outside of the Nuclear Planning
Group (NPG), no requirement to participate in financing equipment decided upon before
reintegration, and that France will head Allied Command Transformation. France is currently the
third largest contributor to the Alliance common funding. France’s place in NATO was cemented in
the 2013 Defence White Paper, which noted that French security could not be conceived of outside
of the transatlantic Alliance.
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23. Hélène Duchêne noted that, while it was clear that the United States still represents the
ultimate security guarantee for many European states, particularly because of its NATO
commitments, Washington has noted the increased importance of the EU in foreign policy and
would like it to play a larger role in the security arena as well. She continued to note that France
understands the role it must play in both the EU as well as NATO. She made it clear that, if other
European nations are willing to undertake their respective responsibilities then the region would be
able to rise to meet almost any challenge faced.
24. When asked about France’s positions on the upcoming Warsaw Summit, Duchêne noted that
France will continue to evaluate how to allocate its time and resources to NATO’s challenges.
Another member questioned how France planned to respond to escalation on the eastern flank.
Duchêne noted that flexibility of response would be the central driving factor; this is why France will
be a framework nation to the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) in 2022.
25. Duchêne continued by stating that effective defence planning in the Alliance is essential and
that the political guidance (published just prior to the visit) would be the principal driver. A key
breakthrough in the guidance, she continued, may be the call for improved joint ISR in NATO.
Maritime security and power projection is also important to the Alliance, she noted and stated that
France will work to adapt the maritime component to the Readiness Action Plan (RAP). She
concluded by stating that: “The Alliance needs to adapt and change to be able to share and
contribute more; not only at the transatlantic level, but also at the European level. France will work
to further EU and NATO cooperation.”
26. In general, the principal takeaway for members from the discussion with Ms Duchêne about
France and NATO is that: The EU, NATO, and France can do much more to integrate their
common security policies and actions. The EU will only credible if it can lead and execute
operations, and NATO Allies need to increase their investments in Allied defence capabilities.
V.
STRATEGIC INDEPENDENCE IN AN ERA OF INCREASING INTERDEPENDENCE
27. France was quick to become a nuclear state in 1960, adding yet another layer of military
independence not only among the Euro-Atlantic security community, but also vis-à-vis France’s
global position. One of the central drivers behind France’s decision to leave the NATO command
structure in 1966 was a fierce desire to maintain this strategic independence it had acquired,
particularly when it came to any matter it viewed as central to the security of France. The
maintenance of this nuclear deterrent is still a central feature to France’s military posture today.
28. To garner greater insight into France’s nuclear deterrent Admiral Louis-Michel Guillaume
(Commander of Submarine and Strategic Oceanic Forces (ALFOST)) and General Bernard
Schuler (Commander Strategic Air Command) briefed the DSCFC delegation during their
meetings at the Assemblée nationale.
29. As both commanders noted to the delegation, the key foundations of the French nuclear
deterrence rely upon a relatively basic principle – backing the credibility of political messaging via
legitimate defence capacity, i.e. backing up rhetoric with capacity. In other words, vital French
interests will be backed by a credible nuclear force if necessary.
30. Regarding France’s strategic air force, 51 years of continuous operations (1964) have been
maintained by French Air Command. France guaranteed its strategic independence with the
launch of its first Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) in 1972. Ever since, France has maintained
a continuous, capable, and complementary air and sea deterrence posture. France’s nuclear
deterrence capabilities are purely defensive means. France has always maintained a nuclear
deterrence posture limited to only what was determined to be necessary and nothing more: the
posture has evolved over the years, but the central concept has remained basically the same – the
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ultimate guarantee of France’s vital interests. France’s nuclear assets are outside of NATO’s remit
– France does not take part in the Alliance’s Nuclear Planning Group.
31. Any one of France’s SSBNs can deliver up to 16 nuclear missiles, if called upon by the
President of the Republic. France’s air and sea nuclear assets are continuously updated to meet
the strict ‘sufficiency’ requirement of the President of France. France only has strategic nuclear
weapons, no tactical nuclear weapons.
32. The central question to deterrence, the delegation heard several times, is credibility. As a
result France’s nuclear forces continue to work to hone their accuracy – the new Medium Range
surface-to-air missiles (MRSAM), it was mentioned, are a perfect example of this. The delegation
was also reminded of the necessity of flexibility of use: General Schuler noted that France’s
nuclear air forces can ramp up and deploy as a means of showing force in times of crisis.
33. Future of the French Nuclear deterrent – regardless of the component, both elements (air
and sea) have undergone considerable upgrading/modernization to be able to continue into the
future. Future programmes are always looking out 15-20 years into the future: the reliability of the
systems is guaranteed for today, the renewal of the system scheduled for 2035.
34. France currently dedicates 3.6 billion Euros to maintain its nuclear deterrence capabilities,
equaling 11% of the current budget. When asked by a member of the delegation if this was
sustainable, the confident reply was, “Yes, this is certainly doable, but France is also always
reviewing its policy.”
35. Throughout the parliamentary mission, and particularly during the day of meetings with
French defence officials at the Assemblée nationale, the DSCFC delegation was constantly
reminded of the fact that, while France continued to view its strategic independence as vital, ever
closer partnership with its allies in the Euro-Atlantic security community is the necessary way
forward.
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