Whence American Internationalism
Author(s): Jeffrey W. Legro
Source: International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring, 2000), pp. 253-289
Published by: The MIT Press
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WhenceAmericanInternationalism
Jeffrey
W. Legro
One ofthemostinteresting
andimportant
puzzlesin international
relations
involves
theshiftin thedominant
ideas heldbyAmericansregarding
foreign
policyduring
thedominant
WorldWarII. Beforethatconflict,
Americanconceptionof effective
was unilateralism,
whichfavoredflexibility
andeschewedstanding
institustrategy
tionalaffiliations
ortiestoothergreatpowersentailing
a precommitment
ofmilitary
force.Yet in thatwar,Americansacceptedas theirnew orthodoxy
thepreviously
chastisedinternationalism,
whichembracedan activerole in international
institutionsand shattered
thetabooagainststanding
involvement
in Europe'sgreatpower
politics.This shiftis puzzling,notbecauseit occurredbutbecauseit did notoccur
WorldWarI orduring
theGreatDepression.Thelag is imporearlier,
especiallyafter
tantbecauseanalystswidelybelievethattheUnitedStates'refusaltoprovideinternationalleadershipin the 1920s and 1930s significantly
worsenedtheGreatDepresthatfostered
totalitarian/fascist
sion,helpedproduceconditions
regimes,
encouraged
andJapan'saggression,
Germany's
andcontributed
tothescaleandviolenceofWorld
War11.1Why,then,in contrast
to itspositionduringWorldWarII, did theUnited
commitments
Statesnotembraceinternational
vis-a-vistheEuropeanpowsecurity
ersafterWorldWarI?
Thisquestioncarriesmorethanhistorical
interest.
Manyofthepressing
contemporaryissuesofworldpoliticshingeon thelikelihoodofchangeinnationalideasabout
international
Scholarstodayargueoverwhether
security.
Japanwill adhereto its
oradoptanautonomous,
militarist
whether
viewofsecurity,
pacifistic
postwar
thinking
Dale Copeland,AndrewErdmann,
For comments
on earlierdrafts,
I am grateful
to MichaelBarnett,
PeterKatzenstein,
David Lake, Ido
MarthaFinnemore,
Paul Freedman,JohnIkenberry,
lain Johnston,
Len Schoppa,David Waldner,
Alexander
Wendt,thereviewers
andeditors
Oren,JohnOwen,Dan Reiter,
inseminars
ofHarvardUniversity,
the
ofInternational
Organization,
andparticipants
attheOlinInstitute
I thankKellyErickson
University.
University
ofChicago,Stanford
University,
and GeorgeWashington
forStrategicStudiesand the
and Rob Martinforresearchassistanceand theJohnM. Olin Institute
University
ofVirginiaforfinancial
support.
1. The listhereincludesscholars,suchas Costigliola1984; Kindleberger
1973; and Gaddis 1972,2,
D. Roosevelt,Dean Acheson,Walt
18-20,23-24; andpolicyofficials,
suchas HenryStimson,Franklin
See Kuklick1970,614-15.
Rostow,andLyndonJohnson.
International
Organization
54, 2, Spring2000,pp. 253-289
? 2000 byThe 10 Foundation
Institute
ofTechnology
andtheMassachusetts
254 International
Organization
Chinais headingtowarda Russian-style
liberalization
ora medievalsiegementality.
Likewise,scholarsdisagreeaboutwhether
Germany
willonedayoverthrow
itsmultilateral
mindsetandreturn
to an autarkicapproachto worldpolitics.Perhapsmost
important
forthefuture
ofworldpolitics,somewonderwhether
willonce
Americans
commitments.
againrefuseinternational
security
Buttoevenbegintoaddressthesepossibilities,
we needsomegeneralunderstanding of whystatesfundamentally
changetheirlong-heldideas towardinternational
a surgeofrecentworkhas demonstrated
affairs.
Although
theusefulness
of analyzingcollectiveideas as a structural
littleattention
force,relatively
has beenpaid to
whyideas themselves
sometimes
changequiterapidlyin a discontinuous
fashion.2
Constructivist
scholarswhohavemostsystematically
studiedthecollectivenatureof
ideas havebegunto addresschangefromtwodirections.
One grouphighlights
promutualconstitution,
cess, be it through
communicative
structure-agent
actions,or
new socialization.3
A secondgroupstressestheimportance
of agentsin remaking
ideas.4Although
each of thesegeneralapproachesto changehas beenfruitful,
both
witha fundamental
issue:how is it thatindividualswhoholddiffering
struggle
or
evensimilarideasaccomplishchangein collectiveideasin somecircumstances
but
notothers?The answerto thisquestion,I argue,dependson thedynamicrole of
ideationalstructure
itself.
ofideationalchange.
thisinfluence
Understanding
requiresa reconceptualization
Suchchange,insteadofbeingviewedas a singlephenomena,
is moreusefully
thought
of as havingtwoideal stages(which,in practice,areoftendifficult
to disentangle).
ortacitly,
thattheold ideational
First,socialactorsmustsomehowconcur,explicitly
structure
is inadequate,thuscausingits collapse.Second,actorsmustconsolidate
somenewreplacement
setofideas,lesttheyreturn
to theold orthodoxy
simplyas a
Efforts
forchangein bothstagesare challengedby collective
defaultmechanism.
ideationproblems
thatmakecoordination
difficult
and/or
incentives
giveindividuals
toshirkefforts
tochallengedominant
beliefs.
barriersdeWhethersocietieseffectively
transcend
collapse and consolidation
in its own transformationpendsin parton therole of theideationalstructure
theinteraction
ofideationally
andtheconsespecifically
shapedsocialexpectations
events.Changein collectiveideas is muchmorelikelyto
quencesof experienced
occurunderthreeconditions:
(1) wheneventsgenerateconsequencesthatdeviate
fromsocialexpectations,
and(3)
(2) whentheconsequencesarestarkly
undesirable,
whena sociallyviablereplacement
andalternaidea exists.By shapingexpectations
has an irreducible
rolein change.Thuscomparable
societtives,ideationalstructure
ies withdifferent
ideaswillevolvedifferently
inreaction
dominant
tosimilarenvironmentalpressures.
2. See, forexample,VanEvera 1984; Rohrlich1987; Goldstein1993; Dobbins1994; Johnston
1995;
Legro 1995; Katzenstein1996a,b;Kier 1997; and Berger1998. My aim is to explainrelatively
rapid
transformations
ofideationalstructure,
notgradualstepsthatovertimecanproducefull-blown
alterations.
3. See Wendt1987and 1999;Johnston
1999;andRisse2000.
4. See Finnemore
1996;KeckandSikkink1998;andPrice1998.
AmericanInternationalism
255
This framework
is usefulin explainingtheenigmaticevolutionof U.S. foreign
I arguethatAmericanideationalcontinuity
policyin thetwentieth
century.
after
WorldWarI was a resultof thereinforcing
effect
ofthatconflict
on thepreexisting
Americanbeliefthatentanglement
in Europe'spolitical/security
affairswouldbe
harmful.
Hence theUnitedStatesdid notaddressitsinternational
problemsin the
1920sand 1930sbyinternationalist
fromsuch
initiatives;
insteaditfurther
withdrew
commitments.
This continuity
was notsimplya reflection
of thepower,threat,
or
conditions
ofthetimes,nordiditdirectly
technology
reflect
thedistribution
ofinterestsor social purposein society.By 1940-41,however,
of
Americanexpectations
whatshouldoccurin international
relationsweresharplyand disappointingly
confoundedbytheeventsleadingup toandculminating
inWorldWarII. Theresultwas
thedramaticshifttowardinternationalism
inAmericanconceptions
of security
that
preceded-andhencewas notcaused by-the Cold War.Thatthesameorientation
existstodayfurther
reinforces
its autonomyfromthe long bipolarU.S.-Soviet
confrontation.
Thisargument
providesleverageinexplaining
foreign
policybecauseithighlights
theautonomous
roleofideationalstructure
in change,clearlydistinguishing
itfrom
arguments
thatviewsocialbeliefsas simplywindsocksof environmental
pressures
or politicaltoolswieldedbypowerful
domesticelites.Empirically,
sucharguments
do notsatisfactorily
becausetheysugexplaintheriseofAmericaninternationalism
gestthatchangewas equallylikelyafterWorldWarI ortheGreatDepression.Coneffect:
thenecessary
roleofideasin
ceptually,
theyneglectan epistemic
endogenous
theirowntransformation.
My pointis notthatideationalchangeis reducibleto the
samepreexisting
collectiveideas.Instead,I highlight
a generallogicthatexplicates
thewaythatideationalstructure
mediateswhichenvironmental
aremost
conditions
are mostopen to
likelyto producechange,indicateswhichideationalstructures
change,and accountsforwhysome actorsare able to sell new ideas whilemany
othersfail.The overallframework
seems applicableto ideationalcontinuity
and
ofissueareas,as I discussintheconclusion.
discontinuous
changeina number
The argument
takesshapein fiveparts.I first
and
specifyandmeasurecontinuity
thelogicofan epistemic
changeinU.S. foreign
policyideas.I thenpresent
approach
fromthe "epistemiccommunity"
I applythatap(whichis different
perspective).
proachto explainAmericanideationalcontinuity
and changeand thenconsiderits
in relationto competing
usefulness
explanations.
Finally,I discusstheimplications
oftheargument.
Ideas ofInternationalism,
1908-50
focusis thedominant
heldbeliefcharacMy explanatory
"episteme"(a collectively
a particular
oreffective
terizing
groupaboutappropriate
corporate
behavior)inU.S.
foreignpolicy.5In most societies one can findcompetingsets of ideas, but forthe
5. My use of epistemeand epistemicdiffers
fromboththedeep constitutive
of social
connotations
episteme,
suchas inRuggie1993;andtheexpertinterest
groupfocusofepistemic
community,
suchas in
Haas 1992.
256 International
Organization
sake of effective
actionone orthodoxy
tendsto dominatein thehierarchy
of such
sets.A number
ofrecentworkshavedemonstrated
theeffects
dominant
ideashavein
suchissueareasas macroeconomic
policy,economicdevelopment,
nationalsecurity,
foreign
economicpolicy,humanrights,
trade,monetary
policy,andinternal
security.6
The mostimportant
partofan epistemeis itscollectivenature:itis notsimplythe
sumof all theviewsof individuals
or groups;insteadit has a degreeof autonomy.
Collectiveideas are intersubjective
and distinctfromindividualbeliefs.Theyare
embodiedin symbols,discourse,andinstitutions.
typically
Individualsandtheirinteractions
influence
collectiveideas,buttheyalso mustconfront
theseideas
naturally
as "fact."7BenjaminPage andRobertShapirohavenotedthisqualityin theirstudy
of collectivepublicopinion.Analystsof organizations
have shownhow beliefsby
takeon uniquesymbolicimportance
andbecomean
whichgroupsorientthemselves
autonomous
forcein theirownright.8
Scholarsofinternational
relations
havedocumentedhow powerful
elitesmanipulate
imagesand thenbecomecapturedby such
notionsata latertime.9
Whatis less wellunderstood
is whysuchconceptual
orientationssometimes
radicallyshift.
Theinitialtask,then,is todocument
variation
inthedominant
Americanepisteme
on howbestto provideforsecurity
in majorpowerrelationsalongone keydimension:theAmerican
beliefinpursuing
international
relations
unilateral
means
through
insteadofinternationalist
policies.10
Unilateralism
impliesa beliefthatgoingitalone,
to othernations,particularly
thatis, avoidinginstitutional
commitments
military
bestservesthenationalinterest.
commitments,
Carriedto itsextreme,
unilateralism
imcan lead to isolationfrominternational
activities.
in contrast,
Internationalism,
pliesa beliefthatsocialwellbeingis bestservedbysupporting
international
institutionsandcommitting
nationalmilitary
powerto maintain
relationships
withthemajor powersin Europe.Whatis notableis thatAmericanviewstowardunilateralism
andinternationalism
havenotfluctuated
randomly
through
time.BeforeWorldWar
was unilateralist;
II, thedominant
orthodoxy
duringthewar,a shifttoan internationalistoutlookoccurred.
Thetransformation
is apparent
in severalmeasures.
One commonway to assess collectiveideas is through
symbolsand discourse.
One suchindicator
in theUnitedStatesis theritualized
Stateof theUnionaddress,
givenannuallybythepresident,
thatdiscussesforeign
policy.11
Thisspeechtendsto
be highlysymbolicandis rightly
seenas an effort
to capturethecharacter,
thought,
anddirection
ofthenation.12
Presidents
wanttopresenttheirideasin waysthatsell,
6. In additiontothecitations
infn.2, see Hall 1989;Sikkink1991;andMcNamara1998.
7. See Durkheim1964;Searle1995,23-26; andWendt1999.
8. See Page andShapiro1992,14-15,364-66; Selznick1949,69-70, 250-59; andCrozier1964,187.
9. See Snyder1991;Kupchan1994;Wohlforth
1993;Berger1998;andVanEvera1999.
of foreignpolicy-internationalist/
10. This continuum
is slightly
different
thanthetwodimensions
by some scholars.See, forexample,
isolationist
and nonmilitary
(or cooperative)/militant-identified
Cooper1969;andWittkopf
1990.
11.Forthefulltextsofthesespeeches,see Israel1966.
theyviewactionabroadandhowmuch
12. Klingberg
also examinesthesespeechesforhowpositively
and
timeis devotedto international
relations.Klingberg1952. He documentsperiodsof extroversion
Forstillanother
use ofthespeeches,see May
introversion,
insteadofunilateralism
andinternationalism.
1992.
AmericanInternationalism
257
6
f President
S
A
x St.Louis Post-Dispatch
New YorkTimes
13
Los AngelesTimes
ChiicagoTribune
AA AA
x.
2
1
f@
A
I
AA
o
.
1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936
1940 1944
1948
Year
FIGURE
1. American foreign policy episteme, 1908-50
andtheytendto rallysupport
andlegitimacy
and salutingsocialtradibyreflecting
tionsand norms.It is clearempirically
thattheseannualspeechesare muchmore
thansimplytheviewsof theindividualleaders,sincepersonalopinionsandpublic
discoursedo diverge."3
Because theaddressis annual,itprovidesonlya roughmeasureofthecontent
andtiming
ofchange,buttheuniform
context
andformat
makesit
a usefulpointofcomparison.
theresultsofa content
Figure1 presents
analysisofthesespeeches(see appendix
formethodology).
The solidlinein Figure1 indicatesthelevelof internationalism
as desirablein theStateoftheUnionaddressforthatyear.A scoreofzero
portrayed
reflectsthepositionthattheUnitedStatesshouldavoid becominginstitutionally
involvedin majorpowerinternational
relationsat all. Fromthisperspective,
the
UnitedStatesshouldliveandletlive,separatefromEurope.A scoreof5 reflects
the
viewthatU.S. security
is bestservedbytheUnitedStatesbeingactivelyintegrated
in
politicalmilitary
and makingprecommitaffairs,
joininginternational
institutions,
mentsofpoliticalandmilitary
powertoothermajorpowers.
To further
theviewsexpressedbythepresident
probewhether
collective
represent
or idiosyncratic
I have surveyedtheeditorialresponsesof fournewspasentiment,
persthatreflectdifferent
regionsand partisanleanings(see Figure1).14 These refororcriticism
ofthedegreeofunilatersponsesarecodedin termsoftheirsupport
alismand internationalist
themesin theStateof theUnionspeeches.If an editorial
13. See, forexample,theinternationalist
FranklinRoosevelt'sfavorablepronouncements
on isolationisminthe1930s.
14. TheNewYorkTimes,ChicagoTribune,
St.LouisPost-Dispatch,
andLos AngelesTimes.
258 International
Organization
calledformoreinternationalism
thanproposedby thepresident
in theaddressthat
year,thesymbolappearsabovethesolidline(byone-half
point);iftheeditorialand
thepresident
wereat aboutthesamelevel,thesymbolappearson theline;andifthe
editorial
favoredmoreunilateralism,
thesymbolappearsbelowtheline(byone-half
point).Collectively
thesetellus whether
theaddressroughly
reflected
broadersentiment.For example,if twoor threenewspapersdisagreedwiththeinternationalist
sentiment
in theoppositedirection,
in a speechwithno offsetting
sentiment
this
wouldsuggestthatthepresident's
viewsdid notresonatewiththoseofthebroader
15Although
nota perfect
society.
gaugebecauseofthelimitednatureoftheeditorial
responseson foreignpolicy,thespeeches,along witheditorialreactionsto them,
offer
a reasonable,
ofthedominant
collectiveideas
easilyreproducible
representation
on security
policybeforeandafterthetwoworldwars.
As shownin Figure1, WorldWarI producedverylittlechangein Americans'
to political-military
commitment
whereasWorldWarII led to a draunilateralism,
matictransformation.
Beforeandafter
WorldWarI thedebatefavoredmoreunilateralistideas. DuringWorldWarII, however,thismeasuretooka qualitative
leap towardhighlevelsofsupport
forinternationalism
andremained
thereafterthewar.
Thispresidential
measureis confirmed
bytheeditorial
responses,
whichtendedto
agreewithor collectivelyswarmaroundtheStateof theUnionaddress-thatis,
someagreed,somedisagreed.In onlyone yeardidthreeormoreeditorials
disagree
16In onlyfiveyears
withthesentiment
expressedin theStateof theUnionaddress.
withthesentiment
weretheretwoeditorialresponsesdisagreeing
expressedin the
addresswithoutanyothersdisagreeing
in an oppositedirection(theotherseither
atall).17Theseresultssuggestthereliabilagreedwiththespeechordidnotcomment
ityof the State of the Union addressas an indicatorof collectivesentimentpresidents
rarelyvoiceda foreign
policypositioncompletely
outoflinewithsociety,
especiallyinthehigh-profile
speechessurveyed.
Finally,theresultsin Figure1 aresupported
byan analysisofthevastsecondary
literature
thatcharacterizes
dominant
ideasbydrawing
on memoirs,
personalpapers,
andpublicopinion
speeches,archivalrecords,surveysofjournalsand newspapers,
data.Based on myreadingof theStateoftheUnionaddresses,inauguralspeeches,
of theevolutionof the
and thesecondaryliterature,
thefollowing
briefelaboration
on security
collectiveAmericanmindset
providessubstantive
depth.
TheLegacy
The originsof twentieth-century
Americanthought
can be tracedto thecountry's
Thoseleadersdidnotfavornoninvolvement
in theworld.Indeed,com"founders."
on
didnotcomment
15.Thereis nota symbolforeachpaperineveryyear,sincesometimes
aneditorial
theforeign
policyaspectsofa speech.
16.In 1915threeeditorials
favoredless internationalism,
andone agreedwiththesentiment
expressed
intheaddress.
In 1931
17.In 1926and 1928twofavoredmoreinternationalism,
anda thirdagreedwiththepresident.
In 1939and 1940twofavoredlessinternationalism,
twofavored
anda thirdagreed
moreinternationalism.
withthepresident.
259
AmericanInternationalism
was political-military
ties
mercewas seenas verydesirable.Whattheystigmatized
Everyyearsince
withmajorpowers(thatis, Europe)thatwouldentrapthecountry.
1796,GeorgeWashington's
"FarewellAddressto Congress"has beenreadaloudin
In ithe advises,"The greatruleofconductforus inregard
Congresson hisbirthday.
toforeign
ourcommercial
tohavewiththemas little
nationsis,inextending
relations
ourdestinywiththatof
politicalconnection
as possible.... Why,by interweaving
anypartofEurope,entangleourpeace andprosperity
inthetoilsofEuropeanambition,rivalship,interest,
humor,or caprice?It is our truepolicyto steerclear of
oftheforeign
permanent
allianceswithanyportion
world."
inhisfirst
ThomasJefferson,
inaugural
addresson4 March1801,echoedthesame
andhonestfriendship
withall nations,entantheme,declaring"Peace, commerce,
ofthedoctrine
that
glingallianceswithnone."Finally,JamesMonroe,theoriginator
statedthat"separatedas
declaredtheAmericasa havenfromEuropeancolonization,
we arefromEurope... we canhaveno concerninthewarsoftheEuropeanGovernmentsnorinthecauseswhichproducethem."18
The imprint
oftheseideas,morethantiredphrases,is evidentevenas theUnited
century.
Atthattime,the
Statesemergedas a greatpowerattheendofthenineteenth
UnitedStatesdidbecomemoreactiveintheinternational
a gradual
arena,indicating
evolutionawayfroman isolationist
formof unilateralism.
ButAmericanideas reTheodoreRoosevelt
mainedlargelylimitedin termsof international
commitments.
was themostaggressiveinternationalist
ofhisera,buthismodestpolicyofengagementmetrelatively
strongresistance.In sharpcontrast
to laterCold Warbeliefs,
noneofRoosevelt'simmediate
successorspubliclyagreedwithhimthattheUnited
StatesshouldupholdthebalanceofpowerinEurope.19
Continuity
AfterWorldWarI
In thepre-World
WarI period,thespeechesofWilliamHowardTaftandWoodrow
Wilsonshow continuity
acrosspoliticalparties.Both leadersrecognizedthatthe
butbothstrongly
reflected
traditional
UnitedStates'placeintheworldwas changing,
withothernations,
views.TheseleaderssawtheneedfortheUnitedStatestointeract
isolationenjoyedheretoparticularly
majorpowers,despitetherelativegeographic
had
fore.Buttheirmainemphasisinvolvedcommercial
activity-justas Washington
advocated.Taftand Wilsoncontinuedto view Europeas a sourceof danger,the
of militarism
decriedtheneedfora standing
army),and
instigator
(bothpresidents
thecause ofthemuch-despised
imperialism.
Thus,despitean increasedwillingness
in continental
Americanswerehesitantto interact
to engagecommercially,
power
I
and
the
States
This
became
clear
as
World
War
United
reluctance
politics.
erupted
triedtokeepitsdistance.Wilsonarguedin 1914thattheUnitedStatesmeant"to live
andletlive." He chidedthosethatwouldchange"a nationthatstakeditsverylifeto
Presidents
1961.
oftheAmerican
18.InauguralAddresses
19. See Osgood 1953,111-12;Dallek 1983,35; andEsthus1978.
260 International
Organization
freeitselffromtheveryentanglement
thathaddarkened
thefortunes
ofoldernations
here."20
andsetup a newstandard
inthewar,Wilsonbegantopreparethecountry
OncetheUnitedStatesintervened
fora newpeacetimedirection.
He arguedin December1919thattheUnitedStates'
place in theworldhad fundamentally
changed:"no policyof isolationwill satisfy
thegrowingneedsand opportunities
ofAmerica."'21But whathe was referring
to
werenotpoliticalandmilitary
butcommerce:
The UnitedStates
specifically
affairs,
had changedin thesensethatit was no longera debtor,buta creditor
and should
His speeches,judgingbyeditorialreacengagein theexpanding
economicmarket.
mixedreaction
tions,werereceivedwitheitherapprovalora somewhat
(oftenreflectingpartisanleanings).But it is notablethatnowherein his Stateof theUnionaddressesdidWilsondirectly
defendthecontroversial
Article10 oftheCovenantofthe
thepeace in
League of Nations,whichwould commitU.S. forcesto preserving
Europeand,as discussedlater,was exactlywhatCongress(and thecountry)
had
rejected.
In theaftermath
of WorldWarI, Wilson'ssuccessorsretreated
to thesafetyof
ideationalcontinuity.
WarrenHardingdeclaredin his inauguraladdressthat"the
and spiritually,
in itselfprovesthe
recordedprogressof our Republic,materially
inOld Worldaffairs."
wisdomoftheinherited
Thekey,as
policyofnon-involvement
was notinvolvement
thatmightimHardingelaborated,
perse, butcommitments
pingeon theUnitedStates'abilityto decideitsowncoursein each instance(hence
precludingsuch commitments).
"This is not aloofness,"HardingsuccinctlydeThe UnitedStateswouldengagetheworldin financeand
clared,"it is security."22
ButU.S. secuto reducearmaments.
trade,itwouldofferadvice,andjoin in efforts
and Hardingrecommended
thesame to
ritywas seen as bestservedby self-help,
others.23
CalvinCoolidgelargelyechoedthesethemes,arguingfortheavoidanceof
theefficacy
of nonintervention,
alliancesand Old Worldcontroversies,
permanent
andalliances.24
andthedangersofbalancesofpower,militaries,
in World
In sum,despitea militarily
successfuleffort
at Europeanintervention
to
Americanaversion commitWarI andthepresident's
ownentrepreneurial
efforts,
The United
mentson securityapparently
changedlittleafterthewar was over.25
seen
earlierin
itscommercial
Statesdidcontinue
expansion-largely
alongthetrend
unilateral
ButAmericans'
basic
Taft'sandWilson'spoliciesbeforethewar.26
concepEven manysotionof strategy
was mostlyan extensionof theprewarorthodoxy.
20. 1915StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
21. 1919StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
22. 1921inaugural
addressinInauguralAddresses1961.
23. 1921and 1922StateoftheUnionaddressesinIsrael1966.
24. 1923 Stateof theUnionaddressin Israel 1966; 1925 inauguraladdressin InauguralAddresses
thetraditional
consensus.Forexample,he
causeswereadvocatedwithin
1961.Coolidge'sinternationalist
voluntary
(1924 Stateof theUnionadwiththeWorldCourtwas strictly
arguedthatU.S. involvement
Treatydid notlimitunilateralactionin anyway (1928 Stateof the
dress)and thattheKellogg-Briand
Unionaddress).ForStateoftheUnionaddresses,see Israel1966.
1994,90; andDeConde 1957,23, 25.
25. See Cole 1983,6-7; BuckleyandStrong1987,90; Guinsberg
1979,x, 39.
26. See Costigliola1984,22, 69; Parrini1969,viii,14; andLeffler
AmericanInternationalism
261
calledinternationalists
wereopposedto strategic
commitments.
A 1921Literary
DigestpollshowedU.S. newspaper
editorsfavoring
helpingFranceifitwereattacked,
butopposinganyformalguarantees.
This surveycapturedtheAmericanbeliefthat
anyprecommitment
offorcestoEuropewas harmful
toU.S. security.27
Transformation
in WorldWarII
in theearlyyearsof Franklin
Americanideas aboutsecurity
D. Roosevelt's(FDR)
presidency
showedstrongcontinuity
withtheideas thatemergedafterWorldWarI
and werepromoted
by Wilson'sRepublicanpredecessors.
As was trueearlier,the
on thereduction
of armaments
UnitedStateswas open to cooperating
viewedas
andencouraging
war.Furthermore,
the
fostering
militarism,
threatening
democracy,
intheearlystagesoftheGreatDepresUnitedStates(although
withless enthusiasm
infurthering
international
commerce.
Buton issuesofmilitarysion)hadan interest
inmajorpowerpolitics,thetraditional
ruled.
politicalcommitments
orthodoxy
The development
ofAmericanthinking
on security
from1933andafterreflects
a
transition
fromtheold to thenew.The balanceofdiscoursein support
oftraditional
inthreephases.Duringthefirst
versusnontraditional
ideasshifted
phase,from19331938,discoursewas one-sidedinfavorofU.S. unilateralism.
Forexample,theinternationalist-minded
FDR declaredin 1934thatthe"UnitedStatescannottakepartin
inEurope,"andthat"self-help
wereAmeriandself-control"
politicalarrangements
ca's tradition.
incidents
on
the
United
Despitethe
the
Statescouldplay
continent,
role:
out
of
defend
act
as
an example,and
thehomeland,
onlyone familiar
stay
it,
offer
council.28
From1938 to 1941 thebalancebecamemoreequal. FDR beganto stresshow
theUnitedStatesandtheAmericanwayof life.On the
othernations'actsaffected
onehand,FDR heededtradition
inwarning
againstentangling
alliances;ontheother,
United
he deridedthosewho "wishfully
believethe
Statescan live in isolation"
had
to
thatthismeanttheUnitedStates
(whilerejecting
join thewar).29
By 1941-42,
inEurope-thethreat
tothe
thebalancehadshifted
the
need
to
the
turmoil
to
engage
now
democratic
wayof lifewas so immensethatthecountry's
safety
dependedon
ofEurathe
resources
eventsabroad-especiallythechallengeofdictators
controlling
sia. FDR belittledisolationists
as "selfishmen who wouldclip thewingsof the
American
peopleinordertofeather
theirownnest."30
The thirdphaseinAmericanviewson security,
from1942on,clearlyandconsisThe
embracedthenecesstressedone sideoftheledger. collectiveorthodoxy
tently
1
andmultilateralism.
Table showsthisdistinct
sityofinternational
cooperation
change
oftheold andnewthinking.
a comparison
through
Comparedwithconceptsbefore
Again,TheLiterary
Digest,31
27. DeBendetti1972,69-79. WhatWe WillDo If FranceIs Attacked
December1921,5ff.
28. 1934StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
29. 1940StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
30. 1941StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
262 International
Organization
TABLE 1.
Transformation
oftheAmerican
foreign
policyepisteme
Oldorthodoxy
Neworthodoxy
International
involvement
"Our manifest
destiny
hasbeen
to standapartstudiously
neutral."(Wilson,1915)
"We cannotmakeAmericaan
islandin eithera military
or
economicsense."(FDR, 1943)
Military
engagement
"OurAmericacanbe no partyto
a permanent
military
alliance."
(Harding,1921)
"Our nationalsafetyandthe
oftheworldwill
security
requiresubstantial
armedservices,particularly
in overseas
service."(Truman,1946)
to majorpowers
Relationship
"The UnitedStatescannottake
partinpoliticalarrangements
inEurope."(FDR, 1934)
"Our ownwellbeingis dependenton thewellbeingofother
nationsfaraway."(FDR,
1945)
International
cooperation
"Ultimately,
nations,
likeindividuals,cannotdependupon
eachotherbutmustdepend
uponthemselves."
(Coolidge,
1924)
"Our guidingstaris theprinciple
ofinternational
cooperation.
To thisconceptwe havemade
a commitment
as profound
as
in history."
anything
(Truman,
1949)
Sources:StateoftheUnionaddressesin Israel1966;andInauguralAddresses1961.
ofsecurity
after1942.The
1940,thecollectiveAmerican
understanding
transformed
viewno longerassertedthatsecurity
was bestservedby standing
dominant
apartas
an unsulliedexampleto,and/or
good officefor,others;instead,thebalanceshifted
and mostnotablycommitments
of
towardinternational
engagement,
cooperation,
forcetoothermajorpowers.
An EpistemicApproach:Ideas and Events
How thencan we explaintheshiftfromone stableset of collectiveviews about
to another?
In addressing
thisquestion,I highlight
managingmajorpowerrelations
of theideationalstructure
takesplace. The
theinfluence
withinwhichdeliberation
is a critical
is
not
that
such
a
is
the
whole
but
that
structure
structure
the
point
story
In what
in
social
ideas
can
transform.
how enduring
piece understanding
radically
and
to
use thislogic explain
follows,I describehowepistemic
changeoccurs(ornot)
theevolution
ofAmericanthinking
on foreign
policy.
TheLogicofEpistemicChange
scholarshavedonesubstantial
workon whyindividuals
Although
changetheirperin
ideas
involves
sonalbeliefs,continuity
andtransformationcollective
necessarily
AmericanInternationalism
263
social mechanismsas well.31Changerequirescollectiveaction,or perhapsmore
accurately,
"collectiveideation":theformation
of socialideas impliesthepotential
in
forcoordination,
evencollectiveaction,problems.Theseproblemsare apparent
thetwostagesthattogether
constitute
ideationalchange.
The first
consensus.Social actorsmust
stageinvolvesthecollapseofthereigning
andtheneedtoreplace
agree,eveniftacitly,
on theinadequacyoftheold orthodoxy
conceptualchangemustnecit.Becausethereis no physicalgroupmind,aggregate
orsubgroups.
Butchange
essarilyrelatetothethinking
and/or
actionsofindividuals
maybelieveotherwise
cannotbe reducedto individuals.Even whenthemajority
mayendurefora
(suggesting
theneedforchange),theextantcollectiveorthodoxy
ofreasons,including
of
variety
individual
ignoranceofothers'privatereassessment
whatis properanddesirable,thecoststo individuals
of altering
(giventhebenefits)
embeddedsymbols,or evena fearof social ostracism
collectiveandinstitutionally
forchallenging
to considerfighting
theacceptedcolgroupbeliefs.Forindividuals
The
lectivewisdom,strong
intersubjective
evidencefordoingso has tobe present.32
secondphaserequiresconsolidation,
coordination
orcollaboration
among
involving
domesticactorson a new ideationalstructure.
Subgroupsmaypreferincompatible
replacement
ideas andfinditdifficult
to agree.Hence,individualbeliefsandincentivesto act on them(to bringaboutchange)maynoteffectively
aggregate,
leaving
theextantcollectiveidea intact.What,then,allowsactorsto overcomethesebarriers?
Although
notoffering
an explanation
perse, scholarsfroma varietyoftraditions
Essentially
relyon thesamesolutionto thistwo-part
collectiveideationproblem.33
betweennormaltimesandcritical
shocks,orcrises.In the
theydistinguish
junctures,
and revolutions-are
studyof politics,threetypesof events-wars,depressions,
mostfrequently
citedas decisive.These crisesare depictedas a typeof collective
and
electroshock
therapythatjolts societiesout of theirextantmodesof thought
Althoughuseful,thesetypesof
givesthemnew waysof dealingwiththeworld.34
but
analysesshedlittlelightonwhysimilareventsproducechangein someinstances
howexactlyshockscause change,andwhya newcreedtakesone form
notothers,
andnotanother.
Thisshortcoming
suggeststheneedtodo morethaninvokeshockas
we mustunderstand
whatitis abouta "shock"oreventthatis
thecause.In particular
an existingideationalorthodoxy
likelyto undermine
(collapse)andenablea society
toreacha neworthodoxy
(consolidation).
oftwofactors:(1)
The firststage,collapse,seemsto be shapedbythesynergism
thefitbetweensocialexpectations
(generated
bycollectiveideas)andevents,and(2)
exSocial epistemesgenerate
is sociallydesirable.35
whether
subsequent
experience
betweenindividualandcollectiveideas andtheoverallapproach,see
31. For moreon thedistinction
Legroforthcoming.
32. See Gilbert1996,195-216;andKuran1995.
33. See Swidler1986;Jervis1976; andOlson 1982.
Lake,andMastanduno1988; Gold1986;Higgs1987;Ikenberry,
see Gourevitch
34. Forapplications,
stone1991;Goldstein1993;andDobbins1994.
35. Sahlins1991.
264 International
Organization
aboutwhatconsequencesshouldresultifsocietiesfollowordeviatefrom
pectations
occur(leadingto change)
theirprescriptions.
Whethercollapseand consolidation
dependson thepreexisting
ideationalstructure
and thelogic of itsrelationship
to
events.For various(advertent
and inadvertent)
reasonssocietiescan eitheract in
accordancewithideationalprescriptions
or not. Ideationalrules are usuallyrespected,butthisneednotalwaysbe thecase-other factorsbesidesideas also can
Whenadhering
affect
behaviorandthesemaydo so in particular
situations.
to ideis thateventswill match,thatpreationalprescriptions,
thecollectiveexpectation
scribedactionwillbringdesirableconsequencesand proscribed
actionundesirable
Whentheconsequencesofexperienced
consequences.
eventsdo notmatchexpectationsofwhatshouldhappen,thereis pressureforcollectivereflection
andreassessment.36
One mightexpectcognitivebiases (forexample,dissonancereduction,
selective
toevidence,attributional
ofsuchdiscrepattention
pathologies)
tomitigate
theeffects
Butsuchinertial
antinformation.37
humanmentalhabitsarepartlycontained
bythe
andresultsincollectiveideas.
publicnatureofsignificant
gapsbetweenexpectations
One can moreeasilyrationalize
personal,contradiction-prone
excuses.Rationalizationbecomesdifficult
to do, however,in social situations,
especiallywhenat least
some othermotivatedactorshave different
(and critical)views. Thus unfulfilled
can potentially
have moresignificant
in a social context
expectations
implications
thanforindividual
beliefs.38
Unfulfilled
areonlypartofthepicture.
Also crucialarethe
expectations,
however,
actualconsequencessocietiesexperience.
Thereis a difference
betweenunexpected
failureandunexpected
success.Bothoutcomesinvolveunfulfilled
but
expectations,
case is conceptual
onlyintheformer
innovation
probable.Peoplearemoresensitive
tolosingsomething
This
theyexpectthantogainingsomething
theydidnotexpect.39
has
social
in
that
successes
do
not
draw
critical
tendency
implications
unexpected
forreasonscapturedin thefolksaying,"if it ain'tbroke,don'tfixit." In
attention
suchcircumstances
it is difficult
and
to generatethetypesof collectivereflection
actionneededfortransformation.
when
failure
is
Likewise,
accurately
anticipated
by
ideationalbeliefs,thetransformation
of thosebeliefsis unlikely.
Protectors
of the
dominant
theirposition.Unexpected
orthodoxy
simplyuse sucheventsto reinforce
allows
individuals
overcome
to
"do you see whatI
failure,however,
confidently
see" concernsresulting
fromthepressures
of socialconformity
andgivescriticsof
theextantorthodoxy
evidencetopressthecase forchange.40
intersubjective
Thisreasoning
is bothsimilartoanddifferent
froma Bayesianupdating
approach.
Itappearssimilarinthatactorsseemtoupdatetheirbeliefsbasedon information.
Yet
36. Levysummarizes
someoftheresearchthatspeakstothispoint.Levy 1994,305.
37. See Jervis1976,esp. 143-45,288-315; EaglyandChaiken1993,559-625; andTetlock1998b.
areautocratic
ordemocratic
caninfluence
38. Whether
countries
thesetendencies.
Butevenautocracies
arenotimmune
fromunderlying
issuesofcredibility
andlegitimacy
basedon ideas.
as centralin
39. See KahnemanandTversky1979;andLevy1994,304. Rose highlights
dissatisfaction
thesearchfornewideasinpublicpolicy.Rose 1991.
40. See Perrow1984;Arnold1990;KatesandClark1996; andSperber1996.
American
Internationalism
265
theframework
hereanticipates
a basicasymmetry
in such"learning"thatis inexplicablefroma Bayesianperspective.
Herenotall unfulfilled
expectations
leadtoupdatin undesiredconsequences,notthoseinvolvingdesired
ing-only thoseresulting
Thesetwosituations
arelargelysymmetrical
intermsoftheircontraconsequences.
dictionwithexpectations
andtheneedtoupdatebeliefs.Buttheyhaveasymmetrical
socialeffects;
thatis,societieswilltreatequivalent
lossesandgainsdifferently:
losses
are muchmorelikelythancomparablegainsto trigger
aggregation
processesthat
lead tochange.41
The epistemicframework
also appearsdifferent
froma Bayesianapproachby
placingmoreemphasison singleeventsincausingchangeas opposedtotheweighting of a seriesof eventsspreadover time.This phenomenamay be particularly
inanyissueareawherestrong
relevant
uncertainty,
problemcomplexity,
andthelack
of opportunities
forrepeatedtestingmeanthatlearningtakesplace accordingto
smallandbiasedsamples.In suchcircumstances,
a Bayesianviewis problematic.42
This seemsto be thecase in worldpoliticswheresingleeventswithbig conserole.43Of courseeven "single"events-such
quencesoftenplaya disproportionate
as thewars,depressions,
andrevolutions
usuallyhighlighted-typically
consistofa
seriesof subevents
linkedin timeandcontext,
andthecumulative
effect
oftheseis
relevantto change.In accordancewiththelogichere(and Bayesianupdating),
the
morea societyencounters
in substanceandtimethatdefyexpectaeventsconnected
tionswithsomenegativeresults,
the
themorelikelywillcollapseoccur.Similarly,
moresignificant
theundesirableresultsof any singleevent,themorelikelywill
collapseoccur.
The secondstage,consolidation
of a newdominant
can also encounter
episteme,
similar,oftentacit,cooperationproblems.Althougha collapse may occurin the
couldstillinhibit
current
failureto reacha consensuson a replacement
orthodoxy,
ofindividuals
transformation.
Even whenthemajority
privately
recognizetheneed
fora variforchange,thecollectivity
stickto theextantorthodoxy
maynonetheless
and
a stalemated
overa replacement
beliefstructure
conflict
etyofreasons,including
ofwhatis properanddesirable.44
individual
ofothers'reassessment
ignorance
of
ofthisaspectseemsimportantly
affected
Again,theresolution
bythestructure
butinstead
ideas in relationto theevent.Ideationalstructures
arerarelymonolithic
of idereveala binaryaxis in theirarchitecture.45
Usuallytheycontaina hierarchy
idea andatleastonemainchallenger.
Thisstrucationalelements
withonedominant
tureis important
becausetheoppositional
idea and its fitwiththegiveneventcan
influence
thelikelihoodof change.Sincethereare alwaysideas availsignificantly
byprospect
theory.
phenomenon
captured
ofthiscognitive
thesocialeffects
41. HereI amemphasizing
see Denzau
of stronguncertainty,
42. On theproblemsof Bayesiananalysisin (common)conditions
level(see,for
support
attheindividual
findsvarying
andNorth1994.In general,theBayesianperspective
relationsscholarsnotea lackofevidencein
1980),andevensympathetic
international
example,Grether
someareasofstatedecisionmaking(see,forexample,Fearon1995,409).
ofsingleeventsinlearning
ininternational
relations,
see Boulding1967,2-3, 9;
43. On theimportance
Jervis1976,235; andTetlock1998a,870-72.
44. See Gilbert1996,195-216;andKuran1995.
ofexamples,see Kane 1990,56.
45. Fora variety
266 International
Organization
able,thekeyissueis theirsocialplausibility:
is therea primary
oppositional
ideathat
has a socialbase-a cohortofadvocates-priorto an eventthatconfirms
theexpectationsoftheoppositional
idea butnotthedominant
idea?46Thisgivesadvocatesof
idea
thealternative persuasion
a socially
power:theynotonlycriticize
butalso offer
salientsolutionthatwillserveas a newfocalpointforcollectivebeliefs.Anyinitial
successthatcorrelates
withtheascendanceofthealternative
strengthens
itsrelative
and thelikelihoodthatit will becomesociallyembedded.It is thisdycredibility
namicat theideationallevelthatcan givevoice andpowerto previously
marginalized conceptsandtheirsupporters.
In sum,ideationalchangeis usefullyexaminedas a productofcollapseandconsolidation.Situationsinvolvingthecombination
of unmetexpectations
and undesiredconsequencesarelikelytofacilitate
whereas
where
collapse,
those
expectations
arefulfilled
and/or
desiredconsequencesoccurfavorideationalreproduction.
Consolidationof a new structure
is enhancedby theexistenceof a prominent
viable
oppositional
idea,theprescriptions
ofwhichseemto correlate
withsociallydesired
results.Althoughcollapse and consolidation
are usefullyseparatedforanalytical
reasons,inpracticetheywillbe related.The moresignificant
thecollapse-because
theconsequencesare so broadlyexperienced
and negativeor becauseexpectations
are dramatically
to overcome
confounded-themorelikelysocietieswill attempt
consolidation.
Likewise,traitsrelatedto consolidation
affect
collapse.The absence
of a single,sociallyviablealternative
epistememakescollapseless likely,whereas
thepresenceof one thatstrongly
meansthat
challengesthedominantorthodoxy
or consequencesto oversocietiesmayneedless in thewayof unmetexpectations
accountofchangeoffered
here
throwtheoldforthenew.Overall,then,theepistemic
is one of constrained
contingency.
It capturestendencies,
notwhollydetermined
thewaysideationalstructure,
outcomes,by highlighting
dependingon events,can
allowor encourageidea entrepreneurs
to succeedin somecircumstances
butnotin
others.
MethodandMeasurement
In whatfollowsI applythisframework
andpuzzlingdevelopment
of
totheimportant
in thetwentieth
thetwo worldwars.
Americansecurity
thinking
century
through
a crisisthatproduces
Thishistory
providestwocomparable
episodes(one involving
inonelongitudinal
ideationalcontinuity,
theothera crisisthatcausestransformation)
is usefulforanalysisbecause a varietyof factorsare relatively
case. This history
broaderpoliticalculture,
stable(forexample,regimetype,deephistory,
geography,
relatedto
andmajorpowerwaras shock)acrosstheepisodes,whereasotherfactors
alternative
themodelandprominent
explanations
(suchas leadershipskill,interest
and systemic
grouppressures,
incentives)
varyacrossthetwoepisodes.I establish
andtransformation
ofmyargument
thevalidity
bydemonstrating
(1) howcontinuity
46. Wildavsky
notesthata problemwillonlybe recognizedas suchifa solutionis available.Wildavsky
1979,42.
AmericanInternationalism
267
inAmericanideasaboutforeign
policywereshapedbytheepistemic
logicinvolving
ideas andevents,(2) thatwhatleadersdid andhowtheyfaredwas affected
byideationalstructure,
and (3) thatexistingexplanations
are indeterminate
withoutthe
explanation
offered
here.
I contendthatchangeandcontinuity
varied(intermsofcorrelation
andcausation)
withthemixofexpectations,
consequences,
andoppositional
epistemes.
Thisargument,of course,raisesthecentralmethodological
issue ofhow one measuressuch
inherently
elusivevariables.The majorpotential
pitfallis a lapse intotautology
by
defining/measuring
causesbasedon theoutcomeofthecase. Hencethemeaningand
measurement
ofexpectations,
consequences,
andoppositional
epistemes
deserveclarification.
Expectations
refersto whatsocietiesanticipate
based on thenormsof thedominantepistemeandthejustifications
forthechosencourseof action.Forexample,if
thedominant
a certainactionand actionis takenon thatbasis,
epistemeprescribes
societieswill anticipatesociallydesirableresults.If a proscribed
actionis undertaken,leaderswilljustifysuchdeviancefromthedominant
ideabya particular
setof
outcomesthatcan be achievedbydoingso. I measuretheseexpectations
according
tothedominant
ideasanddiscoursethatsurround
thedecisionstaken.Consequences
are assessedaccordingto social interpretations
of events.One cannotobjectively
imposea genericstandard
forwhatis seenas a negativeorpositiveconsequencefora
particular
societybecausesucha judgment
inherently
dependson thelensandaims
ofthesocietyitself.One society's"loss" is another
Assessments
society's"victory."
ofexpectations
andconsequencescanbe separated
fromoutcomes(changeincollectivebeliefs)inchronological
termsandincausalterms.My interpretation
ofparticular social expectations
and perceivedconsequencesdependson datathatgenerally
thecodingis nottautological
ina
precedeperiodsofchangeorcontinuity.
Moreover,
directanalyticalsense,sinceexpectations
andconsequencesalonedo notautomatiofthetwofactors.
callyproducechange:suchan outcomedependson theinteraction
andsocialviability
is evidentin the
ofoppositional
Finally,thenumber
epistemes
issue-in thiscase international
involvement
and
publicdebatesovertheparticular
inthetwodifferent
institutional
commitments
episodes.Thesedebatesindicatewhat
prominent
alternative
ideas,ifany,existinpublicdiscourseanddebates.Prominence
andsocialviability
arelinkedtowhether
ideashavehigh-level
oppositional
promotersand/or
broad-based
publicbackingbeforeevents.
I assesseachofthesefactors
basedonthegenerally
clearconsensusinthemassive
historical
thatcoverseliteandpopularattitudes,
media
literature
(mainlysecondary)
andopinionsurveys.
Themostimportant
onthisanalypositions,
constraint
analytical
sis is a "null"alternative-isthereanother
forthesevariablesinthese
interpretation
cases thatis moreplausiblein lightofthehistorical
evidence?Thisconstraint,
along
withtheearliermentioned
efforts
at independent
coding,minimizes(butdoes not
in historical
"causes" byeffects
eliminate)theinherent
dangerofmeasuring
analysis.
In whatfollows,I firstaddressideationalcontinuity
in WorldWar I and then
forthatera,
transformation
inWorldWarII. In eachcase I summarize
myargument
268 International
Organization
discussthecollapsephasein termsof expectations
and consequences,and address
idea dynamics.
theconsolidation
phaseintermsofdominant
andoppositional
ExplainingIdeationalContinuity:WorldWar I
in collectiveideas resultedfromWorldWarI largelybecausetheinterContinuity
inhibiting
bothcollapseandconplayofexpectations
andeventsgenerated
barriers
hadundesirable
consesolidation.CollapsedidnotoccurbecauseU.S. intervention
ideas.
andreinforced
popularunilateralist
quencesthatdefiedexpectations
preexisting
Thosewhobelieveda changewas stillnecessary
couldnotagreeon a viablereplacementepistemetocoordinate
theirvarying
ideason internationalism.
ContraCollapse
The UnitedStatesintervened
inWorldWarI in thespringof 1917,despiteitstraditionof aloofnessfromEuropeanconflicts.AlthoughAmericanswere generally
Germansubmarine
attackson U.S. merchant
shippingand
averseto involvement,
civiliantravelers,
Germanhostility
and
Telegram),
(as revealedbytheZimmermann
finallyproAmericanhopesto shapethepeace (and avoid futureentanglements)
vokedtheUnitedStatesintoaction.MostAmericans
understood
thatthedecisionto
intervene
was exceptional
becauseitinvolveda choice(no one declaredwaron the
sucha choicesincethebeginning
ofthe
UnitedStates).Americans
hadbeendebating
war.Afterall, theUnitedStatescouldhavefollowedthepaththatFDR wouldlater
offerin 1936 whenwaragainlookedimminent,
adequatedefenseto save
"through
Notdoingso was an extraordinary
ourselvesfromembroilment
andattack."47
step.
WhentheUnitedStatesdeclaredwar,thejournalistFrankCobb wrote,"The old
We areno longeralooffromtheworld."48
Thoseopposedto
isolationism
is finished.
to Americantradition
theintervention
consistently
pointedoutthatit was contrary
andthatnegativeconsequenceswouldresult.EvenWilsonworriedbothbeforeand
afterintervening
thatdoingso could have significant
costs-thatit could in fact
as an exampleto other
changetheverynatureoftheUnitedStatesanditspotential
The vocal minority
stressedthispoint,and it was noteasily
countries.
consistently
forgotten.49
intermsofexpectations,
Mostimportant
Wilsonjustified
U.S. intervention
witha
viewof security
campaignforan internationalist
duringthewar.He arguedthatthe
worldhad to be made "safefordemocracy."
Without
U.S. intervention,
democracy
andifdemocracy
theUnitedStatesitselfmightbe vulnerable.
mightsuffer,
suffered,
thatwas heldouttoconvincekeysegments
Thegoal,thepromise,
ofthepopulation
thatintervention
was neededwas thattheUnitedStateswouldfightto builda new
47. 1936StateoftheUnionaddressinIsrael1966.
48. As quotedinLink1965,430-31.
49. See Link1965,264-69; Cooper1969,167-73;andRochester1977,44 47.
AmericanInternationalism
269
international
orderin itsownimage(demanding
activecommitments).
To be sure,
therewerethosewhowantedtointervene
simplyforreasonsofgreatpowerinterest
orstatus,
buttheseindividuals
andgroupshadalwaysfavored
involvement.
Theones
who providedthecriticalleveragein favorof engagement
werethosepreviously
opposedbecausetheyfearedit would sullyAmericanvirtueand haltprogressive
reforms.
These progressives,
however,weresold by theWilsonianargument
that
virtueand reformwouldbe furthered
by internationalism.
Wilsonralliedthekey
progressive
supporters
to exactlythisthemein the1916 election.Whatwas central
forthepostwarperiodwas thattheexpectations
generated
by thisjustification
for
intervention
in Europeanaffairs
and thestandards
it setforjudgingtheefficacy
of
thisdecisionwerenotmatchedbytheconsequencesofensuingevents.50
Againsttheseexpectations,
thesocialinterpretation
oftheWorldWarI experience
was strongly
negative.Ratherthanvictory
is generally
euphoria,"disillusionment"
thetermused to describehow Americansjudged theirintervention-aview that
thewisdomoftheno-entanglement
confirmed
ofitssupportlogicandtheauthority
ers.ManyAmericans
returned
fromthewardrainedanddisgusted
bytheirencounter
withmodernindustrial
warfare.51
Moreimportantly,
discontent
spreadamongelites
and therestof thepolityduringtheprocessof concludingand ratifying
thepeace
treatyand theCovenantof theLeague of Nations.Promisesof a democratic
surge
(whichhelpedinspiretheintervention)
wentunfulfilled
as manygovernments
never
sucha transition
andthosethatdidstruggled
attempted
forsurvival.
Also damaging
topublicsupport
was thefailureoftheAlliestoforsaketheimperialism
so despised
insteadto retaintheircolonies.52
by someAmericans,
Americanswerefurwanting
therrepulsedby revelationsof "secrettreaties"amongtheEuropeanpowersto
divvyup thespoilsofthewar,especiallyagainstthebackground
ofa vengeful
peace
secrettreaties,
andnondemocratic
treaty.53
Imperialism,
werekeyelegovernments
mentsof whatto AmericansmadeEuropeantiesundesirable
and hencewhatwas
was widespread,
and Ameriwrongwithgreatpowerinteraction.
Disappointment
cansgenerally
feltthatU.S. involvement
hadbeena mistake.54
thelynchpin
of
Thisfeelingwas particularly
prominent
amongthosewhoformed
Wilson'spoliticalsupport-theprogressives.
As RobertOsgoodconcludes,"disenchantment
was heightened
by thepaucityof the crusade'smaterialand spiritual
rewardsinproportion
tothemagnificence
oftheidealistichopesithadraisedandthe
of its sacrifices,
bothtangibleand intangible."55
This dynamic
seemingenormity
reinforced
theextantorthodoxy,
andtheLeagueofNationsandFrenchsecurity
treaty
became"casualtiesofthegeneralAmericanreluctance
to shoulderanyfurther
internationalcommitments."56
50. See Knock1992,95ff;Rochester1977,26, 38-47; andKennedy1980,42, 50.
51. See Cohen1967,233; andKennedy1980,219-24.
52. Knock1992,211,239,252.
53. Levering1978,42.
54. See Cohen1967,233; andAdler1965,2-3.
55. Osgood 1953,307.
56. Roberts1997,353.
270 International
Organization
Consolidation
Thwarted
ThelackofchangeinAmericanattitudes
towardunilateralism
is ironicbecausethere
appearstohavebeensupport
amongimportant
elitesforsomething
different
thanthe
prewarunilateralism.57
Atleasttwoalternative
frameworks
fordealingwithinternationalrelations
wereprominent
at thetime:TheodoreRoosevelt'sbalance-of-power
ofanynewdomiapproachandWilson'snascentmultilateralism.
Butconsolidation
nantepistemeproveddifficult.
Neitherfaredwell vis-'a-vis
theWorldWarI experience.U.S. leadership
andunfettered
internationalism
(of eitheran institutionalist
or
geopoliticalstripe)did notresolvewhatmostviewedas thecause of thewarand
Americantroubles:theEuropeanbuildupof menand arms,thearms-conflict
spiral
In contrast
thatfollowed,and theUnitedStates'failureto remainneutral.58
to this
oftheold orthodoxy,
thewaranditsaftermath
littlesupport
forthe
validation
offered
claimsofthosewhowouldoverthrow
it.Deterring
andmanagpotential
aggressors
ingthepowervoidinEuropewerenotthemajorconcern.
This standoff
is epitomizedin thefightovertheVersaillesTreatyand theU.S.
rejectionof theLeague of Nations.The centralsymbolicissue in thestruggle
was
Article10 oftheLeague's covenant,
whichobligatedmemberstatestoprotect
each
otherfromexternalaggression.Opponentsof theLeague, led by SenatorHenry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts,
wantedto alterthis(and other)provisionsof the
ineffect
touseforce.Proponents,
treaty,
gutting
anyprecommitment
especiallyPresithewholeinterdentWilson,opposedsuchreservations,
believingtheyundermined
nationalist
intent.59
Especiallygiventheresultsofintervention,
internationalists
were
for
dividedandhad difficulty
agreeing:"Therewas no clearlyidentifiable
strategy
and the
suchmento followin theforeign
policydebatesoverthepeace settlement
League of Nations."60In a close fight,
thetreatywas rejected,and as described
In theinterwar
earliertheUnitedStates'prewarunilateralist
mindsetwas affirmed.
period,theUnitedStatesselectively
engagedin measuresthatfititsoutlook,suchas
butitrejectedtheLeagueofNationsorotherarrangements
supporting
disarmament,
thatprecommitted
U.S. forcesorthreatened
U.S. neutrality.
therole of ideational
This interpretation
of WorldWarI necessarilyhighlights
ofagents,nonelessimportant
overtheinfluence
thanWoodrowWilson.Yet
structure
of the
Wilson'srole in theideationalcontinuity
somehistorians
have underscored
as havingpersonUnitedStatesintheinterwar
period.Wilsonis commonly
portrayed
allybungledtheLeague of Nationsissue,especiallyin relationto theU.S. Senate,
forthenext
andin doingso, launchedtheUnitedStateson a stay-at-home
trajectory
toforty-three
senatorswerein favorofthe
57. Knock'sdiscussionofthevotesindicatesthatforty-two
wereirreconcilandthirteen
thirty-eight
favoreditwithreservations,
reservations,
another
Leaguewithout
ablyopposed.Knock1992,263-64.
58. See Dallek 1979,101-103;Adler1965,39-40; andMay 1973,4-5.
toFrenchsecurity,
butthiswas notthechoiceofothers,
59. Lodgefavoreda morenarrowcommitment
Digestpoll ofeditors.
suchas Wilsonandprobablythegeneralpublic,as indicatedbythe1921Literary
See Knock1992,265-68; andNinkovich1994,65.
60. Roberts1997,351.
AmericanInternationalism
271
twodecades.61
It does appearthatifWilsonhadcompromised
andacceptedreservationsdemandedby critics,theU.S. Senatewouldhave ratified
membership
in the
LeagueofNations.Butas Wilsonandothersbelieved,doingso wouldhaveevisceratedtheUnitedStates'commitment
androle.62Thus,eveniftheUnitedStateshad
joined theLeague withreservations,
thereis littlereasonto believeit wouldhave
thatdominated
thenexttwodecades.63
dramatically
changedtheAmericanattitudes
Arguingtheoppositeseemsa leap of faith.It is implausibleto maintain
thatifthe
UnitedStateshadmadea watered-down
commitment
totheLeague,itsattitudes
and
actionsininternational
relations
wouldhavebeendramatically
different
acrossissue
areas (such as deterring
in theyearsthat
aggressionand monetary
collaboration)
in explaining
followed.Whatseemsmorerelevant
Wilson'sdifficulties
in sellinghis
case here(since he was generallyconsidereda skilledshaperof opinion)is the
broaderideationalstructure
thatemergedfromthewar.Wilson'sabilitytopersuade
on thisissue was confounded
notonlyby his failinghealth,butalso by the"basic
intractability
of theverypublicopinionthathe claimedto read and shapeintoa
commonconsciousness."64
In thisinstance,
thecombination
ofbehavior(intervention)
thatdeviatedfromthe
offered
prescriptions
bythedominant
epistemeandendedin negativeconsequences
towardcollapseoftheold wayof
(disillusionment)
helpedtoweakenanymovement
in contrast,
oftheold orthodoxy,
thinking.
Supporters
receivedpoliticalammunition
withwhichto fight
theircase. Thiscombination
ofeventsalso impededtheconsolidationof a single,viablereplacement
epistemefromthesmallsetthatexisted.The
resultwas thatunilateralism
emergedas an evenmoredominant
guidingconceptof
interwar
U.S. foreign
policy.
ExplainingIdeationalTransformation:
WorldWar II
The eventsthatled to and becameknownas WorldWar II, in contrastto those
of thedominant
American
leadingto WorldWarI, resultedin thetransformation
ideasabouteffective
foreign
policy.Ideationaldynamics
playeda criticalrolein this
transformation.
As WorldWarII tookshapein thelate 1930s,Americansclungto
theirunilateralist
approachin theface of a seriesof eventswithnegativeconsecontradicted
thetraditional
collectiveideas and confirmed
an
quencesthatstrongly
alternative
set.Thiscontextenabledthosegroupsandindividuals
seekingchangeto
coalesceeffectively.
The resultwas thetransformation
ofAmericanideas aboutappropriate
foreign
policyinthemidstofWorldWarII.
CollapseofUnilateralism
American
intheearly1930swas dominated
thought
bythedomesticeconomicdifficultiesof theGreatDepression,notmatters
abroad.But to theextentthecountry
61. ManyarecriticalofWilson,forexample,Knock1992;andAmbrosius1987.
62. See Knock1992,265-68; Ninkovich1994,65; andAmbrosius1987,250.
63. See Leffler
1979,39; Leigh1976,109; andDallek 1979.
64. Ninkovich1994,96.
Organization
272 International
was theunilateralrelations
epistemeon international
thedominant
lookedoutward,
ofWorldWarI. As CharlesSmith'sstudy
bytheexperience
bequeathed
istorthodoxy
of publicopinionassertedin thelate 1930s, "As long as thememoryof thatwar
go togreatlengths
thepeoplewillinsistthattheirgovernment
[WorldWarI] remains,
Amerisentiment
withinthisunilateralism
Although
conflict."65
to avoidanyfuture
in the
all agreedthatinvolvement
viewpoints,
ofdifferent
cansemphasizeda variety
was
roughpoliticalwatersofEuropewas a bad idea.66The expectation
increasingly
could do littlegood in Europeand onlybringharmto the
thatsuchinvolvement
tobeliefsthatnonentangleclungtightly
Duringthe1930sAmericans
UnitedStates.67
were
war,andthatU.S. interests
thatarmsbuildupsfostered
security,
mentfurthered
bestservedbyneutrality.
thattheUnitedStatescouldretainitssecurity
expectations
Thesebeliefsgenerated
In 1937,whenFDR triedto
if it just stayedout of Europeanand worldconflict.
theresultwas illU.S. internationalism,
by promoting
amelioratethissentiment
thingtolookoveryourshoul"it's a terrible
FDR allegedlycommented,
received.68
A 1937 opinionpoll
to lead-and findno one there."69
derwhenyou are trying
WorldWarI had been a
concludedthat70 percentofAmericansfeltthatentering
mistakefortheUnitedStates.In anotherpoll in 1937,whenaskedif thecountry
Accordrepliedin theaffirmative.70
worldwar,56 percent
wouldstayoutofanother
and
ingly,theUnitedStatesin thoseyearsremainedlargelyoutsidesuchefforts;
whentroubledid ariseabroad,theUnitedStatestriedto seal itselfoffby imposing
laws.71
strict
neutrality
contradictions
The eventsofthelate 1930sandtheensuingwarraisedsignificant
In a relatively
shorttimeperiod,a seriesof events-Italy's
forsuchexpectations.
invasionof Ethiopia,theSpanishCivil War,Japaneseexpansionin China,Germaand thefallof France-provideda
ofAustriaand theSudetenland,
ny'sabsorption
Notonlywas
notionsofaloofnessas security.72
challengetothedominant
significant
theworldgoingtopiecesaroundtheUnitedStates-precededbyaneconomicdepresand engagement-but
eventually
cooperation
sionfueledby a lack of international
atPearlHarbor.
Americaitselfwas attacked
bothin the
as a resultoftheseeventsis apparent
The shiftin collectivesentiment
Americans
opinionpollscollectedatthetimeandintheaccountsofelites.Although
tobecomeinvolvedhadchanged
war,theirwillingness
consistently
rejecteddeclaring
Actsof 1935isolationism
fromthefervid
bytheNeutrality
represented
dramatically
international
involveaddressed
ofproxyquestions
37. Collectiveopinionona variety
ofthosepolledin 1936feltthatintheeventofwar,the
ment.Forexample,95 percent
UnitedStatesshouldnotgetinvolvedagain.By theendof 1940,60 percentfavored
65. Smith1939,518,as quotedinLevering1978,39.
66. Jonas1990,32-69.
67. Ibid.,118-120.
68. Dallek 1979,147ff.
69. Kennedy1999,406.
70. Gallup1972,54, 65.
71. Jonas1991,168-171.
see Osgood 1953,112-113;andJonas1990,204-13.
72. Amongothers,
273
AmericanInternationalism
helpingEnglandto win,evenat theriskof war,ratherthannotgetting
involved.73
Pollstersrepeatedly
inWorldWar
askedthepublicwhether
theythought
intervening
I was a mistake.
InJanuary
1937,70percentsaid "yes" and30 percent
said "no." By
December1940,39 percentthought
42 percentthought
ithadbeena mistake,
ithad
not,and 19 percent
hadno opinion.AfterPearlHarbor,onlysome20 percent
feltthe
anti-entanglement
sentiwarhadbeena mistake.74
In place oftheanti-intervention,
ment,Americans(albeitneverpro-war)acceptedtheriskof involvement,
and after
PearlHarborturned
no peace shortoffullsurrender.
rapidlytofavoring
The viewsof manyelitessimilarly
shifted
withtheseevents.FDR, whosepublic
viewsoftenflowedwiththetideof publicopinion,gainedresolvefromthe 1938
in
Munichcrisis;he consistently
advocatedboththeimportance
ofU.S. engagement
themounting
in general.75
conflagration
andU.S. internationalism
The outbreak
of
warin 1939 changedcongressional
sentiment
towardthearmsembargoon aid to
Franceand Britaineven in theface of energeticefforts
by some to preventsuch
slippage.76
Leadingjournals,suchas TheNew Republic,CommonSense,and The
theireditorialstancetowardtheneedforU.S. engageshifted
Progressive,
similarly
mentintheEuropeancrisis.WiththefallofFrance,thenation'sleadingcolumnist
on
WalterLippmann,
foreign
affairs,
joinedthoseleaningtowardintervention.77
Many
Americans
saw thefallofFranceas a turning
point,especiallyin termsofthelikelihoodtheUnitedStateswouldbecomeinvolvedin thewar.78
Finally,withtheacceptanceofthe"Lend-Lease"aid policytoGreatBritaininthespringof 1941,theNew
YorkTimesdeclaredtheendto "thegreatretreat
whichbeganwiththeSenaterejectionoftheTreatyofVersaillesandtheLeagueofNations.... Isolationhas failed."79
Formostremaining
theinvasionoftheSovietUnionbyGermany
followed
doubters,
a
bytheattackon PearlHarborbyJapanresolvedtheissue.As SenatorVandenberg,
on foreign
prominent
Republicanspokesman
policy,concluded,theJapaneseattack
"endedisolationism
foranyrealist."80
An ardentminority
remained
faithful
totheir
beliefinisolationism,
butsucha viewas a dominant
was through.
orthodoxy
FDR did nothave to promisegreatresultsfromintervention
as Wilsonhad. Insteadhe simplymadethecase toAmericain economic,political,andmilitary
terms
The Japaneseattack
basedon thethreat
posedbyAxis controlofothercontinents.81
on PearlHarborand theGerman-Italian
declaration
of warcompletedtheworkfor
him.As FDR, thefrustrated
triedto hammerhometo thenationin
internationalist,
hisfireside
chaton 9 December1941,"In thesepastfewyears-and,mostviolently,
inthepastthreedays-we havelearneda terrible
lesson."Isolationism,
thepresident
73. See Page andShapiro1992,183; andGallup1972,259.
74. See Gallup1972,54,253; andBruner1944,15-16.
75. See Famlham
1997,6; andKennedy1999,419-20.
76. Dallek 1979,200-201.
andJonas1990,217-18.
77. See Steel 1980,314; Muresianu1988,127ff.;
78. Bruner1944,22.
79. Kennedy1999,474-75.
80. Vandenberg
1952,1.
81. See Ninkovich1994,115-19;andKennedy1999,421. Challenging
thenotionthatan actualthreat
existed,see Russett1972.
274 International
Organization
continued,
had beena mistake.82
The hard-core
isolationists
whohad triedto argue
thattheUnitedStateswas notvulnerable
or thatits security
was notat riskby the
worldcrisisunconvincingly
explainedthePearlHarborattackas a plotconcoctedby
FDR todrawtheUnitedStatesintothewar.83
Consolidation
ofInternationalism
As muchas thedefenders
oftradition
tried,theneedforU.S. engagement
couldnot
be dismissedbythenotionthatthenationhadnotbeendetachedenough,sincewith
each newchallengeithad triedharderandharderto distanceitself.Norcoulditbe
an "armsequals war" thesis,popularin theinterwar
explainedthrough
period,that
armsraces,and armsbuildupscausedwarand couldbe
heldthatarmsproducers,
harmful
to U.S. interests.
By theonsetof WorldWarII, Americanshad begunto
understand
fascistaggression
notas a productofan unintended
armsspiral,butas a
toolforterritorial
expansionforcountries
suchas Germany
andJapan.84
In contrast
to therefutation
of thedominant
two oppositionalideas
orthodoxy,
receivedaffirmation
andgainedlegitimacy.
First,therewas therevivalofWilsonian
MostAmericans
internationalism.
believedthatbilateraland autarchic
responsesto
theinstability
ofthe1920sand 1930scontributed
significantly
to theeconomicdistressthatbecamea wellspring
ofthelateraggression.
Leadersalso thought
thatmore
effective
international
oramelioinstitutions
andmechanisms
mighthaveprevented
ratedtheriseofautarchic
policies.NotjoiningtheLeagueofNations,manyfelt,was
a mistake.Sentiment
towardjoininga postwarLeague of Nationsshifted
dramaticallyduringthewar,with37 percentin favorofjoiningin May 1941,55 percentin
favorin November1942,and72 percentin favorin June1944.85In thesummerof
1943,61 percentfavoreda "permanent
military
alliance"withBritain(25 percent
the traditional
were opposed)-a preference
contradicting
warningagainstsuch
In March1945,81 percentfavoredU.S. participation
in a worldorgarelationships.
nizationwithpolicingpowerto maintain
international
peace.86Americansnowsaw
international
stabilityas dependingon bothaid and open markets,and on both
economicandmilitary
commitments
abroad.TheUnitedStatesadopteda newrecipe
in majorpowerpolitical-military
forsecurity:activeengagement
affairs,
especiandinstitutions.87
multilateral
allythrough
procedures
Wilsonianism
was therise of a "geopoliticaltheory"thatsaw
Accompanying
was fostered
Europeas theworld'sstrategic
pivot.This development
by a growing
Americanconsciousnessof international
was
U.S. security
interdependence-that
affected
abroad.Accordingto thisview,theUnitedStates
necessarily
byconditions
82. Gaddis1972,1.
83. Dallek 1979,313.
1992,101-102;andMay 1973.
84. See Leffler
1992,19-20,23, 499; Patterson
85. Leigh1976,115.
86. Gallup1972,405,497.
87. See Cole 1983,514-28; Gaddis 1972,2, 23, 18-20; Leffler1992,499; Pollard1985,2, 7-9; and
Divine1967,47.
American
Internationalism
275
hadtobe concerned
withEurope'saffairs
andthedistribution
ofpower.In the1930s,
amidstthefailureof theLeague to adjudicateaggressionand theascendancyof
totalitarian
governments,
sucha worldview
gainedincreasing
currency.
Nottocounter
suchbuildupswould allow totalitarian
governments
to expandand harnesslarge
amountsof power,whichmightthreaten
even a fortress
America;if one of these
totalitarian
powerswereto controlEurasia,evenwithout
a directchallengeto U.S.
territory,
therewas a fearthattheUnitedStateswouldhaveto alteritswayoflife(in
otherwords,thethreat
ofa "garrison
state")todeal withthepossibleopponent.88
In thebeginning
phasesofWorldWarII, geopoliticsandWilsonianinstitutionalismfusedin an ideationaluniontoforma newdominant
internationalist
epistemeon
how to managegreatpowerrelations.Those interested
in maximizing
powerand
thoseinterested
international
inpromoting
peace agreedthatengagingininstitutions
and alliances,includingeconomicand military
made sense.89This
commitments,
afterWorldWarI) was pavedbyepistemic
agreement
(incontrast
tothelackthereof
thatwouldsoon
dynamicsthatpreceded(notfollowed)theCold Warcompetition
frominternational
bankerstopacifists,
emerge.Activists,
workedthrough
organizations-such as theLeague of NationsAssociation,theForeignPolicyAssociation,
theCouncilon ForeignRelations,and theCarnegieEndowment
forInternational
Peace-to encouragetheUnitedStatesto expanditsinternational
engagement
and
Thiseffort
was in effect
a socialmovement
thathelpedto developand
cooperation.
as a plausiblepolicyidea.The collapseoftheold orthodoxy
spreadinternationalism
in theearly1940s further
induceda meetingof themindsof opposingviews of
in a waytheorthodoxy-confirming
internationalism
experienceofWorldWarI did
to make their
not.Those who remainedcommitted
to noninvolvement
struggled
case, butgiventheevolutionof collectiveideas and events,theysimplylackedthe
leverageto swaythebroadersociety.90
It wouldbe tempting
hereto creditthistransformation
to FDR's politicalskill.In
contrastto theimage of theill WilsonbunglingtheLeague of Nations,FDR is
and
used theleversof government
depictedas an able politicianwho successfully
in foreign
as theneworthodoxy
societyto installinternationalism
policythinking.91
Andalthough
FDR's skillsandthelessonshe learnedfromWilson'sexperiencedid
internationalism
also
resultsofthesetwoleadersininstilling
playa role,thedifferent
withinwhichtheyoperated.This is clearin
dependedon theideationalstructures
in formulating
FDR's inability(indeed,limitedeffort)
a proactiveinternationalist
policyin responseto theDepressionand Hitler'saggressionin the 1930s.When
forpresident
in 1932,he was attacked
heresponded
running
as aninternationalist;
by
his earliersupportof theLeague of Nations,war debtleniency,and
renouncing
FDR's beliefsonthedesirability
ofinternationtariff
reductions.92
sweeping
Although
his skillfulefforts
alismwereconstant,
onlyemergedand succeededin conjunction
88. Leffler
1992,10-13,19-23,499; andMay 1973.
89. Fox 1985,28.
90. See Jonas1990;andDivine1967.
91. See, forexample,Divine1967;andCole 1983,12-13.
92. Dallek 1979,18-20
276 International
Organization
withthebroadstructural
changeincollectivebeliefsaboutsecurity
thattookplacein
the1940s.
andthe
In summary,
thecombination
ofa monasticadherence
to noninvolvement
shattering
consequences
thatensuedundermined
thedominant
consensus.Twooppositionalyetsociallyplausibleviews existedthatpushedthecountryin the same
of engagement
to international
even
direction
and activecommitments
institutions,
thoseinvolvingmilitary
forcesin Europe.FDR and his "wise men" wereat the
forefront
ofthatshift,
inAmericanthinking
about
butthestoryofthetransformation
Insteadtheirsuccessforeign
policyis notsimplythatofthegreatleadersofhistory.93
can onlybe understood
in thecontextofencouraging
crefulefforts
circumstances
atedby theinteraction
of ideationalstructure
and eventsthattookplace in thelate
1930sandearly1940s.
Alternative
Arguments
All ofthepreceding
wouldbe fornaughtifitcouldbe shownthattheideasclaimed
to otherfactors.In whatfolto have causal autonomy
are actuallyepiphenomenal
thatmightexplainthesame
lows,I briefly
addressprominent
alternative
arguments
inAmericanideassimplyas a product
variation
ofexternal
morenarrow
adaptation,
iminterest
groups,and/or
domesticsocialpurpose.Although
each argument
offers
A plausiblecounterfactual
all areindeterminate.
case can be made
portant
insights,
and internal
interests/social
that,accordingto externalconditions
purpose,change
mighthave as easily occurredduringWorldWarI-or at least duringthe Great
Depression-but,of course,theshiftdid notoccuruntillater.The pointis notthat
environmental
but
forces,interest
groups,ordomesticsocialpurposeareirrelevant,
without
attention
toepistemic
thattheyareincomplete
dynamics.
Environmental
Adaptation
a collage of explanations
thatview the
The mostprominent
alternative
represents
circumof U.S. foreignpolicybehavioras a productof thestrategic
development
tothislogic,theUnitedStatesmainstancesofthetwopostwarperiods.94
According
of
tainedits unilateralist
stanceafterWorldWarI because of (1) thedistribution
it faced,and/or
and safenatureof
power,and/or(2) thethreats
(3) theinexpensive
AfterWorldWarII, theUnitedStateshad
unilateralism
giventheextanttechnology.
and acceptcommitments
becauseit faceda more
morereasonto buildinstitutions
threatfromtheSovietUnion,had bettercontroloveritsallies owingto
significant
in power,andwas morevulnerable
froma distanceas theresultofdeveldisparities
in military
opments
technology.
93. See, forexample,IsaacsonandThomas1986.
94. See, forexample,Costigliola1984,9-10; Leffler1979,368; andLake 1999.
AmericanInternationalism
277
Undoubtedly,
thesituation
aftereachwarwas different.
Butthemajorqualitative
breakin thethreesystemic
factorsis as apparentin thefirstconflict
as it is in the
second.In thekeyareaswhereWorldWarII supposedlydiffers
fromWorldWarI,
thedifference
betweenwhatcamebeforeandafterWorldWarI is at leastas significantas thedifferences
betweenthetwopostwareras.Yet continuity
occurredafter
WorldWarI, suggesting
theincompleteness
oftheadaptation
explanation.
A closer
lookat thethreekeyfactors-balanceofpower,threat,
andtechnology-isillustrative.
A focuson thegeopoliticalbalanceof powershowsthatWorldWarI signaleda
turning
pointdemanding
U.S. involvement,
notwithdrawal.
The warlefta vacuum
ofpoweron theEuropeancontinent.
Germany
was disarmedand Francewas critimuchofitfought
callyweakenedbytheharshconflict,
on Frenchsoil.Thissituation
raisedthepossibility
thatsomequicklyrecovering
country
withinEuropeor some
outsidepowercoulddominate
thecontinent,
an outcomeconsidered
anathema
from
a geopoliticalview.WalterLippmannwroteat thetime,"we findourselvesin a
worldwherefouroftheeightorninecentersof decisiveauthority
havecollapsed."
He arguedthattheUnitedStatescouldnotjustreturn
home"to gaze in raptadmirationattheMonroeDoctrine."95
In particular,
Americans
werenotblindtothepossias a predator.
bilityof Germany
reemerging
DuringWorldWarI, Wilsonportrayed
Germany,
especiallyits militarized
nature,as a threatto theworld.At thepeace
conference
he wondered
whether
Germanaggression
hadbeengivensufficient
attentionandat another
pointpredicted
thattherewouldbe another
warwithina generationifcountries
didnotuniteto do something
aboutit.As a vice-presidential
candidatein 1920FDR similarly
oftheLeague ofNations
arguedthatthemainfunction
was to preventanotherwarcrisis-possiblytenyearsdowntheroadby a revived
Germanyintenton revenge-fromescalatingintowar.96Many "Atlanticists"
favoredat leasta commitment
to Franceas a hedgeagainsta resurgent
but
Germany
wereunabletomakeheadwayagainstthoseopposed.97
In thepast,Britainhadalwayscounterbalanced
todominate
the
countries
aspiring
butafterWorldWarI itscapacityto do so was significantly
diminished.
continent,
Weakenedby thewarand consumedwithdifficulties
and challengesin itsempire,
Britaincouldno longerbe an effective
theUnitedStates
counterweight.
Moreover,
had thepower(manufacturing
morein the 1920s thantheothersix greatpowers
to takeon thatroleafterWorldWar1.98
combined)and shouldhavehadtheinterest
To be sure,therelativedisparity
in powerand likelycontroltheUnitedStateshad
overEuropeafter
WorldWarI was notas greatas after
WorldWarII, butthesituation
was dramatically
different
thanat thebeginning
Yettherewas a puzofthecentury.
AllianceorAnglo-American
zlingabsenceof anytypeofnascentAtlantic
coopera95. As quotedinRochester1977,66-67.
didnotuse geopolitical
96. Ninkovich1994,66-67, 102.Ninkovich
arguesthatWilsongenerally
logic
toselltheLeaguebecauseitwouldhaveconflicted
withhisidealistic
justification
forentering
thewar.He
doubtsthatsuchlogicwouldhavecarriedthedayanywaybecauseofdeep-seated
foreign
policyhabits.
97. Roberts1997,353,362-63.
98. See Howard1972;Kindleberger
1973;andKennedy1987,328.
278 International
Organization
tionto deal withthepost-World
WarI powervacuum.In fact,Europeancountries
someformofallianceormiliinvitedtheUnitedStatesto do justthatbyinstituting
tarycommitment.99
WhatAmericansviewedas commonsenseafterWorldWarII
how
shouldhavebeenviewedthesameafter
WorldWarI hadthecountry
considered
in a similarfashion.Thepointis,itdidnot.
toprovideforsecurity
basedonpoweris onebasedon threat.
Fromthis
Closelyrelatedtoan explanation
theUnitedStatesdidnotcommittoEuropeansecurity
after
WorldWarI
perspective,
AfterWorldWarII, in contrast,
theintenbecauseno country
posed a clearthreat.
tionsandpowerof theSovietUniondemandedU.S. engagement.100
The keyproblemwiththisviewis thatAmericanthinking
didnotdevelopin responseto threats.
inthemid-1930s,
Hitler's
aggression
andonly
TheUnitedStatesfailedtorespondto
did
the
of war
UnitedStatestake
afterPearl Harborand theGermandeclaration
inAmerican
attitudes
directaction.Second,thefundamental
shift
towardinternationWorldWarII-when the
alismoccurred
beforetheriseoftheColdWar.Evenduring
SovietUnionwas considereda future
ally,nota threat-theUnitedStatesprepared
to engageitselfdirectly
in exactlythetypeof long-term
suchas the
commitments,
UnitedNationsand BrettonWoods,thatit had shunnedformostof its history.101
moreeasilyand led to a muchmore
support
Clearly,theSovietthreatconsolidated
in
than
wouldhave been thecase otherU.S.
Europe
significant military
presence
wise.Nonetheless,
thebasicAmericanconceptualshiftthatacceptedthedesirability
of committing
forcespriorto actual conflictsoccurredbeforethe Soviet threat
emerged.
A finalformof theenvironmental
adaptation
argument
hingeson theexpanding
of theUnitedStatesafter
and thecorresponding
vulnerability
reachof technology
theevidencein thisareais mixed,itis as plausibleto argue
WorldWarII. Although
breakintechnology
U.S. vulnerability
occurred
thatthedecisivequalitative
vis-'a-vis
inWorldWarII, evengiventheriseof
inWorldWarI as itis toarguethatitoccurred
airpower.102SeveraleventsinWorldWarI shockedAmericansandshould
strategic
haveconveyedthemessagethattheUnitedStateswas no longerimmunefromenattacksdamagedAmericans'senseofimmunity.
emiesabroad.103Germansubmarine
theZimmermann
And moreimportant,
Telegramsignaledthepotentialabilityof
theUnitedStates,espethreaten
Europeanpowers-thatis, Germany-todirectly
suchas Mexico.104
ciallywiththeassistanceofa country
99. See Adler1965, 12; Dobson 1995,55; Ambrosius1987,214; Leffler1979,25-26, 81, 160, 163;
Kennedy1980,325; andKnock1992,80.
100.See Walt1987;andWagner1993.
101.See Kennan1967,225-30; Divine1967;andPollard1985,4,244.
air
andtheoppositeviewthatstrategic
of thisvulnerability
102.Thompsondiscussestheperceptions
thecontinuing
ofnonenfeasibility
fora morerobustdefenseagainstinvasion,suggesting
powerprovided
Thompson1992,30-40.
gagement.
of thesinkingof theLusitaniain 1915 was so greatthatten
103. One journalistnotedthattheeffect
wheretheywereand whattheyweredoingwhenit occurred.
yearsaftertheevent,peopleremembered
Knock1992,60.
headlines
Wilsonandthepublic,dominating
effect
onbothPresident
hada profound
104.Thetelegram
fordays.See Knock1992,116-17;andLink1965,354.
279
AmericanInternationalism
Technological
capabilities
atthetimedidallowtheUnitedStatestoprojectpower
to Europerelatively
freight
rates
efficiently.
One proxyforthiscost is maritime
betweenEuropeand theUnitedStates.Metal shipsand steampropulsionhad repeopleandmaterialacross
ducedsignificantly
(by60 percent)thecostsof shipping
theAtlantic
inthetwotothreedecadesbeforeWorldWarI anda bitmorebythelate
relatively
stableuntilafter1950,
1920s-a "revolution"
intransport.
Costsremained
whenanother
reduction
WorldWarI, notWorldWar
began.105Usingthisindicator,
breakin technology
costs,inviting
a
II, morecloselymarkedthemostsignificant
in Europe.But thatshiftcame only
similarshiftin Americanideas on engagement
laterin a periodof relatively
stablemaritime
costs.As SenatorLodge argued,the
ocean barrierthatseparatedtheUnitedStatesfromEuropein 1776 and 1812 no
had erasedit.106
This factwas made
longerexistedin 1914-steam and electricity
thatdecidedtheoutcomeof
clearby themassiveconvoyingand U.S. intervention
WorldWarI. Thatoutcomedidnot,of course,revealto theleadersofthetimethat
intercontinental
powerprojection
was less thanit wouldbe in theage ofjet power
and nuclearweapons(developments
thatcame largelyaftertheshiftin American
thatprojecting
force
ideas).AndWorldWarI (specifically,
Gallipoli)diddemonstrate
withouta friendly
portin an amphibiousinvasionagainstopposingforceswas a
clearlydemonstrated
thata
difficult
business.107Buttheeffects
ofU.S. intervention
transatlantic
security-threatening
forcewas morepotentand successfulthanever
beforeinhistory.
In sum,goodarguments
existthatenvironmental
incentives
foranAmericancomWorldWarI. Butthere
mitment
toEuropeweredifferent
after
WorldWarII thanafter
thata decisivequalitative
breakalongthedimenis also good evidencesuggesting
inWorldWarI. The relevanceofan
sionsofpower,threat,
andtechnology
occurred
in thisperiodis apparent
in a
epistemicdynamictoAmericanideationalcontinuity
abouttheirsecurity
hadAmericans
afterWorldWarI thought
simplecounterfactual:
in thesamewaytheydidafterWorldWarII, theywouldhaveresponded
verydifferand technology
conditionspresentat thattime.Hence
entlyto thepower,threat,
alonedo notexplainAmericans'ideationalstasisandchange.
thoseconditions
Interest
Groupsand Social Purpose
thecollectivestate
Another
viewofnationalconceptualdevelopment
disaggregates
In
collective
aresimplythose
to examinetheinterest
within.
this
ideas
groups
view,
ofthe
notionsputforward
the
most
or
some
simpleaggregation
by
powerful
groups
behind
viewsofmanygroups.Thecomposition
ofinterest
U.S. foreign
policy
groups
ofways,including
forthisperiodhas beendescribedin a variety
partisan(Republicans versusDemocrats),politicalideology(progressivesversusconservatives),
105. See Lundgren1996,7-8; andLake 1999,100-101.
106.Cooper1969,23-24.
Millett1996,52.
werenotproblematic.
107. Lake 1999,99-100. Unopposedamphibiousoperations
in Europeto avoid
The difficulty
ofopposedlandingsmightalso havebeenusedinfavorofengagement
sucha need.
280 International
Organization
socioeconomicsectors(thosewithoverseaseconomicinterests
versusthosewithout),ethnicgroups(pro-German
versuspro-British),
andregionalinterests
(isolationist
Midwestversusinternationalist
Fromthisperspective,
coast).108
changesin state
ofunderstanding
orientation
area matter
howtherelativepowerand/or
interests
of
smallergroupswithinthestateshift,
to seize controlofthe
allowingone or another
nationalreins.
Interest
groupscertainly
pushedand pulledon theextantideationalconstraints,
leadingsomeanalyststo arguethatU.S. policywas somewhat
unstableandchaotic
inthe1920sand 1930s.109Butdeviations
in an internationalist
direction
werebulges
in,notthepoppingof,theunilateralist
balloon.Suchexceptions
tendedtobe primarilyintheeconomicrealm,in specificsectors,
limitedinduration,
andlargelyinvolvingprivateparties(suchas theDawes andYoungPlans).110
Thereis no largeshiftin
ininternal
thedirection
ofAmerican
thinking
onforeign
policyconsistent
withshifts
interest
groupsand theirideas.111
For example,theGreatDepressionallegedlyalon U.S. forteredtherelativepowerofdifferent
economicsectors.Yetthethinking
eignpolicydid notchangeuntila decadelaterand onlyaftertheepistemiceffects
discussedearlier.112
A thirdargument
abouttheAmericanshiftemphasizesnotinterest
groups,but
domesticsocialpurpose.JohnG. Ruggiehas arguedthattheUnitedStates'adoption
ofmultilateralism
reflected
itsfounding
as a community
principles
opentoall. AnneMarieBurleycontendstheshiftwas a productof U.S. policymakers
the
projecting
andformoftheNewDeal regulatory
stateontotheworld."113
"philosophy,
substance,
Theseexplanations
tellus muchabouttheformofAmerican
internationalism
whenit
inthesocial
buttheyaremoreambiguousontheissueoftiming.
Iftheshift
occurred,
purposeoftheAmericanstateoccurredduringtheGreatDepression,whywas there
in security
no shiftin ideas aboutexternalintervention
untilthe1940s?Moreover,
duringWorldWarI an explicitlinkwas made betweensupportfora progressive
in thewar abroad.Whyin this
interventionist
programat homeand intervention
at homeand abroadnotstick?In this
instancedid thetiebetweeninterventionism
to the
case externalexperience(thedisillusionment
fromWorldWarI) contributed
end of domesticprogressive
social intervention,
thecausal arrowin the
reversing
114
socialpurposeargument.
WorldWarII, butnotWorld
In sum,thetransformation
ofAmerican
beliefsduring
WarI, suggeststherelevanceofpayingattention
to collectiveideas aboutappropriof ideationaltransformation.
The pointis notthat
ate actioneven in explanations
ofchangeand
determine
thelikelihoodanddirection
collectiveideasbythemselves
thatpower,threat,
interest
technology,
groups,and socialpurposeare unimportant.
108.Fora surveyofsucharguments,
see Doenecke1987.
109.See Wilson1971,x; andFrieden1988,60.
110.See Leffler
1979;andRoberts1997,360.
111.Jonas1990,17-21.
112.On thesectoralshifts
thatoccurredas a resultofthedepression,
see Frieden1988,68, 83.
113.See Burley1993,130; andRuggie1998,72-73, 217-19.
114.See Knock1992,x, 187,255-56; andRochester1977,2, 60-64, 88-89,97.
AmericanInternationalism
281
I haveoffered
Rather,
themorelimitedcase thatideationalstructure
matters
evenin
itsowntransformation,
ofteninconjunction
withotherfactors.
Implications
In thisanalysisI haveattempted
tomakeconceptual
andempirical
headwayin specifying
thewaythatideas,events,andagentsinterrelate
toallowideationaltransformationin somecircumstances
butnotothers.In thisconcludingsectionI explicatethe
rangeand limitsof theapproach,how it relatesto otherprominent
researchprograms,anditsrelevancetocontemporary
international
relations.
An epistemiclogic shedslighton thehistory
ofU.S. internationalism,
butit also
seemsto have broaderapplicability
thansimplya sui generisexplanationof that
case. Theframework
thathas examinedboth
appliesto-and bringstogether-work
ideationalchangeand continuity
in a varietyof issue areas in different
countries.
ExamplesincludeJudith
Goldstein'sstudyofU.S. tradepolicy;PeterHall's analysis
of Britishmacroeconomic
policy;ScottSagan's accountof nuclearweaponssafety
intheU.S. military;
FrankDobbins'studyofindustrial
policyinFrance,Britain,
and
theUnitedStates;RobertW. KatesandWilliamC. Clark'sstudyon environmental
studieson Germanand Sopolicy;andHannsW. Maull's andWilliamWohlforth's
vietforeign
The framework
addstotheinsights
ofthesestudpolicy,respectively.115
ies inthreeways.First,itdisaggregates
changeintotwostagesthatclearlyelucidate
themicrofoundational
collectiveideationissuesat stake.Second,itprovidesa varyand consequences(failureand success)thatin someining logic of expectations
stancesreinforces
in otherschange.Third,it addressestherole of idecontinuity,
ationalstructure
intheemergence
ideas.
(ornot)ofnewdominant
Thereare limitsto theexplanatory
domainof theapproachas well. It will not
encompasseverycase of changein ideas,sincemanyvarietiesof suchalterations
exist.Thisis an argument
abouta particular
typeofchangeanda particular
typeof
is onlyonetype.Shifts
ideas.Relatively
ideational
transformation
rapiddiscontinuous
in collectiveideas can also takeplace in a slowerseriesof stepsovertime.So, too,
can alterations
emergewithinthe generallogic of a dominantepisteme.And,of
oftheneworthe
course,thechangesthatdo occurneednotalwaysmeanthetriumph
completedismissalof theold: layeringcan also result.116
My focushere,however,
has beenon rapidchangeand specifically
thelink(or not)betweencrisesand such
In addition,I have onlyexaminedideas thatare generally"more
transformations.
amenableto theproofof successor failure,and leave a certain
fluid,pragmatic,
andeventhecriticalfaculties
latitude
tolanguage,experience,
ofindividuals";these
ideas mightbe contrasted
witha secondtype,which"are generallymorehomotoexperience
orcontradiction,
andleavelittlescope
geneous,affective,
impermeable
115.See, forexample,Goldstein1993;Hall 1993;Sagan 1993;Wohlforth
1993;Dobbins1994;Maull
1995;KatesandClark1996;andMcNamara1998.Fora moreextendeddiscussionofsomeofthese,see
Legroforthcoming.
116.Goldstein1993.
282 International
Organization
forindividual
variations"
suchas manyreligiousbeliefs.117Thislattercategory
may
requirea different
logicofchange,ifoneexistsatall.
In international
relations,
myargument
has directimplications
fora numberof
different
analytical
traditions.
The first
is theprominent
grand-strategy
approachthat
depictsstatesas rationalactorscorrectly
perceiving
theenvironment
andresponding
tomaximizesecurity.118
One needknowlittleaboutthecollectiveperappropriately
ceptions,beliefs,and modes of calculationof states,sincetheseare genericand
likelyto reflect
systemic
forces.The thrust
ofthisusefulandparsimonious
formof
as inmarket
explanation,
analysis,restsinenvironmental
constraints
andincentives.
Buttheproblemis thatgrand-strategy
predictions
and actualstatethinking
andbehavioroftenseem to diverge.Althoughthe strategic
focuscertainly
capturesthe
adaptivedimensionof foreignpolicy,it overemphasizes
thecalculatingat theexpense of theideational.Groupsinterpret
theircircumstances
and make decisions
basedon a preexisting
ideationalframework
aboutwhatis desirableandwhatshould
Butitis learning
happen.Thereis an adaptivelearning
aspecttothisargument.
from
a collectivebeliefbaseline:one thathas a certainirrational
in thelackof
asymmetry
learning
thatcan resultfromsituations
whereexpectations
areunmetbuttheresults
are positive.And sometimescollectiveideas can even help create-in a typeof
self-fulfilling/negating
prophecy-theverycircumstances
confronted.
Thisappears
tobe thecase intheinterwar
period,whenAmericanviewson howtocause security
contributed
totheinternational
directly
circumstances
thatproducedinsecurity
inthe
formofeconomichardship
andmilitary
conflict.
offocusing
theimportance
on thecollectivenature
Second,theanalysisillustrates
of ideas,thuspointingto a missingelementin studiesthathighlight
thecognitive
traitsof individualsor theinstrumental
agencyof social actors.Theseperspectives
lackan aggregation
mechanism
to accountforcollectivementality.
Hence,psychoinexplaining
thatlacka socialcomponent
areoftenstumped
logicalapproaches
why
a particular
schema(ofthemanyavailableto different
individuals)
emergesto guide
distinct
fromtheindividuaction.Thenatureofcollectiveideasgivesthemproperties
als who adhereto thoseunderstandings.
Even powerfulagents,suchas presidents
and theiradvisors,operatein a broadernationalsettingcharacterized
by ideas and
andstructure
theirindividual
andattitudes.
symbolsthatoftenconstrain
preferences
havehadrelatively
littleto say(excepttoinvokecollective
Likewise,gametheorists
ideas) aboutwhyone focalpointamongmanyis reached,or whyno equilibrium
ThustheepistemiclogicI suggesthelpsto accountforwhysocial
emergesat all.119
actorsare able to negotiatecollectiveideationproblemsin someinstancesbutnot
others.
toaddressa gapintheongoingworkofconstructivist
Third,theapproachattempts
theinfluence
ofcollectiveideas,beliefs,norms,
scholarswhoseektounderstand
and
inworldpolitics.Although
muchofthisworkhasusefully
showntheimpact
identity
117.Moscovici1998,226-27.
118.Fora reviewandcritiqueofthisliterature,
see SteinandRosecrance1993.
119.See, forexample,Schelling1960,70; Kreps1990;andWeingast1996.
AmericanInternationalism
283
of ideationalstructure,
relatively
littleofithas exploredthesourcesof transformationin suchideas.Structural
explanations
tendto emphasizecontinuity,
notchange.
To theextentconstructivists
havetriedto explainchange,theyhavepursuedone of
twopaths,each insightful,
each withgaps.The mainsolution(in responseto structuralreification)
has beento turnto enterprising
social agentswho are able to persuade others.120
Althoughthereis muchto thesestudies,ultimately
theyhingeon
whatis persuasiveindependent
defining
of theoutcomes(thatis, changein collective,notjustinsomeorevenmanyindividual,
ideas).To datethishasbeenanelusive
task.121
I am certainly
notsayingthatsocialmovements
and agencydo notmatter.
Typically,nondominant
social agentsworkto maketheirown viewsas accessibleand
plausibleto as manymembersof societyas possible.In theepistemicframework,
an oppositionalset of ideas thatcan serveas a
agencyis criticalin establishing
in situations
replacement
favorableto collapseand consolidation
and in reactingto
theopportunities
In theU.S. case, forexample,nonstate
presented.
actorsaidedby
FDR's leadership
succeededinestablishing
a viableoppositional
idea ofinternationalismthatenabledthetransformation
during
WorldWarII.122
Anothergeneralconstructivist
approachto changehas focusedon process,be it
structurationist
through
logic or a Habermasiancommunicative
actionanalysis.In
thestructurationist
account,structure
and agencyare "mutuallyconstituted
or codetermined
entities":interaction
bothproducesand
amongagentsand structures
reproduces
thoseentities.123
Thekeyissue,however,
is whether
reproduction
(stasis)
ornewproduction
willoccur.Theanswerforstructu(change)inideationalstructure
rationists
seemsto be historical
contingency.
Likewise,thecommunicative-action
notionthatarguing,
andpersuading
can changemindsis indeterminate
deliberating,
on whenthisis likelyto happenoutsidetheseemingly
open-ended
presupposition
124The framework
that"audiencesare preparedto listen."
hereattempts
to reduce
theindeterminacy
intheseperspectives
thecircumstances
underwhich
bydelineating
willbe persuasiveandwhencollectiveideasarelikelytobe malagenticarguments
in theongoingprocesses
leableto changeversuswhentheyarelikelyto be resilient
ofmutualconstitution
andpublicargumentation.
Matingcollectiveideationalpropertiesand eventswiththemicroprocesses
of collapse and consolidation
helpsto
thistrade-off.
determine
international
theargument
Finally,incontemporary
directsourattention
relations,
to thelikelihoodofideationalcollapseandconsolidation
in ongoingcases ofpoten120.See Finnemore
1996;Price1998;andKeck andSikkink1998.Johnston
examineshowindividual
beliefchangeoccurswithininstitutions,
buthe does notexaminethelinkfromindividuals
to collective
change.Johnston
1999.
121. This is evidentalso in thesocial movement
thathighlights
theinfluence
literature
of cultural
See McAdametal. 1996.
frames.
122.Divine1967.
123. See Wendt1987and 1999;andCheckel1998,326.
124.Risse2000,x. Risse's analysisandexamplesalso seemtoworkthrough
individuals
(forexample,
GorbachevandHassan),againraisingtheissueofhowindividual
beliefchangeconnectstocollectiveidea
change.
284 International
Organization
in Germany,
China,Russia,Japan,and theUnited
tial transformation-especially
thedominantepisteme-individuals
States.The abilityof individualsto overturn
withthisinminddo existin eachcountry-willdependnotjuston theirskillsorthe
situation
theircountry
facesbut
groupsto whichtheybelongor eventhestrategic
and thetypesof eventsand consealso on each nation'scollectiveexpectations
mostofthetimesucheventswillnotshaketheextant
quencesexperienced.
Although
beliefset,whensituationsinvolvebothunmetexpectations
and negativeconsealternative
idea exists,societiesare much
quences,and whena singleprominent
in thedominant
episteme.It is thesecircummorelikelyto experiencea turnover
in Americanideas about
stancesthatcould signaltheonsetof thenextrevolution
positionthathas guided
foreign
policyandthetransformation
oftheinternationalist
theUnitedStatesinworldpoliticsforoverfifty
years.
Appendix:AnalysisofPresidentialForeignPolicyDiscourse
Figure1 is based on a contentanalysisof all the Stateof the Unionaddressesdelivered
toforeign
between1908and 1950.I assessedthepassagesrelating
policyintermsofpositive
andnegativestatements
aboutdifferent
andwelU.S. security
typesofactionsforenhancing
fare.I usedthefollowing
measuring
unilateralism
versusintersix-point
numerical
continuum
nationalism
to assess thetextin termsof itslanguageand causal
(in half-point
increments)
relatedtoforeign
arguments
policy:
withmajor
0 The UnitedStatesshouldavoidgetting
involvedininternational
relations
powers.To theextentpossibletheUnitedStatesshouldliveandletlive.The country
can bestlead as an example.(Thisendofthespectrum
is stronger
tothedegreerhetoric
also denigrates
theoppositeend.)
1 The UnitedStatesshouldnecessarily
engagetheworld,butitshoulddo so without
bindingitselfin institutional
arrangements.
2 The UnitedStatesmustplaya largerolein worldaffairs.
Thismightinvolvesomelimitedinstitutional
commitments
suchas armscontrolandthemutualloweringoftariffs.
Buttraditional
alliancesorgeneralcommitments
to collectivesecurity
politicalmilitary
wouldbe proscribed,
institutions
especiallywithEurope.
3 The UnitedStatesmustplaya largeroleintheworld,especiallyin economicaffairs.
miliPositiveattitude
towardthebenefits
ofinternational
butnotinvolving
institutions,
taryprecommitments.
and
4 U.S. security
international
commitments
wouldbe wellservedbymoresubstantial
eventhoseinvolving
agreements,
military
precommitments.
international
institutions
andrelation5 U.S. security
dependson activelyconstructing
backing.
shipsthattieus toothermajorpowersandtowhichwe givepoliticalmilitary
theopposite
is stronger
tothedegreerhetoric
also denigrates
(Thisendofthespectrum
end.)
The line shownin Figure1 reflects
myassessmentand codingof thespeeches;a second
coder(blindto thepurposesand contentof thestudyand mycoding)also assessedthepasscale. We assignedthesamevaluein 39 percentofthetotal
sages accordingto thesix-point
AmericanInternationalism
285
observations
(forty-one
speeches).125
In 37 percentof theobservations
our assignedvalues
differed
byone-half
point;in 15 percent,
byonepoint;in 10 percent,
byone-and-a-half
points;
andinoneobservation
bytwopoints.
I surveyed
theeditorialresponsesoffourdifferent
newspapers
(reflecting
different
regions
andpartisanleanings)-NewYorkTimes,ChicagoTribune,
St.LouisPost-Dispatch,
andLos
AngelesTimes.Theseeditorials
presenta muchless comprehensive
pictureofforeignaffairs
thanthespeechesthemselves.
Sometimes
theyoffer
onlypassingcomments
onforeign
affairs;
sometimes
theyonlyaddressthedomesticportionsof thespeeches.Editorialsthatmadeno
offoreign
ordidnotcontainenoughinformation
mention
affairs
to code werenotincludedhenceeach newspapermaynotbe represented
everyyear.I coded each editorialbased on a
three-tiered
scale basedon whether
itvoicedmore,roughly
equal,orless support
forinternationalism
thanthesentiment
foundinthepresident's
StateoftheUnionaddress.
The contentof "more" and "less" is definedby theprecedingsix-pointscale. Again,a
secondcoderalso assessedtheeditorials.
In 71 percentoftheeditorials
(n = 92) we assigned
thesamerank;in25 percent
ofthecases we differed
we assigned
byonerank;andin4 percent
an oppositerank.
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