A Lion without Teeth: The Failure of the Responsibility to Protect
By Chandra Sheehy, Salem State College
In the wake of what has been termed a century of genocides the United Nations
General Assembly unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P).
This document was created to provide a global mandate under which the international
community could intervene on the behalf of citizens who were being exposed to
genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This marked a necessary and
landmark shift in the current humanitarian landscape. However, as this paper will show,
this mandate has failed to be utilized as the framers envisioned. In those crises where the
R2P has been cited it has been ineffectively practiced. Additionally, numerous other
opportunities existed where the R2P could have been used, but the Security Council has
failed to act. Though the Responsibility to Protect as it was intended is an essential
development in the prevention of mass atrocity crimes, it has continually been
bastardized by the United Nations Security Council’s inability to reach a consensus and
general lack of political will.
The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Responsibility to Protect
has failed to fulfill its mandate as explicated in the document set fourth by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Through the evaluation
of said document as well as three case studies—Darfur (chosen for its status as the only
crisis for which the Security council has invoked the Responsibility to Protect), Burma
(chosen for its geographic location and exacerbating human security concerns brought on
by a natural disaster), and The Democratic Republic of Congo (chosen for its severity and
long-standing relevance); this paper will attempt to determine if the R2P has failed to
prevent human rights violations and protect the civilian populations in states where such
blatant and conscious shocking violations are occurring. Given this focus this paper will
not include a discussion of the Responsibility to Rebuild, a vital facet of the R2P, as these
interventions have failed to reach the rebuilding stage and thus this responsibility is
outside the scope of this paper.
Failed Promises: The Failure to Protect Populations in the 20th Century
During the 1990’s there was a great deal of controversy over the topic of
humanitarian intervention, both in those cases where it occurred and where it did not
occur. However, the general consensus was that the international community had failed to
protect civilian lives regardless of whether it did or did not intervene. In the wake of the
genocide in Rwanda it became apparent that the United Nations had failed to take the
necessary actions—largely due to a lack of political will—that could have prevented the
death of a large portion of the estimated 800,000 people that died over the course of the
100-day genocide. This inaction led to outrage on the part of civil society and (in
retrospect) spurred the creation of the R2P forward.1 Additionally, the failure to protect
the civilian populations in United Nations “safe zones,” as was the case in Srebrenica, has
caused widespread horror at the peacekeepers’ seeming incapability to act and halt
unneeded loss of civilian life. Given these events, under the aegis of the Canadian
government, a commission was formed to create a doctrine that would strengthen the
1 Edward C. Luck, The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect, (The Stanley Foundation, 2008). United Nation’s ability to react to mass atrocity crimes, and prevent large scale loss of
life: The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.2 3
Enter: The Responsibility to Protect
The Responsibility to Protect doctrine is a product of the assumption that state
sovereignty is not an inherent right, as traditionally assumed, but rather is endowed upon
the state by the people in return for the state fulfilling certain basic needs. Considering
this assumption, the primary obligation of the state is to ensure the safety and well being
of its citizens. In those cases where the state is unwilling or unable to fulfill its
obligations, the international community has the responsibility to intervene and to
reassert order. Under the R2P, in circumstances where the international community must
intervene, it is not with the purpose of overthrowing a government, but rather with the
purpose of preventing or ending unneeded loss of life and establishing an order by which
the state may continue to provide for human security.
The Responsibility to Prevent
Although the Responsibility to Protect includes a provision to intervene, its first
responsibility is to Prevent. According to the document’s authors, the R2P’s primary goal
should be to prevent mass atrocity crimes whenever possible. The Commission outlines
the various methods that may be utilized to prevent large-scale loss of life. These
2 International Commisssion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect , Commission Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 3 Kofi A. Annan, The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Security­General (New York: United Nations Department of public Information, 1999). methods include political, diplomatic, and economic measures that may be used to
pressure an unwilling government.
Political and diplomatic actions may include arbitration, mediation,
threat or application of political sanctions, diplomatic isolation, suspension
of organization membership, travel and asset restrictions [… and] “naming
and shaming.”4
These measures are designed to target specific individuals responsible for perpetrating or
encouraging human rights violations. Unfortunately, some of these sanctions (i.e.
exclusion from international organization) may have a negative effect on the whole
population rather than just those individuals responsible for committing or facilitating
human rights violations. Despite this, these targeted attacks often damage the states’
ability to effectively participate in the international community, as well as certain
individuals’ ability to travel, access international assets, or maintain diplomatic status
abroad.
The Responsibility to React
In the event that the United Nations and its relevant organizational partners are
incapable of preventing large-scale loss of human life utilizing the aforementioned tools,
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine mandates the use of intervention. This creates
possibilities of intervening outside of military action, but these methods “can be blunt and
often indiscriminate weapons.”5 Additionally, these methods have generally been
4 International Commisssion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect , Commission Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 5 Ibid. attempted during the prevention stage and have subsequently failed. Thus, the
Responsibility to React generally refers to military intervention.
However, in those cases where the Responsibility to React does not imply active
military intervention, there are certain far-reaching methods that the Commission
indicates may be used. The Commission recommends several military, economic, and
political methods of intervention. These may include, but are not limited to: arms
embargoes, ending
military cooperation and training programs […] sanctions [that] target the
foreign assets of a country, or rebel movement or terrorist organization, or
the foreign assets of particular leaders [and…] restrictions on income
generating activities such as oil, diamonds, and logging and drugs […]
access to petroleum, aviation.6
These types of sanctions have been used in Serbia and other nations in the past with
varying degrees of success. A concern that has been raised by critics is that the potential
exists for these sanctions to backfire and instead effect the population. Additionally, some
critics have raised concerns that utilizing sanctions aimed at the leaders of states or
terrorist organizations may cause retaliation against the already endangered population,
thus further exacerbating the problem. Thus, as previously mentioned, the Responsibility
to React typically indicates the use of military force.
Presuming that all indirect reactionary interventions have been exhausted, six
criteria exist to determine if a crisis warrants the use of force. The first criteria being the
“right authority.” According to Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, which states that
the Security Council may authorize the use of force by “air, sea, or land forces as may be
6 Ibid.
necessary to maintain and restore international peace and security,” the “right authority”
is possessed by the Security Council in most cases.
7
However, in response to the deep
divisions in the Security Council following the Korean War, the United States Secretary
of Defense Dean Acheson suggested the “United Action for Peace.” This proposal would
enable the General Assembly to be able to act when the Security Council is “obstructed
by the veto.” 8
Under the “Uniting for Peace” procedure, the General Assembly may authorize an
emergency session to “consider the matter immediately with a view to making
appropriate recommendations [… including] the use of armed force when necessary.”9
Though this action would require the approval of the majority of the member states to be
enacted, it effectively provides the GA with the ability to circumvent the SC when
necessary. Thus, in accordance with this resolution, the R2P acknowledges that the GA
possesses the “right authority.”
Having met the first criteria, the “just cause” threshold is perhaps the most
important requirement under the R2P. The International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty has defined “just cause” in very specific term. These terms include:
Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or
not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect
or inability to act, or a failed state situation;
7 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (accessed December 7, 2009). 8 Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action Against Threats and Armed Attacks Volume 15 of Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 ). 9 U.N. General Assembly, 302nd Session. Uniting For Peace, (A/RES/5/377). 3 November 1950 or large scale “ethnic cleansing,” actual or apprehended, whether carried
out by killing, forced expulsion, or acts of terror or rape.10
For intervention to be justified under the R2P a conflict must be able to meet these
requirements. While definitive evidence of the above crimes is preferable it is not
necessary to authorize intervention. Because it is often difficult to fully understand the
scope of the conflict from abroad prior to intervention, compelling belief is sufficient to
authorize force.
In addition to the aforementioned definition of “just cause”, other potential causes
for intervention include state collapse resulting in potential mass starvation, war crimes,
and natural and environmental catastrophes where the state is unwilling to request aid.
These terms have found many contenders within the international community,
specifically among states that believe this is outside the scope of the United Nations, and
the Security Council’s authority. As a result, it is generally accepted that only the former
conditions warrant intervention, while the latter merely warrant concern.
The remaining four principles are generally simple to establish; “right intention,
last resort, proportional means, and reasonable prospects.” “Right intention” refers to the
focus of the intervention. The R2P is intended to protect the civilian populations from
mass atrocity crimes. The goal of any military intervention must be to achieve that
objective, not the objective of any outside party. To achieve this goal multilateral
intervention should be used to ensure that no state actor might use the intervention to
achieve its own means. “Last resort” simply indicates that the international community
must have exhausted all other possible options prior to using military force. “Proportional
10 Ibid. means” refers to the need to use military measures that are equal to the crimes being
committed. Hence, the military actors must take care to utilize only methods that will
target the perpetrators of crimes rather than affecting the victims. Lastly, the term
“reasonable prospects” refers to the establishment of obtainable and explicit objectives
before intervening. In most peacemaking interventions it is this criterion that has been
criticized. Because most peacekeeping operations are multilateral with numerous
commands, it is often difficult to coordinate one realistic set of goals. Ultimately,
intervention without reasonable objectives is largely ineffective.
With the creation of the R2P and its subsequent adoption by the United Nations
General Assembly, the question arose as to whether the R2P was an obligation or right of
the Security Council. The Charter of the United Nations states that its primary purpose is
to “maintain international peace and security” and to undertake any actions that are
necessary to maintaining this peace and security. 11 Additionally, Article 24 states that
the Security Council maintains the “primary responsibility” for carrying out any
procedures essential to preserving peace.12 Given the responsibilities set forth in the
Charter, it is clear that the United Nations Security Council had the obligation to act to
ensure peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council accepted the obligation to
utilize the R2P in this effort to conserve peace through its utilization of this doctrine in
Darfur. By accepting that the R2P could be applied, and further by applying it, the
Security Council was implicit in accepting this doctrine as its obligation. This having
11 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml (accessed December 7, 2009). 12 Ibid.
been said, the Security Council has a compulsion to utilize the R2P to end loss of human
life, which it was fully cognizant of.
Has the Responsibility to Protect failed in its mandate?
Flaws in the Document
Responsibility to Protect is a revolutionary document though it is riddled with flaws
that inherently limit its capacity to succeed. The primary criticism of the R2P is that in its
current form, the permanent five of the UN Security Council are permitted to retain their
veto power in this issue.13 Although the document encourages the Permanent Five to
“agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not
involved,” this suggestion is not binding. 14 In a Council that is frequently divided
because of the disputes between the Permanent Five, it is highly possible that the exercise
of veto power will subvert the Security Council’s ability to react effectively and
appropriately to humanitarian crises. Additionally, though provisions have been made in
the event that the Security Council is incapable of acting, these provisions are ineffective.
The “Uniting for Peace” procedure (the alternative to Security Council action) is not a
binding action. In theory it is a joint action supported by the General Assembly with
some level of unanimity but lacks the proverbial teeth to enforce its decisions.15
Therefore, the alternative measures provided in the document do not adequately insure
that the weaknesses created by this provision are eliminated.
13 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Ottawa : International Development Research Centre , 2001). 14 International Commisssion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect , Commission Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). An additional challenge associated with the R2P is the commitment of troops.
Although the Security Council is the primary body for authorizing the use of troops, the
General Assembly is able to commit troops under the “Uniting for Peace” measure.16 For
the reasons mentioned above, consensus can be difficult to reach thus making the process
of committing troops problematical. Unfortunately a frequent critique of the United
Nations—a critique that has been superimposed on the R2P—is that when troops are
committed, it is often difficult to assemble the force.17 Because the United Nations lacks
a standing army, and thus relies on its member states to donate troops, intervention for
human rights issues is often relegated to a secondary position. Many states do not want to
commit troops and therefore risk the lives of their soldiers in conflicts that are not
relevant to their national interests. The R2P doctrine does not establish any extraneous
conditions or measures by which the Security Council or the General Assembly may
commit troops. The doctrine presumes that the current method of garnering troops is
sufficient to fulfill the requirements of the doctrine, though, this dampens the
international communities ability to act effectively and decisively.
Application
By virtue of the reported human rights violations that have occurred (or allegedly
occurred) in each of these states, it is clear that the United Nations has failed to fulfill its
Responsibility to Prevent. In addition, numerous instances have arisen since the 2005
adoption of the R2P where the doctrine could and should have been invoked, yet the
16 John F. Murphy, The United Nations and the Control of International Violence: A Legal and Political Analysis (Manchester University Press ND, 1983). 17 Michael O'Hanlon, Expanding Global Military Capacity for Humanitarian Intervention (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). Security Council has often failed to invoke the R2P, or has failed to successfully
implement any of the actions necessary to end human rights violations in these situations.
Regarding the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan, the Security Council has invoked the
R2P as a means for protecting the population to no avail. In Burma and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, the Security Council has failed to classify the gross human rights
violations occurring therein as warranting intervention under the R2P and as a result the
killing continues unchecked while the international civil community clamors for action.
As established in the section entitled “The Responsibility to React,” the United
Nations Security Council and, in certain extreme cases, the United Nations General
Assembly, has the “right authority” to intervene for the purpose of protecting populations
from mass atrocity crimes. The “right authority” has already been established for each of
these three case studies. The question is, at least in the case of Burma and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, has the “just cause” principle been met, and if so has the R2P failed?
Darfur
In Darfur it is estimated that 400,000 Darfuri citizens have been massacred by the
government sponsored janjaweed militias, whilst another quarter of a million civilians are
living in refugee camps in the Central African Republic and Chad18. The Sudanese
government has continually disregarded all attempts from the international community to
halt these crimes against humanity, and has showed a lack of political will to stop the
killings. Instead, the NGO’s working in these regions have taken up the burden of caring
18 Interntional Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ICRtoP, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis‐in‐darfur (accessed 20 2009 , October). for these displaced individuals, and the African Union has attempted to protect those
civilians from grave human rights violations through the application of military force.
Still, the 7,000 troops committed to providing protection to these citizens have proven
inadequate when faced with the well-armed janjaweed militias.19 Regarding the just cause
criteria, the current human rights situation in Darfur meets this requirement on the first
prong; a large-scale loss of life exists within the Darfur region of Sudan, and the
Sudanese government has shown that it is unwilling to halt, or perhaps is implicit in the
commission of these crimes. Thus, in this case, the “just cause” requirement has been
fulfilled.
Responding to pressure from the international community, the Security Council
passed UN Security Council resolution 1706—the first resolution to explicitly reference
the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.20 Although this resolution should have been
regarded as a victory for the supporters of the R2P, it was largely ineffective in providing
aid or ensuring the deployment of troops into the region. On July 31, 2007 the Security
Council subsequently passed the UN Security Council Resolution 1769, which provided
for the deployment of 26,000 troops from both the UN and the AU.21 Nevertheless,
despite attempts to mitigate the loss of life in Darfur, only 14,804 troops had been
deployed by October 31, 2009.22
19 Ibid. 20Resolution 1706, UN Security Council, 5519th mtg (31 August 2006), UN Doc S/Res/1706 (2006)
21 Resolution 1769, UN Security Council, 5727th mtg (31 July 2007), UN Doc S/RES/1769 (2007) 22 United Nations Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNAMID African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur, November 2009, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/facts.shtml (accessed November 5, 2009). While the Security Council has continually made efforts to implement the R2P
with respect to Darfur the Sudanese government has blocked its attempts. Meanwhile the
force deployed in Sudan has been overwhelmed by the janjaweed militias, making the
protection of civilian lives nearly impossible. Under the current conditions violence
continues to reign in Darfur, and thousands of refugees are currently displaced in camps
where disease and corruption are staples of daily life. The attempts of the Security
Council to implement the R2P have led to no greater effect than previous attempts at
humanitarian intervention.
Burma
Despite the fact that a serious humanitarian crisis exists (and has existed) in
Burma, the Security Council has failed to authorize intervention under the R2P mandate.
The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect has stated that the human
rights abuses being perpetrated in Burma include
the pervasive use of forced labor, the forced recruitment of tens of
thousands of child soldiers, rampant sexual violence, extrajudicial killings,
torture and the displacement of over a million of Burmese people.23
These violations are often perpetrated against minority ethnic groups in a systematic
attempt to eliminate said groups. In the face of these rampant violations of international
law, many individual governments and NGO’s have requested that the R2P be invoked to
protect the population from further harm. Under the R2P doctrine, “just cause” has been
established in Burma. The systematic attempts to separate and repress certain ethnic
23 Interntional Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ICRtoP, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis‐in‐darfur (accessed 20 2009 , October). groups are classified by the doctrine as being “conscience shocking crimes.”
Additionally, this situation has been compounded by Cyclone Nargis. According to the
R2P, natural disasters where the state is unable to cope, or unwilling to request aid,
qualifies as a situation where international intervention is acceptable.24 In this case, the
government of Burma failed to request aid. Instead, reports have surfaced that the
Burmese government has categorically blocked aid organizations from entering the
country.25 As such, the civilian population has unnecessarily been exposed to conditions
that jeopardize the population’s well being.
The crises in Burma has raised significant international concern, indicating a
growing civil will to stop the human rights violations occurring therein. The Federation
Internationale de Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) has released a statement arguing that the
UN Human Rights Council should petition the Security Council to act immediately and
efficiently.26 Additionally, 60 members of the British Parliament signed the Early Day
Motion requesting that the Security Council fulfill its mandate under the Responsibility to
Protect and intervene in Burma.27 Despite the pressure from governments and civil
society, the UN Security Council has yet to pass a resolution to this effect. In the interim,
these human rights violations continue unchecked in Burma, as the Responsibility to
Protect remains a bastardized doctrine without an application.
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
24 International Commisssion on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect , Commission Report (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001). 25 Human Rights Watch , Burma's Forgotten Prisoners (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2009).
26 Interntional Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ICRtoP, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis‐in‐darfur (accessed 20 2009 , October). 27 Ibid. The Democratic Republic of Congo is perhaps the best example of where
humanitarian intervention and the R2P have failed. Whereas bulk of the Security
Council’s action regarding the situation in the DRC came before the creation of the R2P,
no further action has been taken since the R2P was adopted by the UN. Additionally, the
MONUC mandate has been revised since the adoption of the R2P, and still the doctrine
has not been invoked. Because the human rights crisis has continued to occur since the
R2P became a relevant means of intervention, the situation in the DRC falls within the
purview of this paper.
Since the end of the Civil War in 2003 the DRC has been plagued by a plethora of
human rights violations that have continually been brought to the attention of the Security
Council. In Eastern DRC rape as a weapon of war occurs with a frequency that is
unprecedented. Additionally, it is estimated that upwards of 7,000 child soldiers are being
forcibly employed in ethnically motivated violence throughout this region, even as over
1.25 million people remain internally displaced.28 While organizations such as the U.S.
Holocaust Memorial, the Enough Project, The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers, the International Rescue Committee, as well as various agents working for the
United Nations have reported that the violence occurring in the DRC constitutes gross
human rights violations, the R2P has yet to be invoked. The government’s unwillingness
to act to stop these varying instances of human rights violations, as well as its alleged
implicit participation in these violations constitutes “just cause” as defined by the R2P.
28 Ibid.
In 1999 the Security Council authorized the use of force in the DRC, and
currently upwards of 16,700 troops are stationed in the DRC (MONUC), with a mandate
that currently extends to December 2009.29 These troops have proven to be largely
ineffectual against the government funded militias working in the East. While the troop
numbers have been increased over time they are not funded or equipped to confront the
FDLR forces. To supplement these troops the Security Council has been imposing
sanctions upon the DRC since 2004, which it expanded in 2008. These sanctions have
targeted those individuals specifically responsible for hindering peacekeeping operations
and humanitarian efforts.30 However, even with the combination of sanctions and military
action, MONUC is no closer to achieving peace for the DRC. Indeed in November 2004,
former UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Jan Egeland, and former
UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno, have
stated that the situation in the DCR is “frighteningly similar to the conditions in Rwanda
before the genocide,”31 indicating that rather than preventing mass atrocity crimes, the
DRC is moving ever closer to full-scale genocide.
In all three of the aforementioned countries the mandate for the R2P clearly
applies despite the Security Council’s failure to apply, or effectively apply, its right to
intervention. In each of these states the government is actively depriving its civilians of
their rights and perpetrating mass atrocity crimes. In the case of Darfur, the Security
29 United Nations Peace and Security Section of the Department of Public Information in cooperation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Novemeber 2009, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monuc/facts.shtml (accessed November 5, 2009). 30 Interntional Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ICRtoP, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis‐in‐darfur (accessed 20 2009 , October). 31 Ibid. Council has failed to act with the force necessary or warranted both by the doctrine of the
R2P and the situation within the country. In Burma, the Security Council has essentially
turned a blind-eye to governmental practices that are equitable with ethnic cleansing. In
the DRC the current troop levels and sanctions have done little to stop the violence and
the country is creeping towards genocide. Given these case studies, and the lack of
evidence that there have been any instances where the Security Council has evoked the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine and succeeded in producing timely and effective
results, it is difficult to claim that the R2P is functioning as the framers and the
international community envisioned it. At best it is a failed attempt to generate
international consensus; at worst it is merely a banner that the United Nations can hold up
as false proof that it is acting to stop these crimes. Ultimately, it has failed at meeting its
mandate.
A Light at the End of the Tunnel? Hope for the Responsibility to Protect
Although the R2P has undoubtedly failed to provide security for the civilians in
countries where gross human rights violations are occurring, proponents of the doctrine
have claimed that an as of yet unexplored benefit may arise from the R2P. Whereas
traditional discourse regarding humanitarian intervention has been continually dominated
by the concept of state sovereignty as an inviolable right, the concepts associated with the
R2P have recreated the notions of state sovereignty to reflect the notion that state
sovereignty is a responsibility, which can be forfeited. As such, the dialogue surrounding
humanitarian intervention and prevention has been transformed so that the rights and well
being of the civilians take precedent over the rights of the state. Additionally, the
international community has come to the consensus that the current method for protecting
humanity is inadequate. In this atmosphere there is a greater chance for the creation of a
universal method for dealing with human rights violations.
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