Age for Leisure? Political Mediation and the Impact of the Pension Movement on U.S. Old-Age
Policy
Author(s): Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Sheera Joy Olasky
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Jun., 2005), pp. 516-538
Published by: American Sociological Association
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AgeforLeisure?
PoliticalMediation
andthe Impactof the
PensionMovementon U.S.Old-AgePolicy
Edwin Amenta
Neal Caren
New YorkUniversity
New YorkUniversity
University of California, Irvine
SheeraJoy Olasky
New YorkUniversity
This article elaborates a political mediation theory of the impact of social movements on
states and policy, positing that the influence of mobilization and specific strategies of
collective action depends on specified political contexts and the type of influence sought.
Examining the influence of the US. old-age pension movement, which involved millions
ofpeople, this article appraises the mediation model using state-level data from the
1930s and 1940s on Old Age Assistance-the main supportfor the aged at the time-and
a Senate vote for generous senior citizens 'pensions in 1939. Our models controlfor
other potential influences, notably public opinion, which is often ignored in empirical
studies and sometimes claimed to be responsible for causal influence mistakenly
attributed to challengers. Weemploy pooled cross-sectional and time series analyses and
fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (FSQCA), which is especially suited to
appraising the combinational expectations of the political mediation model. Both sets of
analyses show that the pension movement was directly influential on the outcomes and
provide supportfor the political mediation arguments.
haveincreasingly
turnedtheiratten-
(McAdam 1999; Zald 2000) argue that the
political process and resource mobilization
ments (cf. McAdam,McCarthy,and Zald 1988
models do not help to explainthe consequences
and Amenta and Caren 2004). Much of this
of these movements.Otherreviewers(Burstein
workhas focused on the externalconsequences
and Linton2002) claim thatquantitativeanalyof movements, especially those relating to
ses in this area have frequentlybeen misspecstates and struggles over legislation. Despite
ified and that when public opinion is taken
this work, one reviewer (Giugni 2004) recentinto account challengers are found to have litly argued that our knowledge accumulation
tle direct influence on state-relatedoutcomes.
on the subject has thus far been minor.Others
In this paper, we seek to contributeto this
debate by elaboratingand appraisinga political mediation theory of social movementconDirect correspondence to Edwin Amenta,
sequences (Piven and Cloward 1977;Amenta,
269
of Sociology,NewYorkUniversity,
Department
Carruthers,and Zylan 1992; Skocpol 1992;
MercerStreet,NewYork,NY 10003([email protected],
Amenta, Bernstein, and Dunleavy 1994;
[email protected]).Forhelpfulcommentsandcriticism
andYoung
on a previousversionof thispaper,theauthorsthank Fording 1997; Amenta, Halfmann,
Instead
of askand
Marks
1999; Lipset
2000).
LaureBereni,JenniferEarl,JeffGoodwin,DavidE
influenwhether
movements
are
generally
LaDawnHagland,MildredA. Schwartz, ing
Greenberg,
the NYU Politics,Power,and ProtestWorkshop, tial or whether certain aspects of movements
andtheASReditor. are always influential, as others have done, we
threeanonymous
ASRreviewers,
tion to the consequences of social moveScholars
AMERICANSOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW,2005, VOL. 70 (June:5x6-538)
AND IMPACTOF PENSIONMOVEMENT 517
MEDIATION
POLITICAL
ask under what conditions are social movements likely to be influential. Our political
mediation theory holds that political contexts
mediate the influence of challengers' mobilization and strategies. We argue that in some
favorablecontextsmobilizationmay be enough
in itself for a challengerto exert influence and
that under more difficult political circumstancesmore assertivestrategiesareneeded. In
yet more difficult political contexts (which we
specify), a movement may not be able to exert
any influence. Moreover,we arguethat it takes
a combination of favorablepolitical contexts,
mobilization, and assertive actions to bring
about far-reachingstate outcomes. We specify what constituteslong- and short-termfavorable and unfavorable political contexts, as
demandedby critics of previous social movement research (Goodwin and Jasper 1999);
these differ from the standardfour of the political opportunity model (McAdam 1996;
Tarrow 1996). We also reconceptualize what
counts as an assertive strategy (cf. McAdam
1999; Kitschelt 1986), as previous definitions
have been too broadto addressdifferentmeans
employed by state-orientedchallengers.
We appraisethe model and some alternatives
by analyzing the impact of the U.S. old-age
pension movement on old-age policy in its
formative years. Though largely forgotten
today, the old-age pension movement was a
major political phenomenon. The Townsend
Plan,1 the largest mass pension organization,
was formed in 1934 and in less than two years
had organized two million older Americans
into Townsendclubs behind the slogan "Youth
for Work-Age for Leisure."Townsend Plan
supportersmade up one of only about thirty
1 Althoughmost scholars,followingHoltzman
andphenomenon
as
(1963),referto thisorganization
the"Townsend
we call it theTownsend
movement,"
Robert
Planfirstandforemostforhistorical
accuracy.
Earl Clements,the organization'sinitial leader,
Plan"was appealingandused
thought"Townsend
thatname.The newspapersdid likewise.TheNew
York
Timesindexaccordingly
refersto theTownsend
PlanandsearchingProQuestfor"Townsend
movement"missesmost articleson theTownsendPlan.
Also, the TownsendPlanwas a social movement
ratherthana movement.In addition,
organization
"Townsend
Plan"laterbecametheofficialnameof
theorganization.
social movement organizationsever to attract
1 percent or more of the U.S. adult population
(Skocpol 2003). In 1936, the Townsend Plan
was the subjectof more than400 articles in the
New YorkTimes, placing seventh among all
twentieth-centurysocial movement organizations (see Table 1) in number of mentions in
their peak year. In addition to the Townsend
Plan, many notable state-level pension organizations demanded generous support for the
aged-senior citizens' pensions-rather than
the subsistence-level assistance or restricted,
wage-relatedannuitiesprovidedor promisedby
the 1935 Social SecurityAct. The old-age pension movement case is a useful one to appraise
political mediation theory as the movement
varied greatly in its mobilization and actions
and operated in multiple political contexts,
across states and times.
In addition, because the theory has implications for different outcomes, we employ a
variety of data on outcomes. The first data set
concernsstate-levelOldAge Assistance (OAA)
programs, which were the main support for
the aged from 1936 through 1950. We examine the generosity of OAA stipends and the
program's coverage among the aged population. These two outcomes add leverage to our
analysis, because the pension movement's
claims and strategies largely focused on the
amount of benefit, ratherthan extent of coverage, and thus we would expect that the presence and activity of pension organizations
would influence the amount of benefit more
than the coverage. We also examine which
senators voted for a 1939 measure aiming to
transform U.S. old-age policy into generous
senior citizens' pensions for most adults over
60 years. The political mediation model holds
that effecting radical change requires more
extensive determinantsthan does influencing
more moderate programs,and the voting data
address these claims. We use two methods to
appraisearguments:multipleregressionanalysis and fuzzy set qualitativecomparativeanalysis (FSQCA), the latter of which facilitates
the examination of complex and multiple
causal arguments(Ragin 1987, 2000), such as
those of the political mediation model. Each
type of analysis supports our claims.
518
REVIEW
SOCIOLOGICAL
AMERICAN
in the 20th Century,by Mentionsin Articlesin PeakYear,
Table 1. Top 25 U.S. Social MovementOrganizations
in the New YorkTimesandthe WashingtonPost
New YorkTimes New YorkTimes Washington
Post
Articles
Articles
FrontPage
Organization(PeakYear)
476
205
1. AmericanFederationof Labor(1937)
1,050
617
2. BlackPanthers(1970)
111
1,028
325
786
186
3. CIO(1937)
762
128
446
4. NAACP(1963)
672
180
339
5. Ku KluxKlan(1924)
99
91
409
6. Anti-SaloonLeague(1930)
118
402
68
7. TownsendPlan(1936)
174
381
90
8. Studentsfor a DemocraticSociety(1969)
369
32
86
9. Congressof RacialEquality(1963)
24
121
280
10. AmericaFirstCommittee(1941)
70
200
263
11. AmericanLegion(1937)
255
32
128
12. JohnBirch Society(1964)
4
117
246
13. Leagueof WomenVoters(1937)
24
102
231
14.AmericanCivil LibertiesUnion(1977)
221
10
268
15. MoralMajority(1981)
142
215
36
16. SouthernChristianLeadershipConference(1968)
200
32
71
17. GermanAmericanBund(1939)
47
76
195
18. StudentNonviolentCoordinatingCommittee(1966)
22
104
180
19. Veteransof ForeignWars(1950)
53
136
174
20. AmericanLibertyLeague(1936)
52
253
170
21. ChristianCoalition(1996)
56
37
168
22. AssociationAgainstthe ProhibitionAmendment(1930)
22
92
159
23. Weathermen
(1970)
23
97
157
24. SymbioneseLiberationArmy(1974)
31
91
145
25. JewishDefense League(1971)
NAACP= NationalAssociationfortheAdvancementof
Note: CIO= Congressof IndustrialOrganizations;
ColoredPeople.
THE STATE-RELATED
CONSEQUENCES effects, and negative consequences, such as
AND
OF SOCIALMOVEMENTS
repressionor restrictionson movements(Piven
and Cloward 1977; McCarthy and McPhail
THEORY
POLITICAL
MEDIATION
MODERATEAND RADICALINFLUENCE
A first step for scholarswho seek to studystaterelatedconsequencesof social movementsis to
define "success"or "influence"for challengers
making state-relatedclaims. We follow in the
footsteps of most state-relatedresearch,focusing on new advantages (see Gamson [1975]
1990; Amenta and Caren 2004; Meyer 2005).
But we reject Gamson's([1975] 1990) definition of "success"-whether a challenger's
claims were mainly acted on-because of its
limitations.Challengersdifferin how far-reaching their goals are, and thus a challenger may
fail to achieve its statedprogram,but still win
substantialnew advantagesfor its constituents
(Amenta and Young 1999). There are also the
possibilities of negligible "successes,"such as
a program that did not realize its intended
1998).
Forthesereasons,we employa widerconcept
of influencebasedon collectivegoods, orgroupwise advantagesor disadvantagesfrom which
nonparticipantsin a challenge cannotbe easily
excluded (Hardin 1982). Collective goods can
be material,such as categoricalsocial spending
programs,but they can also be less tangible,
such as new ways to refer to members of a
group. Most state-relatedcollective action in
democraticpolitical systems is aimed at major
changesin policy andthe bureaucraticenforcement and implementation of that policy
(Amenta and Caren 2004). State social policies are institutionalizedbenefits that provide
collective goods routinely to those meeting
specified requirements(Skocpol and Amenta
1986). Once enactedandenforcedwith bureaucratic means, categorical social spendingpro-
AND IMPACTOF PENSIONMOVEMENT 519
POLITICAL
MEDIATION
grams provide beneficiaries rights of entitlement.Withbureaucraticreinforcement,an issue
can become privileged in politics, biasing the
political system in favorof the group.Benefits
through legislation can range from structural
benefits that extend the political leverage of a
group, such as enhancedvoting, associational,
or civil rights, to one-shot pecuniarybenefits,
such as summerjobs, extensions of unemployment insurance, housing vouchers, or bonus
payments.We arguethateffecting more radical
changesrequiresmore extensive favorableconditions, both internaland external.
The old-age pension movement demanded
generousand unrestrictedgrantsto all nonemployed Americans over the age of 60 for their
lifelong serviceto the country-or whatit called
"pensions"for "senior citizens." Pension proponentsin individualstatesdemandedthatOAA
programsbe convertedinto pension programs.
Their demandswere not met. Our focus, however, is on whetherthese groups had an impact
on OAA, which permanentlychangedthe relationship between the state and the aged. We
also addresswhetherthe movement affected a
Senatevote for a pension alternativeto existing
old-age programs.Finally,we estimatethe conditions under which such radical action may
have been possible.
POLITICAL
MEDIATION
THEORY
Many scholars have developed (Piven and
Cloward 1977; Amenta et al. 1992; Skocpol
1992; Amenta et al. 1994; Fording 1997;
Amentaet al. 1999; Lipset and Marks2000) or
tested (Cress and Snow 2000; Soule and Olzak
2004; Giugni 2004) political mediationmodels
of social movement consequences. The basic
idea is that challengersmust engage in collective action that changes the calculationsof relevant institutional political actors and thus
mobilize and adopt strategies in ways that fit
political circumstances. State actors must in
turn see a challengeras potentiallyfacilitating
or disrupting their own goals-for example,
augmentingor cementing electoral coalitions,
gainingin publicopinion,or increasingsupport
for the mission of governmental bureaus.
Political mediation theory rejects the idea that
individual organizationalforms, strategies, or
political contexts will always influence challengers,as is generallyargued(see Amentaand
Caren 2004 for review). Instead, the theory
posits thatdifferentmobilizationsand collective
action strategies will be more productive in
some political contexts than in others.
The most extensive versions of the political
mediationtheory (Amenta et al. 1999;Amenta
forthcoming) build upon arguments that
resourcemobilization, strategies,and political
context influence the consequences of movements. These versions argue that mobilizing
relativelylargenumbersof committedpeople is
probablynecessary to winning new collective
benefits for those otherwise underrepresented
in politics (Rucht 1998; Skocpol 2003; see
reviewin McCarthyandZald2002). In addition,
making claims regardingthe worthiness of the
group (Tilly 1999b) and the plausibility of its
program (Cress and Snow 2000; Ferree et al.
2002) is also necessary.Favorablepoliticalcontexts, both long- and short-term,are also helpful (Jenkinsand Perrow 1977; Kitschelt 1986;
Kriesi 1995;Almeida and Stearns 1998; Meyer
and Minkoff 2004). The political mediation
model, however,helps to explain the impact of
social movements by examining mobilization
and strategies in combination with different
sorts of political contexts. In highly favorable
political contexts, all that should be requiredis
a certainthresholdof resourcemobilizationand
minimally plausible and directed framing and
claims-making.In less favorablepolitical contexts, more assertive strategies of collective
action would be required for a social movement to have influence. In yet other political
contexts, where powerful systemic conditions
work against challengers,it may be impossible
for the challengersto exert much influence. In
short, the context must be extremely favorable
and the mobilization and action extensive for
challengersto achieve the most radical goals.
THETHEORY
ELABORATING
According to political mediation theory, the
abilityof a challengerto win collective benefits
depends partly on conditions it can control,
including its ability to mobilize, its goals and
program,its form of organization,andits strategies for collective action, including issue framing and other claims-making. However, the
impactof even well-mobilized challengersalso
dependson politicalcontext.Politicalmediation
theory holds thatpolitical conditions influence
52o
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
AMERICAN
the relationshipbetween a challenger'smobilization and collective action on the one hand,
and policy outcomes on the other.It holds that
mobilization and collective action alone are
often insufficient to effect changes in public
policy that would benefit a challenger's constituency. The model posits relationships
between mobilizationand strategiesand structuraland short-termpoliticalcontexts.The argument focuses on specific political contexts,
taking into account criticisms that political
opportunity models are often conceptualized
at too broad a level to be empirically tested
(Goodwin and Jasper 1999; cf. Meyer and
Minkoff 2004). Our political mediation argument also differs from political opportunity
structurearguments (McAdam 1996; Tarrow
1996) in thatthe lattertend to addressthe mobilization of challengersthan theirpolitical consequences(Zald2000). Also, ourunderstanding
of political contexts is based not on standard
political opportunityfactors, but on contexts
found influential in altering social policy
(Mayhew 1986; Skocpol 1992; Amenta 1998;
Hicks 1999; Huberand Stephens2001).
The politicalmediationtheoryholds thatspecific long-term aspects of political and party
systems influence the productivity of challengers' action. First, the degree to which formally democratic institutions are bound by
democraticpracticesis key (Amenta1998;Tilly
1999a). An extension of democratic rights
entails lowering the legal restrictionson institutionalpolitical participationfor the common
citizens, includingtheirabilityto assemble and
discuss issues. A highly democratizedpolity is
also characterized
by meaningfulchoices among
parties or factions. By contrast, an underdemocratizedpolity is one in whichpolitical leaders are chosen by way of elections, but in which
there are great restrictionson political participation, political assembly and discussion, voting, and choices among leadershipgroups.An
underdemocratized political system greatly
dampensthe impact of the collective action of
challengers, assuming they are able to arise in
these polities. Underdemocratized
political systems are characterizedby noncompetitiveelections and formal and informal restrictionson
voting, such as poll taxes, extensive eligibility
tests, harassment, and violence. The United
States, especially the South, included many
underdemocratizedpolities, as franchisebarri-
ers were erectedat the end of the nineteenthcentury and persistedthroughmost of the twentieth century (Burnham1974).
Second,patronage-oriented
politicalpartiesthat is, autonomous,long-lasting, hierarchical
organizationsthatseek to nominatecandidates
for a wide rangeof public offices andrely substantially on material incentives (Katznelson
1981; Mayhew 1986)-tend to deflect claims
for collective benefits sought by pro-social
spending challengers. Grantingautomaticand
long-term entitlementclaims to groupsof citizens limits the sort of discretionaryspending,
such as for governmentjobs and contracts,that
maintainsa patronage-orientedpoliticalorganization. For these reasons patronage-oriented
partiesregardsocial movementorganizationsas
a menace and considerprogrammaticspending
policies a threatto the individualisticrewardson
which such parties thrive. Although it is not
impossible for movements to exert influence
under these circumstances, these structural
impediments make it difficult, and also often
thwartthe efforts of state actorsand insurgents
in the party system to enact or enhance programmaticpublic spendingpolicies in favorof
challenging groups. The United States, especially in the Northeastand Midwest, was characterized by many patronage-orientedparty
systems for most of the twentieth century
(Mayhew 1986).
Medium-rangeand short-termpolitical contexts also influence the prospects of mobilized
groups that hope to gain leverage in political
systems that are mainly democratizedand are
not dominated by patronage-orientedparties.
Domestic bureaucrats are key actors here.
Bureaucratswhose mission is consistentwith
that of a challenger-assuming they have initiative,talent,andpower-may provideadministrativerulings, enforce laws, or proposenew
legislationthataids a challenger'sconstituency,
even within the context of an otherwiseindifferent or opposed state (Skocpol 1992). These
domestic bureaucratsmay advancesuch legislation furtherthan they had intendedif a challenger summons a show of strength. These
argumentsaresimilarto Kitschelt's(1986) about
the role of implementationcapacities.But our
argumentsarebothwider,in consideringthedifferent ways in which domestic bureaucracies
might amplify the impact of challengers'collective action, and more localized, as the rele-
MEDIATION
AND IMPACTOFPENSIONMOVEMENT
POLITICAL
vant bureaucracieswill differ accordingto the
challenger and its constituency.Bureaucracies
centrallyconcernedwith social andlaborissues
were inauguratedlargely in the 1910s in the
United States; they varied widely in their orientationand power in the 1930s, and continue
to do so today.
Another crucial factor is the partisanshipof
the regime in power.A new political regime or
government,hoping to add to its coalition, may
aid the constituency of social movements by
proposing spending or other legislation that
favors a certain group.A regime that is favorableor open to the possibilityof increasedsocial
spending would be expected to amplify the
impact of a challenger'smobilization and collective action, while a regime opposedto social
spending would dampenit. Often parties have
long-standingcommitmentsto ideologicalpositions or groups whose interestsand goals may
conflictwith those of challengers(Klandermans
and Oegema 1987). For state-oriented challengers who seek collective benefits through
sustained public spending, the position of the
regime on higher taxation is crucial. Since the
1930s the U.S. Republicanpartyand its representatives have tended to oppose automatic,
programmatic spending claims because they
imply higher taxation, whereas the national
Democratic party and Democrats outside the
South have tended to be "reform-oriented"''
more open to policy claims requiringtaxation
(Amenta 1998; Hicks 1999). Regime conditions variedwidely across the United States in
the 1930s, as some northernstatesfollowed the
nationaltrendto elect pro-New Deal Democrats
and othersdid not. Partisanshipvariationshave
persisted to this day, with the South having
largelyturnedreliablyRepublicanin the decades
afterthe Civil Rights andVotingRightsActs of
the 1960s.
The mediationmodel expects these contexts
to affect the influence of movementactivity.If
the political regime is open to the claims of
challengers and the domestic bureaucratsare
professionalizedand favorablydisposed to the
challenger's constituency, limited activity on
the part of the challenger,even simply providing evidence of mobilization, is likely to be
sufficient to produce increasedcollective benefits. The challenger needs mainly to demonstratethatit has support,suchas throughwriting
letters, holding rallies, petitioning, initiating
521
public awareness campaigns, staging limited
protest, or even engaging in visible internal
events. Members of a reform-orientedregime
are likely to use such evidence of mobilization
as a confirmation of the beneficiary group's
relative importancein an electoral coalition. If
a reform-orientedregimehas manyissues on its
agenda, it is more likely to address first the
issues being pressed by mobilized groups.
Domestic bureaucratsare likely to portraythe
mobilizationas indicatingthe need for the augmentation or greater enforcement of its programs.If the regimehopes to add to its coalition
or if domestic bureaucratshave a mission that
is not yet realized,the best-mobilizedgroupsare
likely to win the greatestbenefits in public policy for their constituencies.
By contrast, achieving collective benefits
throughpublic policy is likely to be more difficult if neither an open regime nor administrative authority exists. When the regime is
opposed to the challengeror sees no benefit in
addingthe challenger'sbeneficiary groupto its
coalition and when state bureaucraciesin the
areaarehostile, the sorts of limited protestlisted above are likely to be ignored or to have a
negligible effect. In the face of more difficult
political circumstances,more assertiveor bolder collective action is requiredto produce collective benefits. Here we drop the standard
distinction between "disruptive"and "assimilative"(Kitschelt 1986) and "noninstitutional"
and "institutional"(McAdam 1999) strategies,
instead focusing on variationsin assertiveness
of action, with "assertive"meaning the use of
increasingly strong political sanctions-those
that threatento increase or decrease the likelihood of political actors gaining or keeping
somethingthey see as valuable(theirpositions,
actingin accordancewith theirbeliefs) or to take
over their functions or prerogatives.Sustained
political action to unseat a representative,for
example, would be more threateningthan, say,
dispatching protesters to picket or to occupy
the representative'soffice. The institutionalcollective action of challengers works largely by
mobilizing large numbers of people behind a
course of action, often one with electoralimplications.This collective action may be designed
to convince the general public of the justice of
the cause and influence elected and appointed
officials in thatmanner,but it can also demonstrateto these officials that a large segment of
522
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
the electorate is willing to vote or engage in
other political activity on the basis of a single
key issue.
If the politicalregimeis not supportiveof the
challenger's constituency or issue, collective
action will be most productiveif it focuses on
elected officials. Such action might neutralize
those who would otherwise be hostile to legislation and win the supportof those who would
be indifferent.Assertive action might include
contestingelections, such as endorsingand supportingthe opponentsof hostile incumbentsor
winning promises from them and then providing support. Newcomers elected with a challenger's endorsement and support would be
especially likely to supportits programor other
programs benefiting its constituents. Other
assertive action would include attempting to
overridelegislative authority,as throughdirect
democratic devices such as the initiative, referendum,and recall. Such displaysof influence
might alter the views of legislators in whose
states the mobilizationstook place, even when
the actions fail. In the face of strong electoral
sanctions, legislators previously opposed may
come to supportmoderatemeasuresthatbenefit the group representedby the challenger.2
The mediation argumentalso addresses the
characteristicsof outcomes and legislation at
issue. The more radical and far-reachingthe
outcome, the greaterthe favorableconditions
requiredand the more the movementmay have
to do to influence it. Thus for some outcomes,
such as improving existing programs,merely
mobilizing under favorablecontexts would be
enoughto exertinfluence.Similarly,employing
assertive sanctions when conditions are structurally favorablebut the short-termcontext is
unfavorable may be enough. Fundamentally
altering policy, however,is likely to take both
strong mobilization and extensive assertive
shows of strength. Even these may not be
enough to create sweeping changes in policy;
more favorable political conditions may also
be necessary. The same is likely to be true for
2 Assertiveactiondirectedatunfavorable
bureaucraciesis also expectedto be moreproductivethan
mobilizationandlimitedprotest.Unfortunately,
we
wereunableto gain systematicinformation
across
statesregarding
thissortof protestandso cannottest
thatpartof the argument
here.
bids to transform the structural position of
groups, such as through new voting or civil
rights.
To summarize, political mediation theory
holds that the influence of mobilization and
strategiesof action are conditional on specific
political contexts. Some systemic politicalcontexts-an underdemocratized polity and a
patronage-orientedparty system-will deaden
the influence of challengers. Medium-range
andlocalizedpoliticalcontextswill havea more
variegatedeffect on the relationshipbetweena
challenger'scollective action and state-related
results. Regimes and bureaucracies open to
challengers'claims will tend to repaythe challengers' mobilization. Even in democratized
polities and non-patronage-orientedpartysystems, however,regimes and bureaucraciesmay
still be unfavorable. In these circumstances
social movements would need to engage in
assertive collective action in orderto win new
benefits. Before we employ quantitativeanalyses to appraisethe individualinfluence of various factors, and formal qualitative analyses
to addressthe multiple theoreticalinteractions
and causal pathways,we briefly introducethe
old-age pension movement and U.S. old-age
policy.
THEOLD-AGEPENSIONMOVEMENT,
U.S. OLD-AGEPOLICY,
AND OUR
ANALYSES
THETOWNSEND
PLANAND THEOLD-AGE
PENSIONMOVEMENT
The Townsend Plan was founded in January
1934 by Dr.FrancisE. Townsend,a laid-off,66year-old Long Beach medical assistant, and
RobertEarlClements,a 39-year-oldrealestate
broker(Holtzman1963;Mitchell2000;Amenta
forthcoming).The purpose of the organization
was to promote the enactmentof the pensionrecoveryprogramTownsendhad first outlined
in lettersto the editorof the Long Beach Press
Telegramin September1933.The plancalledfor
$200 monthlypensions to all nonemployedcitizens over 60 years, excluding criminals,and
was designed to end the Depressionandensure
prosperitythroughthe mandatoryspendingof
thesepensions, as well as to end povertyamong
the elderly.Clementsassembled a hierarchical
organizing staff paid by commission, and
Townsendwas the organization'ssymbol and
AND IMPACTOF PENSIONMOVEMENT 523
MEDIATION
POLITICAL
spokesman,akinto the rolethatColonel Sanders
playedfor KentuckyFriedChicken.To maintain
enthusiasm and mobilize resources, Clements
andTownsendinauguratedTownsend"clubs"local affiliates with no formaldecision-making
powers,but thatmet regularlyto hear speakers,
collect donations,andact in politicalcampaigns.
The TownsendPlan grabbednationalattention
in late 1935 when it was organizingclubs at the
rate of one every two hours.At that point, legislation it had endorsed would have provided
almost all senior citizens with about $60 per
month, less than $200 but far more than what
was promisedby the Social SecurityAct.
Although Townsend clubs and their members remainedthe backboneof the old-age pension movement,they were joined by a number
of pension organizationslater in the 1930s. A
group known as Ham and Eggs won national
attention in 1938 with its programto provide
$30 everyThursdayto aged Californians.Other
notablestate-levelpensionorganizationsincluded the NationalAnnuityLeagueof Coloradoand
the Old Age Pension Union of Washington.In
differentstates many coalitions formed briefly
aroundspecific initiatives, especially in 1938,
when eight pension initiatives were placed on
state ballots. Forthe most part,these initiatives
concentratedon providingmore generousbenefits thanexistingprograms,althoughthe movement also stoodfor a widerextensionof benefits
to the aged. The pension movementexisted for
almosttwo decadesunderdiversenationalpolitical circumstancesand across state-level polities. The Townsend Plan chose to ignore the
state level in the 1930s, arguingthat improving
OAA programsin individualstates would hinder efforts to enact pensions at the national
level. But the Townsend Plan, too, eventually
began to demandchanges in stateold-age laws,
placing propositions for $60-per-month pensions on the ballots of a few western states in
1943. These efforts failed, and by 1950 the
TownsendPlanhadlost most of its membership.
U.S. OLD-AGE
POLuCY
ANDTHEPRESENT
RESEARCH
The 1935 Social SecurityAct createdtwo oldage programs.One was a national,proto-old-age
insuranceprogram,which was not scheduledto
make any paymentsuntil 1942. The second was
a federal-state matching program called Old
Age Assistance, which immediately provided
benefits to the aged in individual states. OAA
was the workhorseof old-age protectionduring
the Depression, the Second World War, and
immediatelyafterward.It was upgradedin 1939
and was not eclipsed by Old Age and Survivors
Insurance (known now as "Social Security")
until the 1950s. We ascertain first whetherthe
old-age pension movement influenced OAA
programs and, if so, in what ways and why.
OAA programsare useful in a test of our arguments because the various state programs did
not converge in their generosity and coverage,
and the pension movement sought to convert
them into pension-like programs with more
generousbenefits, often throughinitiatives.We
would expect the pension movement to have
greaterinfluenceon the generosityof programs
than on the extension of programs.
We also seek to determinewhetherthe pension movement induced senators to vote for a
measure to replace the two programs with a
senior citizens'pension and,if so, whattypes of
activities were effective, by analyzing roll-call
votes (McAdamand Su 2002; Soule et al. 1999)
throughmultipleregressionanalyses.We focus
on 1939, the year that the Social SecurityAct
was amendedand the only year that therewere
votes on seniorcitizens'pensions.The so-called
Lee amendment(S76-1061), thoughnot specifically a vote on authorizedTownsendPlan legislation, would have created a widespread and
generous $40 per monthbenefit, twice as large
as the average OAA payment. The $40 figure
was also the median amount that public opinion polls indicatedthat the governmentshould
pay in monthly old-age benefits (Gallup 1936,
1939). Although the amendment failed, by a
vote of 17 to 56, putting on the Congressional
agenda a radicalalternativeand lining up votes
behind it (Kingdon 1984) is one way for a challenger to influence the political process and
public policy, as it can induce opponents to
accept more moderate legislation. Indeed,
observers suggest thatthis is what happenedin
1939 in the case of the pension movement
(Huston 1939). The Lee amendmentvote also
gives us an opportunityto compare the determinants of influencing existing programswith
those of alteringpolicy in a more fundamental
way. Because the Townsend Plan was mainly
engaged at the national level and made plausi-
524
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
ble claims aboutpensionsat the time, we expect
it should be influential.
These state and national policy outcomes
providea largenumberof cases, makingit possibleto controlforothervariablesthatmightalso
have influenced old-age policy-variables that
are often ignored in studies of the impact of
social movements (Earl 2000). Scholars of
social policy arguethat democratizedpolitical
systems, left-wing regimes, powerfuldomestic
bureaucracies, favorable public opinion, and
economicanddemographicdevelopmentsmight
all influence the policy changes that others
might attributeto the presence or activity of a
social movement(Amenta,Bonastia,andCaren
2001; Skrentny 2002). Worse, some of these
conditions,suchas an increasein the aged orthe
rise to powerof the Democraticparty,may have
spurredboth the pension movement and political action on old-age benefits (Amenta and
Young1999). Ouranalysesaddressthese issues.
EXPLAINING
OLDAGEASSISTANCE
IN ITSFORMATIVE
YEARS
DEPENDENT
AMEASURES
We examine two basic componentsof Old Age
Assistance programs,theirgenerosityand their
coverage, from their first year in operationin
1936 through 1950, when the Social Security
Act was amended to upgrade old-age insurance. The first dependentmeasure is the average size of the OAAbenefit,an indicationof the
relativegenerosity of states. (Fordetails on the
constructionand source of each dependentand
independentmeasure, see Appendix.) In addition, we examine each state'sOAAcoveragethe state'scommitmentto providingassistance
broadly to elderly residents. State legislation
generally set the parameterscontrolling these
programs. Benefit levels and coverage varied
dramaticallyfrom state to state.
INDEPENDENTMEASURES
AND EXPECTATIONS
We appraise the main social movement and
political mediationargumentsthrougha series
of independentmeasures.Threecapturedifferent facets of the politicalinstitutionalaspectsof
the mediation theory, and they vary little over
time. As an indicatorof voting rights and polity democratization,we consider the poll tax, a
key, though far from the only, means to restrict
the franchise.Nine states had poll taxes at the
start of the period, but Florida and Georgia
droppedtheirs. We expect that underdemocratized political systems, characterizedby restrictions on the franchise, would discourage
movements for generous public spendingprograms as well as OAA benefits and coverage.
We also include a measureof patronageparty
organizational strength, with the expectation
that such party organizationswould discourage categorical public spending, resulting in
less generousbenefits and restrictedcoverage.
Wealso includeadministrativestrength,a measure of the strength and structureof the state
laborcommissions. Althoughthey did not typically control OAA, their existence indicates
overalldomesticbureaucraticdevelopmentand
power, and we would expect them to have a
positive influence on OAA outcomes.
Two measures addressmedium-termpolitical and administrativeconditions. We would
expect that control of the state governmentby
a pro-spendingpartywould lead to higherquality OAA programs. We model democratized
Democraticcontrolby including a measurefor
control of the governor's mansion and both
houses of the statelegislatureby the Democratic
partyin states withoutpoll taxes. Additionally,
we include a measure of OAAcountyfunding.
We expect that higher county contributionsto
OAA would negatively influence OAA outcomes, as counties had fewer and more contentioustaxing opportunities,mainlyrealestate
levies.
We also employ several control measures.
Per capita income addresseshow much social
spending states could afford; we expect that
higherper capitaincomewouldpositivelyinfluence OAA (Wilensky 1975). We also include
percentageblackto take into accountthepotentially dampeningimpact of race on OAA benefits (Quadagno 1988; Lieberman 1998).
Percentage aged in each state is likely to spur
demandsfor old-age benefits (Mitchell 2000).
We also include measuresof pro-old-agepublic opinion.Publicopinionis sometimesargued
to be the only directinfluence on publicpolicy
(Burstein 1999) and often is absent in empirical studies of movement consequences, possibly resultingin theirmodels being misspecified
and their conclusions faulty (Burstein and
Linton 2002). We analyze two 1938 Gallup
polls, the earliestpolling efforts on old age that
POLITICALMEDIATION AND IMPACT OF PENSION MOVEMENT
survive in forms suitable for state-level analyses. We focus on the question "How much per
monthshouldbe paid to a singleperson?"in our
analysesof OAA generosity.Themedianchoice
was $40. For OAA coverage, we examine the
question "Do you think pensions should be
givento all old people, or onlyto old peoplewho
are in need?" About 20 percent chose "all."
Responses are aggregated to the state level.
Althoughthereis no systematicinformationon
the saliency of the issue, it is likely that old age
was a prominentissue through 1941, when the
SecondWorldWarbegan.We thereforeinclude
controlmeasures for the war and postwartime
periods.3
Finally,we considerthreepensionmovement
measures, Townsend club activity, change in
club activity,and electoral initiatives.First,we
operationalizeTownsendclub activity4in two
ways. Given the expectation that high mobilizationwill have a lastinginfluence(McCarthy
and Zald 2002), we measureclub activity at its
3 The first Galluppoll on old-agebenefitswas
takenin 1935, but the datado not survive.Other
dataareoftennotusable,becauseGallup'squestions
wereoftenpoorlyworded.Fromthefirstpollforward
Gallupfound that overwhelmingpercentagesof
Americanswere in favorof governmentprovided
a wordusedindiscriminately
at
old-age"pensions,"
the time to referto all mannerof aid to the aged
(Schiltz1971:chapter2). Gallupoccasionallyasked
respondentsaboutthe saliencyof issues, but they
wereusuallyaskedto volunteeranswers,resultingin
tothestatelevel(see
numbers
toosmallto aggregate
if
even
had
Weakliem
2003)
they survived.Forcomprehensivelistingsof theresultsof pollson oldage,
525
peak value for a state. Second, we measurethe
change in activity,which has been arguedto be
more likely than the overall mobilization level
to influence politicians who are seeking informationrelevantto theirreelections(Bursteinand
Linton2002). We also includea measurefor the
most assertivemovement strategyto influence
state legislators-the placing ofpension propositions on the ballot. These propositions were
usually designed to make OAA more generous,
and less frequentlyto relax eligibility requirements. While the vast majorityof these efforts
failed, and the successes were countered by
subsequentlegislation, we expect thatpropositions would have a positive impact on OAA
generosity.Propositionsusuallyinvolve a political show of force: their proponents petition,
dramatizean issue, and insert it onto the political agenda. In this instance, we expect that
they would pressure politicians to prove their
commitmentto their aged constituents.
Althoughit is not possible to test all the interactionsin the politicalmediationargumentwith
multiple regression, the model does provide
different expectations across the independent
measures and across time. First,we expect the
long-terminstitutionalfactorsto influenceboth
aspects of OAA, as these aregeneralinfluences
on social policy. But we also expect the social
movementmeasuresto have a greaterinfluence
on the averagebenefit thanin coverage,because
the claims and demands of the pension movement were largely focused on higher benefits.
MULTIPLEREGRESSIONRESULTS
Ourcross-sectionalpaneldataset includesinformation
on the 48 states, each over a period of
see Cantril and Strunk (1951:541-46) and Schiltz
14 years.Underthese circumstances,with mul(1971).
4 Note thatwe cannot,unfortunately,
appraise tiple cases from the same state and multiple
cases from the same year, we expect that the
about
the
arguments
strategiccapacities(Ganz2000)
errortermswould not be independentand idenand movement infrastructuresof challengers
(Andrews2001),as thesedidnotvarygreatlyforthe
tically distributed,makingpooled OLS regresTownsend
Plan,andit is difficultto get information sion inappropriate.Moreover, our data set is
Forthe
bystateandyearforotherold-agecampaigns.
case dominated, with many more cross-secmostpart,theTownsend
Planwouldhaveto be contional cases thanyears, ratherthantemporarily
sideredhighonstrategic
andinfrastructural
capacities
as is typical in time-series crossresources.It alsohadan innovativeformof organi- dominated,
sectional
research
(Beck 2001). For these reazation,combiningaspectsof realestatesalesorgansons we employ a GLS random-effectsmodel,
izations and fraternalorganizationsin a social
which allows for both time-varying and timemovementorganization.To the extent that the
invariantvariables(Westernand Beckett 1999;
Planmobilization
Townsend
influenced
policyit can
be considereda supportive
resultfortheseperspec- Kenworthy2002; Beckfield 2003). Additionally,
tives.
we expectthatspendingby a statein a givenyear
526
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
will be related to its spending in the previous
year, potentially producing serially correlated
errors. The Wooldridge (2002) test for autocorrelationin panel datareportssignificantevidence of first-order autocorrelation in our
models, and we employ the Baltagi-Wu(1999)
estimator to remove this disturbance.For the
averagesize of OAA benefits and coverage,we
reportan initial model estimatingthe effects of
political contextual factors and control measures, and then a full model that adds social
movement measures in order to ascertain
whetherthey add to the explanation.5
Table 2 presents the results for the average
size of OAA benefit. The initial model, Model
1, yields significant coefficients at the .05 level
or betterfor the politicalcontextmeasures,with
the exceptionof democratizedDemocraticcontrol.All the controlmeasures,except for the war
period, are significant. The full model, Model
2, which accounts for almost 70 percent of the
overallvariance,yields positive and significant
coefficientsforTownsendclubpeak-levelmeasure at the .05 level andthe propositionmeasure
at the .10 level. Moving up a level in Townsend
club mobilization is worth $1.23 per month,
and placing a propositionon the ballot is worth
about $1.37 per month. Both are substantial
gains since the averagepaymentin 1950 dollars
across the entire period was about $37 per
month. In Model 2, moreover, administrative
strengthand OAA county funding remainsignificant at the .05 level, and the poll tax measure is significant at the .10 level. States with a
poll tax spent approximately $3.90 less per
month on OAA, while those with a traditionof
domestic administrative development spent
about $3.88 more per month, after controlling
for other factors. The public opinion measure
also remainssignificantand substantial.A declaration of an additional dollar for the appro-
5 Forthe full models,theHausmanspecification
thattheefficientrandomeffectsmodel
testindicated
was not significantlydifferentfromthe consistent
fixed effectsmodel,andwe performeda Ramsey
errortest(RESET)foromitregressionspecification
ted variablesfor eachyear.Theresults(notshown,
onrequest)weresignificant
butavailable
foronlyone
year,whichis additionalevidenceforthesuitability
of therandomeffectsmodel.
priate amount of stipend was worth 30 cents.
However, when we substitutethe measure of
change in Townsendactivity for the peak value
of Townsendactivity,the measureis insignificant. This suggests that policy-makersare not
respondingto new informationaboutthe challenger.In addition,the coefficient for the World
WarII period was positive, which is counterto
expectations given the drop in attention to
domestic issues, thoughit falls shortof significance.
Table2 also presentsthe results for an initial
and full model on OAA coverage in Models 3
and 4, respectively. Patronageparty strength,
democratized Democratic control, and OAA
county funding are significant at the .01 level
in Model 3. States with Democratic control
coverapproximately3.3 percentagepointsmore
of their elderly population,and moving up one
level in Mayhew'sfive-level measureof patronage party strengthdiminishes coverageby 2.9
percentage points. Moving up 10 percentage
points in public opinion to cover all the aged
meant an increase of one percentagepoint in
coverage.These were substantialinfluences,as
the averagecoverageacross all states andtime
periodswas about22 percent.Among the other
controlmeasures,the coefficient for percentage
aged is significantandnegative,whereasthewar
and postwar period coefficients are both significantandpositive.The wardid not leadto the
reductionof coverage-just the opposite. The
coefficients for race and income are in the
expected directions,but insignificant.Model 4
explains 30 percent of the overall variance.
However,neitherof the social movementmeasures, when added, has a significant impact on
spending coverage.
In summary,structuraland short-termpolitical contextual factors strongly affected both
OAA measures,and in the predicteddirections,
althougheach measurewas not significantin all
models. Among the control measures, public
opinioninfluencedbothoutcomes.The findings
for the social movementmeasureswere mixed.
Townsend club activity and propositions significantlyand substantivelyinfluencedthe average monthly old-age stipend,but they did not
influence coverage underOAA. These results,
however, fit with political mediation expectations, as the pension movement's claims and
collectiveactionwere focusedlargelyon the size
MEDIATION
ANDIMPACT
OFPENSION
MOVEMENT527
POLITICAL
Table2. AverageSize of the OldAge AssistanceBenefit andOAACoverageon SelectedIndependent
Measures
Benefit Size
InstitutionalMeasures
PollTax
PatronagePartyStrength
AdministrativeStrength
DemocratizedDem. Control
OAACountyFunding
Model 1
Model2
-4.584*
(1.88)
-1.220**
(2.50)
3.918*
(2.15)
-0.067
(0.07)
-0.104*
(1.96)
-3.897
(1.61)
-0.871"
(1.74)
3.879*
(2.19)
0.299
(0.30)
-0.090*
(1.70)
Coverage
Model 3
Model4
-3.183
(1.18)
-2.880**
(4.65)
-0.941
(0.44)
3.265**
(3.34)
-0.123**
(2.34)
-3.100
(1.14)
-2.858**
(4.45)
-0.974
(0.46)
3.315**
(3.33)
-0.123**
(2.33)
MovementMeasures
Townsend Club Activity
-
Pension Proposition
-
ControlMeasures
Pro-Old-AgePublicOpinion
PerCapitaIncome
PercentageAged
PercentageBlack
WarPeriod
PostwarPeriod
Constant
Observations
Numberof states
R2
S
2
Df
0.306**
(3.81)
0.007**
(4.86)
1.347**
(3.70)
-0.188*
(2.11)
0.971
(1.30)
4.862**
(4.93)
5.184
(1.08)
672
48
0.69
410.83**
12
1.229*
(2.15)
1.374
(1.44)
0.300**
(3.83)
0.007**
(5.10)
1.323**
(3.66)
-0.119
(1.29)
0.557
(0.73)
4.354**
(4.35)
-0.781
(0.14)
672
48
0.70
427.25**
14
-
0.100
(1.32)
0.001
(0.66)
-0.957*
(2.46)
-0.067
(0.65)
2.262**
(3.16)
1.870
(1.94)
32.778**
(7.97)
672
48
0.30
59.51**
12
0.075
(0.12)
0.625
(0.74)
0.097
(1.27)
0.001
(0.71)
-0.946*
(2.42)
-0.061
(0.55)
2.219**
(3.03)
1.788
(1.82)
32.288**
(6.54)
672
48
0.31
60.14**
14
coefficientsfromrandomeffectsregressions.The absolutevaluesof z
Notes: Data shownareunstandardized
statisticsare in parentheses.Fordefinitionsof measures,see text andAppendix.
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (one-tailed;exceptfor percentaged,warperiod,andpostwarperiod).
of the benefit ratherthancoverage,andthus we
would expect a differentialinfluence.
crispratherthanfuzzy sets, as most of the independent measures are nominal. We located 13
states with GENEROUS OAA benefits.6 (In
ANALYSES
COMPARATIVE
QUALITATIVE
The expectations of the political mediation
model are combinational, and these sorts of
argumentscan often be better assessed using
FSQCA,for whichmulticollinearityis not problematic(see Ragin 1987,2000). Herewe employ
6
To determinewhich statesprovidedgenerous
OAA benefits, we averagethe residualsof a baseline
modeling, includingonly per capitaincome andpercentageaged for each stateacrossourentiretimeperiod. We designate the 13 states that had an observed
528
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
FSQCA notation, a measure written with all
capital letters denotes its presence, while one
written in all lowercase denotes its absence.)
Two of the institutionalpolitical measures are
nominal. States that employed a poll tax during this period are designated POLLTAX.
Those where the state's labor commissioner
had rule-making authority over safety laws
throughout the period are labeled ADMIN.
States that were largely controlled by
PATRONAGEparty organizations are those
that score either of the top two values on
Mayhew's (1986) scale. States where the
Democratic party controlled the governor's
mansion and both houses of the legislature for
at least 40 percent of the time are considered
DEMOCRATIC. As for social movement
measures, states that had reached the highest
level of Townsendclub presenceat any time are
considered highly MOBILIZED, and states
where the pension movement placed one or
more propositionon the ballot are said to have
had ASSERTIVE collective action.
We begin by comparing the theoretical
expectations of the political mediation model
with those configurationsstandardin the social
policy literature.The configurational theoretical expectationsfrom the institutionalpolitics
model of social policy (Amentaand Halfmann
2000) for generous old-age spending, net of
economic controls, are as follows:
polltax*patronage*ADMIN*DEMOCRAT.
(In FSQCA notation, an asterisk (*) indicates
the logical operatorand; a plus sign (+) indicates the logical operatoror.) This expression
reads as follows: States without poll taxes and
without patronage-orientedparties and with
strong administrative powers and with
Democraticpartyregimes are expected to produce generous social programs. By contrast,
the political mediation argumentsuggests that
the mobilization and collective action of challengers can also spur policy, according to the
following expression:
valuethatwas 10 percentlargerthanthe predicted
value,wheretherewas a largebreakin the data,as
The10stateswheretheobserved
generousspenders.
valueis greaterthanpredictedbutless than10 percenthigherarecodedas intermediate
or"don'tcare"
statesarecodedas zeros.
cases,andthe25 remaining
polltax*patronage*(MOBILIZED*
(DEMOCRAT+ADMIN)+ ASSERTIVE).
This means that in structurallyconducive and
politically favorableshort-termsituations,only
challenger mobilization is needed to produce
collective benefits. When short-termpolitical
conditions are less favorable, more assertive
action is the best strategy.This type of activity is sufficient to bring results.
While there are 64 theoretically possible
combinations of the six dichotomous independent variables, only 21 combinations
describe the experiences of the 48 states during this period. The results indicate that six of
the combinations consist of states that always
exhibited generous stipends.7 (See Table 3.)
The six expressions in Table 3 account for 11
of the 13 positive cases. These reduceto three
that encompass each of the successful cases
and can be combined in one expression (see
Table 3). Necessary conditions for high OAA
benefits were the absence of poll taxes and
patronageparties. However, other conditions
also had to be presentto accountfor high OAA
benefits: administrative powers and
Democratic party control; Democratic party
control and mobilization; or assertive collective action alone.
These results have implications for both the
standardinstitutionalpolitical model and the
political mediationmodel. First,as expectedby
both models, democraticrightsandthe absence
of dominantpatronagepartiesarenecessaryfor
high OAA spending. This suggests that under
some structural,systemic conditionsthe activity of both institutional political actors and
social movements are likely to be thwarted.In
political situationswhere it is possible to promote policy, the predictions of the standard
institutional model and the political mediation model are all borne out. The standard
institutionalmodel holds that in favorablesystemic political circumstances, a favorable
regime and administrativepowers would be
likely to produce generous social policy. One
combinations
7Contradictory
mainlyconsistedof
failuresandaretreatedas such.
MEDIATION
AND IMPACTOFPENSIONMOVEMENT 529
POLITICAL
Table3. Six-MeasureFSQCAResultsfor GenerousOAABenefits
IndividualConfigurations(andnumbersof states)
polltax
polltax
polltax
polltax
polltax
polltax
* patronage * ADMIN * democrat * MOBILIZATION * ASSERTIVE (5) +
* patronage * ADMIN * DEMOCRAT * MOBILIZATION * ASSERTIVE (2) +
* patronage * admin * DEMOCRAT * MOBILIZATION * assertive (1) +
* patronage * ADMIN * DEMOCRAT * mobilization * assertive (1) +
* patronage * ADMIN * democrat * mobilization * ASSERTIVE (1) +
* patronage * admin * DEMOCRAT * mobilization * ASSERTIVE (1)
ReducedFormsof Configurations
polltax * patronage * ADMIN * DEMOCRAT +
polltax * patronage DEMOCRAT * MOBILIZATION +
polltax * patronage * ASSERTIVE
polltax * patronage * (DEMOCRAT * (ADMIN + MOBILIZATION) + ASSERTIVE)
Note: ForFSQCAnotationanddefinitionsof measures,see text andAppendix.
of the reduced combinations indicates precisely that.
The results also provide strong support for
the mediationmodel. Two of the hypothesized
combinations expected to lead to generous
OAA benefits are present. As before, only
undersome long-termpolitical contextualconditions is movement influence possible.
Necessary conditions for influence include the
absence of both poll taxes and dominant
patronageparties. Under these circumstances
and a favorable short-term political circumstance, the Democratic party holding power,
only extensive movement mobilization is necessary to bring about high OAA benefits, and
togetherthey are sufficient. When there are no
medium- or short-term conditions in favor,
neither a long-standing domestic administrative tradition nor a Democratic regime in
power, assertive action is sufficient to produce
high OAA benefits.
WHOVOTEDFORSENIORCITIZENS'
PENSIONS IN 1939?
Next we turn to the Senate vote on an old-age
pension measure, the proposed Lee amendment to the Social Security Act Amendments
of 1939. Lee's amendment would have provided pensions of $40 per month to all aged
Americans and would have replaced existing
old-age programs.Though not specifically a
vote on TownsendPlan-sponsoredlegislation,
the Lee amendment would have provided a
generous,widespread,nationallyfinancedpension, which was the hallmark of Townsend's
proposal. Funding these pensions was a more
radicaloutcome andone demandedby the pension movement.The amendmentfailed, 17-56.
But forming a coalition behind a radical alternative is a way to induce legislators to support
more moderate legislation that they might not
otherwisehave favored.We analyzethe vote for
the Lee amendmentboth by logistic regression
and FSQCA techniques. The latter are important because the mediation theory expects that
many favorablecircumstancesarenecessary to
influence this sort of radical outcome.
Forthe regression analyses, we use many of
the previous independent measures, adjusted
for the year. For partisanship, however, we
employ the partyaffiliation of the senator,noting whether he or she was a non-poll tax
Democrat or a memberof a radicalthirdparty.
Public opinion in these models is measuredby
the state-levelsupportexpressedin a December
1938 Gallup poll for the so-called Lodge bill.
That proposal would have provided for $60
monthly pensions for almost all aged
Americans, with $40 being provided by the
federal government.About 65 percent of those
expressing an opinion were in favor. We also
employ a measure of whether the senator was
endorsed by the Townsend Plan, which urged
clubs to supportthose whom it endorsed. The
pension measure may be more valid than the
endorsement measure, as only a third of the
senatorscame up for election in 1938. Because
of the smaller numberand the differentnature
of the cases, we use a modified version of the
model to explain OAA outcomes. In the first
model, we include the poll tax and patronage
party measures, as well as the partisanship
measure.We also include the controlmeasures
53o
REVIEW
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
forincome,percentageaged,andpublicopinion.8
In a second model, we add the threemovement
measuresto see if theyaddanythingto the explanation.
Table4 shows two logisticalregressionmodels of the vote in favorof the radicalLee amendment.Model 1, includingall the non-movementrelatedmeasures,explainsabout20 percentof the
varianceand correctlypredictsabout78 percent
of the cases.Twoof thepoliticalcontextualmeasures are significantand in the properdirection,
with a negativeinfluenceof dominantpatronage
partiesanda positiveinfluenceof democratized
Democraticor thirdpartyaffiliationon the odds
of voting for seniorcitizens'pensions.The controlmeasurepublicopinionin favorof the Lodge
bill has a positive effect, significant at the .10
level, whereas the control percent aged has a
negativeeffect.
Model 2 providesa significant improvement
of fit. The pseudo R-squaredjumps fromabout
.20 to about .40, and the increase in predictive
poweris fromabout78 percentto about84 percent, which is a shift from predicting57 of 73
cases correctlyto 61--or a quarterof theremaining cases. Townsendclub strengthsignificantly
increasesthe likelihoodof a senator'svoting for
the bill. So does a pension initiative,though at
only the .10 level. Havinga pension initiativein
a statemakes a senatoralmostthreetimes more
likelyto vote forthe Lee amendment,fromabout
9 percent to about 25 percent. The Townsend
endorsementhas a positive, but insignificant,
effect, possibly because only one thirdof senators were subjectto being endorsed.The measure of patronage party strength becomes
insignificant, perhapsbecause it was exerting
influenceby dampeningthe pensionmovement.
Also, in the final model the measureof public
opinion is significant at the .05 level and substantivelyimportant.A movementfrom60 percent of the publicsupportingthe Lodgebill to 80
percentwouldincreasea senator'schanceofvot-
8Wealso includeda controlforuniondensity-unionmembersin 1939as a shareof the nonagricultural employed (see Amenta and Halfmann
2000)-because it is oftenarguedthatunionsspur
Thismeasure
provedtobeinsignifold-ageprograms.
icantin ourmodel(resultsnot shown,butavailable
on request),andwe omittedit.
ing forthe Lee amendmentfromabout7 percent
to about25 percent.9
We now turn to examiningcombinationsof
conditions leading to positive votes through
FSQCA.Again,becausemostof the independent
measures are categorical, as is the dependent
measure,we employcrisp-setanalyses.Wescore
those in favoras one, andthose opposedas zero,
andbegin ouranalyseswith the same independent measures as before, though this time we
includewhetherthe senatorhada Democraticor
radicalthirdpartyaffiliation(DEM/THIRD)and
omit the administrativevariable,which is not
applicablenationally.Althoughthe mobilization
measureis the same,we combinethe measureof
initiativesandendorsements
treat(ASSERTIVE),
ing these statewideassertiveactivitiesas functionallyequivalent,to reducethecomplexityin the
results.Ourexpectationsherearethatit maytake
both high mobilizationand assertive action in
the most favorablepossiblecontextsto reachthis
moreradicalresult.Because of the low percentage of positivevotes, almostall truthtablecombinations that include positive votes are
"contradictory,"
includingone or morenegative
votes. Because we are interestedin understanding the conditionsunderwhich it is reasonably
likely for a senatorto vote for a radicalprogram,
we reducecombinationsin which at leasthalf of
the senatorssupportedthe pensionamendment.
Threecombinationsprovidethe greatestsupport for the amendment:
polltax*patronage*DEM/THIRD*
+
MOBILIZATION*ASSERTIVE
polltax*PATRONAGE*DEM/THIRD*
MOBILIZATION*assertive+
polltax*patronage*dem/third*
mobilization*ASSERTIVE
9Wealsoengagedina similarlogisticalregression
analysisof votingfor the TownsendPlanbill, HR
thatyear.HR
6466,in theHouseof Representatives
6466alsocalledforseniorcitizens'pensionsforthe
whowereover60 yearsold,basedon
nonemployed
a transactions
(sales)tax andothertaxes,andwas
expectedto produceinitialbenefitsof about$60per
month.Thebill failed,306-101.Wedidnotreport
theseresults(available
uponrequest)mainlybecause
theylargelyreplicatetheSenateresults.
MEDIATION
AND IMPACTOFPENSIONMOVEMENT 531
POLITICAL
Table4. Votingfor the RadicalLee PensionAmendmenton SelectedIndependentMeasures
Model 1
InstitutionalMeasures
PollTax
PatronagePartyStrength
Non-Poll-TaxDemocratorThirdPartyMember
Model 2
0.196
4.602
(0.13)
(1.85)
-0.477*
(1.92)
1.464
(1.56)
0.212
(0.57)
3.220*
(2.11)
Movement
Measures
TownsendClubActivity
1.279*
(2.28)
2.018
(1.64)
PensionProposition
Endorsement
Townsend
1.035
(0.83)
Control Measures
PublicOpinion
Pro-Old-Age
PerCapitaIncome
PercentageAged
Constant
Observations
PseudoR2
X2
Df
0.045
0.079*
(1.61)
-0.001
(0.37)
-0.428
(1.69)
(2.09)
-0.001
(0.41)
-1.255*
(2.48)
-1.606
-7.966
(0.54)
(1.92)
73
0.20
15.97*
6
73
0.41
32.24**
9
coefficientsfromlogisticalregressions.The absolutevaluesof z statistics
Notes:Datashownareunstandardized
arein parentheses.Fordefinitionsof measures,see text andAppendix.
* p < .05; ** p < .01 (one-tailed;exceptforpercentaged).
As before, a lack of voting restrictionsis a necessary condition.The first combination,which
providesthe most positive votes, six, is also the
one closely associatedwith political mediation
thinking.It includes all possible favorableconditions:a Democratic or thirdpartyaffiliation,
a strongly mobilized pension movement, and
assertiveaction. The second combinationsuggests thathigh mobilizationalone in an already
favorablepoliticalcontextcanbe influential.The
third indicates that assertive action will provide an alternativemeans of exertinginfluence
in less favorablesituations.However,the lasttwo
combinationshelp to identify only three additional senatorsvoting for pensions. The results
supportpolitical mediation thinking, but also
suggest that yet other factorsthanthose in this
version of the model may be needed to identi-
fy legislators most willing to supportthe programs of state-orientedmovements.
CONCLUSION
To summarize, our main claim is that the
collective action of state-orientedchallengers
andtheirinfluenceon publicpolicy is politically
mediatedin specific ways. Challengerscontrol
theirstrategiesand,to be effective,must be able
to alter them according to political contexts.
Under certainpolitical institutionalconditions,
notablyrestrictionson democraticpracticesand
the entrenchmentof patronage-orientedpolitical parties, the impact of state-orientedchallengers is likely to be greatly dampened.In the
firsthalf of the twentiethcentury,only abouthalf
of the state-level U.S. polities were structural-
532
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
ly open to influence. Under these open conditions and more favorable conditions over the
medium and shortterm, little more than mobilization is needed for social movementsto have
influence, whereasin less short-termpolitically favorableconditionsmore assertiveaction is
necessary. Like scholars of framing,we argue
thatthe influence of a challengeris likely to be
confined to the issues thatit plausiblyengages.
To achieve radical results, the most favorable
conditions,mobilization,andassertiveactionare
required.
The results on the developmentof Old Age
Assistanceandon the Senatevote bearout these
claims. All sets of results also provide some
supportfor the views that high mobilization is
a key to influence and that strategiesmatter.In
addition,Townsendclub activityseemedto have
a continuing influence on OAA generosity,
whereas changes in activity did not seem to
influence policy-makers similarly. This suggests that organizationand mobilization may
pay longer-term dividends for challengers,
though perhapsonly so long as the movement
as a whole remainsviable. Assertive strategies
also influenced old-age policy. Pension initiatives had a significant influence on OAA
stipends.The results also suggest thatthe standarddistinctionbetween institutionaland noninstitutional and disruptive and assimilative
action is too broadto addressthe sorts of collective action thatmatterin political processes.
Also, the fact thatthe pension movementlargely concerned itself with high benefits led to a
differential influence on OAA generosity and
coverage, with the movement spurringbenefit
levels, but not coverage.These results suggest
that movement claims-making can limit the
influence of challengersand thatbeing flexible
in this area may make wider benefits possible
for a movement'sconstituency.
The formalqualitativeresultsalso supportthe
mediation idea: that challengersneed to match
collective action strategiesto political contexts.
Combinations of conditions associated with
high OAA pensions were as expected by the
political mediation model. One of three combinations included a Democratic regime and
Townsend club mobilization, suggesting that
under short-term favorable circumstances,
mobilization was sufficient to bring gains in
OAA spending.Anothercombinationindicated
that when short-termpolitical conditions were
not necessarily favorable,the aggressive strategy of initiatives proved sufficient to bring
abouthigh OAA benefits. On the vote to transform old-age policy, movement mobilization
and assertiveaction underfavorableconditions
broughtpositive results.
Our research should not be interpretedto
mean thatthis or thatvariableshouldbe expected always to bring influence for challengersor
to mean thatsocial movementsareusuallylikely to producepolicy results. Our point is simply that social movements can be influential
under certain conditions. It seems likely that
most movementorganizationsare not likely to
be highlyinfluential,given thatchallengersstart
froma positionof relativedisadvantagein political power.The pension movement includeda
fairlypowerfullyorganizedandmobilizedset of
challengers with widespread support,and the
old-age issue was a prominentone in the 1930s
and 1940s. The resultswe reportheremay pertain only to the most significant and highly
publicized movements. That said, there is no
reason to believe that policy results of the sort
that we find would be confined to a movement
based significantly on one large challenging
organization like the Townsend Plan.
Decentralizedchallengers and coalition-based
movementscombiningthe same characteristics
might achieve similar sorts of results.
The resultsalso supportthe view thatpublic
opinion influences public policy and movements can have a further indirect impact on
policy by influencing the generalpublic about
its mission, program,or constituency.However,
the strong version of the public opinion argument finds little support.Adding public opinion measures did not mean that other causes
faded into insignificance. Although data limitations made it impossible to appraisedirectly
the influence of the relative saliency of public
opinion, the old-age issue had a high profile in
the late 1930s, and its saliency was due at least
in part to the pension movement. The Gallup
polls taken in late 1935 and early 1936 were
largelya resultof the rise of theTownsendPlan,
and the polls taken in 1938 and 1939 were in a
response to a resurgent pension movement
(Amenta forthcoming). The results here also
line up with the idea thatthe influenceofopinion polls on political actors may be historically variableandrequiresexplanationin itself.We
hope thatpromisingideas aboutthe contingent
POLITICAL
AND IMPACTOF PENSIONMOVEMENT 533
MEDIATION
impactof public opinion on policy (Jacobsand
Shapiro2000; BursteinandLinton2002; Manza
and Cook 2002) are set out more explicitly and
empiricallyexamined.Scholarsof the impactof
social movementsmay need to model the influence of challengers on opinion and from there
on state outcomes.
As the results show, the political mediation
model, as currently constructed, seems only
partially adequate to understandingthe more
radical and difficult-to-achieve outcomes for
social movements. Favorableshifts in public
opinion (Burstein 1999; Giugni 2004) or innovative framing(Cress and Snow 2000) or gaining ground in discursive struggles throughthe
mass media (Ferreeet al. 2002) maybe required
in additionto factorsidentified by the political
mediation theory to achieve fundamental
changes demandedby challengers.
Also, as studies mount, both from social
movement scholars and political sociologists
examining state policy, the impact of movements on policy seems to be understoodat least
as well as the determinants of mobilization,
which seem considerably more controversial
(cf. Goodwin and Jasper1999; McAdam 1999;
Ferreeand Merrill2004; Meyer 2004). It is no
longer enough for students of the policy consequencesof movementsto justifytheirresearch
as being on a novel subject.What we need are
theoretical refinements and advancements of
more complex ideas and the types of investigations, whetherquantitative,formal qualitative,
or historical,thatcan enableus to appraisetheory and furtherour understandingof the influence of movements on political outcomes. We
also need to addresswhetherpoliticalmediation
ideas areapplicableor whethercompletelynew
theorizing is needed to understandthe many
attempts at influence by movements that are
not mainly directed at the state (Amenta and
Young 1999; Earl 2004).
EdwinAmentais Professorof SociologyatNewYork
Universityand the Universityof California,Irvine.
He is theauthorof WhenMovementsMatter:The
TownsendPlan, the PensionMovement,and the
Makingof Social Security(PrincetonUniversity
Press,forthcoming).
Neal Carenis a Ph.D.candidatein theDepartment
Hisdissertation
ofSociologyatNewYorkUniversity.
examines urban political participation in modern
America.In thefall, he willjoin the RobertWood
Johnson Foundation Scholars in Health Policy
ResearchProgramat the University
of Michigan.
Sheera Joy Olasky is a graduate student in the
Department of Sociology at New YorkUniversity.
Her researchinterestsincludepolitical sociology,
social movements,and urbansociology. She is currently studying environmentaljustice and social
policy.
APPENDIX
AND
DATA,SOURCES,
DEFINITIONS,
MEASURES
QUANrATIVE
DEPENDENTMEASURES
AverageSize of the OAABenefit
The average OAA benefit in each state for
each year in 1950 dollars (U.S. Social Security
Board/Administration1935-1950; U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics 2004).
OAACoverage
The percentageof each state'sresidentsover
the age of 65 years (Gardnerand Cohen 1992)
who received OAA benefits in a given year
(U.S. Social Security Board/Administration
1935-1950).
Radical Lee PensionAmendment
The roll call of the Senatevote S76-1061, the
Lee amendment to the 1939 Social Security
Act Amendments(Rosenthaland Poole 2000):
one for each senatorin favor,zero for opposed,
and others excluded from the analysis.
INDEPENDENTMEASURES
Poll Tax
A dichotomousmeasurethattakes a value of
one for a period when states had a poll tax and
zero for a period without a poll tax (Ogden
1958).
PatronageParty OrganizationalStrength
A time-invariantexpert-judgmentmeasure
of the degreeto which each state'spolitical parties had substantialautonomy,were long-lasting and hierarchical, regularly attempted to
nominate candidates, and relied on material
incentives to engage people to do organizational work, ranging from five in states where
patronagepartyorganizationspredominatedto
one in states where party organizationshad little control (Mayhew 1986).
AdministrativeStrength
A time-invariantand dichotomous measure
of the strengthand structureof the state government that takes a value of one for states
534
AMERICAN
SOCIOLOGICAL
REVIEW
where the laborcommissionerhad rule-making
authorityover safety laws and zero where the
commissioner did not (Brandeis 1935).
DemocratizedDemocratic Control
A dichotomousmeasure for control in each
year of the governor'smansion and both houses of the state legislature by the Democratic
party (Burnham 1992) in non-poll-tax states
(Ogden 1958).
Non-Poll-Tax Democrat or Member of
Radical ThirdParty
A measure scoring one for senators from
non-poll-tax states (Ogden 1958) and
Democrats or members of a third party
(Rosenthaland Poole 2000) with othersscoring
zero.
OAACountyFunding
The percentageof total OAA funding counties contributedin states by year (U.S. Social
1935-1950; U.S.
SecurityBoard/Administration
Social SecurityBoard 1945).
Per CapitaIncome
State income per person in each year, measuredin 1950 dollars(U.S. Bureauof Economic
Analysis 2001).
PercentageBlack
The percentage of state residents who are
African American in each year, based on the
decennial censuses in 1930, 1940, and 1950
(Gardner and Cohen 1992), with values for
intercensal years computed based on a linear
growth for each state.
PercentageAged
The percentage of state residents over 65
years of age in each year based on the decennial censuses in 1930, 1940, and 1950 (Gardner
and Cohen 1992), with values for intercensal
years computed based on a linear growth for
each state.
Pro-Old-AgePublic Opinion
ThreemeasuresfromGalluppolls in 1938 in
which individual responses to the following
questionswere aggregatedto providestate-level
estimates. Open-endedanswersto "Howmuch
per month should be paid to a single person?"
are averagedin our analyses of OAA generosity (American Institute of Public Opinion
1938a). Forcoverage,we computethe percentage of respondentswho answered"All"to the
question "Do you think pensions should be
givento all old people,or only to old peoplewho
are in need?" (American Institute of Public
Opinion 1938b). Forthe Lee vote, we compute
the percentage of respondentsin favor of the
Lodge bill, which would have established a
national$60 permonthpension,with $40 coming from federal funds (American Instituteof
Public Opinion 1938b).
TownsendClubActivity
A measure of mobilization based on a content analysis of a sample of eight issues of the
TownsendWeekly by year, accordingto mentions of Townsendclub activityby state,adjusted by yearly national membership(Holtzman
1963), rangingfromone to five, with five indicating a level of activity that would place it in
the top 20 percentof all state-yearsduringthis
period. Club activity is measuredin two ways:
frozen at its peak value once reached, and
according to the change in activity between
years.
TownsendEndorsement
A dichotomousmeasurescoringone for senators endorsed by the Townsend Plan in the
1938 Senate election (Townsend National
Weekly 1938), with others scored zero.
Pension Proposition
A dichotomousmeasureof the presencein a
given state and year of a ballot propositionor
initiativedesignedto increasepensionamounts,
coverage, or both, constructedfromcontemporary accounts in the New YorkTimes, the
WashingtonPost,the LosAngelesTimes,andthe
ChristianScience Monitor.
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