How Might Psychology Contribute to Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War?
Author(s): James G. Blight
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 617-660
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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Political Psychology,Vol. 7, No. 4, 1986
to
How MightPsychology
Contribute
ReducingtheRiskof NuclearWar?
James G. Blight'
Dear Professor
Freud,
mankind
ofwar?
Is there
from
themenace
...Thisistheproblem:
anywayofdelivering
seea simplewayofdealingwiththesuperficial
...I personally
aspectoftheproblem:
thesetting
of a legislative
andjudicialbodyto settle
consent,
up, byinternational
(Einstein,
July1932)
everyconflict...
Dear Professor
Einstein,
...You havetakenmebysurprise...by
posingthequestionof whatcan be doneto
mankind
fromthecurseof war...with
whatseemedto be a practical
protect
proidealcondition
of things
wouldof coursebe
blem,a concernforstatesmen...The
a community
ofmenwhohadsubordinated
theirinstinctual
lifeto thedictatorship
of reason.Butin all probability
thatis a utopianexpectation.
No doubttheother
indirect
methods
of preventing
warare morepracticable,
no
thoughtheypromise
rapidsuccess...(Freud,Sept. 1932)
Theonlythingwhichpsychology
hasa right
to postulate
at theoutsetis thefactof
thinking
itself...thought
goeson. (WilliamJames,1890)
Severalrecent
aresurveyed
inwhich
havetriedtoapply
attempts
psychologists
their
totheproblemofreducing
theriskofnuclearwar.
professional
insights
Theseincludethosedirected
at deepcauses(theU.S.-Sovietrelationship),
intermediate
causes(imperfect
and,briefly,
rationality
ofdecision-makers)
causes(effects
on
precipitating
ofstress).In eachcase,littleorno influence
thenuclearpolicy-making
processcan be discerned;U.S. foreignpolicymakerschargedwithmanaging
theriskofnuclearwaroperatevirtually
inIn orderto bringnuclearpolicy-making
and
dependently
ofpsychology.
a phenomenological
tonuclear
crisis
psychological
insights
together,
approach
'CenterforScienceandInternational
HarvardUniversity,
Massachusetts
Affairs,
Cambridge,
02138.
617
@ 1986 InternationalSocietyof Political Psychology
0162-895X/86/1200-0617$05.00/1
618
Blight
is described,
thecentraltaskof whichis a systematic
management
descriptionof theevolution
about
duringcrisesofbeliefsheldbydecision-makers
riskof nuclearwar.
KEY WORDS: belief;crisis;psychology(phenomenological);risk; war (nuclear).
INTRODUCTION
Eversincepsychology
wasorganized
intoa separate
intellecdiscipline,
tualsconcerned
withreducing
theriskof warhavelookedto itsmethods
and findings
forinsights
whichmightbe appliedto international
politics.
after
the
William
James(1977b)
War,forexample,
Shortly
Spanish-American
wrotean essayespousing
whathe called"TheMoralEquivalentof War."
mustbe createdwhichhelpto
James,a Darwinian,
arguedthatinstitutions
ouraggressive
channel
instincts
intouseful,
rather
thandestructive
directions.
Later,duringtheriseof fascismand thedrifttowardWorldWarin
the 1930s,physicist
AlbertEinsteinbecameconvinced
thatpsychological
variables-our"mannerof thinking,"
as he calledit-lay at theverycore
ofthecausationofwaramongnations.Einstein
believedthatifonlya way
couldbe foundto"think"
inglobal,rather
thannationalistic
warcould
terms,
be avoided,perhapspermanently.
In an exchange
as "WhyWar"
published
andFreud,1966),hewrotetoFreud,themosteminent
(Einstein
psychologist
of histime,forassistancein provoking
a psychological
revolution
which
wouldusheringlobalthinking.
Freud(Einstein
andFreud,1966)responded
butfirmly
thathecouldprovideno suchassistance;
he knewofno
politely
couldmakeanydirectcontribution
to reducing
theriskof
waypsychology
war.
In thepastseveralyears,therehasbeenan emphatic
revivalofinterest
andothers
inapplying
totheproamongpsychologists
psychological
insights
blemof reducing
theriskof war,especially
nuclearwar.In thefollowing
I havesurveyed
someofthemostinfluential
recent
tolink
sections,
attempts
withreducing
theriskofnuclearwar.Myconclupsychological
knowledge
sionregarding
thisenterprise
is notunlikeFreud'sinresponse
to Einstein's
Theresults
so farindicate
thattherevival
ofEinsteinian
enthusiasm
inquiry:
is unwarranted.
In sum,thecriticalconclusions
are these:
1. Therehas beenlittleor no influence
on thepolicy-making
process,
at thelevelof deep,intermediate,
or precipitating
causesof
psychological
a potential
nuclearwar.
2. Thereis reasonto believethatsuchinfluence
willcontinue
to be
minimal
andalso,infact,thatitprobably
shouldbe minimal,
whenviewed
fromthepolicy-maker's
perspective.
theRiskof NuclearWar?
to Reducing
Contribute
How MightPsychology
619
haveforignoring
reasonpolicy-makers
The mostcompelling
psychiatrists
andmodusoperandiat eachlevel
is this:theassumptions
andpsychologists
areutopian- inthecaseofthe"depth"psychologists
(seesection2) because
of
all important
the
mental
structures
can
believe
virtually
they change
they
scientists
behavioral
worldleaders,and forthe"intermediate"
(see section
thatitis in
makers
convince
can
believe
because
foreign
policy
they
they
3)
ofnuclearpolicyintoa virthetransformation
to permit
theirbestinterest
hasbeen
science.I believethateachofthesepursuits
tualappliedbehavioral
on
the
I
influence
since
fruitless.
will
remain
and
policyproThus,
regard
I believe
nuclearriskreduction,
cess as thesine qua non of successful
as
it
without
out
in
the
to
remain
are
influence,
were,
cold,
psychologists likely
despiteall theirgood intentions.
causes
onprecipitating
As I argueinthelasttwosections,
psychological
thepotential
nuclearwar,thetimemaybe rightforviewing
of a potential
ina newlight.Themain
riskofnuclearwarandpsychology
linkagebetween
learnto thinkina non-utopian
is thatpsychologists
wayabout
requirement
avoidcalling
andthattheytherefore
theproblemof nuclearriskreduction
"offtheshelf"
andsuggesting
revolutions
forconversion-like
psychological
andclinics.In thefinalsection,an outline
fromtheirlaboratories
solutions
totheprecipitating
ofa phenomenological
is sketched
approach
psychological
information
yieldpsychological
causes,an approachwhichmayeventually
thanhaveprevious
moreusefultopolicy-makers
1985a,b;
(Blight,
approaches
1986).
PSYCHOLOGIES OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR:
AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK
In searching
within
fora usefulframework
whichto discussvarious
psychological
approachesto avoidingnuclearwar,I suggestwe startwith
likepresent
thisdilemma:On theonehand,webelievethatunderanything
it wouldbe impossible
fortheleadership
of a superpower
to
conditions,
calculaterationally
theexpectedbenefits
and coststo be derivedfromina nuclearwar,andconcludethatsucha stepwouldbe worthit.On
itiating
theotherhand,we do notbelievea nuclearwaris impossible.
As is often
nuclearwarwouldbe "insane,"thusimprobable,
itsputative
said,although
itsoccurrence,
forapparently
doesnotpreclude
"insane"actions
"insanity"
occurall thetime(Allisonet al., 1985).
Whileweneednotobjectto thiscommonplace
linkageofnuclearwar
with"insanity,"
weneedtobe clearaboutthesortofbreakdown
ordegradationof rationality
thatis mostto be feared.It is emphatically
notclinical
620
Blight
inthecolloquialsense:thatis, a breakdown
or"craziness"
(inthe
psychosis
rational,expected
psycheof a leader,say)in theabilityto makerelatively
occur
valuecalculations.
For although
sucha breakdown
mayconceivably
in thestressof a crisis,thereis littleevidencethatwarsare mainlycaused
in thementalstatesof leaderswhohavegonemad. In
bythedissociation
knowshowtoplanfortheintrusion
ofclinicalinsanity
anycase,onehardly
intointernational
politics.
toresultfrom
Rather,an "insane"majornuclearwaris farmorelikely
in
as
rational
a
fashion
as decisionone or anotherleadership
calculating,
in
a
nuclear
war
is
fact"worth
bodies
are
that
making
initiating
capable,
It
would
this
occur?
on
balance.
How,generally
it,"
begin
speaking,
might
withonesidecoming
ofintentions,
that
tobelieve,
bya misreading
probably
thatinfacttheadversary
theothersidewasno longerrational,
seemedwillingand ableto go all thewayto nuclearwarin orderto resolvea crisisto
itsadvantage.
Ifthisoccurred,
andifeachsidethenbeganto doubttheother's
intenthen
tiontoavoida nuclear
a
of
threats
and
counter-threats
backed
war,
spiral
movesmight
leadoneorbothsides
ensue,a spiralwhichmight
bymilitary
was so perverse
to believethattheirsituation
thatthesingleactionwhich
thebesthopeof maximizing
losseswouldbe
promised
gainsand cutting
escalationto thenuclearlevel,or evenmassivepreemption.
Thustheoften-mentioned
ofa nuclear
warwouldassert
itself,
"insanity"
inlargepartforpsychological
reasons,butnotbecauseleaderswouldhave
lost theirminds,like GeneralRipperin StanleyKubrick'sfilm,"Dr.
in questionwouldmoreaptly
Strangelove"
(1962). Rather,the insanity
describea situation,
arrivedat bymisperception
and rationalcalculation,
as to renderas the"best"optiontheinitiation
so perverse
of a disastrous
nuclearwar.
Thusanypsychological
approachto avoidingnuclearwarwhichseeks
to reducetherisks,mustin somewayaddressthesequestions:
1. How mightan act which,undernormal,relatively
relaxedcondias "insane"(andthusunlikely
to occur),
tions,is regarded
byall concerned
be transformed
intoan actviewedbyrelevant
as progressively
participants
lessinsane,relatively
lessmaladaptive
thanthelogicof deterrence
suggests
it shouldbe? How can wedescribetheprocessbywhichtheintentions
of
deterrence
maybecomeinverted?
2. Whatoughtto be doneto haltor reversethisprocess?
Thegreat(andapparently
fearis thatnuclearweapons,ostensibly
growing)
and
to
all use of nuclearweapons,willbe
designed deployedonly prevent
used anyway.Thus we mustdo our bestto enterinto some imagined
to initiate
psychological
processthatmaylead to an increasedproclivity
nuclearwar,to mapitsgeneralcontoursand thento suggest
policiesand
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
621
toprevent
ourimagined
otherinterventions
thatpromise
fromacnightmares
tuallyhappening.
Thismeansthatwe shouldadoptwhatI prefer
to call a "functional"
nuclear
war.Mostpeoplewhohavebeenpaidthroughout
toavoiding
approach
nuclearwarhaveadopted,conversethenuclearageto thinkaboutavoiding
to whichonetriesto structure
forces
ly,a "structural"
approach,according
in sucha waythatrationalactorson all sides,noticing
and strategies
from
theircalculations
justhowfoolisha nuclearwarwouldbe, decidenotto inwhatis meantby"deterrence."
itiateone. In fact,thisis generally
muchforgranted:
takesallthispretty
A functional
Rationally,
approach
orfortheforeseeable
"worth
it."Atthis
nuclear
waris notatpresent,
future,
that
aboutfactors
beginsto worry,
especially
point,thenuclearfunctionalist
oftheperceived
"worth"
ofinitiating
influence
calculations
nuclear
war.
might
orpotential
thataspectofthe"insaniMalfunctions,
malfunctions,
represent
mustpropeltheirimaginations.
ty"ofnuclearwarintowhichfunctionalists
Thesepossibilities,
even
moreover,
dependfortheir
possibility
largely,
perhaps
on variables
weall tendto thinkofas psychological.
Forsimplicity's
mainly,
atleastthreecanonicalsourcesofpossiblemalfunction
sake,wemayidentify
in theprocessof trying
to maintain
mutualnucleardeterrence:
1. Humanbeingsinteract
withmechanical
systems.
2. Humanbeingsalso interact
witheachother.
3. Humanbeingsalsointeract,
as a vastandabstract
offoreign
"system"
the
policy,withanothersuch variegated"system"representing
nuclearadversary.
To thenuclearfunctionalist,
to one trainedin thebehavioral
particularly
this
Ptolemaic-like
of
sciences,
decisions,
system machinery,
perceptions,
filledto overflowing
withpossibilities
for
beliefs,and so on, is veritably
and
and
error.
It
is
to
notice
systemic systematic, potentially
tragic,
important
thatthisis so evenif,as appearspresently
to be thecase,thenuclearforces
ofthesuperpowers
aremutually
redundant
andthesecondstrike
of
capacity
eachis regarded
as unquestionably
invulnerable.
A glanceatTableI (Nye,1984)willrevealwhya functionalist
approach
lendsitselfso interestingly
to fertilization
fromthebehavioralsciences.
Riskofsurprise
as least
attack,a "boltfromtheblue,"is generally
regarded
arestructured
toprevent
itand,shortoftotal
probable.
Why?Becauseforces
madness
oneoranother
ofeither
thestrucovertaking
leadership
superpower,
turesthemselves
thecalculations
to believean all-outfirstprevent
required
"outoftheblue"is worth
strike
therisk.Prevention
ofthissortofpathbeing
takenis whatmostof ournuclearforcesarein factdesigned
for,and they
thusfarhavedonetheirjob well.
But noticethecentralcharacteristic
of thetwopathsto nuclearwar
usuallyregardedas mostdangerous:(1) escalationof conventionalwar and
Table I. Nuclear-RiskReduction
Paths to Nuclear War
(ranked by probability)
Factors Affecting
Likelihood of Path
1. Escalation of conventional
war
U.S.-Soviet conventionalwar
Balance of generalpurpose forces
Vulnerabilityof theaternuclear
forces
Misperception/miscalculation
Cr
m
M
g
R
t
Im
2. Preemptionin crisis
War appears imminentand
unavoidable
Balance of nuclearforces
Misperception/miscalculation
C
m
M
n
R
n
3. Accidentalor unauthorized
use
Proceduresand devicesdesigned
to preventaccidentsand
unauthorizeduse (thatis,
PermissiveAction Links)
Communicationsystems
Im
d
Im
s
Cr
m
4. Initiationby a thirdparty
Third partyaccess to nuclear
weapons and deliverysystems
U.S. and Soviet presencein
conflictareas
In
t
Cr
m
5. Surpriseattack
ExtremeU.S.-Soviet hostility
Balance of nuclear forces
Vulnerabilityof nuclearforces
Misperception/miscalculation
Irrationality
St
f
M
n
R
n
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
623
in crisis.Each occursin themidstof a deep superpower
(2) preemption
crisis-thatis, leadersof thesuperpowers,
theunfolding
of a
observing
war
or
a
to
that
the
threat
shooting
deeppoliticalconflict,
begin perceive
is greatenough,theriskis highenough,andtimemaybe shortenough,that
a nuclearwarcouldresult(Lebow,1981).Although
morewillbe saidlater
about the conceptof crisis,we may simplynoticeherethat,viewed
itis whatpsychologists
wouldprobably
refer
toas a mental
psychologically,
within
which
the
of
occurrence
a
the
failure
of deterstate,
event,
specific
is
to
be
The
fundamental
of
the
nuclear
functionalist
rence,
prevented.
point
isjustthat,whileina stateofcrisis,
theactwhicheveryone
concerned
formeras
no
In a sense,the
insane
at
all.
lyregarded insane,may longerappear
functionalist
foravoiding
nuclear
andforeseeable
program
war,underpresent
forcelevelsandstructures,
boilsdowntothis:Avoidcrisesbetween
thesuperlearnto managethemsucpowersand wherethisprovesto be impossible,
cessfully.
ThisbecomesallthemoreobviousinTableII, inwhicharerepresented
summaries
ofstrategies
foravoiding
nuclearwar(Nye,1984;p. 407;seealso
Allisonetal., 1985,pp. 12-13).Noticeintheleft-hand
columnthat,nomatterwherewechooseto entersomeimagined
pathto nuclearwar- whether
atthelevelof(1) precipitating,
or(3) deepcauses- ourgoal
(2) intermediate
is to avoid nuclearwarvia avoidingcrises(or, in thecase of an actual,
it successfully).
crisis,via managing
precipitating
In additionto emphasizing
incrisesby
pathsthrough
malfunctioning
whichonemight
arriveat nuclearwar,andalsoitsaccommodation
ofthree
basiclevelsat whichone mighttryto understand
and attacktheproblem,
a nuclearfunctionalist
mustalso accordgreatimportance
to a thirdfactor,
one whichis an almostpurelypsychological
construct.
It is theidea that,
in constructing
and executing
nuclearpolicy,one
foreign
policy,including
is liableto makecertainsortsoferrors,
which
mainlyerrorsinperception,
lead to erroneous
beliefs,whichin turnmaylead to mistaken
policiesand
actions.Thisbasicinsight
is derivedfroma pointpopularized
recently
by
RobertJervis
dilemma":thatin a world
(1976,1983),calledthe"security
ofquasi-anarchic
relations
suchas thosewhichcharacterize
theinteractions
ofnation-states,
one'sownsecurity
tend
to
decrease
thatof
increasing
may
others,and viceversa.
Thisimplies
thatnotonlymaywespeaklegitimately
offailures
ofdeterofwhatI prefer
to call,adaptinga suggestion
of
rence,butalso of failures
Jonathan
Dean(1983)andMichaelMccGwire
ofreassurance.
(1984),failures
Onemay,thatis,failtoreassure
anadversary
thatvariousforces
andweapons
are intended
fordefense,
thustheintention
is misread,and theadversary
inkindinordertoprotect
hisownsecurity.
As Jervis
hasobserved
responds
and as a nuclearfunctionalist
musttake fullyintoaccount,a kindof "spiraling" may occur which produces crises like that which seems to have
Table II. Approachto U.S.-SovietNuclear-Risk
Reduct
BasicGoals
1. Crisismanagement
(of possibleprecipitating
causesof nuclearwar)
Crisisstability
Credibility
Limits
Termination
2. Crisisprevention
(of possiblecontributory
causesof nuclearcrises)
Avoidmisperception
and
miscalculation
of interests
Avoidlossof controlto
smallstates
Avoidlossof controldue
to military
mistake
Increasetransparency
and
predictability
commoninterest
Demonstrate
3. Long-run
stabilization
thatcreates
(of basicconflict
risksof nuclearcrisesand
war)
GeneralStrat
SOPs thatbuytim
Clearsignals
Constantcommun
Civiliancontrolof
movements
Termination
plans
Preventive
diplom
Classicdiplomacy
Earlyconsultatio
Generaland speci
Increasecontacts
Increasereciproc
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
625
WorldWarI, inadditiontomoreclassicfailures
ofdeterrence,
precipitated
likethatwhichinvited
Hitler'sblitzkrieg
intoEasternandWestern
Europe.
sortof errorof provocation
or intimidation
We maycall theformer
a hawk'serror,whileweshouldreferto thesortofinvitation
to aggression
on byinadequatedeterrence
as a dove'serror(Allisonetal., 1985,
brought
policygoalthusbecomes"balanceddeterpp. 212-214).Theoverallforeign
to avoidexcessive
rence"-theattempt
andexcessive
invitation.
provocation
- a "frozen
We mayfillout our foreign
policyaviarywithan "owl'serror
likeexcessive
andmechanical
catch,"whichissomething
safety
organizational
withforcewhenitreallyis appropriate
todo
safeguards
againstresponding
so. Froma psychological
a dove'serrorand an owl's
however,
standpoint,
errorwouldproducethesameresult:ifan adversary
believedeitherthata
lackedthewillor theabilityto respondquicklyand effectively
leadership
to aggression,
thenthiserror(dove'sorowl's)wouldconstitute
an invitation
to aggression,
to
a
failure
of
and
deterrence, war.
leadingperhaps
Two important
of a Hawk'sErrorand a Dove'sError
characteristics
shouldbe noticed.First,each represents
an instanceof inadvertent
or
One
psychological
misreading, misperception. believesthatittakeseither
too muchor too littleto deteran adversary
and thissortof mistakemust
be dueinlargeparttotheinability
to viewone'sownsecurity
arrangements
as an adversary
viewthem.Second,thesesortsofpsychologically
based
might
errorscanmanifest
themselves
at anyofthethreelevelsofcausationalong
whichonemight
a pathclearthrough
tonuclear
war.Each
imagine
following
ofthesecharacteristics
is illustrated
inTableIII. Inthesections
whichfollow,
thisframework
is appliedto recentworkon deepand intermediate
causes
of a potential
nuclearwarandto prospective
workon precipitating
causes.
Table III. PsychologicalDimensionsof the Causation of a PotentialNuclear War
Level of
Causation
Policy Goals
Psychological
Dimension
Hawk's
Error
Dove's
Error
Precipitating
Crisis
management
Preventingthe
beliefin oneself
and in the adversary
that nuclearwar is
inevitableand thatit
is advantageousto go
first
Inadvertent
"Preemptive
escalationthat
surrender"to
blackmail
producesa
perversesituation
Intermediate
Crisis
prevention
Promotinghigher
quality,more
balanced decisionmakingin leaders
Decisions which Decisions
whichinvite
provoke an
attackor
escalation
escalation
Deep
Long-range
stabilityof
the superpower
relationship
Promotingenhanced
cooperationand
trustbetweenthe
leadershipsof the
superpowers
Unbridled
arms racing
Isolationism;
unilateral
disarmament
Blight
626
DEEP PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES:
NUCLEAR DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY
RobertR. Holt(1984),thedistinguished
In thetitleofa recent
article,
has putintoa singleshortquesand
theorist,
psychologist psychoanalytic
and psychiatrists
of our
ofthedepthpsychologists
tiontheentireprogram
The
MeetEinstein's
He asks:"CanPsychology
dilemma:
nuclear
Challenge?"
as
laid
down
Einstein
of
the
a
reminder
with
by
shortly
challenge,
paperbegins
afterWorldWar II: "The unleashedpowerof the atom has changed
towardunparalleled
andthuswedrift
saveourmodesofthinking,
everything
catastrophe.. . . a new typeof thinkingis essentialif mankindis to sur-
vive"(citedinHolt,1984,pp. 199-200).Evena casualperusalofthebooks
will
inthe"Nuclear"sections
thathavesprung
up latelyinmanybookstores
ofEinstein,
a physicist,
onthepresent
revealtheastounding
influence
generaconwhohavebecomeprofessionally
andpsychiatrists
tionofpsychologists
cernedwithnuclearpolicy.
of whatI willcall
constituents
These,then,arethetwofundamental
in
botharederivable
nucleardepthpsychology;
(and manycasesareactualofEinstein.First,theriskofnuclear
lyderived)fromthepoliticalwritings
ofan arms
andrapidly
duetotheexistence
waris heldtobe rising
constantly
ostenThisraceis runbybothsuperpowers
racebetween
thesuperpowers.
andthustoavoida nuclear
war.Butnucleardepth
deterrence
siblytobolster
theophaveprecisely
believethatthearmsracewilleventually
psychologists
of one country
(or both)will
positeresult:Theyholdthattheleadership
or technological
thenuclear
becauseof fear,miscalculation,
error,initiate
warpresently
fearedby all.
is distinguished
Butnucleardepthpsychology
principally
bytheemthepathology
processes,
phasisitsadvocatesplaceupondeeppsychological
of whichis believedto explainan armsrace theyregardas patently
- in thesensethattheendtoward
whichtheybelieveit is taking
irrational
us, nuclearwar,is theveryinverseof thegoal soughtby advocatesof a
In short,
between
thesuperpowers.
vigorousnuclearweaponscompetition
and
nucleardepthpsychologists
believethatwhattheytaketobe ourpresent
inourcollective
thinknucleardangercanbe tracedto problems
escalating
and thattheseproblems
are
ingaboutnuclearwarand nucleardeterrence
ofthosewhomakeandexecute
outside
theawareness
nuclear
deepandusually
riskofnuclear
waras mainly
a psychological
policy.Theythusconceptualize
problem:If we couldalterthewaywe thinkin fundamental
ways,chiefly
the deep
by shiftingto a less parochial,more global perspective,
wouldbe cured,thearmsracewouldbe terminated,
and
psychopathology
theriskof nuclearwarcouldbe greatly
even
reduced,perhapsultimately
to zero.
How MightPsychology
Contribute
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
627
I will
Two schoolsof thoughtdominatenucleardepthpsychology.
themwithinthe terminology
characterize
by Holt (1984,pp.
suggested
thosewhobelievethat
211-212).On theonehand,therearethecognitivists,
of personal
thearmsraceis a pathology
thedeeppsychopathology
driving
thecognitions
ofa greatmanyleadersinthe
albeitoneinvolving
cognition,
UnitedStatesandtheSovietUnion.To putthepointsomewhat
colloquialis
race
because
believe
the
arms
but
crazy
crazy
ly,
pointedly:
Cognitivists
to
the
it.
As
shall
see
this
are
we
propresently, approach
people running
to theviewthatthe
blemof nuclearriskhas ledmanypeoplestraightaway
inkind
different
is notfundamentally
cureforsuperpower
psychopathology
to
sort
of
from
cure
thepsychotherapeutic
any
psychological
processrequired
For mostcognitivists,
notonlymaythe
illnessinvolving
disorder.
thought
butso also may
ofnuclearriskbe conceptualized
psychologically,
problem
thecure,whichis someprocessakinto psychotherapy.
is thatofthe
The otherprincipal
schoolof nucleardepthpsychology
thatthere
isnoevidence
ofthisviewtendtobelieve
interactionists.
Advocates
inthecognitions
oftheinofwidespread
thepresence
pathology
suggesting
that
the deep
dividualleadersof eithersuperpower.
Rather,theyargue
in
is
what
take
to be a
more
embodied
abstract,
they
psychopathology
Within
between
the
two
countries.
what
nuclear
pathological
relationship
take
to
be
of
the
interaction
between
depthpsychologists
crazypatterns
superinstitutionalized
mistrust
andassumptions
ofubiquitous
powers,especially
hostileintent,
theleadersareseenas functioning
as a rule,
quiterationally,
and one of theformstakenbytheirrationaladaptation
to a crazysystem
inthenuclear
isparticipation
totheinteractionists,
armsrace.Thus,according
ifriskofnuclearwaris to be reducedsignificantly,
thequalityofthesupera mainly
mustbe changed
andthisimplies
fundamentally,
powerrelationship
political, rather than psychotherapeutic,cure for superpower
psychopathology.
Themostfamous
isHelen
cognitivist
depthpsychologists
amongnuclear
inherassertions,
inherwriting
andself-righteous
shrill
Caldicott.
Categorical
andspeaking,
Caldicott
ofnuclear
easilybeignored
might
byseriousstudents
ifitweren't
forherastonishing
Sheis a best-selling
psychology
popularity.
memberof the
author,a speakerwho is muchin demand,a founding
forSocialResponsibility
reestablished
Physicians
(PSR) and,morerecently, a drivingforcebehindWomen'sActionfor NuclearDisarmament
(WAND).Thusonemustassumethata greatmanypeoplehave,inCaldicott,
founda voicecommensurate
incontent
andtonewiththeirowndeepfears
and beliefsaboutriskof nuclearwar(butsee Coles, 1984).
is filledwithad hominem
Caldicott's
asaultslike
writing
psychological
thefollowing:
The definitionof a paranoid patientis someonewho imaginesa certainscenarioin
his or herown mind,decides (withno objectiveevidence)thatthisis exactlywhat
628
Blight
someoneelseisthinking,
andthendecidestoactonthatnotion.TheparanoiddelufromthemindsofAmerican
ontotheRussianleaderscomestraight
sionsprojected
andleaders,andtheseideasprobably
reflect
whattheAmericans
exactly
strategists
andbearlittlerelationship
to do themselves
to Sovietstrategy
orrealiareplanning
ty.(1984,pp. 174-175).
forthisdiagnosis
ofparanoiaare,according
toCaldicott,
Leadingcandidates
broad-minded
intellectuals
whosaton Reagan'sMX Commission"
"so-called
thinksheasserts,"suchfantasy
Moreover,
Commission).
(The Scowcroft
at thehighest
levelsofgovernment,
President
ingis stillpracticed
including
and is overtparanoia"(1984,
Reaganand DefenseSecretary
Weinberger,
inKovel("paranoid
madness";
1983,
p. 174).Onemayfindsimilar
diagnoses
drunken
of twosuicidal
("exhibitionistic
p. 84) and Menninger
gesturing
giants";1983,p. 350).
forCaldicottand hercognitivist
Unfortunately
colleagues,however,
herdiagnoses
aresimply,
TheSoviets
havea vastnuclear
demonstrably
wrong.
andbombers
arsenal;theirmissiles
reallyareaimedatus;theyreallydo have
rather
us ina nuclearwar(see,e.g.,
preciseplansforusingthemto destroy
Holloway,1985;Meyer,1985).Howeverthisstateofaffairs
mayhavecome
theSovietnuclearthreat.
It isreal,
about,ourleadersdo notsimply
imagine
as anyonewhoexaminestheevidencemaysee.
In movingfromheranalysisof theproblemof nuclearrisk- crazy
leaders- to hertherapeutic
fora cure,Caldicott's
irrelevance
prescriptions
totheworldofnuclear
that
total.
Because
she
believes
becomes
policy-making
sick
are
the
risk
of
nuclear
war
she
must
choose
deeply people driving
upward,
betweentwo broad prescriptive
alternatives:
akinto political
something
which
our
at
would
be
revolution,
leaders, anyrate,
by
forcibly
replaced;
or therapy,
bywhichtheywouldbe healed.Kovel(1983)leanstowardthe
former
favorssomenovelforms
oftherapy,
alternative;
Caldicott,
however,
suchas a kindofmarriage
in
which
each
wouldbe
counseling,
superpower
to
its
"troth"
to
the
other
wrestrequired "pledge"
(1984,p. 292),monthly
alleviate
lingmatchesbetween"themenwhocontrolthesuperpowers...to
thebuilt-upaggressions"
(p. 305), and parentaladviceto "growup and
becomeresponsible
nations"(p. 337). One mayat firstwonderwhether
Caldicottputsforward
suchsuggestions
as theseseriously
but,notingthe
humorless
toneofherwriting,
onesuspects
thatshedoes.But
unrelentingly
becausehercognitivist
arepatently
false,andbecausetherealizadiagnoses
tionofherprescription
is so wildly
thelikelihood
thatthecourse
improbable,
willactually
sheadvocates
intheriskofnuclear
leadtoa reduction
warought
to be ratedat verynearlyzero.
Theinteractionists
holda muchmore
amongnuclear
depthpsychologists
viewoftherelevance
ofpsychology
to alterations
sophisticated
theybelieve
reducethe risk of nuclearwar. To interactionists,
may substantially
are relevantto nuclearriskreduction
psychological
insights
mainlyin indirect,
of an analogy:between"systems"
suggestive
wayswhichdependon thevalidity
How MightPsychology
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
Contribute
629
of interaction
betweenpeoplewhichmaybe characterized
as "certifiably
between
pathological"
(Holt, 1984,p. 211),and thedefective
relationship
thesuperpowers,
whichis exhibited
inan armsracewhich,
inturn,isbelieved
to driveriskof nuclearwarcontinuously
upward.In otherwords,whereas
likeCaldicottdiagnosethearmsracepsychologically
in order
cognitivists
toprescribe
interactionists
inorder
psychologically,
diagnosepsychologically
to prescribe
Interactionists
thusseekpolicies,nottherapies,
with
politically.
whichtohealwhattheyviewas a deeply
pathological
superpower
relationship.
The rosterof interactionists
containsmanyof the mosteminent
American
andpsychologists,
MortonDeutsch(1983),
psychiatrists
including
ErikErikson(1984),RobertHolt(1984),RobertJayLifton(Lifton
andFalk,
1982),JohnMack(1985a,b),CarlRogers(1982),andRalphK. White(1984).
Here are characteristic
statements
frompsychiatrist
JohnMack and
MortonDeutschon whattheyregardas thedeeppsychological
psychologist
riskof nuclearwar:
problemunderlying
...thenuclearweaponscompetition
actuallyis insane,or,to usethemoremodern
in somedeep,formalor literalsense...Inthecase of thenuclear
term,psychotic,
armsrace,it is notindividuals
whoare psychotic.
Rather,themadnessresidesin
collective
of thinking
andrelationships
thatarepoorlyadaptedto therepatterns
of planetary
survival
in thenuclearage [Mack,1985b,p. 53; seealso,
quirements
ina malignant
social
1985a]....theUnitedStatesandtheSovietUnionaretrapped
risetoa webofinteractions
anddefensive
instead
processgiving
maneuvers,
which,
ofimproving
theirsituations,
makethembothfeellesssecure,
morevulnerable,
and
burdened
anda threat
tooneanother
andtotheworldatlarge.(Deutsch,
1983,p. 21)
Interactionists
believe
theyhaveencountered
similarly
crazyprocesses
before,
inworkwithfamilies
andlarger
andthatis whytheyfeelcomcommunities,
to speakouton whattheyregardas thepsychopathology
petent
underlying
thearmsrace.
Thesortofprescriptions
offered
byinteractionists
seem,at first
glance,
muchlessreductionistic
thanthoseofthecognitivists.
Interactionists
implicitly
laiddownbyStanley
Hoffmann
inhisrecent
trytoactona principle
presidentialaddressto theInternational
SocietyofPoliticalPsychology.
According
to Hoffmann,
"evenif one acceptsthemetaphors
of collective
diseaseor
one
thatthe'cure'can onlybe providedby
pathology, mustunderstand
politics"(Hoffmann,
1986).Thus Mack looks forwardto "a processof
maturation"
measures
political
(1985b,p. 53),whileDeutschfavors
bywhich
willreplaceourpresent,
"mutual
totaldependence
security"
nearly
upon"nationalsecurity"
(1983,p. 24). Each seeksto articulate
politicalmeansto
transform
interactive
endthearmsraceandeliminate
superpower
pathology,
theriskof catastrophic
nuclearwar.In thisway,via thepoliticaltransformationof thesuperpower
theinteractionists
relationship,
amongnuclear
seekto alterourmannerof thinking
in linewithEinsdepthpsychologists
tein'srequirements.
Whileone mustacknowledgetheprimafacieplausibility
of theinterac-
tionist
itis stillimpossible
to be optimistic
viewpoint,
abouttheprobability
630
Blight
thatinteractionists'
For as Hoffmann
goalscan actuallybyaccomplished.
has
all
Allbelieve
nuclear
are
radicals.
out,
(1986) pointed
depthpsychologists
thatriskof nuclearwaris primarily
a function
of a superpower
armsrace
drivenbydeep,recalcitrant
The functional
psychopathology.
significance
ofthisfactis thatanyimportant
intheriskofnuclearwaris conreduction
inthewaythegoverna fundamental
alteration
tingent
uponaccomplishing
mentsof theUnitedStatesand theSovietUnionrelateto eachother,and
whilesuchan imaginedtransformation
neednot necessarily
happenimor evenquickly,any rationalevaluationof theprospectsfor
mediately,
nucleardepthpsychology
oftheprodependsdecisively
uponone'sestimate
radical
babilityof discoveringa plausibleprocessof goal-directed,
scale.Forinteractionists,
thisrepsychological
changeon an international
quiresa politicalprocesswhichcan plausiblybe predictedto yielda
withinteractionist
psychological
changecommensurate
requirements.
Viewedschematically,
therearetwopossiblesourcesofpolitical
movementtowardradicalpsychological
transformation
soughtby theinteractionists.
Movement
occurfrom
inwhichradicalpopulist
thebottom-up,
might
Western
wouldbe emulated
inthenewnuclear
conepisodesinrecent
history
text.Theviewsofordinary
theneedfora newwayofthinkpeople,sensing
ing aboutnuclearwar and superpower
relations,
would,in thisimagined
butcompletely
infiltrate
Western
instance,
gradually
politicaland military
establishments.
Whenthisoccurs,Western
politicalleaderswouldasktheir
Sovietcounterparts
tojointheminhalting
thearmsrace.TheSoviets,relieved, wouldreciprocate.
onecanimagine
interactionist
Alternatively,
goalsbeingaccomplished
fromthetop-down.
In thisscenario,a leaderofa superpower
seizesa momentripefordrastic
relations
andtakesmeasures
which
changeinsuperpower
are unprecedentedly
unilateral
cutsin thenuclear
bold,perhapsincluding
ofweaponsdeemedbytheadversary
arsenal,ora freezeon thedeployment
to be particularly
usefulfora first-strike.
The leader'scounterpart
then
Of
one
can
the
and
course,
reciprocates.
imagine bottom-up top-down
apin manywaysand in different
Yetthese
proachescombining
proportions.
mustbe thebroadconstituents
of anyprocessof changeequal to thereof
the
interactionists.
quirements
The keyissue,however,
is whether
we shouldreasonably
expectsuch
to
lead
to
the
desired
results:
the
end
of
thearmsraceand
processes
actually
massivereduction
intheriskof nuclearwar.Theansweris thatweshould
atthisanswer
wemaynoticethatthefirst-blush
not,andinarriving
plausibiliof
the
interactionists'
ty
program
beginsto collapse.
formovement
fromthebottom-up:
Thereis abFirst,on theprospects
no evidence
thatgrass-roots
inthenuclearagehavehad
movements
solutely
theslightestimpacton thedirectionand intensity
of thenucleararmscompetition(Betts,1984). Quite thecontrary,in fact.In recentyears,forexam-
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of NuclearWar?
631
inthe
begunwithhighhopesandmuchfanfare
pie,theFreezeMovement,
to
into
demise
be
a
without
rapid
early1980s,appearsalready
passing
in sight(Klare,1985).
evena partialfreezeanywhere
anything
resembling
a writer
to
It is simply
a factthat,as YorickBlumenfeld,
verysympathetic
"Thepeacemovement
has had no
radicalnuclearpolitics,wroterecently,
visibleimpacton thescaleor speedof thearmsrace"(1985,p. 44). This
inthenuclearage and,unlessinterachasbeentrueofall suchmovements
find
a wayplausiblyto arguethatthefutureof bottom-up
tionistscan
will
transformationbetheinverse
ofthepast,there
isnoreasonforoptimism.
The sameholdstrueforthetop-down
approach.Thereis simplyno
forwhattheinteractionists
musttryto envisionand no reason
precedent
willbe set.MortonDeutsch,forexample,
tosupposea newprecedent
argues
ifonly
couldeventually
be eliminated
thatthesuperpower
psychopathology
"a bold and courageousAmericanleadershipwould take a risk for
toendthecrazyarmsrace"(1983,
peace...[and]announceitsdetermination
thelimiting
case so farof top-down
initiatives:
Presip. 23). Butconsider
on June10,1963,thattheUnitedStateswould
dentKennedy's
announcement
ofnuclear
thereafter
forego
atmospheric
testing
weaponsso longas theother
nuclear
didlikewise.
powers(theSovietUnionandGreatBritain)
Psychologist
CarlRogershasarguedthatthisboldmove,combined
withtheLimited
Test
Ban Treatywhichfollowed,
is theprototype
of thesortof processneeded
tobegintocurethepathological
superpower
relationship
(Rogers,1982,pp.
12-13).
Yet nothing
acremotely
resembling
anysuchradicaltransformation
In fact,theeventwhich
occurred.
contributed
mosttocreating
tually
probably
a needfora "thaw"in thecoldwar- theterrifying
Cubanmissilecrisisof
a significant
October,1962-wasalso,paradoxically,
pointoforiginforthe
nuclear arms competitionnow so greatlyfearedby nucleardepth
ForwhileoneSovietreaction
to thatnearmisswasa certain
psychologists.
amountofincreased
to President
receptivity
Kennedy's
proposalforan attestban,yetanotherwas probably
theinitiation
mospheric
(or at leastthe
ofa massive
Sovietnuclear
armsbuildup
that,a generation
acceleration)
later,
continues
unabated(Trachtenberg,
in
viewed
their
full
Thus,
context,
1985).
theeventsof 1963were,inrelation
tothegoalsoftheinteractionists,
utterly
be regarded
as a potential
equivocalandcannotplausibly
collectively
point
of departure
forendingthearmsrace.Theymayin facthavecontributed
moreto thecauseof it thanto someimagined
cure.
Limitations
ofspacedo notpermit
an analysisofwhythesuperpower
hasprovenso resistant
to changeandwhyitprobably
willconrelationship
tinueto frustrate
to
transform
in
it
fundamental
anyoneseeking
ways.But
areobvious:Thetwosocieties
somethings
inquestionhavedrastically
conand theconstraints
their
values;theirpoliticalsystems
flicting
governing
as to be renderedalmost
respective
decision-making
processesare so different
632
Blight
thereis evenevidencewhichsuggests
thattwo
mutually
incomprehensible;
hugeand powerful
hegemonic
powersliketheUnitedStatesandtheSoviet
Unionareboundto be verycompetitive
(McNeill,1982).Thesemustall be
of thelongstanding
and continuous
includedin anyplausibleexplanation
enmitybetweenthe superpowers.The point for the nucleardepth
noneof thishas changedor is likely
is that,contraEinstein,
psychologists
- inshort,
In fact,
tochange
hasnotchanged
everything
exceptourthinking.
- oursocialstructure
thetwomostsignificant
determinants
ofourthinking
and ourbiological
nation-state
case,theanarchical
(in thepresent
system)
- havehardly
drives
basicpremise
is simply
changedat all. Einstein's
wrong
andthatis whytheprogram
of nucleardepthpsychology,
whichis wholly
consistent
withthispremise,
is implausible.
Thequestionarises,finally,
as towhether
an approachtoreducing
the
causesof theriskof nuclearwaris conceivable
whose
deeppsychological
arebrighter
thanthoseofnucleardepthpsychology.
In myview,
prospects
themostresponsibly
answeris thatitremains
an openquestion.
optimistic
Yetthosepolitical
tooperateatthelevelofdeepcauses
psychologists
seeking
ofnuclearriskwillneedto facesquarely
an immense
thathasnot
problem
beenadequately
dealtwith,orscarcely
evenacknowledged,
bynucleardepth
It is this:The deeperintothecausalchainof international
psychologists.
relations
onewishesto lookformeansof reducing
theriskof nuclearwar,
thefurther
intothefuture
onemustlookinanticipation
ofpositive
results.
And thefurther
intothefuture
we look,thefuzzierourvisionbecomes,
becausethepresent
stateof ourknowledge
becomeslessrelevant
to future
because
those
worlds
become
harder
to
worlds,
progressively
imaginecorone
Not
that
should
avoid
to
look
both
necessarily trying
rectly.
deeplyand
for
few
believe
nuclear
will
deterrence
last
forever
and
thuswe
far,
people
mustsearchforplausible,lessriskyalternatives
to thepresent
reality
(see
Allisonetal., pp. 244-246).Butthedoublemoralforpsychologists
seeking
to contribute
to reducing
theriskofnuclearwarwouldseemto be this:The
levelof deepcausesis probablynottheplaceto begin;and nucleardepth
is inadequateforthetask,in anycase.
psychology
INTERMEDIATE PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES: CONSTRAINTS
ON THE RATIONALITY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING
Thosewhohavechosento attacktheproblemof nuclearriskat the
intermediate
levelbeginwithassumptions,
and
psychological
methodologies
fromthoseofthedepthpsychologists.
goalswhicharequitedifferent
First,
theinternational
of sovereignty
and competition
system
deploredbyEins-
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
Contribute
How MightPsychology
633
is simply
teinandhisfollowers
exist;superpositedas a given.Nation-states
riskexists
nuclear
nuclear
exists;
weaponsexist;therefore,
powercompetition
continue
to existforas farintothefuture
andwillprobably
as anyonecares
revolutionbut
is not a psychological
to look. The goal, therefore,
assist
in themanagewhichmight
knowledge
policy-makers
psychological
ofthoseatthemethodologies
mentof theriskof nuclearwar.Moreover,
intermediate
causestendnottowardthepsychotherapeutic
analogies
tacking
but towardbasic researchrelatedin
of thenucleardepthpsychologists,
variouswaysto decision-making.
levelis thatforeign
The basicproblemaddressedat theintermediate
likehumanbeingsgenerally,
arenotas rationalas wewould
policymakers,
likethemto be. The virtually
paradigmatic
approachis thusto determine
inspecific
thenatureandextent
to whichdecision-makers
situations
depart,
omniscient
or arelikelyto depart,fromperfectly
rational,
problem-solving
theidealandreality
andto suggest
waysinwhichtheenormous
gap between
mightbe closedslightly.
on problems
No oneworking
of constrained
in policyand
rationality
thatis morethanmarginal.
To
decision-making
expectsto havean effect
illustrate
of constructing
whatI'll call
whythisis so, considerthefantasy
a "foreign
to oversee
policyrobot"whichhas beendesignedspecifically
nuclear
for
that
is
where
would
be
most
policy,
perfect
rationality
appreciated
Becausethisrobotis thusa Benthamite
decisionbythemostconstituents.
makerforthenuclearage,I willcall him"Jeremy."
software
has
Jeremy's
beendesigned
inconsultation
withseveralexperts,
ofcourse.His deepstructuresfollowHans Morgenthau's
(1973) firstprincipleof foreignpolicy
"to
to
the
factual
rawmaterial
of foreign
analysis: givemeaning
policy,we
mustapproachpoliticalreality
witha kindofrationaloutline... presuming
always that ... [the statesman- Jeremy!]acts in a rational (i.e., power-
manner"(p. 119).
maximizing)
Butof course,ourrationalrobotcannotliveand conductpolicyby
meansof a mereoutline.Thus, we borrowfromdecision-theorist
and
Fischoff
Baruch
a
formakpsychologist
(1983) looselystructured
algorithm
ingrationaldecisions:
1.DefinetheProblem.Listthecomplete
setofdecision
options... andthecomplete
setof relevant
thatmayfollowfromthem...
consequences
2. EvaluateConsequences.
Determine
theattractiveness
oraversiveness
ofeachpossible
consequence.
3. AssesstheLikelihood
Ascertain
theprobability
ofthevarious
oftheConsequences.
possibleconsequences
beingrealized,bya reviewof availableevidence.
all thatone knowsand
option,bycombining
4. Decide.Choosea mostattractive
feelsabouta problem.
(p. 136)
relevant
tonuclear
willbe programmed
Thus,on alldecisions
weapons,
Jeremy
to make the rational,best possiblechoice. Design, procurement,
construc-
634
Blight
- on all
and foreign
bothdomestic
negotiations
tion,deployment,
strategy,
thesesubjects,thebestrationalchoicewillbe made.
we needa rationalobto whichgoal? Obviously
Butbest,according
We
our
rational
to
move
which
toward
policy. decide-perhapsrajective
L.
Alexander
not-that
George(1980)has providedthe
tionally,
perhaps
nuclear
decision
answer:a rational
policy,
foreign
policy,including
regarding
is
most
that
or
a
is oneinwhichone"chooses policy option
likelyto achieve
costandrisk"(p. 3). We nowhaveconstructed
at acceptable
interest
national
whose
rationaloutlinehas beendisaggregated
a robot
in ourimaginations
and he has beengivena rational
intoa rationaldecision-making
algorithm,
withall
ournationalinterest,
goal- to be surethateachdecisionmaximizes
policyrobot
possiblecostsand riskstakenintoaccount.Withourforeign
we
andpoliciesofimpeccable
decisions
incharge,withresulting
rationality,
not
war
would
nuclear
thata
ourconfidence
increased
wouldhavegreatly
ofhuman
orotherexamples
occurbecauseofmisperception,
rigidity
cognitive
in decision-making.
fallibility
thatnuclearwaris stillpossible
to realize,however,
It is important
of a nuclearsupera fullyrational,robotized
within
foreign
policyregime
withregard
omniscient
relatively
power.Why?BecausewehavemadeJeremy
andcalculational
realities
structural
topresent
power,butheis notomnipotent.Thatis,hewouldbe forcedto conductforeign
policyandmanagethe
theUnitedStatesand
underpresentconditions:
relationship
superpower
hostile
sometimes
SovietUnionarebothsovereign,
superpowers,
competitive,
ifusuallycovert,
andthethreatto use nuclearweaponsis an ever-present,
of foreign
instrument
policy.Riskofnuclearwarcan neverbe zeroinsuch
made
tousenuclear
threats
a world.Forexample,
weapons,
Jeremy's
implied
some
deterrence
and of achieving
of bolstering
withtherationalintention
as an intention
bytheadversary
maybe perceived
foreign
policyobjectives,
- either
a feltneedtogo first
togotonuclear
bycontrolled
war,thuscreating
escalationor by massivepreemption.
ofthepsychological
To thestudents
policywhofocus
aspectsofforeign
the
Einstein's
on intermediate
causes,
utopiaand Jeremy
post-revolutionary
the
trait:
neither
bears
an
essential
share
robot'sperfect
slightest
rationality
mustbemade.
totherealworldinwhichforeign
resemblance
policydecisions
tousethe
orBentham's,
Law, notEinstein's
prevails.Rationality,
Murphy's
constrained
is
Herbert
termpopularized
Simon, "bounded,"severely
by
by
notconstructed
hassimply
factors.
andexternal
bothinternal
First,evolution
of the
withtherequirements
us in a waythatis evenremotely
congruent
to
our
robot.
We
we
rational
for
just
decision-making assigned
algorithm
setofrelevant
accessto a "complete
thatpermits
do nothavetheequipment
and
or allpossibleoptions.CharlesLindblom(Braybrooke
consequences"
Lindblom,1963),a seminalfigureintheapplicationof theconceptof bound-
theRiskof NuclearWar?
How MightPsychology
to Reducing
Contribute
635
ed rationality
to politicaldecisionmaking,has capturedmarvelously
the
between
difference
problem
solvingbya fullyrationalalgorithm
qualitative
and whatI'll call "Murphy's
algorithm":
Dodging in and out of the unconscious,movingback and forthfromconcreteto
crawlchancehereand systemthere,soaring,jumping,backtracking,
abstract,trying
exploitsmening,sometimesfreezingon pointlikea birddog...[thedecision-maker]
tal processesthatare onlyslowlyyieldingto observationand systematic
description.
(p. 81)
Is thisfullyrational?It is not. But Lindblom'spoint,whichformsthe
foundation
forwhathe callsourpolicy"scienceofmuddling
psychological
itisnatural.
(Lindblom,
through"
1959),isthatwhileitmaynotbe rational,
It reallyis whatwe haveto workwith.Anystrategy
of improving
theraof
our
in
must
his
view
with
a
realistic
tionality
decision-making
begin
ap- whicharemany."Policy-makers,"
as psychologist
praisalofourdeficiencies
a glassdarkly'PhilipTetlock(1983)has putit,"seetheworld'through
the
have
of
created
the
international
scene"
through simplified
imagesthey
(p. 68).
Butboundson therationality
ofourdecision-making
arenotonlyinof
our
its
We
are also conternal,part
evolutionary
equipment
(or lack).
in our abilityto cooperateoptimallywithin
strainedby imperfections
andinstitutions,
suchas governments,
whichareaboveallelse
organizations
ofsocialdecision-making.
instruments
As Herbert
Simon(1983)hasrecent"weare notmonads"(p. 75). Foreignpolicy
ly and pointedly
emphasized
inparticular
isnotconducted,
forexample,
byhavingcitizens
(who'venever
choicetestwhichtheysubmitvia secretballot,to
met)fillout a multiple
be countedandacteduponbysomeonelikeourforeign
policyrobot.Quite
theopposite:foreign
smallgroups
policydecisionsare madebyrelatively
ofvarioussorts,eachwithdifferent
whoseacinterests,
goalsandtherefore
ofconsensus-building,
andso on,which
tivity
requires
processes
conformity,
further
erodeanyhopeforfullyrationalforeign
policy.
Whatdoesallthissumupto,withregard
tointermediate
psychological
causesofa potential
nuclearwar?Justthis:thatbyhavingdefined
a nuclear
waras supremely
eveninsane,andhavingstructured
ournuclear
irrational,
forces
so as toguarantee
thatanyrational
decision-maker
willseethesuicidal
of nuclearwar- havingdone all this,we stillhave no basis
foolishness
whatever
forconcluding
thatnuclearwaris anything
like"impossible."
In
Einstein
et al.'s. post-revolutionary
worldfederation?
In a worldof nationstatesruledbyrobot-like,
rationalactors?No, probably
noteven
perfectly
inthesefantasy-worlds
wouldnuclearwarbe impossible.
Andinouractual
to all weknowabouttheinternal
andexternal
constraints
world,according
on ourrationality,
wehavenojustification
whatever
forbelieving
thatnuclear
war is impossible.
636
Blight
It is of courseimpossible
to surveyall theexperimental,
clinicaland
In fact,
historical
relevant
to theboundedness
of ourrationality.
research
to a moderate-sized
forone
one cannotdo thisevenwithreference
library,
ofscientific
is
a
search
for
dimendefinition
this:
the
psychological
inquiry
abiliand
limits
of
the
bounds
of
our
rational
sions,extent,
problem-solving
But
for
which
the
flavor
of
research
common
ty.
general
psychological
by
to foreign
conconsenthas beendeemedrelevant
policydecision-making,
sultTableIV, whichis adaptedfromJ.P. Kahanetal.'s. (1983)remarkably
In it,onecan find
usefulRandNotecalled"Preventing
NuclearConflict."
famous
and
influential
of
documented
many
examples
proofthatforeign
makers
are
neither
saints
nor
but
often
robots,
close-minded,
policy
misperceiving,
"group-thinking",
conforming
people,andsomesuggestions
forimproving
theirrationality,
at themargins.
In keeping
withourfunctional
themultifaceted
howmight
orientation,
boundedness
of ourrationality
lead to nuclearwar?The possibilities,
unarelimitless.
Kahanetal. haveassembled
severaloftheminto
fortunately,
"A NewCubanCrisis,"inwhichmisperception
a lengthy
andbad
scenario,
abound(1983,pp. 18-21).It is plausible,
thoughlikeall detailed
judgment
scenariosfornuclearwar,quiteimprobable.
Moreconciseand thoughtin myview,is a trichotomy
of generic"paths"to nuclearwar
provoking,
theybelieve,correctlyI think,are consistentwithvarious sortsof
research:
psychological
incognitive
studies
1. Empirical
thatdecisionmakers
psychology
suggest
as deterrence
andmight
maynotalwaysbehaverationally,
theory
presumes,
actuallyescalatebeyonda crisisto nuclearwarforreasonsthatappearirrationalor illogical.
2. Studiesofbehavior
inexperimental
that,evenifboth
gamessuggest
sidesareactingrationally,
thesituation
andinessence
theymaymisperceive
maketherightmove,butforthewronggame.
3. Modelsofindividual
and smallgroupdysfunction
frompsychiatry
offer
a possiblefatalirony:Bothsidesmayactrationally
andbothsidesmay
thesituation,
butinthemistaken
beliefthattheotherside
correctly
perceive
the
one
side
take
a
actionthatresults
misperceives situation,
may
protective
in a warthatnobodywanted(1983,p. 18).
No wonder
theauthors
conclude
theirsurvey
that"thebehavioral
byasserting
sciences
a
basis
for
the
conclusion
that
a nuclearwarbetprovide
distrusting
weenthesuperpowers
is alreadyadequatelyprevented"
(1983,p. 18).
What,then,is tobe donetoreducetheriskofnuclearwar,a riskmade
on thecapacityof leaders
(presumably)
unacceptably
highby constraints
to makethekindof rationaldecisionsrequired
bythelogicofdeterrence?
In a generalway,theansweris obvious:Do whatis possibleto reducethe
immense
forrational
between
ourforeign
gapinthepotential
decision-making
whatsort
policyrobotand our actualforeignpolicymakers.But specifically,
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
637
of recommendations
havebeenmadebythemosteminent
students
of the
intermediate
causesofa potential
nuclearwar?TheyarelistedinTableIV:
interventions
and
suggestedby political scientists,game-theorists,
psychologists.
Butattention
shouldbe drawnnotonlyto thecontent
butalso to the
a formwhichmayultimately
render
formofthevariousrecommendations,
theextant
intermediate
ofavoiding
nuclear
warrather
psychology
completely
besidethepolicy-makers'
thantwelve
point.In TableIV, no fewer
suggestions
are madewhich,if appliedto decision-making
bodiesrelevant
to nuclear
reducetheriskofnuclearwarbyreducing
policy,would(onemaypresume)
theeffect
ofconstraints
on therationality
ofdecision-makers.
Thefirst
ten
begin,in turn,as follows:
1. Decisionmakersshould...
2. Decisionmakersshould...
3. ...decisionmakersshould...
4. Decisionmakersshould...
5. Assigna group...
6. ...organizations
should...
7. ...biasesshould...
8. Multipleadvocacyshould...
9. The executive
should...
10. Use cognitive
mapping...(Kahanet al., 1983,p. 33)
As thecompilers
ofthelistsuggest,
thehortatory
flavoroftheserecommendationsdisguises
an almosttotallackofimpactfromthebehavioral
sciences
Behavioralscientists
upon foreignpolicydecision-making.
are studying
decrements
inrationality;
conclusions
andmaking
lists
theyarealsodrawing
ofrecommendations.
But,so itappears,no oneatthepolicyendis listening.
In fact,theconclusions
of therecentRandsurveyof behavioral
research
on preventing
nuclearwarand alsothoseof a recentCarnegieCorporation
conference
Behavioral
(1984)devotedto thesametopicareidentical:
scientists,whatever
theymayknow,havemadeno headwayat all inaltering
the
processof foreign
policymaking.
makers
Whyis this?Why,if"decision
should,"do theynot?Thereare
to thedeepand perhapsinsurmanysortsof reasons,fromthesuperficial
mountable.
Thereport
theresults
oftheCarnegieConference
summarizing
notesseveraltraditional
facedbybehavioral
science:itis thought
problems
to be mushyand unreliable,
and ideological,
opinionated
and
jargon-ridden
and too complexto be fullyabsorbedby busypolicyincomprehensible,
makers(CarnegieCorporation,
1984,pp. 17-20).Theseareimportant
problemsbuttheyareessentially
practicalones.As thereportindicates,
practicalproblems
ofthissort,rootedlargely
insimple(butpowerful)
perceived
mutual strangeness,can perhaps be overcome by continuingeffortsby
to communicatein variouswayswithmembersof thepolicypsychologists
Table IV. Prescriptions
Intended
to Make ForeignPolicyDecision-M
Study
Jervis
(1968,
1976)
Measures
Prescriptive
IndividualLevelof Analysis
Decisionmakers
shouldrealizethatwhatmayseemunambiguo
is thatdecision
of thisrealization
of theirbeliefs;a consequence
to theirbeliefs.
examineevidencecontrary
shouldbe suspiciousiftheyholda positionin w
Decisionmakers
notlogically
in suchcas
connected
supportthesameconclusion;
forpsychological
comfort
and maynotbe basedon evidence.
Axelrod
(1976)
Beforean event,decisionmakers
shouldmakeassumptions,
belie
thatfollowas explicitas possible;thentheywillknowwhatto e
indicatethatbeliefsshouldbe reevaluated.
shouldbe taughthowto perform
Decisionmakers
map
cognitive
a simplemapis constructed,
moresophisticated
and complexma
thedecisionmaking
improve
process.
Group Level of Analysis
de Rivera
(1968)
Assign a group withinthe administrationthe task of constructi
This group should continueto play the "devil's advocate" role af
Jervis
(1968)
Individualsand organizationsshould be preventedfromlettingt
be tied to specifictheoriesand images; e.g., organizationsthatc
not realize the extentto whichthe definitionof theirrole is link
perceiveeventsand the world.
Conflictingbiases should be constructedwithinthe decisionmak
George
(1972)
MultipleAdvocacy should be institutedat the executivelevel, wh
makinggroup various people advocate a range of policy option
The executiveshould also definehis role as evaluatingand choo
person should be appointedto manage the system.
Axelrod
(1976)
Use cognitivemappingtechniquesto help groups finda commo
complex situation;this may help the group see the whole struct
Use techniquesto permitexpertsto distinguishtheirbeliefsabou
beliefsabout goals. This allows expertsto providesubjectiveopi
individuals.
640
Blight
Iftheseweretheonlyproblems,
simplehardworkand
makingcommunity.
bringa payoffin reducedriskof nuclearwar.
patiencewouldeventually
inthepathof
difficulties
Buttherearemuchdeeper,farlesstractable
scientists
tointervene
attheintermediate
levelofthecausabehavioral
seeking
tionof a potential
nuclearwar.Chiefamongtheseis thatwhichKahanet
recomnature
ofprevious
al. callintheirRandNote(1983)the"self-reflexive
mendations
drawnfromthebehavioral
sciences"
(p. 40). Thebasicproblem
istheveryperwhomustimprove
is this:"thedecisionmaker
decisionmaking
is to be improved"
et
son whosedecisionmaking
al.,
1983,p. 40).
(Kahan
behind
Itunpackstheproblem
Thisis farfrommerecleverdoubletalk.
of
behavioral
recommendathehortatory
form("decisionmakers
should")
tions.As Kahanetal. pointout,thepolicymaker's
maylegitimately
response
be something
like:"WhosaysI should?"or "WhyshouldI?" or "Whatis
All decisionmakersaredoubtless
convinced
wrongwithcurrent
practice?"
that
are
as
mostofthetime,as arebehavioral
scientists, they acting rationally
is thatin
willallow.Thefundamental
as circumstances
therefore,
problem,
do
not
theviewofpolicymakers,
recommendations
behavioral
appear
just
to foreign
to arisefroma context
whichis relevant
policy.Andtheydo not.
makesthisclearer:"Behavioral
thedirection
of theexhortation
Reversing
theadvice
suchdirectives,
scientists
should..."etc.To each sidereceiving
mustseempresumptuous
and irrelevant.
thebehavioral
scienceofdecision-making
Thegreatdivideseparating
fromnuclearpolicy-making
cannotplausibly
be attributed
tosomeinherent
inthepsychological
on sources
faultiness
research
itself.
Indeed,theliterature
oferrorandbiasindecision-making
is a largeandimpressive
one(see,e.g.,
Nisbetand Ross, 1980;Slovicet al., 1977;Tversky
and Kahneman,1974,
evidence
ofover-confidence,
oftrade-offs,
1981).Moreover,
nonrecognition
and beliefperseverance
is farfromlimited
to laboratory
studiesof college
studentsand has, in fact,been shownto applyto groupsas diverseas
andJacobson,
classroom
teachers
(Rosenthal
1968),basketball
(Tverplayers
and Rosnow,1969).
skyetal., 1985)andresearch
(Rosenthal
psychologists
These studiesdemonstrate
withquantitative
precisionthathuman
anddecision-making
is frought
withbiases,falsepresumpproblem-solving
thatrender
tions,andinadequate
procedures
manyofourconclusions
very
farfromtheobjectivefactswetakethemto be. Of course,thegoalofthis
is notsimplyto pointout howbiasedor deviouswe all are,but
research
to discover
intheprocesses
rather
theinvariants
reach
bywhichwereliably
mistaken
conclusions.
Oncesomeofthesefactors
areknown,
itis presumed
thattheirinfluence
can be reducedand theobjectivity
and overallquality
of our decision-making
concomitantly
improved.
The best-known
to applythemethodsand findings
of the
attempt
behavioralsciencedecision-making
to foreignpolicy-making
is thatof Irv-
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
Contribute
How MightPsychology
641
aboutthewayshebelieves
"groupextensively
ingJanis(1982).He haswritten
in groupstowardbiased and
think"-thetendencyof decision-makers
- can be (andhas been)an important
uncritical
compoopinionformation
Thereis littledoubtthatsuch a
nentof presidential
decision-making.
oftheBayofPigsfiasco
as Janishasshowninhisstudies
exists,
phenomenon
escalainthemassive
American
decisions
whichresulted
andofthenumerous
tion of the VietnamWar (1982, pp. 14-47,97-130).The difficulty,
acknowledged
byJanis,residesinthefailureof Janisand hiscolleaguesto
He writes
fromthelongand
haveanyimpacton politicaldecision-making.
ofa psychologist
whohastriedrepeatedly
andunsucfrustrating
experience
of
avoidgroupthink.
Hereis hissummary
to helpdecision-makers
cessfully
he has gotten:
thereactions
willbe directed
If yousuggest
a critical
at
analysissession,mostof thecriticisms
thegroupspirit.If youtrythedevil'sadvocaterole,theother
youfordisrupting
and
members
willactas ifyouweredisloyal.Ifyoutelltheothers
ofyourdiagnosis
ofgroupthink,
to resent
theyarelikely
yourpsychologizing
pointoutthesymptoms
We cannotbe very
becausetheyfeelyouareaccusing
themofbeingincompetent.
and Janis,1980,p. 208)
aboutthelikelihood
of success.(Wheeler
encouraging
Thuswe revisit,
in a morepersonaland poignant
way,thereflexivity
problem:"thedecisionmaker
whomustimprove
is theveryperdecisionmaking
son whosedecisionmaking
is to be improved"
(Kahanet al., 1983,p. 40).
Thisis an important
reasonwhyforeign
almost
hasremained
policy-making
to
the
ministrations
of
behavioral
scientists.
completely
impervious
The nearlyunanimous
to ig(ifimplied)decisionof decision-makers
noretheadviceof behavioral
scientists
is rooted-ormaybe rooted-ina
factor
farmoreimportant
thanmereprofessional
hubris.
Psychologist
Philip
Tetlockmakesthepointconcisely:
There is an enormous conceptual leap from the "relevant" research
literature...to...American-Soviet
relations.
The research
literatures
focuson probabilistic
relations
Thelawsbeingsoughtarestatistical
onesthat
amongvariables.
needto knowwhataretheintentions,
applyon theaverage.Policy-makers
perceptionsandcapabilities
ofa specific
ata specific
time.(Tetlock,
1983,p. 74)
government
This suggeststhat,whatevermay be discoveredor alreadyknownby
behavioralscientists
aboutdecision-making,
it is quiteunlikely
thatthis
willeversignificantly
reducetheriskof nuclearwar,simply
knowledge
becauseitcannotintrude
intothepolicymakingprocess.The fundamental
reasonforthisis thatpolicymaking
is notan appliedscience.Contrast
this
withclinicalmedicine,
whichrestson, and is to a greater
extentthanever
beforean application
Thisis nottrueof therelaresearch.
of,biomedical
tionbetween
behavioral
scienceand foreign
is
policymaking.The former
inmanyrespects
a science,thougha fairly
one;thelatteris an art.
primitive
Each grew up separatelyfrom the other and only one side-the
psychological-seems interestedin a rapprochement.
642
Blight
inprinciple,
thatbehavioral
Whatis thelikelihood
might,
psychology
likea basicscienceunderlying
becomesomething
andintimately
connected
I believe,
andexecution
ofnuclearpolicy?Theanswer,
withtheconstruction
low.The obstacleis notthemere(thoughpresently
substanis: Extremely
Itisrelated
ofreflexivity.
toTetlock's
pointabouttheuniqueness
tial)problem
ofthevariables
a foreign
andindividuality
but
policymakermustconfront,
in situations
it goesmuchdeeperintotheverynatureof decision-making
wherenuclearwarmayappearto be a liveoption.Everyone
acknowledges
mustbe awesometo contemplate
and momentous
to exthatsuchdecisions
havetendedtoconcludefromthesefacts
ecute.Yetbehavioral
psychologists
is thatstresswilloccurand that
thatthecentraldangerin suchsituations
willthusbecomefaulty,resulting
in decisionsto enact
decision-making
thantheyneedto be (see e.g., George,1980,pp.
policieswhichareriskier
47-49;Janis,1982,pp. 250-259;Lebow, 1987).
Butthisapproachfailsto addressa basiccharacteristic
of suchdecito confront
andtranscend
sions,whichis thattheyconstitute
attempts
profoundmoraldilemmas.In fact,theyare exemplars
of a conditionthe
ThomasNagelcalls a "moralblindalley...achoicebetween
philosopher
abominable
coursesof action...[with]
no wayto escape"(1979,p.
morally
the
For
essence
ofa nuclear
74; seealsoHoffmann,
1981,p. 81).
crisis,from
thestandpoint
of an American
or
Soviet
would
be the
chairman,
president
confrontation
witha setof policyoptions,all of whicharebelievedto rein theshortrunor thelong
quireraisingtheriskof nuclearwar,whether
run.No matter
whichwayhe turns,he facesincreased
riskof initiating
a
holocaustof unprecedented
and (in his own mind)totallyunjustifiable
In suchsituations,
decision-makers
areunlikely
to believethey
magnitude.
are at something
a
choice
in
a
behavioral
resembling
point
psychologist's
"decision
tree."Instead,thesituation
to lookmuchmore
theyareinis likely
likea "moralblindalley,"and it willlookthiswaynotbecausestresshas
their
distorted
andperception,
butbecausethatisthewayitreally
is.
cognition
Butletus takea concrete
instance
to bringhomethispointand concludethissection.In thedepthsof theCubanmissilecrisis,JohnF. Kentohavesaidthathebelieved
theprobability
ofwarbetween
nedyis reported
- thus,probably
thesuperpowers
nuclearwar- was"between
1 outof3 and
even"(Sorensen,
beensuggested
thatKennedy's
1965,p. 705).Ithasrecently
fractions
represent
merely
"hyperbole"
(Betts,1985,p. 66) andthatifKenbelieved
a preemptive
strike
nedy"really"
that,hewouldhaveordered
since,
benefit
to
giventhebalanceof forcesin thosedaysand thegreatrelative
theAmericans
ingoingfirst,
theonly"rational"
todo wouldhavebeen
thing
to strike,
to go to nuclearwar.According
to thisview,therefore,
Kennedy
did notreallybelievetheoddshe quoted.Or, ifhe did,his"irrationality"
savedtheworlda nuclearwar(Schelling,
1984).
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
643
But thereis anotherpossibleinterpretation,
one I preferand one which
is consistentwiththemoralimplicationsof Tetlock'simportantpoint. It is
this:Kennedybelievedthe odds werebetween1 in 3 and evenbut he chose
notto go to nuclearwar because his intuition,his ethicalvalues, his reflexive responsestoldhimitwas wrongto do so. Schematically,
whathe believed
he was doing was this: raisingthe risk of nuclear war in the shortrun
(via the"quarantine"of Cuba) in orderto preventgreaterrisksin thefuture
(due to even more dangerouscrises,say, in Berlin). This is reflectedin a
remarkhe made on October22, 1962, in the televisedspeechin whichthe
quarantinewas announced."The greatestdangerof all," thepresidentsaid,
"would be to do nothing"(Kennedy,1962,p. 809). Aftermakinghis initial
decisionto quarantineCuba, he took manystepsto ensurethatKhrushchev
understoodthathe, Kennedy,wantedto avoid a war withtheSovietUnion
at least as powerfully
as he wantedtheSovietmissilesremovedfromCuba.
Once the presidentand his advisersconcludedthatthe missilesmust
be removed(probablya correctconclusion,giventhehawkishpredilections
at that time of manypowerfulcongressmen,militaryadvisers,and most
Americancitizens),Kennedyfaced a classic, if inordinatelymomentous,
moraldilemma.The tensionwas betweenhis utilitariancalculationsregardingwhathe believedwould happento his foreignpolicy,and to American
security,if the missileswere allowed to remain,on the one hand, and on
theother,his absolutistbeliefthatit is fundamentally
wrongconsciouslyto
take stepswhichraise the riskof nuclearholocaust (see Nagel, 1979, pp.
53-74). Whatwouldhappenifhe did nothingwas, in hisview,unacceptably
bad, but whathe believedhe could not avoid doing was also reprehensible
to him.
about thismoraltensionin regardto the
Nagel has writtenpowerfully
dutiesof soldierswho findthemselvesin situationsseemingto call forthe
killingof noncombatants."It is," he writes,"perfectly
possibleto feelthe
forceof bothtypesof reasonverystrongly;in thatcase themoraldilemma
willin certainsituationsof crisisbe acute,and itmayappearthateverypossible courseof action or inactionis unacceptableforone reason or another"
(Nagel, 1979, pp. 54-55).
There is no doubt that PresidentKennedyfeltsome such moral tension verykeenlyduringthe Cuban missilecrisis.Accordingto RobertKennedy(1969), themoraldimensionsof nucleardecision-making
duringthose
13 days in October,1962,becomepreeminent
in thepresident'smind."The
thatdisturbed
himmost,"he said,"...was thespecterofthedeathofthe
thought
childrenof thiscountryand all the world-the youngpeople who had no
butwhose
role,whohad no say,who knewnothingevenof theconfrontation,
lives would be snuffedout like everyoneelse's" (p. 84). No matterwhich
available decisionthe presidentmade, he believedhe raisedtheriskof set-
644
Blight
whichwouldresult
inthewholesale
slaughter
tinginmotiona chainofevents
of innocents.
we can stillonlytryto imaginehowintensely,
Fortunately,
or Sovietchairman
an American
how morallydisturbed
would
president
becomeafterthefirstnuclearweaponis firedduringa superpower
crisis.
to
that
President
not
did
choose
to
Thus, say
Kennedy
preempt
during
themissile
crisisbecausehe wasirrational
is to missthefundamental
point:
Thereis moretogoodforeign
thansimply
maxpolicyanddecision-making
our
bounded
is
situation
And
when
imizing severely
rationality.
Every
unique.
thestakesapproach
theultimate,
warisbeingcontemplated,
as whena nuclear
inthestrict
itmaywellbe that"rationality"
sense,basedas itmustbe on probabilistic
to
comes
a
reduced
assumptions,
role,andthatthecapacity
play
to transcend
moral
dilemmas
becomes
Our fun(essentially)
paramount.
in
damental
such
situations
therefore
not
to
be
thatourleaders
worry
ought
willbecomeirrational,
but ratherthattheymaylose touchwithdeeply
embedded
moralinhibitions
whichmaybe required
to holdincheckcertain
decisionsrequired
of expected
valuecalculations
bytheresults
(see Blight,
whether
thosepsychologists
whobelieve
1986a).Thusonewonders
theyknow
abouteliminating
theintermediate
causesofnuclearwarcan,the
something
in thepresent
circumstances,
speakto policymakersand be heard.
PRECIPITATING PSYCHOLOGICAL CAUSES:
CRISES AND THE DRIFT TOWARD INADVERTENT
OR ACCIDENTAL NUCLEAR WAR
whohasevercommitted
to printon
Practically
everyone
anythoughts
riskof nuclearwartakesforgranted
theinitialrisk,itrises
that,whatever
- whenthreats
in a crisis
to vitalinterests
seemgrave,when
precipitously
to thethreats
all appearto be riskyand whentimeto
plausibleresponses
decideis shortandshirinking
weknow
(Lebow,1981,pp. 10-12).Intuitively,
thismustbe correct,
forall thesecharacteristics
of an international
crisis
cannothelpbutfurther
ina drastic
anddangerous
the
boundconstrain,
way,
ed rationality
of ourdecisionmakers.
wealsoknowthata fundamental
reasonwhycrisesaremore
Intuitively,
and dangerous
than"normal"
timesis thatdecisionmakers,
unpredictable
all mustfunction
understress.In fact,attention
to
groups,and machines
theeffects
of stresson decisionmakingin a crisishas beenthevirtually
tothesubjectofpoliticalcrises.There
paradigmatic
psychologists'
response
is a largeliterature
onthesubject,fromhumanandanimalpsychology,
from
biomedical
and
from
a
rich
anecdotal
store
house
filled
with
the
research,
storiesof thosewho survivedstressful
crisesof everyimaginable
sorttoglobal(Coelhoetal., 1974;HolstiandGeorge,1975;Janis,1982,
personal
pp. 250-259).Yet I havechosento definetheproper"psychological"
domain
How MightPsychology
Contribute
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
645
ofa policy-relevant
intoprecipitating
causesofnuclearwarwithout
inquiry
reference
to stressand itsinfluence
on decision-making.
on stressandcrisisis a directanalog
The reasonis this:Theliterature
that
thebulkofpsychologists'
totheliterature
ondecision
making constitutes
into
the
efforts
to reducenuclearrisksbyintruding
policyprocessat theinI
have
intruded
have
not
termediate
level.But,as
much,and
argued,they
to
whatever
"off-the-shelf"
forgood reasons.The sameargument
applies
on stressand crisis.
one mightderivefromtheliterature
policysuggestions
wish
and psychiatrists
My conclusionis thusthatif we psychologists
tounderstand,
toinfluence,
thepolicy-making
realistically
perhaps
eventually
in criseswhenriskis
nuclearweapons- and especially
processregarding
- thenwemustturnawayfrom
ourshelvesandstrike
outina new
greatest
A briefoutlineof one possibleroutein thatnew direction
direction.
is
in thefollowing
sketched
section.
ofthepresent
Liketheorientation
section,itfollowsfromtheseprinciples:
1. PolicyAutonomy.
Nuclearpolicymakingand decisionmakingis
a craftuntoitself,a kindofartformor skill.It is not,andis notregarded
a poorlyappliedbehavioralscience.
as, merely
byitspractitioners
2. PolicyPrimacy.
ofnuclearpolicymakers
Theintegrity
as suchmust
If one hopesto havea salutary
be respected.
impacton theirwork,itmust
be they,not we psychologists,
who definethe relevantpsychological
questions.
3. PolicyIntegration.
with
Onlybytrulywelding
policyrequirements
is a behavioral
orclinician
scientist
psychological
insights
likelytoinfluence
thepolicyprocessdirectly.
The remainder
ofthissectionis thusan attempt
to understand
whatI take
to be thepolicyand decisionmakers'relevant
in
"psychology" whatseems
to all concerned
to be a nuclearcrisis:one in whichit becomesobviousto
leadersthatnuclearwar,longheldto be highly
all pertinent
improbable,
evenbarelypossible,now has attachedto its occurrence
a risingset of
estimated
probabilities.
Plainly,nuclearwaris believedto be a finite,
parenumerable
number
ofdecisions
tially
away.Whatsortof"psychology,"
then,
is mostrelevant
to theexperience
of beingin sucha situation?
We beginbycircling
roundagainto thecentraldilemma,
theonethat
we
cannot
rest
because
we
have
robust
mutual
deterrence.
That
implies
just
our
efforts
to
deter
have
"inrendered
a
nuclear
war
is, though
initiating
and
therefore
it
sanely"suicidal,
improbable,mayhappenanyway,
especially
ina crisiswhentheboundaries
ofourleaders'
rationality
maybecomeseverely
constricted.
This,then,is one form-a primitive
one, to be sure-of the
in sucha superpower
issueinvolved
crisis:We wantto under
psychological
stand the evolutionof the beliefthat escalatinga conventionalwar to the
withnuclearweaponsina theretofore
nuclearlevel,or preempting
nonmilitary
646
Blight
crisisisthebest,mostrational-appearing
optioninspiteoftheextraordinarily
in a calamitywithoutmeaningful
risk
that
either
act
would
usher
high
precedent.
We notedinTableI thatmostforeign
policy-makers
regardthesetwo
as
most
to
a
nuclear
war:
escalation
andpreemppaths
likely produce major
both
in
a
crisis.
Thesearetwoexamples
tion,
(bydefinition)
occuring deep
ofthegeneralproblemofwhathas cometo be lumpedtogether,
as a rule,
and calledinadvertent/accidental
in a crisis.Since
nuclearwar,occurring
thisproblemis oftendrastically
we mustremind
ourselves
misunderstood,
ofthecentral
Itis notlunacyormechanical
failure
ofstress,
oreffects
worry.
eventhough
ofeachoftheseoccurring
theprobability
ina deepcrisismust,
be higher
thanitis undernormalconditions.
the
Rather,
generally
speaking,
central
factisa beliefthatitisrelatively
tostrike
psychological
advantageous
insomemeasurewithnuclearweapons,andtheconviction
to followup on
thebeliefwitha decisionto launch,eitherbyescalating
or bypreempting.
ThomasC. Schelling
and MortonHalperin(1969)madetheessential
conceptual
pointmanyyearsago aboutthedangerof "nuclearaccidents":
"theproblem...," in theirview,"is notsolelyone of preventing
the'accidents,'
it is equallyor more,one of forestalling
thekindsof decisionsthatmight
lead to waras a resultof accidents... Accidental
waris madepossibleby
thebeliefthatifwaroccurs,itis better
to go first"
accor(p. 48). Likewise,
nuclearwar:"What
dingto Schelling
(1983),withwhatwecall"inadvertent"
weshouldmeanbyinadvertent
waris a seriesofstepsthatinadvertently
get
onesideortheotherintothepositionwhereitadvertently
launchesa large
number
ofnuclear
theotherside"(p. 123).Thecentral
weaponsagainst
issue,
in short,is one of belief:How shouldwe tryto characterize
theevolution
of beliefwithin
a superpower
crisisthatpermits
a decisionto go to major
nuclearwar?
Whatwouldbe thedimensions
or categories
of thisbelief,generally
speaking?AlexanderL. George(1984) has recently
provideda useful
canonicalformforsucha belief,or setof beliefs.The beliefthatnuclear
believedto be insane,was "worthit" would,according
to
war,normally
consist
of
three
George,
parts:
1. a beliefthatthecrisishasgotten
outofcontrol,
thatcooperation
incrisismanagementhas brokendownand cannotbe restored;
2. a beliefthatwarhasbecomevirtually
thatitis time-urgent
to decide
inevitable,
whatto do; andthatone'schoiceis restricted
to accepting
a first-strike
or going
firstoneself;and
3. a beliefthatthereis a premium
on goingfirst.(p. 230,italicsadded)
I believeGeorgeis correct
in asserting
thatoncetheseconditions
had been
fulfilledin a leader or leadershipcontrollinga significant
nucleararsenal,
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of NuclearWar?
647
thenthepsychological
fornuclearwarwouldbe met,deterrence
prerequisite
wouldfailand nuclearwarwouldcommence.
But,ofcourse,oncethisstagehas beenreached,nuclearwarreallyis
it believesthat
inevitable,
justbecausesomeonewiththepowerto initiate
weshoulddirectour
itis,andalsothathemuststrike.
therefore,
Naturally,
ofinitiation
attention
notto themoment
ofnuclearwar,but
psychological
- thatisto say,estimated
beliefs
risksofnuclear
totheevolution
ofrelevant
- during
tocertain
events
a nuclear
crisis.
timesandinresponse
war,atcertain
Ourgoaloughtto be this,inmyview:to learnenoughabouttheseevolving
beliefpatterns
to thepointwhereonemightbeginto speakin an informed
ininformed
wayaboutwaysto managethem.Thatis, a psychologically
ina superpower
tervention
crisisoughtto helpprevent
theonsetinall releof George'sthreefatalbeliefs.
vantleaderships
forcrisismanageWhatthisamounts
toisthepsychological
foundation
thatis, successful
crisis
ment,at thenuclearlevel.Viewedpsychologically,
theonsetof beliefswhichcollectively
is theartof preventing
management
to nuclearwar,all thewhileone seeksto exploit
theprerequisite
comprise
thesituation
so as to maximize
enwhatever
foreign
policygoalswarranted
thebasic
tryintothecrisisin thefirstplace. Georgehas statedconscisely
ofcrisismanagement,"
whathecalls"thebasicparadoxanddilemma
tension,
thatmakethiscritical
so
difficult
to practice
sucenterprise excruciatingly
cessfully.
The paradoxis thatthereneedbe no crisisifonlyonesideis willing
to foregoits
andacceptdamageto theinterests
at stake.Thedilemma,
in turn,arises
objectives
from
a desire
todowhat
toprotect
one'smostimportant
interests
maybenecessary
costsandrisks.
but,at thesametime,to avoidactionsthatmayresultinundesired
canbeusefully
defined
as embracing
thetaskofresolvIndeed,"crisis
management"
ingthispolicydilemma.(1984,p. 224)
As Georgeseesit,thisdilemma
is thusduefundamentally
to"theoftencomof
force
and
the
useful
and
inpetingrequirements
diplomacy,"
purposeful
of
which
is
in
his
view
so
difficult
and delicatethat"crisis
tegration
willremainan art- and a difficult
artat that- ratherthana
management
science"(1984,p. 224).
texture
to George'sremarks,
I thinkwe
Byaddingsomepsychological
can see whythisis so. In entering
intoa crisis,andin themanner
in which
leadersproceedthrough
it,their
goalis,inan important
sense,tomanipulate
thebeliefsoftheadversary
controloftheirown
and,inso doing,maintain
beliefs.As Georgesuggests,
ittakesat leasttwoadversaries
withcompeting
to createa crisis;a nuclearcrisisthusrequires
interests
theinvolvement
of
bothsuperpowers.
Thepsychological
stimulus
foreachside'sentrance
would
be thebeliefthattheotherside'sleadership
maybelieveitcan in someimitsopposite's
vitalinterests.
Thusa crisisis
portant
waydiminish
perceived
648
Blight
wheneachleadership
decidesitwantstheotherto believethat
precipitated
willnotbe permitted
a "dove'serror"(or faileddeterrence)
inthisinstance.
Oncesucha crisishasbegun,however,
onemustseekin thatdynamic,
situation
to balancerisksof a dove'serrorand a
tension-packed,
evolving
hawk'serror(failedreassurance).
In themidstof a nuclearcrisis,in fact,
thegreatfearmustbecomea "spiral"
ofhawk'serrors;
thatis,theprogressive
oftheestimated
of theotherleadership's
escalating
probability
willingness
to risknuclearwarto achieveitsobjectives,
and theresulting
responseof
of one'sownwillingness
to go to nuclearwar,and
raisingtheprobability
so on untilone believestheothersidebelieves(or is aboutto believe)war
is inevitable
andso decidestogo first,
perhapsto"signal"resolveortolimit
damage.
In orderthatsuchbeliefs,
thusnuclearwar,be avoided(without
one
sideortheothersimply
itsinterests
andgetting
surrendering
out)theremust
be someconsiderable
between
thebeliefs,
andhighly
degreeofcoordination
dovishand hawkishintentions,
of one leadership
and those
contradictory
oftheother.Anyonewhohasplayeda gamelikeMonopoly
orpokerrealizes
howextraordinarily
difficult
it is in thosecircumstances
to be certainthat
to theactual(notimagined)
intentions
and
one'sactionsaretruly
responses
oftheotherplayers.Butwhenhugeand complexgovernments
capabilities
in a crisisthatcouldlead to nuclearwar,thestakesare immense
interact
and"communication"
takesplacemainly
viamilitary
movesanddiplomatic
and thesituation
is of coursemuchmoreconfusing.
initiatives,
thatbothsuperpowers
wouldin sucha crisiswishsincerely
Assuming
and powerfully
to avoida nuclearwar,thegreatfearat therootof worry
overinadvertent/accidental
nuclearwarin a crisisis psychological:
fearof
theoperational
results
ofmisperception,
whichleadstomisappraisal,
faulty
andinappropriate
decisions,
actions,all ofwhichtrigger
(andarereinforced
in an adversary.
The psychological
by) similarprocesses
problemof crisis
is
thus
not
management
verysimply
putthough easilysolved:howtoobtain
a moreaccurateappraisalofthebeliefsandintentions
and
oftheadversary
howto communicate
to theadversary
moreaccurate,ifstillcontradictory,
andintentions.
descriptions
ofone'sownbeliefs
Operationally,
George(1984)
has providedsevenprinciples
whichin hisview,ifadheredto, wouldhelp
to bringaboutmoreaccuratecommunication
of beliefsin a crisis.Briefly
described,
theyare as follows:
1. Maintainpoliticalcontrolovermilitary
moves.
2. Slowdownmilitary
movements.
Createpauses.
3. Coordinate
actionand diplomacy.
military
4. Makethreats
of forceconsistent
withdiplomatic
objectives.
5. Avoidgivingtheimpression
thatone is aboutto launchlargescalewar.
6. Showa desirefora negotiated
solution.
7. Leavetheadversary
a satisfactory
wayoutof thecrisis.(p. 226)
How MightPsychology
Contribute
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
649
At firstglance,sucha listmaylook likethelistof itemscollectedfrom
intheprevious
section
what"decision-makers
should.
suggesting
psychologists
*
." and should not do. But the two listsare onlysuperficially
similar.For
andtherefore
rather
irthepsychologists'
listis thoroughly
andintrusively,
relevantly,
prescriptive.
thepurposeofGeorge's
Butthisisveryfarfrom
list,whichis "prescriptive"onlyinthetrivialsensethathe believespolicymakerswhosucceedin
willsucceedin resolving
thosewho
itsrequirements
criseswhereas
fulfilling
is thatit is descriptive
do notwillfail.The significant
in
feature,
however,
of whatpolicymakersactually
a summary
believe
thesensethatitprovides
oftheactualgoalsofacto do; itis a variegated
description
theyaretrying
nuclearcrisis,whoactualpolicymakersinan actual(though
hypothetical)
thecrisisto their
tuallywishto avoida nuclearwarwhilealso manipulating
or at leastavoidingtheimpression
of havingbeenbestedbythe
advantage,
otherside.
Willcrisismanagement,
thisartform,reallyworkwhenthenuclear
is verycautiousand farfrom
chipsare downnexttime?Georgehimself
aboutpredicting
a positive
outcome.Thereareafterall,he notes,
sanguine
oftransforming
forceintoa highly
"severelimitson thepossibility
military
instrument
ofdiplomacy
in
andcoercive
refined,
discriminating
bargaining
crisissituations"
(1984,p. 224).Manyothersapparently
agree,fortherehas
beena flurry
ofactivity
directed
atestablishing
institutional
lately
"guarantees"
thata nuclearcrisiswillneverspinout of control.A recentreportto the
UnitedStatesArmsControland Disarmament
Agency(Uryand Smoke,
for
a
recommends
"Nuclear
Crisis
ControlSystem,"
con1984), example,
of
such
features
as
a
sisting
Force,"a
"RapidDeployment
Peacekeeping
crisis
control
seminar
and
"risk
nuclear
reduction"
talks
presidential
regular
between
thesuperpowers.
Theseandothermeasures
haveas theirfundamental purposebetter,
moreaccuratecommunication
of beliefsand intentions
in a crisis.Crisismanagement
in its manyformshas becomea thriving
untoitself(Ury,1985).
discipline
Butwillit work?RichardNed Lebow,a leadingstudent
of internationalcrisesisveryskeptical.
Hisargument
hasconsiderable
force.Paraphrasthewholeenterprise
of crisis
inghismainpoint,Lebowwonderswhether
isn'tsimply
aninadvertent,
fear-driven
intothemuch
management
backsliding
relations.
Thatis, all the
maligned"rationalactormodel"of international
toenhanceaccurate
comdevices,andschemes
myriad
procedures,
designed
in a crisisrequirefortheirrelevance
munication
theparticipation
ofcalm,
rationalleaderswhounderstand
is wortha majornuclear
fullythatnothing
warso,iftheycanjustkeepreminding
oneanother
oftheir
"rational"
beliefs,
willeventually
workout alright.
everything
650
Blight
Is this a plausibleassumption?Lebow (1983) doubts it, citing
"RationalitheCubancrisisas evidence.
Khrushchev's
erratic
behavior
during
ty,"accordingto Lebow, "...simplycannotbe reconciledwithKhrushchev's
had no plausiblereasonsforquestioning
Kennedy's
policy... Khrushchev
to keepoffensive
commitment
weaponsout of Cuba" (p. 451). He goes
beyondthis,indeed,to arguefora kindof psychoanalytic
"expose"ofthe
Itmay,according
toLebow,be simply
wholeenterprise
ofcrisismanagement.
a "defense"
madenecessary
thatirrational
bythefactthat"thepossibility
couldresultina nuclearwaris frightening"
(1981,p. 298).
decision-making
theLord's
LikeFreud'spatient
calledthe"RatMan,"whoendlessly
repeated
thefrightening
to masterhisfearof rats,Lebowsuggests
Prayerin trying
of
specterof hordesof crisismanagers
citing"reasons"fortheresolution
the Cuban crisis,and earnestly
and fearfully
buildingdeviceswhereby
reasonable
viewsinsomefuture
crisis,wheninfactno
peoplecanexchange
one knowswhyKhrushchev
entered
or exitedfromCuba,and thusno one
knowson thebasisof thatexperience
howto plan fornexttime.
I think,
It is unnecessary,
to followLebowall thewayto hisFreudian
inorderto appreciate
andapparently
nihilistic
conclusion
whatI taketo be
hiscentralpointof psychological
It is roughly
this:We know
importance.
abouttheevolutionary
andobjective
content
ofthebeliefs
verylittle
patterns
aboutriskofnuclearwarheldbyleadersduring
a nuclearcrisis.Thisis true
notonlyofKhrushchev
andtheRussians
butalsoofAmerican
leaders.What
- interviews,
wehavearedocuments
andso on- whichmaybe of
memoirs,
butwhichareofverylimited
usefulness
tothosewho
greatinterest
generally
wouldseektobuildsomething
likea psychological
forcrisis
knowledge-base
as
I
in
have
tried
to
crisis
consists
For,
management.
argue,
management
thesuccessful
of
own
beliefs
and
that
of
the
one's
management
adversary
insituations
ofextraordinary
contradiction
andconfusion.
Funcomplexity,
in
a
nuclear
war
such
circumstances
would
be
traceable
to
a
belief,
damentally,
one whichhad evolvedovertimeand in responseto a bewildering
variety
ofvariables,
thatnuclearwarwas"worth
it."Thus,fromthepsychological
I
am
the
of
crisis
is thebalanced
perspective proposing, goal
management
a
of
beliefs
aboutriskof
crisis,
management,
through deep superpower
nuclearwar.
Butwhatdo weknowaboutthisdomain?Do wepossessa systematic
- events,
of theobjectivereferents
activities,
description
messages-which
stimulated
leaders
to
raise
or
lower
their
beliefs
aboutrisksofnuclear
actually
war?Do we knowanything
aboutthepattern,
or patterns,
consequential
inwhichsuchbeliefs
evolve
crises?
Do wehaveanysystematic
actually
during
evidence
American
leadersintheCubanmissile
crisis
on,say,whether
bearing
basedtheirevolving
beliefsmainly
on messages
fromMoscow,navaloperations,intelligence
reports,domesticpoliticalconcerns,actionsof mistrusted
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
651
oranyofthehundreds
orperhaps
thousands
ofotherpossibilities?
colleagues,
oftheperceptual
likea mapofthecontent
Do wehaveanything
landscape
innuclearcrises?Have wethought
ofdecision-makers
aboutwhat
usefully
bestpermit
theoperasortoftransparent
methodologies
might
psychological
incrisestobe assembled,
ofdecisionmakers
tionalfieldofconcern
ordered,
Do wehavea handleon therawexperience
ofnuclearcrises
anddescribed?
itssalientinto allowpotential
"crisismanagers"
to understand
sufficient
in accordancewith
theirdevicesand techniques
variantsand to construct
thisexperience?
It seemsto metheanswerto all thesequestions
is "no"andthatuntil
is madein providing
somesignificant
a psychological
progress
knowledgebase forcrisismanagement,
wecannotsaywithanyconfidence
thatLebow
is wrong.We cannotclaimto havegathered
systematically
anydatawhich
on which,according
bearon thedimension
to all accounts,all therelevant
actionwillbe nexttimenuclearwarandnuclearpeaceareon
psychological
theline:theformation,
and evolution
of beliefsaboutriskof
alteration,
nuclearwar.
A SKETCH OF A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR
I believe,withmanyothers,
thatavoidingnuclearwaris themostimofourtime.As a psychologist,
I do notbelieve
portant
publicpolicyproblem
andI havecontributed
toitssolution,
whichmust,
mycolleagues
significantly
in myview,consistofpiecemealattempts
to understand
thedimensions
of
theriskofnuclearwarandthento suggest
thatrisk.I do
waysof reducing
notbelievethatreducing
theriskofnuclearwarisprimarily
a psychologists'
as a psychologist,
I do tendto frametheissueso as to
problemalthough,
makecertain
psychological
aspectsoftheproblem
appeartobe basic.Failure
on thepartof psychologists
and psychiatrists
to entermorefullyintothe
construction
ofthecentral
policymakers'
aspectsofnuclearrisklay,itseems
to me,behindourtendency,
at thelevelof intermediate
especially
causes,
towardsolutions
wepluckoffourownshelvesbutwhicharenoteasilyinintothepolicymakers'modusoperandi.It has also led, I think,
tegrated
toutopianschemes
as solutions
tothedeeppsychological
putforward
causes,
solutions
whichfailtotakeadequately
intoaccount
either
thehistorical
record
or politicalreality.
Thegreatconcern
ofnuclearpolicymakersis witha crisisbetween
the
Butnuclearcrisesare notwellunderstood;
in fact,thesort
superpowers.
thateveryonefearsis withoutprecedent,forit is imaginedto precipitatea
652
Blight
devastation.
Becausecrisesarepoormajornuclearwarandunprecedented
- psychologically,
as evolving
belief-states
- crisismanagement,
lyunderstood
whichmayatsomefuture
thelastshredofhopeforavoiding
pointrepresent
a nuclearwar,seemsto meto lackalmostcompletely
a relevantly
useful,
psychological
knowledge-base.
I cannotprovidesucha base here,or anywhere
else,on myown.It
I wantmerely
to try
is a largetask.In thisconcluding
section,therefore,
an attitude
and theunderlying
to suggesta certaindirection,
assumptions
of a kindof psychological
approachthat,it seemsto me,allowstheprothepolicymakers'focus,but
blemofavoidingnuclearwartoremainwithin
whichnevertheless
thepsychologists'
invites
assistance.
Theremaybe other
thisistheonewhichseemstomemost
waysto meetthesetwinrequirements;
promising.
We shouldbegin,I believe,bytakingseriously
Lebow'scriticism
of
It maybe a kindoffantasy,
a rationalistic
crisismanagement:
shieldagainst
an irrational
too fearful
to confront
head-on.Equally,ofcourse,it
reality
maynotbe. Butto theextentthatourbeliefsaboutthepotential
efficacy
of crisismanagement
arebasedon wishes,on ourinterpolating
intoourignorancea modelofrational
actorsactingtheirparts,thentothat(unknown)
wearenotpreparing
forthedaywhenwe maynexthave
extent
adequately
to managea deepcrisisbetween
thesuperpowers.
It is hardto determine
whereLebowwishes
totakeuswithhisprescient
hemeans
argument;
perhaps
to saythatcrisismanagement
be
If
this
conclusion
may impossible. true,
wouldbe verydisturbing,
forobviousreasons:One hardlyknowswhereto
proceedfromtheimplied
equationofcrisisequalsirrationality
equalsallbets
are off.
Thusweneedto findsomemiddleground,
on whichwecanappreciate
thatcrisismanagement
well
be
may
inadequately
bypsychological
supported
is amenableto meliorative
solutions.Several
facts,butthatthissituation
First,itmakesno senseto replace
pointsmustbe madeinitially.
conceptual
a "rational
actor"modelwithan "irrational
actor"model.As thephilosopher
JonElster(1979)has observed:
in orderto gathertheveryevidenceon whichrationality
could be deniedin thecase
of a givenindividual,we mustassumehimto be rationaliftheoutwardlyobservable
behaviouris to be translatableinto evidence.Irrationalbehavioronlymakes sense
againsta backgroundof rationality.(p. 154)
it is certainly
notmandatory
to assumethat"rationalacRelatedly,
tors"areperfectly
rational.
ourforeign
Jeremy,
policyrobot,maybeperfectly
butimperfect,
sometimes
is therulein
rational,
quiteimperfect,
rationality
humanactionof all sorts.Whatdistinguishes
humanaction,therefore,
is
notthatit is perfectly
forthereprobablyis no suchthing,but
"rational,"
rather
thatitis intentional.
Part- notall,certainly,
butpart- ofthevariabili-
Contribute
to Reducing
theRiskof NuclearWar?
How MightPsychology
653
our
ourmotives,
tyin humanbehavioris accountedforbyourintentions,
are
beliefs
consciousgoals.Intentions,
which,
moreover, shapedby
though
ofevents,
on ourimperfect
arenevertheless
basednecessarily
interpretations
ofhumanaction.Somephilosophers
realmotivators
thispoint
tryto convey
causes.
that
reasons
are
by saying
we should,betThuswe neednotchoose,as Lebowseemsto suggest
is possible,and
weena viewwhichholdsthatrationalcrisismanagement
Thisis basedon
one (perhapshisview)whichholdsthatit is impossible.
a
as
whether
made
decision
to
falsely
simplistic
peopleareperfectly
having
are
theirintentions
rationalor not.Theyare not.Buttheyare intentional,
on
and
actions
taken
this
basis
are
to
some
extent
caused
basedontheir
beliefs,
of beliefs
by thedecisionto act upon theconcatenation
psychologically,
Withregardto oursubjectmatter,
nuclearcrises,
oneholdsat themoment.
a propergoal forthepsychologist
is, in myview,to tryto getas closeas
and(then)thepatterning
ofthebeliefs
possibletotheparticularity,
diversity
aboutriskof nuclearwar,as theyevolveovertimein a superpower
crisis.
As a hypothetical
illustration
of whatI am driving
at, letme return
to theexampleofPresident
beliefthat,inthedepthsof
Kennedy's
putative
theCubanMissileCrisis,theriskof warwiththeSovietUnion- andthus,
nuclearwar- was"between
1 outof3 andeven"(Sorensen,
1965,
probably
either
orcovertly,
to applya rigid
p. 705).Now,ifoneis concerned,
overtly
standardof profit-maximizing
thenperhapsone wouldwishto
rationality
concludethatKennedywas eitherlyingor "irrational."
But if we simply
assumethatKennedy
believedit,butthatas outsiders
we areunsurewhat
thesefractions
had forhim,thenwe neednotcall Kennedy
a liar
meaning
or irrational
and we neednotconcludethatWestern
civilization
was saved
cold comfort
foraspiring
In
crisismanagers).
by "irrationality"
(certainly
Insteadweoughttousewhatever
fact,weoughttotrynottoassumeanything.
meansareavailabletotrytounderstand
whatthefractions,
andthereby
some
of themissilecrisis,meantto one of itstwomostsignificant
fraction
parInsteadof concluding
we
cited
fractions,
ticipants.
fromKennedy's
ought
to tryto moveintothesubjective
worldofbeliefsandintentions
inwhich,
and byvirtueofwhich,thefractions
forthepresident.
drewtheirmeaning
What I have finallygottenroundto, then,is issuinga call fora
withwhichto addresspotentialprecipitating
phemenological
psychology
causesof a majornuclearwar (Blight,1987).We need,in otherwords,
- suchas "thebehaviorwasrational
lesseffort
at explaining
crisisbehavior
it
and
more
effort
at
thephenomenal
worldofthe
(or wasn't)"describing
in
decisions
of
war
nuclear
and
nuclear
participants
peace.
I am reminded
byall thisof one of thecentralironiesof thehistory
ofmydiscipline,
Mosthistorians
datethefounding
ofscientific
psychology.
psychology(at least in America),withthe publicationof WilliamJames's
654
Blight
in1890.Theveryfirst
ofthatmassive
sentence
work
Principles
ofPsychology
is: "Psychology
is theScienceof MentalLife,bothof itsphenomena
and
oftheirconditions"
andthe
(James,1890,Vol. 1, p. 1). Withthissentence
whichfollowed
inthosevolumes,
1400pagesofunpacking
phenomenological
founded.
Mentallife,whatitisandwhatitisabout:
was,ineffect,
psychology
forgenerations
thesebecametheobjectsofattention
ofpsychology
all over
Europe.
ButnotinAmerica.Between
James's
dayandperhaps1960orso,U.S.
was dominated
ofthebehaviorof
bycomplicated
explanations
psychology
at about thattimeand a
hungryrats. Jameshimselfwas rediscovered
a descriptive
manifesto
forhissortofpsychology,
attuned
to the
enterprise
ofintentional
mentallife,wasissuedin 1970byCharlesTaylor.
particulars
as a whole,I wouldrecommend
WhatTaylorrequiredof psychology
for
whowishto reducetheriskofnuclear
thosewithpsychological
inclinations
war.For "thewhiterat,"read"rational(or irrational)
actorsin crises":
Whatis reallyneededis to throwopenthedoors,andexamine
therealworld,take
accountnotonlyofthemoresurprising
ofthewhiterat,butexamine
performances
also whatmen[andwomen]can do. Whatis neededis a reflection
on behavior
in
itsownterms
anda classification
ofitsdifferent
a studyofitsstructure,
varieties,
whichwillrevealthefullrangeandlimits
offlexibility
andintelligence.
We needto
seewhathastobeexplained
togetanideaofwhatitwouldmeantoexplain
behavior.
(Taylor,1970,p. 78)
AtthecoreofTaylor'smessagethenwasthattheavailablepsychology
told
himlittleaboutthemeaning
ofbehavior
to thepersonexperiencing
it.Mine
is analogous:we knowall too littleaboutwhatit meansto participate
in
a nuclearcrisis.Untilwe knowmoreaboutthemeaning
of thatsortof exwe willremainrelevantly
of thenatureof theevolving
perience,
ignorant
on whichso muchmaydependin a crisis.
belief-system,
of evolving
Somethingmustbe said about whythe psychology
phenomenal
experience
maybe usefulto policymakers.In a word,it is
becauseitis transparent.
Itsgoalis notto explainbehavior,
intheconventionalsense,byimposing
an explanatory
scheme
tounderuponit.Itis rather
extent
thereasons
actorsgivefortheir
ownactions
stand,towhatever
possible,
ofitsGermanic
(Polanyi,1959).Phenomenology
(stripped
jargon)thushas
twoessential
features:
on description
ofexperience
and (2)
(1) an emphasis
an emphasis
on intentionality,
ortheextent
to whichbehavior
is a function
of beliefand purpose(Wohlheim,
1984;Taylor,1984).
stanceitoughtthusto be possible
Byadoptingsomesuchtransparent
to do twothings:(1) to givea detailedaccountof theevolution
of beliefs
aboutriskofnuclear
warincrisesand(2) inso doingcometo discover
which
aspectsof eventsin theobjectiveworldmeanto policymakersthatriskof
nuclearwarhasrisen,diminished,
orremained
Since
essentially
unchanged.
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
655
thegoalofcrisismanagement,
viewedpsychologically,
is to managebeliefs
to transform
it
aboutriskof nuclearwar,we maythusbe able eventually
We
that
have
intoa moreempirically
endeavor.
may, is,ultimately
grounded
someconsiderable
ideaofwhatwearetalking
about,psychologically
speakcrises.We mightdiscoverwhichevents,
ing,whenwe speakof managing
actionsand policiesareto be avoided-those which,whentheyoccurin a
thatriskofnuclearwaris fearfully
crisis,meantotheparticipants
high.For
itis on thebasisofsuchbeliefsthatanydecisiontogo to nuclearwarwould
depend.
I willconcludewitha briefexercise,
whichI hopewillillustrate
bycontrastwhatneedsto be done.Itspurposeis to stimulate
yourimaginations
work
inthedirection
ofappreciating
theneedforempirical
phenomenological
to helpavoidnuclearwarin crises.The following
algorithm
psychological
is adoptedmainlyfromT. C. Schelling
(1960),butalso fromseveralothers
a step-wise
state(Kahanet al., 1983;Laing,1967,Chap. 4). It represents
of thepsychological
of a superpower
mentof theevolution
preconditions
in nuclearwar.Aftereachpoint,or subpoint,
I askyou
crisis,culminating
to askyourself:
wouldI believethis?To whatwould
"Why,exactly,
simply
I likelybe attending?
Whatprecisefearsand worrieswoulddrivemethis
far?Whatwoulditmeantome,attheonsetofthebelief,toholdthatbelief
in a nuclearcrisis?"
as a decision-maker
Hereisthecanonicalpsychological
sequenceleadingtoinadvertent/accidentalnuclearwar:
1. Precrisis.I believethatboth the adversaryand I believethatmajor nuclearwar
is mutuallysuicidal,and is thusastronomically
improbable.I trusthis rationality.
2. The trade-off.I decide to raise the riskof nuclearwar, in pursuitof some vital
foreignpolicyobjective.I stilltrusttheadversary'srationality;thatis, I believe
he willrespondin such a way as to keep the riskof nuclearwar acceptablylow.
3. Psychologicalflashpoint. (a) Noticingmy operations,but misperceivingmy
intentions,the adversarypreparesforescalationto nuclearwar, or preemption.
(b) Noticinghis operationsand perceivingcorrectlyhis (incorrect)perceptionof
his rationality;I
myintentions,I also prepareto escalate or preempt.I mistrust
believethe adversarymay respondin such a way as to make the riskof nuclear
war unacceptablyhigh.
4. The Slide towardsituationalperversity.(a) I (advertently)readjustdownward
the likelihoodof my failingto anticipateand repel an offensiveaction by the
adversary.(b) I (inadvertently)
readjustupwardthelikelihoodthatI mayattack
due to misperception
or miscalculation.(c) The adversary,noticing
mistakenly,
theoperationalresultsof myshiftin belief,does likewise.(d) Thus beginsthespiral
of "Hawk's Errors"leadingto a beliefthatthe situationis so perverse,deciding
to go to nuclearwar in some fashionappears to be the best option.
5. The TippingPoint. I believetheadversarybelievesthatnuclearwar is inevitable
and so I go-I initiatea nuclearwar.
I suggestfrommypsychologist's
thatthetaskof crisis
perspective
at eachstageis to manipulate
beliefabouttheriskof nuclear
management
war, in oneselfand in an adversary,by means of militaryoperationsand
656
Blight
initiatives.
is thetaskofmanipulating
beliefs
Especiallycritical
diplomatic
inmoments
ofdeepestcrisis.Shouldwebe confident
aboutriskdownward
inourability
tomanagethenextsuchcrisisandavoida nuclearwar?I agree,
withLebow(andalsoGeorge),thatweshouldnot,butnotbecausedecisionwon'tfollowour predicted
makersare not rationalactorsand therefore
are empirical
answersto
in
canonical
outline
scheme.Whatis missing this
which
sum
to
like
the
thequestions
collective
something
posedabove,all of
suchbeliefs.We lacktotallya systematic
of experiencing
descripmeaning
oftheircontent,
andwe'vetherefore
no ideawhatsuch
tionoftheevolution
criticalbeliefsmightmean.
Whatconcrete
formsmightsomesuchresearch
actuallytake,which
incrises
hasas itsgoalthediscovery
oftheempirical
oftheevolution
content
ofbeliefsabouttheriskofnuclearwar?Sucha phenomenology
ofnuclear
crisesmust,it seemsto me,assumeat leastthesetwoforms:history
and
simulation.
intonuclearcrisisdecisionFirst,we needhistorical
inquiries
in thatclosestcall of all, theCubanmissilecrisis.But
making,especially
we willrequirestudieswhichare of a muchfinerpsychological
grainthan
wehavehadso far,andmuchlessdrivenandfettered
bya prioritheories
whether
theories
like"groupthink"
orstrategic
theories
ofdeterpsychological
rence.We need,in short,to directsuchhistorical-psychological
researches
towardthegoalofincreased
inthesedangerous
vicarious
crises.
participation
Second,as MortonDeutsch(1983,pp. 19-21)andPaul Bracken(1985,
we needto createand applya typeofsimulapp. 51-53)haveemphasized,
tionwhichis muchlesspat,tidy,and irrelevant
thanhas heretofore
been
usedpedagogically
bothwithin
and without
thegovernment.
to
According
an experienced
andsupervisor
ofsimulations
forthePenBracken,
designer
tagon, "...we need to developrealisticsimulationsthatintroducemembers
of thepoliticalhighcommandto theproblems
of intensecrisesand even
thebreakdown
ofdeterrence.
of
this
sort
existstoday"(1985,p. 52).
Nothing
Untilenormously
morerealistic
simulations
do exist,nuclearcrisisexin
ercisesremain
the
most
irrelevant
In ourhistories
sense.
and
only"games"
wetherefore
needmoreofwhatWilliamJamescalledRadical
simulations,
Fortheradicalempiricist,
to James,"thecrudity
of
Empiricism.
according
remains
an
eternal
element
thereof...
real
experience
[including] possibilities,
real indeterminations,
real beginnings,
real ends, real evil, real crises,
and escapes"(James,1977a,p. 135).
catastrophes
Neither
norsimulation
history
phenomenological
oughttobe considered
Neither
can
stand
alone
as
the
fora newlyrelepreeminent.
knowledge-base
vantdiscipline
of nuclearcrisismanagement.
Forwhilesimulations
can be
mademoreoperationally
of
representativepresentrealities,
theylackthe
psychological
realityof actualcrises,whennuclearwarmayreallyhave
becomea liveoption.
How MightPsychologyContributeto Reducingthe Risk of Nuclear War?
657
historical
underidiosyncratic
Conversely,
episodes,
occurring
contingenandbalancesofforces,
andevenunforgetcies,assumptions,
rivetting
though
tabletotheirparticipants,
mustalwayslacktheoperational
relevance
which
be builtintosimulations.
can, in theory,
andsimulation
mustbe regarded,
exthen,as complementary
History
ercisesforpsychologists
for
transform
to
crisis
management
searching ways
fromwishtoreality
andthustobegintoconstruct
a psychological
knowledgebase relevantto reducingthe risk of nuclearwar. I invitepolitical
of all persuasions
to join in theexploration
of theprospects
psychologists
forthisessentialenterprise.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Partsof earlierversionsof thisarticlewerepresented
to theFaculty
Seminar
of theProjecton Avoiding
F.
NuclearWar,John Kennedy
School
of Government,
HarvardUniversity,
to theFacultyColloquiumon Peace
andGlobalStudies,
NewYorkUniversity,
andata panel,"PeaceandSecurity
intheNuclearAge,"heldattheUniversity
ofMichigan,
Dearborn.Forhelpthemanuscript,
thanksareduetothreeveryhelpful
reviewers
ingtoimprove
retained
andalso to thefollowing
byPoliticalPsychology,
people:Graham
Allison,McGeorgeBundy,AlbertCarnesale,AlexanderGeorge,Charles
FenHampson,NedLebow,JohnMack,Howard
Glaser,MortonHalperin,
andespecially
toJanet
Raiffa,William
Ury,PaulWachtel,
Dorothy
Zinberg,
M. Lang and JosephS. Nye,Jr.
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